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1. Generality - If the accused attacks the jurisdiction of the court because of the
unique characteristic of his person (e.g. he is a foreigner, military, ambassador, President),
the applicable principle is generality. If the accused attacks the jurisdiction of the court due
to the unique characteristic of the place where the crime was committed (e.g. foreign
vessel, embassy or high sea), the applicable principle is territoriality.
It is submitted that a Vice-President even during his tenure could not invoke
immunity from criminal prosecution for plunder on the following reasons: (1) plunder are
not his official conducts as Vice-President; (2) the job of the Vice-President unlike the head
of the executive department does not demands undivided attention; (3) and the
implementation principal penalty of imprisonment for plunder is not inconsistent with the
constitutional provision on non-removal of impeachable officer except through
impeachment since he can function as Vice-President while serving sentence in
prison.However, accessory penalty of disqualification, which involved removal from office,
is not implementable since the enforcement thereof will offend the constitutional provision
on non-removal of impeachable officer.
b. Convention of the law of the sea - Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea,
the flag state of foreign merchant vessel passing through the territorial sea of another state
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has jurisdiction over crimes committed therein. However, a coastal state such as the
Philippines can exercise jurisdiction over any crime committed on board such ship in the
following cases: (1) if its consequences extend to the coastal State; (2) if it disturbs the
peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; (3) if the ship master or a
diplomatic or consular officer of the flag State requested assistance from the local
authorities; or (4) if it is for the suppression of traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances.
b. Regime of islands - Under the principle of territoriality, the court has also
jurisdiction over crime committed in Kalayaan Islands or Scarboruogh Shoal because the
Baseline Law (RA No. 9522) declares that the Philippines exercise sovereignty and
jurisdiction over it.
c. Bigamy - Under the principle of territoriality, the court has jurisdiction over
concubinage involving illicit relationship maintained in the Philippines; but it has no
jurisdiction over bigamy involving subsequent marriage contracted in Taiwan.
3. Extraterritoriality Under the flag state rule, the Philippines has jurisdiction over
hijacking of PAL airplane in an American territory since it its registered in the Philippines
but not over murder committed in vessel registered in Panama while on high seas although
it is owned by a Filipino. Under the protective principle, the court has jurisdiction over
forgery of Philippine money committed in Taiwan whether by a Filipino or an alien but not
over forgery of US dollars committed therein. Under the extraterritoriality rule, the court
has jurisdiction over plunder, direct bribery and falsification of document by a public
officer in a Philippines consular premises stationed in America but not corruption of public
officer and falsification of document committed by private individual as principal by
inducement. Under the universality principle, the court has jurisdiction over piracy
committed on high seas for being a universal crime but not over murder qualified by the
circumstance of taking advantage of the calamity brought about by piracy on high seas. The
12-mile territorial water of Taiwan or Sabah may be considered as high seas; hence, piracy
committed therein can be prosecuted in the Philippines (People vs. Lol-Lo and Saraw, G.R.
No. L-17958, February 27, 1922).
4. Prospectivity -If the court in trying an accused, who committed a crime prior to
the passage of the law, should give retroactive effect to the law provided that: (1) it is
favorable to the accused and (2) the accused is not a habitual delinquent (Article 22 of
RPC). If the law repeals a previous law or provision defining a crime, the applicable
principle is not Article 22 of RPC but nullum crimen poena sine lege. Since the intention of
the new law is to decriminalize an act punishable by the repealed law, the accused should
be acquitted or released if the already convicted, even though he is a habitual delinquent.
Reclusion perpetua, which has duration of 40 years under Article 27 of RPC and 30
years under Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592 if the convict has undergone
preventive imprisonment, is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, which has no duration.
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Amendatory law, which prescribes reclusion perpetua instead of life imprisonment, shall
be given a retroactive effect for being favorable to the accused (People vs. Morilla, GR No.
189833, February 5, 2014).
6. Repeal RA No. 10655 has repealed Article 351 of RPC on premature marriage
without reenactment. This is a total repeal in which the intention of the new law is to
decriminalize an act punishable of old law. Atotal repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction
to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal (Sindiong
and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000). RA 8353 expressly repealed Article 336 of RPC on rape but re-
enacted it redefining this crimeunder Article 266-A. This is a partial repealin which the
intention of the new law is not to decriminalize an act punishable of old law but to
introduce changes. The effect of the new law is amendatory. This partial repeal of Article
336 does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try and punish offender for rape
committed prior to RA No. 8353 (U.S. vs. Cana, 12 Phil. 241). RA No. 8353 shall be given
prospective effect since it is not favorable to the accused.
The accused shot with a firearm and killed by mistake a thief in the toilet, who
turned out to be his girlfriend. Invasion of property is considered as unlawful aggression
under Article 12 of the RPC because of the self-help doctrine under the Civil Code (People
vs. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, April 20, 1983). Even though there is no actual invasion
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8. Proximate cause Suicide is not a felony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC;
hence, a pregnant woman who attempted to commit suicide is not liable for abortion due to
the consequent death of the infant. Vexatious act (e.g. pouring gasoline) made as part of fun
making is not felony within the contemplation of Article 4. The accused is not liable for
homicide. However, such act is considered as culpable, and thus, he is liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide (People vs. Pugay, No 74324, November 17, 1988).
Vexatious act made out of hate (such as putting a robber snake inside the bag of the victim)
is unjust vexation, which is a felony within the contemplation of Article 4. The accused is
liable for homicide if the victim died due to heart attack caused by seeing a snake in his bag.
a. Tetanus - There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing
and the date when victim was rushed to hospital, exhibiting symptoms of tetanus infection.
Since infection is severe, he died the next day. The incubation period of severe tetanus
infection is less than 14 days. Hence, he could not have been infected at the time of the
stabbing since that incident occurred 22 days before the symptoms manifested. The infection
was an efficient intervening cause breaking the connection between the physical injuries
and death. Hence, the crime committed is physical injuries (Villacorta vs. People, G.R. No.
186412, September 7, 2011). If the victim was infected by tetanus at the time of stabbing,
and the infection is the proximate cause of death, the crime committed is homicide (People
vs. Cornel, G.R. No. L-204, May 16, 1947).
If the victim accidentally killed is the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle, the crime committed is qualified carnapping or carnapping in the
aggravated form under Section 3 of RA No. 10883. If the victim accidentally killed is not the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle, the crimes committed are simple
carnapping and homicide. The concept of carnapping is the same as that of theft and
robbery (People vs. Sia, G.R. No. 137457, Nov. 21, 2001). Although not punishable under
RPC, it can be treated as a felony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC (See: Dimat vs.
People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012). Hence, the accused is liable for homicide, which
is the direct and natural consequence of simple carnapping.
Kidnapping for ransom consummates at the precise moment when the victim was
abducted. Receiving ransom payment is not an element of this crime. What is important is
that the victim was kidnapped for purpose of ransom. Since the crime is already
consummated, there is no basis to say that it is impossible to commit this crime (People vs.
Tan, G.R. No. 95322, March 1, 1993). Moreover, kidnapping is a crime against liberty and
not against person or property.
Firing a gun at the unoccupied bedroom with intention to kill a victim constitutes
impossible crime because it is factually impossible to kill a victim, who was not in the
bedroom (Intod vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992). But throwing
grenade at the unoccupied bedroom, where the victim is supposed to be sleeping,
constitutes arson if the bedroom was burned as a consequence.
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a. Gender crime - Gender is an element of all crimes against chastity except acts of
lasciviousness. In seduction and consented acts of lasciviousness, and abduction, the
offender must be a man, while the victim must be a woman. The offender in adultery must
be a married woman, while in concubinage a married man. If the element of gender is not
present in a crime against chastity, it is impossible to commit this crime (e.g. it is
impossible to commit abduction against a person, who is gay). Despite the impossibility of
its commission, the accused is not liable for impossible crime. To be held liable for
impossible crime, the act which is impossible to commit must constitutes crime against
person or property.However, abduction is a crime against chastity. But the accused may be
held liable for illegal detention.
A person, who has sexual intercourse with a woman not knowing that she was
already dead,is liable for impossible crime since rape is now a crime against person.
However, if he is aware that the woman is already dead, he is not liable for impossible
crime since criminal intent or propensity to rape, which is the basis of penalizing
impossible crime, is wanting.
If the gender element in rape through sexual intercourse is not present, the offender
is not liable for impossible crime. Although it is impossible to commit rape through sexual
intercourse where the victim is a gay, such acts constitute acts of lasciviousness.
b. Unfunded check - If the check is unfunded, stealing the checkand presenting it for
payment with the bank constitute impossible crime. It is factually impossible to accomplish
the crime of qualified theft since the check is unfunded(Jacinto vs. People, G.R. No. 162540,
July 13, 2009). If the check is funded, stealing the check and presenting it for payment with
the bank is not impossible crime. Even if the accused failed to encash the same due to
external cause such as apprehension by police or stop payment, he will be held liable for
consummated theft. In theft, taking property with intent to gain consummates the crime.
Actual gain is not an element thereof. Thus, failure to gain will not prevent the
consummation of the crime (See: People vs. Seranilla, G.R. No. L-54090, May 9, 1988);
10. Indeterminate offense - Climbing on top of the naked victim, touching her
genitalia and mashing her breastsaresusceptible of double interpretation (People v.
Lamahang). His intention is either to rape or seduce her. Hence, the accused cannot be held
liable for attempted rape because intent to have sex is not clear. He is only liable for acts of
lasciviousness (Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014, Bersamin).
Inflicting non-mortal wound upon the victim by shooting him constitutes physical
injuries if the accused did not further shoot him to inflict mortal wounds. The crime is not
attempted homicide because failure to shoot him further shows lack of intent to kill.
Moreover, spontaneous desistance from further shooting to victim to inflict mortal wounds
is a defense in attempted homicide (Pentecostes, Jr. vs. People, GR No. 167766, April 7,
2010). But inflicting mortal wound upon the victim constitutes frustrated homicide (De
Guzman vs. People, G.R. No. 178512, November 26, 2014, Bersamin) even if the accused
desisted from further shooting him. The fact that the wounds are mortal indicates intent to
kill. Moreover, spontaneous desistance from further shooting is not a defense in frustrated
homicide (People vs. Abella, G.R. No. 198400, October 07, 2013).
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12. Battered woman syndrome -The essence of this defense of Battered Woman
Syndrome as a defense is that battered woman, who suffers from physical and
psychological or emotional distress, is acting under an irresistible impulse to defend herself
although at the time of commission of the crime the battererhad not yet committed
unlawful aggression. That is why Battered Woman Syndrome is a defense notwithstanding
the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense such as
unlawful aggression (Section 26 of RA No. 9262). This Syndrome refers to a scientifically
defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in
battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse (Section 3).
The three phases of the Battered Woman Syndrome are: (1) the tension-building
phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving or non-violent phase
(People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004). The basis of the irresistible impulse
to make a defense against the batterer is the womans experiencing two battering episodes.
The elements of Battered Woman Syndrome as a defense are as follows: (1) the
woman is subjected to cumulative abuse by the victim, with whom she has marital, sexual
or dating relationship; and (2) the cumulative abuse or battery is the act of inflicting
physical harm resulting to physical and psychological or emotional distress. Since the
abuse must be cumulative, there must be at least two episodes involving the infliction of
physical harm. If the first episode is infliction of physical harm and the second episode is
verbal abuse, the accused cannot avail Battered Woman Syndrome as a defense.
13. Imbecility and minority Mental retardation includes (a) idiot, whose mental
age is two-year old; (b) imbecile, whose mental age is seven-year old; (c) moron or
feebleminded, whose mental age is twelve-year old and (d) borderline intelligence (People
vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011 Bersamin; People vs. Bayrante, G.R. No.
188978, June 13, 2012).
In rape, there is a difference between actual age and mental age. In statutory rape,
the actual age of the victim must be under 12 years old. In rape against a person deprived
of reason, the mental age of the victim is 2 years old (idiot), 7 years old (imbecile), 12 years
old (feebleminded) or above 12 years old but suffering from borderline intelligence
(People vs. Butiong, supra; People vs. Bayrante, supra).
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Under Section 5 (b) of RA No 7610, when the child subjected to sexual abuse is
under 12 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape and acts of
lasciviousness under RPC. For purpose of Section 5 (b), there is no difference between
actual age and mental age. Hence, the victim whose actual age is 12 years old but her
mental age is 9 years old, is considered as a victim under 12 year of age within the
contemplation of Section 5 (b) (People vs. Pusing, G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016),
14. Insanity - The presumption, under Article 800 of the Civil Code, is that every
human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the
burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence (People vs. Tibon, G.R. No. 188320,
June 29, 2010). There are two tests (People vs. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29,
1950) to determine whether the mental condition of the accused is exempting or
mitigating:
a. Test of cognition Under the test of cognition, the mental condition of the
accused is an exempting circumstance of insanity if there was a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the criminal act (People vs. Bulagao, G.R. No. 184757, October
05, 2011); or mitigating circumstance of mental illness if there was only a partial
deprivation of intelligence (People vs. Puno, G.R. No. L- 33211, June 29, 1981). After
satisfying his lust, accused threatened the victim. This implies that accused knew what he
was doing, that it was wrong, and wanted to keep it a secret. It also indicated that the crime
was committed during one of his lucid intervals. Accused is not exempt from liability for
failure to pass the cognition test (People vs. Alipio, G.R. No. 185285, October 5. 2009).
b. Test of volition Under the test of volition, the mental condition of the accused
is a mitigating circumstance of mental illness if there is complete or partial deprivation of
freedom. In sum, if a sex maniac or homicidal maniac had merely passed the volition test
but not the cognition test, he will only be given the benefit of mitigating circumstance of
illness. Diminution of freedom is enough to mitigate the liability of the offender suffering
from illness (See: People vs. Rafanan, Jr. November 21, 1991, G.R. No. 54135, November
21, 1991). Thus, kleptomania is a mitigating circumstance of mental illness.
Irresistible homicidal impulse in People vs. Bonoan G.R. No. 45130, February 17,
1937, which is an exempting circumstance is not anymore controlling. Irresistible
homicidal impulse, which is based on the volition test, is only a mitigating circumstance. To
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exempt a person from criminal liability due to insanity, the controlling rule is cognition
testand not the volition test(People vs. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004). In
several Supreme Court cases, the pleas of insanity of accused who are suffering from
schizophrenia or psychosis were rejected because of failure to pass the cognition test.
(People vs. Medina, G.R. No. 113691, February 6, 1998; People vs. Pascual, G.R. No. 95029,
March 24, 1993).
15. Child in conflict with the law -The rights and privileges of a child in conflict
with the law are as follows:
2. Ifthe accused is 15 years of age or below but above 12 years, shallbe considered
as a neglected child. Neglected child shall be mandatorily placed in a youth care facility or
Bahay Pag-asa in the following instances: (a) If the child commits serious crimes such as
parricide, murder, infanticide, rape, kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide
or rape, robbery with homicide or rape, destructive arson, or carnapping where the driver
or occupant is killed or raped or offenses involving dangerous drugs punishable by more
than 12 years of imprisonment; and (b) In case of repetition of offenses and the child was
previously subjected to a intervention program and his best interest requires involuntarily
commitment.
3. If the child is found guilty, the court shall place him under suspended sentence,
without need of application instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction (Section 38 of
RA 9344). The law makes no distinction as to the nature of offense by the child. The Senate
debate discloses that the suspension is applicable to heinous crime (People vs. Jacinto, G.R.
No. 182239, March 16, 2011; People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015).
An accused, who is under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime,
is a child in conflict with the law. He will not be deprived of privileges under the law even
though he reaches age of majority at time of rendition of judgment. Exception: While
Section 38 of RA 9344 provides suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child
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is already 18 years of age at the time of conviction. However, Section 40 limits the
suspension of sentence until the child reaches the age of 21 (People vs. Gambao, GR No.
172707, October 01, 2013; People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015; Hubilla
vs. People, G.R. No. 176102, November 26, 2014, Bersamin).
3. If the accused is an adult, application for probation must be filed within the period
of perfecting an appeal (Section 4 of PD No. 968 or Probation Law). However, the accused is
a child in conflict with the law, application for probation may be filed at any time (Section
42 of RA No. 9344). In sum, it can be filed even beyond the period of perfecting an appeal or
even during the pendency of an appeal.
Under Section 9 of PD 968, one, who is sentenced to suffer a penalty (or maximum
indeterminate penalty) of more than 6 years, is not qualified to apply for probation.
However, under Section 70 of RA No. 9165, a first time minor offender can apply for
probation for the crime of possession or use of dangerous drug even if the penalty is higher
than 6 years of imprisonment. But Section 70 of RA 9165 is not applicable sale of
dangerous drugs. Section 24 of RA No. 9165 disqualifies drug traffickers and pushers for
applying for probations although the accused is a minor. The law considers the users and
possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators
(Padua vs. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008).
4. The child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the
court, be made to serve his sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in
an agricultural camp and other training facilities in accordance with Section 51 of RA No.
9344 (People vs. Arpon, G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011; People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No.
199270, October 21, 2015; Hubilla vs. People, G.R. No. 176102, November 26, 2014,
Bersamin).
the deceased spouse, while the second maintains that relationship continues. The principle
of pro reo calls for the adoption of the continuing affinity view because it is more favorable
to the accused (Intestate estate of Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11,
2010). The term spouses in Article 332 embraces common-law spouses. The basis of this
ruling is the rule on co-ownership over properties by common-law spouses (People vs.
Constantino, No. 01897-CR, September 6, 1963, 60 O.G. 3603).
18. Voluntary confession - A plea of guilty made after the prosecution had begun
presenting its evidence cannot be considered voluntary since it was made only after the
accused realized that the evidence already presented by the prosecution is enough to cause
his conviction (People vs. Montinola, G.R. No. 131856-57, July 9, 2001).
21. Band - In robbery, band is a special aggravating circumstance under Article 295
of RPC. In robbery with homicide or rape, band is an ordinary aggravating circumstance
under Article 14.
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Conspirators are all liable for robbery although not all profited and gained from the
robbery. When a conspirator committed homicide by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery, his co-conspirators are liable for special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
unless they endeavored to prevent the killing (People vs. Ebet, GR No. 181635, November
15, 2010; People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Diu, GR No. 201449,
April 03, 2013) or they cannot prevent the killing since they are not aware thereof (People
vs. Corbes, G.R. No. 113470, March 26, 1997). This rule is applicable to special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape (People vs. Anticamaray, GR No. 178771, June 08, 2011) or
robbery with rape (People v. Suyu, G.R. No. 170191, August 16, 2006; People v.
Canturia, G.R. No. 108490 June 22, 1995).
c. Offense under special law - B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the
supplementary application of the provisions RPC including the rule on conspiracy. Hence,
such rule may be applied supplementarily. Thus, a non-issuer of bum check can be held
liable for violation of BP Blg. 22 on the basis of conspiracy. (Ladonga vs. People, G.R. No.
141066, February 17, 2005). The principle of conspiracy may be applied to RA No. 9262.
Thus, a person (such as mother-in-law), who has no marital, sexual or dating relationship
with the victim, can be held liable for violence against woman on the basis of conspiracy
(Go-Tan vs. Go, G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008)
If there is conspiracy, the act of the public officer in violating RA No. 3019 is
imputable to the private individual although there are not similarly situated in relation to
the object of the crime. Moreover, Section 9 provides penalty for public officer or private
person for crime under Section 3. Hence, a private individual can be prosecuted for
violation of RA No. 3019 (Go vs. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April
13, 2007). Even if the public officer, with whom the private individual allegedly conspired,
died, the latter can still be prosecuted for violation of RA No. 3019. Death extinguishes the
criminal liability but not the crime. Hence, if there is proof of the crime and conspiracy
between the dead public officer and private individual, the latter can still be convicted of
violation of RA No. 3019 (People vs. Go, GR NO. 168539, March 25, 2014). However, if the
public officer with whom the private individual allegedly conspired is acquitted, the latter
should also be acquitted (Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998).
24. Accomplice - Lending weapon such a gun to a killer for purpose of killing a
specific person such as Pedro is an act of accomplice. But if the killer used the weapon in
killing a different person such as Juan, the lender is not liable as an accomplice. To be held
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liable as an accomplice, it is important that that he knows and concurs in the criminal
design of the principal (community of design) and participates before or during the
commission of the crime by supplying moral or material aid in an efficacious way. In this
case, the lender concurred in the killing of Pedro but not Juan. Hence, he is not liable as an
accomplice. If the killer used another weapon such as knife instead of the gun borrowed in
killing Pedro, the lender is not liable as an accomplice. Although the lender concurred in the
killing of Pedro, he did not supply the killer material or moral aid in an efficacious way
since the weapon used is not the one borrowed from him.
25. Fencing In fencing, the property, which the accused possesses with intent to
gain, must be derived from the proceeds of theft or robbery (Ong vs. People, GR No.
190475, April 10, 2013). The concept of carnapping is the same as that of theft or robbery
(People vs. Sia, G.R. No. 137457, November 21, 2001). Thus, carnapping can be considered
as within the contemplation of the word theft or robbery in PD No. 1612 (Dimat vs.
People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012). If the property is derived from the proceeds of
malversation or estafa, fencing is not committed. But the accused can be held liable as an
accessory if he profited or assisted other to profit from this misappropriated property.
Actual knowledge that the property is stolen is not required. Fencing is committed is
the accused should have known that the property is stolen taken into consideration the
attending circumstances such as (1) the price of the property is so cheap; (2) expensive
jewelry is being offered for sale at midnight in a street; (3) accused knew that the car he
bought was not properly documented (Dimat vs. People, supra); or (4) new tires are being
peddled in the streets by an unknown seller (Ong vs. People, supra). Furthermore, mere
possession of stolen property shall be prima facie evidence of fencing (Section 6 of PD No.
1612).
The criminal actor, who threwthe body of murdered victim into the river to destroy
the corpus delicti, is liable for murder qualified by the circumstance of employment of
means to afford impunity.The one who assisted in in throwing the body is liable as an
accessory to murder for destroying the body of the crime to prevent its discovery (People
vs. Devaras, G.R. Nos. 100938-39, December 15, 1993)or a principal in the crime of
obstruction of justice for destroying it to impair its availability as evidence in a criminal
proceeding.
The accused cannot be prosecuted both as an accessory for murder and as principal
for obstruction of justice. The penalty prescribed for obstruction of justice under PD No.
1829 is prision correccional in its maximum period unless other law prescribed a higher
penalty. Thus, the offender may be prosecuted for murder as accessory with the penalty of
prision mayor or for obstruction of justice as principal also with the penalty of prision
mayor, since this penalty is higher than that prescribed under PD No. 1829. The intention
of the law in prescribing a fixed penalty or that provided by other law such as RPC,
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whichever is higher, is not to prosecute the offender for obstruction of justice and for other
crime arising from the same act such as destroying the body of the crime.
After the discovery of illegal possession of lumber, the accused unlawfully took the
truckused to commit the crime from the authorities. He is not liable as an accessory since
he did not conceal the instrument of the crime for the purpose of preventing the discovery
thereof. Crime was already discovered when the concealment was made. However, he is
liable for obstruction of justice for concealing the truck to impair its availability as evidence
in the criminal proceeding for illegal possession of lumber (Padiernos vs. People, G.R. No.
181111, August 17, 2015).
Light felony is punishable except when the accused is merely an accessory (Article
16 of RPC) or when it is at the attempted or frustrated stage unless it is a crime against
property or person (Article 7). However, obstruction of justice can be committed even
though the crime under investigation is a light felony.
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There is no credit if the accused is recidivist; has been convicted previously twice or
more times of any crime; or has failed to surrender voluntarily before a court of law upon
being summoned for the execution of his sentence (Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No.
10592).
If the offender is a child, the applicable rule for crediting the period of commitment
and detention is not Article 29 of RPC but Section 41, RA 9344, which provides that the full
time spent in actual commitment and detention of juvenile delinquent shall be credited in
the services of his sentence.
29. Special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) If detention prisoner or convicted
prisoner escapes during the calamity, and subsequently surrenders within 48 hours from
the time the President announces the passing away of such calamity, he is entitled to 1/5
special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) under Article 98 of RPC as amended by RA No.
10592; if the convicted prisoner did not surrender within the period, he is liable for evasion
of sentence under Article 158 of RPC punishable by penalty equivalent to one-fifth of the
time still remaining to be served under the original sentence, which in no case shall exceed
six months; if the detention prisoner did not surrender within the period, he is not liable for
evasion of sentence. Only convicted prisoner can commit evasion of service of sentence
because a detention prisoner is not serving sentence, which he can evade.
In case of the prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding
the existence of a calamity, he is entitled to 2/5 STAL (Article 98 of RPC as amended by RA
No. 10592). A prisoner who did not escape despite of the calamity manifests a higher
degree of loyalty to the penal system than those who evaded their sentence but thereafter
gives themselves up upon the passing away of the calamity. Hence, prisoners, who did not
escape, are entitled to a higher special time allowance.
However, prisoner is not entitled to STAL if he has committed other offense or any
act in violation of the law.
30. Special complex crime Raping the victim or inserting instrument in her anal
orifice after treacherously inflicting mortal wounds is not a special complex crime of rape
with homicide because the original design of the victim is kill and not to rape the victim.
The crime committed is murder qualified by treachery and rape shall be regarded either as
ignominy or cruelty (People vs. Laspardas, G.R. No. L-46146, Oct. 23, 1979) or sexual assault
shall be treated as cruelty (People vs. Bernabe, G.R. No. 185726, October 16, 2009).
a. Special rule for kidnapping with homicide - Where the person kidnapped is
killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought
or was merely an afterthought, the accused is liable for a special complex crime of
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kidnapping with homicide (People vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 116239, November 29, 2000;
People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 118570, October 12, 1998; People vs. Larranaga, 138874-75,
February 3, 2004; People vs. Montanir, GR No. 187534, April 04, 2011; People vs. Dionaldo,
G.R. No. 207949, July 23, 2014). However, if the derivation of liberty is just incidental to the
transportation of the victim to the place where he will be executed, the crime is murder.
Kidnapping with homicide is not committed because of lack of intent to deprive liberty
(People vs. Estacio Jr., G.R. No. 171655, July 22, 2009).
The phrase by reason of the rape obviously conveys the notion that the killing
is due to the rape, which is the crime the offender originally designed to commit. The victim
of the rape is also the victim of the killing. In contrast, the phrase on the occasion of the
rape as shown by Senate deliberations refers to a killing that occurs
immediately before or after,or during the commission itself of the rape, where the victim of
the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim (People vs. Villaflores, G.R.
No. 184926, April 11, 2012, Bersamin; People vs. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011).
Ordinarily, homicide means killing another person. In sum, the person responsible
for the death of the victim must be the offender. But in the case of People vs. Arpa, G.R. No.
L-26789, April 25, 1969, the victim himself, who jumped from boat, is responsible for his
own death, and yet, the SC convicted the accused of robbery with homicide. In other words,
death caused by the victim himself is considered as homicide, which is a component of
robbery with homicide. Hence, suicide or death caused by the victim herself can be
considered as homicide as a component of special complex crime of rape with homicide.
is liable for robbery with homicide (People vs. Pelagio, G.R. No. L-16177, May 24, 1967). If
after the taking of the roasters without violence or intimidation, the thief killed responding
police officer, he is liable for theft and direct assault with homicide (People vs. Jaranilla,
G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974). If after the snatching of the complainants bag
without violence or intimidation, a co-robber crashed the getaway motorcycle and died, the
accused is only liable for theft (People vs. Concepcion, G.R. No. 200922, July 18, 2012).
g. Robbery by using force upon thing - Breaking the window of a house and taking
property inside without entering constitutes theft. Breaking the window is not a
circumstance that will qualify the taking into robbery by using force upon thins since this
crime requires that the breaking of window is a means to enter the building (People vs.
Adorno, CA 40 O.G. 567; People vs. Jaranilla. G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974).
Breaking the window to commit theft is an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
Using picklock to open a locked cabinet and taking property therein is not robbery
by using force upon thing. To constitute robbery by using force upon thing, the picklock
must be used to open the building and not merely a lockedfurniture (US vs. Macamay, G.R.
No. 11952, September 25, 1917). Entrusted key is not a false key in robbery by using force
upon thing.
aggravating circumstance of disregard of dwelling (People vs. Tejero, G.R. No. 128892 June
21, 1999; People vs. Evangelio, G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011). When the elements of
both robbery with homicide and robbery by using force upon thing (unlawful entry) are
present, the former shall absorb the latter. In sum, robbery by using force upon thing
committed on occasion of robbery by means of violence or intimidation shall be integrated
into the special complex crime of robbery with homicide (People vs. De Leon, GR No.
179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 05, 2016). But
aggravating circumstances of disregard of dwelling and unlawful entry shall be both
appreciated (People vs. Lamosa, G.R. No. 74291-93, May 23, 1989).
31. Compound crime - The single act of rolling the hand grenade on the floor of the
gymnasium which resulted in the death of victims constituted a compound crime of
multiple murders (People vs. Mores, GR No. 189846, June 26, 2013). Wherethe use of
grenade render the victim defenseless, use of explosives shall be considered as a
qualifying circumstance because this is the principal mode of attack. Thus, treachery will be
relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance (People vs. Comadre, et al., G.R. No.
153559, June 8, 2004). The single act of running over the victims with a van constitutes
compound crime of multiple murders (People vs. Punzalan, Jr., G.R. No. 199892, December
10, 2012).
a. Single act treated as several acts - Single act of pressing the trigger of
Thompson or armalite is treated as several acts as many as there are bullets fired from gun.
Because of special mechanism of Thompson, the single act of pressing its trigger will cause
the continuous firing of bullets. Thus, accused is liable as many homicides as there are
victims (People vs. Desierto, (C.A.) 45 O.G. 4542; People vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 131116,
August, 27, 1999; People vs. Tabaco, G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19, 1997; People v.
Vargas, Jr., G.R. No. 86728, April 6, 1990; People vs. Bermas, G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94312 July
5, 1999).
b. Variance rule - The body of the information charged the accused of compound
crime with murder and attempted murder since two victims were hit by a single shot. The
evidence shows that murder and attempted murder are separate crimes since the two
victims were hit by several shot. Under the variance rule, if the crime alleged in the
information varies with the crime proven with evidence, the accused shall be convicted of
the crime alleged or proven whichever the lesser. Thus, accused shall be convicted of
complex crime, which is lesser compared to two crimes (People vs. Bernardo, GR No.
198789, June 03, 2013).
c. Several acts - Several acts in killing several victims do not constitute a compound
crime. Article 48 requires a single act constituting two or more crimes (People vs. Toling,
G.R. No. L-27097, January 17, 1975). Exceptions: Several acts in killing several victims
under a single criminal impulse (People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30, 1955) or under
single criminal purpose (People vs. Abella, G.R. No. L-32205 August 31, 1979) shall be
considered as a single act. Hence, it is a compound crime.
The single criminal impulse rule under the Lawas doctrine is more of an exception
than the general rule (People vs. Remollino, G.R. No. L-14008, September 30, 1960). Article
48 on compound crime speaks of single act, but not single criminal impulse (People vs.
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Pineda, G.R. No. L-26222, July 21, 1967). In Lawas case, the SC was merely forced to apply
Article 48 because of the impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons killed by each
accused (People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500. September 11, 2012). Thus, the Lawas
doctrine should not be applied if there is conspiracy since the number of victims actually
killed by each conspirator is not anymore material if there is conspiracy (People vs.
Elarcosa, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010).
The single criminal purpose rule under the Abella case was adopted in
consideration of the plight of the prisoners; hence, it is only applicable if killings were
commit by prisoners against their fellow prisoners (People vs. Pincalin, G.R. No. L-38755,
January 22, 1981; People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012
32. Complex crime proper - Stabbing after the rape is a separate crime of
frustrated homicide. This is not a complex crime proper since the latter is not necessary to
commit the former (People vs. Isla, G.R. No. 199875, November 21, 2012).
a. Abduction and rape - If the main objective of the accused is to rape the victim,
the crime committed is rape. Forcible abduction (People vs. Mejoraday, G.R. No. 102705,
July 30, 1993; People vs. Almanzor, G.R. No. 124916, July 11, 2002) or illegal detention
(People vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. 148991, January 21, 2004), which is incidental to the
commission of rape, is absorbed. The doctrine of absorption rather than Article 48 of RPC is
applicable since forcible abduction or illegal detention is an indispensable means to
commit rape.
If the accused abducted the victim without clear showing of lewd design, the crime
committed is kidnapping since it will appear that the intention of the accused is to deprive
victim of his liberty. If as a consequence of illegal detention, the victim was rape, the crime
committed is a special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. This is the crime committed
regardless of the number of rapes. Multiple rapes will be considered as a component of this
special complex crime (People vs. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011; People vs.
Anticamaray, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011). If as a consequence of illegal detention, the
victim was rape and then killed, the crime committed is a special complex crime of
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kidnapping with homicide. Rape will be considered as a component of this special complex
crime (People vs. Larranaga, 138874-75, February 3, 2004, En Banc).
The difference between rape through forcible abduction and kidnapping with rape
lies on the criminal intention of the accused at the precise moment of abduction. If the
abduction is committed with lewd design, the crime committed is rape through forcible
abduction. On the other hand, if the abduction is committed without lewd design, the crime
committed is kidnapping with rape (People vs. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417, July 27,
2011). Even if the victim was detained for one week and in the course thereof, she was
rape, the crime committed is rape through forcible abduction if the abduction is committed
with lewd design (People vs. Amaro, G.R. No. 199100, July 18, 2014).
If the accused was molesting the victim immediately upon abduction, that is proof
that abduction is committed with lewd design (People vs. Jose, supra). After eating the food
given by accused, the victim became dizzy and thereafter, she passed out. When she
regained consciousness, she notices that she and accused are naked inside a room. She was
raped and detained for 6 days. The crime committed is rape through forcible abduction
(People vs. Amaro, G.R. No. 199100, July 18, 2014).
Membership in CPP-NPA alone will not establish political motivation behind the
killing for purpose of convicting the killers for rebellion (People vs. Lovedioro, G.R. No.
112235, November 29, 1995; People vs. Solongan, G.R. No. 137182, April 24, 2003). But
membership in a liquidation squad and killing a government officer is sufficient to establish
political motivation (People v. Dasig,G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993).
RA No. 6968 eliminated the phrases "engaging in war against the forces of the
government", "committing serious violence" and destroying property in Article 135 of
RPC. These modes of committing rebellion deleted by RA No. 6968 were used by the SC in
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justifying the doctrine of absorption. The amendment of Article 135 does not affect the
accepted concept of rebellion and these overt acts of violence are deemed subsumed in
the provision on public and armed uprising, which is an element of rebellion in Article 134
(Regalado). Hence, the doctrine of absorption is still good. The incidents in Lovedioro case,
and Solongan case happened after RA No. 6968, and yet, the SC is still applying the doctrine
of absorption.
34. Delito continuado - In order that continuous crime may exist, there should be:
(1) plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; (2) unity of criminal
intent and purpose and (3) unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated (Santiago vs.
Garchitorena , GR NO. 109266, December 2, 1993). The following are delito continuado:
(1) several acts of taking roasters owned by different owner under a single criminal
impulse to take them all in violation of a single penal provision, and that is Article 308 of
RPC (Note: This is also called single larceny rule; People vs. Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547,
February 22, 1974); and (2)several acts of taking away by force the valuables of the
employees working in Energex gasoline station committed under a single criminal intent to
commit robbery in that place in violation of a single penal provision, and that is Article 294
of RPC (People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009).
Accused inserted his penis thrice into the private part of victim for purpose of
changing position. The three penetrations motivated by a single criminal intent to satisfy
his lust in violation of single penal provision (Article 266-A of RPC) constitute a continued
crime of rape (People vs. Aaron, G.R. Nos. 136300-02, September 24, 2002). Accused
inserted his penis thrice into the private part of victim for purpose of resting for five
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minutes. He satisfied his lust every time he would withdraw his penis to rest. Since the
three penetrations were motivated by separate three criminal impulse to satisfy his lust,
three separate crimes of rape are committed (People vs. Lucena, GR No. 190632, February
26, 2014).
35. Incorrect penalty The court should prescribe the correct penalties in complex
crimes in strict observance of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. In estafa through
falsification of commercial documents, the court should impose the penalty for the graver
offense in the maximum period. Otherwise, the penalty prescribed is invalid, and will not
attain finality (De Castro vs. People, G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015, Bersamin).
In Fransdilla vs. People, GR No. 197562, April 20, 2015, Bersamin, the trial judge
fixed the indeterminate sentence at "imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum". This is a patent elementary error. Considering that the
clear objective of the ISLAW is to have the convict serve the minimum penalty before
becoming eligible for release on parole, both the minimum and the maximum penalties
must be definite, not ranging. This objective cannot be achieved otherwise, for determining
when the convict would be eligible for release on parole would be nearly impossible if the
minimum and the maximum were as indefinite as the RTC fixed the indeterminate sentence.
Indeed, that the sentence is an indeterminate one relates only to the fact that such
imposition would leave the period between the minimum and the maximum
penalties indeterminate "in the sense that he may, under the conditions set out in said Act,
be released from serving said period in whole or in part."
In People vs. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012, Bersamin - The trial
court sentenced the accused to suffer reclusion perpetua to death for murder. This is
erroneous. Reclusion perpetua and death should not be imposed as a compound, alternative
or successive penalty for a single felony. In short, the imposition of one precluded the
imposition of the other.
Article 64 of RPC provides the rules on application of divisible penalty. Under this
provision, the penalty prescribed for a felony shall be applied in its proper imposable
period based on the presence of modifying circumstances.
Under Article 349 of RPC, the penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. In the absence of
modifying circumstances, prision mayor pursuant to Article 64 shall be applied in its
medium period, which ranges from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying the Islaw, the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of prision correccional,
the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the offense, which is from 6 months and 1
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day to 6 years. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence of 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum is proper
(Lasanas vs. People, G.R. No. 159031, June 23, 2014, Bersamin).
Under Article 249 of RPC, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. In the
absence of any modifying circumstances, reclusion temporal shall be applied in its medium
period, which ranges from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.
Applying Article 64, within the limits of the medium period of reclusion temporal, the
courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil
produced by the crime. Thus, the court could not impose the highest penalty of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, and that, is 17 years and 4 months without specifying the
justification for so imposing. Without proper justification, the court should impose the
lowest penalty of the medium period of reclusion temporal, and that is, 14 years, 8
months. Since ISLAW is applicable, 14 years, 8 months shall be considered as the
maximum penalty while the minimum penalty shall be fixed within the limits of prision
mayor, which ranges from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. Hence, the accused is sentenced
to suffer 10 years of prision mayor as minimum indeterminate penalty to 14 years, 8
months of reclusion temporal as maximum penalty (Ladines vs. People, G.R. No. 167333,
January 11, 2016, Bersamin).
36. Four indivisible penalty - There are four kinds of divisible penalty, which are
governed by Article 64, to wit: (1) penalty composed of three periods fixed in accordance
with Article 76; (2) penalty not composed of three periods computed in accordance with
Article 65; (3) complex penalty under Article 77, par. 1; and (4) penalty without specific
legal form under Article 77, par. 2.
a. Penalty containing three periods Article 76 of RPC expressly fixed the range
of the period for reclusion temporal, prision mayor, temporary disqualification, prision
correccional, destierro, suspension, arresto mayor, and arresto menor. To find the range of
the periods of any of the afore-said penalties, one will simply read Article 76. If the crime
committed is homicide and there is one mitigating circumstance of confession, the
prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal shall be applied in its minimum period because of
Article 64. Article 76 expressly states that the range of the minimum period of reclusion
temporal is from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Within the range of this
period, the maximum indeterminate penalty shall be fixed.
The range of the minimum, medium and maximum periods fixed in accordance with
Article 76 is one-third equal portion of the respective penalties except arresto mayor.
Under Article 76, the minimum period of arresto mayor ranges from 1 month and 1 day to
2 months; medium period ranges from 2 month and 1 day to 4 months; and maximum
period ranges from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months. Hence, the time included in the
duration of the minimum period of arresto mayor is only one month while that of the
medium and maximum is two months.
b. Penalty not composed of three periods - Penalties with divisible duration, the
periods of which are not expressly mentioned in Article 76 are called penalties not
composed of three periods; since Article 76 has not fixed the duration of their periods, they
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must be computed in accordance with Article 65. Under this provision, the time included in
the duration of penalty shall be divided into three equal portions and periods shall be
formed from each portion.
The penalty for malversation under paragraph 2 of Article 217 of RPC is prision
mayor in its minimum and medium period. The range of this penalty is not found in Article
76. Considering that this penalty is not composed of three periods, the time included in the
penalty prescribed should be divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming
one period, pursuant to Article 65 (Zafra vs. People, G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014,
Bersamin).
The duration of prision mayor in its minimum and medium period is 6 years and 1
day to 10 years. To determine the time included in the duration, deduct one day and the
lower limit of the prescribed penalty from its upper limit.
Four years, which is the time included in the duration, shall be divided into three
equal portions.
4 years
3
-------------------------
1 year and 4 months --------- one third portion of the penalty
The minimum, medium and maximum periods shall be formed out the 3 equal
portions of the penalty. The time included in the duration of each period is 1 year and 4
months.
6 years
+1 year and 4 months
----------------------------
7 years and 4 months
+ 1 year and 4 months
----------------------------
8 years and 8 months
+1 year and 4 months
-----------------------------
10 years
Thus, the minimum period of the prescribed penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods ranges from 6 years and 1 day to 7 years and 4 months; its
medium period ranges from 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months; its
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maximum period rages from 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to 10 years (Zafra vs. People, G.R.
No. 176317, July 23, 2014, Bersamin).
Prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period
prescribed for simple robbery under Article 294 of RPC is a complex penalty under since it
composed of three distinct penalties. Thus, prision correccional in its maximum period,
which is the lightest of the three, shall be minimum period of this prescribed penalty.
Prision mayor in its minimum period, which is the next penalty, shall be the medium period.
Prision mayor in its medium period, which is the most severe, shall be the maximum period.
In sum, prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period
prescribed for robbery shall be broken down as follows:
See: People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 168173, December 24, 2008, En Banc, People vs.
Barrientos, G.R. No. 119835, January 28, 1998, En Banc, People vs. Castillo, G.R. No. L-
11793, May 19, 1961, En Banc, People vs. Diamante, G.R. No. 180992, September 04, 2009,
and People vs. Lumiwan, G.R. Nos. 122753-56, September 07, 1998.
Reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua prescribed for sexual
abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 is a complex penalty since it composed of three
distinct penalties. Applying Article 77, par. 1, this complex penalty can be broken down as
follows:
See: People vs. Morante, G.R. No. 187732, November 28, 2012
See: People vs. Macabando, G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013; People vs. Romero, G. R. No.
112985, April 21, 1999; Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No. 159950, February 12, 2007; and
People vs. Oliva, G.R. No. 122110, September 26, 2000
See: Estepa vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 59670, February 15, 1990, Torres vs. People, GR
No. 175074, August 31, 2011, Cabarlo vs. People, G.R. NO. 172274, November 16, 2006;
Mesina vs. People, G.R. No. 162489, June 17, 2015, Bersamin.
If there are three mitigating circumstance and one aggravating circumstance, special
mitigating circumstance for purpose of graduating the penalty shall not be appreciated.
Although there are two remaining mitigating circumstances after applying the off-set rule,
the penalty shall not be lowered by one degree because the appreciation of special
mitigating circumstance requires that there is no aggravating circumstance.
38. Off set rule - Only ordinary aggravating and mitigating circumstances are
subject to the offset rule. Privileged mitigating circumstance of minority cannot be offset by
ordinary aggravating circumstance (Aballe vs. People, G.R. No. L-64086, March 15, 1990). If
privileged mitigating circumstance and ordinary aggravating circumstance attended the
commission of felony, the former shall be taken into account in graduating penalty; the
latter in applying the graduated penalty in its maximum period (People vs. Lumandong, GR
NO. 132745, March 9, 2000, En Banc). Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating
circumstance and cannot be offset by a generic mitigating circumstance (People vs.
Macariola, G.R. No. L-40757 January 24, 1983). The circumstance of treachery, which
qualifies the killing into murder, cannot be offset by a generic mitigating circumstance
voluntary surrender (People vs. Abletes and Pamero, GR NO. L-33304, July 31, 1974).
39. Penalty of offense under special law - The penalty for possession of
dangerous drugs is 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. The court cannot
impose a straight penalty of 12 years and 1 day since the application of indeterminate
sentence law is mandatory (unless the accused deserves a lenient penalty by confessing
pursuant to the Nang Kay principle). Applying the Islaw, the minimum indeterminate
penalty shall not be less than 12 years and 1 day while the maximum shall not exceed 20
years. Thus, the court can sentence the accused to suffer 15 years of imprisonment as
minimum to 18 years as maximum (Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No. 195005, September 12,
2011; Escalante vs. People, G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013).
Under Section 9 of RA 3019, the penalty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is
imprisonment for not less than 6 years and 1 month and not more than 15 years. Applying
the Islaw, the minimum indeterminate penalty shall not be less than 6 years and 1 month
while the maximum shall not exceed 15 years. Thus, the court can sentence the accused to
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41. Adoption of the technical nomenclature of the Spanish penalty - RPC is not
generally applicable to malum prohibitum. However, when a special law, which punishes
malum prohibitum, adopts the technical nomenclature of the penalties in RPC, the
provisions under this Code shall apply (People vs. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994)
such as: (1) Article 68 on the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority; (2) Article 64
on application of penalty in its minimum period if there is a confession; and (3) Article 160
on special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism.
RA No. 7080 and RA No. 10591 adopt the nomenclature of the penalties in RPC.
Hence, minority, confession (Jacaban vs. People, GR No. 184355, March 23, 2015; Malto vs.
People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007) or quasi-recidivisim shall be considered in
plunder and illegal possession of loose firearm.
Under Section 98 of RA No. 9165, the provisions of RPC shall not apply except in the
case of minor offenders. Hence, if the accused is a minor, privilege mitigating circumstance
of minority (People vs. Montalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011; People vs. Musa, G.R. No.
199735, October 24, 2012Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No. 195005, September 12, 2011),
confession or quasi-recidivisim (People vs. Salazar, G.R. No. 98060, January 27, 1997) shall
be considered in crime involving dangerous drugs. In this case, life imprisonment shall be
considered as reclusion perpetua. If the accused is an adult, these circumstances shall not
be appreciated.
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If the special law (such as RA No. 6235 on hijacking and RA No. 3019 on
corruption) did not adopt the technical nomenclature of penalties in RPC, the latter shall
not apply. Mitigating circumstance of confession shall not be appreciated since the penalty
not borrowed from RPC cannot be applied in its minimum period. The crime has not
attempted or frustrated stage since penalty not borrowed from RPC cannot be graduated
one or two degrees lower.
Mitigating circumstance of old age can only be appreciated if the accused is over 70
years old at the time of the commission of the crime under RA No. 3019 and not at the time
of promulgation of judgement (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 177105-06, August 12, 2010,
Bersamin). Moreover, this the mitigating circumstance of old age cannot be appreciated in
crime punishable by RA No. 3019 since this law did not adopt the technical nomenclature
of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
42. Subsidiary penalty - If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine,
he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each amount
equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of
the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court (Article 39 of RPC as amended by
RA No. 10159).
43. Multiple sentences - When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he
shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. Thus, convict
could serve simultaneously arresto mayor and fine, prision correccional and perpetual
absolute disqualification, or reclusion perpetua and civil interdiction. In sum, while
lingering in prison, convict could pay fine, return the property confiscated, be disallowed to
cast his vote or to act function as a public officer.
When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them
successively if the nature of the penalties will not permit simultaneous service. Convict
must serve multiple penalties successively: (1) where the penalties to be served are
destierro and imprisonment; and (2) where the penalties to be served are imprisonment.
However, the successive service of sentences is subject to the three-fold rule and 40-year
limitation rule.
44. Three-fold rule - The three fold rule is to be taken into account not in the
imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed
(People vs. Escares, G.R. No. L-11128-33, December 23, 1957; Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987). Thus, the court cannot dismiss criminal cases in
excess of three on the basis of three-fold rule.
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Novation cannot be used as a defense in case where the existence of contract is not
an element. In theft case, there was no contractual relationship or bilateral agreement
which can be modified or altered by the parties (People vs. Tanjutco, G.R. No. L-23924,
April 29, 1968, En Banc).In estafa through falsification of public documents, the liability of
the offender cannot be extinguished by mere novation (Milla vs. People, G.R. No. 188726,
January 25, 2012).
c. Death - Death of an accused pending appeal shall extinguish his criminal liability
and civil liability arising from crime (Article 89 of RPC); but not his civil liability arising
from a source other than crime (e.g. quasi-delict, contract, quasi-contract or law). Civil
liability arising from a source other than crime is not deemed included in the institution of
criminal action. Hence, the private complainant must file a separate civil action against
either the executor or administrator, or the estate of the accused. During the pendency of
the criminal case, the statute of limitations on this surviving civil liability is deemed
interrupted (People vs. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994). However, in
violation of BP Blg. 22, civil liability arising from a source other than crimeis mandatorily
included in the institution of criminal action. Hence, the court, despite the death of the
accused pending appeal, must determine his civil liability arising from contract (Bernardo
vs. People, G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015). In sum, the private complainant is not
required to file a separate civil action based on contract involving a dishonored check.
d. Pardon - Person, who was pardoned for the crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua, cannot run in the Senatorial race if the terms of the pardon has not expressly
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restored his right to hold public office (Article 36 of RPC) or expressly remitted the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification (Article 41). GMA pardoned
President Estrada with express restoration of his civil and political rights. Hence, he is
eligible to run as Mayor (Risos-vidal vs. Lim, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015).
e. Blameless ignorance doctrine - The State and private complainant should not
be blame for failure to institute the case immediately after the commission of the crime if
they are ignorant or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a crime. Under
"blameless ignorance" doctrine (Section 2 of Act 3326 and Article 91 of RPC), the
prescription runs only upon discovery of the crime by offended party or State through a
person in authority or his agent. Considering that during the Marcos regime, no person
would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions involving cronies such as behest
loan, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions
was possible prior to 1986 (Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24 and 174764-65,
September 11, 2013). Hence, the prescriptive period for violation of RA No. 3019
commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive
investigation (Presidential Ad hoc fact-finding committee vs. Hon. Desierto, G.R. No.
135715, April 13, 2011).
it becomes actionable, and yet, the complainant could not cause its interruption because he
is not yet allowed to file a complaint.
The PCGG has no power to investigate cronies of Marcos for violation of RA No. 3019
not involving ill-gotten wealth. Such investigation for being voidab initiowould not interrupt
the running of prescription (People vs. Romualdez and Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166510,
April 29, 2009).
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Under PD No. 968 as amended, crimes against public disorder are non-
probationable. However, under RA No. 10707, crimes against public disorder such as
alarm and scandal and direct assault are now probationable.
48. Direct assault Simple assault (such as punching) upon an agent of a person in
authority (e.g. police officer) while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes simple
resistance and not direct assault because there is no intent to defy the law and its
representative at all hazard, which is an element thereof (U.S. vs. Tabiana, G.R. No. 11847,
February 1, 1918; U.S. vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 13083, December 11, 1917; People vs. Lapitan,
G.R. No. 38226, November 17, 1933). But serious assault upon agent of a person in
authority while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes direct assault (U.S. vs. Cox,
G.R. No. 1406, January 6, 1904; U.S. vs. Samonte, G.R. No. 5649, September 6, 1910).
Simple assault (such as punching) upon a person in authority (e.g. mayor or chief of
police) while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes qualified direct assault. The
law does not distinguish between serious and simple laying of hands upon a person in
authority as a qualifying circumstance. Hence, a simple laying of hands upon a person in
authority constitutes qualified direct assault. The Tabiana principle is only applicable if the
victim is an agent of a person in authority (U.S. vs. Gumban, G.R. No. 13658, November 9,
1918).
If the person in authority or his agent is engaged in the actual performance of duties
at the time of the assault, the motive for the assault is immaterial. Direct assault is
committed even if the motive (such as non-payment of loan) was totally foreign to victims
official function (Sarcepuedes vs. People, G.R. No. L-3857, October 22, 1951).
The phrase "on occasion of such performance" used in Article 148 of RPC means "by
reasonof the past performance of official duty because the purpose of the law is to allow
them to discharge their duties without fear of being assaulted by reason thereof (People vs.
Renegado, G.R. No. L-27031, May 31, 1974). Attacking a judge on the street by reason of
past performance of duty (such as citing the accused in contempt) constitutes qualified
direct assault (U.S. vs. vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 6820, October 16, 1911). But attacking a retired
judge by reason of past performance of duty is not direct assault since he is not anymore a
person in authority at the time of the assault. Note: The mandatory retirement age of a
judge is 70 year.
The status of lawyer as persons in authority remains even the assault is committed
outside the court room as long as it is perpetrated by reason of the performance of their
professional duties (Records of the Batasan, Volume Four, 1984-1985 of BP Blg. 873, which
amended Article 152 of RPC).
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Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of a person in authority, who is a
victim of direct assault, is liable for direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of an agent of person in authority, who is a
victim of direct assault, is liable for indirect direct assault. Attacking a third person who
comes to the aid of an agent of person in authority, who is a victim of simple resistance, is
liable for physical injuries.
Brother of a detention prisoner and convicted prisoner bribed the clerk of court to
falsify release order and their custodians to release his brothers. Convicted prisoner but
not the detention prisoner is liable for evasion of service of sentence. Brother and clerk of
court are liable for delivery of prisoner from jail with respect to the escape of detention
prisoner and convicted prisoner. Custodians are liable for infidelity in the custody of
prisoners with respect to the escape of detention prisoner and convicted prisoner. Brother
is liable for two counts of corruption of public officer. Clerk of court and custodians are
liable for direct bribery. Clerk of court and brother are liable for falsification of document
as principal by direct participation and as principal by inducement, respectively.
50. Bribery - Plaintiff gave money to the judge, who in consideration thereof
subsequently rendered an unjust decision in favor of the former. The judge is liable of
direct bribery and rendering unjust decision, while the plaintiff is liable of corruption of
public officer. But if the plaintiff gave money to the judge, who subsequently rendered a
decision against the former, the crime committed by the judge is indirect bribery while the
plaintiff is liable of corruption of public officer. The judge is not liable of direct bribery
since rendering a decision against the corruptor indicates that the former did not receive
the money in consideration of rendering a decision in favor of the latter. It seems that the
plaintiff merely gave the money to the judge by reason of his position as such.
51. Abortion and infanticide If the fetus is killed inside the womb of his mother,
the crime is abortion regardless of whether he is viable or not (People vs. Paycana, Jr. G.R.
No. 179035, April 16, 2008; People vs. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884, March 30, 1988). If the
victim is killed outside the womb of the mother, the crime is: (1) abortion if the victim is
not viable e.g. intrauterine life is only 6 months (People vs. Detablan, 40 O.G. No. 9, p. 30;
People vs. Paycana, Jr. G.R. No. 179035, April 16, 2008); or (2) infanticide, if the victim is
viable e.g. his intrauterine life is more than 6 months and his life is less than 3 day old; or
(3) murder if the victim is viable and his life is 3 day old or more.
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If the accused maltreated his wife and as a consequence, his wife and unborn child
died, the crime committed is compound crime of parricide and unintentional abortion
(People vs. Robinos, G.R. No. 138453, May 29, 2002; People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 95851,
March 01, 1995). If the accused maltreated his pregnant wife and as a consequence, his
wife died, and his child was expelled, and died thereafter within 3 days, the crime
committed is compound crime of parricide and infanticide. If the accused maltreated his
pregnant wife and as a consequence, his wife died, and his child was expelled, and died
thereafter on the third day, the crime committed is compound crime of double parricides.
52. Parricide - In parricide, if the victim is his parent or child, the relationship can
either be legitimate or illegitimate; if the victim is the spouse, grandparent or grandchild,
the relationship must be legitimate (People vs. Gamez, GR No. 202847, October 23, 2013).
Relationship in parricide is by blood except where the victim is spouse (Regalado). The
qualifying circumstance of relationship in parricide is personal. Hence, it can be
appreciated against the wife but not against a co-conspirator, who is not related to her
husband, the victim (People vs. Bucsit G.R. No. 17865, March 15, 1922).
Killing his wife after surprising her in the act of committing homosexual intercourse
with another woman is not death under exceptional circumstance. Sexual intercourse
mentioned in Article 247 is different from homosexual intercourse. Killing his mistress
after surprising in the act of committing sexual intercourse with a man is not death under
exceptional circumstance(U.S. vs. Versola, G.R. No. 10759, January 25, 1916). The offender
in Article 247 must be a legally married person. Killing his wife under the circumstance
indicating that she had just finished having sexual intercourse with another man is not
death under exceptional circumstance. He did not catch his wife in the very act of sexual
intercourse, but after such act (People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 46310, October 31, 1939).
manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of the affray; (e) that it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased (Not: If the killers are identified, this element
is not present; since they are identified, they are liable for homicide or murder; Wacoy vs.
People, G.R. No. 213792, June 22, 2015); and (f) that the person or persons who inflicted
serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified.
55. Rape Among the amendments of the law on rape introduced under RA No.
8353 is Section 266-D, which provides Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against
the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so
situated as to render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence
in the prosecution rape (People vs. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012, Bersamin).
The legislators agreed that Article 266-D is intended to soften the jurisprudence on
tenacious resistance (People vs. Dulay, G.R. Nos. 144344-68, July 23, 2002). Failure to shout
should not be taken against the victim (People vs. Rivera, GR No. 200508, September 04,
2013; People vs. Rubio, G.R. No. 195239, March 7, 2012; People vs. Penilla, GR No. 189324,
March 20, 2013). It is not necessary for the victim to sustain physical injuries. She need not
kick, bite, hit or scratch the offender with her fingernails to prove that she had been
defensive (People vs. Torres, G.R. No. 134766, January 16, 2004).
a. Qualifying circumstance - If the relationship between the accused and the victim
of rape is uncle and niece, the Information must alleged that the offender is a relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree because there are niece-uncle
relationships which are beyond the third civil degree. However, a sister-brother
relationship is obviously in the second civil degree. Consequently, it is not necessary that
the Information should specifically state that the accused is a relative by consanguinity
within the third civil degree of the victim (People vs. Ceredon, G.R. No. 167179, January 28,
2008).
Knowledge of the mental disability of the victim is not an element of rape (People vs.
Caoile, GR No. 203041, June 5, 2013) but it is an ingredient of the qualifying circumstance
of mental disability, which must be alleged in the information (People vs. Obogne, GR No.
199740, March 24, 2014; People vs. Lascano, G.R. No. 192180, March 21, 2012).
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
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3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended
party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under
the following circumstances:
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be
taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim
(People vs. Lupac, G .R. No. 182230, September 19, 2012, Bersamin).
b. Absorption rule - If the accused commits rape and acts of lasciviousness, the
latter is absorbed by the former (People vs. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 29, 2002). But
the doctrine of absorption is not applicable to rape through sexual assault. Inserting lighted
cigarette into the genital orifice and anal orifice of the victim and raping her constitutes
two counts of rape by sexual assault and rape through sexual intercourse (People vs.
Crisostomo, GR No. 196435, January 29, 2014). Inserting the penis into the mouth of the
victim and into her genital orifice constitutes rape through sexual assault and organ rape
(In People vs. Espera, G.R. No. 202868, October 02, 2013).
c. Variance rule - If the crime charged is rape, but the crime proven is acts of
lasciviousness, the accused will be convicted of the latter because of the variance rule. Acts
of lasciviousness is a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the charge of rape. If the
crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, but the crime proven is rape through
sexual assault, the accused cannot be convicted of the latter. The variance rule is not
applicable since rape through sexual assault is not necessarily included in the charge of
rape through sexual intercourse. The elements of these two crimes are materially and
substantially different. In such case, the accused will be convicted of acts of lasciviousness,
which is necessarily included in the charge of rape through sexual intercourse (People vs.
Pareja, GR No. 202122, January 15, 2014; People vs. Cuaycong, G.R. No. 196051, October 02,
2013; People vs. CA, G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015).
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d. Marital rape - Husband can be held liable for marital rape. Article 266-A of RPC
uses the term man in defining rape without regard to the rapists legal relationship with
his victim. Under Article 266-C of RPC, in case it is the legal husband who is the offender,
the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action. RA No. 8353 has eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist
because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wifes body and thus her
consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed
(People vs. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014),
e. Public crime - Rape is no longer considered a private crime or that which cannot
be prosecuted, except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Hence, pardon by the
offended party of the offender in the crime of rape will not extinguish the offender's
criminal liability (People vs. Bonaagua, GR No. 188897, June 06, 2011).
f. Statutory rape - The term statutory rape should only be confined to situations
where the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of age. If the victim of rape is a
person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, the crime committed is simple
rape committed against a person "deprived of reason" (People vs. Dalan, G.R. No. 203086,
June 11, 2014, Bersamin).
In People vs. Nuyok, G.R. No. 195424, June 15, 2015, Bersamin, the commission of
rape can be established by circumstantial evidence even if the victim, being the sole
witness, was rendered unconscious during its commission. Accused slapped victim and
punched her in the stomach. She was rendered unconscious. When she regained
consciousness, she found blood in her panties, and felt pain in her vagina. Accused was
convicted of rape.
In People vs. Belgar, G.R. No. 182794, September 08, 2014, Bersamin, the accused
had injected an unknown substance into her belly that had then rendered her unconscious.
Upon waking up, she had found herself lying naked on the ground; she had felt pain in her
vagina, which held a red and white substance in it; and he had been the only person last
seen by her before she had passed out. The lack of direct evidence against him
notwithstanding, these circumstances sufficed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
because they formed an unbroken chain that unerringly showed Belgar, and no other, had
committed the rape against her.
If the offender touches the body of the victim through force, without touching the
labia of her pudendum but with clear intention to have sexual intercourse, the crime
committed is attempted rape. Intent to have sexual intercourse is present if is shown that
the erectile penis of the accused is in the position to penetrate (Cruz vs. People, G.R. No.
166441, October 08, 2014, Bersamin) or the accused actually commenced to force his
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penis into the victim's sexual organ (People vs. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11,
2013).
For there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of
penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not
completed (People vs. Bandril, G.R. No. 212205, July 06, 2015).
If the offender touches the body of the victim through force, with lewd design but
without clear intention to have sexual intercourse, the crime committed is acts of
lasciviousness. Kissing and undressing the victim (People vs. Sanico, G.R. No. 208469,
August 13, 2014) or touching her vagina by the hand of the accused (People vs. Banzuela,
G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013), touching the breast and thighs of victim and kissing
her (People vs. Victor, G.R. No. 127904, December 05, 2002); or rubbing his penis on the
mons pubis of the pudendum (People vs. Abanilla, G.R. Nos. 148673-75, October 17, 2003)
is merely acts of lasciviousness because intent to have sexual intercourse is not clearly
shown, but lewd design is established.
In People vs. Dadulla, G. R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011, Bersamin, the accused's
act of opening the zipper and buttons of AAA's shorts, touching her, and trying to pull her
from under the bed manifested lewd designs, not intent to lie with her. The evidence to
prove that a definite intent to lie with AAA motivated the accused was plainly wanting,
therefore, rendering him guilty only of acts of lasciviousness
In Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014, Bersamin, touching her
genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts are "susceptible of double interpretation."
These circumstances may show that the intention of the accused is either to commit rape or
simple seduction (or acts of lasciviousness). Since intent to have sexual intercourse is not
clear, accused could not be held liable for attempted rape. Hence, he is only liable for acts of
lasciviousness.
If the offender touches the body of the victim without lewd design or without clear
intention to satisfy lust, the crime committed is unjust vexation.
In People vs. Balbar, G.R. Nos. L-20216 & L-20217, November 29, 1967, accused
kissed and embraced his co-teacher while the latter was conducting her class. The factual
setting, i.e., a schoolroom in the presence of complainant's students and within hearing
distance of her co-teachers, rules out a conclusion that the accused was
actuated by a lustful design. The crime committed is merely unjust vexation.
In People vs. Sumingwa, G.R. No. 183619, October 13, 2009, embracing, dragging
and kissing in front of her friend constitute unjust vexation.
56. Perjury - Person cannot be held liable for perjury involving a complaint affidavit
for theft based on the execution of affidavit of desistance. There is no perjury solely on the
basis of two contradictory statements. There must be further evidence that will show
which of the two sworn statements is false (U.S. vs. Capistrano 40 Phil. 902).
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In a verified answer, accused denied the allegation in the complaint for collection on
his loan obligation. He is not liable for perjury since verification is not required in answer
in a civil case. He cannot be prosecuted for perjury on the basis of an alleged falsehood
made in a verified pleading, which is not mandated by law to be verified (Saavedra, Jr. vs.
Department of Justice, G.R. No. 93178, September 15, 1993; Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, G.R.
No. L-48088, July 31, 1978).
The fact that subornation of perjury is not expressly penalized in RPC does not mean
that the direct induction of a person by another to commit perjury has ceased to be a crime,
because said crime is fully within the scope of provision on principal by inducement
(People vs. Pudol, G.R. No. 45618, October 18, 1938).
In De Castro vs. People, G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015, Bersamin, as a bank
teller, she took advantage of the bank depositors who had trusted in her enough to leave
their passbooks with her upon her instruction. Without their knowledge, however, she
filled out withdrawal slips that she signed, and misrepresented to her fellow bank
employees that the signatures had been verified in due course. Her misrepresentation to
her co-employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips. She
thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding the bank, her employer, in
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the various sums withdrawn from the bank accounts of depositors; and falsification of a
commercial document, by forging the signatures of depositor in the withdrawal slips to
make it appear that the depositor concerned had signed the respective slips in order to
enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were complex crimes, because
the estafa would not have been consummated without the falsification of the withdrawal
slips.
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and Falsification will
constitute as one complex crime and when they are considered as two separate offenses.
The complex crime of estafa through falsification of documents is committed when one has
to falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money or goods from another person. In
other words, the falsification is a necessary means of committing estafa. If the falsification
is committed to conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and
falsification are committed. In the instant case, when accused collected payments from the
customers, said collection which was in her possession was at her disposal. The falsified or
erroneous entries which she made on the duplicate copies of the receipts were contrived to
conceal some amount of her collection which she did not remit to the company. Hence, the
accused is liable for separate crimes of estafa and falsification of document (Patula vs.
People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012, Bersamin).
In Zafra vs. People, G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014, Bersamin, there is a big disparity
between the amount covered by receipts issued to the taxpayer, and the amount for the
same receipts in the tax collection reports indicating the falsification resorted to by the
accused in the official reports he filed, thereby remitting less than what was collected from
taxpayers concerned, resulting to the loss of revenue for the government as unearthed by
the auditors. Thus, the accused is liable for complex crime of malversation through
falsification of documents.
59. Estafa In offenses against property (theft or estafa), if the subject matter of the
offense is generic and not identifiable (e.g. money), an error in the designation of the
offended party is fatal. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and
identifiable (e.g. check or jewelry), an error in the designation of the offended party is
immaterial (Senador vs. People, G.R. No. 201620, March 06, 2013). In oral defamation, a
crime against honor, the identity of the person against whom the defamatory words were
directed is a material element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the person injured is
material (People vs. Uba, 106 Phil. 332).
Where the borrower is importers acquiring goods for resale, goods sold in retail are
often within his custody until they are purchased. This is covered by trust receipt
agreement. Failure to return the unsold good or deliver the proceeds of sale to the bank is
estafa in relation to PD No. 115 (Trust Receipt Law). Where the borrower is engaged in
construction, the materials are often placed under custody of his clients, who can only be
compelled to return the materials if they fail to pay. Since the bank and the contractor
know that the return of the materials is not possible, this is not covered by trust receipt
agreement. This transaction becomes a mere loan, where the borrower is obligated to pay
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the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the goods. The accused is not liable for
estafa because of the constitutional provision of non-imprisonment for nonpayment of
debts (Yang vs. People, G.R. No. 195117, August 14, 2013).
In other forms of swindling under Article 316, (1) and (2) of RPC, offender made
false representation involving real property and act of ownership such as selling it, which
causes damage to third person. In paragraph 1, the accused represents that he owned the
property, while in paragraph 2, he expressly represents in the deed of conveyance that the
property is free from encumbrance (Estrellado-Mainar vs. People, G.R. No. 184320, July
29, 2015) or "como libre". These words "como libre" in the Spanish Penal Code are deemed
incorporated in the RPC (Naya vs. Abing, G.R. No. 146770, February 27, 2003).
60. Theft - To "take" under theft the Revised Penal Code does not require
asportation or carrying away (Medina vs. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015). It is not
an indispensable requisite of theft that a pickpocket should carry, more or less far away, a
wallet taken from its owner (People vs. Mercado, G.R. Nos. L-45471 and L-45472, June 15,
1938).
The term "personal property" in RPC should be interpreted in the context of the
Civil Code. Consequently, any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of theft. Business may be
appropriated under Bulk Sales Law. Thus, the business of providing telecommunication
and the telephone service is a personal property (Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076,
January 13, 2009). Since asportation is not an element of theft, a personal property can to
be the object of theft as along as it is capable of appropriation although it is not capable of
"asportation" (Medina vs. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015). Intangible property is
not capable of asportation, and yet, it can be an object of theft since is capable of
asportation.
If the property is tangible, taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender
gains possession over the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same
(People vs. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004). If the property is intangible, taking
includes controlling the destination of this property stolen to deprive the owner of the
property (e.g. the use of a meter tampering, use of a device to fraudulently obtain gas, and
the use of a jumper to divert electricity). Using device to control the destination of
international telephone call under the telecommunication system of PLDT without its
consent to earn by charging user of the phone at the expense of PLDT is taking the property
of PLDT of providing telecommunication service (Laurel vs. Abrogar, supra).
a. No frustrated theft - If the bulky goods are taken by the accused inside a
compound (such as SM), theft is consummated even if the accused failed to bring out the
stolen goods from the compound, which makes him unable to freely dispose it. Inability to
dispose the stolen property is not an element of theft. Unlawful taking is the element which
produces the felony in its consummated stage. Without unlawful taking, the offense could
only be attempted theft, if at all. Thus, theft cannot have a frustrated stage (Valenzuela vs.
People, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007). If the accused is charged with frustrated theft, he
could not be convicted of the crime charged because theft has no frustrated stage. Neither
could he be convicted of consummated theft since it was not alleged in the information. But
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he could be convicted of attempted theft because this is a lesser crime, which is necessarily
included in the charge of frustrated theft (Canceran vs. People, G.R. No. 206442, July 01,
2015).
If the accused received the car from the owner for repair the possession is physical,
and thus, misappropriation thereof is carnapping (Santos vs. People, G.R. No. 77429
January 29, 1990).If the accused received the property to bring it to a goldsmith for
examination and to immediately return it back to the owner, his possession is physical, and
thus, misappropriation thereof is theft (U.S. v. De Vera, G.R. No. L-16961, September 19,
1921). If the accused received the property with authority to sell it (Guzman vs. CA, 99 Phil.
703), or money with authority to use it to buy palays (Carganillo vs. People, G.R. No.
182424, September 22, 2014), or with full freedom and discretion on how to use it to
facilitate its remittance to BIR as payment of tax and reduce the amount due (Velayo vs.
People, G.R. No. 204025, November 26, 2014), his possession is juridical. Thus, failure of
the agent to return it is estafa (Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 703; Tria vs. People,
G.R. No. 204755, September 17, 2014).
A franchise holder must personally operate the motor vehicle. That is the reason
why government regulation prohibits operator of motor vehicle from leasing it. In the eye
of the law the driver of taxi or passenger jeepneyunder boundary arrangement was only an
employee of the owner rather than a lessee. For being an employee, his possession of the
jeepney is physical (People v. Isaac G.R. No. L-7561, April 30, 1955), and thus,
misappropriation thereof is carnapping (People vs. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 8,
2004)
As a rule, the possession of the employee such as bank teller, collector or cash
custodian is only physical possession. Hence, misappropriation of property is qualified
theft. Abuse of confidence is present since the property is accessible to the employee
(People v. Locson, G.R. No. L-35681, October 18, 1932; Matrido vs. People, G.R. No. 179061,
July 13, 2009; Benabaye vs. People, G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015; Chua-Burce vs. CA,
G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000; Balerta vs. People, G.R. No. 205144, November 26, 2014).
However, if the employee is an officer of the companywith discretion on how to use property
or fund of the company,his possession is juridical; hence, misappropriation thereof is estafa.
Thus, the following officers are liable for estafa through misappropriation (1) a corporate
officer with discretion option on how to use bending machine without the participation of
the corporation(Aigle vs. People, G.R. No. 174181, June 27, 2012); (2) bank President with
discretion on how to administer fund (People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014), and (3)
Liaison Officer of a pawnshop with discretion on how to secure or renew licenses and
permits (Gamboa vs. People, G.R. No. 188052, April 21, 2014).
at the time of the delivery of the money. Threat of prosecution and confiscation of the logs
by DENR officers is an intimidation within the meaning of robbery (Sazon vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150873, February 10, 2009).
c. Lost property - Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver
the same to the local authorities or to its owner, is liable for theft. If the finder surrenders
the property found to a policeman, who fails to deliver it the owner, the policeman is liable
for theft. He acquired the position occupied by the actual finder. Appropriating the
property is of the same character of that made by one who originally found the same
(People vs. Avila, G.R. No. L-19786, March 31, 1923).
61. Arson Destructive arson is characterized as heinous crime; while simple arson
under PD No. 1613 is a crime manifesting a lesser degree of perversity. Simple arson
contemplates the malicious burning of property not included in Article 320 of the
RPC (People vs. Macabando, GR No. 188708, July 31, 2013). Burning of inhabited house or
dwelling or personal property is simple arson under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613 because it is
not included in Article 320 of RPC.
If the main objective is to kill the victim in a building, and fire is resorted to as the
means to accomplish such goal, the crime committed is murder only. Murder qualified by
means of fire absorbs arson since the latter is an inherent means to commit the former
(People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994). Single act of burning the building to kill
two persons constitutes compound crime of double murders (People vs. Gaffud, G.R. No.
168050, September 19, 2008).
One has deliberately set fire to a building is presumed to have intended to burn the
building (People vs. De Leon, G. R. No. 180762, March 4, 2009). Since intent to burn is
presumed, intent to kill must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Failure to show
intent to kill, the accused shall be convicted of arson with homicide and not murder (People
vs. Baluntong, G.R. No. 182061, March 15, 2010).
If the main objective is to burn the building, but death results by reason or on the
occasion of arson, the crime is arson with homicide, and the resulting homicide is absorbed
(People vs. Villacorta, 172468, October 15, 2008).
If the objective is to kill, and in fact the offender has already done so, and arson is
resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, the offender may be convicted of two
separate crimes of either homicide or murder, and arson (People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No.
93485, June 27, 1994).
62. Bigamy After the consummation of the crime of bigamy, declaration of nullity
of first marriage and/or second marriage is not a defense on the following grounds:
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Third ground - To avoid criminal liability, the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage must be made previous to the consummation of bigamy, which is required by
Article 40 of the Family Code that provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. A declaration of the absolute nullity of the first marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense in bigamy (People vs.
Teves, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011). Even though the first marriage was contracted
prior to the Family Code, the rule is the same since Article 40, which is a rule of procedure,
should be applied retroactively. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Jarillo vs. People, G.R. No. 164435, June 29,
2010).
Exceptions:
1. In People v. De Lara, 3 No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, the second
marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license. In this
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situation, the accused can use the voidness of the second marriage as a defense in bigamy.
The accused did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a
second marriage. He did not fraudulently secure a Certificate of Marriage, and later used
this criminal act as basis for seeking her exculpation. The crime committed is not bigamy
under Article 349 (Santiago vs. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015) but marriage
contracted against the provisions of the law under Article 350 (People vs. Peralta, CA-GR
No. 13130-R, June 30, 1955).
The De Lara principle is only applicable if the two requisites are applicable: (1) the
accused did not did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a
second marriage. As a rule, the accused cannot use the voidness of the second marriage as a
defense in bigamy because she fraudulently secured a certificate of marriage, and that is
presenting a falsified affidavit of cohabitation instead of marriage license (Santiago vs.
People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015); and (2) the second marriage is null and void for
lack of marriage license; if the first marriage is declared null and void due to lack of
marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation, this is not a defense because Article 40 of the
Family Code required declaration of nullity before the celebration of second marriage
(Lasanas vs. People, G.R. No. 159031, June 23, 2014, Bersamin).
2. The principle that one who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy is not applicable where the parties
merely signed the marriage contract without marriage ceremony performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears
no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Hence,
bigamy is not committed (Morigo vs. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004).
3. X contracted three marriages. His first wife is already dead when X contracted his
third marriage.
X is liable for bigamy involving the second marriage on the basis of his first marriage
because the first was existing when the contracted the second.
X is not liable for bigamy involving the third marriage on the basis of the first
marriage since the first has already been extinguished by reason of death of the first wife
when he contracted the third.
X is not liable for bigamy involving the third marriage on the basis of the second
marriage since the second is null and void for being a bigamous marriage.
Other view: X is liable for bigamy involving the third marriage on the basis of the
second marriage. Although the second is null and void for being a bigamous marriage, X
should have first caused the declaration of nullity of the second marriage for being
bigamous before contracting a third marriage.
and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take
each other as husband and wife (Ronulo vs. People, G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014).
64. Libel - Under Article 360 of the RPC, the publisher, and editor of newspaper,
shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were
the author thereof. The publisher and editors cannot disclaim liability for libelous articles
that appear on their paper by simply saying they had no participation in the preparation of
the same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which
the defamatory articles appeared. It is not a matter of whether or not they conspired in
preparing and publishing the subject articles, because the law simply so states that they are
liable as if they were the author (Tulfo vs. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008).
Stealing property and planting the stolen property to impute to the victim the crime
of theft constitutes complex crime of incriminating an innocent person through theft.
the standard of care and skill commonly possessed and exercised by similar specialists
under similar circumstances. Failure to present specialist as witness to testify on this
standard is fatal to the prosecution of the case (Solidum vs. People, GR No. 192123, March
10, 2014, Bersamin).
There are two views on whether culpa is a crime or just a mode of committing a
crime.
First view: Culpa under Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code is not a crime but just a
mode of committing a crime. Applying this rule, there are three crimes committed, to wit:
(1) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, (2) reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and (3) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.
However, single reckless act resulting in homicide and damage to property is a complex
crime (Angeles vs. Jose, G.R. No. L-6494, November. 24, 1954). But the slight physical
injuries that resulted from the same recklessness shall be treated as a separate crime. Since
this is a light felony, it cannot be made a component of a complex crime (Lontoc, Jr. vs.
Gorgonio, L37396, April 30, 1979; People vs. Turla, G.R. No. L-26388, February 14, 1927;
Gonzaga vs. People, G.R. No. 195671, Jan. 21, 2015; 1983, 2011, and 2012 Bar Exams).
Under this view, the motion to quash shall be denied because reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries and the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and damage to property are separate crimes, and hence, the conviction of the
first is not a bar to the continued prosecution of the second.
Under this view, the motion to quash shall be granted because reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, damage to property and slight physical injuries constitute a single
crime, and hence, the conviction of culpable felony involving slight physical injuries is a bar
to the continued prosecution of the same culpable felony involving homicide and damage to
property.
67. BP 22 Settled is the rule that estafa will not lie when the parties waive the
negotiable character of a check, and instead treat the same as proof of an obligation. For
instance, when there is an agreement between the parties at the time of the issuance and
postdating of the checks that the obligee shall not encash or present the same to the bank,
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the obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa because the element of deceit is lacking (People
vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 163662, February 25, 2015, Bersamin). In BP Blg. 22, the fact that
the check is not intended to be encashed or deposited in a bank is not a defense. This check
produces the same effect as ordinary check. What the law punishes is the issuance of a
rubber check itself and not the purpose for which the check was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance (Cueme vs. People, G.R. No. 133325, June 30, 2000).
a. Knowledge of the payee - When the payee was informed that the checks are not
covered by adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall not arise People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No.
163662, February 25, 2015, Bersamin). In BP Blg. 22, the facts that the payee had
knowledge that he had insufficient funds at the time he issued the check is immaterial as
deceit is not an essential element of the offense under this law. The gravamen of the
offense under BP Blg. 22 is the issuance of a bad check; hence, malice and intent in the
issuance thereof are inconsequential (Rigor vs. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17,
2004).
b. No account with the bank - According to the accused, she did not own the check
that she issued to complainant as collateral. He merely borrowed it from a friend. What BP
Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a worthless check. The law did not look either
at the actual ownership of the check. The law penalizes a person who indulges in the
making and issuing of unfunded check on an account belonging to another with the latters
consent. Also, that the check was not intended to be deposited was really of no
consequence to her incurring criminal liability under BP 22 (Resterio vs. People, G.R. No.
177438, September 24, 2012, Bersamin).
e. Notice of dishonor To be guilty of this crime the accused must have used the
check in order to defraud the complainant. However, prima facie evidence of deceit exists
by law upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to
cover his check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor (People vs. Reyes,
supra). But receipt of notice of dishonor is not an element of estafa through issuance of
bouncing check.
The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply the proof for the
second element of violation of BP Blg. 22 arising from the presumption of knowledge the
law puts up but also affords the offender due process. The law thereby allows the offender
to avoid prosecution if she pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for the payment in full of the check by the drawee within five banking days
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from receipt of the written notice that the check had not been paid. The Court cannot
permit a deprivation of the offender of this statutory right by not giving the proper notice
of dishonor (Resterio vs. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012, Bersamin).
Demand letter was given with the security guard without proof that it reached
accused and through registered mail which was returned with the notation "N/S Party Out
12/12/05". Since there is proof that accused received the notice of dishonor, he was
acquitted. However he is still civilly liable (San Mateo vs. People, G.R. No. 200090, March 6,
2013).
The mere presentment of the two registry return receipts was not sufficient to
establish the fact that written notices of dishonor had been sent to or served on the
petitioner as the issuer of the check. Considering that the sending of the written notices of
dishonor had been done by registered mail, the registry return receipts by themselves were
not proof of the service on the accused without being accompanied by the authenticating
affidavit of the person who had actually mailed the written notices of dishonor, or without
the testimony in court of the mailer on the fact of mailing (Resterio vs. People, G.R. No.
177438, September 24, 2012, Bersamin).
For notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the addressee or a
duly authorized agent of the addressee. In fact, the registry return receipt itself provides
that [a] registered article must not be delivered to anyone but the addressee, or upon the
addressees written order, in which case the authorized agent must write the addressees
name on the proper space and then affix legibly his own signature below it. In the case at
bar, no effort was made to show that the demand letter was received by petitioners or their
agent. All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the registry receipt as
evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is that of one of the
petitioners or of their authorized agent remains a mystery (Resterio vs. People, G.R. No.
177438, September 24, 2012, Bersamin).
The wife of complainant verbally informed the accused that the check had bounced
did not satisfy the requirement of showing that written notices of dishonor had been made
to and received by the petitioner. The verbal notices of dishonor were not effective because
it is already settled that a notice of dishonor must be in writing (Resterio vs. People, G.R.
No. 177438. September 24, 2012, Bersamin).
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, notice of dishonor is not required where the
drawer has no right to expect that the bank will honor the check. Since bank account of
accused was already closed even before the issuance of the subject check, he had no right to
expect the drawee bank to honor his check. Hence, he is not entitled to be given a notice of
dishonor (Lopez vs. People, G.R. No. 166810, June 26, 2008, ).The crime involved in Lopez
vs. People is estafa through issuance of bouncing check. However, it is submitted the Lopez
principle can be applied to violation of BP 22.
before the filing of the information, the purpose of the law has already been attained.
Payment of check after the filing of informationis not a defense. Since there is no showing
of intention to mitigate the bad effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is
no equitable reason to preclude the prosecution of accused. In such a case, the letter of the
law should be applied to its full extent (Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 190834, November 26,
2014).
The essence of estafa through issuance of bouncing check is to punish fraud and not
to protect the integrity of the check. Damage and deceit are elements of estafa, and the
check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of
the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy
the civil liability (Lim vs. People, supra).
68. RA No. 7610 - The Family Code prohibits the infliction of corporal
punishment by teacher. A schoolteacher in employing unnecessary violence on her minor
student, who even fainted, is liable for child abuse under RA No. 7610 (Rosaldes vs. People,
G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014, Bersamin). Accused saw the victim and his companions
hurting his minor daughters. Angered, accused struck minor-victim at the back with his
hand and slapped his face. Since the accused committed the act at the spur of the moment,
they are perpetrated without intent to debase his "intrinsic worth and dignity" as a human
being, or to humiliate or embarrass him. Without such intent, the crime committed is not
child abuse under RA 7610 but merely slight physical injuries (Bongalon vs. People, G.R.
No. 169533, March 20, 2013, Bersamin).
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If the child is 12 years old and above, and the acts of the accused constitute sexual
abuse under RA No. 7610 and rape through sexual assault or acts of lasciviousness, he shall
be prosecuted under RA No. 7610 since this law prescribed a grave penalty (Dimakuta vs.
People, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015). However, if the acts constitute sexual abuse
and rape through sexual intercourse, he shall be prosecuted under RPC since this law
prescribed a graver penalty. He cannot be prosecuted for compound crime of rape and
sexual abuse because the latter is punishable under special law. He cannot be prosecuted
for both rape and sexual abuse because of the rule on double jeopardy (People v. Matias,
G.R. No. 186469, June 13, 2012 and Alberto vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182130, June
19, 2013).
If the child is under 12 years old, and the acts of the accused constitute sexual abuse
and rape or acts of lasciviousness, the latter shall be prosecuted penalized as follows: (1)
rape through sexual intercourse; (2) acts of lasciviousness with the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period (Section 5 of RA No. 7610).Prior to RA No. 8353 (Rape Law),
inserting finger into genital orifice is acts of lasciviousness. Hence, reclusion temporal in its
medium period under RA No. 7610 should be imposed. Under RA No. 8353, inserting finger
into genital orifice is rape through sexual assault where the penalty is prision mayor. To
impose the lighter penalty under RPC as amended by RA 8353 is unfair to the victim. It is
not the intention of RA No. 8353 to disallow the imposition of penalty under RA No. 7610 if
the victim is child subjected to sexual abuse, who isunder 12 years of age (People vs.
Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011). If the crime is qualified rape through sexual
assault, the Chingcase is not applicable since RA No. 8353 prescribed a grave penalty of
reclusion temporal for it (People vs. Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011).
70. Trafficking in person - Accompanying a child and offering her sexual services in
exchange for money constitutes child prostitution. The accused who offered the victim to
the one who raped her is not liable for rape as principal indispensable cooperation since
bringing the victim to the rapist is not indispensable to the commission of the crime of rape
(People vs. Dulay, GR No. 193854, September 24, 2012). If the accused is regularly offering
the sexual service of the child in exchange for money, the crime committed is not anymore
child prostitution. Maintaining or hiring the child as purpose of prostitution constitutes
qualified trafficking in person because the former took advantage of vulnerability of the
latter as a child and as one who need money. Minority is qualifying circumstance (People
vs. Casio, G.R. No. 211465, December 03, 2014; People vs. Hirang, G.R. No. 223528, January
11, 2017, Bersamin). Recruiting without license a person, child or adult, to work as a
prostitute abroad constitutes the crime of trafficking in person and illegal recruitment.
Syndicate is qualifying circumstance in both crimes. Even if the accused is less than three,
but the allegation and evidence shows that there are at least three traffickers and
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recruiters, syndicated can be appreciated as qualifying circumstance (People vs. Lalli, G.R.
No. 195419, October 12, 2011; People vs. Hashim, G.R. No. 194255, June 13, 2012).
71. Illegal recruitment - An employee may be held liable with his employer, if the
former actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. The employee cannot
escape liability by claiming that she was not aware that before working for her employer in
the recruitment agency, she should first be registered with the POEA. Illegal recruitment in
large scale is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Good faith is not a defense (People vs.
Valenciano, G.R. No. 180926, December 10, 2008).
72. RA No. 9165 - Accused were caught by police authorities on board a speedboat
carrying shabu. Since it was not proven that the drugs came from China or foreign country
they were convicted of possession of dangerous drugs, which is necessarily included in the
charge of importation (People vs. Chan Liu, G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015).
For illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish that the
accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug without authority. However,
mere possession of dangerous drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory
explanation (Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No. 195005, September 12, 2011).
a. Use of dangerous drugs - Where residue of dangerous drugs is found and there
is a positive confirmatory test result, the accused should be charged with use rather than
possession of dangerous drugs. This would be in keeping with the intent of the law to
rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use and provide them with an opportunity to
recover for a second chance at life (People vs. Matinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13,
2010).
b. Attempted sale - Poseur-buyer showed shabu for sale to poseur buyer. The sale
was aborted when the police officers immediately placed accused under arrest. The crime
committed is attempted sale (People vs. Figueroa, G.R. No. 186141, April 11, 2012).
c. Coordination with PDEA - Lack of coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate
a buy-bust operation. Such coordination is not an indispensable requirement in buy-bust
operations (People vs. Mendosa, G.R. No. 189327, February 29, 2012)
from the prescribed procedure must then still be reasonably justified, and must further be
shown not to have affected the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
contraband (People vs. Barte, G.R. No. 179749, March 30, 2017, Bersamin).
g. Chain of custody - The following links must be established in the chain of custody
in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn over by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked illegal drugs seized
from the forensic chemist to the court (People vs. Constantino, Jr. GR No. 199689, March
12, 2014).
h. Plea bargaining - Section 23 of RA No. 9165, any person charged under any
crime involving dangerous drugs regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed
to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.
73. RA No. 3019 In Giangan vs. People, G.R. No. 169385, August 26, 2015,
Bersamin -Giangan as the barangay chairman acted upon the honest and sincere belief
that he was then summarily abating the nuisance that a regular user of the obstructed road
had just reported to him. A further indication of the good faith of Giangan was the turning
over of the wooden posts to the police station, manifesting that the accused were acting
within the scope of their authority. Good faith means honest, lawful intent; the condition of
acting without knowledge of fraud, and without intent to assist in a fraudulent or otherwise
unlawful scheme. Also, the act complained of was rendered inconsistent with the manifest
partiality and bad faith that the law punished. He was acquitted of violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA No. 3019 because the element of evident bad faith is not present.
In People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 177105-06, August 12, 2010, Bersamin, the Court of
Appeals (CA) rendered a decision reinstating the title of the complainant. Provincial
Adjudicator despite knowledge of the CA decision still rendered his decision in a DARAB
Case that completely contradicted the CA decision by invalidating title of the complainant.
He displayed evident bad faith and manifest partiality by his arrogant refusal to recognize
and obey the CA decision causing undue injury to the complainant and giving unawaarnted
benefits to private individuals in violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019.
a. Arias principle - To apply the Arias rule for purposes of exonerating an accused
or respondent, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the public officer in
approving the release of public fund must be relying to a reasonable extent on his
subordinates (Jaca vs. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013); (2) that the documents
involving the release of funds must be so voluminous so as to preclude him from studying
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each one carefully (Santillano vs. People, G.R. Nos. 175045-46, March 03, 2010); (3) that
the public officer has no foreknowledge of existing anomaly (Escara vs. People, G.R. No.
164921, July 8, 2005); and that there is not deviation from ordinary procedure in the
release of fund, which necessitate further investigation (Cruz vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 134493, August 16, 2005; Rivera vs. People, G.R. No. 156577, December 03, 2014).
City treasurer, city accountant and city administrator allowed the release of cash
advance in favor of a paymaster despite the fact that she has previous unliquidated cash
advances. They are liable because of conspiracy of silence or inaction. Public officers
omissions to question irregularities indicate a common understanding and concurrence of
sentiments respecting the commission of the offense of causing undue injury to the
government through gross inexcusable negligence. This is called conspiracy by silence (Jaca
vs. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013).
required under this Act to be reported to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails
to do so (Section 4 of RA No. 9160 as amended by RA No. 10365).
First - That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
or other persons; (Note: Senator Pogi can be held liable for plunder even if the principal
offender, who masterminded the plunder of pork barrel, is a private individual, the Pork-
barrel Queen. What is important is that Senator Pogi in connivance with Pork-barrel Queen
acquired ill-gotten wealth). On the other hand, Pork-barrel Queen can be held liable for
plunder on the basis of conspiracy.
Can the Senator use the defense in malversation that he is not responsible for the
misuse of his PDAP since it is the duty of the appropriate implementing agency of the
government to check that the recipient of the fund is not bogus? No. Assuming that the duty
to check that the recipient of the Senators PDAP is not bogus belongs to the appropriate
agency of the government, the Senator is still liable since malversation can be committed
through culpa.
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Note: The word combination means at least two different predicate crimes; while
the term series means at least two predicate crimes of the same kind (Ejercito vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006). Thus, a single predicate crime
amounting to 50 million pesos is not plunder. The intention of the lawmakers is that if
there is only one predicate crime, the offender has to be prosecuted under the particular
crime, which is already covered by existing laws. What is punishable under the law is "acts
of plunder", which means that there should be at least, two or more, predicate crimes (See
deliberation of the Bicameral Committee on Justice, May 7, 1991).
Third - That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00 (Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).
The damages suffered by the government in diverting the road from the poblacion
to the farm of the accused shall not be considered in determining if plunder is committed.
What is important is the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by the public officer and not
the amount of damage suffered by the government.
In People vs. Joseph Estrada, Criminal Case No. 26558, September 12, 2007 -One of
the predicate crimes alleged in the information is misappropriation of the excise tax share
of Ilocos Sur. This was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. However, the following
predicate crimes were alleged and proven by evidence (1) series of acts of receiving
collections from "jueteng" in the aggregate amount of P545,291,000.00; and (2) series
consisting of two acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS to purchase shares of stock of Belle
Corporation and collecting or receiving commission from the sales of Belle Shares in the
amount of P189,700,000.00. This pattern of criminal acts indicates an overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth in the amount of more than P50 million.
Estrada was convicted of plunder.
person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups
(the "spokes"). Under the chain conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics
or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much
the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and
wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer (Fernan, Jr. vs.
People, G.R. No. 145927, August 24, 2007). An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein
there is only one conspiracy involved was the conspiracy alleged in the information for
plunder filed against former President Estrada and his co-conspirators. Former President
Estrada was the hub while the spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that
enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth (GMA vs. People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19,
2016, Bersamin).
In case of several individuals are charged with plunder, the law requires that there
must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons
(GMA vs. People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016, Bersamin). In the Enrile vs. People, G.R. No.
213455, August 11, 2015, if the allegation is true, the main plunder is Senator Enrile. In
People vs. Estrada, the main plunderer is the hub or President Estrada.
If the main plunderer is unidentified, the total amount allegedly acquired by several
accused shall be divided for purposes of determining if the P50 million threshold had been
reached. In GMA vs. People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016, ten persons, where charged of
amassing, accumulating and acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating to P365,997,915.00
without identifying the main plunderer. As such, each of the 10 accused would account for
the aliquot amount of only P36,599,791.50, or exactly 1/10 of the alleged aggregate ill-
gotten wealth, which is far below the threshold value of ill-gotten wealth required for
plunder. In this situation, plunder is not committed.
If the main plunderer is identified, the total amount acquired by him and his co-
conspirators shall be considered in determining if the P50 million threshold had been
reached. For example, if GMA was identified as a main plunder, her acts and that of the
other conspirators in amassing, accumulating and acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating
to P365,997,915.00 shall be considered for purposes of determining if the P50 million
threshold had been reached. In this situation, plunder is committed.
In Enrile vs. People, G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015, it was stated that in the crime
of plunder, the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by Senator, his assistant, and a private
individuals in a conspiracy is immaterial for as long as the total amount amassed, acquired
or accumulated by them is at least P50 million.
67. Wire-tapping - MMDA officer is extorting money from a driver of a vehicle, who
committed trafficking violation along Edsa. The officer threatened the driver that he will
confiscate her drivers license unless she will give him P500.00. However, MMDA officer is
not aware that his act of extorting money is being video-recorder by a passenger. The
passenger violated the Anti-Wire Tapping Law. The recording of private conversations
without the consent of the parties contravenes the provisions of RA No. 4200. The law
covers even those recorded by persons privy to the private communications. The law is
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applicable even if the conversation being recorder pertains to criminal extortion (Mamba
vs. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1110, June 25, 2001). Passenger is criminally liable for violating
law. On the other hand, MMDA officer is liable for attempted robbery. However, in proving
attempted robbery, the driver cannot use the recording since the same is not admissible in
evidence.
66. Hazing - Prior to RA No. 8049, the consent of the victim to hazing and lack of
intent to kill will negate dolo. Hence, the crime committed only reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide (Villareal vs. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012). Congress
instead of amending RPC created a special law (RA No. 8049) to make hazing malum
prohibitum, where consent of the victim and lack of intent to kill is not a defense and the
mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem shall not be appreciated (Dungo vs. People,
G.R. No. 209464, July 01, 2015).
The elements of the crime of hazing are: (1) That there is an initiation rite or
practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or
organization; (2) That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity,
sorority or organization; and (3) That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and
other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological
suffering or injury (Dungo vs. People, supra; People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February
18, 2015). Organization includes companies, PNP, AFP (People vs. Bayabos). Even the
president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a corporation engaged in
hazing as a requirement for employment are covered by the law (Dungo vs. People, supra).
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct
participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that
(1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school
authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive
action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof (People vs. Bayabos).
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The accused claim that the information avers a criminal charge of hazing by actual
participation, but the only offense proved during the trial was hazing by inducement. The
information alleged that the accused during a planned initiation rite and being then officers
of APO fraternity used personal violence upon a neophyte resulting to his death. The
"planned initiation rite" as stated in the information included the act of inducing victim to
attend it. Accused not only induced victim to be present at the resort, but they actually
brought him there. The hazing would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts
of the petitioners that induced the victim to be present (Dungo vs. People, supra).
67. Cybercrime - The following constitute cybercrime offenses: (1) Offenses against
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems; (2) Computer-
related offenses; and (3) content-related offenses (cyber libel, cybersex and cyber child
pornography).
Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and
systems are:
a. Illegal Access Illegal access refer is committed by any person, who shall access
to the whole or any part of a computer system without right. Ethical hackers are
professionals who employ tools and techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither
damage the target systems nor steal information. Since the ethical hacker does his job with
prior permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage
cybercrime law on illegal access (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February
11, 2014).
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e. Misuse of Devices Misuse of devise is committed by any person, who shall use,
produce, sell, procure, import, distribute, or otherwise make available, or possession with
intent to use, without right any of the following: (1) a device, including a computer
program, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing any cybercrime; or
(2) a computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of a
computer system is capable of being accessed with intent that it be used for the purpose of
committing any cybercrime;
Using the name of another person and his pictures in opening a facebook account
without authority constitutes cybercrime offense.
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a. Cyber libel Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyber
libel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code, already punishes it. Online defamation constitutes similar means for
committing libel (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 20335, February 18. 2014).
Cyber libel is an unlawful or prohibited act of libel as defined in Article 355 of RPC
committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised
in the future. In case libel is committed through use of information and communications
technologies, the penalty for libel under Article 355 of RPC shall be increased one degree
higher pursuant to Section 6 of RA No. 10175.
The place where libelous article was accessed by the offended party in the internet
is not equivalent to the place where the libelous article is printed and first published. To
rule otherwise is to allow the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360,
and that was the indiscriminate laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-
flung areas, to harass an accused. At any rate, Article 360 still allow offended party to file
the civil or criminal complaint for internet libel in their respective places of residence
(Bonifacio vs. RTC, Makati, Branch 149, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010).
b. Cybersex Cybersex under RA No. 10175 is committed by any person, who shall
wilfully engage, maintain, control, or operate, directly or indirectly, any lascivious
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor
or consideration.
73. Other cybercrime offense - Other cybercrime offense is also committed by any
person who shall wilfully abet or aid in the commission of any of the cybercrime offenses or
any person who wilfully attempts to commit any of the cybercrime offenses (Section 5).
Under Section 6 of RA No. 10175, the penalty for crimes punishable under special
laws committed through and with the use of information and communication technologies
shall be one degree higher than that provided the law. However, this provision requires the
application of the rules on graduation of penalties under the Revised Penal Code. Hence,
Section 6 finds application only if special law involved has adopted the technical
nomenclature of the penalties of Revised Penal Code.
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