On balance, economic sanctions are reducing the threat Russia poses to Western Interests

Background
Advantages
Sanctions Effective
Ukraine not Western Interest
Pushes Ukraine to West
Hurts Oil Tech
Undermines Putin
Angers Elites
Disrupts Russian Political Leadership
Inducing Regime Change
Created Recession
Coercive Diplomacy
Impact: Reduces aggression
Impact: Reduces Ukraine War
January Specific
Ukraine Impacts
Impact: Syria Cooperation
Democratization
Deterrence
Better than Military
Hurts Russian Military
Link: Spending down
Link: Access to Tech Down
Russian Military Spending/Modernization Bad
Overviews
Russia wanted more
Econ link alt causality
Capital Flight
State of Russia
R/T Neg
R/T Human Rights Abuses
R/T No Change in Ukraine
R/T Iran Pivot
R/T China Pivot
R/T Offsets Sanctions Impact
R/T Gas Deal
China Pivot Good
R/T Support to Syria
De-Links
 TURNS
R/T Putin Approval Rating
R/T Propaganda
R/T Nationalism
R/T Destabilizes Russia
R/T Loose Nukes
R/T Natural Gas Suspension
R/T Hurts Western Economies
R/T Russia Leaves the Dollar
R/T Russia Diversifies Economy
R/T Import Substitution
R/T Countersanctions
R/T Cyber
R/T Democratic Backsliding
R/T Small Arms Transfers
R/T Russia wants to sell more
R/T Triggers widespread civil wars
R/T Space, Bitch
R/T Siloviki Gain power
R/T Russian Economy Rebounding
R/T Destabilization Shift
NEG Disads
Human Rights Abuses
Retaliation
Cyber
Aggression
R/T Abandoned NovoRossiya
R/T Instituted Ceasefire
January Specific
Political Warfare
Support to Syria
Brinksmanship with NATO
NATO Military Spending Bad
Geopolitical Shift
China
Iran
Natural Gas Suspension
Splinters NATO
Democratic Backsliding
Increases conflict
Nationalism
 Econ Root Cause of Russian problems
Hurts Western Economies
Angers Russian People
Food Shortages
Destabilizes Russia
Impact: Loose Nukes
Dollar Hegemony
Black Market
Space, Bitch
Overviews
No Threat auto-negate
Econ causality delink
Russia didnt want more
Squo worsening
R/T Aff
R/T Threat
R/T Cyber Threat
R/T Iran example of success
R/T Deterrence
R/T Hurts Russian Military
Disad: Russian Military Modernization Good
R/T Undermines Putin
R/T Pits Elites Against Putin
R/T Undermines Iran
R/T OIl Hegemony via Saudi Arabia
R/T Reduces Aggression
R/T Sanctions Effective
R/T Smart Sanctions
R/T Naming and Shaming
R/T Social Movements Increase
R/T Oil Tech Sanctions
R/T Prevents Arctic Development
R/T Hurts Turkey
R/T Legitimizes ILaw
R/T Decreases FDI
R/T UN Syria Resolution
R/T Reserve/Running Outta Money
R/T Budapest Memorandum/Military Alt
R/T Ceasefire
R/T Less Arms Trade
R/T Coercive Diplomacy
Background
Definition of Econ Sanction
http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Russia/sanctions-after-crimea-have-they-worked/EN/index.htm

There are three types of economic sanctions. The first restricts access to Western financial markets and services for
designated Russian state-owned enterprises in the banking, energy, and defence sectors. The second places an
embargo on exports to Russia of designated high-technology oil exploration and production equipment. The third is an embargo on exports to
Russia of designated military and dual-use goods.

Stop military export to Russia

Stokholm International Peace Research Institute, EU Arms embargo on Russia
http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/Russia/Russia.pdf

The sanctions prohibit any involvement in the supply of arms and services related to military
to Russia or dual use items for military use or military end-users in Russia by nationals of EU
states or from the territories of EU states, unless contracts or agreements for such supplies had been concluded before 1
august 2014. The prohibition includes involvement in transport or financing of arms and dual use goods for military use for Russia. The

prohibition includes the export of items that are to be subsequently re-exported from Russia to a third country. In addition the import,

purchase or transport of arms from Russia was prohibited, unless contracts or agreements had been concluded before 1 august 2014 and with

the exception of items and services necessary for the maintenance of equipment already within the EU. The embargo was initially in place until

31 July 2015 but it was extended in June 2015, until 31 January 2016.
Advantages
Sanctions Effective
Sanctions could Make Putin Change His Policies
Ben-Gad, Michael (Professor of Economics at City University in London). The Tiny Estonian Town That Could Spell
the End of NATO. Published March 25, 2014 http://theconversation.com/the-tiny-estonian-town-that-could-spell-
the-end-of-nato- 24679
So what is to be done? The only realistic policy available is the imposition of economic sanctions that would cut Russia off from world markets.
Vladimir Putin, who so far has run rings around his western
Such a policy would leave it unable to export its gas to the West.

counterparts, would no longer be able to sustain his governments budget. The hyperinflation and
shortages that would ensue might just make the idea of further adventurism abroad unpopular and force him to
consider rapprochement with the West.

Russian banks cant refinance

Rankin, Jennifer. "As Tensions in Ukraine Mount, Could Tougher Sanctions against Russia Work?"
Theguardian.com. Guardian News and Media, 05 May 2014. Web.
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/04/tensions-ukraine-mount-sanctions- russia-work>.
The effects [of sanctions] would cascade down the economy, as banks and firms struggled to raise funds to roll
over debts worth $193bn that need to be refinanced this year. "If they can't refinance then it
means higher interest rates, it means less investment, it means less and less growth, and
more capital flight and pressure on the rouble," said Timothy Ash of Standard Bank. This scenario spells deeper pain for
an economy already hurting. Despite Putin's drive to stop wealthy Russians squirrelling away their riches in foreign countries, the
country has been haemorrhaging capital. Almost $64bn was moved out in the first three
months of 2014, as much as in the whole of 2013. Since the start of the year, stock markets
have lost 14% of their value and the rouble is down 8% against the dollar. Russia's credit rating has been
downgraded to one notch above junk and growth is expected to stall completely this year. This for a population used to average annual growth

as high as 7% in Putin's first two terms.

Ukraine not Western Interest
Ukraine cant be a buffer state
Mitchell, Wess. Why Ukraine Cant be a Buffer State. February 20th, 2015. http://cepa.org/content/why-ukraine-
cant-be-buffer-state
the idea that making Ukraine into a buffer state can offer a solution to the mounting
In short,
conflict there is a fantasy. Even getting Ukraine to the point where it could be a sustainable,
nonaligned entity would require the West to feed it, arm it and give it coherent, defendable
bordersall things that we are currently not willing to do. We would have to pump into its economy many times
the amount of money currently on offer from the International Monetary Fund and large Western donor states. The current course of denying

military aid while providing a trickle of monetary support is likely to lead, not to an Eastern European Finland, but to a rickety statelet that

is susceptible to subversion and eventual state-capture.

Pushes Ukraine to West
Russian sanctions on Ukraine are going to force Ukrainian integration into the European
economy.
Worstall, Tim. Russia and EU Play Tit for Tat With Sanctions Over Ukraine. December 22nd,
2015.http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/12/22/russia-and-eu-play-tit-for-tat-with-sanctions-over-
ukraine/
Then theres the third set of sanctions, those against the Ukraine by Russia over the new EU trade deal. Yes, this does punish the Ukraines

economyas well as Russias, of course. But the situation here is more complex. Theres very little the Ukraine produces which is of a quality

that anyone in Europe will actually pay for it. Some bulk items possibly, a few specialist metals certainly, but almost no consumer goods would

be purchased by Europeans at any price at all. Russia is the natural outlet for those products so banning their import will indeed, contrary to the

normal effect of sanctions, affect the Ukrainian economy. In the longer term though those sanctions are going to have the opposite effect.
Ukrainian industry, if denied that outlet for cheap and not very good goods to the east, is
simply going to have to upgrade to export to the European market. And goods which find a
ready market there are going to, almost certainly, end up being over specified for the Russian
market in the future. Thus by imposing sanctions against Ukraine Russia is simply accelerating
the integration into the European economyexactly the thing they are trying to prevent.
Hurts Oil Tech
Russia wont be able to expand oil sector at all until 2020 at earliest
Stratfor Global Intelligence. Russia Begins to Buckle Under Sanctions Pressure. September 2015.
https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/russia-begins-buckle-under-sanctions-pressure
Thesanctions have delayed long- and medium-term projects. On Sept. 15, an Energy Ministry official noted that
the ministry does not expect drilling to return to the Arctic Sea until 2020 at the earliest .
ExxonMobil and Rosneft began drilling in the Kara Sea last August, but the United States ratcheted up sanctions the following month, forcing
the first oil from
ExxonMobil to pull out of the project entirely. Pushing back the development timetable by six years likely means that
the project will not come online until the second half of the 2020s, if not later, instead of
during the crucial 2020-2025 period. Moreover, sanctions somewhat inhibit access to technology for shale oil and gas
development. As many of Western Siberia's Soviet-era fields decline, Russia needs reinvestment, redevelopment and the discovery of new

resources just to maintain its current production levels.

Undermines Putin
1 - TURN: Strong leaders in crises often experience short term gains from rally round the flag
effect, but this declines over time
Nicu Popescu. Sanctions and Russia: Lessons from the Cold War. European Union Institute for Security Studies.
October 2015. http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_10_sanctions.pdf
One of the main arguments against sanctions is that they have bolstered Putin domestically. The belief propagated by the Russian media that

the country is at war, is reinforcing the rally-round-the-flag effect and ensuring that the Russian presidents approval ratings remain high at
International crises often strengthen leaders in the short term
least for now. Yet this is nothing unusual.
only to doom them at a later stage. Examples abound: in 1913 Russia celebrated with great pomp and much public display of
unity 300 years of the Romanov dynasty. Within less than four years, the Tsar was toppled and, one year later, shot. Or take the case of Serbias

former president Slobodan Milosevic. The bombing campaign by NATO against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999 led to a brief boost in his

popularity, and he even called an early presidential election in 2000 with the hope of cementing another term. But he lost, refused to

acknowledge defeat and was eventually ousted amidst street protests. Wars themselves, not just politicians, can also be popular, particularly in

their initial phases. The outbreak of the First World War was heralded with a wave of jingoism in many European states. Some of them

including the Russian and Habsburg empires collapsed just a few years later.

LEADS TO read the 55 percent and declining, gains tapering off

2 - TURN: Putin softening anti-western rhetoric over the past two months
The Economist. As Russias economy shrinks, Vladimir Putin softens his tone. 8th December 2015.
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21679701-popular-president-muffles-his-anti-western-rhetoric-russias-
economy-shrinks-vladimir-putin
But most of the speech was more pacific, focusing on the economy, the need to prepare for low oil prices, and social issues. Ukraine was not

mentioned; Crimea appeared only briefly. Anti-Americanism

was nearly absent. No one expects the Kremlin
to make an about-face in its opposition to the West, but the shift in tone was notable . Mr Putin
may simply be reading the weather. Recent polling by the independent Levada Centre finds that 75% of Russians think relations with the West

should be improved. Mr Putin may also be reconsidering the wisdom of further antagonising the outside world. Russias economy is in a

precarious state, as he came close to acknowledging in his speech: By changing nothing, we will simply run out of reserves and the economic

growth rates will linger around zero.

Angers Elites
Divide between Putin and elites means that political change will produce more moderate
future leaders
Anna Mostovych. Rift emerging between Putin and his circle Russian analyst. EuroMadian Press. February
2015. http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/02/05/rift-emerging-between-putin-and-his-circle-russian-
analyst/#arvlbdata
There are interests here of the ruling corporation, the thieving, Chekist corporation, and then there are the personal interests of Mr. Putin.

With increasing pressure a very significant gap is appearing here: Putin is interested in his personal power and his inner circle is not. And at

some point, it(the inner circle) inevitably will conclude that Putin is hurting the corporation ,
Piontkovsky said. He noted that the Russian elite is not interested in a total rupture with the West,
where it has assets and a certain lifestyle, and does not want the total isolation of Russia and
its leader. According to Piontkovksy , when a split takes place between the interests of Putin and those of the ruling elite, new people will
somehow come to power. They will not be Sakharovs or Mandelas but rather some post-Putin Ivanov-Sechenovs. He also believes they will be
forced to distance their policies from the fiasco brought about by Putin and, especially to
fully review their relations with the West. When it comes to relations with Ukraine, he thinks that during this period the
desperate residents of Luhandosiya will disappear immediately, and the new government will begin some serious negotiations with Ukraine

on the issue of Crimea. At that point it will be possible to speak about a new stage of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

Hurting the economic interests of senior government officials would undermine Putin.
Sofer, Ken. "Concrete Steps to Address the Crisis in Ukraine." Center For American Progress. N.p., Mar. 2014. Web.
4 May 2014.
In addition to preparing new, targeted sanctions, the U.S. government can readily impose sanctions on existing violators of human rights within

Russia, as covered by the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012.45 U.S. and European governments can also more rigorously

enforce existing laws against organized crime syndicates and money laundering that could ensnare many Russian government officials and key
damage to the economic interests of senior
business leaders who support the Putin government.46 The subsequent
government officials and Russian business leaders, who represent a vital constituency for
President Putin, could cause enough domestic political backlash to force Putin to take a more
conciliatory approach to the crisis.
Disrupts Russian Political Leadership
Economic and political elites are confused and have begun infighting
Donald Jensen. Russias Elites Battle Over a Shrinking Economic Pie. Institute of Modern Russia. 21 October
2015. http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/politics/2454-russia%E2%80%99s-elites-battle-over-a-shrinking-economic-
pie
Inside the ruling elite, longstanding competition over power and property has intensified as the resource
base has shrunk. The economic storm has caused bewilderment and nervousness at the top, according to one expert, since the
elites did not anticipate the Wests determination to impose effective sanctions and underestimated
the effects of those sanctions. Some power players are reportedly critical of Putin in private but cannot challenge

his authority, since he could easily crush them. Longstanding tensions among the leaders who seek to replace Dmitry
Medvedev as prime minister, and thereby formally become Putins heir apparent, lie just
below the surface. Especially noteworthy has been the increased rivalry among the large state
corporations controlled by the so-called siloviki. Energy giant Rosneft has revived a proposal to split off the transport
arm of Gazprom, its great adversary, as part of a reorganization of the natural gas sector. (Gazprom has had its performance roundly criticized
On the one hand, the crisis generally works
by a number of experts, government officials, and reportedly Putin himself).
in favor of economic liberals and supporters of a conservative budget and structural reforms.
On the other hand, despite their differences, the siloviki are digging in and trying to legitimize their
influence on economic policy and secure control of key cash flows. Putin was widely reported to have relied
on a tight circle of advisors from the power ministries in the planning and execution of Operation Crimea last year and as the invasion of
As the
Ukraine unfolded. (As a rule, Putin prefers to deal with foreign policy and national security issues over domestic policy.)
economic crisis has come to the fore, however, he has relied more frequently on the
government apparatus. Putin reportedly is increasingly suspicious of oligarchs who have
retained their wealth as a result of their loyalty to him and who are being hurt by Western
sanctions (several of whom are skeptical about the war in Ukraine).
Inducing Regime Change
Sanctions show international solidarity with domestic social movements, causes
surrender/victory (Dmitriy Gershenson London School of Economics)
Dmitriy Gershenson, London School of Economics. Vol. 69, No. 274 (May, 2002), pp. 185-206)."Sanctions and Civil
Conflict". Accessed December 22, 2015. Published May 2002. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3549072.pdf.
Throughout this paper, I treat strength of sanctions s and offence efficiency 0 as parameters independent of each other. More generally,

however, 0 can depend on s; i.e. 0 = O(s). Then, a negative effect of s on 0 signifies what Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1992, p. 156) call a 'rally-

around-the-flag' effect, i.e. greater resolve of the incumbent group to continue its policies in defiance of the pressure from abroad.22 Levy
At the same time,
(1999) suggests that, at least at some point, such was an effect of the international sanctions on South Africa.
international sanctions, by showing the world's solidarity with the challenger, can have
positive impact on the challenger's resolve. Lowenberg and Kaempfer (1998, p. 192) note that
the anti-apartheid sanctions helped the black majority to 'organize collective actions among
its members'. Thus, by treating 0 as independent of s, I assume that those two effects cancel out. The proposed analytical framework,
however, can easily accommodate situations when 0 is a function of s. Figure 1 illustrates these findings. Deterrence is the equilibrium for

sufficiently weak sanctions s (which makes victory attractive for the incumbent) and low offence efficiency parameter 0 (which makes

deterrence less expensive). If 0 is high, which makes deterrence expensive, and s is low (to guarantee the attractiveness of victory for the

incumbent), the equilibrium is engagement. The deterrence-engagement threshold value of 0 is a decreasing function of s. High s makes victory

more desirable for the challenger and less attractive for the incumbent. If s is high, the incumbent is less willing to select relatively more
In other words, the exogenous increase in the severity of
expensive deterrence to ensure its victory.
sanctions s induces shifts from deterrence (if 0 was sufficiently low) to engagement and then
to surrender. The results imply that the presence of sanctions is a necessary condition for
surrender; if s = 0, then the equilibria are either engagement or deterrence.24 The model also predicts that severe
sanctions lead to surrender. To understand the impact of sanctions on the expected utility of the challenger group, we need to
evaluate the function CB(s, 9) for s E [0, 1] and 8 > 0. My findings, derived in Appendix B, are illustrated by the indifference Weak sanctions can

hurt the challenger. The inefficiency of the challenger in his struggle against the incumbent (low 0) and the heavy burden of sanctions that falls

on the challenger (low A) exacerbate this effect. These results evolve because of the twofold impact of sanctions. On the one hand,
sanctions make the challenger's victory more likely. On the other hand, sanctions reduce incomes in the economy if
the challenger fails. For weak sanctions the latter effect outweighs the former, while for strong sanctions the reverse is true.26 This relatively

stronger negative impact of weak sanctions on the challenger's expected utility explains why the switch from deterrence to engagement

resulting from an increase in sanctions' strength reduces the expected utility of the challenger (a move to a lower indifference curve in Figure

2). In addition, as shown in Appendix B, the lower the value of A is, the more elongated the indifference curves are. That means that, if the

challenger bears the heavy burden of sanctions (low A), then weak sanctions are more likely to hurt the challenger.
Sanctions influence behavior by creating a divide between the public and the elites and
shifting power within the target state (Susan Hannah Allen University of Mississippi)
Susan Hannah Allen, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, University of Mississippi, Oxford, Vol. 52, No. 6 (Dec.,
2008), pp. 916-944.). The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions. Accessed December 22, 2015.
Published December 2008. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27638645.pdf?acceptTC=true.
Despite the frequency with which economic sanctions are implemented, very little is understood about how these measures can and do bring

about the political change they are initiated to create. With so much attention on whether or not sanctions work, research addressing why,

how, and by what processes sanctions influence behavior has only recently begun to emerge (Blanchard and Ripsman 1999/2000; Rowe 2001;
Conventional wisdom suggests that economic
Brooks 2002; Kirshner 2002; Marinov 2005; Lektzian and Sprecher 2007).
sanctions can influence the behavior of leaders by imposing economic hardship on the
targeted public, who in turn will pressure their government to yield to the demands of the
initiating states (Galtung 1967; Renwick 1981; Lindsay 1986; Nossal 1989). This view of sanctions has influenced American foreign
policy toward a variety of countries, but there is very little empirical evidence as to whether this is what actually occurs on the ground in states

targeted by sanctions. To test this causal mechanism, I examine how sanctions affect the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in

targeted countries. Does antigovernment activity become more common under sanctions, suggesting that the population may be empowered

by the actions of the international community or may believe their rulers to be weakened by the sanctions? All actors within a state have tools

to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the regime. As Huntington (1968, 196) points out, "the wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike;

mobs demonstrate; and the military coup." Given this understanding of state-society relations, I examine whether these activities increase

when economic sanctions are in place. In this article, I explore how international economic sanctions can be used to the greatest effect to

create policy change, probing how economic sanctions affect the domestic political dynamics of targeted states. The findings presented here
As states become more
suggest that domestic political response to sanctions varies greatly by the regime type of the target.
politically open, the domestic public can and does, to some degree create political costs for
leaders who resist sanctions.Conversely, in autocratic states, leaders may actually benefit from sanctions, as domestic publics
are unable to impose political costs and the economic constraints of sanctions often allow leaders to extract greater rents while overseeing the

trade of scarce goods. In light of these findings, current sanctions policy particularly U.S. sanctions policy, which frequently targets states with

closed political systems may be flawed. To increase efficacy, the domestic political institutions of the target state must be taken into account

directly. Economic Coercion and Political Consequences The modern concept of sanctioning developed from the early warfare tactic of the

siege, whereby an attacker hoped to close off a walled city to such an extent that the citizens inside would be starved into submission (Simons

1999). The basic expectation is that sanctioning states apply economic pressure to bring about a change in political behavior of the targeted
I start from the assumption that states
states. Despite formal work by Smith (1996) and some anecdotal evidence,
impose sanctions to inflict economic costs on targets with a view to alter another state's
behavior.1 Following from the logic of the siege, it is unsurprising that the economic effect of
sanctions and the resultant isolation has been considered the single most important predictor
of the coercive impact of these measures (Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997; Drury 1998; Crawford 1999; Hart
2000). The Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990) study shows that successful sanctions have an average economic impact of a 2.4 percent
Economic effectiveness allows a
decrease in GDP, while failed sanctions have an impact of only a 1.0 percent decrease.
sender state to put pressure on the economy of the target state with the expectation that
economic deprivation caused by sanctions will create shifts in power within the target state.
This logic is similar to that which underlies punishment strategies of air power (Pape 1996). When
a punishment strategy is
used (either with air power or economic sanctions), the coercive power attempts to impose
costs on civilians. Italian air-power strategist and early proponent of punishment strategies Douhet (1921) perceived that these
societal costs would create mass-elite divisions in society, and a "swift social breakdown" could be achieved if elites could be detached from the

masses (Freedman 1998). Douhet, in particular, advocated punishing bombing campaigns against urban centers to break the morale of the

enemy population, with the idea that inflicting high costs on civilians leads to popular uprising and demands for the target government to

change its behavior to end the suffering of its people. Recently, the morality of punishment strategies (both in terms of sanctions and air

power) has been questioned, and efforts have been made to diminish the general impact of sanctions with the imposition of targeted

sanctions, often in the form of financial sanctions on the private wealth of political figures. Theoretically, this is a good solution, but many

practical challenges arise in implementation (Cortright, Lopez, and Rogers 2002). The punishment logic is still consistent, however. Even in cases

in which elites are targeted, sanctioners

aim to alter the power relationships within the target state,
dividing masses from elites. In practice, high levels of economic impact, and thus, civilian
punishment have not always resulted in compliance by the target state, as recent sanctions
episodes in Yugoslavia and Iraq demonstrate. Scholars have noted that there is no easily discernable transmission
mechanism that causes social suffering to be translated into political change, even in democratic states, much less autocratic states (Jentleson

2000; Lopez 1999; Baldwin 1985). The economic hardship created by the Serb-led government of the crumbling former Yugoslavia led not to

political action but to greater focus on survival, which caused sanctions to fail (Woodward 1995). While the basic cost hypothesis does depict

part of the story of sanctions, it ignores the possibility of adaptation by the target and does not go far enough in its explanation of the coercive

mechanism behind sanctions (Galtung 1967; Renwick 1981). Regardless of the amount of the economic pressure exerted, without political

costs, there is no reason for targeted states to comply (Blanchard and Ripsman 1999/2000). Sanctions policies that are thought to fail often do
To effect
have economic effects, but that impact is not successfully translated into the desired political out come (Kirshner 1997).
change, sanctions must be politically costly relative to the issue at stake between the target
and the sender (Morgan and Schwebach 1996). According to Losman (1979, 128), concede, targeted states
must sufficiently value the benefits gained by compliance. When sanctions succeed, the
benefits of compliance exceed the value of the offending behavior that triggered the
sanctions initially. In this view, sanctions are a bargaining tool rather than a punitive one. By imposing sanctions, a sending state hopes
to increase its bargaining leverage over the target. Successful sanctions then serve to encourage dialogue to
gain compliance rather than creating isolation to do so (Cortright and Lopez 2000). From this perspective,
sanctions may also be designed to create international political costs in addition to the domestic ones that are the focus of this study,2 but

unless there are political costs imposed on the leader, sanctions are unlikely to alter the status quo policy.
Strong correlation between levels of economic hardship and drive for internal political
change, prerequisite (Susan Hannah Allen University of Mississippi)
Susan Hannah Allen (Department of Political Science: University of Mississippi, Oxford. The Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 52, No. 6 (Dec., 2008), pp. 916-944.). The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions.
Accessed December 22, 2015. Published December 2008.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27638645.pdf?acceptTC=true.
Sanctions and the Politics of the Target State Domestic political change in the target state is often a goal for
sanctions-sending states. Roughly 20 percent of cases in the Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (HSE) data (1990) have political
destabilization of the target state as a goal. A greater percentage (roughly 70 percent) involve demands for smaller alterations in domestic

policies in the target state. How such changes can and do come about is not well understood (Rowe 2001). As discussed above, the level
of economic hardship that sanctions can create is critical to their success , as a positive relationship
between economic hardship and internal conflict is expected. When the population feels the pinch of sanctions, this deprivation logic of
As the economic pressure rises, coercive influence increases.
sanctions anticipates a political response.
Bearing the pain of sanctions is not in the national interest of states, especially if the issue at stake is of
lesser value. Embedded in this understanding of sanctions is the assumption that the opposition in the target state feels a sense of common

cause (however vague) with the sender state and that it will bring further pressure to bear on its government, which forces concession. While
the deprivation
not all antigovernment activity that occurs during a given sanctions episode is directly caused by sanctions,
perspective suggests that there will be a significant increase in antigovernment activity under
sanctions as the public experiences economic hardship. From the deprivation perspective, it is assumed that the
response of targeted populations will be consistent regardless of the political context. In the face of any external threat, however, the

interactions between the ruler and the ruled are complex. The domestic politics of the targeted state may greatly influence the response to

sanctions pressure. Drawing on rational-actor explanations of political violence (Jenkins and Schock 1992), I explore the possibility that the

opportunities afforded by domestic political institutions will moderate the relationship between political action and economic hardship.

Following the political-opportunities explanation of political violence, I suggest that targeted publics will take action against their government

when the benefits associated with such action are high and the costs are reasonably low. When sanctions are in place, this pattern should be

more pronounced than in their absence. The deprivation explanation for the coercive impact of sanctions suggests that there
are limits
to what a society can and is willing to withstand, and after that threshold is reached, political
disintegration will quickly occur. Following this logic, one likely consequence of sanctions is
internal conflict, as sanctions exacerbate divisions in society. As citizens begin to feel the
economic burden of sanctions, they may be motivated to act to encourage their government
to concede to sanctions pressure. The idea that economic hardship caused by sanctions will
lead to political action closely resembles that of relative deprivation theories of political
violence (Gurr 1970), which suggest that when citizens have a sense that they are entitled to a
certain level of goods but feel as though they are unable to attain that level ("value expectations"
exceed "value capabilities"), their frustrations will lead them to lash out at the government. The
economic scarcity caused by sanctions can heighten feelings of deprivation, and relative
deprivation theories suggest that these feelings should lead to action against the
government. Collective interest in survival leads to collective action.
If Putin fails to uphold contract, political dynamic will change when economy plummets (Julia
Ioffe New Republic)
Julia Ioffe (Princeton University, New Republic). Vladimir Putin Might Fall. We Should Consider What Happens
Next. Accessed December 25, 2015. Published August 6, 2014. https://newrepublic.com/article/118995/if-
sanctions-against-russia-succeed-what-follows-putin.
If the first round of U.S. sanctions was met with ridicule among the Kremlin eliteVladimir Putins gray cardinal Vladislav Surkov, sanctioned

back in March, joked that what he likes in the United States is Tupac Shakur, dead since 1996theres not much bluster this time around. Now,

Gennady Timchenko, who magically became a billionaire many times over since his old friend Putin came to power, is overcoming his allergy to

the limelight to moan publicly about how he cant go on vacation to southern France with his family or visit his 19-year-old son at university in

Switzerland. Our public opinion is given to underestimating them, but these sanctions are much more serious, says Sergei Markov, a Putinist

hawk who sits on the foreign affairs committee in the Russian Civic Chamber. Theyre not personal, theyre sectoral. So theyll affect a fairly

large number of people. Additionally, they will affect businesses that are most crucial to the Russian economy. And theyll hit the population.

Maybe it wont be immediate, but it will happen. However, leaving aside the question of whether or not sanctions are necessary punishment

for Putins reckless policy in eastern Ukraine, has the West really considered what will happen if they are
successful? The reservations expressed on both sides of the Atlantic have mostly been about the impact on Western economies, rather
than on what would happen inside Russia. Heres a hint: Russias economy would collapse faster and quicker

than Europes, says Chris Weafer, a prominent (and normally bullish) Russian market analyst and senior partner with Macro-Advisory. And
that brings with it a huge problem. Putins tacit social contract with the Russian people is
based on a very basic exchange: Putin makes sure the Russian people become materially
better off, and the Russian people leave the politics to Putin . So far, both sides have delivered. The crushing
majority of Russians support the Kremlins line or avoid politics like the plague, and the GDP per capita has increased from $1,771 when Putin
If there were a material
came to power in 2000, to more than $14,000 today. Thats a faster growth rate than Chinas.
change in the way people live in Russia, says Weafer, wed see a change in the political dynamic
like weve never seen before.
Created Recession
Power of dollar meant that cut-off caused capital flight capital flight doubled from 2013 to
2014
Daniel Drezner, Tufts University. Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance, International Interactions.
International Interactions. August 2015. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03050629.2015.1041297
Another way that financial sanctions seemed different was that they generated fewer incentives for third-party actors to defect from the

sanctions regime. As previously noted, with trade sanctions, the incentive to act illicitly is considerable. With financial sanctions, the calculation

of costs and benefits changes because of American preeminence. By any metric, the United States has been the undisputed financial hegemon
International financial actors needed
as financial sanctions have been developed as a policy tool (Drezner 2007, 2014).
access to US capital marketsand US dollarsto conduct cross-border transactions. This
access matters more to banks and nonbank financial actors than the potential profits from
violating US Treasury regulations. Once banks factor in the potential implications of getting caught, the sanctions busting
incentive is much lower. Banks are concerned about the reputational and financial costs of being prosecuted for violating sanctions. These

dynamics mean that market forces strengthen financial sanctions, whereas they tend to weaken trade sanctions. In
2014, for example, more than $150 billion in private sector capital left Russia so as to avoid the
prospect of financial sanctions, more than double the figure of 2013.2

The Russian public has take notice of the economic downturn and specifically attribute it to
sanctions.
Simond De Galbert, Center for Strategic & International Studies 2015 A Year of Sanctions against Russia Now
What? October 2015. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-economics-deterring-russia-12945>
The Russian public recognizes the economic impact sanctions are having in Russia. Recent data released by the Pew Research Center,18 built on
suggests that 45 percent of those polled believe sanctions to
a survey conducted in Russia in early 2015,
have a major effect on the Russian economy, and 33 percent blame Western sanctions for
Russias economic struggles (33 percent blame falling oil prices, while only 25 percent believe current government policies to be
responsible for the current economic situation). In addition, 73 percent acknowledge that Russias economic situation is worsening, up from 44

percent who held that view a year ago.

Russia has already seen empiric harms to their GDP (-1.7%), real wages, and poverty rates.
Mark Thompson CNN 2015 How badly have sanctions hit Russia? August 4, 2015.
<http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/04/news/economy/russia-sanctions-impact-imf/>
The IMF expects Russian GDP to shrink by 3.4% this year, as falling real wages, the higher cost of borrowing and shattered confidence hit
western sanctions, and Russia's retaliatory ban on imports of food and agricultural products, could be
domestic demand. And
responsible for nearly half [of the 3.4%] that decline. But longer term, the impact could be even more significant, as
the loss of access to foreign finance and technology hurts investment and makes Russia's
economy even less efficient. "Prolonged sanctions could lead to a cumulative output loss over the medium term of up to 9% of
GDP," the IMF said. Russians are feeling the pain. Unemployment has begun to creep up from very low levels, and millions more have fallen
into poverty. Anemic growth could return in 2016, according to the IMF, but Russia will have to get serious about
reform if it wants to avoid relative stagnation.

IMPACT: Putins expansionist policies are limited by Russias economy

Walter Mead, Foreign Affairs. The Return of Geopolitics. Foreign Affairs. May/June 2014. Web.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141211/walter-russell-mead/the-return-
Russia, meanwhile, has emerged as the middling revisionist: more powerful than Iran but weaker than China, more successful than China at

geopolitics but less successful than Iran. Russia has been moderately effective at driving wedges between Germany and the United States, but
Vladimir Putins preoccupation with rebuilding the Soviet Union has been
Russian President
hobbled by the sharp limits of his countrys economic power. To build a real Eurasian bloc, as
Putin dreams of doing, Russia would have to underwrite the bills of the former Soviet
republics -- something it cannot afford to do. Nevertheless, Putin, despite his weak hand, has been remarkably
successful at frustrating Western projects on former Soviet territory. He has stopped NATO expansion dead in its tracks. He has dismembered

Georgia, brought Armenia into his orbit, tightened his hold on Crimea, and, with his Ukrainian adventure, dealt the West an unpleasant and

humiliating surprise. From the Western point of view, Putin appears to be condemning his country to an ever-darker future of poverty and

marginalization. But Putin doesnt believe that history has ended, and from his perspective, he has solidified his power at home and reminded

hostile foreign powers that the Russian bear still has sharp claws.
Coercive Diplomacy
Sanctions encourage future cooperation
Richard Nephew Center for Global and Strategic Monitoring The National Interest. October 2015.
http://www.cgsmonitor.com/2015/10/07/why-sanctions-against-russia-can-still-make-a-difference/
Sanctions do not get countries to cave in or to renounce strategic objectives. Despite the strongest and most comprehensive sanctions in recent history imposed against Iran, Tehran did not
agree to scrap the nuclear infrastructure that could one day produce nuclear weapons. But sanctions forced Iran to accept significant constraints that will make doing so less likely and much

more complicated for the next decade at least.Sanctions forced Iran to compromise, not to capitulate. Sanctions wont
change Russias strategic perceptions, but they could potentially lead Moscow to compromise more, including through a
more faithful implementation of the Minsk ceasefire. There is a better chance for a real diplomatic resolution of the current

crisis with sanctions than without them.

Impact: Reduces aggression

Sanctions decrease the risk of Russia destabilizing other regions, and signal that unilateral
action for any country will come at a cost
Iana Dreyer (European Union for Security Studies). Do sanctions against Russia work?. Published Decemebr 2014.
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_35_Russia_sanctions.pdf.
sanctions is that, even if they do not help the EU much in its policy on Crimea, they do minimize
In other words, a useful effect of the
the risk that Russia will seek to openly destabilize other parts of Ukraine or, say, Moldova and
Georgia. At a global level, finally, sanctions also signaled to other actors that unilateral military
ventures will come at a cost.

Russia in deterred from seizing bigger chunks of territory

Iana Dreyer (European Union for Security Studies). Do sanctions against Russia work?. Published Decemebr 2014.
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_35_Russia_sanctions.pdf.
The sanctions, in other words, constrained Russia as they deterred Moscow from seizing even bigger
chunks of territory. The separatist areas of the Donbas form only a tiny part of what is called by nationalist elements of the Russian
public Novorossia. The coastal city of Mariupol was not seized by Russia, when it easily could have been.
There has been no attempt by Russian forces to forge a corridor bridging mainland Russia to
Crimea, let alone Odessa and Transnistria.

Impact: Reduces Ukraine War

Sanctions have prevented all-out war.
Ukraine President Poroshenko, Ukraine Today, UPDATED: Penalizing Russia will prevent more attacks -
PoroshenkoDecember 5 2015. <http://uatoday.tv/news/extension-of-sanctions-against-russia- to-prevent-
russian-offensive-poroshenko-547830.html>
Extending sanctions against Russia will provide guarantees that Russia will refrain from full-blown offensive and will also facilitate return of

temporarily occupied areas of Donbas back under Ukraine's control, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko said on Friday
addressing the troops on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. "Extension of sanctions will provide certain
guarantees that Russia will not go on a full-blown offensive, and create better conditions for
strengthening international pressure of our coalition on Moscow on the issue of the return of
the occupied areas of Donbas under the sovereignty of Ukraine," said Poroshenko . Poroshenko also
stressed that no one had forgotten about Crimea. The Ukrainian president is to visit Brussels on December 16, to dot the i's in the issue of the

extension of sanctions against Russia. Read also Lithuanian president slams Russia's aggression in Ukraine, calls for extending sanctions On

December 2, Foreign Minister of Spain said that the European Union had reached an agreement to extend the economic sanctions imposed on

the Russian Federation for another six months.

January Specific
Sanctions have established the grounds for political negotiations.
Simond de Galbert, Center for Strategic and International Studies A Year of Sanctions against Russia Now
What? October 2015
Still, sanctions could have altered the method through which these objectives were implemented. Sanctions first came as a surprise to the

Russian leadership, which assumed division within the West and the European Union would prevent any tough decisions. Sanctions
created an atmosphere that likely helped put a negotiating process in place. The
therefore
prospect of even stronger sanctions created an incentive for Russia to complete the
negotiations, first with Ukraine in September 2014, and then in February 2015 in the so-called
Normandy format (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France). This incentive might have been complemented in February 2015 by Russias

monetary situation at the time, which was only recovering from the rubles December 2014January 2015 free fall.

Ceasefire has reduced most of the fire

Simond de Galbert, Center for Strategic and International Studies A Year of Sanctions against Russia Now
What? October 2015
Whatever the exact incentive sanctions provided for negotiations, the February 2015 agreement managed to decrease the intensity of the

fighting in eastern Ukraine, even if the full implementation of the ceasefire has not yet been achieved. Clearly,
the level of
violence observed before the February 2015 Minsk agreement was much higher than what
has been observed since then by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine, despite the restrictions imposed
locally on the SMMs access and freedom of movement. However, there continue to be daily violations of the ceasefire, with the SMM

reporting 373 ceasefire violations in May, 682 in June, 871 in July, and 971 in August 2015.24

Ukraine conflict de-escalating now Number of ceasefire violations fell over holidays
Stratfor, January 5, 2016, The US could spoil Russia and Ukraines delicate compromise,
https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical- diary/us-could-spoil-russia-and-ukraines-delicate-compromise DOA: 1-5-16
Following a last-minute deal between Russia and Ukraine to extend the Minsk negotiations
into the new year, notable changes are occurring in eastern Ukraine that hint at possible
concessions made by both sides. The biggest player left out of the formal negotiations, the United States, will be important to
watch because Washington's support for Kiev and pressure on Moscow could stall early indications of progress. On Dec. 30, Russia
and Ukraine agreed to extend the deadline for implementing the Minsk protocols , which call for a
full return of the border between Russia and the separatist territories to Ukrainian control, require Kiev to decentralize power and require

elections to take place in eastern Ukraine. The extension was negotiated through the Normandy Four format, which includes France and

Germany alongside Ukraine and Russia. Moscow pushed for the extension but Ukraine wavered, disputing the requirement for elections in

eastern Ukraine and pointing out the continued cease-fire violations in the region. However, just before the four leaders involved in the talks

held their phone call, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a private call to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko that likely led to his

concession. In addition, French President Francois Hollande indicated after the four-party call that elections are part of the agreement. The
extension of the deadline appears to have led to notable changes on the battlefield in eastern
Ukraine. During the past week, cease-fire violations have decreased significantly. There had been a
relative increase in the exchange of fire following the breakdown of the withdrawal process, but over the holidays the
number of incidents dropped from more than 50 per day to about a dozen a day.

Ukraine Impacts
Unstable Ukraine could trigger security threats to Poland and rest of Europe
Terrell Jermaine Starr, December 31, 2015, What Russias been doing in Ukraine since you stopped paying
attention, http://theweek.com/articles/587241/what-russias-been-doing-ukraine-since-stopped-paying-attention
DOA: 1-5-16
But this not the time to abandon Ukraine, either. If the Kremlin
Simply put: Ukrainian politics are a mess.
succeeds in destabilizing Ukraine, it could very well create a security threat for Poland, the
NATO partner and U.S. ally, and the rest of Europe that Putin will later claim only he can
solve.

Impact: Syria Cooperation

U.S. and Russia cooperating on Syria as of YESTERDAY
David Sanger New York Times After Years of War in Syria, U.N. Passes Resolution on Talks. December 18, 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/world/middleeast/syria-talks-isis.html?_r=0
world powers agreed on Friday at the United Nations
For the first time since the nearly five-year-old Syrian civil war began,

Security Council to embrace a plan for a cease-fire and a peace process that holds the distant
prospect of ending the conflict. A resolution adopted unanimously by the Security Council
reflected a monthslong effort by American and Russian officials, who have long been at odds over the future of Syria, to
find common national interests to stop the killing, even if they cannot yet agree on Syrias ultimate future.

Russia began providing material support to Free Syrian Army (Explicitly Against Assad)
Suman Varandani. Russia Supplying Weapons, Air Support To Free Syrian Army; Putin Vows To Destroy 'Targets
Threatening' Its Forces In Syria. International Business Times. 11 December 2015.
http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-supplying-weapons-air-support-free-syrian-army-putin-vows-destroy-targets-
2221577
Russia said Friday it is supplying weapons and air support to the opposition Free Syrian Army,
which is fighting against terrorists in Syria. The comments by Russian President Vladimir Putin came during a meeting
with the Russian defense ministry. "The work of our aviation group assists in uniting the efforts of government troops and the Free Syrian
several of its units numbering over 5,000 troops are
Army," Putin said, according to local news network RT. "Now
engaged in offensive actions against terrorists, alongside regular forces, in the provinces of Homs, Hama, Aleppo and
Raqqa," he said, referring to the Free Syrian Army.
Democratization
Sergei Guriev. Financial Times Corruption Has Laid Waste to The Russian Economy. 2 April 2014.
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/939659ae-b67d-11e3-b230-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3vvv9LYIt
Other
The countrys government has always been reluctant to investigate corruption on its own territory. Russian anti-corruption activists fight an uphill battle.

governments can and should help to locate and freeze corrupt officials foreign assets. That
will undermine support for Mr Putin within Russias ruling class and support for the elite
among the general public. Both will certainly contribute to the arrival of a new, democratic
and thus peaceful Russia.

Russias political system = root cause of conflict

Thomas Bertelman. Myths About Russia and Swedish Non-Alliance. American Interest. 18 August 2015.
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/08/18/myths-about-russia-and-swedish-non-alliance/
In the absence of high oil prices, the Kremlin cannot count on the loyalty that steadily improving living conditions for the people once brought it. Now that loyalty must be secured in some

The countrys revanchist and revisionist foreign policy is therefore much more linked to
other way.

internal political conditions and to the Kremlins policy of safeguarding its interests than to any dim century-old traditions, although these
traditions partially explain why the regimes propaganda has such resonance for the people.
That Russias aggressive policy towards its neighbors is a result of the countrys dysfunctional
internal system is a more or less banal conclusion, but it has some consequences for the security of our immediate surrounding region. As a small neighboring country, we
cannot afford wishful thinking, or to close our eyes to the nature of existing risks.
Deterrence
Backing down sanctions reduces success of other sanctions by 55%
TImothy Peterson, University of South Carolina. Sending a message: the reputation effect of U.S. sanction threat
behavior. International Studies Quarterly. 2013. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/isqu.12017/epdf
Accordingly, Models 3 and 4 utilize issue-specific US sanction threat history variables. First, the coefficient for US backed down t)1 is again

negative and significant in the acquiescence equation of both of these models (p .01 in Model 3 and p .1 in Model 4), supporting hypothesis
the current targets likelihood of acquiescence
1. Substantive results are comparable to those in Models 1 and 2;
decreases on average by 55% when the United States has recently capitulated against a
resistant target (from 0.35 to 0.18 in Model 3 and from 0.46 to 0.18 in Model 4). Additionally, contrary to the aggregate history models,
the issue-specific models demonstrate some evidence for hypothesis 2.

Daniel W. Drezner (2015) Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance, International Interactions, 41:4, 755-
764, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1041297
As more foreign policy leaders become aware of the cost of financial sanctions, however, their effectiveness might change from that learning.

Paradoxically, the ability of financial sanctions to impose significant costs might lessen their use over time. Hovi et al. (2005:499) observe that
to the extent that Target considers smart sanctions more potent than traditional sanctions,
the prospect of facing smart sanctions will make Target less likely to violate international
norms. The ability of these sanctions to generate significant costs on Iran and Russia might act as a deterrent effect going for- ward.
Baldwin (1985) postulated that this could be one unobserved benefit from sanctions implementation. Peterson (2013) has
measured the deterrent effect of United States sanctions on potential target governments.
Miller (2014) has similarly demonstrated a deterrent effect of sanctions for nuclear
nonproliferation. The 2015 US National Security Strategy is equally explicit about this prospect, noting that the use of
targeted sanctions and other coercive measures are meant not only to uphold international
norms, but to deter severe threats to stability and order at the regional level (Executive
Office of the President 2015:23).

Warrant for deterrence

Ioana M. Petrescue (University of Maryland). Rethinking Economic Sanction Success: Sanctions as Deterrents.
Accessed 12/10/15. Published December 2010.
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.364.4777.
The central intuition of this paper is that economic
sanctions imposed on countries involved in militarized
conflicts show senders disapproval of militarized conflicts and a willingness to impose
economic costs on countries involved in militarized conflicts. Thus, countries that were
sanctioned due to their involvement in a militarized dispute are less likely to participate in
future disputes because they try avoiding the economic and political costs associated with
economic sanctions.
8% decrease in probability of conflict if its done by a large sender (the U.S. and EU 16x bigger
than Russia)
Ioana M. Petrescue (University of Maryland). Rethinking Economic Sanction Success: Sanctions as Deterrents.
Accessed 12/10/15. Published December 2010.
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.364.4777.
economic sanctions decrease the probability that a country in the militarized
This study finds that
dispute will participate in another dispute only if the sender is large. The deterrent effects
produced by a large sender is a drop of 8% in the probability of future disputes. The deterrent effect
is present when the GNP ratio between sender and target is larger than 100. For GNP ratio values higher than 100, the deterrent effect

increases with the GNP ratio. Thus, the larger the sender relative to the target, the larger the deterrent effect. Then, I find that decreasing trade

and aid to a country involved in a militarized dispute without imposing economic sanctions have no effect on the future military behavior of this

country.

Lack of sanctions to Putin and Russia made them emboldened.

Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics, Princeton University, 2000.
http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/i/Ignatieff_01.pdf
Even when a states domestic behavior is not a clear and present danger to the international system, it is a reliable predictor that it is likely to be so in the future.

there seems no doubt that Western

Consider the example of Hitlers regime, 193338, or Stalins in the same period. In hindsight,

governments failure to sanction or even condemn their domestic policies encouraged both
dictators to believe that their international adventures would go unpunished and unresisted.

Russia would be far deeper in Ukraine without sanctions (Frederik Kulager Politiken)
Rasmus Dam Nielsen and Frederik Kulager (Politiken). Lidegaard: EU sanctions - not Danish weapons - to get Putin
to toe the line. Accessed January 16, 2016. Published February 5, 2015.
http://politiken.dk/indland/politik/ECE2535519/lidegaard-eus-sanktioner---ikke-danske-vaaben---skal-faa-putin-til-
at-makke-ret/.
When asked what it would take before Lidegaard believe that military aid is in order, he replies: "I will not give Putin an answer book for what it

takes to get the conflict to escalate.

And where exactly our red line is. But our red line is exceeded.'
Lidegaard believes that if the EU had not imposed any sanctions, Russia had been "far deeper
in Ukraine and even more aggressive." "We have not stopped them, no. But sanctions have a stronger every day that goes
along with falling oil prices. One can hope that this at a time makes them realize how completely hopeless a project that they're up to."
Sanctions make it too expensive for Russia to hold territory (Henry Pascoe Journal of
Conflict Resolution)
Daniel McCormack and Henry Pascoe (Journal of Conflict Resolution Browne Center for International Politics,
University of Pennsylvania and, University of Texas at Austin). Sanctions and Preventive War. Accessed January
16, 2016. Published December 30, 2015.
http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/12/30/0022002715620471.abstract.
In these studies, suffering the costs associated with either sending or bearing sanctions
communicates resolve over an issue, lowering the risk of conflict by reducing the chances one
party to a dispute makes an offer unacceptable to its adversary. For example, Russia might be willing to bear
the costs of sanctions in order to communicate its resolve over eastern Ukraine. But sanctions have also had a direct effect on Russian military

power. In the ten years preceding the Ukrainian civil war, Russia doubled its military spending. The 2014 sanctions regime put paid to this

pattern. By October, amidst decreased economic growth projectionsfrom 6 percent to 0.5 percentand concerns over the stability of the

ruble, Russian finance minister Anton Siluanov announced that military spending would have to be cut, reconsider[ing] the amount of

resources that will be spent from the budget [on the military] in order to make it more realistic (Kelly 2014). Sanctions
not only
forced a cut to Russian military spending, they also decreased Moscows ability to pay for
occupying larger slices of Ukraine: even before the invasion Russia subsidized Ukrainian
industry {for} to the tune of US$5 to US $10 billion per year. Despite taking indirect control of
several Ukrainian cities, Russia was forced by the sanctions regime to cut these subsidies,
leading a Brookings report to conclude that [w]hat Russia [can] could not afford is to win
Ukraine (Gaddy and Ickes 2014). Sanctions worked [by] in this instance not by forcing a Russian
surrender of Crimea or Donbass but by preventing a Russian seizure of Kiev.
Better than Military
Sanctions comparatively better
George Lopez, University of Notre Dame The Sanctions Era. 1995.
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:wdkv87vNtAEJ:dl.tufts.edu/file_assets/tufts:UP149.001.
00038.00006+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
Our existing knowledge about sanctions should provide a useful springboard for ongoing scrutiny and policy debate about their advantages

relative to military intervention as a means of settling disputes in the post-Cold War world. As the three cases analyzed indicate, each new

sanctions episode will pose a myriad of dilemmas associated with the use of this instrument. These range from the traditional difficulties of

ensuring international cooperation, to questions about economic and political effectiveness, to debates about the morality of sanctions.62

While complete clarity about the effectiveness of sanctions may always lag behind the policymakers need for precise information, we know a
For all of their
great deal about the conditions under which sanctions can achieve certain objectives without a resort to military force.
awkwardness, imperfection, and slowness in achieving results, economic sanctions are a
viable alternative to military intervention as the century draws to a close.

Mil intervention causes escalation

Patrick Buchanan. U.S.-Russia Clash in Ukraine?. WorldNet Daily. February 2015.
http://www.wnd.com/2015/02/u-s-russia-clash-in-ukraine/
More in character, he could take U.S. intervention as a challenge and send in armor and artillery
to enable the rebels to consolidate their gains, then warn Kiev that, rather than see the rebels
routed, Moscow will intervene militarily. Or Putin could order in the Russian army before U.S.
weapons arrive, capture Mariupol, establish a land bridge to Crimea, and then tell Kiev he is
ready to negotiate.

Sanctions may be flawed, but they are the only feasible alternative to war.
Gebert, Konstanty. Sanctions: a useful but flawed alternative to war. European Council on Foreign Relations,
January 15 2013. <http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_sanctions_a_useful_but_flawed_alternative_to_war>
Does this mean that the EU should give up such a muddled policy? Definitely not. Not only most of its
defects can be removed through more coherent policy planning and monitoring but there is hardly anything which could replace sanctions.
They are the union's sole coercive instrument of power short of military action and Brussels,
mercifully, does not engage in warfare. They have been increasingly used over the two decades - the EU imposes now more sanctions than the

United Nations - and can claim a number of targeted successes. However, a number of simple principles have to be factored into the union's

sanctions policy. The goal of the sanctions must be realistic. Lukashenka will not agree to democratisation, which would deprive him of his

power. And, as the spokesman of Poland's military regime of the 1980s, Jerzy Urban famously said: "The government will always feed itself".

The people - not necessarily. Which is why it is important for the people to be informed about the nature and goals of sanctions targeting their

country. Since these measures are taken allegedly in their interest, they should have the possibility of being able to assess that themselves.

Implementation must be monitored and policed, effectiveness assessed and lessons drawn. In particular, it is clear that the less the sanctioning

power is willing to suffer some of the consequences of the sanctions policies - the less credible, economically and politically, the sanctions will

be to the targeted regime. If our sanctions policy is defective, we should improve it -not give up on it.
It is often our sole instrument of coercion and for the unfortunate subjects of oppressive
regimes, a rare reason to hope that things might actually get better.

Diplomatic interventions reduce length of conflict by 3.3 times while military interventions
dont change duration (define Russian aggression as an ongoing conflict that needs to be
curbed)
Patrick Regan, Binghamton University. Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention: Combined Strategies and the
Duration of Civil War. 2004. http://www.binghamton.edu/cdp/docs/diplomacy-otherforms.pdf
The results suggest that diplomatic interventions dramatically reduce the expected duration of a conflict, economic interventions tend to

prolong a conflict, and military interventions are unrelated to the expected duration of a conflict. For
example, a diplomatic intervention increases the probability that a conflict ends by about 3.3
times over a conflict without a diplomatic intervention. Economic interventions by themselves, on the other hand, appear to increase the
likelihood that the conflict will continue by about 50%. This interpretation is, however, made more complicated by the decay function used to

model the effects of interventions over time, though we will address this when we interpret the full results (see Model 1).
Hurts Russian Military
Sanctions delay investments in modernization and cut off the supply chains of the Russian
military
Simond De Galbert. A Year of Sanctions against Russia Now What? Center for Strategic & International Studies,
October 2015. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-economics-deterring-russia-12945>
In addition to purely economic consequences, sanctions also impacted Russias ambitious plans for the modernization of its military. Things
Russias declining public
could possibly get worse in the years ahead. This impact has so far been twofold. On one hand,
budget has imposed measures to delay investments in modernization projects.16 More importantly,
on the other hand, sectorial European sanctions against the Russian military industry and Ukraines
own decision to ban military exports to Russia are causing delays in the Russian navys
shipbuilding plan inter alia.17 Russias ability to find substitutes to replace Ukrainian-made gas turbine engines may be
questionable in the short term. Such disruptions to the military industry supply chains may be overcome but represent today an obstacle to

Russias modernization plans, which have rarely been fully implemented in the recent past.

Russia has had to cut back its defense budget (i.e soldiers salaries, plans for an aircraft
carrier) and plans for military modernization, and the country has seen failures in military
technology.
Kumar, Kaylan. Cash Crunch: Sanctions Hurting Russias Grand Plans to Modernize Military. International
Business Times, May 8 2015. http://www.ibtimes.com/cash-crunch-sanctions-hurting-russias-grand-plans-
modernize-military-1913725
But
This year, Russia planned to replace 30 percent of its military equipment, launch 50 new warships and introduce T-14 Armata tanks.
government statistics reveal that defense budget will have to take a cut of 5 percent in 2015.
Adding frustration was the embarrassing breakdown of a T-14 Armata tank during Victory Day preparations. CAST, a defense think tank in

Moscow, said that the Russian economy is not generating enough revenue to pay for the 2011-20 defense modernization program. So, the
opportunity for renewing the Russian armed forces and its equipment is looking bleak . At the
same time, Russia cannot ignore the military exercises being conducted in its backyard in May by NATO countries. For example, the northern

borders of Russia are witnessing convergence of 21,000 Estonian, Latvian and Norwegian troops. Any thought that NATO is still rattled by

Russia's annexation of Crimea seems pass as a new rapid-reaction force has given NATO the strength to deal with any contingency in Eastern

Europe. The NATO-led "Operation Hedgehog has been designed as a ground exercise involving Estonia and others, with 13,500 total troops.

NATOs rising assertiveness will likely draw conspiracy theories from Putin, in which he paints Russia as a victim of U.S. efforts to isolate Russia -

- with the aim of forcing regime change.

Military expenditures dropped 10%, and value of currency dropped 20%, blacklisted by
Western defense firms through sanctions (Thomas Grove Wall Street Journal)
Thomas Grove (Wall Street Journal). Russia Shows Off Military Might as Budget Gets Squeezed. Accessed
December 25, 2015. Published August 27, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-shows-off-military-might-as-
budget-gets-squeezed-1440709682.
But while Russia hasnt officially cut its budget for arms procurement or research and development, industry officials say state
defense and security firms have been asked to reduce their expenditures by 10%. Just as
importantly, the rubles allocated are worth less when it comes to buying foreign parts and acquiring Western technology; Russias
currency has slumped some 20% against the dollar over the past month. The budget hasnt
shrunk, but we can only do less and less with what we are being given , said Rafel Mirzoyan, an engineer
at Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, based in southern Russias Stavropol region. Russia, of course, remains a formidable power. U.S.

military leaders including Gen. Joe Dunford, President Barack Obamas nominee to become the Pentagons top military officer, have recently

named Russia as the biggest threat to U.S. national security, due to its nuclear arsenal and recent aggressive behavior toward its neighbors. In

2011, Russia started on an ambitious rearmament program to equip at least 75% of its armed forces with more powerful technology by 2020, a

spending plan worth $680 billion when it was announced. The modernization has encompassed a range of space projects, rocket programs and
Western
the next-generation fighter jet, the T-50. But a sharp drop in oil prices has sent shock waves through Russias economy, while
sanctions have added additional strain on some of Russias largest businesses, including some defense
firms now on Western blacklists. It is unclear how much Russias plans depend on imported parts and technology that are
now off limits because of Ukraine crisis. But in one high-profile blow, France this month broke a 1.2 billion ($1.35 billion) contract to deliver
cutting Russia off from a much-needed glimpse at Western weapons technology.
two warships,
You cant do everything: [There are] not enough resources financially, not enough
intellectual resources, not enough technological partners, said Ruslan Pukhov, director of CAST, a Moscow-
based defense think tank. You can name up to a dozen project but you can realize a maximum of five. The International Aviation and Space

Show started in 1993 and gained force over the 2000s as Russia benefited from rising oil revenues and arms importers looked to diversify away

from Western weapons systems. The Russian leader used the venue this week to host Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-

Nahyan and Jordans King Abdullah II.

Link: Spending down

Revisions of the massive budget plan our opponents described was heavily revised down,
budget going up by 1% in 2016, means modernization cant happen
Kyle Miizokami, January 4, 2016, The Week, Russias Military: Dont Believe the Hype,
http://theweek.com/articles/596822/russias- military-dont-believe-hype DOA: 1-4-16
Russia has the world's fourth largest defense budget, with Moscow spending $54 billion on the military in 2015. Russian defense spending is

finally trending upward, after decades of starvation budgets brought on by the end of the Cold War and a poorly performing economy. Most of

Russia's military equipment is left over from that period. Almost all of the Russian Ground Forces' tanks and armored vehicles date back to the

1980s. Russia's lone carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, was launched in 1990. All three types of Russian heavy bombers pounding Syria were built

by the Soviet Union and only inherited by Russia. In 2010, the Russian government announced an ambitious program to replace 70 percent of

Cold War-era equipment with new weapons by 2020. The spending program would cost at least $700 billion and included a new generation of
tanks, a new class of aircraft carriers, and new generation of heavy bombers. International sanctions, brought on by Russia's annexation of the

Crimea as well as plunging oil prices have quickly taken a heavy toll on the economy. The Russian economy has slipped into recession, with GDP

alone slipping 4 percent in the past 12 months.A falling economy has affected military spending. In 2015, Russia's defense budget increased by a

staggering 33 percent. However, before the year was over some of that spending had to be taken back, and the increase was revised downward
Unable to forecast an end to Russia's economic problems, the defense budget is
to 25 percent.
slated to go up less than 1 percent in 2016. Needless to say, Russia's ambition to spend $700
billion on armaments is as dead as Julius Caesar

Empirically, Russias military just isnt doing as much stuff. While Putin might ostensibly
protect the military from budget cuts, defense officials say hes asked them to slash spending.
This has manifested through a) reducing the number of new fighter jets by 88%, b) only
meeting 38% of Russian military export contracts, and c) being bumped from third to eight in
global military expenditure.
Thomas Grove, WSJ, 15, Russian Defense Industry Hits Speed Bumps, 11-26-2015,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-defense-industry-hits-speed-bumps-1448583770
Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the factory in 2012 and again this week to give it a personal endorsement. Last year, however, the

Armata became an object of rare public criticism as it ran behind schedule and over budget. Now the military is slashing its initial orders. But

some of the more traditional programs have fallen behind schedule. This year, Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov said the Russian
military was reducing its first purchases of the newly designed fifth-generation T-50 jet
fighter to around a dozen. A person close to the defense ministry said the initial order was for
as many as 100. The navy is expecting at least eight next-generation Borei nuclear submarines to be produced by 2020, but Andrey
Frolov, an analyst at Moscow-based defense think tank CAST, said it is likely only six would be completed by the deadline. While Mr.
Putin has publicly protected the armed forces from budget cuts, defense industry officials say
firms have been asked privately to make voluntary cuts in expenditures. That has raised questions about
the industrys ability to fulfill 2015 procurement orders. For the first half of the year, Russias arms industries only fulfilled
38% of their contracts, Mr. Borisov said in July, adding that state companies that failed on their contracts would be punished. Even
Kalashnikov, maker of Russias noted assault rifles, had fallen behind and was in arrears of $78 million to the ministry, Interfax quoted him as

saying.The Russian technology on display in Syria also has its limitations. The defense ministry has defended the accuracy of its airstrikes, but it
Russias financial
has mostly been dropping old-fashioned bombs, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
crisis, along with the devaluation of the ruble, has hit its spending power . Ahead of the crisis last year,
Russian military spending was ranked as the third-highest in the world in dollar terms. Now, expenditures rank seventh or eighth globally, CAST

says.
Link: Access to Tech Down
Access to high tech means military suffering
Kyle Miizokami, January 4, 2016, The Week, Russias Military: Dont Believe the Hype,
http://theweek.com/articles/596822/russias- military-dont-believe-hype DOA: 1-4-16
Sanctions will also effect defense production. Russia is not self-sufficient in a great deal of
high tech industry and relies on international vendors when the Russian shipyard Sevmash refurbished an aircraft carrier for India, a
large amount of equipment was sourced from the West and Japan, likely without their knowledge. That sort of sourcing is just not going to happen anymore. Struck by

sanctions, Russia's defense production will be hampered by a lack of a domestic high tech
industry, sometimes in the unlikeliest of ways: For example, modern fighters and the Armata tank make extensive use of LCD displays to convey information to the crew. Russia,
unlike the much smaller South Korea, has no domestic LCD industry.

Russian Military Spending/Modernization Bad

Advanced militaries require more pre-mobilization, which causes leaders to mobilize even in
minor crises, increasing threat of escalation and destabilization.
Chris Demchak., University of Arizona Modernizing Military Organizations and Political Control in Central Europe.
Journal of Public Policy. August 1995.http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007479
The public policy issues of modernizing public agencies in Central Europe are nowhere more pressing than in the process of modernizing

militaries. The leaders of central Europe - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia - plan to deploy smaller, more professional forces

equipped with advanced weapons and support systems, changing their organizations accordingly. This paper argues that the political and

organizational circumstances roughly common to Central European countries make such modernization highly problematical for effective

civilian policy in crises. Advanced technologies can compound the normal problems of civilian ministerial control by altering modernizing
The more intricate, critical and expensive the machines, the more
military organizations in unexpected ways.
organizational effects they induce. Even in minor crises, military leaders will probably want to
move to heightened states of readiness to be sure the machines are in place and functional.
Under these circumstances, there is greater potential for each otherwise noisy but survivable
crisis to escalate through regrettable military guidance and destabilizing military actions, with or
without full civilian understanding.
Overviews
Russia wanted more
Its more than just crimea
Andrew Michta, Why Ukraine is Our Business. 1/26/15. http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/01/26/why-
ukraine-is-our-business/
Putins sights are set firmly inland on
This weekends fighting in Mariupol has already claimed thirty dead and 83 wounded.
the cities of Odessa and Kharkiv and beyondall places he identified before the war began as
part of his Novorossiya project. The areas under threat go beyond Crimea, Donetsk, and
Luhansk. They include in addition Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Kherson, and
Mikolaiv, which would allow Putins Russia not just to dominate the entire Black Sea northern
littoral but also to expand its territory to the borders of Moldova and Romania. An ancillary strike may soon develop in Transdnistria, which has

begun to practice mobilization bordering on the Odessa region.

Economy and geopolitical ambitions intertwined (Michael Shuman TIME Magazine)

Schuman, Michael (TIME Magazine).Russias Lackluster Economy Means Putin Simply Cant Afford a New Cold
War. Accessed December 25, 2015. Published November 20, 2014. http://time.com/3596744/russia- economy-
ukraine-sanctions-putin-geopolitical-ambition-foreign-policy/.
One of the axioms of global geopolitics [for Russia] is that a country can project power only as far as its economic
might allows. There is good reason why the United States, by far the worlds largest economy, has been the dominant force in all things
political and military for the past 60 years. And we can see China now rising to superpower status on the back of its spectacular economic
Vladimir Putin should take note. As Russias president attempts to reassert his nations
ascent.
clout in Europe, he is doing so on an ever shakier economic foundation. The question for
Putin going forward is whether his stumbling economy can support his geopolitical ambitions.

Sanctions make military action more expensive and thus make aggression a bad investment
opportunity (Ilan Berman The National Interest)
Ilan Berman (The National Interest). The Economics of Deterring Russia. Accessed December 25, 2015. Published
May 22, 2015. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-economics-deterring-russia-12945?page=2.
In the world of venture capital, the operative figure used by potential investors to calculate the solvency and profitability of a company is its
A venture with an unsustainable burn
burn ratethe amount of capital that it expends monthly on its operations.
rate is seen as inefficient and a bad investment bet, and potential funders stay away. The
message to those companies is clear: improve, or perish. This lesson is applicable to Russia as
well. By all indications, the Kremlins current burn rate is already significant. According to
authoritative estimates, Russia is now spending some $105 million monthly on hardware and
personnel deployed in Ukraines east. The attendant military mobilization now taking place
within the Russian Federation itself is believed to be considerably more expensive. These
costs have been compounded by the added drag on the Russian economy imposed by last
years annexation of Crimea (some $4.5 billion or more annually), as well as reduced
governmental revenue from artificially low world oil prices. Nevertheless, the size of Russias
foreign exchange reserves (currently estimated at upward of $353 billion) suggests that
Moscow can keep up its present rate of expenditure for some time yet. But not if the West
drives up the marginal costs of the Kremlins war effort. Doing so requires targeting not high-
profile public figures in Moscow, but the cogs in the Kremlins war machinery: the foreign
suppliers, domestic factories and associated industries that help provide the critical
components of the mechanized divisions, artillery and hardware that Russia will use if and
when it again goes on the march. The logic is simple. The more it costs Russia to build a tank or
submarine, to fuel a long-range bomber, or to properly outfit a warfighter, the quicker it will
end up depleting its savings. And once it does, Moscow will find its potential for aggression
profoundly constrained. In this way, Western nations can help change the terms of the
debate surrounding Russia, from parsing the specifics of Putins policies to actually limiting
his ability to mobilize. That would be a sound investment indeed.
Econ link alt causality
Russian recession not due to economic sanctions (Michael Birnbaum Washington Post)
Michael Birnbaum (Wahsington Post). A year into conflict with Russia, are sanctions working. Accessed 2015.
Published March 17, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-year-into-a-conflict-with-russia-
are-sanctions-working/2015/03/26/45ec04b2-c73c-11e4-bea5-b893e7ac3fb3_story.html
Prices are soaring. The ruble is dropping. And Russian living standards are falling a year after
the annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula. Many economists say that problems would
have erupted even if there were no sanctions. But the wave of Western penalties against the
Russian economy has inadvertently given the Kremlin political cover with its own people,
analysts say. A year after the annexation, the West has been able to do little to alter President Vladimir Putins battlefield calculus.
Russia is still fueling a bloody conflict in eastern Ukraine that has cost more than 6,000 lives, U.S. officials say. Putin denies involvement in
Although
Ukraine, and he shows little sign of backing down. His popularity at home is sky high even as his nations economy is in turmoil.
have hurt, much of Russias current economic weakness has to do with the 48 percent drop in
the price of oil since June, analysts say. But most Russians are pointing their fingers toward
the White House. Sanctions, the Wests primary tool to try to sway Kremlin policies, have become a punching bag. The effectiveness
of the sanctions is becoming a burning question as President Obama comes under growing bipartisan pressure to arm Ukraine if a shaky cease-

fire falls apart. He could also ramp up sanctions. Some in Congress have floated cutting off Russia from the international bank-transfer system,

a possibility that Russian officials said would be tantamount to an act of war.

Economic sanction did not cause the Russian recession (Mark Dabrowski Breugel)
Mark Dabrowski (Breugel). Breugel. Accessed 2015. Published October 16, 2015. http://bruegel.org/2015/10/the-
systemic-roots-of-russias-recession/.
The Russian economy grew rapidly between 2000 and 2007, but growth decelerated after the 2008-09 global financial crisis, and since mid-
A number of short-term factors have caused recession: lower oil
2014 Russia has moved into recession.
prices, the conflict with Ukraine, European Union and United States sanctions against Russia
and Russian counter-sanctions. However Russias negative output trends have deeper
structural and institutional roots. They can be tracked back about a decade to when previous
market-reform policies started to be reversed in favour of dirigisme, leading to further
deterioration of the business and investment climate.

Capital Flight
Russian repression causes capital flight
Lee S Wolosky. Foreign Affairs. Face OFF. March/April 2000.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55843/lee-s-wolosky/putins-plutocrat-problem
The oligarchs' malfeasance has deprived Russia of the private investment it needs to complete its economic transition. Russia needs capital --

far more than is available from public sources. According to Anatoly Chubais, the principal architect of Russia's privatization program, Russia

needs hundreds of billions of dollars for industrial restructuring and modernization. Yet private investors have abandoned
the country because, among other things, their legal and economic rights are abused there
with consistency and impunity.
State of Russia
Putinism is an inherently authoritarian government system against Western interests
(Richard Rahn Center for Global Economic Growth)
Richard Rahn (Center for Global Economic Growth). From Communism to Putinism. Accessed December 22,
2015. Published September 21, 2007. http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/2501.
The view of Russia is clear from where I am writing this, Bucharest, Romania. Month by month, President Putin of Russia has been erecting a

new authoritarian model that owes more of its lineage to fascism than communism. That model can now be named: Putinism -a
Russian nationalistic authoritarian form of government that pretends to be a free market
democracy. Unlike Soviet communism, the new Russian state does not seek to direct every
aspect of political and economic life. Instead, through limited, direct control and intimidation,
plus strategic investments in both institutions and people, not only in Russia but other
nations as well, the Kremlin seeks to ensure favorable global press and decisions beneficial to its interests from political and business
leaders around the world. Here in Eastern Europe, it has been noticed some politicians who take a Kremlin-friendly line suddenly seem to have

more campaign funds. Infrastructure projects, particularly in the energy sector, that are perceived to be most beneficial to Russia's long-term

interest more easily find sources of funding.

Sanctions aim to reverse Russian revisionist policies which are intended to challenge the US
(Fred Weir Christian Science Monitor)
Fred Weir (Christian Science Monitor). "Ukraine Crisis: West's Sanctions Target Putin, Not Policy, Russia Insists".
Accessed December 22, 2015. Published November 8, 2014.
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2014/1128/Ukraine-crisis-West-s-sanctions-target-Putin-not-policy-
Russia-insists.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says the West's sanctions are aimed at promoting
regime change, a view that analysts warn will make compromise over Ukraine even more difficult. Russia sees no connection between
sanctions imposed against it by the United States and the European Union and the deepening crisis in Ukraine. Instead it views them merely as

a "destabilizing" effort to inflict damage, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told journalists Friday.... "Specific facts have been stated that signal that

the unilateral sanctions introduced against us are illegitimate and undermine stability of the global economy and have nothing in common with

the goal of de-escalating the Ukrainian crisis," the official Tass agency quoted Mr. Lavrov as saying. Some analysts warn that this view of the

sanctions, which is becoming increasingly ingrained, makes Russia less likely to compromise with the West over Ukraine. In a speech last week,
Lavrov argued even more explicitly that sanctions were part of a US-led campaign to oust
Russian President Vladimir Putin rather than an effort to find peace in Ukraine . "Western leaders
publicly state that the sanctions must hurt [Russia's] economy and stir up public protests," he said. "The West doesnt want to
change Russias policies. They want a regime change. Practically nobody denies that." Lavrov
appears to be confirming a view many Kremlin-connected experts have been expressing for some time: that Washington has had it in for Russia

ever since Mr. Putin returned to power in 2012 and began strongly asserting Russia's national interests, including by opposing US policies

around the world. Russia-US relations have sharply deteriorated ever since. Pro-Putin
analysts argue that even if the
Ukraine crisis had not erupted, something else would have triggered the sanctions war
against Russia. "Many people [in official circles] believe that the sanctions package was
prepared well in advance, and Ukraine was the pretext for launching it," says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of
Russia in Global Affairs, a leading Moscow foreign policy journal. "There is evidence to support the view that the US
has decided that Russia under Putin is a revisionist power, bent on challenging US positions,
and that it should be firmly dealt with now. People in Moscow have come to believe that US
sanctions will not be lifted for a long time, regardless of whether peace breaks out in Ukraine
tomorrow, and we should dig in for the long haul. It's about containment," he says, referring
to the cold war policy that contributed to the eventual collapse of the USSR. By imposing a credit
squeeze and tough curbs on technology imports, the sanctions have visibly hurt Russia's economy, including a plunge in the ruble and a spike in

inflation. But they've also had unforeseen impacts, such as bolstering domestic political support for Putin and accelerating Russia's drift toward

an economic alliance with China. Another consequence of the Kremlin's hardening view might be to make Russia far less likely to compromise

with the West or Kiev as Ukraine's own internal crisis deepens. "Since Russia doesn't believe the sanctions are connected with Ukraine, there is

no feeling of pressure to do something about it," says Mr. Lukyanov. "It's a very convenient pre-emptive explanation."
Russia is an existential nuclear threat to the West (Jacqueline Klimas Washington Times)
Jacqueline Klimas (Washington Times). Military leaders name Russia as top threat to U.S.. Accessed January 15,
2016. Published July 21, 2015. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/21/military-leaders-name-russia-
top-threat-us/?page=all.
ArmyGen. Mark Milley joined other top military brass Tuesday in naming Russia as the top threat the U.S. faces today, as lawmakers questioned

the wisdom of cutting an Army base in Alaska. Russia

is the only country on earth that contains a nuclear
capability that could destroy the United States, Gen. Milley told members of the Senate
Armed Services Committee at a hearing to consider his nomination to serve as the next Army
chief of staff. Its an existential threat to the United States, so it has capability. Intent, I dont know;
but the activity of Russia since 2008 has been very, very aggressive. Russia invaded the Crimean Peninsula in February 2014, annexing the

Ukrainian territory as part of Russia, and has supported ethnic-Russian rebels in the eastern part of its neighbor. Other spheres in which

Russians have acted aggressively include their jets approaching other nations airspace and buzzing U.S. planes and ships in acts the Pentagon

called provocative and unprofessional.

Russian foreign policy is inherently authoritarian, expansionist, and anti-humanitarian

(Volodymyr Valkov Ukrainian Bureau for Human Rights)
Volodymyr Valkov (New Eastern Europe Magazine, American Jewish Ukrainian Bureau for Human Rights).
Expansionism: The Core of Russia's Foreign Policy. Accessed December 25, 2015. Published This is my tag.
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1292-expansionism-the-core-of-russia-s-foreign-
policy.
Vladimir Putin's Russia is becoming increasingly expansionist on the international arena. The
annexation of Crimea, the naming of Ukraine's eastern regions as Novorossiya (New Russia)
using tsarist terminology, revival of Soviet symbolism and mythology, the sponsorship of
terrorism and separatism in Ukraine, the organisation of frozen conflicts in Moldova, Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan, coercive creation of the Eurasian Union, aggressive use of Gazprom
as a political tool, and the formulation of a right to protect Russian speakers abroad it is not
hard to find examples of Russia's aggressive expansionism. Russian expansionist foreign
policy is clearly marked by anti-Americanism. Russia seems to be particularly interested in
issues that have a high potential of breaking coalitions between the United States and its
European partners. One of them is Russian facilitation of activities that expose American intelligence practices. Perhaps symbolically,
Russia is reviving the direct geographical rivalry with the US as might be seen from the cancellation of Cuba's Soviet era debt, Putin's Latin

American tour and the creation of the BRICS development bank, opposition to the US on Syria and repeated attempts at intensifying Russian-

Chinese relations. Russia is still a backward country in the political, social and economic aspects. Russian politics is run mostly by a network of

former communists and ex-KGB officers. Russia continues to dwell on the glory of the Soviet Union, uncertain as it may be, and victory in the

Second World War. Human capital is underestimated and human life in general is one of the cheapest, most undervalued resources in Russia.
Human rights do not exist in Russia and Russia's budget and export consists mainly of oil and
gas revenues. Most of the budget is spent on arms acquisition. The list of Russian backwardness continues,
but at this point from what we have seen happening in Ukraine due to Russian actions compellingly indicates that Russian expansionism is a

very dangerous development in the international system. The downing of Malaysian flight MH17 also demonstrates Russia's extremely poor

judgment in creating, equipping and using terrorist groups for achieving dubious foreign policy objectives. Russian expansionism is directly

opposed to the spread of democracy, especially in the former Soviet republics and even more so in Ukraine. Russian current leadership views

Ukraine as part of its own original territory and considers Ukrainians as part of the same Russian people. This position was presented clearly

by Putin during a state-organised live TV call-in show in April 2014 as well as on many other occasions. The EuroMaidan is now being vilified by
The Russian government is using every available opportunity
the Russian puppet media as a fascist coup dtat.
to smear Ukraine's growing commitment to democracy. One of the most disturbing examples of such
government-sponsored Ukraine bashing was performed at the open-air show in Crimea on August 9th, where Ukraine was theatrically

portrayed to the audience as a having been overrun by fascist forces and later gloriously liberated by Russian troops. Until the Maidan protest

that united most Ukrainians in their choice for a democratic future, Russian expansionism was not clearly visible. Now, as Ukraine is making
Russia is
another attempt to leave Moscow's authoritarian geopolitical orbit, overcome Soviet-era corruption and build democracy,
desperate to use force in order to prevent a successful democratic transformation of Ukraine.
Ukraine's resistance to Russia has led to the greatest conflict in the post-Soviet area,
surpassing the fighting during the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 in terms of infrastructure
damage and casualties. Today Russia's militarism has reached its highest level. Putin's
territorial claims, distortion of history, incitement of inter-ethnic hatred, provocative
preludes to war, invasive military and foreign policy doctrines, anti-democratic, anti-
European and anti-American rhetoric all suggest the following: Putin's dictatorship is Europe's
greatest threat. Ukraine's resistance to Russias unprovoked aggression demonstrates that the dissemination and spread of democratic
values works. Democracy has succeeded in Poland and it is now changing Ukraine. Democratic and European aspirations are transforming

Georgia and Moldova. They will eventually work in Russia, but never under Putin's regime and only if Ukraine does not fail as a democracy.

After the economic misery of the 1990s, the Russian people are distrustful of democracy. That is the fear that Putin has exploited so far to steal

their liberties in return for his effective management. Putin offers a minimum standard of living and stability in exchange for the
Another national fear that the Russian government is manufacturing
curtailment of individual freedoms.
to intimidate the society is that of democracy itself. The Kremlin seeks to show that
democracy is incompatible with the Russian tradition of government, incapable to meet the
needs of the Russian people, and citing the Ukrainian example that democracy in a weak
state can bring fascists to power. Without a successful example of democracy in a country
that most Russians can most easily relate to, the corrupt Russian ruling elite will continue to
promote xenophobic and anti-democratic fears in the Russian society, enticing the people to
accept dictatorship as a preferred model. The democratisation of Ukraine is the most pragmatic, realistic and affordable
long-term strategy against Russia's expansionism and authoritarian values. The West must double its support for the democratisation of the

former Soviet countries that are showing their interest in such values. Almost 70 years of Soviet communism and 44 years of Cold War did not

suddenly end in 1991. It must be clearly understood by the western countries, many of whom have little or no experience of the Soviet system,

that some parts of the population in the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine, still feverishly hope for the restoration of some semblance

of the Soviet Union. This is the section of population that is being used by Putin in eastern Ukraine in order to sustain his expansion. While
the core of Russia's foreign policy is expansionism, the essence of its internal policy is
isolation. The most recent example of the disappearing freedom of expression in Russia is the law adopted in April 2014 that requires a
registration of bloggers who have more than 3000 subscribers. Another law adopted by the Russian parliament in May 2014 prescribes criminal

responsibility for saying that Crimea is a part of Ukraine. Clearly, Putin's

regime is intent on blocking ideas and
shutting down criticism not only from outside but also from its own people. The internal
restriction of political and civil rights provides an important insight. It illustrates that Russia is
not only at war with the West, but also at war with itself. And it also means that the Russian-
Ukrainian War is not simply a war of military muscle, but a war of values. The toughest
European and American sanctions are absolutely justified and necessary to stop Russia from
acquiring control over Ukraine, or parts of Ukraine, including the illegal annexation of Crimea,
which must be reversed. The occupation of eastern parts of the Ukrainian territory is evidently on the Kremlins immediate
agenda, as seen from the Russian earlier unaccomplished efforts on August 9th to send humanitarian aid escorted by Russian troops to the

areas controlled by the Russia-sponsored terrorists and separatists. The repeated attempt on August 12th to deliver humanitarian aid from

Russia, which is said to consist of a convoy of 280 trucks, this time presumably cleared of any Russian military supervision and the process of its

distribution is also highly likely to become a source of provocation with the potential to create a pretext for the deployment of Russian military

forces in Ukraine. If Russia succeeds in swallowing Ukraine, or any of its parts, by imposing its own vision of order, it will subsequently enable

Russia to impose its decision-making authority over other post-Soviet states, continuing to change the map of Europe, inflaming conflict areas

in other parts of the world and professionalising terrorism.

More sanctions in the future are very likely (Virginia Harrison CNN Money)
Virginia Harrison (CNN Money). Now might be the time to buy Russia. Yes, really.. Accessed December 29, 2015.
Published March 31, 2015. http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/30/investing/russia-markets-time-to-
buy/index.html?iid=EL.
Is the worst over for Russia? Some brave investors seem to think so and are piling back into its markets. The oil-dependent economy is on track

for a deep recession this year, and there's a risk that the West may impose more sanctions over Ukraine. Yet Russia's stock market,
currency and bonds are all bouncing higher. After a horror year that saw the ruble roughly halve in value, Russia's
currency has gained about 4% since the start of 2015 to trade at about 58 to the U.S. dollar. That compares with the record low of 80 hit in late

December. Helping revive the currency's fortunes has been a halt in oil's recent slide. Crude futures are steadier, trading just below $50 a barrel

as tensions in the Middle East stoke supply concerns. That's positive for the Russian economy, which relies heavily on oil revenues. Bond
markets are also showing promise. Russia's 10-year government bond yields have eased to about 11.5% from 13.5% at the start of the year.

Yields, which move in the opposite direction to bond prices, are still well above where they were a year ago but the drift lower is positive.
"That's a product of broader stabilization in financial markets," said VTB Capital chief Russia
economist Vladimir Kolychev. "It seems that trend is sustainable." Bank of America Merrill Lynch is also
bullish on Russian bonds. David Hauner, an analyst at the bank, recently picked ruble-denominated government bonds as his top bet in eastern

Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Hauner said instability in Ukraine may be steering investors away from the "best [trade] of the year."

Russian stocks have brightened too. The MICEX index has rallied more than 14% so far this year. Fund flows appear to support the view that

sentiment is shifting. The stock market saw capital inflows of $6.6 million in the week to March 25, Russian media reported, citing data from

EPFR Global. That may sound small but it's a big swing from the previous week when the markets recorded an outflow of $57.7 million.
While Russia's financial markets are calmer than they were in December, the investment
climate could sour again quickly if relations with the U.S. and Europe deteriorate further, or if
oil prices resume their slide -- perhaps triggered by the lifting of sanctions on Iran. A ceasefire
deal reached in February between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists remains
fragile. Violence in contested eastern Ukraine appears to be receding but an escalation of
fighting could trigger additional sanctions. Andrew Risk, principal Russia analyst at London-
based political risk firm GPW, said there is a "reasonably strong likelihood of more
sanctions." New trade restrictions would exacerbate Russia's economic problems. Still, ignoring
Russia as an investment destination could be shortsighted. "It's still a very large economy with potentially very interesting opportunities," Risk

said. And past political tension between Russia and the West hadn't prevented successful investments in the past.
R/T Neg
R/T Human Rights Abuses
Acting on human rights actually creates more human rights abuses in long term.
Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics, Princeton University, 2000.
http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/i/Ignatieff_01.pdf
Beyond the specics of the Indonesian case,
human rights activists need to face up to the fact that human
rights advocacy can set in train secessionist pressures that do threaten existing states and
may make the human rights situation of ordinary people worse rather than better in the
short term. The painful truth is that national self-determination is not always favorable to individual human rights, and democracy and
human rights do not necessarily advance hand in hand.
R/T No Change in Ukraine
1. Sanctions are designed to prevent aggression in the future not end current expansion
sanctions prevented further aggression and were largely responsible for ceasefires (Oleg
Buklemishev Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
Oleg Buklemishev, 8-13-2015, "Myths and Realities of Sanctions in Russia," Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/08/13/myths-and-realities-of-sanctions-in-russia/iemn
The architects of modern-day sanctions understand these issues very well and nowadays attempt a new approach: targeted sanctions against

specific members of the elite. We are now seeing these smart sanctions in action against Russia. The growing discontent inside the Russian

elite shows that this attempt is having some effect. There is more to this than the fact that some members of the Russian ruling class are being

forced to schedule routine medical operations in Israel rather than in Germany, or the seizure of bank accounts and real estate assets that are
It would be nave for the West to expect the rapid elimination of the
fairly unimportant for their owners.
root cause of the sanctionsa restoration of the Russian-Ukrainian border of mid-February
2014. Yet no one ever believed this was the real goal. The aim of the sanctions was to send a
clear signal of the Wests political position and, more importantly, to try to prevent a further
escalation of the conflict. The sanctions are dynamic, not static. They can be strengthened or eased in order to restrain or
stimulate certain actions. We do not know how far military activity in Ukraine would have gone
otherwise, since the ceasefires and agreements negotiated in Minsk were largely the result of
the sanctions. In the light of all this, it is no longer correct to say that the sanctions have had
no effect.
2. Putins Novorussia Project demanded more than just Crimea. The fact that Putins
expansion has stopped is enough to prove that Ukraine is better of than it would have been
had Putin continued on his expansionist path.
Andrew Michta, The American interest, Why Ukraine is Our Business. 1/26/15. http://www.the-american-
interest.com/2015/01/26/why-ukraine-is-our-business/
Putins sights are set firmly inland on
This weekends fighting in Mariupol has already claimed thirty dead and 83 wounded.
the cities of Odessa and Kharkiv and beyondall places he identified before the war began as
part of his Novorossiya project. The areas under threat go beyond Crimea, Donetsk, and
Luhansk. They include in addition Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Kherson, and
Mikolaiv, which would allow Putins Russia not just to dominate the entire Black Sea northern
littoral but also to expand its territory to the borders of Moldova and Romania. An ancillary strike may soon develop in Transdnistria, which has

begun to practice mobilization bordering on the Odessa region.

Russia withdrew all troops and became conciliatory after sanctions (Naftali Bendavid Wall
Street Journal)
Naftali Bendavid (Wall Street Journal). Russia Increases Troop Numbers on Border With Ukraine. Published July
14, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-increases-troop-numbers-on-border-with-ukraine-1405353043.
Moscow's motivation isn't entirely clear, the military officer added, but "they are definitely capable of moving into Ukraine and dramatically
After Russia annexed the Ukrainian region of Crimea earlier this
influencing the situation in the east."
year, Moscow stationed about 40,000 troops along the border with Ukraine. The move was
condemned by Ukrainian and Western leaders, who said the troops were well-equipped and capable of mounting a rapid incursion into
Following Ukraine's presidential election last May won by Petro Poroshenko, as well as sanctions imposed by the
Ukraine.
U.S. and European Union, Russia withdrew almost all of those troops, and Russian President
Vladimir Putin began making conciliatory statements toward Ukraine. The renewed military buildup of
recent weeks is causing unease among Western leaders. "We see again a presence on the Ukrainian border by large Russian formations," Gen.

Philip Breedlove, NATO's top military commander, said last week. "Those formations are growing every day and their capability grows every

day, and that is concerning." NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in a speech in San Francisco, said Moscow is sending

contradictory signals about its intent. "You see a kind of a double game from the Russian side," Mr. Rasmussen said. Mr. Putin is making

conciliatory statements, he added, "but then, on the other hand, we see a continuation of covert military operations and other operations in

Ukraine with the aim to continue to destabilize the situation in eastern Ukraine." NATO officials are concerned about what they see as a sort of

ambiguous or shadow warfare by Russia, including propaganda campaigns and the use of separatist proxies within several countries.

Ceasefire has reduced most of the fire

Simond de Galbert, Center for Strategic and International Studies A Year of Sanctions against Russia Now
What? October 2015
Whatever the exact incentive sanctions provided for negotiations, the February 2015 agreement managed to decrease the intensity of the

fighting in eastern Ukraine, even if the full implementation of the ceasefire has not yet been achieved. Clearly, the level of
violence observed before the February 2015 Minsk agreement was much higher than what
has been observed since then by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine, despite the restrictions imposed
locally on the SMMs access and freedom of movement. However, there continue to be daily violations of the ceasefire, with the SMM

reporting 373 ceasefire violations in May, 682 in June, 871 in July, and 971 in August 2015.24

Post-sanctions, conflict casualties decreased by 232% (Ukranian News)

(Ukranian News). UN Says Over 9,000 People Killed In Eastern Ukraine Since Last Year, More Than 20,000
Injured. Accessed January 16, 2016. Published December 10, 2015. http://ukrnews.today/un-says-over-9000-
people-killed-in-eastern-ukraine-since-last-year-more-than-20000-injured/.
The report said that despite a high number of casualties, a ceasefire within a ceasefire agreed upon by Russia and Ukraine in August has
According to the report, 178 civilian casualties
largely held and contributed to a decrease in the number of casualties.
47 deaths and 131 wounded were recorded between Aug. 16 and Nov. 15, a drop of 232
percent from the previous period of May 16 to Aug. 15. In the May-August period, the
organization reported 413 civilian casualties that comprised of 105 deaths and 308 injured .
After more than 9,000 people have lost their lives, the reduction in hostilities, and thus in new casualties, is very welcome, said U.N. human

rights chief Zeid Raad al-Hussein, according to the Associated Press (AP), adding: I urge all sides to fully implement the Minsk agreements and

to actively work to ensure the application of the rule of law and international human rights norms everywhere in Ukraine. Clashes in Eastern

Ukraine have been ongoing between pro-Russian rebels demanding secession and government forces. Overall, 9,198 people have been killed

and more than 20,000 people have been injured in fighting, up from 7,883 deaths and 17,610 injured recorded in the previous quarterly report

released in September. This increase of almost 1,200 killed and over 3,000 injured is because of the counting that is made by official

authorities, especially the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, said Gianni Magazzeni, a senior U.N. official involved in the report,

according to the AP, adding: We tried to bring the figures in line with available information at the present time.

Ukraine conflict de-escalating now Number of ceasefire violations fell over holidays
Stratfor, January 5, 2016, The US could spoil Russia and Ukraines delicate compromise,
https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical- diary/us-could-spoil-russia-and-ukraines-delicate-compromise DOA: 1-5-16
Following a last-minute deal between Russia and Ukraine to extend the Minsk negotiations
into the new year, notable changes are occurring in eastern Ukraine that hint at possible
concessions made by both sides. The biggest player left out of the formal negotiations, the United States, will be important to
watch because Washington's support for Kiev and pressure on Moscow could stall early indications of progress. On Dec. 30, Russia
and Ukraine agreed to extend the deadline for implementing the Minsk protocols , which call for a
full return of the border between Russia and the separatist territories to Ukrainian control, require Kiev to decentralize power and require

elections to take place in eastern Ukraine. The extension was negotiated through the Normandy Four format, which includes France and

Germany alongside Ukraine and Russia. Moscow pushed for the extension but Ukraine wavered, disputing the requirement for elections in

eastern Ukraine and pointing out the continued cease-fire violations in the region. However, just before the four leaders involved in the talks

held their phone call, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a private call to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko that likely led to his

concession. In addition, French President Francois Hollande indicated after the four-party call that elections are part of the agreement. The
extension of the deadline appears to have led to notable changes on the battlefield in eastern
Ukraine. During the past week, cease-fire violations have decreased significantly. There had been a
relative increase in the exchange of fire following the breakdown of the withdrawal process, but over the holidays the
number of incidents dropped from more than 50 per day to about a dozen a day.
R/T Iran Pivot
Russia leverage over Iran, Tehran doesnt care about Moscow anymore, sees Russia as
competition A) Iranian Trade deals with the west B) Iran competes with Russia in global
energy market (Samuel Ramani The Washington Post)
Samuel Ramani (The Washington Post). So are Russia and Iran best buddies now? Um, maybe not.. Accessed
January 15, 2016. Published November 12, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2015/11/12/so-are-russia-and-iran-best-buddies-now-um-maybe-not/.
Even though Russia supported United Nations sanctions against Iran in 2010, the Kremlin has been consistently critical of damaging effects on

sanctions on the Iranian economy and has emphasized the need for the West to end Irans international isolation. So its hardly surprising that

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov enthusiastically praised the nuclear spite the trade benefits, the Iran nuclear deal is a net loss for Russia

for two reasons. First, Russia has lost its diplomatic leverage over Iran. Thats the conclusion of Alexei Malashenko,
a leading expert in Russia-Middle East relations at the Carnegie Moscow Center, who recently told me that thats because Russia is no longer

needed to mediate between Iran and the West. Iran has now signed multi-billion dollar trade deals with
Europe and with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, which makes Russia less important to
Iran. This diversification has not been met with approval from anti-Western hawks in the Kremlins inner circle. For example, Deputy Prime
Minister Dmitry Rogozin uncharacteristically refused to comment on the nuclear deal. Second, Iran is now competing with
Russia in the global energy markets. Russian economists fear that Irans increased production will keep oil prices low for
years longer than expected.

De-link: Iran and Russia cannot work together, dont agree on Syria policy (Yaroslav Trofimov
Wall Street Journal)
Yaroslav Trofimov (Wall Street Journal). Can Russias New Iran Alliance Last?. Accessed January 15, 2016.
Published 10/22/15. http://www.wsj.com/articles/can-russias-new-iran-alliance-last-1445534148.
For Moscow, the Syrian war fits into its global strategy of creating a multipolar world in which Russia would re-emerge as one of the key

powers alongside a declining America. The Kremlin is focused on preventing color revolutions and regime changes such as those in Ukraine or
Moscow views propping up Mr. Assad as establishing a precedent that
Egypt. Following this logic,
further regime changes would no longer be tolerateda message intended as much for the West as for opponents
of President Vladimir Putin at home. Second come Moscows other considerations, such as the need to secure its naval facility on the Syrian

coast, Russias only outlet in the Mediterranean Sea. Iran, by contrast,

remains a revolutionary nation seeking to
transform the region and to bolster the sway of fellow Shiites all the way to Lebanon and
Yemen. Iranian officials openly call for regime change in Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Gulf monarchies, let alone the elimination of the
state of Israel. Irans way of operating in Iraq, Lebanonand now in Syriais to weaken these
states by building up proxy Shiite militias. Stoking sectarian strife, however, isnt something that
appeals to Russia, where as much as 15% of the population are Sunni Muslims, in some
regions with a history of unrest.
History of distrust between Iran and Russia (Samuel Ramani Washington Post)
Samuel Ramani (Washington Post). So Are Russia and Iran best buddies now? Um, maybe not. Accessed January
15, 2016. Published 11/12/15. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/12/so-are-
russia-and-iran-best-buddies-now-um-maybe-not/.
The USSR supported Iraq during the
After Irans 1979 revolution, the country had a tense relationship with the Soviet Union.
Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), as it feared an Iranian victory would spread Khomeinis Islamist
ideology across the Middle East. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russias relationship with Iran thawed. Russia expanded
commercial ties, sold arms to Iran, and by the mid-1990s was actively helping Iran in the development of its nuclear program. Thats because

Iran and Russia shared some geopolitical interests. Both countries opposed Turkeys strategy in the Middle East and the U.S.s expanded

influence in Central Asia. But Russia-Iran cooperation polarized each countrys elites because of their long-standing distrust for one another.

This animosity stemmed from Irans opaque military buildup and Russias historic ambitions of enveloping Iran within its sphere of influence.

Russian elites saw Iran as untrustworthy; Iranian elites saw Russia as imperial and arrogant. This distrust showed up in a number of ways. In

1996, Igor Rodinov, Russias defense minister under Boris Yeltsin, listed Iran as a country whose military buildup could threaten the post-Soviet

region that had recently formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A 2003 Ministry of Defense report revealed Russias disdain

for Irans nuclear ambitions, leading Russia to cut assistance to the project. Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev took opposite points of view

about Irans nuclear program. In 2009, Putin denied that Iran had nuclear aspirations while Medvedev said in 2010 that Iran was close to

producing a nuclear bomb. That revealed how deeply divided Russian elites were about the credibility of Irans nuclear plans. In
2012,
Putin expressed concern that a nuclear-armed Iran would destabilize the Middle East
making it clear that Russian support for Iran could evaporate if it developed a nuclear bomb.
In turn, Iran made clear that it opposed Russias disapproval, through provocative actions like a 2011 lawsuit against the Russian government

over its decision to suspend S-300 missile shipments. Mark Katz, a professor of politics at George Mason University and a noted expert on

Russia-Middle East relations, argues that Iran viewed Russias insistence that it be Irans only supplier of uranium, as an act of imperial hubris.
R/T China Pivot
1 - delink - they cant help each other with large scale goals, only reason Russia shifted to
China was to get leverage in negotiations with the West
Christopher Miller. Russia Cant Replace the West with China. The Moscow Times. August 2014.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-can-t-replace-the-west-with-china/504548.html
neither country is in a position to
The most important cause for skepticism about a stronger Chinese-Russian entente is that
play a primary role in helping the other accomplish its core goals. China's main aims are to
safeguard economic growth at home and expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific region. In both
areas, Russia can play a role, but only a minor one. The U.S., Europe and Asian countries will be far more important to China's economic

development than Russia will. Moscow, meanwhile, is currently focused on its western frontier. Yet
China has little interest in
Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova, and is unlikely to get seriously involved. The main reason the Kremlin has
been trumpeting ties with the Chinese during the Ukraine crisis is not because officials believe that China will help directly, but because the

appearance of closer ties gives Moscow greater leverage in negotiations with the West. From Russia's perspective, the best-case scenario is a

relationship that, with the exception of energy ties, is broad and visible, but not very deep. A full alliance with Beijing holds little appeal in

Moscow because Russia would be the junior partner. Don't expect the Kremlin to agree to that.

R/T Offsets Sanctions Impact

Turning to China will not compensate for losses from US trade via sanctions, cannot reverse
decline (Judy Dempsey Newsweek)
Judy Dempsey (Newsweek). Lifting Sanctions Against Russia Would Be a Terrible Mistake. Accessed December
25, 2015. Published December 18, 2015. http://www.newsweek.com/lifting-sanctions-against-russia-would-be-
terrible-mistake-407061.
Putin boasted that his decision to ban the import of certain European products in retaliation for EU sanctions would be to Russias benefit.

Russia could easily compensate by relying on its own agricultural produce and other goods, the Kremlin maintained. But instead of using

Western sanctions to introduce reforms and loosen the states grip on the economy and modernize the countrys infrastructure, Russia has let

the opposite happen. It is as if populism, bravado and the rejection of globalization were substitutes for growth. More worrying for an economy

that relies on oil and gas exports to maintain growthexports whose prices are at record lowsis the creeping stagnation that began before
as Guriev argues, Russian trade and economic deals with China will not
the Ukraine crisis. And
reverse the decline, however much the Kremlin tries to promote the idea that it does not
need the West and can find a savior in China. Few other analysts believe that Putin will embark on domestic reforms,
despite the ever-increasing costs of delaying them. Europe, in the meantime, needs to pursue a strategy, and not by building new pipelines for

Russian gas. That wont lead to change. Instead, the European approach should involve something more sustained, aimed at the
younger generation and at Russias pockets of civil society and centered on soft power. Europes strategy needs to focus on expanding as much

as possible scholarships for students, economists and academics. Europe should pursue youth exchanges, something that Poland has been

doing for the past few years to try to puncture Russias state propaganda, which depicts the West as decadent and hell-bent on destabilizing

Russia and bringing about regime change.

Nope, EU trade still much higher and set to stay that way
Andre Yakunin, 1-5-16, New Europe, Should Russia look East or West for Economic Presoperity,
http://neurope.eu/article/should- russia-look-east-or-west-for-economic-prosperity/ DOA: 1-5-16
The idea that Russia and Chinas economic relationship is a seamless alignment of natural allies should therefore be brought into question.

According to the Russia-China investment fund, trade from Russia to China has actually fallen steadily over the past three years, even though in

the first half of 2015 alone it still totalled $30.6bn. While it is true that trade with the EU has also declined, these statistics bely the reality on
Sino-Russian trade is not likely to surpass the total trade between Europe and
the ground that
Russia or even reach a level of parity in the immediate future.

R/T Gas Deal

1 - Nonunique - probably needed more oil buyers anyway in wake of global decline in oil
prices

2. Delink Gas Deal Fell Appart.

Steven Mufson The Washington Post. Russian energy sector struggles as U.S. and Europe tighten sanctions. Dec
22nd, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/12/22/russian-energy-sector-struggles-
as-u-s-and-europe-tighten-sanctions/
The biggest victim of the energy sector sanctions so far has been a plan for three natural gas pipelines to China. The Russian pivot to China was

supposed to open up a major new market for Russia, which currently relies heavily on exports to Europe. Although the deals
havent been scuttled, they have been postponed, perhaps for years . An increase in worldwide natural gas
supplies and liquefied natural gas facilities has cut the global price of natural gas in half during the past year, undermining the rationale for the

pipeline.

2 - delink - No evidence of any other alliances, political or military, between the two because
they dont really care
Zack Beauchamp. The big problems in the Russia-China relationship cant be solved by a gas deal. Vox News.
May 2014. http://www.vox.com/2014/5/23/5741362/russia-china-pipedream-alliance
beyond the propaganda value of talking about an
Neither Russia nor China have really strong reasons to be allies
anti-American alliance, it turns out that neither China nor Russia really has it in their interests
to form a military alliance. A non-aggression pact, mutual defense treaty, or any other kind of alliance would only be useful if
either country was at imminent risk of invasion (they're not), or if they wanted to work together in some act of aggression abroad. But neither

has shown any interest in helping out with the other's border conflicts. A Russia-China alliance only really makes sense as a full-scale challenge

to the American-led world order: an enemy-of-my-enemy is my friend kind of deal. Again, both state medias like to talk about challenging the

world order, but there's little evidence either China or Russia wants that. True, both countries would like to be the big dog in their respective

spheres of influence. And neither would mind being more politically, militarily, or economically influential than they are now. But it's one thing

to be regionally expansionist, as Russia and China are, and another thing altogether to want to remake the world security order. That's
part of why, since the end of the Cold War, Russia and China haven't built deep diplomatic
partnerships or economic links. One of the closest things to a formal bond in those realms, the multilateral Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, has never amounted to much of a politico-military organizing group

China Pivot Good

1 - Asian pivot gives U.S. better opportunities to engage Russia diplomatically and improve
relations
"Russia's Asia Pivot: Confrontation or Cooperation?" Center for Strategic and International Studies. N.p., 2 Feb.
2015. Web. 07 Dec. 2015. <http://csis.org/publication/russias-asia-pivot-confrontation-or-cooperation>.
Russias resulting support for maintaining balance and stability in Asia is largely compatible
with U.S. interests in the region, as long as the confrontation over Ukraine does not become the basis for a global stand-off on
the model of the Cold War. Even as the United States and Russia continue to spar over European and Eurasian security, Washington
has an opportunity to pursue limited engagement with Moscow in the Asia-Pacific. Doing so would
allow the United States to maintain a working relationship with Russia at a time when tensions over Ukraine threaten to unleash a protracted
Such engagement can also help address some of Asias major security
confrontation in Europe.
challenges, including the nuclear stand-off on the Korean Peninsula, territorial disputes in the
East and South China Seas.

2A - Reduces Conflict with Russia because China acting as an intermediary

Larisa Smirnova, December 2015, Russian International Affairs Council, Russia and the World: Foreign Policy
Outlook 2016, available for purchase at Russia-direct.org DOA: 1-6-16
it is actually in the best interests of the West to encourage, rather than fear, Russias
As it turns out,
cooperation with the Asian nations, notably China. There are no reasons for the West to either be apprehensive of
the successes or applaud the potential failures of Russias Asia pivot. At a point when international politics has
reached a dangerous phase of a shifting balance of power, the stance of cooperation rather than confrontation is
obviously a much wiser one to take. Even assuming that the main goal of Western policy makers is to
contain Russias unilateral belligerence (real or perceived), and engage it back into the politics
of compromise, the influence of China as an intermediary can be extremely instrumental in
reaching this goal.

2B - Defensive allies reduce chance of war by 28% China will exert pacifying influence on
Russia
Brett Leeds, Rice University. Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of
Militarized Interstate Disputes. Midwest Political Science Association. 2003.
http://atop.rice.edu/download/publications/LeedsAJPS03.pdf
This is easiest to see by examining the bar graph pictured in Figure 1. This figure shows the percentage change in the probability of dispute
when a
initiation that can be attributed to outside allies when all other variables are held at their mean values. The first bar shows that
target state has an ally committed to its defense, the probability of dispute initiation is 28%
lower than the probability of dispute initiation in a dyad with the mean characteristics in the dataset but no
outside allies. The second bar represents the case in which the challenger has an offensive ally; in this instance, the probability of
dispute initiation is 47% higher than it is in the case in which neither the challenger nor the target has any allies committed to intervene.
R/T Support to Syria
1. Non-unique. Russia was propping up Assad beforehand. At worst, Russias means have
shifted.
Ingo Mannteufel, Deutsche Welle Opinion: Putin's 'Syria card' in the Ukraine conflict. 1/3/16.
http://www.dw.com/en/opinion-putins-syria-card-in-the-ukraine-conflict/a-18956434
Yet Russia's power in the Syrian war should not be overestimated . As a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, Russia has certainly always possessed enough means to put stumbling blocks in the way of the West's foreign policy. The Kremlin has

raised the stakes in Syria by building an air force base in Latakia and firing several cruise missiles from battleships. But no one should be
even before that, Moscow helped out its protg, Assad, with
deceived by these strong-arm tactics:
diplomacy and military aid.

2. ALT Causality
A) To keep Assad from shifting his alliance towards Iran
B) It finally started to look like Assad was losing, would be risking Russias only ally in the
middle east
C) Tartus Military base (Economist)
(Economist). Why Russia is increasing its military presence in Syria. Accessed 12/10. Published 9/22/15.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/09/economist-explains-15
Why is Russia doing this just now? Explanations are various and there will be several parts to the answer. One is simply that over the
summer it genuinely started to look as though Mr Assad was losing. IS, as well as other less extreme
opposition groups, have been pushing back the border of the small statelet he still controls (small geographically, that is: it still comprises the
Fear of a collapse, or a coup, that might in the worst case deprive
bulk of Syrias dwindling population.)
Russia of its naval base at Tartus, the only military facility Russia still controls outside the
former Soviet Union, will have been genuine. Some reports suggest that Tartus is being expanded, to be able to take the
largest Russian ships.
2D. Putins Syria strategy is a sign of weakness and fear () (Amanda Taub Vox)
Amanda Taub (Vox News). Putin's Syria intervention isn't grand, brilliant strategy. It's an act of fear. Accessed
January 16, 2016. Published September 30, 2015. http://www.vox.com/2015/9/30/9419729/putin-syria-
fear/in/9204014.
Russian President Vladimir Putin's military intervention in Syria, and then his call at the United Nations for a global "anti-Hitler coalition" to fight

ISIS there, can certainly look, from the American perspective, like a power grab. Putin's boldness seems like a sign that President Obama's

passivity has allowed the Russian leader to run roughshod over US interests in the Middle East particularly to hawks already frustrated that

the US has refused to do more in Syria. But don't be taken in by Putin's carefully cultivated image of strength and decisiveness. His
intervention in Syria is most likely driven not by boldness but by reactiveness and, most of all, by fear. Fear of
anarchy, fear of populist uprisings, fear of Western meddling, fear of any weakening of strong government rule, and fear
that he himself could succumb to these forces. (Putin's Syria strategy is also unlikely to be very effective: Propping up
Assad and partnering with Shia Hezbollah and Iran seems likely to worsen the sectarianism and anti-Assad sentiment that is driving much of the

war. And Russian airstrikes aren't likely to rally Syria ns around Assad.) To understand how Putin sees Syria, and why he's getting himself into
this mess, you have to understand how he looks at Libya, the lessons he drew from its collapse, how it led him to misunderstand the West

and why both Libya and Syria are the sum of many of his worst foreign policy fears.

De-Links
Russia cant afford to take on additional costs and fight another war (Amanda Taub Vox)
Amanda Taub (Vox News). Putin has a big problem in Syria that no one is talking about. Accessed January 16,
2016. Published September 30, 2015. http://www.vox.com/2015/9/30/9426333/putin-syria-russia-
problem/in/9204014.
Russia's economy is already struggling, and a
But Putin's public opinion problems on Syria could be just the beginning.
new war will be an expensive additional burden. If Russia's presence in Syria makes its forces
a target of terrorist attacks there, or, worse, if it coincides with attacks at home, that could
damage public opinion even further. Russians' skepticism of Putin's Syria policy is especially stark when contrasted with the
overwhelmingly positive response to his actions in Ukraine. That was a huge boost to Putin's popularity, helping his regime weather Russia's

2014 economic problems with high public support.

Syria adventure costs Russia $4M per day, cost is increasing unsustainably, is temporary
(Peter Hobson The Moscow Times)
Peter Hobson (The Moscow Times). Calculating the Cost of Russia's War in Syria. Accessed January 16, 2016.
Published October 20, 2015. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/calculating-the-cost-of-russias-
war-in-syria/540015.html.
Russian air strikes in Syria are costing Moscow up to $4 million per day, data collated for The Moscow
Times by a defense think tank showed. The figures by IHS Jane's show that bombing raids, supply runs, infrastructure and ground personnel

along with a salvo of cruise missiles fired into the conflict zone have cost Russia $80 million-$115 million since
strikes began on Sept. 30. Compared to Russia's 3.1 trillion ruble ($50 billion) defense budget this year, that is small change. But
the Kremlin could see its costs and commitments grow . Analysts warn that the conflict in Syria could
drag on for years, and if soldiers die, Russian involvement could dramatically escalate. Flying out of an airbase in territory controlled by
Syrian President Bashar Assad, some 36 Russian warplanes and 20 attack helicopters have flown around 40 sorties per day for the past three

weeks, according to the Defense Ministry, strafing targets belonging to rebel groups and the jihadists of the Islamic State. Precise data is scarce,

but media reports say servicing and protecting the air force are around 1,500-2,000 personnel on the ground, supplied via naval and air

transport through the Black Sea and Iranian and Iraqi airspace. A handful of warships in the eastern Mediterranean adds extra reinforcement.

Each warplane costs $12,000 per hour to fly, and each helicopter $3,000 per hour, according to IHS.
Russia is geographically incapable of escalating conflict, especially without the West finding
out (Max Fisher Vox)
Max Fisher (Vox News). Putin's military intervention in Syria, explained. Accessed January 16, 2016. Published
September 30, 2015. http://www.vox.com/2015/9/24/9392543/russia-syria-putin.
Some of the commentary on Russia's intervention has expressed concern that although the initial force is relatively small, perhaps Russia will

build it out into a larger invasion that really can change the overall trajectory of the war. But geography will get in the way of that.
Logistically, it is not really feasible for Russia to significantly increase the size of its force and thus
escalate its position in Syria. Russian military flights to Syria have to get there somehow, but
that typically requires flying over countries that bar such flights. Russia cannot ship the equipment there via
its navy without being spotted as it passes through Turkey, and even if it wanted to move in its equipment in broad daylight, this would be
In other words, while this deployment
difficult, expensive, and time-consuming, if it's even within Russian capabilities.
does matter on its own, do not expect Russia to do what it did in Ukraine, and quietly sneak
in enough military equipment to radically alter the military balance on the ground.

TURNS
Sanctions coerce Russia to cooperate in Syria (Owen Matthews Newsweek)
Owen Matthews, 9-18-2015, With Stepped-Up Syrian Intervention, Putin Is Playing a Greater Game, Newsweek,
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/10/02/stepped-syrian-intervention-putin-playing-greater- game-373665.html
In late September, Putin will travel to New York for the first time in 10 years to address the United Nations General Assembly. It will be his first

appearance there since the Russian annexation of Crimea last February and the war in Eastern Ukraine that followed it, which resulted in the

shooting down of Malaysia Airlines MH-17 and draconian international sanctions against Russia. All indications are that Putin will use the

speech to cast himself as a peacemaker in Syriaand in the process try to restore Russias position as a pillar of world security. Hes also,

according to spokesman Dmitry Peskov, going to address the issue of sanctions, which (along with sinking oil prices) caused the Russian
Foreign Minister
economy to shrink by over 4 percent last year. Putin desperately needs the EU and U.S. to ease sanctionsand
Sergei Lavrov hinted in talks with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in Doha in August that Russia will trade
cooperation in Syria for the scrapping sanctions.

Sanctions could turn Russias bombing into an ally in the fight against ISIS (Moises Naim The
Atlantic)
Moises Naim, 12-8-2015, "Europe: Caught Between Islamic Terrorism and Russian Imperialism," Atlantic,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/12/putin-russia-sanctions-syria-ukraine/419265/
But these leaders may be overlooking what is perhaps the main determinant of the less combative Putin now on display: The price of Russias

main exports, oil and gas, have plummeted from highs that until last year helped fill the Kremlins coffers and gave it the wherewithal to pursue

an aggressive, fiercely independent foreign policy. Oil that once sold at more than $100 a barrel is now at less than $60, and the Russian

government needs it to rise to $105 to balance its budget. Its not surprising, then, that Putin is interested in doing
whatever is necessary to eliminate Western sanctions. They have already cost the Russian economy more than 1
percent of its GDP. If Europe stays unitedensuring that sanctions on Russia are preserved until there is a credible and durable ceasefire in

Ukraine, and thus pressuring the Kremlin to abandon its attempts to recover the countrya relatively good outcome could be fashioned from
a welter of conflict:
Putins imperialistic adventurism in Europe could be contained, even as the
West gains an important ally in the fight against the Islamic State. That wouldnt be so bad.

Russian airstrikes in 2016 help fight ISIS (Christopher Harress International Business Times)
Christopher Harress (International Business Times). Russia Airstrikes in 2016: Thousands of ISIS Targets Hit By
Moscows Jets This Year. Accessed January 14, 2016. Published January 11, 2016. http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-
airstrikes-syria-2016-thousands-isis-targets-hit-moscows-jets-year-2259339 .
Russia has already conducted more than 1,000 airstrikes in Syria this year amid a continued push to beat the
Islamic State group, according to a top Kremlin general. As a result, hundreds of cities, towns and villages in
Syria were liberated from ISIS control in 2015 and thus far in 2016, Lieutenant General Sergey Rudskoy,
chief of the main operations department of the Russian General Staff, reportedly said. Russian air force jets had hit military infrastructure, oil

producing and processing facilities, and areas where militant military equipment was kept, said Rudskoy, according to a report by Tass, a

Russian news site based in Moscow. "A total of 311 sorties have been made over the first 10 days of 2016 during which strikes were delivered

at 1,097 facilities in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia, Hama, Homs, Damascus, Deir ez-Zor, Hasakeh, Deraa and Raqqa," said Rudskoy. "In
December 2015, militants were driven from 134 cities and towns and from 19 settlements
more in the first days of the new year. "While U.S. and its coalition partners began airstrikes more than a year ago,
Russias inclusion in the fight against ISIS appears to have made a significant dent in the
terror groups ambitions to build a caliphate in Syria and Iraq.
R/T Putin Approval Rating
1 TURN Leaders in crises often experience short term gains from rally round the flag effect,
but this declines over time. Nicu Popescu of the European Union for Security Studies gives the
example of 1913, when Russian nationalism was at an all time high four years before the
people overthrew the tsar
Nicu Popescu. Sanctions and Russia: Lessons from the Cold War. European Union Institute for Security Studies.
October 2015. http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_10_sanctions.pdf
One of the main arguments against sanctions is that they have bolstered Putin domestically. The belief propagated by the Russian media that

the country is at war, is reinforcing the rally-round-the-flag effect and ensuring that the Russian presidents approval ratings remain high at
International crises often strengthen leaders in the short term
least for now. Yet this is nothing unusual.
only to doom them at a later stage. Examples abound: in 1913 Russia celebrated with great pomp and much public display of
unity 300 years of the Romanov dynasty. Within less than four years, the Tsar was toppled and, one year later, shot. Or take the case of Serbias

former president Slobodan Milosevic. The bombing campaign by NATO against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999 led to a brief boost in his

popularity, and he even called an early presidential election in 2000 with the hope of cementing another term. But he lost, refused to

acknowledge defeat and was eventually ousted amidst street protests. Wars themselves, not just politicians, can also be popular, particularly in

their initial phases. The outbreak of the First World War was heralded with a wave of jingoism in many European states. Some of them

including the Russian and Habsburg empires collapsed just a few years later.

2 Putins willingness to murder political figures has instilled fear in his population that
skews his polls in his favor. In reality, support is much lower than polls indicate.
Amanda Azinheira (US News). Not Mr. Popularity: There's more than meets the eye to Putin's sky-high poll
numbers.. Accessed December 25, 2015. Published July 21, 2015. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-
report/2015/07/21/putins-high-poll-numbers-dont-mean-hes-popular.
As Vladimir Putin's international image continues to decline, his domestic popularity has, paradoxically, reached an all-time high. The most

recent poll by the Moscow-based Levada Center reports a staggering 89 percent approval rating for the Russian president, in spite of a

stumbling economy, declining living standards, rampant corruption and deepening international isolation. Putin, it seems, has demonstrated

that nothing can hold him down. But instead of asking themselves exactly how Russia's leader remains on top, Western policymakers might
it's important to consider the environment in which these polls
want to inquire whether he truly is. Here,
were taken. Putin's government has a firm grasp of the power of intimidation, and fear certainly plays a role in
influencing public opinion. In a country where a prominent political figure can be murdered
steps from the seat of government without consequence, imagine receiving a telephone call
from a stranger asking whether or not you support the current leadership. Your answer might not
accurately reflect your actual views. In a culture especially used to compartmentalizing public and private personas, a public opinion poll

doesn't necessarily represent what's being said at home among friends. To add to the fear, Levada, the polling agency that released the results

of the latest public opinion poll, was required to register as a "foreign agent" under recent laws cracking down on Russian NGOs. The term has a

particularly negative connotation among Russians, stemming from its Soviet origins as jargon to describe foreign spies. While Levada bravely

refused to register, the accusation doubtless detracted from its legitimacy, making Russians far more leery of voicing their discontent to a

"foreign agent" on the other end of the line.

3 Support for the government and its policies is declining in the sqou, still pressure to back
down
Robert Levgold, The National Interest, "Lowdown: What Russian Citizens Really Think of Putin and Why.". N.p., 25
Sept. 2015. Web. 07 Dec. 2015. <http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/lowdown-what-russian-citizens-really-
think-putin-why-13933>.
Added to the deepening and spreading sense of nationalism (the krim nash [Crimea is ours] tee-shirts are less on display, but the

sentiment persists and the 85 percent support for the annexation has scarcely budged since March 2014), together with the strong tendency to

blame Russian woes on the United States, this sense of Putins leadership as the best guarantee of continued stability helps to explain Putins

popularity. Many Russians will tell you that it is not really at 83 percent, as the polls show, but almost none doubts that it is genuinely high. The
no other politicians ratings are half as high, nor is the governments, nor are
fly in the ointment is that
those of government policies, although approval of the direction in which the country is
headed last month was 55 percent, down nine points from June, but 14 points higher than when Putin
returned to the presidency in 2012.

3B) people are fleeing Putin faster than ever before. (Amanda Azinheira US News)
Amanda Azinheira (US News). Not Mr. Popularity: There's more than meets the eye to Putin's sky-high poll
numbers.. Accessed December 25, 2015. Published July 21, 2015. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-
report/2015/07/21/putins-high-poll-numbers-dont-mean-hes-popular.
Nonetheless, empirical indicators of the true state of Russian society can still be found . Many of
Putin's critics, for example, are voting with their feet; today, emigration from Russia has reached its highest point
since the 1990s, and surging five-fold between 2011 (when 37,000 left Russia) and 2014
(when 200,000 did). What's more, those leaving tend to be part of Russia's educated middle
and upper-middle class, causing intellectual brain drain on a massive scale. The country's
soaring emigration rate amounts to a resounding vote of no confidence in Putin's Russia by
those who can afford to leave. Those that can't, meanwhile, do their best to stay on the Kremlin's good side. But this state of
affairs won't persist forever. Already, rising inflation and soaring commodity prices are beginning to generate discontent on the Russian street.

Facing a bleak economic and political future, it's only a matter of time before the Russian public breaks free of Putin's hypnosis. When it does,

the outside world will get a chance to see just how popular Russia's president truly is.

3C) TURN: 75% of Russians want better relations with the West, understanding that further
antagonism will only hurt their economy more (The Economist)
Economist, 12-8-2015, "As Russias economy shrinks, Vladimir Putin softens his tone,"
http://www.economist.com/node/21679701/
Mr Putin may simply be reading the weather. Recent polling by the independent Levada Centre finds that
75% of Russians think relations with the West should be improved. Mr Putin may also be
reconsidering the wisdom of further antagonising the outside world. Russias economy is in a precarious
state, as he came close to acknowledging in his speech: By changing nothing, we will simply run out of reserves
and the economic growth rates will linger around zero. The economic hardship is beginning to hit groups
normally loyal to the Russian leadership. A nationwide protest by lorry drivers has been slowly rolling across Russia since mid-November. The

drivers have come out against a new toll system for heavy cargo on federal highways. They also object to the fact that the man paid to run the

system is Igor Rotenberg, the son of Arkady Rotenberg, one of Mr Putins oldest cronies. Rotenberg is worse than ISIS (Islamic State), read the

banner on one lorry in southern Russia.

4. Putin softening anti-western rhetoric in annual address.

The Economist. As Russias economy shrinks, Vladimir Putin softens his tone. 8th December 2015.
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21679701-popular-president-muffles-his-anti-western-rhetoric-russias-
economy-shrinks-vladimir-putin
But most of the speech was more pacific, focusing on the economy, the need to prepare for low oil prices, and social issues.
Ukraine was not mentioned; Crimea appeared only briefly. Anti-Americanism was nearly absent. No one expects
the Kremlin to make an about-face in its opposition to the West, but the shift in tone was
notable. Mr Putin may simply be reading the weather. Recent polling by the independent Levada Centre finds
that 75% of Russians think relations with the West should be improved. Mr Putin may also be
reconsidering the wisdom of further antagonising the outside world. Russias economy is in a precarious
state, as he came close to acknowledging in his speech: By changing nothing, we will simply run out of reserves and the economic growth rates

will linger around zero.

IPMACT: Policy change because public opinion is still incredibly important in Russia, despite
media control.
Henry Hale, The Gaurdian Russian Nationalism and the Logic of the Kremlins Actions on Ukraine. August 29th,
2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/russian-nationalism-kremlin-actions-ukraine
Russia is not a simple
In light of all this, Putins actions in Ukraine are best understood through the lens of his domestic political considerations.

dictatorship in which whatever he says goes, no matter what. Stability there depends heavily
on public support for the leadership. The USSR and eastern Central Europe show that control
over media cannot by itself generate support for a regime.
R/T Propaganda
1: Non unique: incentive for Putin to prop up nationalism exists without sanctions
2: TURN: Financial Sanctions have harmed the governments budget: money to finance
propaganda cut by 10%
Leonid Bershidsky (Bloomberg). Putin's Propaganda Industry Tightens Its Belt. Accessed January 15, 2016.
Published January 2015. http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-01-23/putin-s-propaganda-industry-
tightens-its-belt.
TASS is only the latest propaganda outlet to make cuts. The government-owned Rossiyskaya Gazeta, which holds the monopoly on the official

publication of new laws and government decrees, is letting go 10 percent of its staff. News Media, the holding company that runs a number of

media assets for Putin's close friend Yury Kovalchuk, decided to cut between 15 and 30 percent of its staff, including 15 to 17 percent of the

employees of Lifenews, the TV channel that has carried some of the most powerful domestically-targeted propaganda on the Ukraine crisis.
Faced with a steep drop in oil revenues, the Russian government is sequestering the 2015
budget to cut spending by 10 percent. Government-financed media are not exempt from the
cut. Last week, they received official word from the finance ministry that their funding will be
reduced by 10 percent. This concerns the national TV channels and Russia Today, the entity that runs a Russian-language news
agency that competes with TASS, a Russian radio station and an international TV operation under the RT brand.

3. At some point Russia will have to wake up to reality: Propaganda has caused the entire
world to turn against Putin (Brian Whitmore The Atlantic)
Brian Whitmore (The Atlantic). Putin Gets Caught in His Own Trap. Accessed January 15, 2016. Published
8/12/15. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/08/putin-russia-ukraine-energy/401003/.
Moscow has no doubt been very effective in mounting guerrilla-marketing campaigns aimed at sowing doubt and confusion in the West. And

Russian officials have been skillful in manipulating and surreptitiously influencing media narratives on issues like the war in Ukraine and the
After spending nearly half a billion dollars to get its message out
downing of flight MH17. But guess what?
to the world, after unleashing armies of trolls to disrupt Western news sites, after launching
the most widespread disinformation campaign since the end of the Cold War, after all this,
Russias global image is in the toilet. According to the Pew Research Centers new report, only
three countries in the world have a net positive opinion of Russia: China, Vietnam, and
Ghana. Worldwide, a median of just 30 percent of respondents viewed Russia favorably. Writing in Bloomberg View, political commentator
Leonid Bershidsky quipped that the money might be spent just as wisely buying more $600,000 watches for Putins press secretary, Dmitry

Peskov. And the numbers are dismal across the board. In Europe, just 26 percent view Russia favorably; in the Middle East, only 25 percent do.

In Latin America, its only 29 percent. In the regions most favorably inclined toward RussiaAsia and Africaits just 37 percent. And if Russias

global image is bad, Putins is dismal. Worldwide, just 24 percent trust him. In Europe, just 15 percent do.
R/T Nationalism

1. Rationalism > nationalism, Putin is extremely pragmatic and predictable (James Walker
Texas A&M University)
James Walker (Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University). Walker: Russian actions
are aggressive, but rational. Accessed January 16, 2016. Published January 2, 2016.
http://amarillo.com/opinion/opinion-columnist/guest-columnist/2016-01-02/walker-russian-actions-are-
aggressive-rational.
United States and Russian relations have taken a dangerously negative turn in recent years. Tensions erupted initially in Ukraine and more

recently in Syria, where Russian air strikes against moderate rebels are impeding Western efforts to combat Islamic State. Western politicians

have consistently denounced the actions of Russian President Vladimir Putin, labeling him delusional, and making provocative comparisons to

Adolf Hitler. Such rhetoric is misleading; the truth is that Russias

behavior is highly pragmatic, and therefore
predictable. Vladimir Putins conduct of international relations prioritizes security above all
other objectives, and he is willing to use aggressive, expensive, and even brutal tactics, to
deter threats in Russias geopolitical backyard. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, international relations scholar
John Mearsheimer articulates the theory of offensive realism. The core assumption of this theory is that the world is anarchic that there is no

global governing power that constrains states behavior. The implication is that states must acquire power in order to ensure their survival, and

that conflict is therefore inevitable. In 21st century America, it is difficult to think of security as a scarce commodity. The U.S. possesses the

largest, most powerful military on the planet. Our navy controls the seas and, by extension, the international trade routes upon which the

global economy depends. We have abundant natural resources and the strongest economy in the world. We dominate the Western

Hemisphere and are isolated on both sides by water for thousands of miles. No country has the capacity to invade or conquer the United

States. Despite fears of terrorism and weapons proliferation, America enjoys an unprecedented level of security in an anarchic world. Russia is a
security issues dominate Moscows political discourse. NATO/EU expansion
different story;
presents a serious threat to Russian interests, as Putin has publicly and consistently declared.
The 2014 Ukrainian coup dtat brought to power Western-backed political factions who, given the opportunity, almost certainly would have

kicked the Russian naval fleet out of the Crimean base at Sevastopol. Putin
reacted like any rational actor would in his
position; he sent troops into Crimea to secure vital military assets. In the Donbass region,
Putin has demonstrated that he is willing and able to support a bloody and protracted civil
war in order to prevent NATO from incorporating Ukraine into the alliance. In Syria, Russia is deeply
concerned by Western actions. U.S. officials have repeatedly called for regime change in Damascus without providing a feasible alternative to

Assad. History has proven that the West is much more effective at ousting dictators than at building democracies, and Russia is not willing to

allow Syria an ally and geostrategic neighbor to become another Libya. As Americans, we tend not to view the world through the lens of

power politics because it clashes with our identity as a benevolent nation; the contention that all states pursue power to maximize security

contradicts the narrative of exceptional America, a country with the moral authority to institutionalize freedom and fight injustice. But security,

not morality, still rules the day in international politics. Russia, like virtually all other states in history, acts in its own self-interest to enhance its

chances of survival. Do Russias actions in Ukraine and Syria violate international laws? Yes. Should the U.S. continue to oppose them?

Absolutely. But our rivalry with Russia is nothing unique or personal; our differences in Ukraine and Syria are interest-based, and we
must
not allow moral indignation or blind antagonism to do further damage to a vital strategic
relationship. Depicting Russia as an evil or unpredictable rogue state whose actions
circumvent the principles of rational decision-making will do exactly that.

2. Nationalism wont last long in the wake of economic setbacks because people have to face
the tangible costs eventually; proven by Russian history (Iana Dreyer European Institute for
Security Studies)
Iana Dreyer and Nicu Popescu, 12-2014, Do sanctions against Russia work? European Institute for Security
Studies, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_35_Russia_sanctions.pdf
Equally (if not more) important is that sanctions shattered Putins contract with the Russian people: namely, improving collective prosperity in

exchange for accepting authoritarianism and the siphoning off of Russias riches by elites. The restrictive measures, combined with the other

factors now hitting the countrys economy, are forcing Putin to tentatively replace his model with nationalism and anti-Westernism.
However, as Russian history suggests, patriotism might not last long in the absence of
tangible economic prosperity. The collapse of the Russian empire in 1917 occurred in the
wake of the initial patriotic boost of the First World War. The USSR crumbled after its
economy collapsed in the 1980s. And support for Yeltsin and liberal democracy in the 1990s
plummeted after reforms failed to yield economic dividends.

3 - TURN: Putin softening anti-western rhetoric TWO WEEKS AGO

The Economist. As Russias economy shrinks, Vladimir Putin softens his tone. 8th December 2015.
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21679701-popular-president-muffles-his-anti-western-rhetoric-russias-
economy-shrinks-vladimir-putin
But most of the speech was more pacific, focusing on the economy, the need to prepare for low oil prices, and social issues.
Ukraine was not mentioned; Crimea appeared only briefly. Anti-Americanism was nearly absent. No one expects
the Kremlin to make an about-face in its opposition to the West, but the shift in tone was
notable. Mr Putin may simply be reading the weather. Recent polling by the independent Levada Centre finds
that 75% of Russians think relations with the West should be improved. Mr Putin may also be
reconsidering the wisdom of further antagonising the outside world. Russias economy is in a precarious
state, as he came close to acknowledging in his speech: By changing nothing, we will simply run out of reserves and the economic growth rates

will linger around zero.

R/T Destabilizes Russia
Downturn caused by the sanctions wont cause instability and war
Nikolay Pakhomov is a political analyst and consultant in New York City. He is a Russian International Affairs
Council expert, January 4, 2015, The National Interest, The Truth About Sanctions Against Russia,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-truth- about-sanctions-against-russia-14789?page=2 DOA: 1-4-16
So far, it has not been
After Russia claimed its right to a more assertive foreign policy, its economy has found itself in a far more challenging international environment.

completely broken, and Russian society seems ready to endure harsher economic conditions
for the benefit of a more ambitious foreign policy course: at least 59 percent of Russians support the countrys foreign policy. But
this endurance challenge is set to continue at least for the coming year.
R/T Loose Nukes
Weapons kept in pieces
John Mueller (Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University), 4/16/10, There are no "loose nukes
http://atomicinsights.com/therearenoloosenukesprofessorjohnmuellerauthorofatomicobsession/
Well, mainly because they dont exist. (Emphasis added.) No one has really been able to find anything thats a
loose nuke. If you did actually buy or sellbuy or steal a nuclear weapon, what youd find is that its got a lot of locks on it, and theres very few
they keep their weapons in pieces, so youd
people who know how to unlock it. In the case of Pakistan, for example,
have to steal or buy one half, findgo to another secure location and buy or steal the other
half, somehow know how to put tab A into slot B, and set it off. The number of peopleas I say, the
number of people who know how to set them off is very small. The people who designed them are notdo
not know how to set them off. And the people who maintain them do not know how to set them off. So just getting the bombsand they also

have locks on them which will, if tampered with, will cause a conventional explosion, which will cause the weapon itself to self-destruct,

effectively, in a conventional explosion. So the danger is extraordinarily small (Emphasis added.), it seems to me.

All the fissile material isnt enough

Robin Frost International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11, December 2005
Twenty confirmed incidents have involved highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium-239 (Pu239); these are listed in Table 1. According to

the IAEA, most featured very small quantities. As of December 2004 (the most recent year for which the agency has released complete data),
no trafficking incident known to the IAEA involved more that a very small fraction of the
quantity required to build a weapon, and the number of those that have involved true weapons-grade fissile materials is
debatable. The total for all IAEA-confirmed trafficking cases involving HEU for the decade from 1993 to 2003
was just 8.35kg. even if it had all been weapons-grade material and all in one shipment, this
would still have been about two-thirds short of the 25kg of HEU required for a basic bomb.
With the notable exception of 363g of mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) reactor fuel seized at Munich airport in Germany in 1994, the

quantities of plutonium known to have been trafficked have been minute. The largest single haul of pure plutonium was a tiny pellet of

extremely highly-enriched super-grade metal seized at Tengen in Germany in 1994. the source of the substance remains unknown, although

there are suspicions that it came from a Soviet weapons laboratory. The total amount of IAEA-confirmed plutonium trafficked between 1993

an 2003 was 374.3g, or less than one-twelfth of the amount needed for a basic bomb.

Russia doesnt want people stealing their nukes.

Emily He Council on Foreign Relations (January 2006) Loose Nukes
http://www.cfr.org/weaponsofmassdestruction/loosenukes/p9549#p4
Have terrorist organizations ever tried to obtain Russian nuclear weapons? Yes. Russian
authorities say that in the past
three years alone they have broken up hundreds of nuclear material smuggling deals . In October
2001, shortly after the World Trade Center attacks, a Russian nuclear official reported having foiled two separate incidents over the previous

eight months in which terrorists had staked out a secret weapons storage site. In the 1990s, U.S. authorities discovered several alQaeda plots
to obtain nuclear materials, and former CIA Director George Tenet told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Osama bin Laden had

sought to acquire or develop a nuclear device.

R/T Natural Gas Suspension

(1) Europe Has Reserves

Coats, Christopher. "Why Russia Is Unlikely To Use Natural Gas As A Weapon In Ukraine Crisis." Forbes. Forbes
Magazine, 03 Mar. 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/christophercoats/2014/03/03/what-the-ukraine-situation-
means-for-europes-energy-security/
To be sure, Europe has a number of factors working in its favor should Russia decide to again
halt the flow of gas through an increasingly uncertain Ukrainian landscape. First, the recent
recent tension comes after a mild European winter that has allowed countries to build sizable
reserves that could last months if the issue was forced.

(2) TURN: Within 2 years, the US could supply the EU with liquefied natural gas to help
diversify from Russia. This would increase energy security, while also increasing liquidity to
help increase EU bargaining power
The NATO Review. Transatlantic energy security and the Ukraine-crisis: A blessing in disguise?
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/NATO-Energy-security-running-on-empty/Transatlantic-energy-security-
Ukraine-crisis/EN/index.htm
3. The United States cannot directly help Europe with gas supplies in the short term. First
shipments of US LNG [liquefied natural gas] will not come online until 2016 with larger
quantities to follow only after 2018. But in the medium-term allowing unrestricted US LNG
exports to Europe would be a great contribution to overall efforts to increase the energy
security of European allies, even if the EU should be conservative about how much actual US
gas will end up in Europe. The price points in Asian markets are currently far more attractive
and will likely remain the preferred destination for US gas exports. But by increasing liquidity on
the global LNG markets, the United States could further improve the negotiating power of
European buyers, especially those in Central Europe and the Baltic. And this would also have
the symbolic value of promoting open and transparent global energy markets versus resource
nationalism and protectionism.

(3) TURN: Russia relies on EU customers for 3% of its total daily economic output. Any
suspension of oil would only harm Russia, reducing its fiscal ability to act aggressively in the
Ukraine conflict
Coats, Christopher. "Why Russia Is Unlikely To Use Natural Gas As A Weapon In Ukraine Crisis." Forbes. Forbes
Magazine, 03 Mar. 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/christophercoats/2014/03/03/what-the-ukraine-situation-
means-for-europes-energy-security/
Finally, the issue that may work most in Europes favor is Russias own dependence on energy
revenue from the west. For European customers, Russia provides a significant contribution to
its energy needs, but for Moscow, EU consumers provide about $100 million a day to Russian
coffers, accounting for about 3% of the countrys overall economic output

Alt solvency: global oil market openings reducing ability of Russia to make credible threats
Gardiner, Nile et al. Beyond the Crimea Crisis: Comprehensive Next Steps in U.S.- Russian Relations. The Heritage
Foundation. 25 March 2014. Web.
Given the five to seven years that approving, engineering, permitting, and constructing a new
LNG terminal takes, lifting gas export restrictions might not have a direct impact on the Ukraine
crisis in he near term, but it would send an important signal to Russia and the rest of the world.
It would show any leader from any country that derives power from controlling energy interests
that such strategies will no longer be effective. Despite the lengthy time needed to permit and
build an export facility, an import terminal in the United States is being retrofitted to serve as
a bi-directional export terminal and will likely be online by the end of 2015. The exporting
company, Cheniere, has already entered into long-term contracts with Spain and the United
Kingdom. Along with exports from countries like Qatar, Australia, Indonesia, and others,
international markets will put pressure on Russia and reduce its ability to use energy as a
political bargaining chip. Opening markets would provide a diversity of suppliers and greater
energy supplies for the global market. This would likely result in lower prices and would
certainly mean more choice for countries like Ukraine in the not so distant future. Ultimately,
providing that choice would be what diminishes Russian power. Establishing free-market
reforms now and increasing energy supplies would help to prevent future incidents and price
shocks not just in Ukraine, but across the globe.
R/T Hurts Western Economies
1. Topicality: At best, sanctions harming western economies is a calculated risk and not a
Russian threat.
2 Their study is terrible: Figures largely inflated and group all harms of Russian economic
crisis; (Oleg Buklemishev Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
Oleg Buklemishev, 8-13-2015, "Myths and Realities of Sanctions in Russia," Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/08/13/myths-and-realities-of-sanctions-in-russia/iemn
How much do the latter sacrifice? A new study published by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) estimates that the Ukraine-
The
related sanctions and counter-sanctions could cost the economy of the European Union up to 100 billion euros and two million jobs.
authors do not disclose their research methodology, but their figures appear to be greatly
inflated. First of all, all of Europes overall losses from the Russian economic crisis are being
lumped into this figure, although many of them are unrelated to the sanctions. Mercedes
sales, for example, are clearly falling for other reasons. Secondly, the luxurious repertoire of European food
on offer in Moscow restaurants suggests that many of Russias counter-sanctions are not actually working and
are therefore doing little harm to European agricultural producers. Still, lets consider the hypothetical
possibility that Europe really will suffer 100 billion euros in losses. That would be very bad news indeed, but it would be especially bad news for

Russia. That is because it seems that Western politicians have concluded that the considerable losses they suffer from sanctions are still lower

than the moral and political victory of keeping them in place. So, the higher the value that Russia attaches to Europeans economic losses, the

greater the threat that the EU feels from Russia and the greater the importance it attributes to sanctions as a means of containing this threat.
2. De-Link: losses from sanctions are mitigated by the redirection of western exports to other
markets (Marcin Szczepanski European Parliamentary Research Service)
Marcin Szczepanski (European Parliamentary Research Service). Economic impact on the EU of sanctions over
Ukraine conflict . Accessed January 14, 2016. Published October 2015.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/569020/EPRS_BRI(2015)569020_EN.pdf.
Russia is the European Union's third-biggest trading partner. In 2014, trade volume between the European Union (EU) and Russia decreased,

mainly due to the impact of the recession on the Russian economy, as well as the conflict in Ukraine which led to EU sanctions and Russian

countermeasures. Beginning in early 2014, the EU introduced and extended a range of diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Russian

Federation in protest at Russian involvement in destabilising Ukraine and violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity. Russia has retaliated with an

embargo on certain EU agricultural products. The EU's economic sanctions will be in place until at least January 2016, while the Russian

measures have been extended until June 2016. It is hard to disentangle the effects of these sanctions from those stemming from the

deteriorating economic situation in Russia. Although the overall impact on the EU economy has been rather limited, certain sectors and

countries are more significantly affected. Estimates of the impact vary, but indicate overall that the European economy is
resilient to the adverse effects of falling trade with Russia. Importantly, the EU's financial sector is not
considered to be systemically threatened by its exposure. The most visible direct effect is the substantial fall in EU agri-food exports to Russia.
The losses are, however, mitigated to a large extent by redirecting exports to alternative
markets.
3 De-link Updated deals are designed to limit the harms to western companies.
Walker, Marcus. "Europe, U.S. Significantly Expand Sanctions Against Russian Economy." WSJ. N.p., 29 July 2014.
Web. 05 Dec. 2015. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/europe-u-s-significantly-expand-sanctions-against- russian-
economy-1406666111>.
The new package of measures reflects what governments in Berlin, Paris, London and
elsewhere were able to agree on, rather than just a calculation of how to sway Mr. Putin. An EU compromise that targeted
some business dealings with Russia while sparing others was designed to spread and limit the sacrifices among the bloc's 28 countries. The U.K.,

although a strong supporter of sanctions, was worried that rich Russians and their companies could turn away from its financial center in

London. France wanted to protect its contract to deliver two warships worth more than $1.5 billion to Russia. Germany sought to preserve its

business selling advanced equipment to Russia's energy sector. Tuesday's

deal seeks to dampen the impact of
sanctions in Europe's economy, much of which is still in a fragile recovery from the global
financial crisis, by excluding existing contracts. That means France could still sell at least one ship to Russia, while
German engineering firms could continue supplying Russian energy giants OAO Rosneft and OAO Gazprom, at least in the short term.

3B: This is why according to Mark Thompson of CNN, most economists expect the fallout from
sanctions to be contained.
Petroff, Alanna and Thompson, Mark. Crimea: Economic Fallout of a yes vote CNN Money. March 16, 2014.
European markets could suffer modest and short-lived losses from the chill in relations with Russia, given close business and trading ties. Still,
economists expect the fallout to be contained. Berenberg's Holger Schmieding said the hit to Germany's economic
growth would be at most 0.1% to 0.2% over the next 12 months, assuming the crisis is limited to Crimea. That would leave the European

recovery intact.

4 - TURN: Hardship builds extra credibility in the eyes of Moscow because accepting the
hardship signals resolve from western states
Liik, Kadri. "The Limits and Necessity of Europe." European Council on Foreign Relations. N.p., 3 Aug. 2015. Web.
06 Dec. 2015. <http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_limits_and_necessity_of_europes_r
ussia_sanctions3091>.
At the end of the day, one
very important implication of the sanctions regardless of whether one
considers it a goal or a by-product is to boost Western credibility in the eyes of Moscow. It
was telling how in the days following the fall of Viktor Yanukovychs regime in February 2014, a flurry of phone calls went from the Western

capitals to Moscow, asking Russia not to intervene in Ukraine. These calls were not listened to largely because the Wests track record, such

as its reaction to the Georgia war of 2008, allowed Moscow to assume that it will get away with annexation relatively easily. The
fact that
the West adopted serious sanctions and is prepared to bear some economic hardship also
itself has undoubtedly left an impression on Moscow, which, if lasting, has a chance to
influence Moscows calculations at similar junctures in the future. Europe needs to be aware that our
problem with Russia is long- term and multi-layered. It is clear that the sanctions are not a miracle cure to fix it all, but they need to be a small
They are instrumental in restoring our credibility and possibly fixing a few
part of a bigger strategy.
near- or medium term goals. Getting that right, however, is important, as credibility is
something Europe badly needs if it wants to influence processes in the future. Hence the necessity of
sanctions despite all their limits.
R/T Russia Leaves the Dollar

1 - West =/= U.S., Europe would benefit from the dilution of U.S. monopoly on currency
demand

2 - delink - Russia been trying to dump dollar since 2010

Kramer, Andrew. New York Times. Sidestepping the U.S. Dollar, a Russian Exchange will swap Rubles and
Renminbi. 12/14/10. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/15/business/global/15iht-ruble15.html?_r=0
Russia and China are poised to take a small but symbolic step in their expanding economic relationship, a move that in the long term could make the dollar less relevant to business between
the two nations.

On Wednesday, a Moscow securities exchange is scheduled to open direct trading between

the Chinese currency, the renminbi, and the Russian ruble. If the market develops, it could eventually cut
the dollar out of a portion of Russian and Chinese trade. Although Chinas business with Russia is only a sliver of what it does with
the United States, there is room to grow: Russia is the worlds largest energy exporting nation, and China a big consumer as the worlds second-largest economy, behind the United States. And
yet when a railroad tanker of Russian oil crosses the border into China, the transaction is settled in dollars.
R/T Russia Diversifies Economy
1 - Russia has history of talking about diversification and then not following through.
Nick Ottens. Atlantic Sentinel 2012 Russia Fails to Diversify Economy Away from Energy.
http://atlanticsentinel.com/2012/11/russia-fails-to-diversify-economy-away-from-energy/
President Vladimir Putin and his deputy Dmitri Medvedev have talked for years about the
need to reduce the Russias dependence on oil and natural gas exports but progress in this
area is lacking. Indeed, they have recently taken steps that run contrary to their stated goal.
Despite the economic reforms that were enacted during Putins first eight years in the Kremlin, including dramatic income tax cuts, sound fiscal consolidation and education and infrastructure

The state maintains a heavy hand in

investments which helped fuel economic expansion, corruption and entrenched interests block further growth.

key industries, most recently evidenced by Putins intervention in a dispute between the
European Commission and Russian energy giant Gazprom when he shielded the latter from
an antitrust probe. The Kremlin is a majority shareholder in Gazprom which alone accounts for 12 percent of Russian exports. The company still reported a $44 billion profit
last year but exports are falling and domestic gas production in Europe is on the rise. Economy minister Andrei Klepach has warned that Gazprom could find itself under pressure from shale
gas competition as early as 2014.

2 - Failed to diversify in past 10 years why would they suddenly be able to now
The Economist. Whats Gone Wrong with Russias Economy. December 2014.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/12/economist-explains-16
Russia is highly dependent on oil revenues (hydrocarbons contribute over
The problems were long in the making.

half the federal budget and two-thirds of exports) and over the past decade it has failed to
diversify its economy. It is horribly corrupt, has weak institutions and no real property rights. The Kremlin distributes oil money via state banks to firms and projects
which it selects on the basis of their political importance and their pro-Putin stance, rather than trusting the market to allocate capital to the most efficient firms. If you look at wealth, Russia is
the worlds second-most unequal country. Its working-age population is shrinking fast.

3 - Cant diversify because diversification programs themselves funded by oil money low
oil prices = no funds to use
Morena Skalamara. China Can't Solve Russias Energy Technology Trap. The Diplomat. February 2015.
http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-cannot-solve-russias-energy-technology-trap/
Russias economy dependence on hydrocarbons is a bad story that is destined to get worse.
For years Vladimir Putin has been reminding Russians that urgent action is needed to
modernize and diversify Russias economy, develop domestic expertise, and foster energy market reforms. But given that his own system rests on
the informal glue of corruption, Russia has unsurprisingly largely failed to address the states meddling in business, shortcomings in the rule of law, and takeover of the energy business by

energy reform never became a viable option. Instead, Russia has been
politically favored interests. Consequently,

trapped in a vicious circle whereby its capacity to hire foreign specialists and purchase
required energy technologies depends heavily on revenues from oil and gas exports, and
thus, on oil and gas prices. This unsustainable situation was in place even before the two disastrous from Russias perspective recent developments: sanctions
and the decline in the price of oil. Today, with the Urals crude around $50 a barrel, Russias ability to harness Western technology is greatly undermined. Moreover, because of sanctions,
Russia faces severe limits on its residual ability to acquire the technologies that the country needs to develop the promising but nonetheless geologically challenging offshore and onshore sites
in the Arctic and Eastern Siberia.
4 - TURN: Sanctions depriving them of investment needed to diversfiy economy
James Carafano et al, December 2015, The Regime of Vladimir Putin, Heritage, December 2015,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/12/us-comprehensive-strategy-toward-russia DOA: 1-4-16
The sanctions include bans on oilfield equipment, the import and export of arms, and exports of dual-use technology. Russian banks have been cut off from Western capital markets.

Continuing the sanctions will increase pressure on Russia over the long run by reducing its
ability to diversify its economy in the face of lower world energy prices.
R/T Import Substitution
1. Import substitution would only occur in sanctioned industries, i.e guns and oil
production, which are fields that require large exports to be sustainable.
2. Sanctions make Russia less efficient at producing those goods because they A) have
less technology B) can no longer leverage their comparative advantage within those
fields to be productive -> increases the prices of those goods, and makes it less
attractive for potential buyers of the export, reducing total growth.
3. Lots of prerequisites to successful import substitution, Russia has none of them (Oleg
Buklemishev Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
Oleg Buklemishev (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Director of the Economic Policy Research Center,
Moscow State University). Myths and Realities of Sanctions in Russia. Accessed December 30, 2015. Published
August 13, 2015. http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/08/13/myths-and-realities-of-sanctions-in-russia/iemn.
Import substitution The last, strangest and perhaps most pervasive myth is Myth No.5, which maintains that sanctions
are helping rather than hindering Russias economic development. This may be the most authentic myth,
since it most completely defies logic. What possible benefits could the Russian economy gain from sanctions? In theory, if

domestic producers dont have to worry about competition in certain sectors, they can capture those sectors. This, in effect, is import

substitution. However, there is a big gap between theory and practice. Creating new businesses in
Russia from scratch requires investment, and therefore cheap sources of lending which are currently in short supply, in
part due to sanctions. Even the most basic increase in production requires, in addition to working capital, surplus
capacity, labor, and high-quality raw materials. There are few sectors of the economy which can provide these.
Furthermore, investment in import substitution only makes sense if there is a guarantee that vacant niches remain open
for a long time and that there is no overall economic turbulence. That is not the case in Russia at the moment. The government has the
reputation of changing its economic policy at short notice for political reasonscounter-sanctions could be repealed at a moments notice.
the economy is entering a recession, and domestic demand is falling. Businessmen are
Moreover,
unlikely to view this as an auspicious time for import substitution.

Import substitution is unsustaibible occur (Nigel Wilson International Business Times)

Nigel Wilson, 4-25-2014, "Can Russia Really go it Alone?," International Business Times,
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/can-russia-really-go-it-alone-1446146
Some Russian banks have picked up business in wake of the West's sanctions against key Russian businessmen. Petrochemical giant Sibur is

part-owned by sanctioned businessman Gennady Timchenko. The group has begun refinancing 27bn Roubles worth of deals with Russian banks

after talks with international lenders broke down. However, analysts believe thatthe system would not be able to sustain
itself if international lenders were to fully withdraw. Russia had $624bn in foreign debt at the
start of the year, too much to refinance domestically. Moreover, Moscow's reliance on
imports is the biggest factor drawing it away from isolation and rooting it in the international community. It relies on
imports of food, machinery, pharmaceuticals, textiles and plastics. Putin has railed against Russia's reliance
on imports for years but that rhetoric has changed very little on the ground. Russia's lack of investment in its domestic
production capacity is a long-term problem and that can't be changed on a whim. The president and
the country is at a crossroads. Russia's slow integration into the global economy can be reversed. Putin certainly sees the benefit of insulating

Russia as he seeks to consolidate his grip on power. But while relatively short term measures like credit ratings companies and national

payments systems may offer a degree of autonomy, it will take years of investment in the country's production infrastructure before Russia can

really go it alone.
R/T Countersanctions
Michael Emerson concludes that in the EU, the impact of sanctions will be about .03% of EU
GDP- within the margin of error of literally zero
Michael Emerson, 10-13-2014, "The EU-Ukraine-Russia Sanctions Triangle," Center for European Policy Studies.
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu-ukraine-russia-sanctions-triangle
Food imports from the EU, the US, Norway and Australia have been banned for one year. This has hurt some EU producers and suppliers, but

the proportions are marginal. (Interpreted from table) EU food exports to Russia make up just .09% of the EUs
GDP. The European Commission estimates that about 40% of EU agri-food exports to Russia are being sanctioned. Of the 5 billion worth of
flows that are hit, 1.5 billion was already affected by restrictions imposed early in the year. The overall impact of the new
sanctions may thus be estimated to be 0.03% of EU GDP. The Commission also intervened in various markets for
fresh agricultural produce in August to reduce the market impact of the sanctions, putting certain quantities into storage. There is an

unquantifiable negative macroeconomic impact through damage to the business climate, which at a time of delayed recovery from recession is

a serious matter. The policy response blends in with the overall task of getting resumed macroeconomic growth, however, for which the

European Central Bank announced, on October 2nd, a huge programme of asset purchases amounting potentially to one trillion (a thousand

billion) euro.

Fucking flames

1. Sanctions have backfired against Russia because now, all of these countries are
increasing their trade with the West. What that means is that theyre no longer
dependent on Russia, and thus Russias influence is declining in these areas. Cenusa of
the Centre for European Policy Studies finds that Moldovan exports to the EU have
grown by 22.5%, Ukrainian exports to the EU by 14.9%, and Georgian exports increased
by 90% during the Russian embargo.

Denis Cenusa (Centre for European Policy Studies). Russias Punitive Trade Policy Measures
towards Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Accessed 12/19/15. Published September 2014.
https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/26652/uploads.
Resulting reorientation of exports towards the EU. In the first five months of 2014 exports to
the EU grew by 22.5% compared to the same period of 2013, while the share of exports to CIS
countries shrank dramatically, by 18.8%. As a result the share of exports going to the EU
reached 53.8% (44.8% in 2013), while the CIS share dropped to 31.8% (39.9% in 2013). In
addition, the composition of the exports changed, with large increases in cereal products,
animal feed, vegetal oil and fats, and organic chemicals.14 This shows that Moldovan exporters
are effectively targeting the EU market and understand the sectors where they are most
competitive.
Denis Cenusa (Centre for European Policy Studies). Russias Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine,
Moldova, and Georgia. Accessed 12/19/15. Published September 2014.
https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/26652/uploads.
Thus, overall, the Russian embargo contributed to a healthy trend of diversification in
Georgian exports. In the years of the Russian embargo Georgias total agricultural exports
grew by 90%. Whereas before the embargo Georgian wine was exported to 36 countries, by
2011 Georgian producers had entered 15 new markets, including China, Poland, Germany and
Singapore. Georgias agricultural sector also continued to remain attractive to foreign direct
investment (FDI) despite the Russian embargo. All this happened in the context of economic
and financial crisis, and before concluding the DCFTA with the EU.

Denis Cenusa (Centre for European Policy Studies). Russias Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards Ukraine,
Moldova, and Georgia. Accessed 12/19/15. Published September 2014.
https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/26652/uploads.
Reorientation of exports towards the EU. The combination of Russias punitive actions and the
EUs unilateral opening of its market by introducing autonomous trade preferences pushes
exports towards the EU. According to the State Statistics Services of Ukraine,6 exports to the EU
grew by 14.9% in the first half of 2014 compared to a year earlier, while exports to Russia
dropped by 23.3% over the same period. Consequently, the share of exports to the EU reached
33.1% of total exports compared to 27.3% a year before, while the share of exports to Russia
dropped to 19.9% compared to 24.7% in 2013.

Net positive impact of Georgia

Eric Livny. Impact of Russian Sanctions on the Georgian Economy. Tbilisi State University School of Economics.
2007. http://iset.ge/files/russian_embargo_pdf.pdf
To conclude, perhaps ironically, the Russian embargo did more good than harm to the Georgian
economy. It was introduced at a time when Georgia had the economic slack to cushion the negative impact of the embargo; it created
strong incentives for the Georgian private sector to modernize and diversify; it catalyzed an increase in economic aid and technical assistance

from the international community, donors and partners.

R/T Cyber
1. De-Link: More attacks doesnt mean that theyre effective
2. De-Link: We cant conclusively trace most cyber attacks, so no idea whether these actually
came from Russia (Lawrence Muir of US News).
Lawrence L. Muir Jr. (US News) Cyberwarfare a Viable Nonviolent Alternative to Military Strikes. Accessed
January 16, 2016. Published June 8, 2012. http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-there-be-an-international-
treaty-on-cyberwarfare/cyberwarfare-a-viable-nonviolent-alternative-to-military-strikes.
Any ratified cyberwarfare treaty should be printed on the same stock of paper as the euro note to remind the signatories how ultimately

without value some forms of international cooperation may sometimes be. Moreover, even if such a treaty would be promulgated, much like

the League of Nations, it is not in the best interests of the United States to join. Each thought will be addressed in turn below. A cyberwarfare

treaty would be ineffective. First, there is no concrete definition of cyberwarfare. If the definition of the subject of the treaty cannot be agreed
Moreover, most cyberattacks have come from
upon, the treaty negotiators cannot proceed further.
inconclusively determined origins, due to the abilities of attackers to disguise them. Given the
difficulty of attribution, international negotiators will have to create a heightened bar to establish a signatory's responsibility. International

legal standards disagree on two points: the level of control a state must have in order to be liable, and the burden of proof on that attribution.

Nations that rely on non-state actors will have more incentive to continue using loosely controlled "hacktivists" to carry out attacks to slip

under that standard, claiming both a lack of control and that an aggrieved party must prove that control beyond any doubt. Rather than

"civilizing" cyberwarfare, any treaty would have the effect of unleashing computer partisan rangers against critical cyberinfrastructure, with

potentially devastating consequences. Moreover, there has been a lack of international appetite to support the aggrieved nation and respond

in kind to the aggressor nation. In 2007, Estonia specifically requested the attacks it absorbed from Russia be treated as a cyberattack by NATO

and its request was denied due, in large part, to the factual uncertainties behind attribution and the lack of desire to escalate tensions in

response to computer hacking. If NATO's treaty failed to protect Estonia, why would a larger, vaguer treaty be more protective? Finally, there is

a strong reason not to curtail cyberattacks. The United States and Israel were able to nonviolently set back Iran's nuclear program through

Stuxnet without a single casualty. Considering the alternative drone strike that would surely have brought about human loss, cyberwarfare, if

correctly deployed, may turn out to be something the international community may wish to encourage rather than discourage. At the very

least, the United States would be foolish to sign away a weapon it can so effectively and nonviolently deploy.

3. De-Link: The Number of Cyber Attacks has remained stable over the past 10 years,
according to a
Benjamin, Edwards University of New Mexico "Hype and Heavy Tails: A Closer Look at Data Breaches." . University
of New Mexico, 2015. http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2015/papers/WEIS_2015_edwards.pdf
Recent widely publicized data breaches have exposed the personal information of hundreds of millions of people. Some reports point to

alarming increases in both the size and frequency of data breaches, spurring institutions around the world to address what appears to be a

worsening situation. But, is the problem actually growing worse? In this paper, we study a popular public dataset and develop Bayesian
Analysis of the model shows that neither size nor
Generalized Linear Models to investigate trends in data breaches.
frequency of data breaches has increased over the past decade. We find that the increases that have
attracted attention can be explained by the heavy-tailed statistical distributions underlying the dataset. Specifically, we find that data breach

size is log-normally distributed and that the daily frequency of breaches is described by a negative binomial distribution. These distributions
may provide clues to the generative mechanisms that are responsible for the breaches. Additionally, our model predicts the likelihood of

breaches of a particular size in the future. For example, we find that in the next year there is only a 31% chance of a breach of 10 million

records or more in the US. Regardless of any trend, data breaches are costly, and we combine the model with two different cost models to

project that in the next three years breaches could cost up to $55 billion.

4. De-Link: Alt-Causality: Russia got hit with cyber-attacks earlier this year.
Sputniknews August 26 2015, Cyberattacks on Russian Authorities Increase,
http://sputniknews.com/russia/20150826/1026219646.html
Secretary of the Russian
VLADIVOSTOK (Sputnik) The number of hacker attacks on Russian networks online is increasing,
Security Council Nikolai Patrushev said Wednesday. Today experts record a noticeable increase
in the number of cyberattacks on information and telecommunication networks and
information systems of the [Russian] authorities, Patrushev said at a conference in the Russian Pacific city
of Vladivostok. Experts report the presence of foreign intelligence code in Russian information systems, Patrushev added, stressing improved

information protection in the country is required. Check-ups held by Russian technical control watchdogs and the Federal Security Service have

revealed ineffective information protection in a number of Russian regions, particularly in the east of the state, according to Patrushev. "The

use of information-communication resources located outside Russia by regional and local authorities for official purposes presents a serious

danger," Patrushev said at a briefing in the Russian port city of Vladivostok.

5. De-Link: Only 1.7% of all cyber attacks come from Russia (Joshua Keating Slate)
Joshua Keating (The Slate). Is Russia Really the Cybercrime Capital?. Accessed January 16, 2016. Published August
6, 2014.
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/08/06/billion_password_hack_russian_hackers_aren_t_prolific_th
ey_re_just_really.html.
Earlier this month, alleged hacker Roman Selezev, known online by the alias Track2, was arrested in Guam on suspicion of stealing data from

hundreds of thousands of credit cards. Hes currently the subject of a diplomatic scuffle between Washington and Moscow. And in June, the

U.S. unveiled charges against Evgeniy Bogacgev, who is accused of installing malware on computers around the world to access banking data,

leading to more than $100 million in thefts. Does this all mean that Russia is the world capital of hacking? In volume terms, its not at all. In a

report last year, cloud services provider Akamai reported that Indonesia had overtaken China as the leading source of cyberattacks, accounting

for 38 percent of the worldwide total. Russian

hackers accounted for a measly 1.7 percent of attacks,
putting them behind their counterparts in the United States, Taiwan, Turkey, and India. What
Russia does have is a fairly robust underground cybercrime market, reportedly valued at
around $2 billion per year. Russian hackers are also blamed for about a third of all new viruses. The first widely reported bank
hacking casethe transfer of $10 million from a Citibank account in 1994involved a hacker in St. Petersburg. Services from password theft to

spamming to denial of service attacks are relatively easy to acquire from Russian hackers.
6. TURN: Cyber warfare is really cheap, indicates that Russia has had to shift its tactics away
from militaristic to covert. (Peter Suciu Fortune Magazine)
Peter Suciu (Fortune Magazine) Why cyber warfare is so attractive to small nations. Accessed January 16, 2016.
Published December 21, 2014. http://fortune.com/2014/12/21/why-cyber-warfare-is-so-attractive-to-small-
nations/.
That may seem like a large figure for the nation of 24.9 million people, especially considering that Pyongyang isnt exactly known for its centers

of higher learning. Yet many small nation-stateseven those that are in regions that lack universities with notable computer science

programsare finding that cyber war provides more bang for the buck than investment in conventional weapons. Cyber warfare is a
great alternative to conventional weapons, says Amy Chang, a research associate in the technology and national
security program at the Center for a New American Security. It is cheaper for and far more accessible to these
small nation-states. It allows these countries to pull off attacks without as much risk of getting caught and without the repercussions
when they are [caught]. There are many reasons why a nation-state or non-nation entity would pursue a cyber war program, and today many

countries large and small invest in cyber warfare. According to recent intelligence studies more than 140 countries have some level of cyber

weapon development programs. In 2012 the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the research arm of the Pentagon, invested

$110 million in Plan X, a foundational cyber warfare program that aims to harness computing power to wage war more effectively. The

program was only one part of DARPAs reported $1.54 billion cyber budget for 2013 to 2017.

7. TURN: Ceasefires reduce the amount of cyber-attacks.

Aarti Shahani, NPR.org, 15, Report: To Aid Combat, Russia Wages Cyberwar Against Ukraine, 4-28-2015
Researchers also found that when both sides negotiated a cease-fire last June, the cyberattacks stopped for that same period as well. "That is
Fred Cate, a cybersecurity expert and professor at Indiana University Maurer School of
incredibly interesting," says
Law. "It's like the adversaries are actually thinking of themselves as attacking." It looks like the hackers see themselves as
part of the battlefield, he says, "and so they stop those attacks when a cease-fire's in place
as opposed to thinking of themselves as just intelligence gathering, which usually continues even during a ceasefire." This research is among the

few documented examples of cyberwarfare. While it doesn't pinpoint specific stolen data that reconfigured a specific battlefield, it does reveal

the edge of a new weapon against enemies. "If you can substitute fake instructions, if you can get them to do the wrong thing, if you can get

them to send the troops where you want them sent," Cate says, "this could dramatically alter the way in which we think about warfare."

8. TURN: The fact that we know about Cyber Attacks and Identify them decreases the
effectiveness of Cyber attacks.
Kulwant Saluja. PCWorld. Sept. 2015 As the U.S. government faces cyber attack, 'there's no playbook' for fighting
back
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2980788/security/as-the-u-s-government-faces-cyber-attack-
theres-no-playbook-for-fighting-back.html
Robert Knake, former head of cybersecurity policy at the National Security Council, said those advocating for hacking back are overreacting.

Its bad. But its not devastating, said Knake of the confidential data exposed by the breach. The reason its not devastating is that we know
Knake said identifying the
about it. Speaking at a recent Atlantic Council panel debating the consequences of cyber revenge,
breach offers the opportunity to mitigate the damage. Once armed with this knowledge, the
government can use the hack to its advantage, he argued. For example, in the event that a
nation uses information gleaned from the breach to identify Americans involved in sensitive
activities, Knake said the U.S. could respond with misdirection by changing personnel.

9. IMPACT DEFENSE: Attacks fail 86% of the time (Rod Walton ELP International)
Rod Walton (ELP International). VIDEO: Security expert says successful hack against power grid likely. Accessed
January 16, 2016. Published 09/22/2015. http://www.elp.com/articles/2015/09/security-expert-says-successful-
hack-against-power-grid-likely.html.
This hasnt happened yet, but the potential is getting closer as bad actors compile knowledge of the grids cyber weaknesses and gather illicit
A recent USA Today report indicated that the U.S. Department of
financial support for their efforts.
Energy was under constant siege in recent years, with 1,131 attempted cyberattacks from
2010-2014. The hackers were successful about 14 percent of the time, or in 159 of the
attempts, according to the article. Another report, this one released Tuesday by cybersecurity ratings BitSight, indicates that
the energy industry only ranks fair to middling when it comes to cybersecurity efforts. The energy-utility sector was ranked fourth among

sectors, slightly above health care and behind finance, government and retail. Education was categorized, far and away, as the most vulnerable

to cyber attack by BitSight.

R/T Democratic Backsliding
Targeted sanctions dont cause democratic backsliding because they weaken the government,
and may actually solve the harms of broad sanctions (Dursen Peksen East Carolina
University)
Dursun Peksen and Cooper Drury, 2010, Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on
Democracy, Journal of International Interactions,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03050629.2010.502436
This project points out that economic sanctions often disproportionately hurt the economic well-being of opposition groups that, in turn,
Smart sanctions that
disrupts their political viability to pressure the government for more political reform and openness.
directly aim at the target leadership might help decrease the corrosive impact that the
sanctions with no discrim- inatory measures inflict on democratic freedoms (Cortright and Lopez 2002;
Wallensteen et al. 2003). At minimum, such targeted sanctions in the forms of arms embargoes,
financial asset freezes or international travel bans on the political elites will not worsen the
economic well-being of the opposition. Instead, they might directly hurt political elites and
subsequently make them less intransigent against foreign demands for greater respect for
political rights and civil liberties.

Selection bias; we put sanctions on countries that are already undergoing democratic
backsliding (Christian von Soest Journal of Peace Research)
Christian Von Soest and Michael Wahman, 1-10-2015, "How The West Selectively Promotes Democracy Through
Sanctions," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/10/how-the-
west-selectively-promotes-democracy-through-sanctions/
In a recently published article (temporarily ungated) in the Journal of Peace Research, we gather statistical data on all democratic sanctions

issued by the European Union and the United States to systematically study when and where Western democracies use sanctions to promote
We find that the promotion of democracy or punishing of backsliding has been the
democracy.
single most important goal when initiating sanctions against authoritarian regimes . Other sanction
goals can be to fight nuclear programs or terrorism or to help end civil wars abroad.

Russia hasnt been trending toward democracy, so theres nothing to lose; Putin pushed
Russia back into the realm of authoritarianism (Alfred Evans Journal of Eurasian Studies)
Alfred B. Evans, 1-31-2011, "The failure of democratization in Russia: A comparative perspective," Journal Of
Eurasian Studies, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366510000345
And yet, as the current decade nears its end, the consensus of scholarly analyses and popular
perceptions in the West indicates that, if Russia did enter a transition to democracy, that
transition was not successful. From the point of view of those in the United States and
Western Europe who had high hopes for the spread of democracy, the most important test
case for democratization was largely a disappointment.3 During the 1990s, while Boris Yeltsin
was the president of Russia, most Western academic specialists regarded that country as a
democracy that was in an early stage of transition, with some imperfections that did not negate
the fundamentally democratic character of the political regime. Within a few years after
Vladimir Putin became the president of that country, however, the assessment of that regime
by most political scientists specializing in the study Russia changed. Between 2000 and 2005
the outlook of Russia watchers in the West shifted, so that many began to refer to the
political system of that country as authoritarian (Hahn, 2004 and McFaul, 2004). Stephen Whitefield has noted that
during Putins time as president of Russia, there was an increasing consensus among scholars, journalists, and policy-makers in the West that

Russian politics had moved significantly off a democratic pathway (Whitefield, 2009, 93). Considering both the undemocratic features and the

elements of pluralism remaining in Russian politics, however, it would seem justifiable to apply Marina Ottaways category of semi-

authoritarian (Ottaway, 2003) to the Russian political system. Most Western scholars who focus on that country would seem to agree with

Steven Fishs assertion that democratization has failed in Russia (Fish, 2005, 81).
R/T Small Arms Transfers

1 - delink - Increase in arms sales was because of rapid increase in Russian military spending
IN EARLY 2000s
Pravda Report. Russia named world's only country to increase arms sales in 2014. December 2014.
http://www.pravdareport.com/russia/economics/15-12-2014/129315-russia_arms_sales-0/
According to the SIPRI, the overall decline in arms sales is associated with increased activities of the Russian defense industry, as well as with

new players on the market. The decrease in the arms exports that the United States and several European countries have shown can be
A
explained with the withdrawal of NATO mission from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as with the reduction of defense budgets.
significant increase in Russian arms sales was the result of the government's continuous
investment in the 2000s to modernize production and arms to reach the level of Western
countries, the report said. Noteworthy, the report does not take account of Chinese companies due to the shortage of reliable data.

R/T Russia wants to sell more

1 - TURN because the internal link is retaliation against the West, decreased desire to attack
West turns the internal link

R/T Triggers widespread civil wars

1 - reverse causality because instability will cause arms dealers to inflow weapons in first
place, guns dont fuel conflict unless there are people who want to fire them

2 - they dont show that this has happened in any exporting country

3 - Make them isolate the impact to the West and not just the global economy

4 - the only impact they provide to Western countries themselves is econ harms, but stability
within Europe vastly outweighs
R/T Space, Bitch

1 - delink - rocket stockpiles solves

Lisa Winter. Russia Threatens to Ban US Access to ISS In Retaliation To Sanctions. IFLScience. 2014.
http://www.iflscience.com/space/russia-threatens-ban-us-access-iss-retaliation-sanctions
Russian rocket engines are used by the United Launch Alliance for their rockets that are used to bring military and defense satellites into space.
ULA has stated that they already have enough engines stockpiled to perform the
However, the
next two years worth of launches. Additionally, privately-owned SpaceX already has operational rockets that can be
commissioned for use, should the need arise. All of the components for the Falcon 9 rockets are designed and manufactured in the United

States. While SpaceX is currently fulfilling a contract with NASA, they are seeking to gain a contract with the Department of Defense as well.

2 - delink - SpaceX solves

Lisa Winter. Russia Threatens to Ban US Access to ISS In Retaliation To Sanctions. IFLScience. 2014.
http://www.iflscience.com/space/russia-threatens-ban-us-access-iss-retaliation-sanctions
hats actually not a huge problem despite the fact
If Russia wont allow American astronauts to travel to and from the ISS using their spacecraft after 2020, t

that NASA cancelled the shuttle program in 2011. SpaceXs Dragon spacecraft could launch from the US as soon as

2017 with the capability of carrying seven astronauts as once. Orbital Sciences, another privately-owned company, is also
working toward delivering humans to a low Earth orbit. However, Orbital Sciences uses a modified Russian NK-33 engine in its Antares rockets.

3 - delink - US has enough resources to overcome any Russian cutoffs

Lisa Winter. Russia Threatens to Ban US Access to ISS In Retaliation To Sanctions. IFLScience. 2014.
http://www.iflscience.com/space/russia-threatens-ban-us-access-iss-retaliation-sanctions
The bottom line is that this back-and-forth disagreement over Russias invasion of Ukraine has nothing to do with scientists, yet those are the people who will suffer the most over all of these
sanctions. Since 2001, the International Space Station has been a place where over 200 people from 15 countries have come together in the pursuit of exploration and knowledge, despite any

socioeconomic or political differences. Though the US will be able to overcome any roadblocks put into place by
Russia, the whole situation is still fairly sad. That said, 2020 is a long way away, and a great number of things could happen before then. We can only hope that common sense will
prevail so we can all return to peaceful and productive scientific collaboration.

It good
Marina Koren. Whats Going to Happen to the International Space Station?. National Journal. 2014.
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/2014/05/14/whats-going-happen-international-space-station
The rosy pic-ture of col-lab-or-a-tion has soured since then. In early April, NASA sus-pen-ded con-tact with Russian government representatives, citing the countrys ongoing
violation of Ukraines sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the time, operations aboard the ISS were exempt from the sus-pen-sion. Now the fu-ture of those op-er-a-tions is in
doubt.

Russias threat of kicking U.S.

That kind of talk is enough to change the situ-ation on the ground even as co-oper-a-tion con-tin-ues in space.

astronauts off ISS could add more fuel to NASAs partnership with private Amer-ic-an
space-flight com-pan-ies, who are work-ing to launch as-tro-nauts from Amer-ic-an soil by
2017. U.S. law-makers have long called for end-ing Amer-ic-an de-pend-ence on Rus-si-an
space trans-port, and the re-cent threats from Mo-scow could rally sup-port in Wash-ing-ton.
Removing Politics in Space
Jeffrey Kluget. TIME Magazine. Astronauts Inc.: The Private Sector Muscles Out NASA. December 17, 2010.
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,2037089,00.html#
If old NASA hands winced at this kind of giddy talk, they kept it to themselves and wisely so.
In the face of contracting federal budgets and an expanding private sector, the space agency of
the golden years is being blown up and rethought transformed from a government operation
into a public-private partnership that, so its advocates say, will replace the politics, stodginess
and glacial pace of Washington with the speed, nimbleness and accountability of the
marketplace.

Incentives solve best- reinvigorates public interest and jumpstarts NASA

Foust 10 (Jeff, foust is the editor and publisher of the space review, Review: The Privatization of Space
Exploration, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1617/1, 5-3)
In The Privatization of Space Exploration, Lewis Solomon, a law professor at George Washington University,
makes the case for
an enhanced role for private ventures in space. He links the increased interest in commercial
human spaceflight to the flights of SpaceShipOne in 2004 that won the $10-million Ansari X
PRIZE: it got people excited to dream again about human spaceflight. Its such commercial
efforts, he argues, that can lift NASA from decades of stagnation, provided that the agency is
more willing to work with such ventures than it has in the past.

Privatization solves space leadership

Nelson 11 (Steve, Nelson is a staff writer for the daily caller, Fiscal Conservatives call for increased privatization of
space, http://dailycaller.com/2011/02/08/fiscal-conservatives-call-for-increased-privatization-of-space/, 2-8)
Tuesday morning the Competitive Space Task Force, a self-described group of fiscal conservatives and free-market leaders, hosted a press conference to encourage increased privatization of
the space industry. Members of the task force issued several recommendations to Congress, including finding an American replacement to the Space Shuttle (so to minimize the costly
expenditures on use of Russian spacecraft) and encouraging more private investment in the development of manned spacecraft. Former Republican Rep. Robert S. Walker of Pennsylvania said,

If we really want to win the future, we cannot abandon our commitment to space
exploration and human spaceflight. The fastest path to space is not through Moscow, but
through the American entrepreneur. Task Force chairman Rand Simberg, of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, said, By opening
space up to the American people and their enterprises, NASA can ignite an economic,
technological, and innovation renaissance, and the United States will regain its rightful place
as the world leader in space.

Private sector is crucial for tech breakthroughs

Bormanis 7/19/10 holds a B.S. in Physics and an M.A. in Science, Technology and Public Policy, earned under a
NASA Space Grant Fellowship at George Washington University (Andre, Critical partnerships for the future of
human space exploration, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1667/1)
If NASA is still building Ares 1 and Orion when the federal government begins to make the draconian cuts necessary to move toward a balanced budget, we will be stuck in LEO for a very long

Shifting more of the cost to the private sector and international partners will help alleviate
time.

the burden on the US taxpayer. Enhancing the role of robotics will lower the cost of human missions beyond LEO even more by deferring the expense of
 By taking a more incremental, step-
human Mars landing and return vehicles until after Ph.D. missions have yielded their maximum scientific returns .

by-step approach, as opposed to the largely inflexible Apollo-style architecture represented

by Constellation, unforeseen technological breakthroughs can more easily be integrated into
future systems. Human exploration of the solar system wont begin in earnest until a radical
reduction in the cost of getting humans and payloads into LEO is achieved. Such a breakthrough may not come for
decades, if ever, or it could happen sooner than we dare believe. In the meantime, we can continue to test the waters of the great ocean of space with whatever resources and ingenuity we
can muster, confident that someday well be making waves.

Impacts
Stephen Dubner. Is Space Exploration Worth the Cost? A Freakonomics Quorum. Freakonomics. 2008.
http://freakonomics.com/2008/01/11/is-space-exploration-worth-the-cost-a-freakonomics-quorum/
Economic, scientific and technological returns of space
At what cost? Is there a price to inspiration and creativity?

exploration have far exceeded the investment. Globally, 43 countries now have their own observing or communication satellites in Earth orbit.
Observing Earth has provided G.P.S., meteorological forecasts, predictions and management of hurricanes and other natural disasters, and global monitoring of the environment, as well as
surveillance and intelligence. Satellite communications have changed life and business practices with computer operations, cell phones, global banking, and TV. Studying humans living in the
microgravity of space has expanded our understanding of osteoporosis and balance disorders, and has led to new treatments. Wealth-generating medical devices and instrumentation such as
digital mammography and outpatient breast biopsy procedures and the application of telemedicine to emergency care are but a few of the social and economic benefits of manned exploration

that we take for granted. Space exploration is not a drain on the economy; it generates infinitely more than wealth than it
spends. Royalties on NASA patents and licenses currently go directly to the U.S. Treasury, not back to NASA. I firmly believe that the Life Sciences Research Program would be self-
supporting if permitted to receive the return on its investment. NASA has done so much with so little that it has generally been assumed to have had a huge budget. In fact, the 2007 NASA
budget of $16.3 billion is a minute fraction of the $13 trillion total G.D.P.
R/T Siloviki Gain power
1. Putin is siloviki. The fuck are you running this argument
2. The liberals still have enough sway to push for things like the ceasefire (Jensen IMR)
Donald Jensen (Institute of Modern Russia). Are the Kremlin Hardliners Winning?. Accessed 1/14/16. Published
10/1/14. http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/world/2041-are-the-kremlin-hardliners-winning .
the liberal clans in the elite, they are relatively weaker than the war party at the moment, but they are not sitting idly
As for
and waiting to be cut down. It was they, and not the siloviki, who pushed for the ceasefire in
Ukraine. Though Putin may be preparing to tighten the screws that would marginalize them even further, should the liberals
sound the alarm about any threat to Putins position from the far right, it is almost certain that
he would listen.

3. The Siloviki dont actually have political control (Bushuev DW)

Mikhail Bushuev (Deutche Welle). Kremlin hardliners rule in Putin's Russia. Accessed 1/14/16. Published 9/18/14.
http://www.dw.com/en/kremlin-hardliners-rule-in-putins-russia/a-17932564 .
Although the hardliners have gained in influence, their importance should not be overemphasized, according to Minchenko. "If the
hawks had won the upper hand, Russian troops would already be in Kyiv," he said. "That would be a
victory for the hawks." Bremmer is also careful when analyzing the role played by the "Siloviki" in the Kremlin. He believes that the

conservatives are defining developments in Russia at the moment. But ultimately, the president has the final say over
Moscow's course.
R/T Russian Economy Rebounding
1. Not doing better than it would have done absent sanctions
Andrew Rettman Jan 13 2016 World Vision, EU Observer, Sanctions to have little impact on Russia in 2016, US says,
https://euobserver.com/foreign/131812
The sanctions, imposed by the EU and US in mid-2014, prompted the Russian economy to
contract by 1 to 1.5 percent more than it would have done in 2015, a State Department official told press in
Brussels on Tuesday (12 January). They also led international investors to write down the vaue of Russian assets by some 10 percent and saw
The Russian economy shrank 4
Russian-linked deposits in certain European banks, for instance, in Austria, to go down sharply.
percent in total in 2015. In normal circumstances, it might have grown by up to 5 percent , the
US official said. The slump in world oil prices, which coincided with Russias invasion of Ukraine, was the main factor, costing at least 4 percent

of GDP. Lack of structural reforms, such as loosening state control on major firms, also had a bigger impact than the Western measures. The

sanctions, wich curb Russian firms access to credit and which prohibit exports of energy technology, are being extended until mid-2016 due to

Russias non-compliance with the Minsk 2 ceasefire accord.

R/T Destabilization Shift
1. We outweigh: Sanctions have bought time for Ukraine to re-fortify its military, preventing
Russian expansion into Marinka.
Jos Luengo-Cabrera EU Institute for Security Studies On target? EU sanctions as security policy tools September
2015 http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_25_EU_Sanctions.pdf
Judged through this tactical prism, sanctions have provided Ukraine with some breathing space before the next round of fighting. Thus, it was

thanks to the EUs sanctions that the Minsk negotiations and an imperfect cease re were made possible at all. Such moments of brief respite

were essential for Ukraine to strengthen the core structures of its state (notably its defence sector and security services), which was previously
but sanctions against Russia
deeply in infiltrated by Russia. Ukrainian state performance remains weak in terms of governance,
bought invaluable time for Ukraine to elect a new political leadership, buttress its defenses
and become more resilient than it was at the beginning of the conflict. Russias failed assault
on Marinka in June 2015 appears to reelect Ukraines improved military capabilities . Today, Russia
would have to signifcantly step up its use of violence to alter Ukraines defence lines. This would in all likelihood trigger more painful economic

sanctions by the EU and its partners.

2. According to the Polish Institute of International Affairs, sanctions increased the costs to Russia of
expansion, preoccupying it with continuing the conflict rather than expanding. This allowed Ukraine
to fill power vacuums by having an election, meaning that without sanctions, rather than having a
weak government, Ukraine would have had no government at all
Stanislav Secreiru November 25 2015 Polish Institute of International Affairs.
https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=20910
Last but not least, the sanctions are not about democracy promotion in Russia, rather they aim to give a chance for a deeper democracy to

take root and thrive in Ukraine, in tune with the popular demands expressed in 20132014. The sanctions do not seek to weaken Russia per se.

Their reversibility shows that the main goal is to help Ukrainian statehood survive in the context of Russias military aggression. As the West has

ruled out direct use of lethal means to protect Ukraine, the sanctions represent a fairly efficient and low-cost tool to shelter Ukraine and

dissuade Russia. If the West had stayed away from the issue in 2014, most probably it would now have had to devise a more expensive and

risky answer to Russias aggression, which by that time may have threatened Ukraines neighbours, too. Critics argue that despite the sanctions

Russia has not vacated Crimea and instead has put troops and sent munitions to Donbass, while Ukraine is still poorly governed. But this is only

part of the story. The sanctions escalate the price Russia pays for Crimeas annexation.With the sanctions in place, Russia is
preoccupied with how to keep the conflict burning and less about another major military
thrust in Ukraine (which by now would result in higher casualties on the Russian side).
Probably the most essential aspect often neglected is that the sanctions bought the time
needed to fill the political and military power vacuum in Ukraine (e.g., giving time for presidential and
parliamentary elections as well as military mobilisation). Seen in this perspective, without the sanctions debate there
would be today not a discussion about imperfect governance in Ukraine but about the
absence of governance in a worst-case scenario.

3. Sanctions have established the grounds for political negotiations.

Simond de Galbert, Center for Strategic and International Studies A Year of Sanctions against Russia Now
What? October 2015
Still, sanctions could have altered the method through which these objectives were implemented. Sanctions first came as a surprise to the

Russian leadership, which assumed division within the West and the European Union would prevent any tough decisions. Sanctions
created an atmosphere that likely helped put a negotiating process in place. The
therefore
prospect of even stronger sanctions created an incentive for Russia to complete the
negotiations, first with Ukraine in September 2014, and then in February 2015 in the so-called
Normandy format (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France). This incentive might have been complemented in February 2015 by Russias

monetary situation at the time, which was only recovering from the rubles December 2014January 2015 free fall.

Ceasefire has reduced most of the fire

Simond de Galbert, Center for Strategic and International Studies A Year of Sanctions against Russia Now
What? October 2015
Whatever the exact incentive sanctions provided for negotiations, the February 2015 agreement managed to decrease the intensity of the

fighting in eastern Ukraine, even if the full implementation of the ceasefire has not yet been achieved. Clearly,
the level of
violence observed before the February 2015 Minsk agreement was much higher than what
has been observed since then by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine, despite the restrictions imposed
locally on the SMMs access and freedom of movement. However, there continue to be daily violations of the ceasefire, with the SMM

reporting 373 ceasefire violations in May, 682 in June, 871 in July, and 971 in August 2015.24
NEG Disads
Human Rights Abuses
Human Rights bad in Russia
Human Rights Watch. Russia: Worst Human Rights Climate in Post-Soviet Era. 24 April 2013.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/24/russia-worst-human-rights-climate-post-soviet-era
(Moscow) The Russian government has unleashed a crackdown on civil society in the year
since Vladimir Putins return to the presidency that is unprecedented in the countrys post-
Soviet history. The 78-page report, Laws of Attrition: Crackdown on Russias Civil Society after
Putins Return to the Presidency,describes some of the changes since Putin returned to the
presidency in May 2012. The authorities have introduced a series of restrictive laws, begun a
nationwide campaign of invasive inspections of nongovernmental organizations, harassed,
intimidated, and in a number of cases imprisoned political activists, and sought to cast
government critics as clandestine enemies. The report analyzes the new laws, including the so-
called foreign agents law, the treason law, and the assembly law, and documents how they
have been used.

Human Rights is chiefly balanced against national interest

Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics, Princeton University, 2000.
http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/i/Ignatieff_01.pdf
human rights has become main-streamed into the
From being the insurgent creed of activists during the Cold War,

policy framework of states, multilateral lending institutions like the World Bank, and the UN itself. The foreign policy
rhetoric of most Western liberal states now repeats the mantra that national interests must be
balanced by due respect for values, chief of which is human rights. But human rights is not just an additional
item in the policy priorities of states. If taken seriously, human rights values put interests into question, interests such as sustaining a large
export sector in a nations defense industry, for example. It becomes incoherent for states like Britain and the United States to condemn
Indonesia or Turkey for their human rights performance while providing their military with vehicles or weapons that can be used for the
repression of civilian dissent. When values do not actually constrain interests, an ethical foreign policythe self-proclaimed goal of Britains
Labour governmentbecomes a contradiction interms.

Instability in the past, the chief problem of the post cold war era, has been caused by human
rights abuses.
Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics, Princeton University, 2000.
http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/i/Ignatieff_01.pdf
The overwhelming problem of the postCold War world system has been the collapse of state
order in three key sectors of the globethe Balkans, the Great Lakes region of Africa, and the
southern Islamic frontier of the former Soviet Union. Obviously these regions have fragmented in part
because of the agrant human rights abuses committed by ethnic majority tyrannies that
triedand failedto create stable nation states. But in part fragmentation also results from the destructive impact of demands
for territorial autonomy and independence on the part of secessionist groups.
Increasing action based on human rights.
Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics, Princeton University, 2000.
http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/i/Ignatieff_01.pdf

Where all order in a state has disintegrated and its people have been delivered up to a war of all against all, or where a state is engaging in gross, repeated, and
systematic violence against its own citizens, the only effective way to protect human rights is direct military intervention. Since 1991, this right of humanitarian

intervention has been asserted, most loudly by the French, but also by other governments seeking to justify interventions in Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo.36 The
armed forces of the Western powers have been busier since 1989 than they ever were during
the Cold War, and the legitimizing language for this activity has been the defense of human
rights. Yet the juridical status of a right of intervention is exceedingly unclear.37 While the UN Charter calls on states to proclaim human rights, it also prohibits
the use of force against other states and forbids internal interference. The human rights covenants that states have signed since 1945 have implied that state
sovereignty is conditional on adequate human rights observance. The gulf in international law between the nonintervention language of the charter and the
interventionist implications of human rights covenants has never been bridged

More impacts
Jonathan Masters. What Are Economic Sanctions. Council on Foreign Relations. 8 April 2015.
http://www.cfr.org/sanctions/economic-sanctions/p36259
Governments and multinational bodies impose economic sanctions to try to alter the strategic
decisions of state and non-state actors that threaten their interests or violate international
norms of behavior. Critics say sanctions are often poorly conceived and rarely successful in
changing a targets conduct, while supporters contend they have become more effective in
recent years and remain an essential foreign policy tool. Sanctions have become the defining
feature of the Western response to several geopolitical challenges, including Irans nuclear
program and Russias intervention in Ukraine.

Impact: Decreasing Human Rights Abuses reduces the probability of interstate conflict by 88%
David Sobek. 2005 LSU The Human Rights Peace: How the Respect for Human Rights at Home Leads to Peace
Abroad.
Statistical significance, however, does not necessarily indicate substantive significance. Rather
than looking at the substantive effects of each variable, Figure 1 examines physical integrity
rights.11 In general, as the states in the pair increasingly respect physical integrity rights, the
probability of conflict decreases. Movement from the lowest to highest amount of respect
decreases the probability of conflict by 88%. Figure 1 plots the marginal effects of joint respect
of physical integrity rights. The effect is always significant (95% confidence interval below 0),
but it decreases as the index reaches the higher levels. This implies that movements toward
higher respect when at the lower levels have a larger substantive impact on decreasing conflict
than the same movement when already at a high level.
Warrants for above Claim
1. Extension of Democratic Peace Theory- Nations with aligned political ideologies around
human rights are less likely to disagree and face political grievances.
2. It is easier for nations, especially democratic ones, to justify intervention against nations
that are actively violating human rights.
Retaliation
Russias tactics are reactionary to the West
International Crisis Group. Ukraine: Running out of Time. May 14 2014.
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ukraine-running-out-of-time.pdf
Putin may well not be pursuing a rigid tactical plan. Which of the above possibili- ties he
pursues, or indeed whether he eases the pressure on Kyiv and agrees to dial back the crisis,
may depend to a considerable extent on how he assesses the Western reaction and the cost of
a long-term confrontation. What is clear is that the mood in official Moscow is still grimly
determined. On 12 May, as Ukraine was struggling to respond to the referendum fallout, the
Russian government announced that it would switch to a system of prepayment from Ukraine
for natural gas. No more nannying, tomorrow switch [Ukraine] to prepayment, Prime
Minister Dmitry Medvedev in- structed the head of Gazprom, the state-owned natural gas
giant.107 Ukraine does not have the resources for such payments.

Retaliation (Maxwell New Europe)

Frank Maxwell (New Europe). EUs Economic Sanctions exalt Putins Nationalism. Accessed 12/18. Published
9/23/14. http://neurope.eu/article/eu%E2%80%99s-economic-sanctions-exalt-putin%E2%80%99s-
nationalism/ .
Vladimir Putins strong nationalism is nothing new; however since the Ukrainian crisis the Russian leaders discourse has increasingly turned
The EUs flurry of economic sanctions have given the Russian President a new
anti-Western.
opportunity to boost up patriotism by using a nationalistic rhetoric to criticize the economic
restrictions. However, there is no indication of any shift in Russias foreign policy towards Ukraine, nor that the economic sanctions will
be annulled in the near future.

Retaliation (Aleksashenko CGI)

Sergey Aleksashenko (Center on Global Interests).Sanctions One Year Later: Did They Even Matter?. Accessed
12/18. Published 12/18/15. http://globalinterests.org/2015/03/12/sanctions-one-year-later-did-they-even-matter/
.
The main goal of the sanctions, which were introduced in stages, was to stop Russian aggression in
Ukraine. Instead, Russia paid no attention to the sanctions and subsequently 1) annexed the
Crimean peninsula; 2) unleashed an armed conflict in eastern Ukraine; 3) effectively
transformed a significant part of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions into a territorial entity
independent of Kiev by autumn of 2014 (the time of the first Minsk agreements); and 4) sharply expanded the
territory under the separatists control, including the logistically important Donetsk airport and the city of
Debaltseve, in February 2015 (Minsk-2).
Retaliation (Cumbo CNAS)
Benjamin Cumbo (Center for a New American Security). Russian MotivesAn Essay Exploring Russias Approach to
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Accessed 12/18. Published 7/8/15.
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Report-Russian-Motives_Final_070815.pdf .
The current Russian approach to governance and outsiders stems from decades of a Russian sense of victimization, which precipitated

the rise of a conspiratorial narrative that views external actors particularly those in the West with suspicion.5 While many of these

conspiratorial narratives are based more on hyperbole than actual facts, one can appreciate their popularity in Russian society by

looking toward the past. In the view of Putin, his inner circle, and a number of everyday Russians, external actors committed nearly every
Having been attacked by a number of European powers
deprivation their country has experienced.
throughout history, Russians are uniquely sensitive to any actions that would supposedly
seek to limit or infringe upon Russian notions of sovereignty. Western powers were attempting to
encroach upon the traditional Russian Empire. For Putin, letting an area that historically belonged to Russia arguably the birthplace of

Russian society slip into the orbit of an aggressive amalgamation of European states was unacceptable. One must recognize that
Putins desire to initiate conflict in Ukraine stems from a decade 2004 to 2014 of antagonistic
relations between Russia and its Western neighbors. During this decade, the Ukrainian government vacillated
between aligning with the West and placating Russia, much to the consternation of Moscow. A combination of a transition in Ukrainian

leadership, fallout from the Orange Revolution, and the growth of divisive nationalist fervor greatly contributed to the Putins decision to

annex Crimea and invade five oblasts in eastern Ukraine, which seriously damaged relations between both countries. 8

Retaliation (Economist)
(Economist).From cold war to hot war. Accessed 12/18. Published 2/14/15.
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-
dangerous-confrontation .
Mr Putins preferred method is hybrid warfare: a blend of hard and soft power. A combination of instruments, some military and some
non-military, choreographed to surprise, confuse and wear down an opponent, hybrid warfare is ambiguous in both source and intent,

making it hard for multinational bodies such as NATO and the EU to craft a response. But without the ability to apply hard power,

Russias version of soft power would achieve little.

Russia has invested heavily in defence, says NATOs new
secretary-general, a former Norwegian prime minister, Jens Stoltenberg. It has shown it can deploy forces at very
short noticeabove all, it has shown a willingness to use force. Russias current stance displays a
willingness to create South-east Ukraine shows the new model army at work. Spetsnaz units first trained the Kremlin-backed separatist

rebels in tactics and the handling of sophisticated Russian weapons. But when the Ukrainian government began to make headway in

early summer, Russia had regular forces near the border to provide a calibrated (and still relatively covert) response.It is hard to tell how

many Russian troops have seen action in Ukraine, as their vehicles and uniforms carry no identifiers. But around 4,000 were sent to

relieve Luhansk and Donetsk while threatening the coastal city of Mariupolenough to convince Mr Poroshenko to draw his troops back.

Since November a new build-up of Russian forces has been under way. Ukrainian military intelligence reckons there may be 9,000 in

their country (NATO has given no estimate). Another 50,000 are on the Russian side of the border. Despite Mr Putins claim last year that

he could take Kiev in two weeks if he wanted, a full-scale invasion and subsequent occupation is beyond Russia. But a Russian-
controlled mini-state, Novorossiya, similar to Abkhazia and Transdniestria, could be more or less economically sustainable.
And it would end Ukraines hopes of ever regaining sovereignty over its territory other than on Russian
terms, which would undoubtedly include staying out of the EU and NATO. Not a bad outcome for Mr
Putin, and within reach with the hard power he controls.
Cyber
US is not prepared for a Cyber War
Gertz, Bill. "U.S. Military Not Prepared for Cyber Warfare, Commander Warns." Washington Times. The
Washington Times, 28 Feb. 2014. Web. 02 May 2014.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/28/us-military-not-prepared-cyber-warfare-
commander-w/?page=all.
The U.S. military is ill-prepared for waging cyber warfare and needs to bolster defenses
against the growing threat of cyber attacks against both military systems and private
infrastructure, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command told Congress on Thursday. Those
attacks are coming and I think those are near term and were not ready for them, said Army
Gen. Keith Alexander, head of Cyber Command and also outgoing director of the National
Security Agency. Alexander, in prepared testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee,
sounded the alarm on the need for better cyber attack and defense capabilities. Cyber threats
are increasing, shifting from temporarily disruptive attacks, to extremely damaging cyber strikes
that can destroy data and machines, and potentially threaten the U.S. economy and endanger
American lives. Despite our progress at U.S. [Cyber Command], I worry that we might not be
ready in time, he said. Threats to our nation in cyberspace are growing. The main concerns
are cyber attacks from nation states such as China or Russia that could create massive power
outages in the United States, or an attack on U.S. financial networks, such as stock exchanges
and financial institutions, that could cripple the economy.

A Cyber Pearl Harbor

Thom Shanker. New York Times. Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack on U.S. October 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/world/panetta-warns-of-dire-threat-of-cyberattack.html?pagewanted=all
Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta warned Thursday that the United States was facing the
possibility of a cyber-Pearl Harbor and was increasingly vulnerable to foreign computer
hackers who could dismantle the nations power grid, transportation system, financial networks
and government. An aggressor nation or extremist group could use these kinds of cyber tools
to gain control of critical switches, Mr. Panetta said. They could derail passenger trains, or
even more dangerous, derail passenger trains loaded with lethal chemicals. They could
contaminate the water supply in major cities, or shut down the power grid across large parts of
the country.

95% of U.S. private sector networks are vulnerable

Associated Press. Mike Rogers. (United States Representative Mike Rogers serves as the
Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) ([Lawmaker: Cyberattacks
against US getting worse. Associated Press. February 10, 2013
http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2013/02/10/lawmaker cyberattacks- against-
us-getting-worse_print.html]
The U.S. is vulnerable to cyberattacks that could shut down financial services or destroy
information that companies need for daily operations, the chairman of the House Intelligence
Committee said Sunday.Rep. Mike Rogers says 95 percent of private sector networks are
vulnerable and most have already been hit.

Russia uses cyber attacks through their military and patriotic hackers
[Cilluffo, Frank. (Chairman of Homeland Security Review Panel for GW University) "Cyber Threats from China,
Russia and Iran: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure." . Homeland Security Policy Institute, 20 Mar. 2013.
Web. .
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/Meehan_Cilluffo%20Testimony%20March%202013.pdf]
Ambassador David Smith notes: Russia has integrated cyber operations into its military
doctrine; though not fully successful...Russias 2008 combined cyber and kinetic attack on
Georgia was the first practical test of this doctrine...[and] we must assume that the Russian
military has studied the lessons learned. 19 Russia was also behind the 2007 distributed denial
of service (DDoS) attacks on Estonia (its government, banks, etc.) although Russia denies official
involvement. Relying upon patriotic hackers guidedby government handlers plus a little help
from the Russian intelligence service, however, does not alter the reality that activity
undertaken by those hackers is state-sponsored and directly implicates Russia.

Russia is conclusively a cyber threat to the US

[Cilluffo, Frank. (Chairman of Homeland Security Review Panel for GW University) "Cyber Threats from China,
Russia and Iran: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure." . Homeland Security Policy Institute, 20 Mar. 2013.
Web. .
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/Meehan_Cilluffo%20Testimony%20March%202013.pdf]
Russias extensive attacks on U.S. research and development have resulted in Russia being
deemed (along with China), a national long-term strategic threat to the United States, by the
NCIX.
Aggression

On January 2nd, Russia released its first National Security brief in 6 years that named the
U.S. as a threat to Russian national security for the first time ever
Vladimir Soldatkin. Putin names United States among threats in new Russian security strategy. Reuters. 2 Jan
2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/russia-security-strategy-idUSKBN0UG09Q20160102
A new appraisal names the United States as one of the threats to Russia's national security
for the first time, a sign of how relations with the west have deteriorated in recent years. The
document, "About the Strategy of National Security of Russian Federation", was signed by President Vladimir Putin on New Year's Eve. It replaces a 2009 version,

endorsed by then- President Dmitry Medvedev, the current prime minister, which mentioned
neither the United States not NATO. It says Russia has managed to heighten its role in solving global problems and international conflicts. That
heightened role has caused a reaction by the West, it says. "The strengthening of Russia happens against the background of new threats to the national security, which has complex and
interrelated nature," the document says. Conducting an independent policy, "both international and domestic" has caused "counteraction from the USA and its allies, which are striving to
retain their dominance in global affairs." That in turn is likely to lead to "political, economical, military and informational pressure" on Russia, the document says."

Narrative of opposition and adversarity sanctions feed

The Economist. From Cold War to Hot War. February 14th, 2015 <www.economist.com
/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part- broader-and-moredangerous- confrontation>
Now, according to Russias chief propagandist, Dmitry Kiselev, even a decision about the use of nuclear arms will be taken personally by Mr Putin, who has the undoubted support of the

. Bluff or not, this reflects the Russian elites perception of the West as a threat to the
Russian people

very existence of the Russian state. In this view Russia did not start the war in Ukraine, but
responded to Western aggression. The Maidan uprising and ousting of Viktor Yanukovych as Ukraines president were engineered by American special
services to move NATO closer to Russias borders. Once Mr Yanukovych had gone, American envoys offered Ukraines interim government $25 billion to place missile defences on the Russian
border, in order to shift the balance of nuclear power towards America. Russia had no choice but to act. Even without Ukraine, Mr Putin has said, America would have found some other excuse

Mr Putins purpose is not to rebuild

to contain Russia. Ukraine, therefore, was not the cause of Russias conflict with the West, but its consequence.

the Soviet empirehe knows this is impossiblebut to protect Russias sovereignty. By this
he means its values, the most important of which is a monopoly on state power. Behind Russias
confrontation with the West lies a clash of ideas. On one side are human rights, an accountable bureaucracy and democratic elections; on the other an unconstrained state that can sacrifice its
citizens interests to further its destiny or satisfy its rulers greed. Both under communism and before it, the Russian state acquired religious attributes. It is this sacred state which is under
threat. Mr Putin sits at its apex. No Putinno Russia, a deputy chief of staff said recently. His former KGB colleaguesthe Committee of State Securityare its guardians, servants and
priests, and entitled to its riches. Theirs is not a job, but an elite and hereditary calling. Expropriating a private firms assets to benefit a state firm is therefore not an act of corruption. When
thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets demanding a Western-European way of life, the Kremlin saw this as a threat to its model of governance. Alexander Prokhanov, a nationalist writer
who backs Russias war in Ukraine, compares European civilisation to a magnet attracting Ukraine and Russia. Destabilising Ukraine is not enough to counter that force: the magnet itself must
be neutralised. Russia feels threatened not by any individual European state, but by the European Union and NATO, which it regards as expansionist. It sees them as occupied by America,
which seeks to exploit Western values to gain influence over the rest of the world. America wants to freeze the order established after the Soviet collapse and remain an absolute leader,
thinking it can do whatever it likes, while others can do only what is in that leaders interests, Mr Putin said recently. Maybe some want to live in a semi-occupied state, but we do not.
Russia has taken to arguing that it is not fighting Ukraine, but America in Ukraine. The Ukrainian army is just a foreign legion of NATO, and American soldiers are killing Russian proxies in the
Donbas. Anti- Americanism is not only the reason for war and the main pillar of state power, but also an ideology that Russia is trying to export to Europe, as it once exported communism.

Anti-Westernism has been dressed not in communist clothes, but in imperial and even clerical
ones (see article). We see how many Euro-Atlantic countries are in effect turning away from their roots, including their Christian values, said Mr Putin in 2013. Russia, by
contrast, has always been a state civilisation held together by the Russian people, the Russian language, Russian culture and the Russian Orthodox church. The Donbas rebels are fighting not
only the Ukrainian army, but against a corrupt Western way of life in order to defend Russias distinct world view.
Putins aggressiveness leads to military action and increased likelihood of conflict.
O zdem Sanberk, Director of the International Strategic Research Organisation De- escalating Russia-West Military
Tensions Before its Too Late Friday 4 September 2015 <http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/de-
escalating- russia-west-military-tensions-before-its-too-late-_3091.html>
The Ukraine crisis has caused the biggest rift between Russia and the West since the end of
the Cold War. The crisis has resulted in thousands of deaths, including the downing of a Malaysian passenger jet over Ukrainian airspace in July 2014 that killed all 298 people on
board, and has caused billions of dollars of destruction. The conflict has also reverberated on a regional and global level in

the form of an increased risk of military conflict between NATO and Russia, intensified
geopolitical and geo- economic divisions, and it has undermined international cooperation
against common threats such as ISIS in the Middle East. Perhaps most importantly, as the
Ukraine crisis remains unresolved, the wider military build-up in the Euro-Atlantic area carries
an immediate danger of military conflict as a result of a mistake or miscalculation by either
side. This situation is not sustainable. Thus, such a danger must be kept to a minimum even if it cannot totally be neutralized. On both sides, many
would agree with these words, but the question now is how would this goal be best achieved in the current circumstances? To provide some solutions, first and foremost we need to look at
where we are in the Ukraine crisis. The ceasefire agreement, produced through the efforts of Germany and France on 18 February 2015, is largely holding between Ukraine and pro-Russian
rebels. Despite the fact that this agreement is more comprehensive than the first ceasefire agreement signed in September 2014 (although this was never implemented), it is not difficult to
find many analysts in Russia, the West and Ukraine who view the current ceasefire as shaky and the renewal of heavy fighting between the parties quite possible. The latest ceasefire
agreement contains a number of measures to de-escalate the crisis and provides the basis for a political solution in the future. However, there is not a single provision in the agreement that
Ukrainian and pro-Russian rebels fully agree on, reflecting contradictory positions on the nature of the conflict. Russia continues to express that it is not a combatant in the conflict in Ukraine
and so there is no need for Moscow to be bound by any provisions of the agreement. The key asset that Russia wants to keep under its control in order to continue pressuring the Kiev
government on political matters and to support pro-Russian rebel groups in Eastern Ukraine is the long border with Ukraine. Most agree that a renewal of heavy fighting would not bring any

It is because of the ongoing risk

success to Ukraine's 250,000 strong military forces in the face of a pro-Russian army of 100,000 rebels supported by Moscow.

of the renewal of the conflict and an inability to prevent ceasefire violations that western
countries extended sanctions against Russia until January 2016. It is the context of fragile
ceasefire in Ukraine and ongoing disagreements between western countries and Russia on
the Ukraine crisis that has not only maintained the risk of a renewal of the military clashes in
Ukraine but also continues to increase the risk of military collision between NATO and
Russian military forces. Such a collision in the Baltic region, Black Sea and some other regions is now not out of the question. The consequences of a military accident
involving NATO and Russian military forces will surely be much more serious and dangerous for both sides, and other states, when one thinks of the reality of a confrontation occurring
between a nuclear armed alliance and a nuclear armed state. Since March 2014, it has been reported that there is an increasing pattern of military activities on the part of both Russia and
NATO. Indeed, the risk of a military encounter between Russia and NATO during the recent period is well documented by the latest position paper of the Task Force on Cooperation in Greater
Europe. As pointed out in that paper, the European Leadership Network, a London based think-tank and one of the partners of the Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe alongside my

Ankara, has identified 66 military incidents between NATO and

own International Strategic Research Organisation (USAK) in

Russian forces, and between the Russian military and those of Sweden and Finland. Of these
military encounters, three were classified as carrying a high risk. The Position Paper argues
that military exercises have also increased in size and number on both sides. Russia has also
deployed additional air and sea defensive and offensive military equipment to Crimea, and
increased military activities, for example by using surveillance aircraft and long-range
strategic aviation. Although NATO and Russian military forces as well as national armed
forces have so far shown restraint in these military encounters and exercises, this cycle of
continuous military activities carries a high risk a picture reminiscent of the Cold War
confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union. It seems clear that Western countries
inside and outside NATO will change their approach towards Russia only if Moscow
demonstrates a more constructive position in the Ukraine crisis and Moscow itself is so far
showing no signs of changing its own position. The most important factor in the meantime, therefore, is the need to keep the mutual military
activities of Russia and NATO under control

Even EU officials have admitted sanctions dont work

ANTON TROIANOVSKI, Merkel, Georgian Leader Warn of Russias Cold War-Style Meddling Abroad. Nov 17, 2014.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/merkel-warns-of-russias-cold-war-style-meddling-in-eastern-europe-1416230955
The leaders warnings reflected recognition in European capitals that sanctions havent
deterred Russian President Vladimir Putin from seeking to increase the Kremlins sway
beyond Ukraine. In Brussels on Monday, European Union foreign ministers didnt endorse
broad new economic sanctions against Russia but pledged to step up diplomatic efforts in Kiev
and Moscow.

R/T Abandoned NovoRossiya

Expansion plans wont stop until Putin has his buffer zone
Ben Tanosborn. Phoenix rose from ashes; Novorossiya will rise from Western sanctions. Pravda Report.
October 2015. http://www.pravdareport.com/opinion/columnists/10-02-2015/129739-novorossiya_will_rise-0/
Given both, historic reality and Russia's uncompromising desire for self-preservation as an
influential regional power, militarily and economically secure, it is unlikely that Putin will
consent to anything less than a bona fide geopolitical buffer zone, one which will preclude NATO membership for Ukraine,
or Kyiv dominance in the affairs which might take place below the 47th parallel, or east of the 35th meridian. And no bully-nation or criminal

sanctions will hold Vladimir Putin hostage to the true evil empire... the empire Ronald Reagan had confused in his state of dementia.

R/T McFaul Card

McFaul attributes the end of the Novorossiya policy not to sanctions but to the inability of
Putin to gain influence in Ukraine
Michael McFaul. The Myth of Putins Strategic Genius. New York Times. October 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/23/opinion/the-myth-of-putins-strategic-genius.html?_r=0
Again, the costs of these brief gains piled up. As a result of sanctions and falling energy prices, the Russian economy has shrunk to $1.2 trillion from $2 trillion in 2014. And NATO, once an

.
alliance in search of a mission, is now focused again on deterring Russia

Mr. Putin has also been compelled to abandon the Novorossiya project: His proxies in eastern
Ukraine neither enjoy popular support nor run an effective government. And his actions have
guaranteed that Ukraine will never join his Eurasian Economic Union or line up with Russia
again.
R/T Instituted Ceasefire
At best, russia is simply changing the way it attempts to destabilise Ukraine - Theyre
increasing sabotage and terrorism
IHOR KOZAK, Newsweek, 12/25/15 PUTIN PLOTS TO MAKE UKRAINE A FAILED STATE
http://www.newsweek.com/putin-plots-make-ukraine-failed-state-408957
And so it seems that, in order to achieve its long-term strategic goals, the Kremlin's leadership is emphasizing alternative aspects of hybrid

warfare. According to retired U.S. Army General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, who visited Ukraine seven times in

2015, "Ukraine is a work in progress by Putin. He has multiple channels to attack Ukraine, economically,
politically, diplomatically, militarily." Recent developments on the security front within Ukraine's borders are disturbing. The
Ukrainian security service (SBU) and other law enforcement agencies report a significant increase in acts of
sabotage and terrorism. According to SBU official Oleksandr Tkachuk, "Russian special services are intensifying their
activities in peaceful cities, trying to destabilize the situation and trying to show that Ukrainian law
enforcement bodies and Ukrainian authorities are not able to protect their citizens."

Russian troops built up near Ukraine recently increased to 50K, Ukrainians worried about
escalation, 33K separatists at full combat readiness
Adam Nathan. Ukraine fears 'big war' as Russia sends in more troops. THe Independent. 15 August 2015.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-fears-big-war-as-russia-sends-in-more-troops-
10457571.html
Military authorities in Ukraine believe the number of Russian troops within and close to its
borders has risen to more than 50,000, raising fears of a substantial escalation in the conflict
raging in Ukraine's eastern regions. Almost 9,000 Russian Federation Armed Forces personnel are believed to be based inside Ukraine, according to
reports from the countrys National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) seen by The Independent on Sunday. The rest are based in the neighbouring Rostov region of Russia, including

This is in addition to 33,400 so-called illegal armed

mechanised assault units and communications command systems.

formations of Russian-backed separatist soldiers inside eastern Ukraine, with 400 main
battle tanks and close to 2,000 armoured troop carriers reported to be at full combat
readiness.

Recent uptick in ceasefire agreement and instability in Ukraine

Adam Nathan. Ukraine fears 'big war' as Russia sends in more troops. THe Independent. 15 August 2015.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-fears-big-war-as-russia-sends-in-more-troops-
10457571.html
Western officials have been quick to talk of their concern at the rise in the number of
attacks and rocket fire between Ukrainian forces and the Russian-backed separatists in recent
days. Specifically, there is concern at the number of violations of a ceasefire agreement,
implemented back in February after talks in Minsk, that was aimed at ending the conflict. While the levels of fighting have decreased since then, the recent surge is worrying. For example, the
firing of banned Grad multiple-rocket launch systems restarted last Wednesday evening, with dozens of separate Grad rocket attacks recorded through to yesterday [SAT] morning.
January Specific
Russia blocking Minsk II implementation
DW.com, 1-5-16, Opinion: Putins Syria Card in the Ukraine Conflict, http://www.dw.com/en/opinion-putins-syria-
card-in-the- ukraine-conflict/a-18956434, DOA 1-5-16
But the increased Russian involvement in Syria can be understood only by viewing it through the prism of Ukraine. On the one hand, Vladimir Putin wants the sanctions imposed on Russia to
be mitigated. On the other, he wants Ukraine to be destabilized to the point that its road to Europe is obstructed. That is the purpose served by the Moscow-dependent power structures in
eastern Ukraine - the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LNR). Their existence would be called into question if the Minsk II agreement were fully
implemented and Kyiv regained control over its own border with Russia. The fulfillment of Minsk II is, in turn, a requirement for the lifting of Western sanctions.

However, it is not expected that the Minsk agreement will be fulfilled in 2016. Instead,
Moscow is working to ensure that the situation in Donbass becomes what is known as a
"frozen conflict." And Ukrainian politicians are playing into the hands of Moscow, as they are
being hesitant about changing the constitution to grant more autonomy to the regions -
especially in the disputed east - as prescribed by the Minsk II agreement.

Minsk agreements not being implemented

David McCalister, 1-4-16, New Europe, The labyrinth of transatlantic prosperity, http://neurope.eu/article/the-
labyrinth-of- transatlantic-prosperity/ DOA: 1-5-16
The Minsk talks saw some success in September and
Russia and Ukraine have made very little progress in broader strategic negotiations.

October, when the cease-fire between pro-Russia separatists and Ukrainian security forces was observed almost completely, but fighting has more
recently increased along the line of contact between the two sides in eastern Ukraine and
there is still a failure to advance the political components of the Minsk agreements. Russia is pushing
Ukraine and the Europeans to give the separatist territories more autonomy with constitutional amendments, but Kiev and the West insist that Moscow must give back control of the border

The two sides are interpreting the Minsk agreement differently,

between Russia and the separatist territories first.

making it difficult to move toward a lasting resolution of the conflict. _

Fighting has not been reduced

Thomas Gibbons-Neff is a staff writer and a former Marine infantryman, December 31, 2015, As Ukraine Enters
2016, Peace Remains Elusive, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/12/31/as-ukraine-
enters-2016-peace-remains-elusive/ DOA: 1-4-16
Despite a ceasefire signed in February that was supposed to have been completely implemented by the start of 2016, the prospect of peace in Ukraine remains elusive. The war in
the countrys east between government troops and Russian-backed separatists periodic lulls in the
fighting notwithstanding has remained largely unchanged since earlier this year. While some heavy weapons, such as tanks and

artillery, have been removed from the front lines, both sides still clash daily.

Their evidence is old fighting increased at the end of December

Thomas Gibbons-Neff is a staff writer and a former Marine infantryman, December 31, 2015, As Ukraine Enters
2016, Peace Remains Elusive, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/12/31/as-ukraine-
enters-2016-peace-remains-elusive/ DOA: 1-4-16
The multinational watchdog group, the Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe has
been largely responsible for monitoring both sides of the conflict since the signing of the last
Minsk agreement. On Thursday the OSCEs chief monitor for its mission to Ukraine, Ambassador
Ertugrul Apakan, expressed hope for peace, but reiterated that a true ceasefire is a way
off.The fact that the number of ceasefire violations in the last weeks of December had
increased again in eastern Ukraine reflects a worrying development as the year ends,
Apakan said in a statement. In December there was a marked increase in fighting, especially around the
city of Donetsk. In addition to heavy machine guns and mortars, there have been multiple reports regarding the use of BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems, a weapon explicitly banned
by the Minsk ceasefire.
Last week, Ukrainian forces reported that separatist troops, along with tanks and other vehicles entered the town of Kominternovo near the strategic port city of Mariupol. The small village is
in a grey zone between government and separatist forces. A spokesman for the Ukrainian troops, Anton Myronovych called the move a large-scale provocation, during an interview with a
Ukrainian television station.
On Sunday, OSCE observers came under fire from separatist forces near Kominternovo after heading to the village to investigate if it had, in fact, been taken over and to conduct crater analysis
following fresh fighting
there. According to the monitoring groups reports, villagers stated that separatist troops had entered the town. The villagers also recalled hearing armored vehicles at night; however, the
OSCE could not confirm if Russian-backed separatist troops were still in the town because they were restricted from proceeding past its western border, according to a Monday report.
Political Warfare

Putin has now created a spate of policies counter to western ideals.

NOSSEL, SUZANNE. "Its Time to Kill the Feel-Good Myth of Sanctions." Foreign Policy. N.p., 9 June 2015. Web. 04
Dec. 2015. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/09/its-time-to-kill-the-feel-good-myth-of- sanctions-russia-iran/>.
sanctions seem to have galvanized Putin in pursuing a spate of policies everything
If anything,

from creating his own credit agency to financing European green parties that will oppose
fracking and compound dependency on Russian oil aimed to thwart his antagonists and
undermine their efforts to isolate him. With no sign of Russia knuckling under, the question becomes, how long can the sanctions and isolation
continue and to what end?

Russia funds divisive politics in West

The Economist. From Cold war to Hot war. 14th Feb 2015.
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-
dangerous-confrontation
Mr Putins most devious strategy, however, is to destabilise the EU through fringe political
parties (see article). Russias approach to ideology is fluid: it supports both far-left and far-right groups. As Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss put it in The menace of unreality, a
paper on Russian soft power: The aim is to exacerbate divides [in the West] and create an echo-chamber of

Kremlin support. _

Pro-Russian parties took of EU seats

The Economist. In The Kremlins Pocket. 14th Feb 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643222-
who-backs-putin-and-why-kremlins-pocket
POPULIST parties of both right and left, many pro-Russian, did well in last Mays European
elections, taking between them a quarter of the seats. This has raised fears of a coherent pro-
Russian block forming in Strasbourg.

Russia used fringe politicians to legitimize aggression

The Economist. In The Kremlins Pocket. 14th Feb 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643222-
who-backs-putin-and-why-kremlins-pocket
Russia has already found a use for its European friends: to legitimise (to some) its dodgy
elections. A motley crew of populists were flown in to give ringing endorsements of the Crimea
referendum and the election in the Donbas, organised by separatists. Among them were Mr
Kovacs and Aymeric Chauprade, an adviser to Ms Le Pen. Russian media falsely portrayed these
lackeys as official, independent election observers.
Support to Syria
Russia Killed the FSAs mans.
Reuters Third Russian air strike on Syrian rebel group kills leader.Oct 20, 2015
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-latakia-idUSKCN0SE0M420151020
Russian air strikes in Syria's Latakia province killed a rebel commander and four other fighters from a
group armed by President Bashar al-Assad's foreign enemies, a spokesman for the group said on Tuesday. The attack on Monday evening

marked the third time Russian war planes have targeted the First Coastal Division group since Moscow began its air strikes in support of

President Bashar al-Assad on Sept. 30, the group's spokesman Fadi Ahmad said. He said a further 15 civilians had been killed in the air strike in

Jabal Akrad, a rural, mountainous area in the province. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights earlier put the death toll at 45 rebels and

civilians. The First Coastal Division is one of several groups that have received foreign military support including U.S.-made anti-tank missiles,

the most potent weapon in the rebels' arsenal. The group, which fights under the umbrella of the "Free Syrian Army",
confirmed the death of its chief of staff, Basil Zamo, formerly a captain in the Syrian military. Ahmad said a fighter
trained in the use of the anti-tank TOW missiles had also been killed. The Russian jets had struck one of the group's headquarters, and then

struck the same target again after rescue workers had arrived on the scene.

90% Russian airstrikes against Assad opposition (Daily Mail)

(Daily Mail). More than 90% of Russian airstrikes in Syria have not targeted ISIS, US says. Accessed January 14,
2016. Published October 7, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/07/russia-airstrikes-syria-not-
targetting-isis.
Russias military strikes in Syria have not been aimed at the Islamic State group or jihadists tied to al-Qaida,
A large majority of

and have instead targeted the moderate Syrian opposition, the US State Department said on

Wednesday.Greater than 90% of the strikes that weve seen them take to date have not been against Isil or al-
Qaida-affiliated terrorists, said spokesman John Kirby. Theyve been largely against opposition groups that want a better future
for Syria and dont want to see the Assad regime stay in power.
Brinksmanship with NATO

NATO Military Spending Bad

1% increase in military spending decreases income by $3,695

Dale Bremmer, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology. Military Spending: Is the Peace Dividend real or Illusory.
April 2001. https://www.rose-hulman.edu/~bremmer/professional/defense_2001.pdf
Also, as expected, LFORCE--the percentage of the population between ages 15 and 64--had a positive and significant impact on GDP. The coefficient for the remaining population variable--
POPGROWTH--had the expected negative sign but was insignificant at any conventionally accepted level of significance. The estimated coefficient for government spending less military
spending--GOVERNMENT--was positive but insignificant. None of these results were unexpected or at odds with most other published studies. Of course, the most interesting result produced

a one percent
by this estimation procedure was the negative and significant coefficient for the military spending variable--DEFENSE. In fact, according to the estimates

increase in military spending reduces per capita GDP by $3,695--not an insignificant amount.

1% increase in military spending increases inflation by .69% (logic: funded by new money)
John Aiyedogbon, Bigham University. Impact of Military Expenditure on Inflation in Nigeria 1980-2012. Review
of Arts and Humanities. June 2014. http://rah-net.com/journals/rah/Vol_3_No_2_June_2014/1.pdf
Table 4.3 further shows that the impact of capital military expenditure and exchange rate on inflation rate are negative while recurrent military expenditure, interest rate and money supply

a one percent increase in recurrent military

exert positive influence on inflation in Nigeria within the period under review. For example,

expenditure has the tendency to increase inflation by 0.69 percent while a one percent increase in capital military
expenditure is capable of decreasing inflation by 0.29 percent. However, only recurrent military expenditure is statistical significant in explaining inflation in Nigeria. The negative constant
shows that in the absence of the independent variables, inflation rate in Nigeria would be negative.
Geopolitical Shift

China

Russia Has Made Pivot To China

Krauthammer, Charles. "Who Made the Pivot to Asia? Putin." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 22 May
2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles- krauthammer-who-made-the-pivot-to-asia-
putin/2014/05/22/091a48ee-e1e3-11e3-9743- bb9b59cde7b9_story.html?tid=pm_opinions_pop.
In Shanghai, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a
spectacular energy deal $400 billion of Siberian natural gas to be exported to China over 30
years. This is huge. By indelibly linking producer and consumer the pipeline alone is a
$70!billion infrastructure project it deflates the post-Ukraine Western threat (mostly empty,
but still very loud) to cut European imports of Russian gas. Putin has just defiantly
demonstrated that he has other places to go. The Russia-China deal also makes a mockery of
U.S. boasts to have isolated Russia because of Ukraine. Not even Germany wants to risk a
serious rupture with Russia (hence the absence of significant sanctions). And now Putin has just
ostentatiously unveiled a signal 30-year energy partnership with the worlds second-largest
economy. Some isolation.

Russia Pulling Back Troops to Appease China

MacFarquhar, Neil. Ukraine Crisis Pushing Putin Toward China. The New York Times. Published May 19, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-pushing-putin-toward-
china.html?hpw&rref=world&_r=0
Mr. Putins announcement of a pullback of Russian forces from the Ukraine border was likely to
help calm the situation there before presidential elections scheduled for Sunday. But it could
also be seen as a gesture to Chinese sensitivities about separatism, given Beijings continuing
troubles with Tibet, the Uighurs and scores of lesser-known ethnic and religious minorities.

If The West Isolates Russia, Russia Will Turn to China

Heritage, Timothy. Putin looks to Asia as West threatens to isolate Russia. Reuters. Published May 21, 2014.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/21/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-insight-idUSBREA2K07S20140321
When President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty this week annexing Crimea to great fanfare in
the Kremlin and anger in the West, a trusted lieutenant was making his way to Asia to shore up
ties with Russia's eastern allies.
Forcing home the symbolism of his trip, Igor Sechin gathered media in Tokyo the next day to
warn Western governments that more sanctions over Moscow's seizure of the Black Sea
peninsula from Ukraine would be counter-productive.
The underlying message from the head of Russia's biggest oil company, Rosneft, was clear: If
Europe and the United States isolate Russia, Moscow will look East for new business, energy
deals, military contracts and political alliances.
The Holy Grail for Moscow is a natural gas supply deal with China that is apparently now close
after years of negotiations. If it can be signed when Putin visits China in May, he will be able to
hold it up to show that global power has shifted eastwards and he does not need the West.
"The worse Russia's relations are with the West, the closer Russia will want to be to China. If
China supports you, no one can say you're isolated," said Vasily Kashin, a China expert at the
Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) think thank. A strong alliance would suit both
countries as a counterbalance to the United States.

China will militarily back up Russia over the US based on the Syria crisis
Wintour, Patrick. "Syria Crisis: China Joins Russia in Opposing Military Strikes." Theguardian.com. Guardian News
and Media, 05 Sept. 2013. Web.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/syria-china-russia-opposing-military- strikes.
China has joined Russia in opposing military strikes on Syria, saying it would push up oil prices
and create an economic downturn.The Chinese intervention came as G20 leaders gathered in
Saint Petersburg on Thursday for a summit likely to be dominated by Syria. The Russian
president, Vladimir Putin, is expected to allow the issue on to the agenda for dinner, reflecting
the reality that the fate of the world economy is inextricably intertwined with the risk of a
Middle East conflagration.

NATO Sanctions Will Force Russia To Make a Gas Deal with China
MacFarquhar, Neil. Ukraine Crisis Pushing Putin Toward China. The New York Times. Published May 19, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-pushing-putin-toward-
china.html?hpw&rref=world&_r=0
The crisis in relations with the West over Ukraine has made ties to Asia, and particularly
relations with its economic engine, China, a key strategic priority. With Europe trying to wean
itself off Russian gas, and the possibility of far more serious Western sanctions looming should
the crisis deepen, Moscow needs an alternative
The centerpiece of Mr. Putins two-day visit to China could well be a long-stalled deal with
Russia to ship natural gas from new Siberian fields to China starting around 2019. The two have
been haggling over the deal for a decade, but could not agree on a price for the gas.
Experts anticipate that Russia is finally prepared to come to terms, if only to let Washington and
Western Europe know that it has other markets for its gas and important friends in the world.
Because of this current disaster in our relations with the West, they have no alternative, said
Vasily B. Kashin, a China expert at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a
Moscow policy organization. They need to go to Asia to make any deals possible as quickly as
possible.
Russia needs new markets because it is hugely dependent on commodity exports, earning some
67 percent of its export income from oil and gas alone. Financing from China would also help
offset reluctance by Western banks to extend new loans, given the threat of sanctions.
There will be a natural gas agreement, which is very important not for the agreement itself,
but because it will open the road for further, much bigger agreements in natural gas and other
raw materials, Mr. Kashin said.
There is no more time, with sanctions escalating, said Ildar Davletshin, the head of oil and gas
research at Renaissance Capital, an investment bank. Russia has become more desperate to
get a real outlet.

Gas Deal Threatens US Global Power

Krauthammer, Charles. "Who Made the Pivot to Asia? Putin." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 22 May
2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles- krauthammer-who-made-the-pivot-to-asia-
putin/2014/05/22/091a48ee-e1e3-11e3-9743- bb9b59cde7b9_story.html?tid=pm_opinions_pop
This alignment of the worlds two leading anti-Western powers all the more significant. It marks
a major alteration in the global balance of power. China and Russia together represent the core
of a new coalition of anti-democratic autocracies challenging the Western-imposed, post-Cold
War status quo. Their enhanced partnership marks the first emergence of a global coalition
against American hegemony since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Indeed, at this weeks Asian cooperation conference, Xi Jinping proposed a brand-new
continental security system to include Russia and Iran (lest anyone mistake its anti-imperialist
essence) and exclude America. This is an open challenge to the post-Cold War, U.S.-dominated
world that Obama inherited and then weakened beyond imagining.
If carried through, it would mark the end of a quarter-century of unipolarity. And herald a
return to a form of bipolarity two global coalitions: one free, one not though, with
communism dead, not as structurally rigid or ideologically dangerous as Cold War bipolarity.
Not a fight to the finish, but a struggle nonetheless for dominion and domination.
The retreat is compounded by Obamas proposed massive cuts in defense spending (down to
below 3 percent of GDP by 2017) even as Russia is rearming and China is creating a
sophisticated military soon capable of denying America access to the waters of the Pacific Rim.

Emerging China-Russia Military Alliance Threatens US Interests

"China Calls for New Security Pact with Russia, Iran." CBSNews. CBS Interactive, 21 May 2014. Web.
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-calls-for-new-security-pact- with-russia-iran/.
China's president called Tuesday for the creation of a new Asian structure for security
cooperation based on a regional group that includes Russia and Iran and excludes the US.
President Xi Jinping spoke at a meeting in Shanghai of the Conference on Interaction and
Confidence-building measures in Asia, an obscure group that has taken on significance as
Beijing tries to extend its influence and limit the role of the United States, which it sees as a
strategic rival. "We need to innovate our security cooperation (and) establish new regional
security cooperation architecture," said Xi, speaking to an audience that included President
Vladimir Putin of Russia and leaders of Central Asian countries. The proposal marks the latest
effort by Beijing to build up groups of Asian or developing governments to offset the influence
of the United States and other Western governments in global affairs. Putin's presence at the
meeting was significant for China-Russia relations at a time when both are diplomatically
isolated -- Russia over Ukraine and China over its territorial disputes and U.S. accusations of
cyber spying. Both Putin and Xi are grappling with economic and political challenges and being
assertive abroad can help to build nationalist support at home, Babbage said. "There's an
interesting synergy from shared circumstances, with large parts of the world lining up against
them and expressing strong concerns over their behavior," he said.

Gas Deal Will Lead to a More Broad and Threatening Alliance

MacFarquhar, Neil. Ukraine Crisis Pushing Putin Toward China. The New York Times. Published May 19, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-pushing-putin-toward-
china.html?hpw&rref=world&_r=0
In highlighting that the sanctions are helping to disrupt the Russian economy, the Obama
administration has virtually ignored that it is pushing Russia toward greater dependence on
China, Mr. Gaddy noted.
Aside from what he described as a strategic energy alliance, Mr. Putin mentioned possible
joint projects in airplanes and helicopters, mining, agricultural processing and transportation
infrastructure. Other technical and military cooperation agreements will also be discussed, but
both sides tend to keep those secret, so details might not emerge for some months, experts
said.
The Russians are hoping that China will also agree to help build a bridge linking the mainland to
the Crimean port of Kerch, lending not only valuable expertise but also tacit endorsement of an
annexation that much of the world considers illegal. There is no current land link to the
annexed territory.
China abstained from a United Nations Security Council vote in March rejecting the referendum
that Russia organized in Crimea before annexing it. That earned China special praise from Mr.
Putin in his speech announcing the annexation.
Russia and China are also scheduled to hold joint naval exercises in China toward the end of the
month, and President Xi Jinping was one of the few world leaders to put in an appearance at
the Winter Olympics in Sochi.
Military Shift increasing arms sales China
Christopher Miller. Russia Cant Replace the West with China. The Moscow Times. August 2014.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-can-t-replace-the-west-with-china/504548.html
The second sign of improving ties is military relations. China has long been an important arms
export market for Russia, but the Kremlin's recent decision to sell S-400 surface-to-air missiles
to China marks an important shift.
In the past, Russia's arms exports to China were limited by the geopolitical rivalry between
Moscow and Beijing. To this end, the Kremlin ensured that Russian forces maintained a
technological edge.
But the sale of S-400 missiles not only reduces Russia's technological superiority over China, it
also shifts the military balance between China and its neighbors, especially Japan, Taiwan and
India. If sales of high-tech kits to China continue, it may be evidence that Moscow sees less
need to fear military competition on its Eastern border, and more room for cooperation.

Russias Asian pivot also improves the Chinese military capacities

Berke, Robert. "Russian Sanctions Might Be Obama's Greatest Blunder | OilPrice.com." OilPrice.com. N.p., 25 Jan.
2015. Web. 07 Dec. 2015. <http://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/Russian-Sanctions-Might-Be-Obamas- Greatest-
Blunder.html>.
What Russia has done, in that one move, is to help repair a major hole in Chinas military
armor, making it invulnerable to a U.S. cut-off of sea bourn energy supplies, which until now
was one of the greatest fears of Chinese military strategists. From the Chinese perspective, this is a gift that fulfills its wildest
dreams. Its also a gift that could severely undermine the West's plans to deliver expensive Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) to China and Asia, while already facing competition from Qatar and
Australia LNG, will now also run up against Russian pipeline gas through China.

Currently russia and china are actively working together to stop the spread of democracy.
Kurlantzick, Josh. The China Syndrome Carnegie Endowment. 2007. Accessed
2015.http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/01/11/china-syndrome
At the same time, within international bodies China argues that sovereignty trumps any need
for international intervention in a country, thereby undermining the rationale for Western
states to fund democracy promotion in developing nations. In the long run, this sovereignty-
first principle could become a concerted challenge to democratic nations, if China and other
authoritarian states like Iran and Russia can form a more coherent bloc. Already, China, Russia,
and Central Asian authoritarian states have issued joint communiqus denouncing the export
of democracy, and have begun to protect each other at international forums like the United
Nations.
Iran
Russia will support Iran in their Nuclear Endeavors
Rafizadeh, Majid. (President of the International American Council) "Ukraine Crisis Bolstering Iran-Russia-China
Axis." The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 28 Mar. 2014. Web. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/majid-
rafizadeh/ukraine-crisis- bolstering_b_5045450.html
If the Russian-West standoff over Ukraine crisis continues, Moscow is more likely to play the
"Iran card" on Ukraine by changing its stance on Iran's nuclear talks, in retaliation and high-
stakes gamble to counter sanctions by the United States and the European Union. According to
the Interfax news agency, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov pointed out that
Moscow may have to use the Iranian talks to "raise the stakes," in response to the actions taken
by the United States and the European Union. The Russian position, and its demands on Iran's
nuclear program, is likely to become less firm. While the Western powers attempt to
significantly scale back and reduce Tehran's centrifuges from approximately 20,000 centrifuges
to a few thousand, Moscow has been far more lenient, pointing out that it is willing to accept a
final deal with a Tehran retaining most of its nuclear infrastructure and keeping even nearly
20,000 centrifuges. Generally, China has followed the Russian position in the nuclear
negotiations.The Ukraine crisis and Russia-West standoff might not interfere with reaching a
final nuclear deal between Tehran and the P5+1, but the terms of the agreement are likely to
be much less strict on Tehran as Russia and the Islamic Republic strengthen ties and feel less
pressured to cooperate or make concessions to the West. Russia and China (who reluctantly
supported the four rounds of U.N. sanctions against Iran and later condemned the unilateral
sanctions), can now focus more on their own terms and agenda, including building nuclear
reactors for Iran. Last week, Iran's state-run Press TV announced that Putin and Iranian
President Hassan Rouhani agreed that Moscow would build two additional nuclear power
plants for Tehran and construct new facilities next to Iran's power plant in the city of Bushehr.

Iran and Russia will become much closer politically

Rafizadeh, Majid. (President of the International American Council) "Ukraine Crisis Bolstering Iran-Russia-China
Axis." The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 28 Mar. 2014. Web. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/majid-
rafizadeh/ukraine-crisis- bolstering_b_5045450.html
As the current Western-Russian tensions continue and due to the geopolitical security
interests shared between Russia and Iran, Moscow finds no better geopolitical ally than the
Islamic Republic. Several other crucial reasons contribute to this geopolitical security interests.
First of all, the Ukrainian crisis makes both Russia and the Islamic Republic much closer due to
the convergence of interests and geopolitical objectives between Putin and Iranian Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in resisting Western hegemony in the Middle East. As the
current Ukrainian crisis continues, Moscow finds a closer strategic ally in Tehran, working to
resist the West and retain their strategic depth in the region. In addition, for China, its current
interests are to strengthen strategic ties with Moscow and Tehran for security. The Ukraine
crisis has moved Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing closer to one another to counterbalance the
West and resist Western hegemony, providing a platform for them to create the strategic
geopolitical axis in the region.
Natural Gas Suspension
EU struggling with foreign fossil fuel dependence, suspension of Russian natural gas harmful
The NATO Review. Transatlantic energy security and the Ukraine-crisis: A blessing in disguise?
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/NATO-Energy-security-running-on-empty/Transatlantic-energy-security-
Ukraine-crisis/EN/index.htm
The Ukraine-crisis will help Europe confront its energy security challenges and may bring closer
the transatlantic alliance on energy security. But there are three strategic dilemmas that the
transatlantic partners will need to respond to in the coming years.
1. It is worth recalling that the Ukraine-crisis occurs at a time when the European Union -
similar to other major global consumers with the notable exception of the United States is
struggling with increasing fossil fuel import dependence and huge import bills. Parallel to a
push for increased usage of renewables and energy efficiency, Europe will need to consider its
own indigenous unconventional gas potential. While it is unlikely that Europe will be able to
replicate the American unconventional revolution, unconventional gas production may
potentially offset the declining conventional production on the continent.

Other gas routes are unstable since they go through regions of political and hard security risk
The NATO Review. Transatlantic energy security and the Ukraine-crisis: A blessing in disguise?
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/NATO-Energy-security-running-on-empty/Transatlantic-energy-security-
Ukraine-crisis/EN/index.htm
2. Diversifying away from Russia is within grasp but will come at a security premium. The EU is
in a good position to access external gas supplies, as it is surrounded by major producing
regions. At the same time virtually all existing and prospective external gas supply sources and
routes are fraught with political and hard security risks the EU and NATO will have to be acutely
aware of and grapple with for decades to come. This will require a strategic rethinking of co-
operation and burden sharing on issues such as energy intelligence gathering and analysis,
critical energy infrastructure protection inside and outside EU and Alliance territory,
cybersecurity and strategic energy relations with partner countries.
Splinters NATO
Sanction debate causing divide between NATO countries
Peter Apps. "West's options: Russia's Ukraine challenge." BBC News. BBC News, 2 Mar. 2014. Web. 5 May 2014.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27126837
There is likely to be a split between the EU and US on the possibility of widening economic
sanctions. European firms have much closer ties with Russia, and the eurozone's economic
recovery remains fragile. But the US does far less business with Russia, and could go much further that Europe. It has already imposed sanctions on Bank Rossiya
and imposed asset freezes and visa bans on Russian politicians, businesses and military figures. Experts believe the first step would be widening that sanctions list. New sanctions could target a
wider selection of state companies, including those beyond President Putin's inner circle. Denying particular technology used in agriculture and metal processing could also boost the effect of

But the West seems unwilling to tackle Russia's energy sector. Europe's reliance on
sanctions.

Russian gas makes it particularly vulnerable to Russian reprisals. On this, the US would be
alone.

Triggers disunity
Schult, Christoph, Jo rg Schindler, and Ralf Neukirch. "Russian Dilemma: Why EU Sanctions Are a Bluff - SPIEGEL
ONLINE." SPIEGEL ONLINE International. 12 May 2014. Web. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/strong-
eu-economic-sanctions- against-russia-unlikely-a-968913.html>.
Although the 28 EU member states try hard to project a sense of unity to the outside world,
their differences in opinion make themselves felt in internal meetings. Merkel is afraid that, in
the end, the Union's disunity could spill into the open and Putin would have accomplished one
of his important goals, dividing the Europeans.

Russia funds divisive politics in West

The Economist. From Cold war to Hot war. 14th Feb 2015.
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-
dangerous-confrontation
Mr Putins most devious strategy, however, is to destabilise the EU through fringe political
parties (see article). Russias approach to ideology is fluid: it supports both far-left and far-right
groups. As Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss put it in The menace of unreality, a paper
on Russian soft power: The aim is to exacerbate divides [in the West] and create an echo-
chamber of Kremlin support.

Pro-Russian parties took of EU seats

The Economist. In The Kremlins Pocket. 14th Feb 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643222-
who-backs-putin-and-why-kremlins-pocket
POPULIST parties of both right and left, many pro-Russian, did well in last Mays European
elections, taking between them a quarter of the seats. This has raised fears of a coherent pro-
Russian block forming in Strasbourg.
Russia used fringe politicians to legitimize aggression
The Economist. In The Kremlins Pocket. 14th Feb 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643222-
who-backs-putin-and-why-kremlins-pocket
Russia has already found a use for its European friends: to legitimise (to some) its dodgy
elections. A motley crew of populists were flown in to give ringing endorsements of the Crimea
referendum and the election in the Donbas, organised by separatists. Among them were Mr
Kovacs and Aymeric Chauprade, an adviser to Ms Le Pen. Russian media falsely portrayed these
lackeys as official, independent election observers.

Sanctions dividing U.S. and Europe because of asymmetry in economic impact, Europe feels
10 times as much pain as U.S.
Paul RIchter. U.S. use of sanctions is riling some beyond the target countries. L.A. Times. January 2015.
http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-dollar-power-20150112-story.html
Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown no sign that he intends to reverse the annexation of
Crimea or ease support for separatists in eastern Ukraine. He may be calculating that if he holds
out, Europeans will eventually cut back their sanctions because of the economic pain to
companies in their own countries, Schott said.
In the meantime, America's eagerness for sanctions, particularly the moves against Russia, is
causing strain with Europe. Restricting business with Russia hurts Europe more than the U.S.
because Europe has 10 times more trade with Russia.
Russia and other targets of sanctions have other ways to retaliate, which could damage U.S.
interests. Russian officials have threatened to halt cooperation with the U.S. on placing
pressure on countries such as Iran and Syria, for example. And U.S. intelligence officials have
seen worrisome signs that Russians have been breaching unclassified U.S. computer systems,
perhaps in retaliation.
Democratic Backsliding
Two warrants for why sanctions decrease democracy
Dursun Peksen & A. Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on
Democracy, International Interactions, 36:3, 240-264, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.502436
This view of sanctions is problematic, however. A growing body of literature shows that
economic coercion hardly harms the coercive capacity of the targeted regimes. On the
contrary, sanctions generally harm the socioeconomic and political status of average civilians,
while political elites remain insulated from the coercion (Andreas 2005; Gibbons 1999; Peksen
2009; Weiss 1999; Weiss et al. 1997). Deriving insight from this research, we argue that
sanctions consolidate the regimes power and create incentives within the target that lead
the regime to restrict the democratic freedoms of citizens in order to preserve its hold on
power. First, the target leadership can use the economic disruption (caused by sanctions) as a
strategic tool to manipulate access to and redistribute resources made scarce by sanctions to
enhance its authority and subsequently to weaken opposition groups.3 Second, sanctions
generate new incentives for the state to restrict democratic freedoms by (1) creating
audience costs if the leadership concedes to the senders demands and (2) providing
encouraging signals to domestic opposition groups to be more active. Below, we discuss how
each aspect of this argument thwarts political freedoms.

First warrant explained in greater detail

Dursun Peksen & A. Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on
Democracy, International Interactions, 36:3, 240-264, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.502436
Economic sanctions inadvertently help the targeted regime consolidate authoritarian power
by enabling elites to enhance their ties with the key political supporters, while at the same
time economically disrupting its opposition groups (e.g., an opposition party or an anti-regime
social or political movement) to sustain their political relevance. Once sanctions are imposed
on the target, the countrys economy must bear that cost, a cost that Hufbauer et al. (2008)
estimate to be 3.3% of GNP on average.5 Most countries targeted with sanctions do not have
robust, growing economies; their growth rate five years prior to being sanctioned averages
2.4% and their inflation rate averages 48%.6 Therefore, the typical sanction causes a real
reduction in the overall wealth of the target.

Second warrant explained in greater detail

Dursun Peksen & A. Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on
Democracy, International Interactions, 36:3, 240-264, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.502436
In addition to consolidating the regimes hold on power, sanctions also provide new incentives
to restrict political rights of opposition groups. First, economic sanctions can cause significant
domestic political costs for the target, if it concedes to the senders demands (Galtung 1967;
see also Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998). When an external actor demands policy changes from
another regime, the targeted leadership usually perceives the foreign pressure as a threat to
sovereignty and particularly to regime survival (Morgan 1995; Morgan and Schwebach 1997).
Specifically, the leadership is likely to surmise that conceding to the foreign pressure will
decrease their legitimacy and support in the country. Hence, the anticipated audience costs
caused by conceding to external economic pressureespecially to the pressures demanding
more domestic reformscreate an incentive for the regime to be less conciliatory toward
foreign coercion and gives another excuse to employ repression against opposition groups to
show the regimes determination against any external pressure. Such actions of restricting
political pluralism and participation by the political leadership in the face of sanctions also
demonstrate to the public the regimes strength and resolve against challenges to its
leadership.

Impact: 6% decrease in democracy for partial sanctions (basically smart sanctions) and 16%
for regular.
Dursun Peksen & A. Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on
Democracy, International Interactions, 36:3, 240-264, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.502436
To put these results in perspective, we use the first differenced model (column 2 in Table 1) to
show how large the immediate impact economic sanctions have on the target country. Using
the Freedom House regime measure, our model predicts a 7% reduction in the average
political liberties score the year after the sender state initiated sanctions. The substantive
effects of extensive and limited sanctions illustrate the much greater negative impact on
political liberalization from extensive sanctions. Specifically, limited sanctions cause only a
6% decline in democracy in target countries, while the democracy score drops by more than
16% when extensive sanctions are employed.

Controls for reverse causality in two ways:

Dursun Peksen & A. Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on
Democracy, International Interactions, 36:3, 240-264, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.502436
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, we address the endogeneity issue. It is possible that
instead of sanctions causing a deterioration of democratic freedom, antidemocratic actions
by the regime cause economic sanctions to be initiated. Certainly, democratic states have used
sanctions in reaction to authoritarian coups in the past. While we tried to make a strong
argument that economic coercion changes the conditions and incentives within the target that
lead to suppression of democratic freedoms, there is also considerable empirical evidence that
sanctions are the cause rather than the effect. First, if we change the lag structure of the
model so that the sanctions variable is lagged more than one year, the results remain
significant. We lagged the sanction variable one, two, three, and four years, and while the
size of the coefficient grew somewhat smaller, it remained negative and very significant. It
seems hard, to say the least, to argue that a reduction in democratic freedoms in one year
would cause sanctions to be levied four years earlier.

Dursun Peksen & A. Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on
Democracy, International Interactions, 36:3, 240-264, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.502436
Second, while the four-lag specification provides strong evidence that slips in democracy are
not causing sanctions, we also ran a two-stage simultaneous model where the level of
democracy was the first dependent variable and the presence of sanctions was the second
dependent variable (Amemiya 1978; Maddala 1983). We used the same independent variables
for the first model as in all of the democracy models. In the second equation (predicting
sanctions), we used economic, financial, and political control variables as well as the
appropriate temporal controls. The results showed that sanctions still had a significant,
negative effect on democracy, but the reverse was not true. The level of democracy was not
associated with sanctions.

Does say that smart sanctions might solve back for harms, so be careful
Dursun Peksen & A. Cooper Drury (2010) Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on
Democracy, International Interactions, 36:3, 240-264, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2010.502436
This project points out that economic sanctions often disproportionately hurt the economic
well-being of opposition groups that, in turn, disrupts their political viability to pressure the
government for more political reform and openness. Smart sanctions that directly aim at the
target leadership might help decrease the corrosive impact that the sanctions with no
discrim- inatory measures inflict on democratic freedoms (Cortright and Lopez 2002;
Wallensteen et al. 2003). At minimum, such targeted sanctions in the forms of arms
embargoes, financial asset freezes or international travel bans on the political elites will not
worsen the economic well-being of the opposition. Instead, they might directly hurt political
elites and subsequently make them less intransigent against foreign demands for greater
respect for political rights and civil liberties.

Democracy reduces likelihood of attack by 13%

Michael Tomz, Stanford University. The Democratic Peace: An Experimental Approach. January 2011.
https://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/methods/papers/tomz.pdf
As expected, citizens were much less willing to attack another democracy than to attack an
autocracy. In the U.K., for example, roughly 34% of respondents wanted to attack a
nondemocratic target, whereas only 21% supported strikes against a democratic target (see
Table 1). The difference, which we regard as the estimated effect of democracy, was around 13
percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval that stretched from -19.6 to -7.0. We
conclude, therefore, that democracy exerted substantively large and statistically significant
effects on public preferences in the U.K.

One standard deviation increase in political dissimilarity increase risk of conflict by 42 percent
Mark Suova, Florida State University. Institutional Similarity and Interstate Conflict. International Interactions
Journal. 2004. http://www.tandfonline.com.mutex.gmu.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/03050620490492213
One useful way to illustrate the substantive influence of the institutional similarity variables is to employ fitted values and compare ideal-type cases, and given the interactive relationships
between the variables this is especially useful. Table 4 shows how the probability of a militarized dispute changes from a baseline value where everything is held at its mean value to four

dyads in which both political and economic similarity are one standard
different sets of conditions. First,

deviation below themean leads to an increase of about 42% in the likelihood of a militarized
dispute. On the other hand, dyads with both political and economic similarity one standard deviation greater than the mean decreases the likelihood of a dispute by about 57%. To
better understand the individual influences of economic and political similarity, I identified cases in which economic similarity was greater than one standard deviation above the mean and
political similarity less than one standard deviation below its mean, and vice versa

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/939659ae-b67d-11e3-b230-00144feabdc0.html - ixzz3vvxHDPFk

Recession caused Russian elites to turn to aggression to maintain hold on power, spawned
aggressive foreign policy that has created a threat to global security
Sergei Guriev. Corruption Has Laid Waste to The Russian Economy. Financial Times. 2 April 2014.
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/939659ae-b67d-11e3-b230-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3vvv9LYIt
Having driven the economy into recession, the Russian elite has to find a new way to stay in
power. For an authoritarian regime that is always a difficult task, requiring money, repression and propaganda.
Recession means Russias government can no longer use money to buy public acceptance.
Repression and propaganda have to take up the slack. In these circumstances, nothing could
be more helpful than a small and victorious military adventure. Tangible victories no matter how small or how costly
boost the rulers popularity. It is not surprising that Mr Putins approval ratings now stand at 80 per cent.

it has spawned an aggressive

Russias corruption can no longer be considered to have the salubrious effect of keeping the elite in check. On the contrary,

foreign policy to which western leaders are now struggling to respond. Russian corruption has
indeed become a threat to global security.

Political rights declined in Russia following Crimea standoff

Vladimir Gelman, European University at St. Petersburg. The Rise and Decline of Electoral Authoritarianism in
Russia. Post 2914. https://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/503-
522_Gelman.pdf
the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the following
But this equilibrium is partial and unstable:

confrontation with the West over Ukraine has shaken it to a great degree. Against this
background, the public applauded Russias aggressive foreign policy and Putins approval
rating climbed above 80 percent, according to numerous surveys.59 At least for a while, the Russian leadership received
carte blanche from its fellow citizens, and used this support to strengthen its dominance by
tightening the screws, targeting the opposition, jamming public dissent, and toughening
regulations, with the goal of reducing the opportunities for undermining Putins rule. The Russian
media orchestrated an aggressive campaign against the West and its domestic supporters, who were labelled a fifth column. To paraphrase the Boney M song Rasputin, which was popular in

Russia in the 2010s under the reign of Putin, turned into a Russian hate machine,
the 1970s,

which increasingly relied upon lies and fear in both the domestic and international arenas.

Every democratic indicator fell in Russia in 2014, literally classified by Freedom House as not a
free country
James Carafano et al, December 2015, The Regime of Vladimir Putin, Heritage, December 2015,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/12/us-comprehensive-strategy-toward-russia DOA: 1-4-16
Freedom House ranks Russias 2015 status as Not Free, and its freedom,
Problem. Russia is not a free country.

civil liberties, and political rights scores all declined in 2014. Russia ranks on par with Iran,
Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The murder of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in Moscow in February 2015 eliminated an outstanding democratic voice in Russia. Most U.S. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have
moved their offices outside Russia, and most Russian opposition figures are now in exile, although living abroad is no guarantee of safety as the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko with
radioactive polonium-210 in London in 2006 demonstrated. Even campaigners who are not directly political have fled. In mid-April, Yevgenia Chirikova, Russias leading environmentalist,
departed for Estonia, commenting that the only way to campaign in Russia is leaderless resistance so that itd be unclear who to target.[7]
The Russian media is similarly controlled, and the Kremlin wages a quiet but well-funded war on social media, where hundreds of paid employees crowd municipal Russian forums with pro-
regime comments and fake arguments, all relentlessly and frequently crudely anti-American and anti-Western.[8] Behind this effort and Putins victory in the fraudulent 2012 election rests an
obvious unease with both the West and the Russian people, which was sparked again by the poor performance of his United Russia Party in the December 2011 parliamentary elections.

Russias political system = root cause of conflict

Thomas Bertelman. Myths About Russia and Swedish Non-Alliance. American Interest. 18 August 2015.
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/08/18/myths-about-russia-and-swedish-non-alliance/
In the absence of high oil prices, the Kremlin cannot count on the loyalty that steadily improving living conditions for the people once brought it. Now that loyalty must be secured in some

The countrys revanchist and revisionist foreign policy is therefore much more linked to
other way.

internal political conditions and to the Kremlins policy of safeguarding its interests than to any dim century-old traditions, although these
traditions partially explain why the regimes propaganda has such resonance for the people.
That Russias aggressive policy towards its neighbors is a result of the countrys dysfunctional
internal system is a more or less banal conclusion, but it has some consequences for the security of our immediate surrounding region. As a small neighboring country, we
cannot afford wishful thinking, or to close our eyes to the nature of existing risks.

Root cause of problematic Russian Ideology = failure to democratize

Kadri Liik, National Centre for Defense Studies. DISCUSSION: IS THERE ANY REASON TO FEAR A NEW COLD WAR?
. 2008. https://www.president.ee/images/stories/pdf/00122770.pdf
Todays
There are people who argue that a new cold war is impossible, because Moscow does not have a particular ideology. I believe that this argumentation is not to the point.

Russia is governed by former KGB agents, who have a very specific set of beliefs. They tend to
believe in conspiracy theories, that the world is governed by power centres and smaller
states and nations are simply pawns in their hands. I believe that this mindset inevitably
leads to conflict. Thus, Russia does not have an official ideology, that would clash with that of the West. Or maybe they have? Russia is characterized by a nationalist-
chauvinist world view, that does not really help them win allies in Europe and therefore they are less dangerous than Communist Russia. However, we must bear in mind that todays Russia is

I believe that the

wealthier than in the Soviet era. Thus the question is whether they need to bother with winning over the people, when they can just buy off politicians?

root cause of it all lies in the fact that Russia failed to become a democracy in the early 1990s
along with the rest of Eastern and Central Europe. Russia failed to change its identity. I like the
concept put forward by Robert Cooper who has said, that states not only have interests, but also identities, which determine how states define their interests. And Russia tends to define its
interests at the expense of its neighbours, because they did not rethink their position in the early 1990s.
Increases conflict
Sanctions double the probability of militarized conflict in a diplomatic crisis
David Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher (University of New Orleans/Texas A&M University). Sanctions, Signals,
and Militarized Conflict. Accessed 12/10/15. Published April 2007.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227693062_Sanctions_Signals_and_Militarized_Conflict.
Substantively, the effect of sanctions can be seen by calculating the change in the predicted
probability of a crisis involving militarized action with and without sanctions, while holding the
other variables in the model constant at their means. The effect of sanctions on the likelihood
of a crisis involving the use of military force is to increase the probability of militarized
conflict by 17%, resulting in a near doubling of the probability of conflict from .18 without
sanctions to .35 with sanctions.

Increases 195% when a democracy is the government initiating the sanction (see warrants
below)
David Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher (University of New Orleans/Texas A&M University). Sanctions, Signals,
and Militarized Conflict. Accessed 12/10/15. Published April 2007.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227693062_Sanctions_Signals_and_Militarized_Conflict.
Table 2 summarizes the substantive effect of sanctions on the probability of a use of military
force. Scenario 1 shows that the effect of sanctions initiated by a nondemoc- racy in a crisis is to
reduce the probability of militarized conflict by about 58%. As we can see in scenarios 2 and 3,
the result is changed greatly when the initiator of sanctions is a democracy. The probability of a
militarized conflict increases by 195% when a democracy initiates sanctions in a crisis.
Scenario 3 reveals the substantive difference between a democracy and a nondemocracy using
sanctions in a crisis. Democracies are an astonishing 600% more likely to be involved in a
militarized conflict following the use of sanctions than are nondemocracies. Observing these
changes in predicted probabilities confirms our earlier expectation that the strength of the
coefficient on sanctions in Model 4 is weakened due to the difference in dispute propensity
after sanctions for democracies and nondemocracies.

Controls for the reverse causality and find that it has no impact on the results.
David Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher (University of New Orleans/Texas A&M University). Sanctions, Signals,
Militarized Conflict. Accessed 12/10/15. Published April 2007.
Because our theoretical argument concludes that sanctions are likely to lead to militarized
conflict, we have been careful to always lag our sanctions variables on the right-hand side.
However, one might still object that the analysis only shows that sanctions and conflict are
coincidental, and not that sanctions lead to military conflict. Therefore, as a final test, we
analyze a model of sanctions initiation that includes militarized conflict as a lagged
explanatory variable for the occurrence of sanctions onset. If one form of conflict simply
makes another form of conflict more likely,19 then we should be just as likely to see lagged
militarized conflict as a positive explanatory variable for sanctions. However, if we find that
lagged sanctions lead to militarized conflict (as we have) but that lagged militarized conflict
does not lead to sanctions, this would strengthen the argument made here. The previous
models in this article were focused on militarized conflict and are not intended to explain the
onset of sanctions. Therefore, we modify our model in accordance with an existing model of
dyadic sanctions onset (Lektzian and Souva 2003) and include a lagged variable on the right-
hand side for militarized conflict. Table 4 shows the results of this analysis and confirms that,
while sanctions tend to lead to militarized conflict, the reverse is not true. Previous work by
Lektzian and Souva (2003) used a GEE model to estimate the onset of sanctions and only
focused on politically relevant dyads. The results, reported in Table 4, for the all-dyads model
are very similar to their findings. The only variables to change sign or significance are relative
capabilities, which they found to be negative and significant, and we found to be negative but
insignificant, and the effect of distance. They found distance to be insignificant, and we found
that the further states are from one another, the less likely they are to use sanctions.

Warrant 1: Democratic governments are typically under pressure from the audience to stand
strong by sanctions; backing down makes them appear weak, making them more likely to
stick behind sanctions to the point where a tense situation can devolve into conflict
David Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher (University of New Orleans/Texas A&M University). Sanctions, Signals,
Militarized Conflict. Accessed 12/10/15. Published April 2007.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227693062_Sanctions_Signals_and_Militarized_Conflict.
There are two reasons for expecting the relationship hypothesized above. The first reason
concerns the political costs of sanctions to the sender, and the second is related to the
economic costs. Democracies are the primary users of sanctions, and democratic leaders face
greater political costs for foreign policy failures. The audience costs associated with backing
down in a public dispute tend to tie the hands of democratic sanctioners, increasing their
costs for backing down against a resolute target state. While an increased incentive to stand
firm on the part of democratic sanctioners may increase the probability of sanctions being
successful, the risk of the dispute spiraling into militarized conflict also increases. According to
Fearon (1997, 81), while tying-hands signals are initially cheaper, and thus more attractive, they
generate a greater risk that the countries in the dispute will wind up committed to an
unwanted conflict. However, a major problem for democracies when using sanctions is that
they tend to send a mixed signal. While their audience costs signal resolve through the tying of
hands, the overt action of sanctioning, more often than not, signals weakness because the
sanctions are designed to be economically costless to the sender.
Warrant 2: Interpreted as sign of weakness because they show a lack of resolve to commit to
costlier foreign policy actions, which emboldens the target state to the point of militarized
conflict (This is my tag This is my tag)
David Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher (University of New Orleans/Texas A&M University). Sanctions, Signals,
Militarized Conflict. Accessed 12/10/15. Published April 2007.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227693062_Sanctions_Signals_and_Militarized_Conflict.
The implication is that when sanctions are chosen as the initial response to a crisis, there is a
danger that the target of the sanctions will interpret this as a sign of weakness on the part of
the sender. This can increase the probability of war if it emboldens the target against
acquiescing to the senders demands. The suggestion is that sanctions viewed as foreign
policy on the cheap may increase the probability of military conflict by signaling a lack of
willingness to commit costly resources, indicating weak and uncertain statesmanship on the
part of the sender rather than an indication of firm commitment. Moreover, as noted above,
when democracies use weak sanctions while simultaneously tying their hands with audience
costs, the probability of war should be greatest.
Nationalism
Andrew Bertoli, UC Berkeley. NATIONALISM AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT: A REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY
ANALYSIS. 2013. http://polmeth.wustl.edu/files/polmeth/nationalismandinters_1.pdf
Scholars use nationalism to explain international conflicts from the Napoleonic Wars to the U.S. invasion of Iraq (McCartney 2004; Cederman, Warren, and Sornette 2011).

Nationalism is generally defined as the belief that a national group should have the right to self-rule (Cottam 1979; Gellner 1983), but it often comes with feelings of pride,
superiority, and victimization (Anderson 1983; Mearsheimer 1990). Scholars have argued that it can increase enmity between countries (Woodwell

2007), undermine international cooperation (Rosato 2011), motivate societies to fight costly wars (Posen 1993),

and cause governments to overestimate their relative military power (Schrock-Jacobson 2012).

The impact is more future conflicts.

Gretchen Schrok-Jacobson, Penn State University. The Violent Consequences of the Nation: Nationalism and the
Initiation of Interstate War. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2012.
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/55cb8fd2e4b0362202a2330d/t/55cbca67e4b0ef8aac5ffbf6/143941898334
8/Journal+of+Conflict+Resolution-2012-Schrock-Jacobson-825-52.pdf
Many scholars assume that nationalism is inherently aggressive without systematically exploring the relationship between nationalism and interstate war initiation. Thus, many questions are
unanswered. Does nationalism increase the risk of war and if so, how? Which types of nationalism are most likely to trigger warfare? The author argues that nationalist persuasion campaigns
produce several mechanisms that encourage conflict. Nationalism provokes "national enemies" and their foreign allies, generates biased strategic assumptions, creates domestic interest
groups that favor war, [and] permits the suppression of opposition groups, and promotes "nationalist bidding wars." When these processes exist, nationalism should increase the probability of

data on the existence and type of state-level nationalism from

war initiation. But, different forms of nationalism may not have similar effects. Using original

1816 to 1997, the author finds that nationalism significantly increases the probability of interstate
war initiation. However, not all forms of nationalism are created equal in this regard.

Andrew Bertoli, UC Berkeley. NATIONALISM AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT: A REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY

ANALYSIS. 2013. http://polmeth.wustl.edu/files/polmeth/nationalismandinters_1.pdf
This paper identifies the strong causal relationship between nationalism and state aggression. The findings hold under various statistical tests and are not affected by minor changes to the

design. Moreover, the results can be replicated using the FIFA regional soccer championships. As these international sporting events make clear, nationalism remains a
key source of interstate conflict. If democracy continues to spread, it may help constrain the effects of nationalism in worsening state relations. But unless the
international system undergoes a revolutionary change, we should expect nationalism to continue to be a divisive force in world politics.
Econ Root Cause of Russian problems

Failed development = root cause of Russian Aggression

Andrew Wood. The Russian Challenge. Royal Institute of International Affairs. 4 June 2015.
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russian-challenge-authoritarian-nationalism
The root cause of the challenge posed to the West by Russia lies in the countrys internal
development, and its failure to find a satisfactory pattern of development following the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Vladimir Putin and his circle are not the same as Russia and its people, and their interests do not
necessarily coincide. The West has neither the wish nor the means to promote, or for that matter to prevent, regime change in Russia. But

Western countries need to consider the possible consequences of a chaotic end to the Putin system.

Basic Phycology says that the Russias response to sanctions will be informed by violence and
anger.
Susan Allen The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 52, No. 6 Dec., 2008 The Domestic Political Costs of Economic
Sanctions. Accessed December 22, 2015. Published December 2008.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27638645.pdf?acceptTC=true.
Drawing on psychological studies, scholars have found a link between economic hardship and
human frustration and aggression (Dollard et al. 1971). Unable to attain their "just desserts," citizens
will experience increased frustration as the economic hardship of sanctions affects them
more and more. One innately human response to perceived feelings of deprivation is discontent or anger. Anger can lead to acts of
aggression and violence. Gurr (1970, 37) suggests that "the frustration aggression mechanism is in this sense analogous to the law of gravity:
men who are frustrated have an innate disposition to do violence to its source in proportion
to the intensity of their frustration." Societies that are divided or naturally heterogeneous before sanctions may become
further splintered by the economic effects of sanctions. These divisions will likely enhance feelings of deprivation, especially if the economic

pain is not equally distributed across groups in society. In Rhodesia, like South Africa, the ethnic minority in power had a vested interest in

maintaining the status quo. To this end, the government worked to shield white supporters from the pain of sanctions, which in turn

exacerbated racial tensions. Under sanctions, support for the Rhodesian government increased among whites, but the white community only

accounted for 4 percent of the population.3 The other 96 percent of the population felt the international opprobrium of sanctions validated

their antigovernment efforts (Baldwin 1985). Inflation and unemployment, which often occur in the wake of severe economic effects because

of sanctions, further increase the intensity of feelings of deprivation. Under sanctions in the early 1990s, inflation in Haiti increased by 138

percent,4 while employment in the manufacturing sector dropped by 80 percent (Gibbons 1999). Conditions such as these are likely to create

economic discontent, which is a prerequisite for political violence (Gurr 1970). When the economic burden is not equally spread across the

population, the distributional effects of sanctions may heighten feelings of deprivation. Sanctions frequently broaden the gap between rich and

poor (Niblock 2001; Gibbons 1999), especially if economic elites are able to profit from black marketeering. The opening of this gap was

particularly problematic in Libya in the 1990s because the regime, refuting Western economic theory, had staunchly touted egalitarianism as a

key social value. Before sanctions, there was no private investment, and individual wealth was strictly limited (Niblock 2001).
Hurts Western Economies

Sanctions cause huge economic risk to Europe and US

"Sanctions: What Could Be the next Move?" BBC Business. British Broadcasting Company, 21 Mar. 2014. Web. 05
May 2014.http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26612848
Nina Schick, of Open Europe, estimates
Wouldnt a trade war also hurt the West? Quite possibly. Banking, for example, is a two-way process.

that Russian companies have $653bn of foreign debt. Any financial shocks in Russia will
impact on the banking systems in Europe and the US. Targeting Russian energy companies also has its consequences, especially for
Europe. What happens to the gas price if, say, Gazprom retaliates by limiting supplies. Another Russian energy giant, Rosneft, has close ties to BP. Neither the UK company nor the UK
government would want BP's interests undermined.

German Growth would decline by approximately 1%

Schult, Christoph, Jo rg Schindler, and Ralf Neukirch. "Russian Dilemma: Why EU Sanctions Are a Bluff - SPIEGEL
ONLINE." SPIEGEL ONLINE International. 12 May 2014. Web. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/strong-
eu-economic-sanctions- against-russia-unlikely-a-968913.html>.
Genuine economic sanctions would clearly be expensive for the Europeans. According to a
confidential report by the European Commission, Germany would have to reckon with a loss of
0.9 percent in growth this year, and 0.3 percent next year. The situation looks even direr in
other countries.
Angers Russian People
http://www.hoover.org/research/why-economic-sanctions-dont-work

of Russians blame the West for the recession

De Galbert, Simond. A Year of Sanctions against Russia Now What? Center for Strategic & International
Studies, October 2015. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-economics-deterring-russia-12945>
The Russian public recognizes the economic impact sanctions are having in Russia. Recent data released by the Pew Research Center,18 built on a survey conducted in Russia in early 2015,

suggests that 45 percent of those polled believe sanctions to have a major effect on the
Russian economy, and 33 percent blame Western sanctions for Russias economic struggles (33
percent blame falling oil prices, while only 25 percent believe current government policies to be responsible for the current economic situation). In addition, 73 percent acknowledge that
Russias economic situation is worsening, up from 44 percent who held that view a year ago.

These sanctions have created significant amounts of anti-Americanism.

Birnbaum, Michael. "A Year into a Conflict with Russia, Are Sanctions Working?" Washington Post. The Washington
Post, 27 Mar. 2015. Web. 01 Dec. 2015. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-year-into-a-conflict-
with- russia-are-sanctions-working/2015/03/26/45ec04b2-c73c-11e4-bea5- b893e7ac3fb3_story.html>.
The options have split Russias weakened ranks of Kremlin critics, who were also deprived of a charismatic ringleader, Boris Nemtsov, after he was gunned down last month. Some opposition

, the main anger the sanctions seem to have

leaders say mounting economic woes will eventually turn Russians against Putin. But so far

fueled here is anti-Americanism, which is reaching heights not seen since Stalin, some
observers say. The full financial force of the West is concentrated on attacking us, Nikolai Starikov, a pro-Kremlin pundit given heavy rotation on Russian state TV, told a
seminar as the ruble swooned in December. What they are doing is smashing the foundations of a great geopolitical construction that will become their competitor.
Food Shortages

Putin placed ban on agriculture imports from Europe in retaliation from sanctions
"Russia Food Import Sanctions: EU, US Contraband Nationwide Crackdown Ordered By Putin." International
Business Times. N.p., 03 Aug. 2015. Web. 08 Dec. 2015. <http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-food-import-sanctions-
eu-us-contraband- nationwide-crackdown-ordered-putin-2035818>.
Russia's crackdown on finding and destroying contraband foods imported from the EU or the
U.S. has been expanded beyond border controls to the entire country. The Russian Ministry
of Agriculture, as well as several independent watchdogs, were set to perform checks for
illegally imported food and destroy it if found across the nation, the Russian daily Kommersant reported Monday. "That
means that if officials from the customs service, phytosanitary (agricultural product) control or Rospotrebnadzor (consumer rights) find sanctioned produce during an inspection of, for
example, a retail distribution center, the food will be destroyed in accordance with general regulations," Vasily Itskov, a Russian government representative said, as reported by Russian news
service Sputnik International.

Hurts Russian Consumers

Sanctions: Who's Really Hurting in Russia? | Europe | DW.COM | 31.05.2015." DW.COM. N.p., 31 May 2015. Web.
09 Dec. 2015. <http://www.dw.com/en/sanctions-whos-really-hurting-in-russia/a-18480370>.
More than 50 percent of Russians have reduced their spending and almost 20 percent have
no disposable income left after paying for food and housing. They're cancelling holidays
abroad and tourism to Europe is down 30 percent. And businesses are feeling the pinch. Government statistics show retail
spending has dropped 9.8 percent in the year to April 2015. Clothes shops and restaurants are shutting their doors and over the
past few weeks I've noticed that stalls at my local food market are disappearing as increased rents drive vendors out. One meat seller explained that she pays 5,000 rubles (about 90 euros) a
day to rent a one meter length of bench space (unrefrigerated) to sell her pork.

Food shortages leads to more poverty

"Russian Food Crematoria Provoke Outrage amid Crisis, Famine Memories." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 06 Aug.
2015. Web. 09 Dec. 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/russia-crisis-food- idUSL5N10G23620150806#OuXQV
Aq7JOcjD0pK.97>.
Sanctions have led to a major growth in food prices on Russian shelves. Russian pensioners, veterans, large families, the disabled and other needy social groups were forced to greatly restrict

With annual food price inflation running at

their diets, right up to starvation," it says. "If you can just eat these products, why destroy it?"

over 20 percent, public indignation has been deepened by Russian media reports that the agriculture ministry was tendering to buy
"mobile food crematoria" to speed up the destruction. Agriculture minister Alexander Tkachev declined to comment on Wednesday. . . Now the soaring food prices are hurting the poor at a

The rouble has lost more than

time when the economy is in crisis due to the effects of the sanctions and a steep fall in the price of oil, Russia's main export.

40 percent of its value against the dollar and overall inflation is above 15 percent. The Rosstat statistics
agency says the number of Russians living below the poverty line - defined as those earning less than 10,400 roubles ($160) a month -

has jumped. In the first quarter this year, the total hit 23 million, or 16 percent of the
population, up from more than 16 million people, or 11 percent of Russians last year. Opposition
figure and former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov responded with bitter irony. "20 million Russian citizens are below poverty line. Their president ordered food products destruction from
Aug.6. Some real triumph of humanism," Kasyanov said on Twitter.
Destabilizes Russia

Russian federal makeup background

Henry Hale. Indiana University. Ethnofederalism: Lessons for Rebuilding Afghanistan, Preserving Pakistan, and
Keeping Russia Stable. 2001. http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pm_0208.pdf
Russia: Russia falls into the category of stable ethnofederations, not possessing a core ethnic
region for Russians. Ironically, however, Putin and other Russian nationalists have sometimes
called for reducing the number of Russian regions, perhaps combining many of the oblasts and
krais. The study reported here would suggest that this actually would make the breakup of
Russia more likely because reducing the number of Russian regions would make it more likely
that these regions will be able to coordinate their actions in a way that could present the
federal presidency with a situation of dual power, threaten minority regions, and facilitate the
imagining of a Russia without its ethnic minority units

Russia is Uniquely Vulnerable to Civil War due to their Oil Economy

LeVine, Steve. (Professor of Energy Security at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service) "The Coming Oil
Crash." Foreign Policy Magazine, 19 June 2012. Web. 25 May 2014.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/19/the_coming_oil_crash
Low oil prices can have serious social impacts simply because, with less free cash, people tend
to start more closely scrutinizing their surroundings -- and when they become unhappy with
what they see, they start looking for a scapegoat. The conditions that led to the string of Arab
Spring ousters were not so much the lack of democracy as widespread public dissatisfaction
with personal economic prospects. Analysts see similar vulnerabilities for the rulers of Iran,
Russia, and Venezuela; when Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez can no longer milk the state
oil company for public payouts, for instance, his political support could be in jeopardy.

Local economic Problems would create instability in Russia

Oliker, Olga, and Tanya Charlick-Paley. Introduction. Assessing Russia's Decline: Trends and Implications for the
United States and the U.S. Air Force. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2002. N. pag. RAND: Project Air
Force, 2007. Web. 25 May 2014.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1442.pdf
Finally, the fact that economic, political, and demographic declines affect parts of Russia very
differently, combined with increased regional political autonomy over the course of Russian
independence and continuing concerns about interethnic and interregional tension, creates a
danger that locality and/or ethnicity could become rallying cries for internal conflict.
Impact: Loose Nukes
Causes Civil War Which Could Easily Leads to Nuclear War
Steven R. David (Professor of International Relations and Vice Dean for Undergraduate Education at Johns Hopkins
University). "Saving America from the Coming Civil Wars." Foreign Affairs. 1 Jan. 1999. Web. 25 May 2014.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/54626/steven-r-david/saving-america-from-the-
coming-civil-wars
If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause.
A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the
powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian
control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between
government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has
fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical
care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old
and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may
enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a
national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose
another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food,
and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the
armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all
clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial,
however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional
conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more
independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government
finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the
periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to
Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own
constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds
promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the
Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for
autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow
responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the
consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia --
even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian
Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of
refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily
spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would
poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would
be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the
privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime.
Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of
control over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even
without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000
nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered
throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to prevent the los]s of any
weapons or much materiel. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear
sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American
groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat
America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than
the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.

Russia Cant Afford Nuclear Security

Blair, Bruce, and Clifford Gaddy. (Bruce Blair is a senior fellow and Clifford Gaddy a fellow in the Brookings Foreign
Policy Studies program) "Russias Aging War Machine Economic Weakness and the Nuclear Threat." Brooking's
Review (1999): 10-13. Web. Summer 1999.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/1999/6/summer%20russia%2
0bruce%20blair%20and%20clifford%20gaddy/blair.pdf
Economic weakness is strengthening the anti-Western, antidemocratic, and antimarket reform
trends in Russia today. It is also steadily eroding the mil- itarys tradition of
political neutrality. Although the militarys aversion to Bonapartism appears to remain intact,
rising nationalism draws additional strength from its growing politicization.
For Russias conventional forces, the combination of lack of resources and the time and effort
that must be diverted to sheer survival has been devastating to combat readiness.
But nowhere does the weakness and inefficiency of Russias state economy have more serious
implications than in maintaining the sophisticated systems and men of
the nuclear weapons complex. The strategic weapons themselves are fast reaching the end of
their shelf life, and Russia cannot afford replacements. Current aging forces have become more
vulnerable. Surveillance satellites and radars are wearing out. Russias early warning system is
decaying as gaping holes develop and susceptibility to false alarms grows. Budget shortages,
among other probbems, prevent Russia from dispersing submarines and mobile land rockets
into the sanctuaries of the oceans and forests. The Russian navy struggles to keep one or two
ballistic missile sub- marines out of a fleet of twenty-six at sea, and at times cannot even do
that. The Strategic Rocket Forces strain to disperse out of garrison into covert field locations a
single regiment (nine missiles) of mobile rockets, out of a total mobile force of 350. Russian
bomber pilots receive only about 20 hours of flight training a year, com- pared with 200 or
more hours for their U.S. counterparts. Underground command posts are crumbling. Even the
famous nuclear suitcases that accompany the president and other top authorities are falling
into disrepair. Prestigious institutes, such as the laboratories that design nuclear weapons, build
the deep underground command posts, and engineer the communications links that would be
used to send the go code to the strategic rockets, are virtually bankrupt. Like the
conventional forces, Russias nuclear units suffer from housing and food shortages, pay arrears,
extended duty shifts owing to man- power shortages (massive draft evasion has depleted the
enlisted ranks), and moonlighting to make ends meet. The competence and integrity of the
generals who lead them have declined. They are demoralized and alienated from the state,
which fails to support them, and the society, which no longer holds them in high esteem. They
are themselves less impressive individuals owing to declining standards for admission to the
higher military academies. Hardship and disaffection at all ranks, enlisted and officer corps
alike, have sharply increased the rate of suicides, crime, and political activity (the latter illegal
for active military personnel). Remarkably, cases of disobedience and protest have so far been
rare (though the wives of nuclear officers often stage demonstrations, sometimes interfering
with operational activities). To our knowledge, no one has yet vented frustration by threatening
to use, or trying to use or steal, nuclear weapons. But conditions that might drive individuals or
groups to violate nuclear safety rules or threaten to fire weapons are ripening. At the least,
worsening conditions of life and work in the nuclear forces decrease proficiency in managing
weapons and sap motivation to adhere strictly to safety rules.

Each percentage point drop in conflict possibility worth 2.5 billion to the world
Paul Collier. University of Oxford. Does Military Intervention Work?. April 2008. http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/does-military-intervention-work-
The first cost-benefit analysis of peacekeeping initiatives reveals that the risk of future conflict
depends upon the scale of military deployment. Compared with no deployment, spending $100
million on a peacekeeping initiative reduces the ten-year risk of conflict from around 38% to
16.5%. At $200 million per year, the risk falls further, to around 12.8%. At $500 million, it goes
down to 9%, and at $850 million drops to 7.3%.
Because of wars massive costs, each percentage point of risk reduction is worth around $2.5
billion to the world. The most expensive deployment reduces the risk of conflict by a massive 30
percentage points, with ten-year gains of $75 billion, compared to the overall cost of $8.5
billion. This is a very promising investment.
Dollar Hegemony
Basic explanation
Daniel Drezner, Tufts University. Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance, International Interactions.
International Interactions. August 2015. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03050629.2015.1041297
There has been speculation since the 2008 financial crisis that the dollars standing as the worlds reserve currency will begin to erode
(Eichengreen 2010; Kirshner 2014). The
use of targeted financial sanctions could exacerbate the decline of
US financial hegemony by incentivizing a financial equivalent of balancing behavior. Political risk
analysts predict that this weaponization of finance could trigger a politically motivated diversifi-

cation away from US capital markets and the dollar (Bremmer and Kupchan 2015). Indeed, this contingency has been
the subject of widespread speculation in the press (Evans 2014; Richter 2015), among policy analysts (Hallinan 2014; Steil and Litan 2006), and
the musings of target country leaders. After
experiencing Western-based financial sanctions for a few
months, Russian president Vladimir Putin called upon other BRICS leaders to develop a system
of measures that would help prevent the harassment of countries that do not agree with some
foreign policy decisions made by the United States and their allies.3 A few months later, Putin explicitly
warned the United States about the blowback of sanctions on the dollars status:4

Most obvious example of weaponization of finance is U.S. sanctions on Russia

Ian Bremmer. Top RIsks 2015. Eurasia Group. 5 January 2015. http://www.eurasiagroup.net/pages/top-risks-
2015#4
The United States is expanding its ability to track the financial transactions of government leaders of concern, as well as their state and private
sector allies, in order to close their access to capital and property. It is pressuring others who engage in business with these individuals to cut
Most obvious is the steady escalation of sanctions against Russia and other perceived
them off.

rogue states. Less obvious are large-scale measures against financial institutions (mostly European banks) that help finance international
entities under US sanction. In the background looms the ultimate threat: that the United States will financially isolate rogue states by severing
Risks of miscalculation and unintended
their access to capital and the infrastructure used to clear payments.

consequences are high, because use of these tools is new and Washington is learning how they
work by trial and error.

Weaponization of finance is causing countries to shift away from dollar no efficacy in

future
Ian Bremmer. Top RIsks 2015. Eurasia Group. 5 January 2015. http://www.eurasiagroup.net/pages/top-risks-
2015#4
Of critical importance, the weaponization of finance is a tool that can be used with minimal cooperation from other
governments. The most important near-term challenge is the damage inflicted on transatlantic relations. Europe will become more frustrated
with an American unilateralism that Europe (and European banks) must pay for. Also, the US could well slap new sanctions on Russia and/or
Iran, eliciting a backlash in 2015. Over the longer term, though, others
will diversify away from reliance on the dollar
and US-dominated institutions, particularly in East Asia, where China has the muscle and the
motive to create its own institutions, and where there is less dollar-denominated debt to
complicate the process. The Asia infrastructure investment bank, the BRICS bank, and the Silk
Route Maritime and Overland initiatives are all steps in that direction. These projects, combined with
 will eventually undermine
Beijing's determination to broaden and deepen commercial and investment relations across the region,

Washington's ability to use these tools to lean on financially weak states.

Sanctions accelerating decline, dollar has lost over 11% since 2001, also spikes out financial
crisis as an alternative causality
Russia Sanctions Accelerate Risk to Dollar Dominance. Bloomberg Business. August 2014.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-06/russia-sanctions-accelerate-risk-to-dollar-dominance
U.S. and European Union sanctions against Russia threaten to hasten a move away from the
dollar thats been stirring since the global financial crisis.
One place the shift has become evident is Hong Kong, where dollar selling has led the central bank to buy more than $9.5 billion since July 1 to
prevent its currency from rallying as the sanctions stoked speculation of an influx of Russian cash. OAO MegaFon, Russias second-largest
wireless operator, shifted some cash holdings into the citys dollar. Trading of the Chinese yuan versus the Russian ruble rose to the highest on
July 31 since the end of 2010, according to the Moscow Exchange.
While no ones suggesting the dollar will lose its status as the main currency of business any time soon, its dominance is ebbing. The

greenbacks share of global reserves has already shrunk to under 61 percent from more than 72
percent in 2001. The drumbeat has only gotten louder since the financial crisis in 2008, an event that began in the U.S. when subprime-
mortgage loans soured, and the largest emerging-market nations including Russia have vowed to conduct more business in their currencies.
The crisis created a rethink of the dollar-denominated world that we live in, said Joseph Quinlan, chief market strategist at Bank of America
This nasty turn between Russia and the West related to
Corp.s U.S. Trust, which oversees about $380 billion.

sanctions, that can be an accelerator toward a more multicurrency world.

Impact: loss of monetary sovereignty and ability to use economic policy effectively
Ben Steil. The Future of the Dollar. Harvard International Review. 2009. http://hir.harvard.edu/rethinking-
financethe-future-of-the-dollar/
The best hope for salvaging financial globalization, then, is a renewed statutory framework for the Fed, one which explicitly acknowledges the
global role of the dollar and the dependence of the American economy on foreign confidence in it. This would no doubt lead to very different
Fed behavior when faced not only with rising inflation, but with evidence of persistent dollar selling in favor of alternative monetary assets, like
Without foreign confidence in a dollar which is used globally, the Feds ability to guide
gold.

interest rates, control inflation, and contain financial crises domestically will dissipate to the
point where its sovereignty is meaningless. What Charles de Gaulle once called Americas
exorbitant privilege, printing the worlds reserve asset, is one which America will in the future
have to do far more to sustain.

Dollar hegemony creates infinite demand for U.S. debt, allows for high levels of spending that
fuel U.S. hegemony
Josh Zoffer. The Future of Dollar Hegemony. Harvard International Review. 2012.
http://hir.harvard.edu/crafting-the-cityfuture-of-dollar-hegemony/
The second benefit of this system is its effect on the market for US government debt. The largest market in the world for a single financial asset
is the multi-trillion dollar market for American bonds. This market, considered by many to be the most liquid in the world, allows any nation or
large investor to park massive amounts of cash into a stable asset with a relatively desirable rate of return. While the depth and stability of US
financial markets as a whole were part of the original reason nations gravitated toward the dollar as a reserve currency, the explosive growth of
US government debt has made US Treasury bonds the center of the foreign exchange market and the most widely held form of dollar reserves.
The use of the US Treasury securities in currency reserves has created an almost unlimited
demand for US debt; if the federal government wishes to issue debt, someone will buy it if only
as a way to acquire dollar holdings. This artificially high demand means that the United States
can issue debt at extremely low interest rates, especially relative to its national debt and overall
economic profile. And while the United States has had to pay off its existing debt by issuing new securities, no nation wants to call in
its debt for fear that it would devalue the rest of its dollar holdings. While precarious and arguably dangerous in the long term, the reality is
that as long as the dollar is the international reserve currency, the United States will have a blank check that no one wants to cash. Whether or
the ability to finance its debt has allowed the United
not you agree with US fiscal policy, it is indisputable that

States to provide its citizens with a high standard of living and fund its enormous military
programs. Essentially, dollar hegemony has served as the backbone of US primacy.
Domestically, the ability to run effectively unlimited budget deficits has allowed the United
States to fund its massive entitlement programs and, more recently, afford sweeping bailouts at
the height of the recession. The United States has used its unlimited allowance, afforded by
dollar hegemony, to finance its high standard of living and maintain the prosperity required of a
hegemon. More importantly, the United States has used the demand for American debt to fund
its military apparatus. Each year, the United States spends over US $600 billion on its military, excluding spending on the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, constituting over forty percent of global military spending. Since the establishment of the post-World War II international
order, the United States and its allies have relied on US military might to enforce their wishes upon the world and maintain the Western-
dominated order. The ability to intervene militarily in any conflict that threatens US interests and maintain US geopolitical influence and
hegemony is a direct result of dollar hegemony. For the past sixty-five years, the United States has relied on its
excessive spending to fund its position of privilege and relied on the dollars position as the international reserve currency to fund this
spending.

ex. Sanctions triggered Gazproms currency switch.

Holodny, Elena. Business Insider. Weaponization of Finance: Russia is turning to the Chinese Yuan. 6/16/15.
http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-slaps-down-the- dollar-2015-6
"Two state energy companies, gas producer Gazprom and its oil arm Gazprom Neft, said they
would use more Chinese currency in trade, while Russia's largest bank, Sberbank, has also
promoted the use of the yuan," The Moscow Times' Peter Hobson writes. "The Russian Central Bank said it was working to create a new funding instrument
in yuan, and the Finance Ministry said it was considering issuing debt in the currency." Gazprom Neft announced that it began settling shipments of oil to China in yuan. And previously, the
head of Gazprom, Alexey Miller, said in a TV interview that the company was negotiating with China to use yuan and rubles for gas deliveries via a planned pipeline in Western Siberia.

"Gazprom Neft's swift embrace of the yuan was likely spurred by sanctions, not profits," Alexei
Devyatov, chief economist at UralSib Capital, told The Moscow Times.
Additionally, "Western banks work slower, with more restrictions, and it becomes simpler to move to the currency in which trade is being done," Vladimir Pantyushin, senior strategist at the
investment bank Sberbank CIB, told The Moscow Times.
Black Market
Increases black market activity and smuggling
Daniel Drezner, Tufts University. Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance, International Interactions.
International Interactions. August 2015. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03050629.2015.1041297
A related policy problem was the link between trade sanctions and the spread of corruption, as
the UNs oil for food scandal in Iraq made clear. Trade sanctions and black market activity go
together because sanctions outlaw otherwise ordinary market activity. Sanctions give both
private-sector entrepreneurs and public-sector officials a strong incentive to take the criminal
routeearning above-normal profits in the process. As Andreas (2005) has demonstrated,
trade sanctions encourage the creation of organized crime syndicates and transnational
smuggling networks in both the target state and neighboring countries. The more
comprehensive the sanctions, the greater the economic incentive to violate them.

Sanctions create permanent corruption and black market structures and degrade the rule of
law
PETER ANDREAS, Brown University. Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy.
International Studies Quarterly. 2005. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0020-
8833.2005.00347.x/epdf
The upsurge in the use of economic sanctions in the post-Cold War era has prompted much
scholarly and policy debate over their effectiveness and humanitarian consequences.
Remarkably little attention, however, has been devoted to their criminalizing consequences and
legacy for the post-sanctions period. In this article, I develop an analytical framework
identifying and categorizing the potential criminalizing effects of sanc-tions across place (within
and around the targeted country) and time (during and after the sanctions period), and apply
and evaluate this framework through an in-depth examination of the case of Yugoslavia. For
comparative leverage and to assess the applicability of the argument beyond the Yugoslavia
case, the analysis is briefly extended to other cases both within and outside the Balkans
(Croatia and Iraq). The article suggests that sanctions can unintentionally contribute to the
criminal-ization of the state, economy, and civil society of both the targeted country and its
immediate neighbors, fostering a symbiosis between political leaders, organized crime, and
transnational smuggling net-works. This symbiosis, in turn, can persist beyond the lifting of
sanc-tions, contributing to corruption and crime and undermining the rule of law. The article is
one of the first efforts to integrate the study of sanc-tions and transnational crime, and
suggests that the criminalized collat-eral damage from sanctions and its post-sanctions legacy
should be made a more central part of the evaluation of sanctions.
Space, Bitch

Causality
Joseph Stromberg. Russia is kicking NASA out of the International Space Station in 2020. Vox. 2014.
http://www.vox.com/2014/5/13/5714650/russia-just-evicted-nasa-from-the-international-space-station
Russia announced that starting in 2020, it will no longer allow NASA astronauts on the
On Tuesday,

International Space Station, in retaliation for sanctions levied by the US because of Russia's
invasion of Crimea.
How can Russia bar American astronauts from a station that both countries own? Simple. Right now, NASA relies on Russian rockets to get its astronauts to and from space, paying them $70.7
million for each one-way ticket.

Space privatization leads to space pollution, waste of taxpayer dollars, and privatization of
any profits.
Gagnon 03 (Bruce, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space and Senior
Fellow at The Nuclear Policy Research Institute, Space Privatization: Road to Conflict?, 6-21,
http://www.space4peace.org/articles/road_to_conflict.htm)
Three major issues come immediately to mind concerning space privatization . Space as an environment, space law, and profit in space. We've all probably heard about the growing problem of
space junk where over 100 ,000 bits of debris are now tracked on the radar screens at NORAD in Colorado as they orbit the earth at 18,000 m. p. h. Several space shuttles have been nicked by
bits of debris in the past resulting in cracked windshields. The International Space Station (ISS) recently was moved to a higher orbit because space junk was coming dangerously close . Some

As we see a flurry of launches by private space

space writers have predicted that the ISS will one day be destroyed by debris.

corporations the chances of accidents, and thus more debris, becomes a serious reality to
consider. Very soon we will reach the point of no return, where space pollution will be so
great that an orbiting minefield will have been created that hinders all access to space. The time as
certainly come for a global discussion about how we treat the sensitive environment called space before it is too late. The taxpayers, especially in the U. S. where NASA has been funded with
taxpayer dollars since its inception, have paid billions of dollars in space technology research and development (R & D). As the aerospace industry moves toward forcing privatization of space
what they are really saying is that the technological base is now at the point where the government can get out of the way and lets private industry begin to make profit and control space .
Thus the idea that space is a "free market frontier. " Of course this means that after the taxpayer paid all the R & D, private industry now intends to gorge itself in profits. One Republican
Congressman from Southern California, an ally of the aerospace industry, has introduced legislation in Congress to make all space profits "tax free". In this vision the taxpayers won't see any

Plans are now underway to make space the next "conflict zone " where
return on our "collective investment. "

corporations intend to control resources and maximize profit. The so-called private "space pioneers" are the first step in this
new direction. And ultimately the taxpayers will be asked to pay the enormous cost incurred by creating a military space infrastructure that would control the "shipping lanes" on and off the

Privatization really means that profits will be

planet Earth. Privatization does not mean that the taxpayer won't be paying any more .

privatized . Privatization also means that existing international space legal structures will be
destroyed in order to bend the law toward private profit . Serious moral and ethical questions
must be raised before another new "frontier" of conflict is created .
Overviews
No Threat auto-negate
Econ causality delink

Recession wouldve happened anyway, but sanctions give Putin political cover which bolsters
his domestic support
Birnbaum, Michael. "A Year into a Conflict with Russia, Are Sanctions Working?" Washington Post. The Washington
Post, 27 Mar. 2015. Web. 01 Dec. 2015. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-year-into-a-conflict-
with- russia-are-sanctions-working/2015/03/26/45ec04b2-c73c-11e4-bea5- b893e7ac3fb3_story.html>.
Many economists say
Prices are soaring. The ruble is dropping. And Russian living standards are falling a year after the annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula.

that problems would have erupted even if there were no sanctions. But the wave of Western
penalties against the Russian economy has inadvertently given the Kremlin political cover
with its own people, analysts say. A year after the annexation, the West has been able to do little to alter President Vladimir Putins battlefield calculus.
Russia is still fueling a bloody conflict in eastern Ukraine that has cost more than 6,000 lives, U.S. officials say. Putin denies involvement in Ukraine, and he shows little sign of backing down.

His popularity at home is sky high even as his nations economy is in turmoil.

Local companies have actually had increased exports due to the sanctions.
Fiona, Clark. "Sanctions: Who's Really Hurting in Russia? | Europe | DW.COM | 31.05.2015." DW.COM. Deutsche
Welle, 31 May 2015. Web. 01 Dec. 2015. <http://www.dw.com/en/sanctions-whos-really-hurting-in-russia/a-
18480370>.
If they act unilaterally they risk a flood of resignations as staff flock to the higher paying company, giving the first to raise rates a cherry picking opportunity. And it's good for exports. A
devalued ruble makes Russia's raw materials more competitive on the world market -
ironically helping many of the oligarchs on the sanctions list to increase their profits.
Russia didnt want more
(If about Ukraine) Because of the complexities of Russian nationalism, Eastern Ukraine is the
only area that makes sense for Putin.
Hale, Henry. Russian Nationalism and the Logic of the Kremlins Actions on Ukraine. August 29th, 2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/russian-nationalism-kremlin-actions-ukraine
Crimea hits the sweet spot for Russian nationalism: a territory with an ethnic Russian
majority that would not integrate many non-Russians into the Russian Federation. Beyond
this, territorial expansion starts to become more complicated politically for Putin, potentially
inflaming ethnically exclusive Russian nationalists. Unrest in recent years has shown the latter
can take to the streets in substantial numbers, often violently.
Squo worsening

Russia increasing provocations of West

The Economist. From Cold war to Hot war. 14th Feb 2015.
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-
dangerous-confrontation
A pattern of provocation has been established that includes a big increase in the number of
close encounters involving Russian aircraft and naval vessels, and snap exercises by Russian
forces close to NATOs northern and eastern borders. Last year NATO planes carried out more
than 400 intercepts of Russian aircraft. More than 150 were by the alliances beefed-up Baltic
air-policing missionfour times as many as in 2013. In the first nine months of the year, 68
hot identifications and interdictions occurred along the Lithuanian border alone. Latvia
recorded more than 150 incidents of Russian planes entering its airspace.

Even a transition from over military tactics doesnt prevent ongoing destabilization.
The Economist. From Cold war to Hot war. 14th Feb 2015.
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-
dangerous-confrontation
Destabilisation is also being achieved in less military ways. Wielding power or gaining
influence abroadthrough antiestablishment political parties, disgruntled minority groups,
media outlets, environmental activists, supporters in business, propagandist think-tanks,
and othershas become part of the Kremlins hybrid-war strategy. This perversion of soft
power is seen by Moscow as a vital complement to military engagement.

Destabilization Increasing (Yavoriv Economist)

Yavoriv (Economist). Training Wheels. Published 4/24/15. http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21649772-
russia-protests-american-military-trainers-ukraines-army-has-long-way-go-training-wheels .
WITH American boots on the ground in Ukraine, Russia could not remain quiet. When American paratroopers began a training mission in

western Ukraine earlier this week, the Kremlin said it could destabilize the situation. Then the Russian defence ministry accused America of

deploying the trainers to the conflict's front lines, and the foreign ministry declared that the peace process has hit a "dead end". American
Russia is building up its forces along the border with Ukraine and increasing
officials, in turn, claim that
supplies to its separatist proxies, perhaps in preparation for a fresh offensive . A recent uptick in
violence, especially near the prized port city of Mariupol, has already jangled Ukrainian nerves. While Russia may refrain from further action

until after the European Union votes on whether to renew sanctions in July, few now expect the Minsk peace deal to endure.

Sanctions dont stop destabilization (Galbert CSIS)

Simond de Galbert (CSIS). A Year of Sanctions against RussiaNow What? A European Assessment of the Outcome
and Future of Russia Sanctions. Accessed 1/14/16. Published 10/15.
http://csis.org/files/publication/150929_deGalbert_SanctionsRussia_Web.pdf
transatlantic sanctions have not altered Russias strategy to
Despite their impact on the Russian economy,
use military force to destabilize Ukraine and retain influence over its future. But sanctions have likely
pushed Russia toward negotiating the conclusion of the Minsk ceasefire agreements and to a certain extent implementing them. Despite

frequent violations, the Minsk II agreement concluded in February 2015 remains the only pathway currently on the table toward a long-term

political settlement.
R/T Aff
R/T Threat

R/T Cyber Threat

We trigger cyber threat

Russia-US Cyber war will occur with NATO intervention

[Miles, Kathleen. "Security Experts Warn Of Possible Russian Cyberattack Against The U.S., Ukraine." The
Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 30 Apr. 2014. Web. 03 May 2014.
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/30/russian-cyberattack-us- ukraine_n_5237377.html>.]
If we move to the heavy sanctions, the sectoral sanctions ... the Russians are going to strike
back in some way, said former U.S. counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke, who spoke on a
panel about cybersecurity at the Milken Institute Global Conference in Beverly Hills, California.
Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, who also spoke on the panel, said the U.S. should work
with Ukraine to prepare a defense against this potential cyberattack.Weve seen [Russia] use
[cyber warfare] in Georgia. Weve seen some elements of that being used in Crimea, Panetta
said. If [Russia] has an attack It takes down communications, takes down missile systems,
takes down the counter attack...
R/T Iran example of success
1 - delink - Despite international sanctions, Iran continued to develop their nuclear agenda.
Sangar, Arti. "Sanctions in Iran: How Effective Are They? - Diaz Reus International Law Practice." Diaz Reus
International Law Practice. N.p., 15 Nov. 2011. Web. 08 Dec. 2015. <http://diazreus.com/sanctions-in-iran-how-
effective-are-they/>.
Since 1987, the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union, among others, have levied significant economic sanctions against Iran. The goal of these sanctions is to force Iran to
suspend uranium enrichment and allow unfettered supervision of its nuclear operations. To meet these goals, the sanctions regime has imposed numerous restrictions, including limitations on
foreign trade and business with Iran and Iranian-owned companies. The latest U.S. sanction, labeled the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act (the CISADA),

Despite these economic

imposes a new array of penalties aimed at drying up foreign investment in Iran, and blocking Iranian access to the U.S. financial system.

penalties, Irans leaders have not altered their nuclear agenda. In what can only be seen as a
snub to the current sanctions regime, Iran will be launching its first nuclear power plant
shortly. Leaders around the world must now decide whether stiffer penalties will be an effective course of action, despite the failures of the current sanctions program.

2 - TURN: The sanctions didnt force Iran to the table, and a deal wouldve happened earlier if
it wasnt for Western hardlining
Parsi, Trita. "No, Sanctions Didnt Force Iran to Make a Deal." Foreign Policy No Sanctions Didnt Force Iran to Make
a Deal Comments. Foreign Policy, 14 May 2014. Web. 08 Dec. 2015. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/14/no-
sanctions- didnt-force-iran-to-make-a-deal/>.
In reality, it was neither the sanctions nor Irans centrifuges that produced the current
breakthrough. The diplomatic opening came about for the same reason it did during the Cuban Missile crises: Both sides compromised. Tehran stopped advancing sensitive
parts of its program and agreed to greater transparency. And Washington finally accepted enrichment on Iranian soil in the November 2013 interim agreement. Tehran had long insisted that if
its enrichment was accepted, it would agree to transparency as well as restrictions. For all practical purposes, accepting Iranian enrichment is the modern equivalent of removing Jupiter

If this unrealistic and legally questionable red line had been discarded earlier, the
missiles from Turkey.

breakthrough could have been achieved much earlier long before the Obama sanctions
were imposed. Mohamad ElBaradei, the former head of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, has written that the "interim agreement, facilitated by Rouhanis low-key diplomacy,
could have been reached 10 years ago." But, he added, it took the "West a decade to realize
that bare-knuckle competition for regional influence was not a viable strategy for dealing
with Iran." _

3 - TURN: The myth perpetuated that sanctions forced Iran to the table can permanently alter
US foreign policy, and lay the foundation for sanctions being the typical response from
lawmakers when tension arises. This is a dangerous blueprint that wont work for other
nations.
Parsi, Trita. "No, Sanctions Didnt Force Iran to Make a Deal." Foreign Policy No Sanctions Didnt Force Iran to Make
a Deal Comments. Foreign Policy, 14 May 2014. Web. 08 Dec. 2015. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/14/no-
sanctions- didnt-force-iran-to-make-a-deal/>.
Yet the myth that sanctions produced the current diplomatic breakthrough persists. Lawmakers continue to argue for more sanctions, even though such action would cause the talks to

If the myth of the sanctions

collapse, claiming that since sanctions brought Iran to the table, more sanctions will give the United States even more leverage.

success prevails, American foreign policy will be led down a perilous path. A false and
dangerous blueprint for dealing with proliferators and international disputes in general will
emerge: Forget diplomacy, never compromise, impose sanctions, threaten war and hope
for the best. With Iran, thanks to the quiet compromise on enrichment, war is more distant than ever since the crises erupted. The world may not be as
lucky next time it goes down an all-out sanctions path.

4A - TURN: Economic sanctions forced Iran to operate on the black market and develop
economic ties with other countries not in agreement with Western sanctions
Sangar, Arti. "Sanctions in Iran: How Effective Are They? - Diaz Reus International Law Practice." Diaz Reus
International Law Practice. N.p., 15 Nov. 2011. Web. 08 Dec. 2015. <http://diazreus.com/sanctions-in-iran-how-
effective-are-they/>.
The sanctions against Iran continue to punish foreign investors doing business with Iran by cutting off access to international banking services, capital markets, international airspace and
waters for commercial trade. Because of these sanctions, major international firms are unwilling to risk their position in the global market to do business with an increasingly isolated Iran. This
has caused a drastic decrease in U.S and European investment in Irans petroleum sector. The Iranian economy, which sits on the worlds second largest reserve of both oil and gas,

Iran continues to work around these sanctions,

undoubtedly feels the brunt of this decline in U.S. and European capital. However,

relying on black market goods and services to complete their deals. For example, Iranians
have resorted to using banks and shell companies throughout the Middle East to avoid
sanctions. Additionally, Iranian banks and corporations now remove their Iran-based names and locations from transaction documents. Iran has also
increased business with nations that are not on-board with the current sanctions regime.
China has nearly $100 billion tied up in Iranian oil and gas reserves. Russias economic
interest in Iran is comparable.

B - Impact 1: Geopolitical Power lost b/c forms anti-Western geopolitical bloc

C - Impact 2: Sanctions create permanent corruption and black market structures and degrade
the rule of law
PETER ANDREAS, Brown University. Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy.
International Studies Quarterly. 2005. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0020-
8833.2005.00347.x/epdf
The upsurge in the use of economic sanctions in the post-Cold War era has prompted much scholarly and policy debate over their effectiveness and humanitarian consequences. Remarkably
little attention, however, has been devoted to their criminalizing consequences and legacy for the post-sanctions period. In this article, I develop an analytical framework identifying and
categorizing the potential criminalizing effects of sanc-tions across place (within and around the targeted country) and time (during and after the sanctions period), and apply and evaluate this
framework through an in-depth examination of the case of Yugoslavia. For comparative leverage and to assess the applicability of the argument beyond the Yugoslavia case, the analysis is

sanctions can unintentionally

briefly extended to other cases both within and outside the Balkans (Croatia and Iraq). The article suggests that

contribute to the criminal-ization of the state, economy, and civil society of both the targeted
country and its immediate neighbors, fostering a symbiosis between political leaders,
organized crime, and transnational smuggling net-works. This symbiosis, in turn, can persist
beyond the lifting of sanc-tions, contributing to corruption and crime and undermining the
rule of law. The article is one of the first efforts to integrate the study of sanc-tions and transnational crime, and suggests that the criminalized collat-eral damage from sanctions
and its post-sanctions legacy should be made a more central part of the evaluation of sanctions.
5 - TURN: So many other examples flow neg ex Syria and Cuba
NOSSEL, SUZANNE. "Its Time to Kill the Feel-Good Myth of Sanctions." Foreign Policy. N.p., 9 June 2015. Web. 04
Dec. 2015. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/09/its-time-to-kill-the-feel-good-myth-of- sanctions-russia-iran/>.
On top of all this, there is mounting evidence that isolation often simply doesnt change
countries behavior. Obamas decision late last year to reestablish relations with Cuba
acknowledged what had been obvious for decades: Isolation hadnt reshaped the behavior of
the Castro regime. Western countries and the Arab League isolating Syria in response to
President Bashar al-Assads brutal crackdown beginning in 2011 did not deter him in the least,
and actually prompted both Iran and Russia to step up in his defense.
R/T Deterrence
1A - TURN: More sanctions reduce future effectiveness of sanctions
Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, University of Notre Dame. On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An
Empirical Analysis . Midwest Political Science Association. 1997.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2111779.pdf?acceptTC=true
there is
That fact should encourage further systematic analyses on a number of issues that our study does not address. First, our data suggest that for goals other than destabilization,

a modest but real downward trend over time in the likelihood that sanctions will succeed. There
are two plausible explanations, both of which depend upon the fact that the majority of sanction episodes in our sample were imposed by the United States (either alone or in conjunction with

One possibility is that the frequent use of sanctions by a single nation has produce
other states).6

declining credibility over time (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990; Paarlberg 1983). Put differently, the more often the same
state imposes sanctions, the less credible that country's commitment or seriousness appears
to target nations. It may also be the case that sanctions have become less useful over time
because of the increasing propensity of the United States to use sanctions for entirely
symbolic reasons. In other words, we suspect that sanctions are not always specifically designed to succeed, or at least not to succeed in their ostensible (i.e., publicly
stated) goals. If, instead, the actual goals are purely symbolic or expressive, they can hardly fail to succeed in their true goal of showing disapproval, but are nonetheless judged as unsuccessful
because they did not produce the change in behavior that was the official, rhetorical goal. To understand how and when sanctions work, then, we need better data on what they are in fact
meant to achieve.

B - stat = -7% effectiveness every 10 years

Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, University of Notre Dame. On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An
Empirical Analysis . Midwest Political Science Association. 1997.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2111779.pdf?acceptTC=true
the reference case-year at the temporal midpoint of the sample and
For goals other than destabilization,

financial sanctions not invoked-has a probability of success of .37. This increases to .44 if we
move backward a decade in time. The use of financial sanctions has a much stronger impact, increasing the probability of compliance almost twofold to .64.
These results are rather more encouraging, suggesting asthey do that policymakers can dramatically affect the probability of success (other things being equal) by the available intervention
strategy of using financial sanction

(If about Ukraine) Because of the complexities of Russian nationalism, Eastern Ukraine is the
only area that makes sense for Putin.
Hale, Henry. Russian Nationalism and the Logic of the Kremlins Actions on Ukraine. August 29th, 2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/russian-nationalism-kremlin-actions-ukraine
Crimea hits the sweet spot for Russian nationalism: a territory with an ethnic Russian majority
that would not integrate many non-Russians into the Russian Federation. Beyond this, territorial
expansion starts to become more complicated politically for Putin, potentially inflaming
ethnically exclusive Russian nationalists. Unrest in recent years has shown the latter can take to
the streets in substantial numbers, often violently.
R/T Hurts Russian Military
1 - delink - Putin has shielded the defense budget from the sanctions economic effects.
Putin's defence fixation deepens Russian budget problems. Reuters, January 15 2015. <
http://www.reuters.com/article/russia-crisis-budget-idUSL6N0US25520150115
President Vladimir Putin's insistence on huge defense spending makes it hard to see how a government plan to make deep budget cuts will see

Russia through a deepening economic crisis. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov called on Wednesday for a 10 percent cut in planned

expenditures, warning that if oil were to average $50 a barrel this year, the budget would face a shortfall of 3 trillion roubles ($46 billion). But
defense spending will not be affected because of a Putin directive that dramatically limits
room for maneuver: military and security costs swallow up more than a third of the budget
and are set to rise by about 30 percent this year. Siluanov had signaled opposition to the huge outlay on the military.
"One needs to redistribute and restructure expenditures in favor of infrastructure, education and so on. Such military expenditures are heavy to

carry," he said. However, that was on Dec. 26 and on Wednesday he performed his about-face, acknowledging that defense was off-limits.
Despite the crisis gripping the economy, Putin is preoccupied with boosting Russia's
international might, being tested in the standoff the West over Ukraine. He has also shown he will not
put his popularity at risk by cutting social expenditures such as pensions, which rely on federal subsidies that consume another quarter of the

budget. Last month he said pensions must be indexed to inflation, which is now running at more than double the annual rate of 5.5 percent

projected in the 2015 budget. "For Putin the priority is the army, the secret service and the bureaucracy. And also financing pensioners, the

main supporters of the regime," Boris Nemtsov, an opposition leader and former deputy prime minister, wrote on his Facebook page.

2 - delink - Putin has also shielded the modernization program from cuts, and it will continue
to go on in spite of any economic harm from sanctions.
Franz-Stefan Gady. Putin to Press on With Russias Military Modernization. The Diplomat, June 27 2015.
<http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/putin-to-press-on-with-
russias-military-modernization/>
Despite a crippling recession, Russian President Vladimir Putin vowed to press on with his 22
trillion ruble (more than $400 billion) military modernization plan, according to Sputnik News. Addressing a group of
recent graduates of Russian military staff colleges in the Kremlin yesterday, Putin emphasized that structural reform within the

Russian Armed Forces and new weapon acquisitions programs will continue unhindered over
the next few years. A strong army equipped with sophisticated weapons guarantees Russias sovereignty and territorial integrity. It also guarantees that millions of our
fellow citizens can live in peace. I am sure you understand it quite well, Putin said, explaining Moscows rationale for the massive rearmament program. Sputnik News summarized the rest of
his speech: Touting the strengthening of Russias strategic nuclear forces and space defense units, Putin also praised the increasing combat capabilities of almost all branches of the armed
forces. He mentioned the ongoing delivery of state-of-the-art aircraft, submarines and surface ships to the Russian military, which is also being equipped with high-precision weapons, combat
robots and unmanned aerial vehicles that were showcased at the recent International Military-
Technical Forum Army-2015.
Russian military spending after sanctions surged to the highest level in 25 years at $81B (Eric
Schmitt New York Times)
Eric Schmitt (New York Times). Russian Military Uses Syria as Proving Ground, and West Takes Notice. Accessed
January 15, 2016. Published October, 14, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/world/middleeast/russian-
military-uses-syria-as-proving-ground-and-west-takes-notice.html?_r=0
Russian military spending bottomed out in the mid-1990s but has risen steadily under Mr.
Putin and, despite the falling price of oil and international sanctions imposed after the
annexation of Crimea, it has surged to its highest level in a quarter-century, reaching $81
billion, or 4.2 percent of the countrys gross domestic product, a common measure of military
expenditure.

A - Sanctions are not effectively stopping Western interactions with Russian oil companies
Farchy, Jack. "EUs Russia Sanctions Fail to Dent Oil Deals - FT.com." Financial Times. Financial Times, 14 July 2015.
Web. 01 Dec. 2015. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/21d66e58-10ef-11e5-8413-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3t72hNV1h>.
Europes biggest oil groups are extending business deals with their Russian energy partners
despite this months EU vote to continue imposing sanctions, highlighting how western companies are learning
to live with the restrictions placed on Moscow. BP is close to agreeing a deal to acquire a 20 per cent stake in a Siberian oilfield from state-

owned Rosneft that could be worth $700m, people familiar with the matter told the Financial Times, while Eni and Statoil have received

approval from European capitals to continue work on their joint ventures with Rosneft. Shell is also still working on its Salym joint venture with

Gazprom Neft, the oil arm of the Russian gas giant, and has applied for approval from the Dutch government for other projects.

B - Oil companies have found ways to restructure around sanctions, driving incentives to
reform laws
Balko, Radley. "Backgrounders: Sweatshops and Globalization." (n.d.): n. pag. School of Business & School of
Languages and World Affairs - College of Charleston. Jesus Sandoval-Hernandez, 11 Dec. 2007. Web. 1 Jan. 2015.
<http://sandovalhernandezj.people.cofc.edu/index_files/egl_36.pdf>.
Russias response to the sanctions is
According to Anna Belova, PhD, GlobalData's senior upstream analyst covering the Former Soviet Union,

centered on addressing the issues it faces without affecting its strong production numbers.
In addition to strengthening and extending geopolitical ties on the international stage,
Russias oil and gas industry is actively seeking foreign participation in the domestic sector
and lobbying for legal incentives to foreign investments, Beolva explains. While domestic and foreign entities could provide
capital inflow for the Russian upstream sector, both would require regulatory changes, and the sanctions could provide the impetus for a

restructuring of the subsoil law.

Disad: Russian Military Modernization Good

Two reasons why modernization reduces aggression

1 - A weak military magnifies any perceived threat which pushes them more towards more
threats, except this time with nukes (escalates brinksmanship and animosity)
Bettina Renz, George Mason University Russian Military Modernization: Cause, Course, and Consequences.
Problems of Post-Communism. 2012.
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.mutex.gmu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=ee220e0e-7fa5-4589-b7c1-
b8c91e24d8a5%40sessionmgr4005&vid=1&hid=4214
with its armed forces currently weakened by the process of change, the sense of
What is clear is that,
vulnerability generated has led Russia, in classic confirmation of the security dilemma concept, to magnify the
threats it faces, or thinks it faces. Conscious of its vulnerability to threats, real or imagined, Moscow may begin to look more
and more toward the inflexible tool of its tactical nuclear weapons as its principal defense mechanism. While no one really supposes that such

weapons will be used in any confrontation with the West, the same cannot be said of any possible conflict with the Chinese. ironically, Beijings

military still relies on mass. the best modern military counter to mass is to employ either PGMs or tactical nuclear weapons. the Russian military

has hardly any of the former but plenty of the latter. hair triggers and tactical nuclear weapons are not comfortable bedfellows.

2 - Russia will act more aggressively to try and convince possible enemies that theyre
stronger than they really are
Bettina Renz. Russian Military Modernization: Cause, Course, and Consequences. Problems of Post-
Communism. 2012. http://web.a.ebscohost.com.mutex.gmu.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=ee220e0e-
7fa5-4589-b7c1-b8c91e24d8a5%40sessionmgr4005&vid=1&hid=4214
Naturally, given the problems inherent in this transformation, the Russian military will, for a certain period into the future, be in a state of flux.

It will thus be perceived as weaker. any major transformation in any military will, at least for a period of time, leave it falling between two

stools. as the early twentieth-century Russian military thinker anton Kersnovskii put it, the main difficulty of military organizational

development lies in the dualism of the task: preparing for tomorrows war and at the same time correcting yesterdays mistakes in case war

breaks out today.5 Russia, with a military undergoing a lengthy and painful transformation, is already, and will continue to be, a country

feeling vulnerable. Like israel, another state that feels vulnerable, Russia
is more likely to engage in aggressive and
preemptive military action to create that element of surprise that can overcome its
weakness. thus, we may see the Russian military adopting a very dangerous hair-trigger philosophy.
R/T Undermines Putin
1 - TURN: Sanctions give Putin the ability to paint us as the bad guy
Simon Jenkins. Guardian. "The west's do-somethings will do nothing for Ukraine." March 11, 2014.
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/12/ukraine-crisis-west-do-nothing-russia
Then come the celebrated "options" the nuclear sanction of freezing bank balances, stopping credit lines, cancelling barter deals and

suspending joint projects. An upward ratchet of supposed misery is to be imposed on Russians, somehow commensurate with Putin's

increasing lawlessness. It is the diplomats' equivalent of "bombing the enemy back to the stone age". This will teach them, they cry. This will

deter them. The rationale is puzzling. It has always been doubtful that the maxim "It's the economy, stupid" applies to international relations,

especially those involving the economies of authoritarian regimes. Putin will have embarked on his Crimean adventure with some assessment
Pushing back at Nato and the EU
of possible retaliation and, if not, with an acceptance that the retaliation was worth it.
after two decades of sustained advance along Russia's eastern border has been hugely
popular. National pride usually trumps cost. Besides, Russia is now a serious economic player, if not on the scale of China. It is not Iraq or
Afghanistan or Burma, small poor countries that western governments can easily impoverish to suit their moral whims. Russia can at least reply

with a degree of mayhem, as indicated in last week's leaked (and sensible) Downing Street memorandum. Germany, increasingly a point of

sanity in European diplomacy, clearly opposes cutting relations with Russia over Crimea. Trade is in all of Europe's interest, and is the long-term

glue most likely to reduce friction between Europe and Russia.

2 - TURN: Sanctions give Putin political cover and radicalize the population sanctions never
created regime change, and reverse actually worked better (Logic: richer citizens can afford to
oppose govt)
Abdelmalek Alaoui. From Russia to Africa: Why Sanctions Are Ineffective Against Toxic Leadership. Forbes,
February 24 2015. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/abdelmalekalaoui/2015/02/24/from-russia-to-africa-why-
sanctions-are-ineffective-against-toxic-leadership/>
For several months, economic sanctions have been stepped up against Russia and its Nomenklatura by western countries, in an attempt to pressure Moscow into loosening its grip on eastern

Ukraine. Until now, this strategy has mainly proven ineffective at turning around the military situation
in the region, and by some accounts has radicalized Vladimir Poutines supporters and allies.
Last week, a rally of the Russian presidents supporters gathered thousands in support of his Ukrainian policy, and theories supporting the assertion that

Russia is the victim of a vast conspiracy aiming at destroying the only alternative to US
supremacy over the world are flourishing throughout state-controlled medias. Beyond the specific case of
Russia and its territorial dispute with its neighbor, international economic sanctions have been widely used since the Second World War in various parts of the world by western countries in

the sanctions approach, praised by many western diplomats, has almost

order to trigger policy changes in authoritarian regimes. However,

never contributed to create a regime change. On the contrary, revolutions took places in
countries that were widely supported economically by western countries, such as Egypt,
Tunisia, and more recently, Burkina Faso.
3 - delink - Empirically, political revolutions dont occur as a result of economic frustration
caused by sanctions. In theory, it could happen. But in reality, it doesnt.
Oskarsson, Katerina. "Economic Sanctions on Authoritarian States: Lessons Learned." Economic Sanctions on
Authoritarian States: Lessons Learned. Middle East Policy Council, Winter 2012. Web. 09 Dec. 2015.
<http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/economic-sanctions- authoritarian-states-lessons-
learned?print>.
O'Sullivan also makes a critical distinction: the impact and the effectiveness of sanctions are "by no means synonymous."35 The assumption that the economic damage caused by sanctions will
"somehow seamlessly translate into political change" is far from obvious.36 It is believed to have developed from the logic underlying the strategy of punitive air strikes.37 When either air

power oreconomic sanctions are used, the sender state attempts to impose costs on civilians, with the
expectation that these societal costs would create "mass-elite divisions in society, and a swift
social breakdown could be achieved if elites could be detached from the masses."38 As Drezner points
out, the relative failure of this logic to materialize has led to a shift in emphasis in sanctions

research toward the exploration of mechanisms within the black box of the target state. Particular attention is now being paid to the political economy of authoritarian countries, on
which 78 percent 39 of sanctions have been imposed over the past three decades.40 Moreover, the collateral disaster in Iraq did not lead to destabilization of Saddam's regime or weaken his
grip on power, leading policy makers to question the effectiveness of comprehensive sanctions on authoritarian targets.41 This has led to a shift of attention toward targeted, so-called "smart"
sanctions: financial measures, asset freezes, travel bans and arms embargoes, among others.
R/T Pits Elites Against Putin
1 - TURN: If my opponent's arg is true and Putin is threatened, the way he responded to that
in the past is by engaging in more aggression out of fear
Amanda Taub. Putin is Weak. Vox. 8 July 2015. http://www.vox.com/2015/7/8/8845635/putin-is-weak
Putin's invasion of Crimea and military support for
Once again, this is a serious weakness masked by a veneer of strength.

Ukraine's rebels seem like aggressive, powerful moves. But in fact, they were born out of fear
from Putin's turn to nationalism in a desperate ploy to shore up his popular support after the 2011 crisis of legitimacy. And by creating a problem between Putin and Russia's elite that Putin

This is a pattern that has repeated itself over and over again:
cannot solve, they have undermined the stability of his regime.

When faced with a serious crisis, Putin finds an effective short-term solution but in doing
so, he creates deeper problems that he has no way to solve.

2 - TURN: Oligarchs want to confront West theyll choose someone worse (Logic: Oligarchs
get profits from Russian influence which is threatened by West)(reject their logical warrant
that oligarchs will seek profits by reducing confrontations)
Andrei Kozyrev. Russias Coming Regime Change. New York Times. 20 July 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/opinion/russias-coming-regime-change.html?_r=0
the Kremlins present rulers see the example of the democratic West, above all the
Like their Soviet predecessors,

United States, as a threat. Instead of preaching a Communist-style supremacy, most realize that their regime will be uncompetitive in the long run. Yet the oligarchs

cling to power as long as possible through intimidation and disinformation, seeking to

undermine Western norms, from human rights to business transparency and international
law.

3 - delink - Elites want same strongman, will just seek Putinism without the Putin
Who Will Replace Vladimir Putin in 2018?. The Moscow Times. November 2013.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/who-will-replace-vladimir-putin-in-2018/489793.html
If Putin leaves without choosing a successor, the ruling authorities will follow in the footsteps of the Politburo after Josef Stalin's death in 1953,

he said. "The
Soviet elite wanted to try and find some way of preserving the elements of the
system they liked and shedding the elements they did not above all, their vulnerability to
the leader," Galeotti said. "Then so too we could expect to see the Russian elite trying to find some
way of instituting Putinism without Putin. "However, as with the Soviet elite, they will probably be looking for a
consensual leader willing to rule in the name of the elite as a whole, not a powerful leader."

4 - delink - The Political elites wont bite the hand that feeds them.
Dawisha, Karen The Putin Principle: How it came to Rule Russia World Affairs Journal June 2015 Accessed 12-18-
15 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/putin-principle-how-it-came-rule-russia
And these billionaires, far from being titans of industry motoring the modernization of the Russian economy or independent centers of power

pushing for reform, have secured and increased their wealth by relying on and bolstering the centralized power of the state. The wealth of the

oligarchs and political elites who came to power with Putin in 2000 has been more stable than in any other Group of 7 country. Political
leaders close to Putin have become multimillionaires, and the oligarchs around them,
according to Forbes, have become billionaires who understand that their wealth and power
will be secure as long as they dont challenge Putin politically. Under this return to state capitalism, the state
nationalizes the risk but privatizes the rewards to those closest to the president in return for their loyalty.

5 - TURN: In status quo, elites rallying around Putin

DMITRY POLIKANOV, December 2015, Polikano is member of the Board, PIR Center (Russian Center for Policy
Studies, December 2015,Russia and the World: Foreign Policy Outlook 2016, available for purchase at Russia-
direct.org DOA: 1-6-16
After nearly two years of this regime, it has become clear for everyone that the sanctions have nothing to do with the alleged stipulations be it the status of Crimea, or the execution of the
Minsk agreements. For the Western politicians who keep extending the sanctions they are valuable per se to indicate the Atlantic solidarity and their commitment to the principle of inability

sanctions are the punishment for Russias revival as a great power and, hence, they will be indefinite or, at least,
to do business as usual. For Russian politicians, it is clear that the

will last for another 3-5 years. Hence, they help to consolidate the Russian elite and most members of this elite

adapted to this economic reality. In fact, they nearly fell into a relaxed state of complacency
in the middle of 2015 (fortunately, the awakening shock in autumn was rapidly decreasing oil prices).
R/T Undermines Iran
1 - TURN: Sanctions undermine reform
Farshneshani, Beheshta. "In Iran, Sanctions Hurt the Wrong People." New York Times, 22 Jan. 2013. Web. 5 Dec.
2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/19/sanctions-successes-and- failures/in-iran-sanctions-
hurt-the-wrong-people>.
Despite the desperate circumstances, proponents of Iran sanctions adhere to the myth that sanctions are targeted at the regime and do not affect the lives of ordinary people. They argue that
economic pressure will weaken the Islamic Republic and bring it to revise its nuclear and democratic calculus. Still others assert, quite audaciously, that the calamitous conditions engendered

sanctions on Iran are only

by the sanctions are naturally necessary to provoke a ground-up revolution that will ultimately result in regime change. But

severely weakening the middle class, breaking the collective will and marginalizing
democratic voices while solidifying the power of the ruling elite.

2A - TURN: Pushes Russia to Iran

Rafizadeh, Majid. (President of the International American Council) "Ukraine Crisis Bolstering Iran-Russia-China
Axis." The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 28 Mar. 2014. Web. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/majid-
rafizadeh/ukraine-crisis- bolstering_b_5045450.html
As the current Western-Russian tensions continue and due to the geopolitical security
interests shared between Russia and Iran, Moscow finds no better geopolitical ally than the
Islamic Republic. Several other crucial reasons contribute to this geopolitical security interests. First of all, the Ukrainian crisis makes both Russia and the Islamic Republic
much closer due to the convergence of interests and geopolitical objectives between Putin and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in resisting Western hegemony in the Middle
East. As the current Ukrainian crisis continues, Moscow finds a closer strategic ally in Tehran, working to resist the West and retain their strategic depth in the region. In addition, for China, its
current interests are to strengthen strategic ties with Moscow and Tehran for security. The Ukraine crisis has moved Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing closer to one another to counterbalance the
West and resist Western hegemony, providing a platform for them to create the strategic geopolitical axis in the region.

B - Russia is shipping Iran weapons by defying weapons sanctions Push Iran to

Russia together
Fitz, Marshall. "Immigrants Are Makers, Not Takers." Center for American Progress. 8 Feb. 2013.
Web. 02 Oct. 2015.
Russian officials say the first batch could be delivered 18 months after Iran has specified the S-300 type that it wants. Technical talks are continuing. "The deal to supply the S-300 to Iran has

. The
not only been signed between the parties but it has already come into force," said Sergei Chemezov, head of Russia's Rostec arms firm, speaking at the Dubai Airshow-2015

$800m (545m) contract, signed in 2007, was frozen by Russia in 2010 because of the
international sanctions. President Vladimir Putin unfroze it in April.
R/T OIl Hegemony via Saudi Arabia

1A- TURN: United States loses international credibility when it supports Saudi Arabia
"US Support for Human Rights Abroad: The Case of Saudi Arabia." The Christian Science Monitor. The Christian
Science Monitor, n.d. Web. 07 Dec. 2015. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-
Watch/Backchannels/2014/0128/US-support-for-human-rights-abroad-The-case- of-Saudi-Arabia>.
The disconnect between the US government's rhetoric of steadfast support for human rights
and its tendency to turn a blind eye to misbehavior by friends and allies hardly needs to be
pointed out. While the annual country reports on human rights from the State Department, mandated by Congress, are thorough and honest looks at almost every member of
the UN, in the case of favored countries, they are then set aside to metaphorically gather dust, with ambassadors and other diplomats in embassies around the world generally hoping they
stay there (since their jobs are ultimately about building and maintaining good relations with foreign powers, not antagonizing them). But the apparent hypocrisy (witness ongoing deliveries of
advanced US weapons to Egypt since its military coup) undercuts the message and I often wonder if it would be better for the US to tone down its rhetoric, or abandon it completely, if the
nation's leaders aren't really willing to follow through.

B-

2A - delink - U.S. oil reserves mean we dont need the Middle East for oil anymore
Andrew Bacevich, Columbia University. Even if we defeat the Islamic State, well still lose the bigger war. New
York Times. October 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/even-if-we-defeat-the-islamic-state-well-
still-lose-the-bigger-war/2014/10/03/e8c0585e-4353-11e4-b47c-f5889e061e5f_story.html
Yet even as the United States persists in its determination to pacify the Greater Middle East,
the final verdict is already in. U.S. military power has never offered an appropriate response to
whatever ails the Islamic world. Weve committed our troops to a fools errand.
And worse, the errand is also proving unnecessary. With abundant North American energy
reserves now accessible all that shale oil and fracked gas we dont need the Persian Gulf
oil that ostensibly made our post-1980 military exertions imperative. For whatever reasons,
Washingtons national security elites seem oblivious to the implications these resources have
for policy in the Middle East.
No matter how long it lasts, Americas war for the Greater Middle East will end in failure. And
when it does, Americans will discover that it was also superfluous.

B - Gulf oil is only 20% of imports, projected to fall 55% in coming years, oil supplies
adaptable
John Glaser. Americas Toxic Middle East Allies. The National Interest. 28 December 2014.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america%E2%80%99s-toxic-middle-east-allies-11929
Furthermore, Persian Gulf oil only has a modest impact on the U.S. economy,accounting for
about 20 percent of oil imports. And even this modest percentage is declining. Total crude oil
imports have declined by 23 percent since 2008, and, according to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, net import volumes of crude oil and liquid fuels on a volume basis are
projected to decline by 55 percent between 2012 and 2020. The U.S. is also relatively insulated
from sudden disruptions in supply. In every major oil shock since 1973, global energy markets
adapted rather quickly through increasing production from other sources, rerouting shipping
transportation, and putting both private and government-held inventories around the world to
use.
R/T Reduces Aggression
1 - delink - Just deflects, doesnt reduce. Even if Russia shifted from Ukraine, they relocated
aggression to Syria

2 - delink - Russian policy in Ukraine and Crimea has not changed since sanctions, something
even the White House admits.
Wang, Wan. Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia in the Ukraine Crisis. Canadian Center of Science and
Education, February 27 2015. <http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/viewFile/45567/25287>
sanctions have not changed the
Vladislav Inozemtsev, the director of the Russian think-tank the Post-Industrial Research Center, believes that the

status quo: Crimea is still under Russian control, while Russias actions in eastern Ukraine are
mostly in response to internal factors in Ukraine rather than as a reaction to the behavior of
the West (Inozemtsev, 2014, November 15). A senior administration official in the White House admitted that,
despite economic indicators showing that the sanctions have crippled the Russian economy,
they have not changed the situation in Ukraine and Crimea to date. At a meeting with high-ranking military leaders on
December 19, Putin vowed that Russia would never abandon the patriots who supported the Crimean peninsula (Boxun, 2014, December 21). Some people have thought that Russia respected
the election results in Ukraine by not responding to the request of Donetsk in eastern Ukraine for the reunification of Oblast to the Russian Federation that was proposed after the referendum,
indicating that the US and European sanctions have played a certain deterrent role in Russias attitudes and behaviors towards Ukraine (Jian Jisong &Wang Hongxin, 2014). It is undoubtable
that sanctions have had an impact to a certain extent. However, it should be noted that Russia might never intend to allow the pro-Russian cities in eastern Ukraine to duplicate the Crimean
annexation and eventually join the Russian Federation. What Russia wanted probably was to maintain its influential power in the eastern region of Ukraine. The international

sanctions led by the US and Europe have hindered the development of the Russian economy.
However, Russia still maintains political stability domestically, and Putin's support rate has
been at all-time high levels; thus, Russia still adheres to its original positions on the Crimea
and Ukraine issues.

3 - TURN: Sanctions give Putin political cover for his complicity in the destruction of the
Russian economy, which only increases his popularity and makes it less likely that he will
back down.
American farmers among the winners in sanctions-hit Russia. CNBC, April 1 2015.
<http://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/01/american-farmers-among-the-winners-in- sanctions-hit-russia.html>
Sanctions aimed at individuals failed to change Kremlin behavior and the broader economic punishment introduced later is mostly hurting ordinary people this year, according to Evgeny
Gontmakher, an economics professor and former deputy minister of social affairs. Government estimates say inflation could hit 12 percent this year, hurting workers whose jobs are already
under pressure. "If the sanctions continue, they mostly hit the ordinary population, not the elite," he said. "Inflation is a tax on the poor, most of all." He said the oligarchs have not yet become
restive. "Among the business elite, there's a certain discontent, because the channels for economic cooperation with the West are blocked now, that's clear. But there's absolutely no sign yet

Sanctions are routinely cited in state media as the cause of most

of any open discontent or pressure on the president."

current economic problems. These include woes more properly blamed on over- dependence on oil revenue, Gontmakher said. The government
has managed "to shift the responsibility for it onto the West, and not our own systems and
institutions," he said. "In that sense, the initiators of the sanctions have really lost out." Despite a
year of sanctions, President Vladimir Putin's approval rating has hovered well over 80 percent in recent months. "Sanctions without popular dissent will hardly work" in weakening the
government, said Shevtsova.
R/T Sanctions Effective
Sanctions fail about 95% of the time
Robert Pape. Stanford University. Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. 2003.
http://www.stanford.edu/class/ips216/Readings/pape_97%20(jstor).pdf
115 identified cases in all. They reported sanctions success in 40 cases or 34 percent of the
total. Practically none of the claimed 40 successes of economic sanctions stands up to
examination. Eighteen were actually settled by direct or indirect use of force; in 8 cases there is
no evidence that the target made the demanded concessions; 6 do not qualify as instances of
economic sanctions; and 3 are indeterminate. Of HSEs 115 cases, only 5 are appropriately
considered successes.
[MATH: 5/115 = 4.3% success rate = 95.7% failure rate]

Sanctions have been ineffective thus far

David Cameron. Yale University. "Sanctions Will Not Deter Russia." May 5, 2014.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-r-cameron/russiasanctions_b_5267803.html
The sanctions were imposed after it became apparent the agreement reached on April 17 in had failed to de-
escalate the crisis. At Geneva, the U.S., EU, Ukraine and Russia agreed that all illegal armed groups must be disarmed and all illegally-
seized buildings and illegally-occupied streets, squares and parks vacated; that a monitoring mission of the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe, OSCE, lead in implementing the de-escalation measures; and that the constitutional reform process be "inclusive,

transparent and accountable [and] include the immediate establishment of a broad national dialogue, with outreach to all of Ukraine's regions
The pro-Russian militias continued to hold government
and political constituencies." None of that happened.
buildings throughout the Donetsk region and took buildings in additional cities. A military
mission attached to the OSCE consisting of Ukrainian officers and European officers was
detained and paraded before the media as "prisoners of war" by the self-proclaimed mayor
of Slavyansk. And there has been no "broad national dialogue" about constitutional reform.

Russia has little foreign debt, large currency reserves, and could survive sanctions for 2 years.

Schult, Christoph, Jo rg Schindler, and Ralf Neukirch. "Russian Dilemma: Why EU Sanctions Are a Bluff - SPIEGEL
ONLINE." SPIEGEL ONLINE International. 12 May 2014. Web. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/strong-
eu-economic-sanctions- against-russia-unlikely-a-968913.html>.
Many governments are also skeptical that the sanctions could actually get Putin to back down.
In German security policy circles, that outcome is considered almost impossible.
The thumbscrews the West has thus far implemented "haven't instilled much fear" in Putin and
his associates, one security official argued. Russia has little foreign debt and large currency
reserves, giving it a transitional period of at least two years -- enough time to find new buyers
and distribution routes for Russian gas."We'll be sitting in the cold before the Russians run out
of money," says one security official.
Sanctions Will Not Alter Putins Actions
Cameron, David. Sanctions Will Not Deter Russia, Concerned About Its Security Interests in Ukraine. Yale Global.
Published May 1, 2014. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/sanctions-will-not-deter-russia-concerned-about-its-
security-interests-ukraine
Unlike the EU sanctions, which have had and will have no effect, the American sanctions on the
17 companies mostly banks and energy companies and revocation and tightening of export
licensing on high-tech items with military uses will complicate business for the companies
involved and perhaps impose modest costs on the economy in general.
But they wont cause Putin to walk the walk for the same reason the earlier sanctions didnt
stop the annexation of Crimea: Rightly or wrongly, he believes Kiev, controlled by the forces
that have controlled it since February 22 and are likely to control it after May 25, constitutes a
threat to Russias national interests and security. As long as Russiasinterests and security are
threatened, it will continue to apply pressure on
Ukraine.... Russia will in all likelihood, and notwithstanding the recent sanctions, continue to do
what it has been doing not simply in order to destabilize the Kiev government, although it
certainly has done that, but in order to protect and secure what it regards as its national
interest.

Extended) Sanctions will not stop Putins actions (Article acknowledges economic damage
and concludes neg)
Parker, Clifton. Sanctions against Russia may inflict some pain, Stanford scholars say Stanford News. Published
May 7, 2014. http://news.stanford.edu/news/2014/may/ukraine-sanctions-russia-050714.html
"Sanctions will not alter (Russian President Vladimir) Putin's policies," said Stephen Krasner, a
Stanford professor of international relations and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute
for International Studies. "Annexing Crimea and loosening Kiev's control over the eastern
Ukraine have strengthened Putin's domestic position."
R/T Smart Sanctions

1 - delink - Sanctions on Russia havent really been narrowly targeted smart sanctions; they
target large Russian energy companies, which have a big impact on the economy. In fact,
theyre more expansive than all other sanctions programs combined.
Joseph J. Schatz (Politico). The transatlantic cost of Russia sanctions. Accessed 12/9/15. Published 12/9/15.
http://www.politico.eu/article/transatlantic-unity-russia-sanctions-united-states-europe-ukraine/.
U.S. officials like to say that the Russia sanctions program is larger than all other sanctions programs
combined. So the goal for the EU and the U.S. was to write a joint sanctions program that would hurt Russias economy by cutting its
banks and energy companies off from Western financing but not so much that it would disrupt the global financial system, or European and

American economies.

2 - TURN: Hurting leadership means they increase repression even more

Daniel W. Drezner (2015) Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance, International Interactions, 41:4, 755-
764, DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1041297
The first and most straightforward question is whether targeted financial measures are as smart as policymakers claim. The logic behind asset

freezes and financial restrictions is that they hurt the target elites at least as much as target populations, thereby sparing the suffering of the

powerless. And indeed, Peksen (2009) shows that comprehensive sanctions lead to a far greater decline in the physical integrity rights of

individuals in target countries than targeted sanctions. Because financial sanctions are designed to be more costly to the target, however, it is
as an
possible that this category of sanction generates greater costs to human security. Escriba-Folch (2012) argues, for example, that
authoritarian regime faces greater financial constraints, it will opt for repression over
rewarding key members of the electorate as a tactic for staying in power. By definition, financial
sanctions are designed to place such restrictions on the target government. It is therefore possible that targeted financial sanctions are more

likely to trigger repression. Because targeted financial sanctions are a relatively recent phenomenon, it has been difficult to assess its empirical

effects. With their widespread use, however, both case studies and econometric analyses will be necessary as more data becomes available.

TURN: promotes cohesion among targeted elites

Daniel Drezner, University of Chicago. How Smart are Smart Sanctions?. International Studies Review. 2003.
http://www.danieldrezner.com/research/smartsanctions.pdf
Stepping back, more serious theoretical problems with the concept of smart sanctions become clear. For example, the contributors implicit

theory of how sanctions yield results rests on shaky ground. Smart sanctions could lead a target regimes supporters to pressure the

government to acquiesce, but the authors fail to acknowledge alternative scenarios. Even with smart sanctions, a target
regime may shift the costs to its domestic opponents. Similarly, embargoes targeting a coterie of the regimes
supporters may merely reinforce group cohesion rather than weaken support for the government.
Smart Sanctions increase elite nationalism (Yurgens The national interest)
Yurgens (The National Interests). The West vs. Russia: The Unintended Consequences of Targeted Sanctions.
Accessed 12/10. Published 10/8/14. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-west-vs-russia-the-unintended-
consequences-targeted-11427?page=5 .
So far, Russias internal diseases have harmed it much more than Western sanctions. Likewise, the sanctions do not undermine the stability of
sanctions contribute to the Putin-driven soft
the Russian political regime. On the contrary, the personal
nationalization of the elites, and the state can more than make up for financial losses
sustained by certain individuals and companies. For the elements of Russian society already dissatisfied with the
Russian government, such sanctions are a bonus of sorts that adds to their satisfaction over the Crimea annexationRussia gets Crimea and

despised elites are punished too.

Warrant: Galvanizing the political, economic and social elites

Yurgens (The National Interests). The West vs. Russia: The Unintended Consequences of Targeted Sanctions.
Accessed 12/10. Published 10/8/14. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-west-vs-russia-the-unintended-
consequences-targeted-11427?page=5 .
Neo-conservative Russian isolationists are already influential around President Putin. In the
absence of any visible carrots from the West, using the stick endlessly will only strengthen
the neo-conservative segment of the Russian elite and population. Russia today is far from the
Iranian situation, where the supreme leader decided to avoid selecting a belligerent president
to make negotiations possible. In Russia, the current situation can persist for a relatively long
time, although the country already feels a strain on its budget and public expenditures.
R/T Naming and Shaming

1 - TURN: Backlash for Naming and Shaming can be gamed by political figures to increase
domestic control, sometimes via violence
Nigam, Sonya. "Naming and Shaming of International Human Rights Abuses." Naming and Shaming of
International Human Rights Abuses. Canadian Law Magazine, 9 Dec. 2013. Web. 01 Dec. 2015.
<http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/4918/Naming-and-shaming-of- international-human-rights-abuses.html>.
One reason is that some governments capacities for reform vary by types of human rights violationsit may be easier for some governments to reform their legal or political structures, at
least on paper, by holding elections or passing legislation to better protect some political rights, than to stop agents of terror that are out of their direct control. Another reason is that

some governments abuse human rights strategicallywhen faced with global pressures for
reform, some despots use terror, such as killings or beatings, to counteract the effectiveness
of political reforms they make in response to international pressures, such as holding
elections.

2 - TURN: Naming and shaming specific regimes can actually increase that regimes support
from its allies.
Nigam, Sonya. "Naming and Shaming of International Human Rights Abuses." Naming and Shaming of
International Human Rights Abuses. Canadian Law Magazine, 9 Dec. 2013. Web. 01 Dec. 2015.
<http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/4918/Naming-and-shaming-of- international-human-rights-abuses.html>.
Aid relationships that are not politically important to the donor are maintained for charitable
reasons or to promote a positive image of the donor state, both of which are negated when
the recipients are caught abusing human rights. On the other hand, if the aid relationship provides more tangible benefits to the donor it
satisfies demands of a donors domestic public, preserves profitable economic ties, confers a strategic or military advantage to the donor, or politically benefits the donor in some other way--

The larger the donors benefit from the

these benefits will weigh against the reputational cost of cooperating with a known offender.

relationship, the less naming and shaming matters. In some situations, a donor might even
increase aid to a shamed state in order to compensate it for aid lost from other sources

3 - nonunique - G-8 suspended them and named-and shamed them too

Felicity Vabulas, University of Chicago. Does the G-8s Suspension of Russia Actually matter?. Washington Post.
April 3 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/03/does-the-g-8s-suspension-
of-russia-actually-matter/
Second, there is increasing evidence that naming and shaming states that violate both explicit
and implicit commitments in the international arena is both costly and can ultimately change a
states behavior. Why? States care about their reputations, and as Michael McFaul, the just-
departed American ambassador to Moscow, states, symbols do matter. While the Russians
have tried to downplay the G-8 suspension, it is likely that they are seething behind closed
doors. For them, the G-8 was an indication to the rest of the world that they were part of the
big-boy great power club of democracies. The role of prestige is paramount when rising
powers choose to join international clubs.
R/T Social Movements Increase
1 - TURN: Putin confronting the west is bad for activism b/c increases approval rates to deter
protests
Denis Volkov (Institute of Modern Russia). Does Russias Protest Movement Have a Future?. Accessed 12/11.
Published 2/24/15. http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/nation/2184-does-russias-protest-movement-have-a-future .
Calls for political protest fall on deaf ears, since most people consider the ruling regime to be
legitimate. (It is worth noting here that the main driver of Putins increased popularity was the annexation of
Crimea and a large-scale confrontation with the West). One of the main indicators of this fact is Putins 85% approval rating.
The governments high approval rating has caused protest activity to drop to an all-time low.
The social discontent and anxiety caused by the economic crisis are growing, however, and soon this will be reflected in the approval ratings.
R/T Oil Tech Sanctions
Sanctions preserved existing oil tech including arctic and shale operations
Steven Mufson. Where do the latest U.S. sanctions leave Russian Oil?. Washington Post. July 2014.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/07/30/where-do-the-latest-u-s-sanctions-leave-russian-
oil/
To some extent, Rosneft has already been girding itself for sanctions. Just a couple of days
before the U.S. sanctions announced in mid-July, Rosneft completed a deal to buy the Russian
operations of Weatherford, a major international oil services firm. Pavel Molchanov, an oil
analyst at the investment firm Raymond James, believes the sanctions will have "minimal"
impact. "Even from a multiyear perspective, the new rules are highly unlikely to be game-
changing," he said. "This is partly because of how narrow the rules are, but also because Russia
has fairly well-developed capabilities in energy technology/infrastructure (though admittedly
not much when it comes to unconventionals)." He says that oil service companies will be able
to continue to do business as long as their equipment had been previously contracted. That
might protect Exxon's Arctic exploration and drilling in Russia's massive Bazhenov shale region.
R/T Prevents Arctic Development
1 - Nonunique - Russia has a drilling platform now, clearly have the tech
Mansur Mirovalev. Russia's failing designs for Arctic oil exploration. Al-Jazeera. March 2015.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/03/russia-failing-designs-arctic-oil-exploration-
150316075032235.html
The Prirazlomnaya platform, where the Greenpeace activists were seized, is the world's first ice-resistant rig that weighs half a million tons and is supposedly spill- and explosion-proof, says its

The rig started pumping oil in April 2014, and the launch was hailed in almost
operator, the oil arm of Gazprom, Russia's state-run natural gas giant.

military terms. "Today, we pioneered the development of Russia's Arctic shelf," Gazprom's CEO Alexei Miller said in a statement. "No doubt, Gazprom will continue

the conquest of the Arctic."Putin symbolically commanded to start the pumping from
Moscow and proclaimed it commenced "our country's big, extensive work in the Arctic".The
Prirazlomnaya oil was proudly christened ARCO ("Arctic oil") and was described as similar to Kuwait's Ratawi and Saudi Arabia's Arabian Heavy brands. A promotional film glorified the rig as a
continuation of the USSR's groundbreaking efforts to subdue the forces of nature. Environmentalists and experts were less optimistic, though. "Despite the president's celebratory tone, this
shipment is very late, it contains very poor quality oil and it poses a huge risk to the pristine Arctic environment," Greenpeace International Executive Director Kumi Naidoo said in a statement.
"The fanfare surrounding its departure looks more like a PR stunt than a credible new source of oil."

2 - delink - they solved via shifting to Vietnam

Mansur Mirovalev. Russia's failing designs for Arctic oil exploration. Al-Jazeera. March 2015.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/03/russia-failing-designs-arctic-oil-exploration-
150316075032235.html
The only fly in the ointment was Gazprom's admittance that Prirazlomnaya's production was profitable only when oil prices exceeded $80 per barrel.
Less than a year later, the price slumped well below that. Western sanctions slapped on Moscow specifically restrict access to drilling technologies - and Russia simply lacks the

Gazprom said in November that it would team up with PetroVietnam for a project
expertise.However,

in the Pechora Sea, not far from the Prirazlomnaya.

3 - delink - they solved by shifting to China

Stephen Blank. Russias New Arctic Base Continue the Militarization of the High North. Jamestown Foundation.
November 2015.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44572&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=0e9
9f9c8f2c16df6822b0b8e1a2f75af#.VnbE0horIb0
Russian rhetoric about Western threats notwithstanding, much of Russias military construction in the High North more likely appears designed to counter or deter suspected growing threats

due to the Wests sanctions,

from China. This interpretation seems particularly plausible given the location of these bases, including those in the Kuriles. Yet,

Russia is becoming increasingly beholden to China for the investment necessary to sustain the
ongoing construction of energy infrastructure in the Arctic (Novatek.ru, September 3).

4 - delink - takes 5 years for Russia to develop own tech

Joe Friedrichsen. Under the Radar: War for the Arctic?. Echo News. November 2014.
http://theechonews.com/radar-war-arctic/
For Russia, oil and gas extraction in the Arctic will require the creation of cost-effective
technological solutions. Alexander Mandel, adviser to the director general of Gazprom Neft,
said Russia cant rely solely on foreign companies to provide it with equipment. That reliance on
Western technology to develop and extract Arctic oil and gas deposits, combined with Western sanctions,
gives Russia a strong incentive to localize oil production. Russia can decrease its dependence on the West
by developing solutions to these issues. Mandel also noted the creation of standard offshore platforms
and ships to accomplish such a goal will take about five years to develop.
R/T Hurts Turkey
Proxy War in Syria Threatens U.S.-led strikes
Geoff Dyer, Financial Times. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9039a686-9398-11e5-bd82-
c1fb87bef7af.html#axzz3uhmGggnH http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9039a686-9398-11e5-bd82-c1fb87bef7af.html -
ixzz3uhmdZG3b
There are also unresolved questions on who will do the fighting, beyond the small groups of
rebels the US and Turkey are currently backing. The area includes towns such as Dabiq, where
Isis is believed to have a strong and fortified presence. Mixed into those delicate obstacles is
the renewed tension between Russia and Turkey. If confirmed, the reported Russian air strikes
in Azaz underline the potential for Russian, Turkish and US aircraft to be operating in a narrow
area and conducting very different operations.http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9039a686-9398-
11e5-bd82-c1fb87bef7af.html - ixzz3uhmnyrGY As it looks for ways to impose consequences on
Turkey, Russia could also see the border offensive as a potential target for meddling. Turkey has
warned the Kurds not to try and take control of the border strip, but Moscow could be tempted
to encourage the Kurds to grab more territory.

Root cause of proxy war = Russian bombings in Syria

Vox. http://www.vox.com/2015/11/24/9790990/turkey-russia-plane-shootdown
That is not to say that Turkey necessarily shot down the Russian plane in cold-blooded
vengeance for Russia bombing ethnic Turkmens. But the bombings may have contributed to
already-rising tensions between Turkey and Russia over Syria. And it's not just the flights: Russia
intervened in Syria to support Bashar al-Assad, but Turkey has been involved in Syria for a few
years seeking to topple Assad. They're on opposite sides of a deadly serious proxy war.
Escalation was not out of the question.
R/T Legitimizes ILaw
The U.S. has violated International Law for decades with the War on Terror 1 policy isnt
going to change all of that
Alfred McCoy. You Must Follow International Law (Unless Youre America). The Nation. February 2015.
http://www.thenation.com/article/you-must-follow-international-law-unless-youre-america/
All that should be impressive enough for a discredited, long dead authoritarian thinker. But Schmitts dictum also became a philosophical foundation for the exercise of American global power
in the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Washington, more than any other power, created the modern international community of laws and treaties, yet it now reserves

the United States, as the planets

the right to defy those same laws with impunity. A sovereign ruler should, said Schmitt, discard laws in times of national emergency. So

last superpower or, in Schmitts terms, its global sovereign, has in these years repeatedly ignored international law,

following instead its own unwritten rules of the road for the exercise of world power.
Just as Schmitts sovereign preferred to rule in a state of endless exception without a constitution for his Reich, so Washington is now well into the

second decade of an endless War on Terror that seems the sum of its exceptions to
international law: endless incarceration, extrajudicial killing, pervasive surveillance, drone
strikes in defiance of national boundaries, torture on demand, and immunity for all of the
above on the grounds of state secrecy. Yet these many American exceptions are just surface manifestations of the ever-expanding clandestine
dimension of the American state. Created at the cost of more than a trillion dollars since 9/11, the purpose of this vast apparatus is to control a covert domain that is fast becoming the main
arena for geopolitical contestation in the twenty-first century.
R/T Decreases FDI
1% increase in FDI increases income gap in that country by .02%
Xiaolan Fu, University of Cambridge. Limited Linkages from growth engines and regional disparities in China.
Journal of Comparative Economics. 2002. PDF on Dropbox.
The relative FDI ratio also exhibits a significant positive impact on the income gap; it indicates
that a one percent increase in the average FDI in coastal provinces relative to that in inland
regions increases the income gap by about 0.02 percent. This result suggests that an increase in
FDI in the coastal regions relative to the inland regions leads to a larger income gap between
the regions. The estimated coefficient of the structural variable is negative and statistically
significant; it indicates that a one percent increase in the ratio of the number of urban
employees to the number of total employees reduces the income gap by 0.19 percent. This
result suggests that urbanization in the inland regions reduces the income gap between coastal
and inland regions. Finally, the movement of domestic capital may increase regional income
inequalities because capital has been flowing from the poor inland regions to the fast-growing
coastal regions since the reforms began. However, because we lack reliable data on the scale of
inter-regional capital flows, we could not include this effect in our empirical model.

FDI inflows into resource sectors causes Dutch Disease

Alberto Botta. The Macroeconomics of a Financial Dutch Disease. Post Keynesians Economics Study Group.
2014. http://www.postkeynesian.net/downloads/wpaper/PKWP1410.pdf
In this paper we describe the medium-run macroeconomic effects and long-run development
consequences of a financial Dutch disease that may take place in a small developing country
with abundant natural resources. The first move of such a peculiar Dutch disease is on financial
markets. An initial surge in FDI targeting domestic natural resources sets in motion a perverse
cycle between exchange rate appreciation and mounting short-term capital flows. Such a spiral
easily gives rise to exchange rate volatility, foreign capital reversals, and sharp macroeconomic
instability. In the long run, such acute macroeconomic instability as well as overdependence on
natural resource exports all dampen the development of non-traditional tradable good sectors
and curtail labor productivity dynamics. We advise the introduction of constraints to short-term
capital flows, in the form of taxes on exchange rate-based capital gains, to tame exchange
rate/capital flows boom-and- bust cycles. We also provide support to a developmentalist
monetary policy that targets competitive nominal and real exchange rates in order to favor the
process of production and export diversification. Such a policy stand can be particularly
effective to counter-act the long- run negative effects of the financial Dutch disease we
describe.
FDI increases chance of coups b/c 1 increases attractiveness of controlling govts and 2
gives more funding to economic elites that could launch a coup, decreasing their need to be
loyal to the dictator
Andrey Tomashevskiy. Investing in Violence: Foreign Direct Investment and Coups. 2012.
http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/tomashevskiy.pdf
Not only does FDI increase the attractiveness of state control, FDI may also contribute to a shift
in the balance of power within a particular state and make the threat of a coup more credible
by providing additional resources to actors within the dictators ruling coalition. Malesky (2008)
argues that FDI can contribute to the autonomy of subnational actors, loosen central
government control and lead to de-facto decentralization. FDI may provide an independent
resource base to elites which can then be used to launch a successful coup. If FDI leads to
increases in the productivity of domestic firms through technology spillovers and forced
adjustment due to increased competition, domestic assets owned by elites or the military may
increase in value and contribute to increased elite autonomy. By developing an independent
resource base, elites become less dependent on patronage distributed by the dictator and
more willing to pursue independent political goals.
R/T UN Syria Resolution
Putin violated the resolution immediately after it was put in place because he doesnt give a
fuck
Editorial Board, December 21st, 2015. A U.N Resolution on Syria is Shattered - And Russia is to Blame.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-un-resolution-on-syria-is-shattered/2015/12/21/069c0f66-a803-
11e5-9b92-dea7cd4b1a4d_story.html
THE U.N. Security Council unanimously passed a resolution Friday demanding that all parties
immediately cease any attacks against civilians and civilian objects as well as any
indiscriminate use of weapons, including through shelling and aerial bombardment. Less than
48 hours later, Russian planes carried out at least six airstrikes on civilian targets in the
northern Syrian provincial capital of Idlib, killing scores of people. It was a blatant violation of
the resolution Russia had just voted for and an indication of how Vladimir Putin actually
regards the diplomatic deals on Syria the Obama administration has been pushing.
R/T Reserve/Running Outta Money
1. Russia Has been stocking up on gold, creating a reserve independent of political risks like
sanctions
Mark O'Byrne, Goldseek, 15, Russia Sees Gold Reserves As Additional Financial Cushion In Face Of External
Uncertainties, 11-13-2015, http://news.goldseek.com/GoldSeek/1447420592.php
Russian central bank governor, Elvira Nabiullina spoke about Russias gold and foreign currency reserves today saying Russia intended building

them up to $500 billion in the coming years. More importantly, she confirmed that Russia continues to see gold reserves as an important
Russian central bank governor, Elvira Nabiullina spoke
monetary asset in her words as a financial cushion.
about Russias gold and foreign currency reserves today saying Russia intended building them
up to $500 billion in the coming years. Russia and China have been the leading official sector gold buyers over the last 15 years.
Russian central bank officials have previously said that Russia views gold bullion as 100%
guarantee from legal and political risks.

2. Russian reserves stable (Adomanis Forbes)

Mark Adomanis (Forbes). Amidst A Deepening Recession, Russia's International Reserves Are Stable (For Now).
Published 1/14/16. http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2016/01/14/amidst-a-deepening-recession-
russias-international-reserves-are-stable-for-now/#2715e4857a0b257c661a631a
After spending the better part of a hundred billion dollars in an (ultimately futile) effort to defend the ruble, the Central Bank essentially threw
Over the past 10 months, Russias foreign currency reserves have been
in the towel last March.
essentially stable despite an accelerating collapse in the price of oil. The following chart clearly shows the
extent to which falling oil prices have simply stopped having an impact on Russias currency holdings: The fact that its not doing that, and that
has deliberately maintained a significant reserve of dry powder despite
for the better part of a year it
ongoing and even accelerating economic damage, suggests that the banks leadership understands that whats
happening is a new normal that wont change anytime soon. Does any of this matter? Well, the fact that the Central Bank still has a sizable (if

reduced) pile of money sitting around wont do very much to help the average Russian citizen, whose living standards have been battered by a

nasty combination of high inflation, rising unemployment, and deepening recession. But it does suggest that the countrys fundamental
stability is not at risk and that the policy makers are not panicking and continue to
macroeconomic
focus on the long-term.

4. Russia has just formed a 100-billion-dollar reserve fund with BRICs countries that includes
41 billion dollars in funding from China; they could very easily just tap into these reserves.
AFP (Business Insider). Russia is creating a $100 billion rival to the IMF. Accessed 1/14/16. Published 5/03/15.
http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-russia-signs-up-to-100-bn-brics-fund-to-rival-imf-2015-5.
Russian President Vladimir Putin ratified an accord Saturday to set up a $100 billion reserve
fund for the so-called BRICS the leading emerging economies Russia, China, Brazil, India, and South Africa. Moscow is
expected to contribute $18 billion to the reserve, well behind the $41 billion China has promised to pour into
the fund, which was set up after an agreement signed in July in Brazil. The emerging economies also plan
to form their own international bank based in Shanghai to challenge western dominance over international money markets.
5. Shifts to less costly methods of political destabilization.
The Economist. From Cold war to Hot war. 14th Feb
2015. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-
dangerous-confrontation
Destabilisation is also being achieved in less military ways. Wielding
power or gaining influence abroadthrough
antiestablishment political parties, disgruntled minority groups, media outlets,
environmental activists, supporters in business, propagandist think-tanks, and othershas
become part of the Kremlins hybrid-war strategy. This perversion of soft power is seen by Moscow as a vital
complement to military engagement.

5b. Politically, diplomatically, economically, sabotage and terrorism

Ihor Kozak, Newsweek, 12/25/15 PUTIN PLOTS TO MAKE UKRAINE A FAILED STATE
http://www.newsweek.com/putin-plots-make-ukraine-failed-state-408957
And so it seems that, in order to achieve its long-term strategic goals, the Kremlin's leadership is emphasizing alternative aspects of hybrid

warfare. According to retired U.S. Army General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, who visited Ukraine seven times in

2015, "Ukraine is a work in progress by Putin. He has multiple channels to attack Ukraine, economically,
politically, diplomatically, militarily." Recent developments on the security front within Ukraine's borders are disturbing. The
Ukrainian security service (SBU) and other law enforcement agencies report a significant increase in acts of
sabotage and terrorism. According to SBU official Oleksandr Tkachuk, "Russian special services are intensifying their
activities in peaceful cities, trying to destabilize the situation and trying to show that Ukrainian law
enforcement bodies and Ukrainian authorities are not able to protect their citizens."
R/T Budapest Memorandum/Military Alt
No legal obligation to intervene under Budapest Memorandum (Galbert CSIS)
Simond de Galbert (CSIS). A Year of Sanctions against RussiaNow What? A European Assessment of the Outcome
and Future of Russia Sanctions. Accessed 1/14/16. Published 10/15.
http://csis.org/files/publication/150929_deGalbert_SanctionsRussia_Web.pdf .
Ukraine is not a NATO ally and assurances such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum are political ly more
than legally binding. Although Russias aggression was politically unacceptable, the transatlantic alliance has no legal
obligation to defend Ukraines sovereignty militarily. And Western leaders quickly discarded the option, considering
the underlying risks of a military escalation between the West and Russia. Russia understood this hesitancy well and made sure, through

multiple statements by President Putin, to impress upon Western countries how much escalation could cost even the consideration of having

nuclear weapons playing a role in the crisisif they considered interfering militarily in Ukraine.

Not proven to be adequate alternative

Michel Rossignol. Sanctions: The Economic Weapon In The New World Order. 1993. Political and Social Affairs
Division of the Canadian Government.
Sanctions have not proved to be the surefire alternative to military action hoped for by
President Woodrow Wilson and others after the First World War . In most cases, it has taken sanctions
months, if not years, to produce the desired results; in other cases, sanctions have failed to prevent the use of military force. Indeed, even

where there were positive results, for instance in Rhodesia and South Africa, it is difficult to determine to what extent sanctions were

responsible, since so many other factors were involved.

ex. Kuwait, we put sanctions then intervened anyway when they failed
George Lopez, University of Notre Dame. The Sanctions Era: An Alternative To Military Intervention. 1995.
dl.tufts.edu/file_assets/tufts:UP149.001.00038.00006
The evidence suggests, however, that President George Bush had little faith in the ability of sanctions alone to achieve allied goals in
Kuwait. By late September 1990, less than two months after sanctions were imposed and well before they
could have had any substantial impact on Iraqi policy, the President began to argue within the small decision group that guided White House

policy that the use of military force would be necessary to expel Iraq from Kuwait.2 ' By contrast, the President's chief military advisor, General

Colin Powell, appears to have argued for giving sanctions more time to work before resorting to military force. But on 8 November, the
White House ordered a massive increase in the military deployments as the U.N. Security Council
(resolution 678) and later the U.S. Congress approved the use of "all necessary means" to force Iraqi withdrawal, should other means (vis-h-vis

sanctions) fail.
R/T Ceasefire
1. This is just posturing, Russia de-escalates to avoid more sanctions and then re-escalates
Peter Harrell, Center For American Security, Lessons From Russia For The Future Of Sanctions, September 2015,
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-
pdf/CNAS%20Report%20Economic%20Statecraft%20%232%20FINAL.pdf
On the other hand, sanctions have yet to dissuade Russia from its strategic objective of steadily
escalating its support for separatists and consolidating the territory under pro-Russian control in eastern Ukraine. In some respects,
Russia appears to be engaging in a cyclical strategy of escalating its intervention just below
the point where it expects further sanctions to be imposed, or to a point where it expects any sanctions
imposed will be manageable, and then tactically de-escalating the situation or launching a new peace negotiation to avoid sanctions actually

being implemented. It remains to be seen whether the continued impact of sanctions on the Russian economy in 2015 will convince Russia to

support a more durable deescalation in eastern Ukraine.

Despite Minsk, still constant inflow of weapons, foreign fighters, and conflict (Stephanie
Nebehay Reuters)
Stephanie Nebehay (Reuters). Men, arms, still pour into east Ukraine from Russia: U.N.. Accessed January 15,
2016. Published December 9, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-un-
idUSKBN0TS0TQ20151209.
A fresh ceasefire last August has led to a significant drop in hostilities, particularly due to the
withdrawal of certain heavy weapons by the Ukrainian military and armed groups from the
contact line, it said, while warning of a new build-up. "There remains, however, an inflow of
ammunition, weaponry and fighters from the Russian Federation into the territories
controlled by the armed groups, leaving the situation highly flammable," the report said.
Gianni Magazzeni, chief of the Americas, Europe, and Central Asia Branch of the U.N. human
rights office, told a news briefing: "There is still a continuing flow of foreign fighters including
in some cases retired or former servicemen of the Russian Federation and a continuing flow
of weapons." Ceasefire violations have occurred near Donetsk and Horlivka, areas controlled
by armed groups, where artillery systems are being deployed, Magazzeni said. "There are
increasing skirmishes taking place along the line of contact... an area where we have 800,000
people living," he said. "That gives you a very clear sense of the implications of resumed
fighting especially if it's not any longer remnants of war and IEDs (Improvised Explosive
Devices), but it is actually the use of Howitzers and other very heavy weapons."
Fighting has escalated thee times to pre-ceasefire levels despite Minsk II (Alex Leonor
Euromaidan Press)
Alex Leonor (Contributor for the Euromaidan Press). Putins Alternate Ukraine Strategy: Between Blitzkrieg and
Schleichkrieg. Accessed January 15, 2016. Published November 19, 2015.
http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/11/19/putins-alternate-ukraine-strategy-blitzkreig-schleichkrieg/#arvlbdata.
Then there was the Minsk II ceasefire. When diplomats and journalists talk about Minsk II, they rarely
mention that the final Russian assault on the Ukrainian troops in Debaltseve, the climactic battle of the
war in Ukraine (so far) occurred after the Minsk II agreement was signed on 11 February 2015
(Ukrainian troops finally fought their way out of Debaltseve on 18 February). Since the end of the battle
of Debaltseve, fighting has escalated at least three times. In April, in August, and now, in November.
Russia has so far been unable to capture any more Ukrainian territory, but today some of Ukraines
Western friends are more willing than ever to end the war in Ukraine at almost any additional cost to
Ukraine.

2 - Russia believes sanctions are running dry and thus gearing up for a European war (Ilan
Berman The National Interest)
Ilan Berman (The National Interest). The Economics of Deterring Russia. Accessed December 25, 2015. Published
May 22, 2015. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-economics-deterring-russia-12945?page=2.
When it comes to the prospects of war in Europe, perhaps we simply arent asking the right questions. For months now, Russia watchers within

the Beltway and in European capitals have been preoccupied with anticipating the next moves of Russian President Vladimir Putin in the year-

old conflict taking place in Ukraine. But achieving a satisfactory answer to the question of what Russia might do has proven maddeningly

elusive. This is because much of Moscows policies to date have been opportunistic in naturedriven by perceived Western weakness and

divisions within the NATO alliance, rather than by a clearly defined end state on the part of the Russian government. Given this state of affairs,

Western capitals should focus less on possible Russian actions, and more on how to constrain its potential for aggression. The United States and

Europe have already begun to do so. Three formal rounds of sanctions to dateand subsequent expansions of existing restrictions by both

Washington and Brusselshave taken aim at obvious targets of opportunity within Putins regime. These are threefold: state-owned

enterprises (like natural gas giant Gazprom and its oil analogue, Rosneft), members of Putins inner circle (including influential oligarchs and

power brokers Igor Sechin and Gennady Timchenko), and high-ranking government officials (such as Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin). In

this way, Western nations have begun to drive up the marginal costs to Russian decision makers of their Ukrainian misadventure. The world oil

market has arguably done much more. Saudi Arabias active and ongoing attempts to depress the global price of oil through increased

productiona reaction to both the unfolding rapprochement between the United States and Iran, as well as Americas unfolding fracking

revolutionhas had a pronounced collateral effect on Russias energy-heavy economy. Yet this trendline, like Western sanctions themselves,
Putin himself recently argued
is perceived in Moscow as fleeting in nature and unsustainable in the long run. Which is why
that the Russian economy has now weathered the worst of the resulting economic downturn.
It is also why Russia appears to be preparing for a wider war in Europe. According to former
Kremlin economic adviser Andrei Illarionov, Russian military spending which long averaged
between 2.5 and 3.2 percent of national GDPis today rising to levels analogous to the
period immediately preceding last spring's incursion into Ukraine. The amount of money now
being spent by Moscow, Illarionov notes, rivals the initial mobilization that accompanied the
start of hostilities in Ukraine (in excess of 10 percent of GDP), suggesting that Russia is
preparing for escalation, in Ukraine and perhaps even beyond.

3 - Cease-fires prolong conflict by allowing both parties to re-arm, which actually increases
the number of deaths
Edward Luttwak of Foreign Affairs, Give War A Chance, Aug 1999, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20049362.pdf
it can resolve political
An unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue:
conflicts and lead to peace. This can happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when
one wins decisively. Either way the key is that the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached. War brings peace only after
passing a culminating phase of violence. Hopes of military success must fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further

combat. Since the establishment of the United Nations and the enshrinement of great-power politics in its Security Council, however, wars

among lesser powers have rarely been allowed to run their natural course. Instead, they have typically been interrupted early on, before they

could burn themselves out and establish the preconditions for a lasting settlement. Cease-fires and armistices have frequently been imposed
a cease-
under the aegis of the Security Council in order to halt fighting. Nato's intervention in the Kosovo crisis follows this pattern. But
fire tends to arrest war-induced exhaustion and lets belligerents reconstitute and rearm their
forces. It intensifies and prolongs the struggle once the cease-fire ends and it does usually
end. This was true of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, which might have come to closure in a matter of weeks if two cease-fires ordained by
the Security Council had not let the combatants recuperate. It has recently been true in the Balkans. Imposed cease-fires frequently interrupted

the fighting between Serbs and Croats in Krajina, between the forces of the rump Yugoslav federation and the Croat army, and between the

Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia. Each

time, the opponents used the pause to recruit, train, and equip
additional forces for further combat, prolonging the war and widening the scope of its killing
and destruction. Imposed armistices, meanwhile, again, unless followed by negotiated peace accords, artificially freeze conflict and
perpetuate a state of war indefinitely by shielding the weaker side from the consequences of refusing to make concessions for peace.
R/T Less Arms Trade
Russian arms trade not affected (Dmitry Dokuchaev Russia Direct Magazine)
Dmitry Dokuchaev (Russia Direct Magazine). Russian arms market unhampered by sanctions, at least for now.
Accessed January 15, 2016. September 15, 2015, http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/russian-arms-market-
unhampered-sanctions-least-now,IS,.
Russia has always been a significant player in the international arms market, the natural result
of the Cold War ideological confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. One
would be forgiven for thinking that Russias economic recession, coupled with the impact of
Western sanctions (including some directed against the defense sector), would have seriously
undermined Russias position as an arms exporter. But that is not the case - at least for the
time being. Evidence is provided not only by domestic figures, but also by the results of
studies by influential international think tanks that specialize in arms-related matters.

Economic necessity drives Russian arms sales so sanctions supercharge (Paul Rivlin Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies)
Paul Rivlin (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies). The Russian Economy and Arms Exports to the Middle East,.
Accessed January 15, 2016. Published November 2005.
http://www.inss.org.il/uploadimages/Import/(FILE)1188301974.pdf.
Russia can no longer afford to transfer arms freely as did the Soviet Union for many years. Sales now are driven by profits more than by

ideological interests. At the same time, Russia's desire to court favor among Middle East states, which in turn can help curb Islamic
Economic necessity drives Russia to promote
fundamentalist threats, is a major factor in its foreign policy decisions.
arms sales and energy sales, though not at the expense of foreign policy interests. As long as
the political price is not prohibitive, Russia will pursue lucrative arms, nuclear, and energy sales,
even at the displeasure of the West. As ideological considerations have yielded to economic interests in the drive behind
arms sales, certain weapons, especially those with dual use potential, represent greater danger than in the past
R/T Coercive Diplomacy
Coercive diplomacy fails 80% of the time (Robert Art United States Institute of Peace)
Robert Art (United States Institute of Peace). "The United States and Coercive Diplomacy: Past, Present, and
Future,". Accessed January 15, 2016. Published 8-8-2003. http://www.usip.org/publications/the-united-states-and-
coercive-diplomacy-past-present-and-future.
research on applications of coercive diplomacy by U.S. policymakers
In fact, according to Robert Art, his
over the past 12 years shown that, "coercive diplomacy fails more often than it succeeds."
Discussing the cases in his study, which range from U.S. interventions in Somalia and Kosovo to the Clinton administration's 1994 negotiations

with North Korea, Art stated that applications

of coercive diplomacy by the United States only succeeded
in meeting its policy objective 20 percent of the time. While Art noted that political objectives often will change
during coercive diplomatic actions and that it was also difficult to define clear policy success, he stressed that the study's finding was consistent

with the findings of other research in the field. What makes coercive diplomacy such a difficult tool for U.S. policymakers to wield effectively Art

asked.

70% of Russians do not want to make a compromise on sanctions (Levada Center)

Yekaterina Sinelschikova (Russia Beyond the Headlines). 70 percent of Russians opposed to compromise on
sanctions report. Accessed January 15, 2016. Published July 10, 2015.
http://rbth.com/society/2015/07/10/70_percent_of_russians_opposed_to_compromise_on_sanctions_report_47
633.html.
According to a Levada Center survey taken in June, 70 percent of Russians believe that the country should not
make any compromises because of the sanctions imposed by the West over Moscows role in
the Ukrainian conflict. Just 20 percent of those polled said that Russia "should look for a compromise and make concessions in
order to have the sanctions lifted." Yet despite this outward defiance, sociologists say that a third of the population is
experiencing difficulties due to the sanctions, although paradoxically this does not seem to be
having an effect on the popularity rating of Russian President Vladimir Putin, which recently
reached a record 89 percent.

Sanctions make Russia insecure theyll never change the way they act diplomatically
(Clifford Gaddy Brookings Institution)
Clifford Gaddy (Brookings Institution).One year of western sanctions against Russia: We still live in different
worlds. Accessed January 15, 2016. Published 3/9/2015. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-
chaos/posts/2015/03/09-one-year-western-sanctions-against-russia-gaddy.
The United States and the European Union have now both announced that they are extending the economic sanctions they first imposed
One year on, the West thus remains committed to a
against Russia in March 2014 for its actions in Ukraine.
policy which has failed so far and which has no chance of succeeding in the future. The
[Western] sanctions policy was destined to fail because it was based on false assumptions
about how most Russians thinkin particular, how they think about security. We and the Russians are
fundamentally at odds on what sanctions are all about. The current official Western view is
that sanctions are a way to punish Russia for violating the rules of the international order and
to thereby correct its behavior in the future. The Russians believe the sanctions are designed
to weaken Russia and reduce its ability to defend itself. These diverging views are only the tip
of the iceberg of mutual misunderstanding between Russia and the West, misunderstanding that is
rooted in our fundamentally different views of how nations can best ensure their security in todays world. Angela Merkel famously said that

Vladimir Putin lives in another world. The meaning was that he has a completely different frame of reference, and as a result, that he does

not views events and actions the same way that we in the West do. What Merkel said of Putin applies to the majority of Russians. This is

certainly true as regards concepts of global and national security. The West and Russia are worlds apart on what constitutes a security threat,

on Russias actions in Ukraine, and on what sanctions represent. Our Western view is that security in an interconnected world has to be based

on cooperation, dialogue, and trust. It can only be guaranteed by everyone adhering to a rules-based system. Russia rejects that idea of

security. It believes that the only real guarantee of its own security and sovereignty is its independent ability to defend itself. No multinational

or supranational organization can guarantee that. Western leaders explain that sanctions are intended to change Putins calculus. This

assumes that there are some gains he would be willing to forego in return for easing the pain of current or future sanctions. Yet when we apply

this cost-benefit modelwhich is one adopted from the realm of the economics of crime and law enforcementwe fundamentally

misunderstand what is at stake for Russia. Ukraine is not loot from a robbery, whose value Russia weighs against the cost of seizing it. In its own

view, Russia acted in Ukraine to defend against an existential threat. By applying sanctions, we think we are pressuring Russia to shift its

behavior towards a more acceptable form. Russians see us as forcing them to choose: either accept a political and military situation that will

threaten the survival of their nation or be subject to a constantly intensified campaign of economic warfare. For Russia, this is not a choice. It is

defeat in either case. We are therefore caught in a trap, one of our own making. We adopted a policy that could never work as it was intended,

namely, as a way to force Russia to change its behavior and obey the rules of our order. Russia will never respect those rules as long as it
Sanctions can therefore not solve
remains convinced that our order prohibits Russia from guaranteeing its own security.
our Russia problem. Russia will act as it has in Ukraine, and worse, as long as it feels
insecure and still remains capable of defending against threats. If winning in this conflict for
us means that we force Russia to acknowledge that our version of international security prevails
over its version of security, there is only one way we can win. Russia must collapse completely. There are, of course, those in the West who

think Russia is headed for collapse internally, perhaps sooner rather than later, and that sanctions will hasten the day. This is a very dangerous

bet.