H. A. G. BRAAKHUISH, The Views of William of Sherwood On Some Semantical Topics and Their Relation To Those of Roger Bacon

Brill
The Views of William of Sherwood on Some Semantical Topics and Their Relation to Those of
Roger Bacon
Author(s): H. A. G. BRAAKHUIS
Source: Vivarium, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1977), pp. 111-142
Published by: Brill
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Vivarium
XV, 2 (1977)
The Views of William of Sherwood on Some Semantical Topics

and Their Relation to Those of Roger Bacon*
H. A. G. BRAAKHUIS
is well known, Roger Bacon in his CompendiumStudii Theo-

As logiae deals with the two semantical problems he considers of
primordialimportanceformetaphysicsand logic.1The positions
taken on these problems have accordingly,in his opinion, an effect
on every theological or philosophical dispute. The problems are the
following: a) can a word signify anything that is univocally com-
mon to being and non being (utrum vox possit significarealiquid
commune univocum enti et non enti), b) can a word loose its signifi-
cance (utrum vox possit cadere a sua significatione).
From the beginningof his treatmentof the problems Roger makes
it unambiguously clear that in his opinion the firstof the questions
is to be answered in the negative and the second in the affirmative.
Accordingto him nouns in principlesignifyonly actual existingthings
and in case the thing(s) signifiedby a certain noun were to perish,
nothingwill be left forthat noun to signify.Or if the same noun (i.e.
the same combination of sounds) were eventually charged with the
new functionof signifyingthose things that once did exist, then the
firstand the second significationof that noun will have a relation
of equivocation.2
* This paperwas read,in firstdraft,at the SecondEuropeanSymposion for
MedievalLogicand Semantics heldin Leiden/Nijmegen, November1974.
1 FratrisRogeriBacon Compendium Studii Theologiaeed. H. Rashdall . . . ,
Aberdoniae MCMXI (anast.repr.Farnborough 1966),pp. 52-64.
2 See ibid.,p. 54: ... quia omnianominaque inponimusrebusinponimusut
suntpresentanobis;p. 59: Ex hac ergoratione(radice,Rashdall)patet quod
non potesthomoesse animalnullohomineexistente,nec Cesar poteritesse
homo: quia nominahuiusmodi significant essenciasrerumpresentes et actuales,
quia non significant (nomensignificat, Rashdall) aliquid communepresenti,
preterito et futuro;pp. 60-61:quia (scilicet:nomen)noninponebatur nisisub
racionepresents et esseactualis... et ideocumperiitres,et sicnonest,nomen
nonsignificabit illud;
p. 61: dicendum estquodvoxque significabat rempresentem perinpositionem
aliquandonon significabit rem illam preteritam sub eadem inposicione;set
benepotestinponiei novainposicione, licetsitnichil;quia possumusperpriva-
III
The usually defended semantical concepts leading to an answer
contraryto the one Roger gives, he treats very sourly and contempt-
uously.3 One of these conceptions so firmlyrejected by Roger is that
of the esse habitale:
Compendium, p. 55: sed cum mendaciamultiplicantursemper,et iterum
finguntunum esse quod nunquama philosophianec a sapientibusfuit
inventumnec receptm,et dicuntilludessehabitale, et hoc dicuntesse
communepresenti, et futuro,et communeentiactualiteret non
preterito,
entiactualiter.
If one now looks for a person to whom to ascribe such a conception,

the name of William of Sherwood comes easily to mind forin his so-
called Introductionesin logicam we find exactly this conception of
esse habitale *
,6 p. 83a8-34:.... quia cum dicitur:"omne animal est",
Introductiones
predicaturhie esse actale,quod est existere.Cum autemdico: "omnis
homoest animal",predicatur esse habitale.
.... Cumenim'est' poniturinterhec extrema'homo','animal' tamquam
medium,dicithabitudinem mediaminterhec duo.
One could also point to other passages in William of Sherwoos

work, where this esse habitaleis related explicitlyto the problem of
the empty class.
Thus we read in his Syncategoremata ,6in the section on est:
Syncategoremata, p. 71: Sciendumautem quod hoc verbum'es quan-
doqueaccipituraequivoce;dicitenimquandoqueesseactalequoddebetur
quandoqueesse habitalequod debeturei quod in se
actualiterexistenti,
esse in aliquo singulari,
est naturaaliqua et natumest habitualiter licet
cionementisintelligerenonens; et sicutintelligimus nonens,sicpossumusdare

nomen,set nova eritinposicio,et equivocerespectuprionssignificati (signati,
Rashdall).
Theselast sentencesshowthatofcourseRogerBacon allowssignification of
nonbeingstoo.
3 Cfr.Sten Ebbesen & Jan Pinborg,Studiesin theLogicalWritings Attributed
toBoethiusde Dacia, in: Cahiersde l'Institutdu Moyen-gegrecet latin (de
l'Universitde Copenhague),3 (1970),pp. 1-54te1'10*)*esP-PP-4~44 (9<>-94)
wherea listoftheseconceptions is givenand ofthemenwhodefended them.
4 See StenEbbesen & JanPinborg,ibidem,p. 44 (94),whoregarding thiscon-
ceptionofessehabitalepointto WilliamofSherwoodand referto thepassage
ofhis Introductionescitedhere.
5 We use the editionof Grabmann:Die Introductiones in logicamdes Wilhelm
vonShyreswood Einleitungund Textausgabe
(f nach 1267). Literarhistorische
von MartinGrabmann(SBAW, Phil.-hist.Abt., Jhrg.1937, 10)>Mnchen
1937,but use the corrections offered by J.Malcolm,On Grabmann' s Textof
WilliamofSherwood, in: Vivarium, IX (1971),pp. 108-118.
6 See J.R. O'Donnell,TheSyncategoremata ofWilliamofSherwood, in: Medieval
Studies,III (1941)PP-46-93-
112
non actalitersit. Primomodo haec est falsa: ' omnishomoest animai'
nullohomineexistente;secundomodovera; et sic sumiturin hac 'omnis
homoestanimai' secundumquod ly 'omnis'dividitpropartibussecundum
speciem.
In much the same way as in the preceding passage the notion of

esse habitale also occurs in William's treatment of the sophism
'omnis homo de necessitate est animar in the same work.7
These last two passages are both to be connected8 with the treat-
ment of 'omnis' in the same work, where we read e.g. :
Syncategoremata, p. 49: Proptereadicendumquod pars secundumspeciem

estparsquae debeturuniversali inquantumestuniversale, et haecestpars
secundumquod est habitualiter ens; pars autemsecundumnumerum est
pars actualiterens et non debeturuniversaliper se. Primomodo pars
hominisest homo habitualiterin Sorte sive Sortes,et similiterhomo
habitualiterin Platone,et hae partes sunt nullo homineactualiterex-
istente.Secundomodoestparshominishomoactualiter in SortesiveSortes,
homoactualiterin Platone,et hae partesnonsuntnisihomine
et similiter
actualiterexistente.
Perhaps one could also point to another aspect of William's doc-

trine, namely that of the habitual supposition (suppositio in habitu
or secundumhabitm ), which should be put on a level with Peter of
Spain's natural supposition (suppositio naturalis) by means of which,
as Peter asserts explicitly,a term can stand for existingand non ex-
istingthings.9
This all seems to justify considering William of Sherwood as an
advocate of the esse habitalewhich was so despised by Roger Bacon.
In my opinion, however,if that were to be the case, a problemwill
arise concerning the attitude of Roger Bacon towards William of
Sherwood. For we know Roger to have held William in high esteem
precisely with regard to philosophia communis, which is commonly
7 See his Syncategoremata, p. 75.

8 As is rightly
pointedoutbyNormanKretzmann, see hisWilliamofSherwood's
Treatiseon Syncategorematic Words,transi,withan introd.and notes,Minnea-
polis1968,p. 93, n. 16.
9 See Peterof Spain {PetrusHispanus Portugalensis) Tractatus, calledafter-
wardsSummuleLogicales.Firstcriticaleditionfromthe manuscripts withan
introduction by L. M. de Rijk, Ph. D., TractatusVI, 4, p. 8i2"5andTractatus
X, i, p. 19711-13.For a treatment and comparisonof the two notionsof sup-
positioninvolved,see L. M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum. A Contribution to
theHistory ofEarlyTerminist LogicII, 1,Assen1967,pp. 571-575,andespecially
idem,The development ofsuppositionaturalisin mediaevallogic , in: Vivarium,
IX (1971),pp. 71-107,estp.pp. 80-85.
113
agreed upon to mean or, at any rate, to include logic.10 Now, the
reasons why Roger bestowed praise or blame on certain persons may
not be totally clear in everyaspect, it would be howeverratherstrange
indeed for Roger to esteem William so highlyas a logician if he knew
- and we can be almost certainof that - William to stick to an opin-
ion he himselfcondemnedas mendacious,the more because it concerns
a subject Roger appears to consider as pivotal not only in the field of
logic but in theology as well.
However, if we examine more carefullythe position of William of
Sherwood concerning the semantical problems under discussion, we
may not only find some reason for the praise Roger bestowed on
William, but, what is more important, also get a clearer idea of
William's opinions on these matters, especially as compared with
those of Roger. We may furthermoreget a somewhat better idea of
the ways in which some of the problems so eagerly debated in the
second half of the 13th century11had already presented themselves
in the time before.
a) Relation supposition- appellation

Let us start by taking a closer look of William's tract De appel-
latione.12The tract starts with some generalremarkson the differences
between appellation, supposition and copulation and it is observed
that the functionof appellation belongs to both the subject-termand
predicate-term.After that a remark is made on the relation of the
suppositumof a term to the appettatum:
p. 82a0-23:Nota enim quod suppositumquandoque est
Introuctiones,
aliquodens,quandoquenonens; appellatumautemsimpliciter est ens; et
et appellatumquandoquesuntidem,quandoquenon.
sic suppositum
In order to determinewhen suppositum and appellatum coincide or

not, a variant of the usual rule of appellation is given:
ibid.,p. 8224-26:Terminuscommunisnon restrictus habenssufficientiam
et
appellatorum supponens verbode presentinon habentivim ampliandi
supponittantumprohiisqui sunt.
10 See GrabmannIntrouctiones, pp. 14-15and especiallyNormanKretzmann,

Williamof Sherwood's IntroductiontoLogic, transi,withan introd.and notes,
Minneapolis 1966,pp. 5-7.
11See forthisStenEbbesen & JanPinborgStudies(quotedn. 3), passimt Jan
Pinborg,Bezeichnung in der Logik des XIII. Jahrhunderts , in: Miscellanea
Mediaevalia,VIII (1971),pp. 238-281and JanPinborg,LogikundSemantik im
. Ein Ueberblick,
Mittelalter Stuttgart-BadCanstatt,1972,pp. 92-100.
12See Grabmann, pp. 82-85and Kretzmann,
Introductiones, pp. 122-131.
114
This is followed by a detailed explanation and discussion of the
various conditions laid down by that rule.13This continues until p.
8514,wherethe purpose oftherule and its treatmentis clearlyindicated:
Et omnibushiis conditionibus
ibid.,p. 8514-15: observatisidem eritsup-
positumet appellatum;terminusenimsupponitpro appellatis.
Hereafter,however, (fromp. 8515onwards till the end of the section)

anotherview follows on the relation between suppositum and appel-
latum and on the conditions under which they are the same or not.14
We findWilliam eager to stressthis view as the profierone (p. 8515-16:
Vel aliter, si proprie velimus loqui, dicamus quod . . p. 85s4: Unde
debet propriedici . . . ). And we should not fail to notice that this view,
which he presents as the proper one, is quite contraryto the former
one.
According to the formerone, a term has by its own virtue a range
of reference (denotation) that includes besides present things also
past and futurethings.For a termto denote in fact only presentthings,
special conditions are required (these are the conditionslaid down by
the rule of appellation) : cfr.:
ut hic 'homocurri;iste terminus'homo
ibid.,p. 8233-832: ' secundum se
potestsupponerepro preteritis, et futuris,sed coartaturhie
presentibus
ad presentesperverbumpresentis temporis.
13Thisis veryclearlyshownbythetranslation ofKretzmann, withitsinserted
subsectionheadings.
14I am afraidNormanKretzmann failedto see this,forhe says (Introduction,
p. 130,n. 101):
"Althoughthissentence(= p. 8514-15) seemsto announcethe end of Sher-
wood'sexplicationof the ruleregarding supposition and appellation,the sen-
tencesimmediately followingseemto presentsomeafterthoughts on the sub-
ject ofampliation".
As we willsee, whatfollowsare not 'someafterthoughts', but is theproper
wayofviewingtherelationbetweensupposition and appellation,whichis quite
contrary to the formerone. For that matterparagraph16 of his translation
shouldbetternotbe extendedto theend ofthesection.
AlsoW. Kneale (W. and M. Kneale,TheDevelopment ofLogic,Oxford1962,
p. 260) failedto noticethefactthattwodifferent viewsare presented.
OnlyafterI had presentedthe firstdraftof this articleI couldobtainthe
important workofAlfonsoMaier,Terminologia logicadellascolastica(Lessico
intellettualeEuropeo Vili), Roma 1972. He, indeed,observesthat William
proposeshereanotherpossibilityof viewingthe relationof suppositionand
appellationand that the view concernedis contraryto the formerone, see
p. 168: La possibilitqui affacciatada Guglielmodi Shyreswood rappresenta
l'essattorovesciamento della affermazione . . . etc. In generalthe sectionsof
thechaptersI on appellatioand II on ampliatio-restrictio thatare devotedto
the 13thcentury(pp. 85-97,135-137and 152-172)are verypertinent to the
problemsdiscussedin thisarticle.
115
Or, to put it in another way, according to this view (the range of)
supposition is to be narrowed [restrictedor contracted 15) in order to
become (the range of) appellation.
Accordingto the latter view, however,a termhas by its own virtue
a range of referencethat includes only things that actually exist at
the present time, though by force of some special predicates this
range can be extended to past or future,or generally: non existent
things:
Vel aliter,si proprievelimusloqui,dicamusquod terminus
ibid.,p. 8515"24:
de se supponitpro presentibus ; et si supponatpro aliis,hoc eritratione
sui adiuncti,scilicetverbiampliandivel verbipreteriti vel futuritemporis.
Et erithec ampliationon solumrationesignificati sed
nec consignificati,
pervirtutem amborum.Undecumdico: "homocurrit",supponitly 'homo '
de se propresentibus, et ab hac suppositione nontrahitur per16predicatum.
Si autemdicam: "homocucurrit"vel "potestcurrere", iam trahiturhec
suppositioad nonexistentes, in sensudicocompositionis.17
Thus, according to this latter view, (the range of) supposition coin-
cides fundamentallywith (the range of) appellation, and it is to be
widened (ampliateti ) to reach beyond appellation; thereis, accordingly,
no possibilityforrestrictionto be accomplished by the verb:
Unde debetpropriediciquod hocverbum'potest
ibid.,p. 8524*27:
' et similia
ampliantsuppositionem hoc
termini, verbum 'curriet similianon re-
stringunt terminm, quia terminusde se supponitpropresentibus.18
As for the reason why this second view on supposition is correct,

William points to what he considers as the significationof a term:
'homo
Et dico quod illeterminus '
ibid.,p. 8527"31: supponitpropresentibus
formam
de se, quia significat in comparationead suas res.Hec autemcom-
paratiotantumsalvaturin existentibus. Solumenimestsuumsignificatimi
formaexistentium; et proptereaprohiissupponitde se.
16Of coursethe typeof restriction accomplished by theverbof a proposition

is meanthere. For the different typesof restrictionsee L. M. de Rijk, The
development (quotedabove, note9), passim.
It shouldbe noticedthatin thepassageofWilliamdiscussedibid.,pp. 81-82
(namelyIntroductiones, inline32 tribus
pp. 8228-832) accordingtothemanuscript
has to be correctedin talibus(thishas notbeennoticedby Malcolm); thediffi-
cultiesofKretzmann and De Rijk havelosttheirsenseherewith in myopinion.
18perMs, ad Grabmann (notnotedby Malcolm).
17This last remarkrefersto the distinction Williamhas made p. 8414- re-
gardingsentenceswitha verbofthepast or futuretense,cfr.Malcolm,op. cit.
(above,n. 5), p. 110.
18 For the differences betweentnesetwo contrasting views,cir. inDorg,Be-
zeichnung, p. 249andidem,Logik,pp. 95-96andespecially Maier,Terminologia,
esp.pp. 157-169.
116
I think we can hardly do anythingelse but believe William on his
word when he declares this second view to be the proper one. And I
think we can find some indication elsewhere that indeed this is the
directiontowards which his opinions tend. As such we mightdraw at-
tention to the circumstance that William's opinion that the func-
tion of appellation belongs to the subject-termas well as to the pre-
dicate term (and to the latter precisely as predicate term19)seems to
be morein accordance with this second view on supposition.20Further-
more,we mightpoint to William's treatmentof sentenceswith a verb
of the past or future tense {Introductiones,p. 8414-30).There he de-
clares that such sentences have a double sense, namely a compounded
and a divided one, and he furthermorestates that according to the
latter sense the supposition of the subject term is not discriminated
by the predicate term and thus maintains its original force,one could
say, of standing foractual existing things.21
19 See Introductiones , p. 8215-19:Sciendumetiamquod terminus ex partesub-
iectiappellatsuas res,sed nonsecundumquod est subiectum.Ex parteautem
predicatiappellat,et secundumquod est predicatum;secundumautemquod
predicatum(not: predicaturMalcolmp. 115) comparaturad subiectumsuum
per aliquamsuarumrerum,et secundumhoc appellat.This is broughtout by
Williamagainsttheopinionthatthesubject-term suppositsand thepredicate-
termappellates.
20 It is at anyrateremarkable thatRogerBacon,whodefendsthesecondview
on supposition, as willbe seen,also rejectsthe viewthat appellationis ofthe
predicate- termalone,and statestoo that appellationbelongsto the subject-
termas wellas to thepredicate-term; see his Sumule(cfr.below,n. 23) p. 277
18-24
: Et diciturquodappellacioesttermini sinetempore
predicabilis significatio
(significato,Steele). Quodestfalsum,quia appellaciodiciturpercomparacionem
ad appellataque respicit.Cumigitursubjectusterminus equaliterrespiciatap-
pellata sicut (sic, Steele) terminuspredicatus,erit appellaciosubjectisicut
predicati.
The mainpointhereis not that William(and Roger),in oppositionto a
viewsuchas proposedby e.g. the tractCumsitnostra(see de Rijk,Log. Mod.
II, 2, p. 449), ascribesthefunction of appellationto the subject-term, forthis
is quiteusualwiththedefenders ofthefirstviewon supposition too; it is that
Williamstressesherethatthe predicateis connectedto the subjectby means
of a res ( = concreteindividual)to whichthe formsignified by the predicate
' *
belongs.For in cases as homoestanimal thisis notsucha usual opinion,cfr.
below,n. 33 and n. 44.
Regardingthe interpretation of the passageof Williamquoted (n. 19), it is
to be notedthatit givesindeedWilliam'sownopinion,as mayappearfromthe
context(Dicuntquidam ... Et sciendum. . . Sciendumetiam),cfr.however
de Rijk,Log.Mod. II, 1, pp. 563-564;and secondlythatit doesnotgiveneces-
sarilyevidenceoftheidentitytheoryof the copula,see Maier,Terminologia,
pp. 91-92.(For otherpointsofMaier'sinterpretation, see below,n. 57).
21Introductiones, p. 8414-23 : Dicendumquodhuiusmodi sermones, ubipredicatur
verbumpreteriti '
temporisvel futuri,suntdplices,ut homocucurri.Potest
II 7
As far as his remark on significationis concerned (p. 8527"31),we
might compare it with other passages where significationis also link-
ed not only to the formbut by means of the formto the substances or
things to which the formbelongs. See e.g. :
Introductiones,p. 787-10:Omne enim nomensignificaisolam formamet
non absolute,sed inquantuminformat substantiamdefferentem
ipsam et
sic aliquo mododat intelligere substantiam.
ut est
humanitatem
ibid.,p. 7814-15:. . . quia hec dictio'homo'significat
formaindividuorum . . . .aa
Now, it should be kept in mind that the view on appellation pro-

posed by William as the proper one, is exactly the same as the one
defended by Roger Bacon, as is most clearly shown by his Sumule
dialectices.23In this work Roger makes a clear distinctionbetween the
two views on appellation24defendingvigorouslythe view that a term
enimistesermodicicompositus vel divisus.Si compositus : tuncdebetcontinue

proferri; et continuitas subiecticumpredicatosignificat quod debeatsua sup-
positiodiscernia predicato,et secundumhoc ly 'homo'supponitpropreteritis
et non pro presentibus nisi inquantumsuntpreterita.Si 'divisus: tuncdebet
discontinue proferrisic "homo,cucurrit";et significat discontinuitas orationis
quod suppositionondiscernitur perpredicatum.
22One mightpointherealso to William'sconcernto preservethe comparatio
ad resevenin thecase ofsimplesupposition[ibid.,p. 7713*16ff.).
23In my opinion,thereis not verymuchreasonto doubtthe attribution of
theseSumuleto Roger.Firstlythereare the remarkable doctrinalsimilarities
betweenthe Sumule,esp. the sectionde Appellatione, and the Compendium,
pointedout by Steele(SummaGrammatica MagistiRogeriBaconnecnonSumule
Dialectices MagistiRogeriBaconnuncprimumed. R. Steele( = Operahactenus
ineditaRogeriBaconi,Fase. XV) OxoniiMCMXL,pp. XXI-XXII). Secondly
thereis thesecondMs: Sevilla,Bibi.Columbina 5-2-40,discovered byE. Longpr
{La Summula de
dialctica Roger Bacon, in: Archivm Franciscanum Historicum,
31 (1938),pp. 204-205)but unknown to Steele,whichtoo ascribestheworkto
Roger Bacon. This Ms seemsto be quite independentfromMs Digby 204.
Finally,it is to be notedthatthedoubtsofA. G. Littleconcerning theauthor-
shipofRogerapparently restedonlyon an error.In hisAppendix : RogerBacon's
Worksin Compendium ed. H. Rashdall,pp. 71-118,on p. 103a mistakeis made
(and it is repeatedin RogerBacon Essays etc. coll. and ed. by A. G. Little,
Oxford1914, (reissuedNew York 1972),p. 407) to the effectthat the names
Roberti and Rogeriare exchangedforeach other;one shouldread: "Expliciunt
sumulemagistiRogeriBaccun" and in the second following line 'Sincate
-
greumata fratisRobertiBacon'.
24Sumule,p. 27728"38: Duplex tamenest sentenciade appellacionibus, quia
quidamdicuntquod terminus appellatde se appellatapresencia, preterita,et
futura,et est communis entibuset non-entibus; alii dicuntquod terminus est
solumnomenpresencium et nichilest communeentiet non-enti, sivepreterito,
presenti,et futuro,secundumquod dicit Aristotelesin primoMetaphysice.
Quia verosentenciaprimaest communis, ideo primodiscernamus eam.
It is to be remarked thatRoger,likeWilliam,treatstheusualruleofappel-
lationin connection withtheviewhe does notconsidercorrect.
118
by virtue of its own, stands only for actual existing things and that
only by virtue of some special predicates a term can stand fornon ex-
isting things.25And like William, Roger defends this view by appeal-
ing to the proper nature of significationof a term.26In my opinion
there is no need to stress that the same view underlies the principles
defendedin the Compendiumstudii theologiae.
On my view we are entitled to conclude that there is a remarkable
agreement between William and Roger, although William may not
expose his intentionsas clearly as Roger does. This agreementis the
more remarkableif we take into considerationthat the view proposed
by William and Roger was not the generallyaccepted one, as Roger
rightlyremarks.27As far as we know there is indeed no one besides
the two to defend this view in the time concerned, i.e. roughly the
firsthalf of the 13th century. On the contrarywe find that most of
the texts which are known at the moment express the view of what
one could call the theory of larger supposition, according to which
the appellata form only a subclass effectuatedby restrictionof the
class of supposita.28
25Ibid.,pp. 28o29-28i7: Quareterminus de se solumconcernit presencia,et sup-

ponitproillisde sui natura(materia,Steele); pernturmautemverbide pre-
teritoet futuro, vel habenti<s> naturam(materiali, Steele)eorum,ut verba
ampliandi, poterunt starepropreteritis et futuris. Ex hiispatetquodverbumde
presentinichiloperaturad supposicionem terminia partesubjecti,cum non
possitfacereterminm starenisi pro presentibus, et terminusde sui natura
hochabetquod sicstet.Set quia nonhabetde se ut stetpropreteritis et futuris,
ideo verbumde preteritoet futurovel habensvim ampliandipotentfacere
ipsumstarepro aliis a presenti.Ex hiis patet quod predicatumnullomodo
contrahit subjectumnec restringit, set solumampliaiejus supposicionem, vel
'
racionesignificacionis sue, ut 'sole,'potest',conveni(ponit,contrait,Steele)
et hujusmodi,vel racioneconsignificacionis, scilicettemporis,ut verbumde
preterito et futuro.
28Ibid., p. 283s-19:Cujus solucioest quod nominanon habenttempuspro
significato neca parteconsignificati sibideterminant appellatapresencia, secun-
dumquod obiectio(absolute,Steele) procedit,set racionesue significacionis
taliasibiassumunt ; inponiturenimnomenreipresenti et appellatopresenti. . .
Sicutenim'homo ' determinai sibiex sua significacene homines,sic et homines
presentes et existentes.
27Sumule,p. 27735-36, quotedabove,n. 24.
28Onemightpointto thefollowing tracts(seethelistgivenbyMaier,Termino-
logia,pp. 87-90): the Introductiones Parisienses(notso explicitly), see de Rijk,
Log. Mod., II, 2, p. 371; theDialcticaMonacensis, see ibid.,pp. 616-617;the
SummeMetenses, see Log. Mod.,II, 1, pp. 458-459;theTractatus deproprietati -
bussermonm, see Log. Mod.,II, 2, pp. 722-723;PetrusHispanus,Tractatus X
i (ed. de Rijk) p. 1978"14,and X 4, p. 1985-9; LambertofAuxerre,see Lamberto
d Auxerr e, Logica (SummaLamberti). Primaedizionea cura di FrancoAlessio
(= Pubblicazionidella Facolt di letteree filosofiadell'Universit di Milano
119
b) The conceptof esse habitale
A second point to be examined is the concept of esse habitale.
Even though it is not my intention to deny that this notion can be
found in the work of William of Sherwood, I do think it merits a
closer examination in orderto determinethe consequences he attaches
to it.
Let us then examine his Syncategoremata,the section on est,29
where his ideas on the esse habitale are clearly stated.
William begins by remarkingthat the verb 'est' is not a syncate-
gorematical term,though regarded as such by any others:
LIX), Firenze1971,p. 212: Sciendumautemquodappellatio,prouthiesumitur,
differt a suppositionesicut superbisa suo inferiori vel econverso;appellatio
eniminferior est ad suppositionem ; namubicumqueest appellatio,ibi est sup-
positio,sed non convertitur . . . Ita suppositiosuperiorest ad appellationem,
et est appellatiosuppositioquedam. (This last sentenceomittedby Alessio,
haplology!) ; and Vincentof Beauvais. Speculumdoctrinale , cap. 37, col. 240
(quotedby de Rijk, Development , p. 105).
In his chapteron Ampliatio- restrictio(coartatio)Maier (Terminologia ,
esp. pp. 157-172)presentsthefollowing somewhatdifferent picture.According
to himthepositionofPeterofSpain and LambertofAuxerreis to be regarded
as a combination arisingfromon onesidetheviewoftheDialcticaMonacensis,
theTractatusdeproprietatibus sermonm andtheSummeMetenses (andWilliam
ofSherwood),forwhichthefundamental doctrineis therestriction ofthecom-
monterm,and on the othertheviewpresentedby RogerBacon,in the sense
that ampliatioand restrictio are consideredneutrallyto be reciprocalto one
another.
It is to be noted,however,thattheworkofPeterofSpainis earlierthan,or
at mostcontemporaneous withthatofWilliamofSherwood, in whichas faras
we know,thetheoryofstrictsupposition is formulated forthefirsttime,and it
is certainly earlierthanthatofRogerBacon. It is to be remembered too,that
thecombination ofampliationand restriction is foundalreadyin theSummule
antiquorum , see L. M. de Rijk, On thegenuinetextofPeterofSpain*s Summule
LogicalesI, in: Vivarium,VI (1968),pp. 1-34,esp. p. 17. It is to be keptin
mind,furthermore, that thosewho hold the theoryof largersuppositionand
thusdefendthe possibility forrestriction to be accomplished by the verb (as
Peter undoubtedlydoes, see Tractatus,XI 10-13,PP-202-204),nevertheless
admitalso ampliationto be accomplished bytheverb.RogerBaconhas pointed
out this already,see his Sumule,p. 28o10"15: Item,per naturamampliacionis
videturhoc idem, cum omnessupponuntampliacionem supposicionis istius
termini.Set si sit communispresenti, preterito et futuro,nonpotestsua sup-
posicioaliquo modo ampliali,igiturnon eritsic commune;quare solumerit
nomenpresencium. Quod est concedendum.
In myopiniontherefore, thereis not so muchdifference betweenPeterand
Lambertand theDialcticaMonacensisetc.
At any rate therecan be no doubtthat Peterand Lambertconsideredthe
rangeofsupposition as widerthantherangeofappellation, thelattercovering
onlypart of the former; see thetextsquotedearlierin thisnote.
29 See O'Donnell, Syncategoremata, pp. 70-71 and Kretzmann,Treatise,pp.
90-93.
120
Syncategoremata, pp. 71-72: Et primo modo procedentesprimo modo
determinemus de hoc verbo'est',non quia sit syncategorema,sed quia a
multisponituresse syncategorema. Et illi nitunturhuic dietoAristotelis,
scilicetquod 'est'consignificat
quamdamcompositionem quam'sine com-
positisnonestintelligere. Creduntenimquod hoc 'consignificare sitsuum
significareet sic solumest consignificativum et conpraedicativum sicut
syncategorema. 30
And William adds explicitly that in the case of 'est' occurringin

the third position (tertiumadjacens) it should be regarded too as a
predicate also and not as only that which signifiesthe composition
(p. 71, second paragraph).
I believe that William's opinion as such is not without some im-
portance, because in this way there is a greater emphasis on the ex-
istential importof the verb 'es.zl In any case Peter of Spain, who is
known to adhere to the theory of larger supposition,32seems to in-
clude est among the syncategorematicalterms to the extent that he
sees it as that whichhas the sole functionof formingthe composition.33
30 Kretzmann(Treatise,p. 90) prefersthe readingquod est significaiwitha
reference to Aristotle's De interpretation, 3 i6b23. It is to be noted,however,
thatthemedievallatintranslations read,as is requiredby theGreektext:quod
est consignificat (cfr.Aristoteles Latinus II 1-2. De Interpretation vel Perier-
meniased. L. Minio-Paluello . . . G. Verbeke,Bruges-Paris,1965 ad locum).
Thereis a traditionon the 13thcenturythat givesquodestsignificat, cfr.J.
Hamesse,Les Auctoritates Aristotelis, Un florilgemdival. . . (= Philosophes
MdivauxXVII), Louvain-Paris,1974,P- 35 (- no-32-7)-In our case con-
significat,however, is presupposed by thefollowing sentence,whichshouldbe
translatedas follows:"fortheybelievethatthis'consignify' (whichis said to
be accomplished byest)is itssignifying function and thatin thatwayit (namely
est)is solelyconsignificative ..
31For theconnection ofthe viewson thenatureofthecopulawiththeviews
on supposition, cfr.Pinborg,Bezeichnung, p. 249 and idem,Logik,p. 96.
32Cfr.above,n. 28.
33Thismaybe gatheredfromPeter'streatment of 'est'in hisSyncategoreumata.
He does not touchthereupon the functionof 'est' as a predicate,and treats
'est'as thesignpar excellenceofthecomposition. Thiscomposition he declares
to be based on the convenientia extremorum. I quote fromMs Milano, Bibi.
Ambrosiana, H. 64 Inf. (comparedesp. withMs Ivrea,Bibi. Capitolare, 79: for
theseMss,see de Rijk Tractatus, pp. CIV-CVII):
f. 5orb: cum ergo in dictionibussincategoreumaticis per se intelligantur
'est'et 'non' ...
f.50vb: nota ergo quod hoc verbum'est' consignificat compositionem, et
etiamalia verba,sed hoc verbum'est'perpriusconsignificat eam,cumnatura
sit priusaliisverbis,cumin eis intelligatur.
f-53rb:(on the questionhow the composition can be understood). . . ideo
compositio actus ad substantiam, que significaturper verbum,nonpotestin-
telligisine extremis.Ideo dicit Aristotilesquod 'est*consignificat quandam
compositionem quam sinecompositis nonest intelligere, cumsolumhabeatin-
telligiperilludquod inclinatur et perilludcui inclinatur, quia inclinatioverbi,
121
William continues by pointing out that the verb 'est' sometimes is
to be taken equivocally, because sometimes it means an esse actale,
for which is needed an actual existing reality; sometimes on the
other hand it means an esse habitale, for which only some natura
suffices,and which can be conditionally(habitualiter)in some singular
thing which does not actually exist. This leads William to conclude
'
that the proposition omnis homo est animal', in the case of no single
man existing, has a double sense, because whenever esse actale is
meant, it is false, when on the other hand esse habitale is meant, it
is true:
Syncategoremata,p. 71: Sciendumautemquod hoc verbum'est' quando-

que accipituraequivoce;dicitenimquandoqueesse actalequod debetur
actualiterexistenti;quandoqueesse habitalequod debeturei quod in se
que est ipsiusactus ad substantiam, remotisquod inclinatur et cui inclinatur

nichilest.Et ideocompositio sineextremis nichilest.Et quia unumquodque in-
telligiturperilludquod dat ei esse,cum extremadentesse compositioni, ideo
compositiohabetintelligi perextrema.
f-53Yi>:- sed hoc sequitur:'extremasuntsibi invicemconvenientia ; ergo
compositioeorumest' ... et econversosequitur:'compositio est; ergoextrema
sunt sibi invicemconvenientia' . . . quia convenientia extremorum causa est
compositionis et compositio est effectus convenientia extremorum.
Especiallyinteresting in thecontextof oursubjectis theviewofPeterthat
composition is to be regardedas quodammodo ens whichis commonto being
andnon-being; seef.53:
Queriturutrumcompositio sit simpliciter ensvel non.
Et videturquod non,quia reperitur in rebusexistentibus, ut 'homoestanimal'
et in rebusnon existentibus, '
ut chimeraestnonens*,ergoreperitur in eis per
aliquod communerepertum in ipsis ... ; sed nichilest communeentiet non
enti,nisiens quodammodo ; ergocompositioprimosequiturensquodammodo ;
ergoet ipsa est quodammodoens; ergononestsimpliciter ens.
Et dicendumquod compositio importataperverbumcommuniter se habetad
compositionem entiumet nonentium.Undeperpriussequiturensquodammodo,
ut obiectumest; et ipsa in communiest ens quodammodoet nonsimpliciter.
The difference betweenthe two examplesis thatoftheformer the extrema
suntsimpliciter entia,whileof the latterthe extremanonsuntentia (f.54ra).
For the referential forceof thesesimpliciter entia,one mightcomparePeter's
treatment ofthesophism'omnishomonecessario estanimal'quotedbelow,n. 44.
It is to be notedthat the text of the Syncategoremata as presentedin the
Cologneincunabulareditions,whichhas beentranslatedintoEnglish(Peterof
Spain. Tractatus Syncategorematum and selected anonymous treatises.Transi,by
J. P. Mullaly. . . (= MediaevalPhilosophicalTexts in Translation,13), Mil-
waukee1964)is quitedifferent fromPeter'sowntext.
For a veryexplicitviewregarding 'est' as tertiumadjacensofsomeonewho
defendsviews that are rejectedby Roger,cfr.Ebbesen & Pinborg,Studies ,
p. 19 (69)59"60 ("Petrusde Ybernia"): Sed dicendum:cumdicitursic 'Cesarest
Cesar',hoc verbum'est' non predicatur, immoest nota predicandi;sic enim
Aristoteles dicit.
122
est naturaaliqua et natumest habitualiter
esse in aliquo singulari,licet
nonactualiterest.Primomodohaec estfalsa'omnishomoestanimal' nullo
homineexistente;secundomodovera . . .
With regard to the circumstancesin which the verb 'est' can be taken
equivocally, William mentions two opinions. One according to which
this equivocacy occurs also when 'est' is used as a single predicate, so
that the proposition 'homo est' has the aforesaid double sense, in the
case that no man exists. The other accordingto which this equivocacy
occurs only when 'est' functions as tertiumadjacens and a superior
termis predicated of an inferior.Wilham favoursthis second opinion,
because if 'est' functionsas the only predicate, it means esse without
qualification and in its full sense and this can only occur in the case
that somethingactually exists. And when 'est' functionsas the only
predicate there is nothingthat can account for the equivocation.
Syncategoremata,p. 71: Et hoc satis bene dicitur,quia, ut videtur,si sic
diceretur"homoest",dicithieessesimpliciter et completum, quod quidem
homininoninest,si nonactualitersit,34nec est aliquidquod trahitipsum
ut dicatessesecundomododictum,quod est esse diminutivum.
This brings to mind several points.

First: it seems to me that William's refusal to allow for an esse
habitale in the case 'est' functionsas a single predicate, must be seen
as a rejection of the esse confusumor presens confusum ,35It should be
noted at least that Roger Bacon rejects this notion ofpresensconfusum
in similarwords.36
Second: it is interestingto read that William allows for an esse
diminutivum- that is to say if esse habitale is meant - in the case
that and because of the fact that animal is predicated of homo, i.e.
when a superiorterm is predicated of an inferiorone.37
34O'Donnell:homininoninest;si nonactualiter, sic nec.The readingwe give

corresponds morewiththeMss and punctuationmarks foundin them.
35For thisnotion,cfr.e.g. Logica" Cumsitnostra" , de Rijk,Log. Mod., II, 2
and theSummeMetenses
p. 45o14-26, , ibid.,II, i, p. 460.
38Cfr.Sumule,p. 28719"27: Ahi autemdicuntquod presensduplexest,scilicet
confusum et determinatum. Presensconfusum presents nontenetusum,quia
nonrespicitaliquodtempuscertumsetconfunditur ad omnetempus... ; presens
determinatum est quod aliquodtempuset nuncrespicit.
Puto tarnenquod hoc verbum'est', propriesumptumet simpliciter sine
determinacione acceptum,sempercopulatesseactaleet determinatum.
37Thosenamelywhodefendtheviewsrejectedby
RogerBacon,usuallydeny
thatanimalis to be considered a diminutive determination, cfr.e.g. "Petrusde
Ybernia",see Ebbesen & Pinborg,Studies,p. 20 (70)41:istudenimquod dico
'animal'determinatio diminuens nonest.
123
Third: the most important point is of course, that William un-
ambiguously accepts equivocation between esse actale and esse
habitale. It may be useful to explain what William is saying. It is
not his intention to state that there is equivocation between esse
'
actale and esse habitale in the sense that the inference homo est
animal (esse habitale); ergo homo est (esse actale)' is rendered im-
possible by the fallacy of equivocation.38 He defends the view that
the proposition ' homo est animal' itself has a double sense according
to esse actale or esse habitale. Thus according to the firstsense
' homoest
animal ; ergohomoes is a legitimateinference.
William is consequent in distinguishingthis double sense in sen-
'
tences like omnis homoest animal' Togetherwith the parallel distinc-
'
tion of omnis 'as referringto fartes secundumnumerum(esse actale)
or to partes secundumspeciem (esse habitale)39we findthe mentioned
38 That suchan inference is impossible, by thefallacyofequivocationor some

otherway,is, again,the usual opinionof thosewho defendviewsrejectedby
Roger.Cfr.Ebbesen & Pinborg,Studies,p. 19 (69)60"66 ("Petrusde bernia");
73-80
p. 24 (74)74*85 (anonymous);p. 28 (78)1-8(anonymous)and p. 39 (89)
(RobertKilwardby?). For someearliertextsin whichwe meetthesameview,
see below,n. 44.
39 This distinction is presentedin the Syncategoremata, p. 49, (cfr.the text
quotedabove,p. 113).It is to be notedthatthedistinction between partessecun-
dumspeciem andpartessecundum numerum is defended alsoby RogerBacon.See
hisSummadesophismatibus etdistinctionbus (ed. Steele,OxoniiMCMXXXVII,
= Opera hactenusinditaRogeriBaconi, Fase. XIV), p. I5729-I581:Si vero
('omnis')addaturterminogenerali,aut igiturhabentitesspeciessub se, aut
non.Si non,noncaditdistributio; si sic,potestdistribui. Que distributio potest
fieripro singulisgenerumvel pro generibussingulorum, sive pro partibus
propinquisvel remotis,sive pro partibussecundumspeciemvel secundum
numerum. Generasingulorum suntpartespropinque,et partessecundumspe-
ciemsuntheedempartes,singulagenerum suntpartesremote,et partessecun-
dumnumerum suntidem.In the following Rogerdefendsthisdistinction, see
ibid.,p. i6o36ff.,esp.p. 16117-18: Et dicendum est ut plures,quamvis sentiendum
ut pauci, quod distinctio(distributio, Steele)sustineri potest.Herebyit is to
be remembered that Rogerin thissame workdeclaresthat,althoughthesign
'omnis ' needsthree need threeappellataactu,see ibid.,
appellata,it 'does not
9 ' '
p. 146i.esp. p. 14615*23: quamvis omnisscincategorisma proportionateomni
est
quod categorisma, quantum ad hoc quodutrumque determinat sibinumerum
in ternario,non tarnenquantumad actualitatemilliusnumeri,quia 'omne '
determinat sibi multitudinem in se et non in set 'omne' scin-
categorisma alio,
categorisma in alio numerum requirit,et ideocumilludaliudpossitesseactale
vel potentiale,vel preteritimi vel futurum, exiget'omnis'diversimode sua ap-
pellata,et nonsemperactu. (Cfr.WilliamSyncategoremata, p. 49: Sed intellige
quod, cum distribuit pro partibussecundumnumerum, requirittria appellata
actualiter entia,etcumpropartibussecundum speciem, requirit triahabitualiter
entiavel plura). Thuswe see thatregarding thesepointstheopinionsofWilliam
and Rogerseemto be in agreement.
124
distinction in the treatment of the sophismata: 'omne animal est
asinus',40 'nullus homo est animal'41 and 'omnis homo de necessitate
est animal'.42
With regard to the fact that William so stronglyemphasises the
equivocation between esse actale and esse habitale, one would be
inclined to say that William is not included in the denunciationRoger
Bacon expresses in his Compendium.Perhaps it is possible to evaluate
'
the situation differently,however: by stating that omnis homo est
animal' nullo homine existente has a double sense and as such is to
be regarded as either true or false, William stands somewhere half-
way between Roger, forwhom in the Compendiumthis propositionis
false, even falsissimum,43and the other party, forwhom these propo-
sitions are true, usually even simplicitertrue.44
Concerning therelatedpoint,however,if 'omnis* can be addedto termslike

'fenix'and 'sol' thathave onlyone appellatum, in a proposition ofthepresent
tense,theiropinionsdiffer ratherin thesamewayas in theproblemunderdis-
cussion.WhereasWilliamallowsfora doublesenseofthiskindofpropositions
(Syncategoremata , p. 50: Adhucquaeriturutrumhaec dictio'omnis'possitaddi
veretermino habentiunicumsolumappellatumut ei quodest'sol' . . . Dicendum
quod,si ly 'omnis'teneturproprieet dividatpropartibushabitualiter existenti-
bus,potestaddi ei quod est 'sol' ... Si autemcommuniter tenetur, non),Roger
declaresthesepropositions to be simplyincongruent [Summa,pp. 147-149,see
also Sumule,pp. 27831-2798).
It shouldbe keptin mindthatPeterof Spain does not presentthe above-
mentioned distinction , thatin facthe seemsto reject
in his De distributionibus
it,see his Tractatus XI 14, p. 2055*22.Concerning therelatedproblemif'omnis'
can be added to termslike 'phenix',Peterexplicitly allowsforthisand rejects
theviewthatthreeappellataare needed,see his Tractatus, XII 7-9,pp. 21221-
21618.
40 See theSyncategoremata, p. 49; Kretzmann, Treatise, pp. 21-22.
41Syncategoremata, p. 56; Kretzmann, Treatise,pp. 48-49.
42Syncategoremata, p. 75; Kretzmann, Treatise,pp. 105-106.
It shouldbe keptin mindthatthe relatedpassageof the Introductiones , p.
83 28-35(cfr.above,p. 112) is fullyin accordancewiththeviewsof Williamas
presented by us and withhis treatment ofthe sophismhereconcerned. For it
shouldbe remembered thatin thepassageoftheIntroductiones onestartedfrom
theassumption thatthereare existingonlytwomen[ibid.,p. 838-7) ; therefore
William'sstatement thatin sucha case thepredicateoftheproposition 'omnis
homoestanimal'concernsessehabitaleis consonantwithhis view about the
correctuse ofthesign'omnis'(cfr.above,n. 39).
43Compendium, p. 63. See also his Summa,p. 14517"20: Ad quartumdicendum
'
quod nullo homineexistente,nec triangulo,ille propositiones (seil.: omnis
habettresetc.'et: 'omnishomoestanimal') sunt false sicut
triangulus
vel est sicut 'omnis simpliciter, 'omnis
postea scietur; incongrua hujusmodi phenix est',
homoest'; although inthisworkheleavesopena possibility whichhe apparently
wouldnotallowforin theperiodofhisCompendium, see ibid.,p. 14520-23: aliter
possetfingiquod etsihomovel triangulus nonhabeantappellataactu,habent
tamentriaappellatasecundumhabitmvel secundumaptitudinem nature.
125
c) Supposition in negativepropositions
A thirdpoint that meritsattentionis William's opinion on supposi-
tion in negative propositions. As is known Roger discusses (in his
Sumule and his Compendium45) negative propositionsas presentinga
difficultyfor his view that a term by its own virtue supposits only
44For somelatertexts,cfr.Ebbesen & Pinborg,Studies,pp. 19 (69)87-22 (72)
("Petrusde Ybernia"); 24 (74)-25(75) (anon.); 33 (83)83"64 ("Petrusde Yber-
nia" ?) and esp.pp. 39 (89)60"69 (RobertKilwardby ?): dicendum estaliterquod
primapropositio(seil.: 'omnishomode necessitate estanimal')simpliciter vera
est sive homosit, sive non sit. Unde dico quod hec est vera 'omnishomode
necessitate est animal' et illa 'homoest animal' nullohomineexistente,sieut
ostendebatquedam ratio, quoniam ad veritatempropositionis in naturali
materianonexigitur existentia extremorum actu.Cumigiturintellectus hominis
et animalisnaturaliter sint coherentes, manifestum quod, sive homosit sive
non sit, dummodohec vox 'homo'hominemsignificet, simpliciter in ipso in-
telligitur animai.Et ideo nullohomineexistente hec est vera 'homoestanimai'
et 'omnishomode necessitate estanimai'.
For someearlierviews,one mightpointto: the LogicaCumsit nostra , Log.
Mod.,II 2, p. 45014-23 : Dicendumquod in propositionibus in quibuspredicatimi
de necessitatesequitursubiectum,predicaturesse confuse,hoc est quod non
magisrefert unumtempusquam aliud.In propositionibus veroin quibuspre-
dicatumnumquamsequitursubiectum,predicaturesse determinate, hocest
esse ut nunc.Sed quando predicaturesse confuse,indifferenter supponitter-
minuscommunis prohiisque suntet que nonsunt.Dico quod estverade neces-
sitate: 'homoestanimal',quamvisnuushomosit in mundo.Et hec similiter :
'tonitrus estsonusterribilis'.Et nonsequitur:'ergotonitrus est',quia in primali
'est'significat tempusconfusum, in conclusione determinate. Et sic est fallacia
figuredictionis.
Furtherto: PetrusHispanus,Syncategoremata (cfr.aboven. 33),f.8irb:Hiis
habitisqueriturde hoc sophismate:'omnishomonecessarioest animar.Pro-
batio: hec est necessaria'omnishomoestanimai'; ergomodificata modoneces-
sitatiseritvera; ergohec est vera 'omnishomonecessario estanimai'. Contra :
omnishomonecessarioest animai; sed Sortesest homo; ergoSortesnecessario
est animai- -intertioprime.Sed conclusioest falsa; ergoaliqua premissarum
est falsa.Non minor;ergomaior.Sed hec estprima'omnishomonecessario est
animai'; ergoprimafalsa. Solutio:primaest vera simpliciter et improbatio
peccat secundumaccidens,quia sub terminissimpliciter non sunt sumendi
terminiut nunc.Et dicunturterminisimpliciter qui habentesse necessarium;
terminiautemut nuncdicunturquia aliquandosuntaliquandonon.
And also to thecollection ofsophismatafoundin Ms Cittdel Vaticano, Bibi.
Apost.Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 7678; see M. Grabmann, Die Sophismataliteratur des
12. und13. Jahrhunderts mitTextausgabe einesSophsimadesBoetiusvonDacien
. . . (= BeitrgeXXXVI, Heft 1), Mnsteri. W. 1940,pp. 37-40,esp. p. 39:
Solutio: omnishomode necessitate estanimaletc.Dico quodestverasimpliciter
et concedoconclusionem et probationem et respondeoad argumentum ulterius
factumad hoc 'Sortesde necessitateest animai;ergoSortesde necessitate es
per fallaciamsecundum quid et simpliciter.It is to be noted that this text seems
to be acquaintedwithsolutionsand arguments similarto thoseofWilliam(see
ibid.,p. 40).
45Sumule,pp. 28320-28710; Compendium, pp. 57-59.
126
for actual existing things. Especially in his Sumule he states clearly
that although many assert that a term used in a negative proposition
may stand for being and non-being, according to him a term in a
negative proposition,as in a affirmativeone, stands only foractually
existingthings.46
In William I have not been able to find anything concerningthe
relation of affirmative,privative or infinite,propositions to negative
'
ones. Neither does he seem to discuss sentences like aliquid non es .47
Both of which matters are amply discussed by Roger. Nevertheless
William expresses explicitly his opinion on negative sentences with
an emphasis on universal negative ones.
Let us examine more closely his Syncategoremata , the section on
nuttus*8 To the question whethernullus has the effectof making the
term attached to it supposit for a non existing thing,William replies
that although 'nullus homo, ergo non Caesar' is a valid inferencethis
does not mean that the term 'homo supposits for Caesar:
' '
Syncategoremata, pp. 57-58:Item.Dubitaturde hac dictionenullusutrum
faciatterminm sibiadjunctumstareprononexistentibus.
Et videturquod sic: rebusenimse habentibusut nuncsequitur:'nullus
homocurrit:ergoCaesarnoncurri.Probatio:da oppositum, scilicetquod
Caesarcurrit,et sequiturquod aliquishomocurrit,quia ipse non potest
currere nisiipse sit et etiamsit homo.
Sed si sicpossetinferri,tunc'homo'supponitprononentibus, ut videtur;
sedhocestcontraregulamsuppositionum,cumhabeatsufficientiam appel-
latorum.Item. Eodem modo staretin contrariaet contradictoria; et sic
proomnibuspraesentibus haec essetfalsa'omnishomocurri.
currentibus
Et dicendumquod benetenet:'nullushomo;ergonon Caesar'.Nec est
ibi locus a toto in quantitate,cum Caesar non sit homo; sicutnec hic:
'nullumhabens oculos videt; ergo nec lignum'.Et sicut iste terminus
'Habensoculos ' non ' '
supponitproligno,sic nec hic homoproCaesare.
This passage should be compared with the section on non of the
same work, where the extension of a negative propositionis discussed
in comparison with that of an affirmativeone. William appears to
48Sumule,p. 28415-21: Et dicendumad ilia quod terminusin proposicione
negativa,dico particulariet indefinita,
statpro ente,sicutin affirmativa,quia
negacionichiltransmutat in termino,cumsequaturet nonprcdt.Dubitacio
tarnenest de universalinegativa,et puto tarnenquod stat similiterin illa
terminus pro presenti,quia negacioidem negatquod affirmat et
affirmacio,
solumillud.
47The onlyplace I couldfindthat comesnearto such a discussionis Intro-
whereWilliamdeclaresthe proposition '
ductiones, p. 8316-16, aliquis homonon
es to be true.Thisis stated,however,as a resultofthe conditionthat'omnis
homoes is falsebecause of insufficientiaappellatorum; and that is not the
kindofproblemsdiscussedby Rogerin thepassagesadducedabove.
48Syncategoremata, pp. 56-58;Kretzmann, Treatise,
pp. 48-54.
127
allow a negative proposition to have inferentialforce (respectus)for
beings and non-beings:
Syncategoremata, p. 73: Proptereasic dicamusquod in propositionede
praesentiet non ampliantisolumhabeturrespectusad praesentes, sed in
negativaetiamad non existentes.Quia, si nullushomocurrit,ergonec
tunc Caesaressetet sic essethomo,ergo
Caesar,quia si Caesar curreret,
homocurreret; ergoa primo: si Caesarcurrit,homocurrit;ergosi nullus
homocurrit, nec Caesar.
William denies the allegation that a termwould then stand fora non-
existingthing(s), by basing himselfon an explanation that places the
term 'homo' on a level with the term 'homoqui actualiterest':
ibid.: Sed contra: si hoc argumentum tenet,tuncut videturest ibi locus
a toto in quantitate,et tuncly 'homo'stabitpro Caesareet sic pro non
existente.
Sed dicendumquod hoc non est verum.Quod patet in hoc exemplo
'nullushomoqui actualiter ergonec Caesar', quia sequitur:'si
est currit',
Caesar currit,Caesar actualiterest' et similiter:'est homo'; unde: 'si
nullushomoqui actualiterest; ergonec Caesar'. Et quamvis teneathoc
'
argumentum, patet tamenquod hie totalisterminushomoqui actualiter
est'nonsupponitproCaesare,nec estibi locusa totoin quantitate ; necin
praecedenti,sed magisab oppositis,quia haecaffirmativa Caesaremcurrere
rpugntpraemissaein utroquetermino, non quia Caesaxsit homo,sed
essethomo; et quia affirmativa
quia si curreret, rpugnt,sequiturnegativa.
We may now safely conclude that William holds that terms in a

negative propositionstand only forexistingthings.And thisis precisely
Roger's opinion.
As an aside I should like to draw attentionto the fact that in both
passages William denies explicitly that Caesar is a man (p. 58 : cum
Caesar non sit homo, p. 73 : non quia Caesar sit homo) and so agrees
completelywith Roger on this point.49
49 Cfr.Compendium , p. 63.
It shouldbe noticedthat it is not easy to findexamplesof opponentsto
William'sviews (or to Roger'smoregeneralviews)concerning this pointof
negativepropositions. One mightbe inclinedto thinkof people as Peter of
Spain,but he does notdiscussthepointin hisDe distributionibus (cfr.esp. the
sectionon nullus, Tractatus, pp. 2i93-2202).One couldevenstressthathe ex-
plicitlyrejectsthe viewthatin a negativeproposition thereshouldbe restric-
tionto non-beings ; it is to be remembered,
(ibid.,pp. 20523-20721) however, that
he bases thison assumptions thatdo notrunparallelwiththoseofWilliamor
Roger.One mightalso pointto LambertofAuxerre, whorejectstheinference
'nullushomoest; ergoCesarnonest' (Summa,p. 221). This,however, doesnot
seemto lead himto conclusions thatare contrary to William'sconcerning the
pointunderdiscussion.
128
d) The conceptof habitual supposition
Finally some remarks have to be made on William's concept of
habitual supposition.
In his Logica Modernorum50 de Rijk has called attentionto the fact
that 13th century logicians sometimes fail to maintain a clearcut
distinction between signification (as the conceptual presentation of
an universal nature) and supposition (as the propertyof a term used
in a propositionand concerningdenotation). They teach a rather con-
fusingmixture of the two, which de Rijk has called virtualsupposi-
tion: examples of this are Peter of Spain's suppositio naturalis and
William of Sherwood's suppositio secundumhabitm.In a later article
on the development of the virtual supposition51he has much con-
tributedto the clarificationof this intricatematter.
I believe that it is possible however to propose a modificationof
the interpretationde Rijk presents of William's habitual supposition.
I think de Rijk is certainly correct in emphasizing52that William
considers habitual supposition to be a kind of significationfor which,
in contradistinctionto the genericconcept of signification,the frame-
work of the grammaticalcategoriesis of decisive importance.The same
holds true for habitual copulation. Actual supposition and actual
copulation on the other hand require an orderingof one concept (as
presented by signification)in relation to another (also presented by
signification).And in my opinion de Rijk rightlyremarks53that this
orderingneed not necessarilybe provided by a propositionalcontext;
on the contrary what one would call an orational context (' homo
'
albus', qualislibethomo') will sufficefor this ordering.54
Puttingour information55 together,the followingschemeis the result:
. a. suppositio secundum habitm
i. significatio
^ b.
copulatio secundum habitm
50 de Rijk,Log. Mod.,II 1, pp. 571-575.
51L. M. de Rijk, The development ofsuppositionaturalisin mediaevalLogic I,
in: Vivarium IX, (1971),pp. 71-107.
62Development , pp. 83-84.
53ibid.,pp. 81-82.
64In additionto the arguments broughtforward by de Rijk, one couldpoint
also to William'sremarksconcerning actual copulation,the counterpart of
actualsupposition. In thesectionDe copulationeWilliamdealswiththe distri-
butivecopulationaccomplished by the signaquantitatiswhencopulatedto a
term (Introductiones, p. One has to agree that a combinationlike
8126-30).
' forthis.
'qualibethomosuffices
129
2. suppositio actualis
3. copulatio actualis
4. appellatio
The differencebetween on the one hand (1) and on the other (2), (3)
and (4) is that (1) is a propertythat a word (dictio) already has as
dictio, that is to say: before it has entered into a context,56whereas
(2), (3) and (4) occur only after a word has at least entered into an
orational context57and are the result of this. It is to be noted that of
course (1) does not disappear when (2), (3) or (4) occur, so that (2),
(3) and (4) must be considered functionsof (i).58
65Especiallyas is foundin theintroductory chapterof thesectionDe proprie-
tatibusterminorum (Introductiones
, p. 74n-755).
66Williamis fullyaware of this. Cfr.Introductiones, p. 722'24:Sicut enim
dictioest dictioantequamordinaturin oratione,similiterante habetsignifi-
cationemet nonex eo quod ordinatur cumalio. Cfr.also ibid.,p. 8816ff., where
Williamagreeswiththe opinionthat: dictioest priornaturaquam oratione,
retinetergoesse dictionisantequamingrediatur orationem.Hoc autemhabet
ex sua significatione. Suam ergosignificationem habet antequamingrediatur
orationemet non ex ordinatione sui in oratione,by answering: Dicendumest
quod necesseest dictionemhaberesignificationem ante orationemet ab ea
nullampotesthabere.
57In the case of appellationa propositional contextseemsto be required:
Williamin thiscontextexplicitlyspeaksof subject- termand predicate-term,
see Introductiones Cfr.also above,nn. 19 and 20.
, p. 8211"19.
According to Maier{Terminologia, p. 91) it shouldbe William'sviewthat
appellationis entailedonlyby habitualsupposition and notby actualsupposi-
tion.Thus appellationshouldbelongto a termas such,and whenactingas a
subject-term the termcan accomplishthe functionof appellationbecauseit
alwayspreservesits habitualsupposition, whenactingas a predicate-term it
can accomplish thesamefunction becauseit thenonlyhas habitualsupposition.
Maierinterprets in thiswaythepassageIntroductiones, p. 8212'19(cfr.above,n.
19 and below, In this
p. 132). myopinion interpretation can only be theresult
ofthecircumstance thatMaierputshabitualsupposition on a parwithnatural
supposition. Thusit doesnottakeaccountofthenotionofcopulation(habitual
and actual),thecounterpart ofsupposition, forin thecase ofa copulating term
thereis no difficulty to ascribeappellationto actual copulation, cfr.below,n.
65. In thiscontextit shouldbe remembered thatWilliamascribesappellation
tobothtermini supponentes andtermini copulantes, seeIntroductiones :
, p. 74a3-34
Appellatioautemin omnibussubstantivis et adiectivis(termshavingsupposi-
tion)et participiis(termshavingcopulation).Cfr.furthermore, belowpp. 131-2.
This does not alterthe fact,however - and I thinkthatMaieris quiteright
in thisrespect- thatin theviewsofWilliamon signification muchemphasisis
laidonwhatonecouldcalltheappellative forceofthewords.
58 Cfr.Kretzmann, Introduction,p. 106,n. 11. Thiscomesouttoo,and perhaps
moreclearly,in Introductiones, p. 7610"24 and p. 771"9,whereWilliamdefends
thatthedivisionsformalis-materialis andsimplex-personalis indicatea diversity
of suppositionand not of signification (equivocation),since these different
modesare based on,and occurwithin,one and thesamesignification. Cfr.also
thetextsquotedabove,n. 56.
130
The subdivision within (i) is a mutually exclusive one in the sense
that certain parts of speech - those which signifysomethingas sub-
sisting[significatioalicuius utsubsistentis)- have a suppositiosecundum
habitm, while others- those which signifysomething as adjoining
{significatioalicuius ut adiacentis)59- have a copulatiosecundumhabi-
tm. The effectof this is that when parts of speech of the firstkind
{ia) enter into a context, a suppositio actuaUs results; whereas when
parts of speech of the second kind (j) enterinto a context a copulatio
actualis results.60
The above comes out quite clearly in the introductorypassage on
the propertiesof the terms. Here William states that significationis
to be found in every part or word of an expression;61supposition (i.e.
suppositio actualis) is to be found in substantive nouns or pronouns
or substantive words,62because these have the kind of signification
that is suppositio secundum habitm; and copulation (i.e. copulatio
actualis) is to be found in all adjective nouns, participles and verbs
(because these have the kind of significationthat is copulatiosecundum
habitm, one might add) :
Introductiones : Ex hiispatetquod significatio
, p. 7429*33 estin omniparte
seu dictioneorationis.Suppositioautemin nominesubstantivo tantumvel
pronominevel dictionesubstantiva;hec enim significant rem ut sub-
69Adjoining(adiacens),itis to say: to a substance, cfr.Introductiones,p. 8i19*20:

Et iterum,quia omnecopulanssignificat in adiacentiaad substantiam, et sic
copulatpersonaliter. Kretzmann{Introduction, p. 121, n. 66) conjectures:ad
substantivam. This howevercannotbe right:it would not explainthat all
copulationis personal,sinceforthat a res differens formam= substantiais
needed(cfr.William'sremarksconcerning personalsupposition, Introductiones,
Cfr.also e.g. DialcticaMonacensis,Log. Mod., II 2, p. 60630*33.
p. 7630'33).
Cfr.below,n. 76.
60Signification in the genericsensetherefore shouldnot be considered some
sortofbasisofsignification to whichhabitualsupposition and copulationform
additions.It is possibleto speakofsignification in a genericsense,becauseit is
possibleto speak of presentation of a formto the intellectwithoutspecifying
the mannerin which(as subsistingor as adjoining)that formis presented.
Cfr.also below,n. 66.
61Thisshouldbe thecorrecttranslation oftheratherpeculiarphrase: in omni
parteseu dictioneorationis.Possiblyhoweverthisphraseis theresultofcon-
taminationof in omniparteorationisand seu dictione , this latteroriginally
positedsupra lineam.Nevertheless it is clear that Williamdeals herewith
dictiones(partsofspeech)as forming partof an oratio.For thetermoratioin
thiscontext,cfr.de Rijk,Development, p. 104,n. 75.
62Fortheexplanationofthisnotion,cfr.Kretzmann, Introduction,p. 106,n. 7.
One might,however,also thinkof substantiated adjectives,cfr.Dialctica
Monacensis, Log. Mod.,II 2, p. 6079"18
andLambertofAuxerre, Logica, p. 207f.
131
sistentem et ordinabilemsub alio. Copulatioautemin omnibusadiectivis
et participiis
et verbis.63
This interpretation of suppositio secundum habitm as a kind of
significationseems also to be applicable to the other passage where
William makes use of this notion:
Dicuntigiturquidamquod terminus
ibid.,p. 8211-15: ex partesubiectisup-
ponitet ex partepredicatiappellat.Et sciendumquod ex partesubiecti
supponitsecundumutramquediffinitionem ex parteautem
suppositionis,
predicatisupponitsecundumhabitualemsuam diffinitionem.
In my opinion W. Kneale64is rightin supposing that here we have
to think of cases where the subject-termand the predicate term both
are substantive nouns. In such cases the subject term has supposition
in both senses (ia and 2) ; the predicate term on the other hand has
only habitual supposition (ia), forit seems rather difficult,indeed, to
consider the predicate as an orderingundersomethingelse.65
I thinkthe conclusion is certain that it is really William's intention
63As Williamremarks, somepartsofspeechremainthatare notencompassed
by the combination of supposition and copulation,see Introductiones, p. 752"4:
Nulla autemistarum,scilicetsuppositio,copulatio,appellatio,est in partibus
indeclinabilibus, quia nulla pars indeclinabilis significatsubstantiamvel ali-
quid in substantia.It is interesting to notehere,again,thestressWilliamlays
in regardwith(thefunctions of) significationon the substance(cfr.above,p.
118).
84Kneale,Development oflogic,pp. 248-249.
65It willbe clearthatwhenthepredicatetermis an adjectiveor a participle
(thetwootherpossibilities thereareforappellationto occur,see Introductiones,
therewillbe no difficulty,
p. 7433"34), sincethenthereis actual copulationex
partepredicati.
For a betterunderstanding of William'sintention,one shouldremember
(withKneale,loc. cit.,and cfr.also above,n. 20) thataccording to hima predi-
cate-term - and therefore alsoa predicatetermlikeanimal- predicatesa form
only,see ibid.,p. 787*18. (Thisdoes notmeanthatWilliamshouldholdthata
predicate-term standssimply - cfr.ibid.,p. 75s6and 8i20"26- therefore I am not
so surethaton p. 78etsi stetsimpliciter shouldbe readas : etsicstetsimpliciter,
as Kretzmann(Introduction , p. 112,n. 33) proposes).
It mustbe notedthatWilliam,althoughit is strictly speakingincompatible
withhis definition of actual supposition, nevertheless presents{Introductiones,
'animal' in ' omnishomo estanimal'as an instanceofsuppositioconfusa
p. 7536)
tantum.This mightbe explainedby thefactthatWilliampresentshereto his
pupilsa ratherusual divisionofsuppositiopersonalis;usual,it is to say,in a
certaintradition, cfr.de Rijk,Tractatus, pp. LXXYII - LXXIX. Thereis one
difference,however:theLogica Utdicitand theLogica Cumsitnostrapresent
the divisioncommunis - discretaas a subdivisionof suppositiopersonalisas
opposedto suppositiosimplex,whereasWilliampresents{Introductiones, p.
thedivisioncommunis
7518*28) - discretasideby sidewiththedivisionsimplex-
personalisas twoequivalentsubdivisions ofsuppositio formalis(thesubdivision
communis - discretais leftout in theschemeofde Rijk {ibid.,p. LXXVIII).
132
to regard suppositio secundum habitm (and copulatio secundum
habitm ) as a kind (mode) of signification.
Now I believe that his intention is no more than this, and in my
opinion some reasons may be adduced to corroboratethis view.
Thus, it seems ratherdifficultto see how thishabitual supposition,as
it is explained above, can performthe same functionthat Peter of Spain
ascribesto his suppositionaturalis.On theotherhand, ifhabitual suppo-
sitionwere somethingsimilarto natural supposition,it would seem equ-
ally difficultto understandits use in the second passage quoted above.66
We mightfurthermore point to the circumstancethat also other13th
century authors distinguish,perhaps more clearly than William does,
between supposition as a kind of significationand supposition as a
property,or acceptio, of a term. And natural supposition,if admitted
to exist, is seen as a subdivision of the latter. We might referhere
to Roger Bacon and Lambert of Auxerre.
67
Roger Bacon mentions in his Sumule four differentways of using
the term 'suppositio', one of which is substantivarei designatio, sicut
dicimus quod sustantivanomina supponuntrem suam, idest: sustantive
dsignant.This is distinguishedfromsupposition as proprietastermini
communisper comparacionemad individua; and fromsupposition as
8
proprietasterminisubjectif
It may be useful to digress somewhat upon the view of Lambert
of Auxerre.69
66Cfr.above,n. 57, fortheinterpretation ofMaier.
07Sumule , p. 268a0ff.
68Thereis howevera difficulty here.As may appearfromtheword'secundo '
(p. 26832), whichis apparently faultybecausethesubstantiva reidesignadodoes
notmakeit clearthatsupposition can occuronlyinsidean oratio,the textis
corruptedhere.And indeedMs Sevilla,Bibi. Columb.,5-2-40offersquite a
different readingof our passage. Here only two possibilities are mentioned,
namelyuno modo: suppositioas proprietasterminicommunisetc.(= Steele,
p. 26825-29), and the text continues:secundomodo dicitur:proprietas termini
subjecti,sive: suppositioestinquantumalii supponitur et subiciturin oratione.
De istomodoad presensestintentioetc.
Indeedwithsupposition in thismeaningit is clearthat: supposicionon est
proprietas nisiterminiactualiterordinatiin oracioneet non extra.
Fromthe wordsof Rogerin the sectionon copulationone mighthowever
infercorrectly thatsupposition as a substantivareidesignatiois notat variance
with Roger'sintentions:Sumule , p. 2893"8:Omniaenimnominaadjectivaet
omniaverbaet adverbiasignificancia aliquamrempredicabilem copulant,hoc
est: adjacentersignificant; est enimcopulaciorei significate perunamdiccio-
nemad aliamadjecciovel adjacensinclinado.Sic nonestde sustantivis nomini-
bus,nec aliispartibusoracionis,aliis a predictis.
69 For I thinkthereis reasonto proposesomechangein the de
interpretation
Rijk has given(.Development , esp. pp. 89-96)ofthisview.
133
Lambert, as is known, distinguishesfour differentways in which
the word 'suppostilo' is used: according to the firstway supposition
is : substantivarei designatiovel significatio; according to the fourthit
is acceptioterminipro se sive pro re sua velpro aliquo suppositocontento
sub re sua vel pro aliquibus suppositis contentissub re sua. Lambert
continues that it is the fourthway which is intended in this context
because the discussion regards supposition as the propertyof a term.
He stresses that supposition in the firstway is not such a property:
Summa,pp. 206-207: Et istoquartomodoest hicintentiode suppositione.
Sic enimsuppositioest termini proprietas,non tribusmodispredictis. . .
Primoautemmodo dieta suppositioest quedamsignificatio specialister-
mini et non terminiproprietas.Quod patet sic: vera est predicatio,si
dicatursic: "substantivareisignificatio cumergode dif-
est significatio",
si substantiva
finitopossitdici quidquiddiciturde diffinitione, reisignifi-
catiosit diffinitiosuppositions,poteritdici quod suppositioeritsignifi-
nonestsuppositio
catio.Si autemestsignificatio, que esttermini
proprietas ;
quarerelinquitur quod suppositioprimomododietanonest suppositiode
qua hic intenditur. Quod verumest; sed est suppositioprimomododieta
significatioterminisubstantivi.Et huic suppositioni respondetcopulatio
que est adiectivareisignificatio.
Thus it is clear that supposition (1) is a kind of signification,namely
that of substantive terms, which is opposed to copulation (1) as the
kind of significationadjectival terms have.
Now supposition (4)- i.e. the propertyof a term- allows itselffor
a subdistinction,for it can be said in a wider and in a strict sense
(communiteret proprie). It appears from the sequel that supposition
in the widersense {communiter dicta)- and it should be rememberedit
concernshere supposition (4) - encompasses supposition in the strict
sense {suppositioproprie dicta) and copulation.
Supposition (4) in the wider sense is said regardless of the kind of
significationthe term concerned, that is the term of which the sup-
positionis to be a property,has. Supposition (4) in the strictsense, on
the other hand, is said only of substantive terms,or in other words it
is the propertyof a term taken into account that the term concerned
is a substantival one; and copulation (4) is the propertyofan adjectival
term.70
For thesake ofconveniency I willreferto theeditionofLambert'sworkby

F. Alessio(quotedabove,n. 28), althoughthiseditionis unfortunately fullof
errors;I willcorrectthesetacitly.
70The mainpointofthesubdistinction ofsupposition (4) seemsindeedto be a
parallelbetweensignificationand supposition(4): in thesamewayas it is pos-
in a generalsense,i.e. withoutindicating
sibleto speakofsignification thekind
or whiledoingso (and thenwe speak of supposition(1) and
of signification
134
It is to be noted that the examples given by Lambert of what is
called supposition (4) in the wider sense indeed concern substantival
' '
and adjectival terms, namely: homo est species , homo curri (sub-
' ' album curri
stantival) and album disgregati (adjectival).71
That suppositionin the strictsense and copulation,ofwhichLambert
speaks in this passage, are indeed to be considered as propertiesof a
term, that is as suppositio (4) proprie dicta and copulatio (4), may
appear not only fromLambert's own words by which he introduces
these notions.72It comes out clearly,too, in the definitionshe gives of
these notions. For these are exactly the same as the definitionhe had
given of suppositio (4) (quoted above) and he inserts only the kinds
of significationa term can have (I underlinethe pertinentwords):
ibid.,p. 207: Et est suppositiopropriedictaacceptioterminiremfixamet
perse stantem representantissecundumquam (scilicet:acceptionem)teneri
potestpro re sua sive pro vel
supposito contentis
suppositis sub re sua.
Copulatiovero est acceptio terminirem dependentem representantis
secundum quamteneripotestproresua velprosuppositovelprosuppositis
contentis sub re sua.
Thus, in my opinion, we have to distinguishbetween on one side

suppositio (1) and copulatio (1) as kinds of significationand on the
other suppositio (4) and copulatio (4) as propertiesof a term.
Now this is exactly what Lambert tells us to keep in mind:
ibid.,p. 208: Ex predictispatetquod suppositioest termini et
significatio
termini proprietas;et similitercopulatio.Alitertarnensumitursuppositio
ut esttermini et ut esttermini
significatio proprietas ; similiter
et copulatio,
ut visumest.Et de suppositione et copulationeque sunttermini proprieta-
tes,et nonproutsunttermini hie intenditur.73
significationes,
copulation(1) ), so it is possibleto speakofsupposition(4) regardless ofwhat

kindof termit concerns{suppositio communiterdicta)or withregardto this
(and thenwe have suppositio propriedicta(4) and copulatio(4) ).
71I am afraidde Rijk did not noticethis,see his Development, p. 92. That
'album '
disgregaand albumcurriare indeedto be consideredexamplesof
copulation(4) may appear also fromRoger Bacon, Sumule,p. 2898-13:De
copulacioneautemsciendumestquod copulacioaut est simplexaut personalis ;
terminus adjectivusvel particularis potestcopularesimpliciter vel personaliter,
sicutpatetmanifeste secundumomnesdiffrencias supposicionis determinatas,
simpliciterut 'albumdisgrega,discreteut 'hoc albumcurri. . .
72Summa,p. 206. Et isto quartomodo est hic mtentiode suppositione. Sic
enimsuppositioesttermini proprietas,nontribusmodispredictis;ibid.,p. 207:
Sciendumvero quod suppositiode qua intenditur hie, diciturduobusmodis,
scilicetcommuniter et proprie.
73In thepassagefollowing thisone Lambertentersfurther intothedistinction
ofsuppositio(4) intosuppositio(propriedicta)and copulatioand theirconnec-
tion withrespectively substantivaland adjectivalnouns (that is withsup-
positio(1) and copulatio(1) ) : Item,si querataliquisquare suppositioappro-
135
If we wish to put the above said into a scheme the followingresults:74
/ suppostilo- substantivareisignificatici
I = copulatio(i) )
(i modo) (opp.: adiectivareisignificatio
j / acceptioterm.subst.
/ l = suppostilo dieta
proprie
' suppostilo= acceptiotermini
proetc. 1
(40modo) = suppostilo dicta '
communiter
I acceptioterm.adiect.
' ==copulatio(4)
It is to be remarkednow that Lambert introducesnatural supposi-

tion as a kind of supposition(4). 75
Thus, in my opinion, the result of our digress can be that Lambert
of Auxerre distinguishes clearly between supposition as a kind of
significationand supposition as a propertyof a term and accordingly,
between suppositionas a kind of signification(cfr.William's suppositio
secundumhabitm)and natural supposition.
For my assumption that supposition as a kind of significationis

something other than natural supposition, we might furthermore
point out that some of the earliertracts,which distinguishsupposition
and copulation as kinds of significationand also allow natural sup-
position or somethinglike it, introduce these notions in quite distinct
76
passages. Thus the Dialctica Monacensis and the Summe Metenses.11
prietursubstantivis, copulatioadiectivis,ex dictisquid sit dicendumpatet.

Supponereenimest per se stantiset rem suam fixamrepresentantis, per se
autem stare et rem suam fixamrepresentare propriumest substantivorum;
copulareveroest adiacentiset remdependentem representantis, adiacerevero
et rem dependentem representare propriumest adiectivorum. Ideo proprie
loquendosuppositioest substantivorum copulatioestveroadiectivorum.
74In myopinionthismayshowthatthereis no questionofthetwofoldconfu-
sionde Rijk has seenhere[Development, p. 93). For suppositio primomododicta,
thekindofsignification, withsuppositio
is notto be identified communiter dicta,
the property(acception)of a term;and secondly,suppositio propriedicta,the
property ofa substantive term,is notthesameas suppositio primomododicta,
thekindofsignification.
This does not yet mean that the distinctions are unrelatedto each other:
theirrelationlies preciselyin the pointthat the kindsof signification a term
can have are introduced in theacceptionofthatterm.Cfr.above,p. 135.
75See theend ofthetextquotedabove: Et de suppositione et copulationeque
sunttermini proprietates, et nonproutsunttermini significations, hieintendi-
tur.(Cfr.also above,n. 72).
78For suppositionand copulationas kindsof signification, see de Rijk, Log.
Mod., II 2, pp. 6o621-6o723, Supponeresiquidemest substantive
esp. p. 60623-33:
<rem> significare et per se et sine dependentiatali que est in principali
significatione.Copulare est adiectiveremsignificare et in tali dependentiaque
136
Finally I would like to point to Peter of Spain, because he too recog-
nizes suppone?e and copulare (like the Dialctica Monacensis he does
not use the nouns suppositioand copulatioin this connection)as kinds
of signification,the first accomplished by substantive nouns, the
second by adjectival nouns and verbs.78Suppositio and copulatio on
the other hand he introduces as kinds of acceptio terminipro aliquo :
the firstof a terminisubstantivi , the latter of a terminiadiectivi,79
est de principalisignificatione. Dicitur autem terminusille supponerequi
nullamdependentiam habet in principalisua significatione. Ut patet in hoc
termino'homo',qui substantiamcum qualitatefinitesignificat, que sunt de
principalisignificatione. Et similiterpateat de quolibetsubstantivo.Dicitur
autemille terminus copularequi dependentiam habetin principalisua signifi-
catione.Ut patetin hac dictione'albus', que significat qualitatemfinite,sub-
stantiamveroinfinite; undedependensest ad subiectumper quod suamfiniat
substantiam.
For something likenatural- accidentalsupposition, see ibid.,pp. 6i631-6i78:
Undecuminappellatoneetsuppositione terminus communis varietur, videndum
est qualiterhoc fiat.Ad hoc sciendumquod terminuscommunis per se sump-
tus supponitpro omniquod potestparticipai!formam eius siveid sit presens
sive preteritum sive futurum. Unde ille terminus'homo'per se sumptussup-
ponitproomnieo quod potestessehomo.Hoc autemsunttamexistentes quam
nonexistentes. Et idempateatde quolibetterminocommuni.Contingit autem
quod terminus communis in locutionepositusquandoquesumiturpro presenti-
bus, utinhac locutione:' homoest',quandoquepropreteritis, utinhac locutione:
'homo ut in hac locutione:'homoeri.
fui, quandoquepro futuris,
77For suppositionand copulationas kindsof signification, see de Rijk, Log.
Mod.,II i, p. 455: Est autemsuppositiosubstantivarei designatio, idestper
nomensubstantivum.Et supponereest substantiverem designare.Unde
'homo' ' '
, 'asinus', albedo dicuntur termini supponentes (suppositiones, de Rijk).
Copulatio est adiectiva rei (om.de Rijk) designatio,idestpernomenadiectivum.
Et copulareest adiectiveremdesignare, ut 'albus,-ba,-bum'et 'hic est hecet
hocfelix'.
For something like naturalsupposition, see ibid.,p. 458: Et ex hoc patet
differentia interappellationem et suppositionem, quia terminus communis per
se positussupponitpro omnibusillis qui sunt vel qui eruntvel qui fuerunt
participantes formamcommunem a qua imponitur. Unde bene dicitur:'homo
'
est','homofuit', homoeri.
Onemightpointalso to theTractatus deproprietatibus sermonm, see de Rijk,
Log. Mod.,II 2, pp. 7ii4-7i34forthekindsofsignification and ibid.,p. 7165-11
forabsolute- respective supposition.
78 See PeterofSpain,Tractatus(ed. de Rijk) VI 2, pp. 7917-8o6: Significations
alia est rei substantiveet habetfieriper nomensubstantivum, ut 'homo'; aha
estreiadiectiveet habetfieripernomenadiectivum vel perverbum,ut 'albus'
vel 'curri.... Nominavero substantivadicuntursupponere,nominavero
adiectivaet etiamverbadicunturcopulare.
In myopinionthesewordscouldscarcelybe explainedotherwise.
79ibid.,VI 3, p. 8o8-9:Suppositiovero est acceptioterminisubstantivipro
aliquo; p. 8o17:Copulatioest terminiadiectiviacceptiopro aliquo.
It is to be notedthat in the linesbetweenthesePeterworksout the dif-
ferencesbetweensignificatio and suppositio(and copulatio,one mightadd).
137
Whereby it should be rememberedthat he presents natural supposi-
tion as a subdivision of suppositio as acceptiotermini.
In my opinion the conclusion to be drawn fromthe preceding can
onlybe that suppositioas a kind ofsignificationshould be distinguished
fromsuppositio naturalis.
The first concerns what a term signifies, and indicates that the
universal nature, essence or formis (re)presentedas a subsisting one
(i.e. as something of the firstof the ten categories); it is opposed to
copulation (as a kind of signification),which (re)presentsthe universal
nature, essence or formas subjoined to somethingelse (i.e. as some-
thing of the other, accidental categories).80
The second concernswhat the termmay denoteas a result of having
signification; it is thereforea propertyof the term (or acceptiotermini
as it is frequentlystated) ; indicating the range of denotation- i.e.
the individuals that may participate in the universal nature which is
presented by the significationof the term- uneffectedby any con-
text, it is opposed to accidental supposition in which the influenceof
the context takes effect.81
Adducingthe secondofthesedifferences, Peteruses theverbsupponete, ibid.,

p. 8o14"15: Neque sunteiusdem,quia significare est vocis,supponerevero est
terminiiam quasi compositiex voce et significatione. Thus, althoughPeter
does not use the nounsuppositioin a twofoldsense,he stillusestheverbsup-
ponetein a twofoldsense,namelyof: rei substantive representare (p. 8o5)and
of: to stand (said of a substantiveterm)forsomething (p. 8o14"15).
80 It is indeedusefulto stressthepointthatthekindsofsignification concern
thepresentation of a natureetc. as something subsisting (as something ofthe
firstcategory)respectively as something adjoining,forone was aware of the
factthate.g. albedoand albumbothsignify a natureetc.whichis in realityan
accident.This comesout veryclearlye.g. in a remarkin the socalledIntro -
ductiones antique(de Rijk,GenuineTextI, pp. 24-33;forthetitle,see de Rijk,
Tractatus, p. LXXII) pp. 30-31: Suppositiosic diffinitur: suppositioest sub-
stantivarei designatio.Sed contra:'Albedo* ; suppositioista nonsignificai earn
perse stantem.Ergo diffinitio nullaest . . . Solutio.Dicimusad primum, quod
bona est,quia licet'albedo '
primadiffinitio significet accidens,tamensignificat
per modum substantie, hoc est per modum per se stantis.Et hec est ratioquia
'albedo '
potestsupponere.
The same will be also the backgroundof the remarkof Peter of Spain,
Tractatus,VI 2, p. 801-4:Quare proprienon est significatio substantivavel
adiectiva,sed aliquidsignificatur substantiveet aliquid adiective,quia adiec-
tivatiovel substantivatio suntmodirerumque significantur, et non significa-
tionis,in whichsubstantivatio and adiectivatio are to be understoodas: being
(made)ofthefirstcategory, resp: beingoftheothercategories.
81Sincesuppositionas a kindofsignification is something quitedistinctfrom
suppositionas a property of a term,to determine supposition to be a kindof
signification is, so to speak,neutralto the questionwhetherone admitssup-
positionas a propertyof a termto occuroutsidean oratio(naturalsupposi-
138
Now, since William of Sherwood's suppositiosecundumhabitmwas
determinedas a kind of signification,there seems to be no reason to
put this notion on a level with suppositio naturalis.
One mighthowever object that, - if it is true that the notion of
habitual supposition differsfrom the notion of natural supposition,
and if it is true that William does not consider it the proper view to
hold that a term has a natural capacity to stand for all actual and
possible individuals partaking in a universal nature82- he neverthe-
less seems to hold that a term has a (natural) capacity to stand for
all the individuals that actually participate in the formsignifiedby
that term.83
Now, I have no intentionto deny that this could be a correctren-
dering of William's meaning. It should be remarked, however, that,
as we have seen already,84William assigns this functionexplicitlyto
the significationof a term. I am not convinced, forthat matter,that
wordingslike terminussupponit de se show necessarilythe factual ad-
mittanceof natural supposition as the propertyof a term outside any
context. It is to be rememberedthat e.g. Roger Bacon, who says ex-
plicitlythat supposition occurs only as a propertyof a term inside an
oratio,85 nevertheless states that: a terminus de se solum concernit
presencia et supponit pro illis de sui natura** On the other hand it
should be kept in mind that texts that admit a natural supposition,
definethis notion always in wordingslike terminusper se sumptusor
per se positus.87The most importantthinghowever to bear in mind in
tion)ornot.An exampleofa combination withthislastpossibilityis theLogica

Cum sit nostra,see de Rijk, Log. Mod., II 2, p. 44618-33: Et est suppositio
substantivarei designatio,idest significatioterminisubstantivi. . . Item.
Suppositioest sermonis subicibilissignificatio;
'sermonis subicibilis'poniturad
differentiamsermonispredicabilis.Hec est differentia intersuppositionem et
significationem.Supponereest remsuam sub appositoponere;significare est
remsuamsubprincipali rationeipsiusinstituentis designare.Terminus supponit
quando poniturin oratione;terminussignificat sive poniturin orationesive
extraorationem.
82Cfr.above,pp. 116-7.
83One couldpointto Introductiones, forin thispassageit is stated
p. 8s15-31,
fivetimes(8516-17;8521;8528"27; 85a8and 8531)thata termde se supponitpro
presentibus.
84Above,p. 116.
85Sumule,p. 26832-34: . . ex quo patetquod supposiciononest proprietas nisi
terminiactualiterordinatiin oracione,et nonextra(cfr.above,n. 68).
86Sumule,p. 28o29-30 (cfr.above,n. 25).
87Cfr.the DialcticaMonacensis,Log. Mod., II 2, pp. 6i631*6i76(quoted
above,n. 76); the SummeMetenses, ibid.,II i, p. 458 (quotedabove, n. 77);
the Tractatusde proprietatibussermonm, ibid.,II 2, p. 716: Absolutadicitur
139
this connection,is that the admittance of natural supposition seems
to go togetherwith the definitionof supposition (as a propertyof a
term) as the acceptioof a termpro aliquo,88With William however we
find the kind of definitionof supposition that we could call the syn-
tactical one, in which supposition (as a propertyof a term) is defined
in relation to an orderingwith another term (or concept signifiedby
another term).89Within such a view there seems to be no possibility
forsupposition as the propertyof a term standing on its own, because
in such a case there is no relation at all to whatever other term or
concept.90
Therefore,in my opinion, we have to credit William with the same
view as Cum sit nostraand Roger Bacon that there can be only sup- ,
position as the propertyof a term actually ordered in the context of
an oratio.91
Concluding these remarks, in my opinion, we are entitled to say

that we have broughtforwardsome evidence of the factthat, although
William of Sherwoodadmitsan esse habitale, neverthelesshis opinions
on quite some semantical topics run remarkably parallel with those
of Roger. Thus, we have ascertained their basic consensus of opinion
concerningi.a . the relationof supposition and appellation,the referent-
'
quam habet terminusper se sumptus,ut homo supponitenimabsoluteex
institutionepro quolibetequaliter; Petrus Hispanus,Tractatus, VI 4, p. 812"5:
Suppositionaturalisestacceptioterminicommunis proomnibusa quibusaptus
natusestparticipan, uthomopersesumptus de naturasua supponitproomnibus
hominibus qui fuerunt et qui suntet qui erunt(cfr.also theSummuleAntiquo-
rum, de Rijk,GenuineTextI, p. 9) ; LambertofAuxerre, Logica,p. 208: Naturalis
suppositioest quam habetterminus a se et a naturasua. Hanc diciturhabere
terminus quandoperse ponitur, idestquandonullialii adiungitur; and Vincent
of Beauvais, Speculumdoctrinale , cap. 36 col. 239: Naturalisest quam habet
terminuscommunisnon ab alio, sed virtute propriaesignificationis. Ut iste
terminus'homo'sumptus perse potestsupponereprohominequi est et qui non
' '
est,si dicaturomnishomo(quotedby de Rijk,Development, p. 105).
88 This holds good at any case forthe line SummuleAntiquorum (de Rijk,
GenuineTextI, p. 9), Peterof Spain (cfr.the text quotedabove, n. 79) and
Lambertof Auxerre(cfr.the textsquoted above,pp. 134-5).The othertexts
thatadmita naturalsupposition or something likeit giveonlya determination
of suppositionas a kindof signification. As we have statedabove (n. 81) this
determination is neutralto the allowanceforsuppositionto occuroutsidean
oratio.
89 This syntacticaldefinition is found,as we haveseen,also in theLogicaCum
sitnostra,see above n. 81, and RogerBacon,see above,n. 68.
90 Thispossibility is deniedexplicitly bybothCumsitnostraand RogerBacon,
see thetextsreferred to in theprecedingnote.
91Onemightpointhereto hisdefinition ofsuppositio actualis,cfr.above,p. 129.
140
ial forceof supposition in negative propositionsand the definitionof
supposition and copulation as kinds of significationand as properties
of a term. Even if William and Roger are not in entire agreementas
to some of the points we have touched upon, yet we have seen William
take up a positionregardingthese points that is not farremotedof that
of Roger. This last regards mainly the concept of esse habitale,
which is rejected by Roger92 but admitted by WilHam; notwith-
standing that, however, WilHam holds there to be equivocation be-
tween actual and non-actual being. Broadly the same holds true for
the related issue of the truthvalue and truthconditionsofpropositions
'
such as omnis homoest animal'
The fundamentalpoint of their,entire or partial, agreementseems
to be the emphasis they both lay on the relation the signifyingforce
of a word establishes between that word and actually existingthings.
This is, especially as regards William, interesting,because it happens
withina frameworkin which the proper significateof a word is deter-
mined to be the forma, and in which, moreover,one adheres to the
inherencetheoryof the copula.
This agreement,now, between WilHam and his youngercontempo-
rary93is, indeed, the more remarkablesince the views they defend,as
we have seen, are not the commonlyheld ones.
92As we have seenabove (n. 43), Roger'sattitudeis in the Summanotyetso
categorical,althoughhis wordings theredo notshowmuchenthusiasm forthe
concepteither.
93I thinkthatindeedthe workof Williamis earlierthanthat of Roger.De
Rijk{Development, p. 80,n. 28)proposedthedatec. 1250fortheworkofWilHam,
becausehe thinksthe usual arguments fordatinghis workc. 1240 notcon-
clusivenor those adduced forhis influenceon Peter of Spain, Lambertof
Auxerreand others.Concerning the last point,I thinkthatthepresentpaper
givesamplesupportforDe Rijk's viewand thatit also corroborates theargu-
mentsadducedbyhimin hisSomethirteenth centurytracts
on thegameofobliga-
tionIII, in: Vivarium, XIV (1976),pp. 26-49,esp. pp. 31-42,that William's
workdid notoriginate in Paris; cfr.also thenextnotes.
Thereis, however,in myopinionan argument fora date, c. 1230-1240,of
William'sworkwhichis not adducedso far. Kretzmann(Introduction, p. 7)
drawstheattention to a passageofRogerBacon'sCompendium studiiphilosophic
ae, inwhichRogeropposesthewiseantiqui,suchas RobertGrosseteste, Thomas
Wallensis,Adam Marsh,RobertMarsh,WilliamLupus and Williamof Sher-
woodagainstthemoderni saeculares.Thesenames,and certainly thefirstthree
of them,bringus back to the yearsc. 1240-1250in Oxford(whichlines up
also withthe biographical data of Roger); and the contextof thisargument
requiresthat Rogersumsup heretheologians.So we mightgatherfromthis
thatWilliamwas activeas a masterin theology in Oxfordin thetimeconcerned ;
this,by the way,wouldfitin withthe important ecclesiasticalcareerhe has
made. But thenwe have to put his workas an artistbeforethattime,let us
say somewhere c. 1230-1240.
141
With regard to this, we might notice some points. Firstly, it is
clear that there are great divergences between on the one hand the
views of William and of Roger and on the other the views of the
masters of what is called the Parisian tradition.94These divergences
concern doctrinal issues (e.g. the relation supposition- appellation,
the predicative function of 'est', the truth value and conditions of
'
propositionssuch as omnis homoest animal') but also more technical
issues (esp. the syntactical definitionof supposition and the rejection
of supposition outside an oratio that goes along with it). Secondly,
however, there are also divergencesbetween on the one hand William
and Roger and on the other representativesof the Oxfordtradition,
esp. the Logica Cum sit nostra. This disagreementconcerns mainly
a set of coherent doctrinal issues (so the relation supposition- appel-
'
lation, the notion of esse confusum,the evaluation of omnis homoest
animal' and the assignmentof the functionof appellation only to the
predicate). An interestingpoint regarding this last disagreementis
that one sometimes gets the impression of an internal dispute inside
the Oxfordtradition.95
It is, in my opinion, this basic agreement between William and
Roger in for the rest a rather isolated position that makes the praise
bestowed by Roger on William understandable but above that makes
the place of William in the developmentof the 13th centurysemantical
theorysuch an interestingone.
Nijmegen
FilosofischInstitut
Erasmuslaan 40
94See de Rijk, Tractatus, pp. LXVIII-LXXX. The divergences pointedout

in thepresentpaper,and esp. thoseconcerning thedefinitiongivenofand the
functionascribedto suppositionas a propertyof a term,give,I think,still
bettersupportforthedistinction betweentheParisianandtheOxfordtradition.
I hopeit is needlessto say thatwe have seenespeciallymanydivergences be-
tweenWilliamand PeterofSpain.
96One mightthinke.g. ofthe discussionaboutappellationas a timelessfunc-
tionofthepredicate(cfr.above,nn. 19 and 20).
It is to be notedthatwe have indicationthatin othertextsof the Oxford
traditionviewscan be foundthat are so to speakpreparatory to someof the
viewsofWilliamand Roger;so especiallyas concerns theacknowledgement of
a doublesensein propositions suchas 'omnishomoestanimal' (I hopeto give
theevidenceforthisin mystudyofthetheoryofthesyncategorematical words
in the 13thcenturythatwillbe finished soon).As a matteroffactthiscircum-
stance accentuatesmorethe difference betweenthe Oxfordand the Paris
tradition.
142

H. A. G. BRAAKHUISH, The Views of William of Sherwood On Some Semantical Topics and Their Relation To Those of Roger Bacon

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H. A. G. BRAAKHUISH, The Views of William of Sherwood On Some Semantical Topics and Their Relation To Those of Roger Bacon

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Brill

The Views of William of Sherwood on Some Semantical Topics

is well known, Roger Bacon in his CompendiumStudii Theo-

If one now looks for a person to whom to ascribe such a conception,

One could also point to other passages in William of Sherwoos

cionementisintelligerenonens; et sicutintelligimus nonens,sicpossumusdare

In much the same way as in the preceding passage the notion of

Syncategoremata, p. 49: Proptereadicendumquod pars secundumspeciem

Perhaps one could also point to another aspect of William's doc-

7 See his Syncategoremata, p. 75.

a) Relation supposition- appellation

In order to determinewhen suppositum and appellatum coincide or

10 See GrabmannIntrouctiones, pp. 14-15and especiallyNormanKretzmann,

Hereafter,however, (fromp. 8515onwards till the end of the section)

As for the reason why this second view on supposition is correct,

16Of coursethe typeof restriction accomplished by theverbof a proposition

Now, it should be kept in mind that the view on appellation pro-

enimistesermodicicompositus vel divisus.Si compositus : tuncdebetcontinue

25Ibid.,pp. 28o29-28i7: Quareterminus de se solumconcernit presencia,et sup-

And William adds explicitly that in the case of 'est' occurringin

Syncategoremata,p. 71: Sciendumautemquod hoc verbum'est' quando-

que est ipsiusactus ad substantiam, remotisquod inclinatur et cui inclinatur

This brings to mind several points.

34O'Donnell:homininoninest;si nonactualiter, sic nec.The readingwe give

38 That suchan inference is impossible, by thefallacyofequivocationor some

Concerning therelatedpoint,however,if 'omnis* can be addedto termslike

We may now safely conclude that William holds that terms in a

69Adjoining(adiacens),itis to say: to a substance, cfr.Introductiones,p. 8i19*20:

For thesake ofconveniency I willreferto theeditionofLambert'sworkby

Thus, in my opinion, we have to distinguishbetween on one side

copulation(1) ), so it is possibleto speakofsupposition(4) regardless ofwhat

It is to be remarkednow that Lambert introducesnatural supposi-

For my assumption that supposition as a kind of significationis

prietursubstantivis, copulatioadiectivis,ex dictisquid sit dicendumpatet.

Adducingthe secondofthesedifferences, Peteruses theverbsupponete, ibid.,

tion)ornot.An exampleofa combination withthislastpossibilityis theLogica

Concluding these remarks, in my opinion, we are entitled to say

94See de Rijk, Tractatus, pp. LXVIII-LXXX. The divergences pointedout

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