DOI 10.

1515/tl-2012-0011 Theoretical Linguistics 2012; 38(3-4): 195203

William Croft
Dimensional models of event structure and
verbal semantics

William Croft: Department of Linguistics, MSC03 2130, 1 University of New Mexico,

Albuquerque, NM 87131-0001, U.S.A. E-mail: wcroft@unm.edu

Warglien, Grdenfors and Westera (henceforth WGW) present a model of event

structure based on conceptual spaces (Grdenfors 2000); discuss a number of is
sues in verbal semantics in light of their model; and compare the model to current
models proposed by linguists. In the last section before the conclusion (WGW,
5.3), WGW state that the model that I have presented (Croft 2012, henceforth
Verbs; see also Croft 1998a,b, 2009) is the one that comes closest to theirs.
Unfortunately it is difficult to evaluate WGWs model on the basis of their
article. Although it is a geometric model, based on vectors, there are only two
diagrams representing the formal structure of the model, one diagram of Oscar
pulling a sledge (each participant having a vector), and one diagram of five
aspectual types as function properties. In other words, the reader cannot really
determine what WGWs vector representations look like. WGW make broad
claims about the utility of their model in accounting for verbal semantic phe
nomena. However, it is not clear if their model provides a more enlightening
analysis of verbal semantic phenomena than the various models proposed by
linguists.
WGW rather frequently issue promissory notes for analyses which the reader
cannot judge (all section numbers refer to sections of WGW):

Although we are not providing a full analysis of causation here ... (3.1)

Although we have not presented the details of the similarities of the actions involved, these
can be worked out systematically from our vectorial representation of actions (4.2; but
almost no vector representations of actions are presented)

We see it as a research program to analyze the domains presumed by different verbs to test
the viability of the single-domain constraint (4.3)

All these verbs [of separation and attachment] express higher-level change than is express
ible in our basic framework. We cannot elaborate here on how to extend the conceptual
spaces analysis to include these cases, but we expect it to be feasible (4.4)
196 William Croft

It should be clear from the earlier analysis that our model can account for all four [of
Talmys (1976) causal] types(5.3; it is in fact not clear; see below)

We are aware that there are many problematic examples that could challenge the proposed
framework. Such examples may point to cognitive factors that our approach does not cap
ture (6)

While it is good that WGW do not claim more than they should for their model,
the reader is left frustrated that so few details of their model are given.
Nevertheless, I believe that their model is worth taking seriously, perhaps
unsurprisingly since I have advocated a similar model for many years. The two
models have in common a dimensional approach to the representation of event
structure (verb meaning), and an assertion of the value of a geometric semantic
model for the interpretation of linguistic expressions, in particular verbs (or more
generally, predicates).
Unfortunately, WGWs point about the value of a geometric model is not ex
pressed clearly in their article. At the beginning of 3, WGW present a semantic
representation of break from Rappaport Hovav and Levin (1998): [[ X ACTMANNER]
CAUSE [Become [Y BROKEN]. They argue that BROKEN represents a confusion
of a conceptual and a formal grammatical category. This is not true: in Rappaport
Hovav and Levins representation, BROKEN is clearly a conceptual unit, even if
it is not further analyzed there. The real issue here is that a logic-like semantic
representation like Rappaport Hovav and Levins looks more like a logical calcu
lus formula than the model into which such a formula is interpreted, in model-
theoretic terms. There is no such confusion with dimensional models such as
WGWs or mine. The latter are clearly models, not formulas of a logical calculus
(see Verbs, 1.2, 5.5).1
WGWs model and the model in Verbs cannot be mistaken for logical calculus
formulas because they are geometric, that is, conceptual structure is represented
in multiple orthogonal, continuous (or partly continuous) dimensions. This type
of semantic representation is rarely used in linguistics, except in specialized do
mains such as color terminology (Berlin and Kay 1969; Kay et al. 2009). WGW and
I both argue that geometric representations not just pictorial diagrams, but rep
resentations whose geometric properties define linguistic semantic properties

1In this context, WGW refer to my complaint about the fact that much linguistic terminology is
ambiguous between referring to a conceptual category and referring to a language-specific
grammatical category that expresses that conceptual category. But this is a completely different
issue than the one involved in comparing Rappaport Hovav and Levins, WGWs and my
semantic representations of events.
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Dimensional models of event structure

are useful for representing many linguistic semantic structures, including event
structure (see also Croft and Poole 2008; Croft 2010). In this central theoretical
point of WGWs paper, we are in agreement.
In the remainder of this comment, I will compare the dimensional model that
I present to WGWs dimensional model, and discuss the similarities and differ
ences between the two models.
In Verbs, I present a three-dimensional model of event structure relevant to
verb meaning and verbal constructions, in particular tense-aspect constructions
and argument structure constructions (Verbs, chapter 5). Two dimensions are
geometric dimensions: a time dimension, for the unfolding of an event over time;
and a qualitative state dimension, to represent the different states that each par
ticipant is in or passes through over the time interval that the event unfolds
(Verbs, chapters 24). Events unfold over time in phases hence this is a phasal
analysis of aspect, albeit richer than other phasal analyses in the linguistic se
mantic literature (see Verbs, 2.3.1 and references cited therein). Each phase is
defined in terms of its two-dimensional properties across the time (t) and qualita
tive (q) dimensions. For example, a state phase is a point on q, and may or may
not be extended on t; an achievement (transition) phase is extended (includes
two distinct points) on q, but only a point on t; a dynamic phase is extended on
both t and q, and so on. This geometric representation was first developed with
Jerry Hobbs at SRI International in the 1980s, and similar representations have
occasionally been suggested in the linguistics literature; the model in Verbs was
first published in Croft (2009).
The participants themselves are ranged in a third dimension, the force-
dynamic dimension (Talmy 1988/2000) which represents the interactions be
tween participants. This dimension is actually a graph structure, but I argue
that simple verbs/predicates in human languages conceptualize (construe) an
event as a directed, acyclic, nonbranching causal chain (Verbs, 6.2). The causal
chain model of events involving interactions among participants was pro
posed by various linguists in the 1980s (if not earlier); my own version was
developed in Croft (1991, 1998b, inter alia). The causal chain for simple predicates
can therefore function as a third dimension representing the causal chain of
participants.
An important feature of this three-dimensional representation is that each
participant in the event has its own time-quality (t/q) profile. This is illustrated in
Figure 3 in WGWs article, reproduced from Verbs, 5.4.2. That is to say, on the
force-dynamic dimension each participant has its own subevent, representing
the aspectual phases that the participant undergoes as the event unfolds in time.
The interaction between participants is represented on the third, force-dynamic
dimension.
198 William Croft

WGWs dimensional model, as I understand it from their article, differs from

the dimensional model in Verbs in two major respects. First, their model lacks a
temporal dimension (WGW, 5.3). Second, instead of a single qualitative state di
mension to represent stasis and change of different kinds, and a force-dynamic
dimension, WGW have an open-ended set of vectors. Also, WGW mistakenly de
scribe the model in Verbs as a purely causal model (WGW, 5.3). The model in
Verbs does include causal structure, but it includes the aspectual and qualitative
structure of events as well.
It is not clear to me why WGW want to avoid positing a temporal dimension,
since the whole point of their conceptual spaces approach to semantics is to
represent concepts in terms of an open-ended number of intersecting geometric
dimensions. But they see this as a virtue. WGW argue that they can reproduce the
aspectual contrast between punctual and durative implicitly in a distinction be
tween extended and punctual vectors, the former decomposable into a sequential
composition of vectors and the latter not (WGW, 5.2). This is part of WGWs expli
cation of five aspectual types, Vendlers four types (states, activities, achieve
ments and accomplishments) plus semelfactives.
However, in Verbs I argue that there are (at least) ten basic aspectual types,
all of which are discussed in the semantics literature (both formal semantic and
cognitive linguistic; see Verbs, 2.2 and references cited therein). These types can
be analyzed as a structured set which is elegantly accounted for by a model in
cluding two distinct dimensions, time and qualitative state (Verbs, 2.3). WGW do
not address this finer-grained classification of aspectual types, or how it would be
represented in a dimensional model without time. The most problematic case for
a model that lacks a temporal dimension is distinguishing three types of states, as
in (1):

(1) a. Point states: The sun is at its zenith. (Mittwoch 1988)

b. Transitory (stage-level) states: Krzysztof is ill.
c. Permanent (object-level) states: Krzysztof is Polish. [ethnicity]

Since this three-way distinction among states is in fact a three-way distinction

among stative phases found in other aspectual types, any problem in analysis for
these states is also a problem for the analysis of related aspectual types.
It is not clear to me if an equally elegant analysis of all of the aspectual types
found in the semantics literature is possible in WGWs model. But the truth is, I
do not see why WGW are handicapping themselves by excluding a temporal
dimension when they are so generous in employing an indefinite number of other
dimensions in their conceptual structures. And a temporal dimension seems es
sential anyway in defining concepts such as those expressed by temporal adverbs
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Dimensional models of event structure

like slowly and quickly, and temporal duration expressions such as for N minutes/
hours/days, etc. If so, why not use the temporal dimension in event structure rep
resentation?
The handling of the qualitative dimension and force-dynamics in WGWs di
mensional model is unclear to me from the description in their article. They pro
pose force vectors, specifically two types of vectors, a force vector and a result
vector (3.1). In 4.2, they argue that their model can account for similarity of
meanings such as different manners of motion (walk, jog, jump) by comparing the
force patterns (ibid.) for each event type. How the force patterns are defined and
compared is not explained.
In the three-dimensional model in Verbs, there is a dimension of qualitative
states. This dimension corresponds to what Levin and Rappaport Hovav and
others call the verbal root or constant: it is the qualitative semantic substance of
an event that distinguishes it from other events with a similar aspectual type and/
or similar causal structure (e.g. walk and run), but which also links the event to
other event types that are qualitatively the same but have a different aspectual
and/or causal structure (e.g. transitive and intransitive roll).
In verbal semantic models in linguistics, the verbal root remains largely
unanalyzed. In Verbs, I present the initial steps of an analysis, in terms of a one-
dimensional qualitative scale. I would be the first to say that this is an oversimpli
fication of the qualitative structure of an event, and I would welcome a more com
plex qualitative representation of events, as promised (though not delivered) by
WGW. However, the one-dimensional qualitative structure in Verbs does allow for
the representation of an important property of qualitative structure. Namely, for
some predicates, the qualitative states on that dimension are organized in a scale
on which (for a subset of those predicates) the event unfolds monotonically over
time; this is incidentally another reason for having a temporal dimension. This
scalar characteristic of many event types has attracted quite a bit of attention
recently in the verbal semantics literature (e.g., Hay, Kennedy and Levin 1999;
Kennedy and McNally 2005; Kennedy and Levin 2008; Beavers 2008, 2011), and it
plays a major role in Verbs, in the form of the distinction between directed change
and undirected change.
The distinction between directed and undirected change, along with other
aspectual distinctions, is significant for the analysis of a number of verbal seman
tic phenomena, including some discussed by WGW. WGW discuss the relation
ship between transitive and intransitive uses of verbs like fry and roast: She fried
the fish and The fish is frying (WGW, 4.4). WGW try to argue that fry and roast are
a manner verb in one use and a result verb in the other use, and attribute the dif
ference to intentionality. Yet the distinction is straightforward: both uses involve
a directed change, and the past-tense transitive use is in addition bounded
200 William Croft

whereas the present-progressive intransitive use is unbounded. Intentionality

does not have anything to do with this distinction. The same applies to WGWs
appeal to intentionality in 4.6. While it is important to represent intentionality in
event structure, it is not relevant to the phenomena discussed above.2
The representation in Verbs, as in earlier work (Croft 1991), uses the force-
dynamic or causal interactions among participants in an event. I argue that the
causal chain into which these interactions are organized provides the simplest
and most general theory of argument realization (Verbs, ch. 56; Croft 1991,
1998b). WGWs force vectors actually do not represent force-dynamic relations
between participants. Each force vector is associated with one participant. Hence
they correspond more closely to properties encoded in the temporal and qualita
tive state dimensions in the model in Verbs. In WGWs model, the relation
shipbetween participants is captured by a mapping from force vector to result
vector (WGW, 3.1). That mapping, not the vectors, represents the causal or force-
dynamic relationship among participants in an event. In fact, that mapping is
very similar if not identical to the mapping between the phasal aspect structures
of each participant in the causal chain in the third dimension (the causal chain)
in Verbs.
WGWs vector representations and vector-to-vector mappings are not elabo
rated or explained in their article. How do the mathematical properties of vectors,
such as their direction and length, contribute to an understanding of the struc
ture of events as encoded in human languages, in particular an understanding
superior to that found in Verbs or other semantic representations proposed by
other linguists? The two-dimensional phasal analysis of aspect in Verbs can easily
be represented as a sequence of vectors for the phases. Perhaps WGWs model is
simply identical to that in Verbs, especially if the qualitative dimension in Verbs
is elaborated into multiple dimensions, and if WGW were to introduce the time
dimension. As noted above, WGWs model represents causation as a mapping
between vectors associated with participants, just as the model in Verbs does. So
perhaps the two models are virtually identical.
What is the difference between a force vector and a result vector? Is there a
mathematical difference between the two types of vectors, or is it just an arbitrary
typing of vectors? What type of vector is associated with an instrument? Does the
instrument have a result vector of the result of the agent acting on it, and a force

2The dimensional model in Verbs does not represent intentionality. To do so, I would
incorporate a classical mental space model (Fauconnier 1985) in order to represent intended
vs.actual unfoldings of events. For the event types and aspectual and argument structure
constructions discussed in Verbs, introducing intentional mental spaces (or an equivalent
semantic structure) did not appear to be necessary.
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Dimensional models of event structure

vector for its effect on the patient? WGW discuss instruments in 4.5, but the
answer to these questions is not clear from their discussion.
WGW criticize the model in Verbs because it does not mathematically distin
guish between Talmys causation types (WGW, 5.3). WGW argue that the dynam
ics of the force and result vectors can distinguish all of these causation types.
But there is no explanation of the difference between the two types of vectors
intheir model, let alone their dynamics, let alone how that dynamics could cap
ture Talmys four causation types, or the richer description of the relationships
among Talmys four causation types described in Verbs, 5.3.1, 6.4.2. As far as I
can tell, representing different types of causation as more than just different types
of vectors is a future project for WGWs model as much as it is for the model in
Verbs.
WGW propose two conditions on their dimensional model. The first is their
two-vector condition: an event must involve at least two vectors and one object.
They allow for a single participant to possess both the force and result vectors, as
in intransitive sentences such as Susanna is walking or Paul is jumping. I agree
with this analysis of intransitive sentences. Linguistically, there is a wide range of
formal constructions for intransitive events, including middle and passive voice
(including deponents), reflexives and reciprocals of different kinds, and active
(subject-like), inactive (object-like) and dative experiencer-like (Haspelmath
2011: 56061) coding of single participants (see Verbs, 6.2.3.2 and 6.3 for an
overview). These different codings represent alternative construals of the force
dynamics of one-participant events, and are sensitive to subtle differences in the
degree or types of control and affectedness of the single participant. A linguisti
cally useful representation of event structure should capture these subtle distinc
tions. It is not clear whether WGWs model does so.
The second condition that WGW propose is a single-domain constraint: the
meaning of a verb (verb root) is a convex region of vectors that depends only on
asingle domain(4.3). WGW use this in order to account for the hypothesis of
manner-result complementarity. I found this unconvincing in part because I am
persuaded that manner and result are not complementary in verb meaning (this
position is argued by Goldberg and Koontz-Garboden and Beavers, cited in WGW).
But the greater problem in using the single-domain constraint to explain manner-
result complementarity (if it exists in some form) or any other verbal semantic
constraint is that the strength of the constraint depends partly on how domains
are identified, as WGW themselves admit (4.3).
To sum up: WGW propose a dimensional model of event structure that is
similar to that in Verbs in fact, perhaps identical to it. Unfortunately WGWs
model remains a promise at the moment. This commentary has been perhaps
excessively critical because the claims in WGWs article go well beyond what is
202 William Croft

actually presented there, which makes their criticism of other linguists work in
this area somewhat unfair. I certainly welcome an approach that exploits geomet
ric representations of conceptual structure in semantic domains where such rep
resentations have the potential to provide elegant, illuminating and powerful
tools for understanding how meaning shapes linguistic expression across lan
guages. I encourage WGW to further develop their dimensional model of event
structure, joining with linguists who share their theoretical goals, and take ad
vantage of the many empirical observations and generalizations that have been
made (and will be made) in this area of linguistic analysis.

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