HARD AND TRAGIC CASES, PRINCIPLES AND THE LIMITS OF LAW
Coordinators and Chairs:
MANUEL ATIENZA (University of Alicante) JOS MANUEL AROSO LINHARES (University of Coimbra)
In a limit-situation such as our own, whilst rethinking Laws place in its
specific connection with peace (one of our congress thematic cores), it seems indispensable to return to the counterpoint easy cases/ hard cases and to the difficulties (if not paradoxes) that its specific pragmatic engenders, as well as to the possibilities opened up by the consideration of a specification of hard cases, the one which allows us to acknowledge the so-called tragic cases. This workshop aims rethinking this pragmatic (and its methodological projections) in their direct connection with the experience of principles and the corresponding legal systems representation this one submitted to the multiplication of concepts or conceptions of Law which the so-called academic house (on a certain meta- dogmatic level) has been producing in recent decades. Is the tension between the binomial easy cases/hard cases and the category legal system (or the reflection which critically witnesses it) a productive one, whilst understanding the pragmatic of plurality which characterizes contemporary legal thinking? Are the difficulties and paradoxes associated to the binomial easy/hard precisely the same when we explore different legal methodological trends and traditions, namely those which correspond on the one hand to Holmes and Harts legacies (involving so different possibilities as those explored by Law and Economics and Law and Literature, by Critical Legal Scholars and Inclusive Legal Positivists) and on the other hand the so-called standard theory of argumentation (Alexy, MacCormick, Aarnio, Peczenik), this one invoking Wrblewskis legacy (the analytical reconstitution of argumentation as a process of justification, with different horizontal or vertical levels)? Should the critical denouncing of those difficulties and paradoxes, as well as the overcoming of an open area concept of discretion, involving a certain community of principles (Dworkin) or a specific dialectics between the legal system and the adjudicating problem (Castanheira Neves), open up the path to an effective refusal of the binomial easy/hard? Does not the experience of tragic cases, whilst hard cases with no correct answer, demand the consideration of another decisive issue, the one which, experiencing Laws cultural and civilizational identity, pays attention to an authentic problem of limits (the limits of Law and its practical normative world)? These are some of the questions which we are challenged to consider.
Abstracts must be submitted to the coordinators of the
Special Workshop by e-mail at: manuelatienzarodriguez@gmail.com, jmarolinh@gmail.com.
Accepted languages are: English, French, German
Spanish and Portuguese.
Deadline for submitting abstracts to the coordinators: