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2. (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (A/D).
2016 3. (15m) buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved
for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest
[LAND TITLES AND DEEDS] land protection purposes.
Agcaoili Book; Atty. Panes Lectures; LA Notes
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants , owners of beach resorts in Boracay filed
with this Court an action to nullify PGMAs proclamation claiming that it infringed on
Sec. 1 Title of Decree This decree shall be known as the Property Registration Decree. their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay; there is no need for a proclamation
reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land; and Being classified as neither mineral nor
timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902
Regalian Doctrine (Art. 12, Sec. 2 of the 1987 PC) and Act No. 926, known as the first PLA. Thus, their possession in the concept of owner
- all lands of whatever classification and other natural resources not otherwise for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
appearing to be clearly within private ownership belong to the State
OSG argued that petitioners-claimants Boracay is an unclassified public forest land
Jura Regalia pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation
private title to a land must be traced to some grant, express or implied, or of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority
from its successors to reclassify lands of the public domain into A&D. There is a need for a positive
- The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
Philippines. This refers to Royal Rights that all lands were formerly held by
the King. ISSUE:
- (Maam Panes): refers to private ownership and how private ownership of W/N petitioner claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
lands were given by virtue of the royal rights possessed by the King Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure
Exceptions to Regalian Doctrine title under other pertinent laws.
1) Native Title (Carino v. Insular) refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and
domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a HELD:
claim of private ownership by ICCs/Indigenous Peoples, have never been REGALIAN DOCTRINE AND POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE TO RECLASSIFY
public lands, and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held the same LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and
way since before Spanish Conquest executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely:
1) Philippine Bill of 1902 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or
Time Immemorial - A period of time when as far back as superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;
memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to have occupied, 2) Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos; and
possessed in the concept of an owner, and utilized a defined 3) Proclamation No. 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
territory developed to them, by operation of customary law or
inherited from their ancestors with their customs and traditions
2) Ancestral Domain (Cruz v. Secretary) 1935 1973 CONSTITUTION 1987 CONSTITUTION
CONSTITUTION
1. agricultura 1. agricultural 1. agricultural
SECRETARY OF DENR V. MAYOR JOSE S. YAP l 2. industrial/commerc (maybe
October 8, 2008 2. forest or ial A/D)
timber 3. residential 2. forest/timbe
This case involves 2 petitions regarding the right of the present occupants of Boracay 4. resettlement r
Island to secure titles over their occupied lands. 5. mineral 3. national
6. timber/forest parks
FIRST CASE: G.R. No. 167707 Certiorari on CA decision affirming RTC granting 7. grazing lands 4. mineral
declaratory relief field by Mayor Jose Yap et al and ordered the survey of Boracay for 8. others by law
titling purposes
1976, (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay Island, which Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been
identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons. President Marcos expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was
declared the area as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the an unclassified land of the public domain.
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). Hence, subsequent issuance of PTA Circular 3-82
to implement Proclamation No. 1801. THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
- Petitioners claim that Proclamation and PTA Circular precluded them from the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has been consistently
land for titling purposes; Marcos declaration raised doubts on their right to adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.
secure titles over their occupied lands and Since the Island was classified as
a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership; Under Section 48(b) All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from
Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
judicial confirmation of imperfect titles. inalienable public domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the
public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of
OSG invoked Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code that Boracay the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall
Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted
lands classified as public forest, which was NOT available for disposition and since such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what
Boracay Island had not been classified as A & D whatever possession they had cannot otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.
ripen into ownership.
SPANISH RULE
ISSUE: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest
titling of the lands in Boracay. RTC neither Proclamation nor the Circular mentioned that of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines
lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. The Circular passed to the Spanish Crown.
itself recognized private ownership of lands.
- Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging
The Laws Of The First introduced Regalian doctrine and laid the foundation that all
private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in
Indies And The lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.
Royal Cedulas purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain
- The RTC took judicial notice that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island
Ley Hipotecaria Or provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as
were covered by OCT in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. The titles
The Mortgage Law well as possessory claims.
were issued on August 7, 1933.
Of 1893.
- CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration
that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest The Royal Decree partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the
reserve. Of 1894 Or The Indies. It established possessory information as the method of
Maura Law legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain
conditions which were set forth in said decree. Under Section
SECOND CASE: G.R. No. 173775 a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and 393 of the Maura Law, an
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 issued by PGMA classifying Boracay into 1) informacion posesoria or possessory information title,
reserved forest and agricultural land. 2) when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is
During the pendency of the 1st case, PGMA issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying converted into a title of ownership
Boracay Island into 3) only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of
1. (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and 4) uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public,

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and adverse, predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
5) from the date of its inscription. ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945;
6) However, possessory information title had to be and
perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura (2) The classification of the land as alienable and disposable
Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would land of the public domain.
revert to the State. discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land
PD No. 892 registration proceedings. Under the decree, all holders of
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on February 16, Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
royal concessions which took various forms, namely: 1976 lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the
a) titulo real or royal grant; Spanish Titles effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976.
b) concesion especial or special grant; may no longer be Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands shall be
c) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; used as evidence governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code,
d) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and of ownership due as amended by Act No. 3344.
e) informacion posesoria or possessory information title. to the rise of Evidences of Ownership during Spanish Regime
several 1) Royal Grant
conflicting 2) Special Grant
claims of 3) Adjustment Title
ownership 4) Title by Purchase
AMERICAN RULE 5) Possessory Information Title
Philippine Bill 6) Gratuitous Title
1) AGRICULTURAL ( those public lands acquired from Amended and updated the Act. No. 496
of 1902
Spain which are not timber or mineral lands) enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of
US assumed
2) MINERAL PD No. 1529, property
administration of
a. absolute grant (freehold system) Property governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well
the Phil. Is. After
b. lease (leasehold system) Registration as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.
the 1898 Treaty
3) TIMBER OR FOREST LANDS. Decree Broadened the jurisdiction of RTCs with regard to original
of Paris
established a system of registration by which recorded title June 11, 1978 registration of title to lands
Act No. 496 Created the former LRC which is now Land Registration
becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is
Land Authority
known as the TORRENS SYSTEM.
Registration Act
Made the Court of Land Registration
On February 1,
Does not create title nor vest one, simply confirms and
1903 A POSITIVE ACT DECLARING LAND AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS
register
introduced the HOMESTEAD SYSTEM , REQUIRED. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time
provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
Act No. 926 official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
imperfect titles
First Public agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
i. OCENPO of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years
Land Act disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and classified.
preceding July 26, 1904
October 7, 1903
SALE OR LEASE OF PUBLIC LANDS.
title to public THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION OF STATE
permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons
lands in the OWNERSHIP OF THE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS ON THE PERSON
owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the
Philippines APPLYING FOR REGISTRATION (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
public domain
remained in the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
judges of courts have the authority to determine classification
govt and its title incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
of lands
sprung from
CFIs had power to adjudicate cases relating to land titles and claim) is A/D.
Treaty of Paris
disputes
1) presidential proclamation or P
Cadastral system of registration when in the opinion of 2) an executive order; E
the President, the public interest requires that the title to any 3) an administrative action; A
lands be settled and adjudicated, he shall order the DoL to 4) investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a R
make survey thereof, w/ notice to all persons claiming an 5) legislative act or a statute. L
Act. No. 2259
interest therein. Thereafter, DoL shall be represented by SG,
Cadastral Act The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed
shall institute the registration proceedings by filing a petition
Feb. 11, 1913 to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
in the proper court against the possessors stating that public
interest requires the titles to such lands be settled and In this case records bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
adjudicated. Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that
comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural the land is A/D. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other They call for proof.
countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges.
For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation Who may classify lands?
Act No. 2874
en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, JUDICIARY (ANKRON AND DE ALDECOA )These cases were decided
Second Public under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 (October 7,
1894, was required.
Land Act 1926). During that time, the President had no power to classify lands of the public
***POSITIVE ACT REQUIRED
November 29, domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. Hence, the courts were free to make
Courts are no longer authorized to determine classification of
1919 corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
lands
Under Jones Law power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. To aid the
Gave the executive through the President the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands into A & D, mineral or courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then
forest. After declaration of A&D, this law requires publication necessary to devise a presumption on land classification that in the absence of
and notice evidence to the contrary, lands are considered agricultural. However, this
remains as the existing general law governing the presumption did not automatically converted all lands of the public domain as
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain A&D agricultural lands for it would be utterly inconsistent with and totally
other than timber and mineral lands, and privately owned repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine. The presumption in Ankron
lands which reverted to the State. and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under the
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial
under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an
CA No. 141 applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act
lands of the public domain since time immemorial or
PUBLIC LAND No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or
since July 26, 1894.
ACT their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act
1935 No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the
Amendments of this Requirement
Constitution; Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State. In any case, the
Republic Act (RA) No. 1942
December 1, assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was,
OCENPO 30 Years
1936 in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited
PD No. 1073,
OCENPO since June 12, 1945, or earlier. for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land
despite the presumption.
There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Since 1919, courts were no longer free to
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those that
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his have already became private lands. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and
reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through
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the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the
authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of
the public domain.
Here, private claimants, unlike the HEIRS OF CIRIACO TIROL who were issued
their title in 1933, did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land
registration court of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no
opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are
now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by
Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having
been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts
were no longer authorized to determine the propertys land classification.
Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
PRIVATE CLAIMANTS CONTINUED POSSESSION UNDER ACT NO. 926
DOES NOT CREATE A PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS ALIENABLE.
Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay
Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto converted
the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.A
similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.
Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition
of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided
for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands, for
the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated
on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained
in the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from
the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the
United States.
The term public land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title
still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands. Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue
that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that
the lands are alienable and disposable. (Emphasis Ours)
EXCEPT FOR LANDS ALREADY COVERED BY EXISTING
TITLES, BORACAY WAS AN UNCLASSIFIED LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN PRIOR TO PROCLAMATION NO. 1064. SUCH
UNCLASSIFIED LANDS ARE CONSIDERED PUBLIC FOREST
UNDER PD NO. 705. The DENR and the National Mapping and Resource
Information Authority certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of
the public domain. PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all
unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD
No. 705 defines a PUBLIC FOREST as a mass of lands of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the
determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are
not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay
Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however,
respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD
No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island.
Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the
way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local
and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort,
rather than a forest land. Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have
built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island; that the island has
already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of
Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do not
negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution
classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of
wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushesA forested area classified as forest land of the public domain
does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may
have stripped it of its forest cover. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation
of imperfect title do not apply. (Emphasis supplied)
PROCLAMATION NO. 1801 IS NOT A POSIITIVE ACT. However, private
claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978
entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified
Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist
spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole
of Boracay into an agricultural land but merely recognizes that the island can
be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA
No. 141. Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive
act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable
or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801shows that the proclamation
is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological
purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.
IT WAS PROCLAMATION NO. 1064 OF 2006 WHICH POSITIVELY
DECLARED PART OF BORACAY AS ALIENABLE AND OPENED THE SAME
TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP.
Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is only the President, upon
the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to
classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber
and mineral lands. In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify
lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.
Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to
do so. Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until
released and rendered open to disposition.
PROCLAMATION NO. 1064 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW. Private claimants
further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the
(CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into
agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under
PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural
land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall
cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131
and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did
not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay
Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD
No. 705., the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification
of land. If the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of
Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian
law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice on this point:
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law
delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to
those lands of the public domain, denominated as public forest under the
Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or
classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions of
the Revised Forestry Code.
PRIVATE CLAIMANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO APPLY FOR JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE UNDER CA NO. 141. NEITHER DO
THEY HAVE VESTED RIGHTS OVER THE OCCUPIED LANDS UNDER THE
SAID LAW. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
1) OCENPO of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and
2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
Why pb of 1902 and act. No. 926 and pn 1801 reliance must fail?
because of the absence of the 2nd of a/d their entitlement to a government
grant under our present public land act presupposes that the land possessed
and applied for is already alienable and disposable. this is clear from the
wording of the law itself. where the land is not alienable and disposable,
possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights.
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were
classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first
element of OCENPO of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
All is not lost, however. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another,
they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to
their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land
laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that
bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
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In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open
up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some
sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd.
That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to
protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and
ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and
protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that
become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to
control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v.
Munoz:
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that
should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more
have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation,
conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For,
forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common
knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a
number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry
up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear.
Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric
plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With
erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops,
livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the
foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue.
REPUBLIC V. NAGUIAT
FACTS: Respondent Celestina Naguiat filed for an application for registration of 4
parcels of land located in Zambales. She alleges that she is the owner of the subject lands
having acquired them from LID Corporation. LID Corp. acquired the land from Calderon,
Moraga, Monje and their predecessors in interest who have been in OCENPO for more
than 30 years. She believes that the lots are not mortgaged nor encumbered.
petition be dismissed. Petitioners Cruz and Europa countered the constitutionality of
IPRA and its implementing rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources. Also, that the law is in violation of the Regalian Doctrine
embodied in the Constitution.
Also, petitioners contended that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands, it might include private lands found within the
said areas.
Issue:WON IPRA is unconstitutional as it contravenes Regalian Doctrine?
Ruling: NO, IPRA is held to be constitutional.
After due deliberation on the petition, 7 members of the court voted to dismiss the
petition, and 7 members of the court voted to grant the same.
The case was redeliberated upon, however, the votes remained the same. According to the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition has to be dismissed. The constitutionality of IPRA
is upheld.
Justice Panganibans Dissenting Opinion:
Contentions of RA 8371s unconstitutionality:
1. It violates the inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains. That
this is in contravention to Section 2, Art. 12 of the Constitution that only
agricultural lands of the public domain can be considered as alienable and
disposable lands.
2. No land area limits are specified - That 4/5 of the countrys natural resources and
1/3 of the countrys land will be concentrated to 12 Million IPs, and while 60
million other Filipinos will share the remaining. These figures violates the
constitutional principle of a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth among Filipinos.
3. It abdicates the State Duty to take Full Control and Supervision of Natural
Resources
4. Public Domains and Natural Resources are owned by the State and Cannot be
Alienated or Ceded

RP opposed the application alleging Sec. 2 Nature of Registration Proceedings, Jurisdiction of Courts
1) No OCENPO since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; Judicial Proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be
2) muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute in rem
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied Based on generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system
for or of his OCENPO ; CFI shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
3) applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant all applications for original registration of title to lands,
can no longer be availed of . . .; and that including all improvements and interests therein, and
4) parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to RP not over all petitions filed after original registration of title,
subject to private appropriation. with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or pet
The court through its clerk of court shall
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Naguiat which was subsequently affirmed by the furnish the Land Registration Commission with
CA. Hence, the appeal before the SC. The Republic faults the CA on its finding which o 2 certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issue
respects the length of Naguiats occupation of the subject property and for not petitions for land registration,
considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been o with the exception of stenographic notes,
declassified from forest land to A&D property. within 5 days from the filing or issuance thereof

ISSUE: whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or
other inalienable lands of the public domain?

RULING: SC had an opportunity to discuss the concept of Regalian Doctrine in this case. History
It states that all lands of the public domain belong to the State that is the source of any - conceptualized by Sir Robert Torrens from South Australia
asserted right to ownership of land. Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or - the purpose is to do away with the delay, uncertainty, and expense of the
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain system
part of the inalienable public domain.
What is Torrens System?
The burden of proof to overturn the presumption that the land subject of an application is - Those systems of registration of transaction with interest in land whose
alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. The SC said that the CA, in this case, declared object is, under governmental authority;
assumed that the lands in question are already A&D. CA ratiocinated that the possession - To establish and certify to the ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title
of Naguiat of the lands created a legal fiction where without judicial declaration, the same to realty,
ceases to be a public land and becomes private property ipso jure. - To simplify its transfer

Respondent Naguiat did not present any incontrovertible proof that there has been a What are the Purposes of Torrens System? (Legarda v. Saleeby)
positive act from the government which reclassified the land applied for as A&D. The tax 1) To quiet title to land;
receipts cannot be a sufficient proof for there is no information about the classification of 2) To put a stop forever to any question of the legality of title
the property on it. Instead, the applicant could have obtained a Certificate of Land Exception
Classification from the DENR as a valid proof. Since the land is unclassified, according Claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate or
to SC, the same cannot be acquired by adverse occupation. Occupation on such land in which may arise subsequent thereto
the concept of an owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure without necessity of
registered title. To this, the application of Naguiat to have the lands registered is denied. waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su casa to
avoid the possibility of losing his land.

ISAGANI CRUZ VS. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT Advantages of the Torrens System

347 SCRA 128 1) Substitutes security for insecurity
FACTS: 2) Reduced the cost of conveyances and time occupied
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, petitioners, assailed the constitutionality of certain 3) Exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage
provisions of RA 8371 ( Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) together with its 4) Simplified ordinary dealings
implementing rules and regulations. The OSG also commented that IPRA is partly 5) Affords protection against fraud
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to 6) Restored to their just value many estates, held under good holding titles, but
indigenous people. depreciated in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred
the reoccurrence of any similar faults
On the other hand, CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens
patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those THREE PRINCIPLES in the TS
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous people. For this reason, it prays that the 1) Mirror Principle
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o if there are several transfers, the TCT will be a mirror in that it
should be identical to the current facts. If the seller sells the
land, the old title must be identical to the new one in terms of
technical description, so as to reinforce the concept that the
buyers should be able to rely on the face of the title.
o Exception
a) when a person deals with a registered land with
someone that is not the registered owner
b) when the party has actual knowledge of facts
which should impel a reasonably cautious mind to
make such inquiry to the lack of title;
c) in cases of banking and financing institutions
2) Curtain Principle
o The concept that the buyer should be able to rely on the face of
the title, and should not go beyond the certificate. In a way, the
buyer does not have to go behind the curtain to ascertain the
truth of the title, because the Torrens Certificate guarantees him
that.
3) Insurance Principle
o Equates registration to a guarantee by the State
LAWS PRIOR TO 1529, See Table under Sec. v. Yap
PD 1529
How is jurisdiction over the RES acquired?
A: Sec. 23
1) Publication
2) Mailing
3) Notice
Who may apply for registration?
A: Sec. 14, p. 1-4 OPAL
1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
in OCENPO of AD lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier
2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws
3) Those how have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river
beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws
4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided
by law
Where and how to file the application for Registration?
With the RTC of the province or city where the land is situated. The TC shall
issue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing, and the public shall
be given notice thereof by means of publication, mailing and posting. Any
person claiming an interest in the land may appear and file an opposition,
stating all his objections to the application. The case shall be heard and all
conflicting claims of ownership shall be determined by the court.
Once the judgment becomes final, the court shall issue an order for the
issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate of title in favour of the
person adjudged as entitled to registration.
Thereupon. The LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY shall prepare the
corresponding decree of registration as well as the original and duplicate
certificate of title which shall be sent to the Register of Deeds of the city or
province where the land lies for registration.
Jurisdiction in civil cases involving title to property
Sec. 19(2), BP 129
With the RTC where assessed value of the property exceeds 20k
If Manila, if the assessed value of the property exceeds 50k
Exceptions
o Forcible entry
o Unlawful detainer of lands or buildings
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TITLE AND CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
TITLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
Source of right Merely confirms a title already existing
Foundation of ownership Mere evidence of ownership
Best evidence of ownership Best evidence of title
LEGARDA V. SALEEBY
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
CASE: Land is registered under the name of two persons
FACTS:
o That the plaintiffs LEGARDA and the defendant SALEEBY occupy, as owners,
adjoining lots which existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots.
Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs LEGARDA. Upon petition to the
Court, Legarda was able to obtain a decree of registration which included the
stonewall.
o Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs LEGARDA
discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to
them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They
immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an
adjustment and correction of the error committed
o The lower court however, without notice to the defendant SALEEBY denied said
petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the
registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the
registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant
SALEEBY.
ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in granting to SALEEBY the stonewall as his
registered property? NO
RULING:
The REAL PURPOSE OF THAT SYSTEM is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever
to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of
registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest
secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the
"mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not
be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is
judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the
forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in
rem.
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an
ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration
is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who
may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of
registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To
permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world)
to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the
registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law.
THE REGISTRATION, UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM, DOES NOT GIVE
THE OWNER ANY BETTER TITLE THAN HE HAD. If he does not already have a
perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The
certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement
of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is
the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once
registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.
Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be
altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by
a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the
registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision
in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in
the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the
name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a
particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same
parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future
litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to
the action. This, we think, is the rule, EXCEPT as to rights which are noted in the
certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which
need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an
adverse, open, and notorious possession. REGISTERED TITLE UNDER THE
TORRENS SYSTEM CAN NOT BE DEFEATED BY PRESCRIPTION (section 46, Act
No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice.
No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons,
has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the
"torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory
provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of
the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT
IN THE CASE OF TWO CERTIFICATES OF TITLE, PURPORTING TO
INCLUDE THE SAME LAND, THE EARLIER IN DATE PREVAILS,
WHETHER THE LAND COMPRISED IN THE LATTER CERTIFICATE BE
WHOLLY, OR ONLY IN PART, COMPRISED IN THE EARLIER
CERTIFICATE. Hogg adds however that, "IF IT CAN BE VERY CLEARLY
ASCERTAINED BY THE ORDINARY RULES OF CONSTRUCTION RELATING
TO WRITTEN DOCUMENTS, THAT THE INCLUSION OF THE LAND IN THE
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF PRIOR DATE IS A MISTAKE, THE MISTAKE MAY
BE RECTIFIED BY HOLDING THE LATTER OF THE TWO CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE TO BE CONCLUSIVE." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra,
and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens
System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two
certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or
interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or
interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of,
or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not
expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide
that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that
WHERE TWO CERTIFICATES PURPORT TO INCLUDE THE SAME REGISTERED
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LAND, THE HOLDER OF THE EARLIER ONE CONTINUES TO HOLD THE
TITLE" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or
included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not
be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a
petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
GENERAL RULE: "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any
court,
EXCEPTION: fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year.
Q: If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in
a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a
collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or
decree of registration?
We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered
title in that way. We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs
the right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in
the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things,
that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong
to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course,
presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real
ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration.
Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the
real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has
been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the
earlier in date shall prevail.
In the present case, the appellee SALEEBY was the first negligent (granting that he
was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he cannot complain) in not opposing
the registration in the name of the appellants. Granting that he was the owner of the land
upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the
name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against
impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine
invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.
IN CASE OF DOUBLE REGISTRATION UNDER THE LAND REGISTRATION
ACT, THAT THE OWNER OF THE EARLIEST CERTIFICATE IS THE
OWNER OF THE LAND. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be
applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the
other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an
"innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right,
title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had,
only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against
the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the
rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of
Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against
defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of
third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser."
That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an
original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent
purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections.
UNDER THE RULE OF NOTICE, IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE PURCHASER HAS
EXAMINED EVERY INSTRUMENT OF RECORD AFFECTING THE TITLE. Such
presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record
and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have
disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith.
Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed.
Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record
contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the
public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would
lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of
conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be
recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is
indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow
a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the
statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land,
subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of
such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the
recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide
purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he
had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons
must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons
as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law.
The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at
times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and
obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance
of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the
owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of
such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are
of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers.
We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a
purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts
contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to
the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original
certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the
portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of
what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry
there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and
in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the
difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent
purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land
has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once
brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent
transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded
as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the
appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot
registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had
included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee
be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent
purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the
appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the
registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice
resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in
the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose
of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser
from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to
his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the
holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first
original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title,
against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete
knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original
certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with
which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any,
resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and
who was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting
from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land.
Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary
registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view,
without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other
registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered
and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that
record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to
the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights
in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all
the requirements of the law should be protected.
SOLID STATE MULTI-PRODUCTS Corp. vs.CA
G.R. No. 83383 May 6, 1991
FACTS:
In 1982, Solid State, a domestic corporation, filed an action for quieting of title on a
parcel of land located at Imus, Cavite which was allegedly registered by Virata in his
name by fraudulently obtaining a title through an administrative reconstitution of a non-
existent original title of the land, and that by reason of said reconstitution, there now
exists a cloud on the title of Solid State. Solid State alleges that it bought the land from
Julian Pearanda who obtained the same through the grant of application for the sale of a
friar land from the government. The land was registered in the name of Pearanda in
1969 under CA 32. Pearanda's occupation of the land is derived through a voluntary
assignment of right of the former occupant, Mabini Legaspi, and that the same is free
from claims and conflicts and that the said applicant has established his rights over the
subject land, in view of which, said investigator recommended that said lot be awarded to
applicant Julian Pearanda according to law.
Virata countered saying that he bought the land from Mabini Legaspi who
obtainedownership in 1957 on the subject land after the Director of Lands sold the same
at public auction. Official Receipts of payment for the instalments were shown as a proof.
The title was reconstituted since the Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned including
the ROD office which holds the title to the subject property. Legaspi also denied that she
sold the land to Julan Pearanda. RTC ruled in favor of Virata which was then affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal before the SC.
..
Issue:
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WON CA correctly held that Virata is the true and lawful owner of the subject property?
NO.
Ruling:
Solid State contends that Act No. 1120 or Friar Lands Act provides the procedure for the
sale and disposition of
the friar lands to private persons. The acquisition by Pearanda was in compliance with
all legal requisites laid down by the law for the validity of the sale. He further contended
that the issuance to Mabini Legaspi of a COT in her favor was a violation of the Friar
Lands Act as there was no required approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
The friar lands were purchased by the government for sale to actual settlers and
occupants at the time said
lands are acquired by the government. The Bureau of Lands shall first issue a certificate
stating therein that the
government has agreed to sell the land to such settler or occupant. The latter then shall
accept the certificate and agree to pay the purchase price so fixed and in the instalments
and at the interest specified in the certificate. Subject to a resolutory condition that non-
payment of price in full may cancel the sale. The court said that the title Pearanda has
the valid acquisition from the government of the subject friar land since it was in
compliance with law and hence, the sale in favor of Solid State is valid and binding.
Contrary to that, the
SC said while the sale of the lot to Legaspi occurred much earlier in time, the same
cannot be considered as a ground to for him to be considered the true owner of the land.
Legaspi did not present an evidence showing that a certificate of sale was ever issued by
the BoL in his favor. The existence of the official receipts showing payment of the price
of the land by Legaspi does not prove that the land was legally conveyed to her without
any contract of sale. Legaspi also alleged that he purchased the land in a sale at public
auction, which procedure is nowhere provided in the pertinent laws conveying friar lands.
The law expressly state that an actual occupant of the land shall purchase the lot occupied
by him at a private sale not in a public auction. There was also absence of a deed of
conveyance to Legaspi by the government after the full payment of the instalments on the
disputed lot.
Time and again, registration does not vest title to the land, but merely a procedure to
establish
evidence over realty. Even if the 1 year period has already lapsed, the title did not
become incontrovertible but it is a null and void for not complying with the requirements
of the law. Therefore, Virata could not have validly obtained title to the land
FULLTEXT RULING:
We find the petition impressed with merit.
Since the assigned errors were interrelated, it would be well for this Court to discuss them
jointly.
Petitioner does not question the factual findings made by the respondent appellate court
and supported by the records (p. 22, Rollo). It does not however accept the legal
conclusion made by the appellate court and trial court that the registered title of private
respondent to the land should prevail over its own title.
Petitioner contends that Act No. 1120, otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act
provides the procedure for the sale and disposition of the friar lands to private persons;
that pursuant thereto, the acquisition by petitioner's predecessor-in-interest Julian
Pearanda of the disputed Lot 7449, which was formerly part of the friar lands estate, was
in compliance with all legal requisites laid down in Act No. 1120, for the validity of the
sale by the government in favor of Pearanda of such friar lands.
It also argues that the sale of Lot No. 7449 to respondent's predecessor, Mabini Legaspi,
and the issuance of a certificate of title in her favor was in violation of the Friar Lands
Act as there was no required approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
There is no dispute here that the land involved in this case is a friar land and that the laws
which are applicable are Act No. 1120, known as the Friar Lands Act, providing for the
administration and temporary leasing and sale of certain haciendas and parcels of land,
commonly known as friar lands, and Commonwealth Act No. 32 dated September 15,
1936 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 316 dated June 9, 1938, which provided
for the subdivision and sale of all the portions of the friar lands estated remaining
undisposed of.
Sec. 12 of Act No. 1120 provides in part:
. . . the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a
certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to such
settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him at the price so fixed payable as
provided in this Act at the Office of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands . . . and that
upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued interest the
Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by
proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the
manner provided in section one hundred and twenty two of the Land Registration Act.
Also, Sec. 18 of the same Act provides:
No lease or sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of
this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the Interior. (Emphasis ours)
Similarly, Sec. 2 of C.A. No. 32, as amended by C.A. No. 316 provides in part:
. . . The persons who, at the time of the subdivision survey are actual and bona
fide occupants of any portion of the Friar Lands Estates, not exceeding ten
hectares, shall be given preference to purchase the portion occupied at a private sale
and at a price to be fixed in such case, by the Director of Lands, subject to the approval
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, after taking into consideration its location,
quality, and any other circumstances as may affect its value, the provisions of section 12,
of Act 1120, as amended, to the contrary, . . . (Emphasis ours)
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the friar lands were purchased by the
government for sale to actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by
the government.
1) The Bureau of Lands shall first issue a certificate stating therein that the
government has agreed to sell the land to such settler or occupant.
2) The occupant then shall accept the certificate and agree to pay the purchase
price so fixed and in the installments and at the interest specified in the
certificate.
3) The conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so called
certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject
only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price
agreed upon is not paid for in full. The purchaser becomes the owner upon
the issuance of the certificate of sale in his favour subject only to the
cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon is not paid (Pugeda vs.
Trias, No. L-16925, March 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 849.)
4) Upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued interests,
the government shall then issue a final deed of conveyance in favor of the
purchaser.
5) However, the sale of such friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the
Secretary of Interior as provided in Act No. 1120. Later laws, however,
required that the sale shall be approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce. In short, the approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale.
It is undisputed that SOLID STATEs predecessor, Julian Pearanda was the actual
occupant of Lot 7449 when he filed his application to purchase the said lot on November
22, 1968; that on December 16, 1989, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
approved the sale of the lot without auction to Pearanda; that a sales contract was
executed between the Director of Lands and Pearanda on February 28, 1969 for a
consideration of P 1,198.00 payable in 10 monthly installments; that upon the full
payment of the price, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued the
final deed of conveyance of Lot No. 7449 in favor of Pearanda. Subsequently, the
Register of Deeds of Cavite issued TCT No. 39631 in the name of Pearanda, and when
the latter sold the land to petitioner, TCT No. 39631 was cancelled and TCT No. T-80889
was issued in favor of the latter.
Clearly, the purchase of the friar land made by Pearanda was in compliance with law.
The execution of the sales contract vested the right of ownership in Pearanda over the
land. There is no doubt whatsoever that the said sale was valid as it was approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, the sale made by Pearanda in
favor of the petitioner transferred the ownership of the land in favor of the latter resulting
in the proper issuance of TCT No. T-80889 in its name.
On the other hand, the antecedents leading to the acquisition of title by respondent
VIRATA are clearly shown in the records. The latter's predecessor, Mabini Legaspi
bought Lot 7449 in a sale by public auction held on May 5, 1943 conducted by the
Bureau of Lands and friar lands agent Severino Rivera, and paid the purchase price
thereof in installments in 1943; that on December 12, 1944, the Bureau of Lands sent a
letter to the Register of Deeds of Cavite requesting the issuance of certificates of title to
several persons including Mabini Legaspi, in whose favor TCT A-2188 was issued; that
subsequently on December 6, 1957, she sold the disputed land to respondent Virata,
which was evidenced by a deed of sale registered with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite on
December 10, 1957; that on the same date, TCT No. 11520 was issued in the name of
Virata. Due to the fire which gutted the building housing the Registry of Cavite on June
7, 1959, the latter administratively reconstituted the original of TCT No. 11520 on
September 1, 1959, based on the owner's duplicate certificate and renumbered the same
as TCT No. 1120 RT 1660.
Apparently, the sale of the lot to Mabini Legaspi occurred much earlier than the date of
acquisition of same lot by petitioner's predecessor, and the evidence presented by
respondent Virata indicates that the latter's predecessor paid the purchase price of Lot No.
7449 on installments. Nowhere in the evidence for the respondent or in the records of
this case however, would show that a certificate of sale was ever issued by the
Bureau of Lands, which would vest ownership and title over the land in favor of
Mabini Legaspi. The existence of the official receipts showing payment of the price of
the land by Legaspi does not prove that the land was legally conveyed to her without any
contract of sale having been executed by the government in her favor. Viewed from all
angles, the acquisition of the lot by Legaspi was highly irregular and void, and not in
compliance with the procedure mandated by law for the sale of friar lands. For one
thing, Mabini Legaspi allegedly purchased the land in a sale at public auction, which
procedure is nowhere provided in Act No. 1120 or in C.A. 32, as amended by C.A. 316.
The laws expressly state that an actual occupant of the land shall purchase the lot
occupied by him at a private sale and not in a sale at public auction (Sec. 2, C.A. 32 as
amended). Further, neither was there any deed of conveyance issued to Legaspi by the
government after the full payment of the installments on the disputed lot.
Highly significant at this point is the fact that there was neither allegation nor proof that
the sale was with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. The
absence of such approval made the supposed sale null and void ab initio. Without the
certificate of sale to prove the transfer of the ownership of the land from the government
Mabini Legaspi and without the required approval of the sale by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, We find that Mabini Legaspi did not in any manner
acquire ownership over the land in 1943. The ownership or title over the friar land,
specifically Lot No. 7449 remained in the government until Pearanda, petitioners
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predecessor, lawfully acquired ownership over the same lot on February 28, 1969 by
virtue of a sales contract executed in his favor.
The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Mabini Legaspi did not vest ownership
upon her over the land nor did it validate the alleged purchase of the lot, which is null and
void. Time and again, it has been held that registration does not vest title. It is merely
evidence of such title over a particular property. Our land registration laws do not
give the holder any better title than that what he actually has (De man et al. vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. L- 46935 December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 701; Cruz vs. Cabana, No.
56232, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 656).
Although a period of one year has already expired from the time the certificate of
title was issued to Mabini Legaspi pursuant to the alleged sale from the government,
said title does not become incontrovertible but is null and void since the acquisition
of the property was in violation of law.
Further, the petitioner herein is in possession of the land in dispute. Hence, its action to
quiet title is imprescriptible. In one case, this Court ruled that an adverse claimant of a
registered land who is in possession thereof for a long period of time is not barred from
bringing an action for reconveyance which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property
against a registered owner relying upon a Torrens title which was illegally or wrongfully
acquired. In actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the
conveyance complained of was void ab initio, a claim of prescription of the action would
be unavailing. Being null and void, the sale made to Mabini Legaspi and the subsequent
titles issued pursuant thereto produced no legal effects whatsoever. Quod nullum est
nullum producit affectum. There being no title to the land that Mabini Legaspi acquired
from the government, it follows that no title to the same land could be conveyed by the
former to respondent Virata. Even assuming that respondent Virata was a purchaser in
good faith and for value, the law is, as between two persons both of whom are in good
faith and both innocent of any negligence, the law must protect and prefer the lawful
holder of registered title over the transferee of a vendor bereft of any transmissible
rights . Further if a person happened to obtain property by mistake or to the prejudice of
another with or without bad faith, the certificate of title which may have been issued to
him under the circumstances may and should be cancelled or corrected. Our unavoidable
conclusion in this case is that the title of petitioner under the Torrens land system
should be upheld considering that no previous valid title to the same land existed.
Petition granted.
GREY ALBA VS. DE LA CRUZ
17 SCRA 49
Facts:
Petitioners are heirs of Segunda Alba Clemente. They, as co-owners sought for the
registration of a parcel of
land located in Baliuag, Bulacan. The land is said to be an agricultural one used for the
raising of rice and sugar cane. This petition for registration was granted by the court.
Subsequently, Anacleto Dela Cruz objected before the court asking for the revision of
the case. Dela Cruz alleged that the decree of registration was fraudulently obtained by
the petitioners and that included in the parcels of land Albas sought to register is the two
parcels of land he inherited from his father which was a state grant. To this the court
revised its decision which excludes the two parcels of land claimed by Dela Cruz.
Issue: WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Anacleto De La Cruz?
YES.
Ruling:
It is admitted that Dela cruz was occupying the two parcels of land at the time the
appellants presented their petition for registration. That Dela Cruz did not appear in the
petition as an occupant and also that he is alleged to be a tenant for the Albas the reason
why the latter did not include his name in the petition as occupant. It is proved that the
Uncle of the petitioners, who took care of them after their parents died, have leased the
property to Anacletos Father. Anacleto agreed that there was a lease but the two parcels
of land he is claiming were not
included in the lease contract. The fact that the petitioners were able to have the subject
land registered will tell us that such registration is conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the government, whether their names are mentioned in the application
or included in the general description to all who it may concern. By express provision
of the law, such as the Land Registration Act, the world are made parties-defendant by
the description in the notice to all whom it may concern.Though, Anacleto De la Cruz
was not served with notice, he was already made a party defendant by publication
and the entering of the decree in 1908 must be held conclusive against all persons
including him. The SC said it was error for the lower court to have opened the
decree and modified the judgment on account of absence, infancy, or other
disability. It could have been opened only on the ground that the decree was
obtained through fraud.
While it was alleged that there was fraud, the SC did not consider such allegation. It ruled
that the petitioners
honestly believed that Anacleto was occupying the lands as their tenant. Specific,
intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner
injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive
fraud.To this, the SC said that the Lower Courts decision be reinstated and the decision
of the Appellate Court be reversed.
JURISDICTION OVER LAND REGISTRATION CASES
VENUE
RTCs Exclusive Jurisdiction (Sec. 2 (2) of PD 1529)
1) All applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein
2) All petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all question arising upon such applications or petition
MTCs delegated jurisdiction
MTCs may hear and determine land registration cases in the following instances:
1) Lot sought to be registered is not subject to controversy or opposition
2) Lot is contested, but the value thereof does not exceed 100, 000
a. Such value is ascertained by
by the affidavit of the claimant
by the agreement of the respective claimants (if there be more than one), or
from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property
SC Administrative Circular 6-93-A
Nov. 15, 1995
1) Cadastral or land registration cases filed before the effectivity of this A.C. shall be
transferred by the Executive Judge of the RTC having jurisdiction over the cases
to E.J. of the appropriate Courts of limited jurisdiction for the required raffle
among the branches of the court under his administrative supervision
2) But those already commenced as of the date of effectivity shall remain w/ said
courts, except when the parties agree otherwise
RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC.,
vs. RoD Paranaque.
[G.R. No. 133240. November 15, 2000]
FACTS:
PETITIONER CORPORATION was formerly known as Rudolf Lietz,
Incorporated. On July 15, 1996, it amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its
name to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc and was approved by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on February 20, 1997. As a consequence of its change of name, petitioner
sought the amendment of the TCTs over real properties owned by the said corporation, all
of which were under the old name, Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. For this purpose,
petitioner instituted, on November 20, 1997, a petition for amendment of titles with the
RTC of Paraaque City impleading as respondent the ROD of Pasay City, apparently
because the titles sought to be amended, all state that they were issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition
that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in Pasay City. Subsequently,
petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds
of Paraaque City. Hence, Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition now
impleading ROD of Paraaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in Paraaque
City. Court dismissed due to improper venue since properties are in Pasay In the
meantime, however, on January 30, 1998, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu
proprio on the ground of improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the
Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City.[7]MR
denied
PETITIONER BEFORE SC
The court a quo acted contrary to the rules and jurisprudence on the matter for the
following reasons:
1. It has no power to immediately dismiss an initiatory pleading for improper venue;
2. Assuming the Order of 30 January 1998 was proper, it was nevertheless still a
matter of right on petitioners part to amend its petition in order to correct the
wrong entries therein; and
3. The unassailable reality is that the subject parcels of land are located in Paraaque
City, so venue was properly laid despite that erroneous allegation in the original
petition.[11]
OSG
The Solicitor General filed on November 4, 1998 his Comment said that trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the res because it appeared from the original petition that the
lands are situated in Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Paraaque
court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have acted on the motion to
admit amended petition.
PETITIONERS REPLY JURISDICTION V. VENUE On February 15, 1999,
petitioner filed its Reply. TC had jurisdiction over the petition, but that venue appeared to
be improperly laid based on the erroneous allegation therein on the location of the
properties.
ISSUE: May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper
venue? NO.
RULING: While the ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the petition below
was clearly that of improper venue, the Solicitor General confuses venue with
jurisdiction. A distinction between the two must be drawn.
JURISDICTION OVER THE VENUE OF AN ACTION
SUBJECT MATTER
nature of an action is conferred only by as fixed by statute may be changed by the
law. It may not be conferred by consent or consent of the parties, and an objection on
waiver upon a court which otherwise improper venue may be waived by the
would have no jurisdiction over the failure of the defendant to raise it at the
subject matter of an action proper time.
Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to In such an event, the court may still render
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the consent or agreement of the parties. a valid judgment
jurisdictional Procedural (may be waived); to provide
convenience to the parties rather than
restrict their access to the courts as it
relates to the place of trial.
Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court
a. laying of venue is procedural
rather than substantive.
b. It relates to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person rather than
the subject matter.
c. Provisions relating to venue
establish a relation between the
plaintiff and the defendant and
not between the court and the
subject matter.
d. Venue relates to trial not to
jurisdiction, touches more of the
convenience of the parties rather
than the substance of the case.
In Dacoycoy v. IAC, this Court ruled:
The motu proprio dismissal of petitioners complaint by respondent trial court on
the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to
distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
VENUE, IN INFERIOR COURTS AS WELL AS IN THE CFI (NOW RTC), MAY
BE WAIVED EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY Dismissing the complaint on the ground
of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the
proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well as in the courts of first
instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly. Where the defendant fails to
challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot
on appeal or in a special action be permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue,
which is deemed waived.
THOUGH TECHNICALLY WRONG, MAY BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE
PARTIES FOR WHOSE CONVENIENCE THE RULES ON VENUE HAD BEEN
DEVISED. Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to
dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical
intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the
parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot
pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue
by motu proprio dismissing the case.
INDEED, IT WAS GROSSLY ERRONEOUS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
HAVE TAKEN A PROCEDURAL SHORT-CUT BY DISMISSING MOTU
PROPRIO the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing the
procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are for the
speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary
importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the
rules of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to
be heard on his cause.[18]
PETITIONER CORRECTLY INVOKED THE JURISDICTION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN SEEKING THE AMENDMENT OF ITS
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE. The jurisdiction of the RTC over matters involving the
registration of lands and lands registered under the Torrens system is conferred by
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, The Property Registration Decree, viz:
Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. --- Judicial proceedings for the
registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the
generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.
COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interest therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions.
The COURT through its CLERK OF COURT shall
1. furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all
pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or
petitions for land registration,
2. WITH THE EXCEPTION of stenographic notes,
3. within five days from the filing or issuance thereof.
In the case at bar, the lands are located in Paraaque City, as stated on the faces of the
titles. Petitioner, thus, also correctly filed the petition in the place where the lands are
situated, pursuant to the following rule:
Venue of real actions. --- Actions affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper
court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved,
or a portion thereof, is situated.[19]
VDA. DE ARCEO VS. CA
185 SCRA 489
Facts:
Spouses Arceo are owners of four parcels of unregistered lands located in Bulacan. They
had one Son named Esteban who had 5 children. Estebans children and their children are
the parties involved in this case. In 1941, Spouses Arceo executed a donation inter vivos
in favor of Jose, one of Estebans children. Since 1942, Jose paid the taxes, took personal
possession of the land and claimed it as his own. In 1941, also, Arceos supposedly
signed a deed of donation mortis causa to give away the subject properties in favor of all
his grandchildren including Jose. However, the said document was notarized in 1944 only
after Mrs. Arceo died.
Subsequently, the wife of Jose, together with their children, filed with the cadastral court
an application for
registration in their names the subject lands. This was contested by Pedro and Lorenzo,
Joses siblings contending that they are entitled to a part of the subject parcels of land.
The cadastral court rejected the registration and distributed the properties according to
law on intestate succession instead. The CA affirmed its decision.
Issue: WON the cadastral court has jurisdiction in determining the ownership of lands?
Ruling:
As to the issue of jurisdiction, Section 2 of PD 1529 provides that RTC, sitting as a land
registration court, is no
longer circumscribed as it is in the previous law. PD 1529 eliminated the general
jurisdiction of RTC and the limited jurisdiction of RTC acting merely as a cadastral
court; the purpose of this is to avoid multiplicity of suits.
In this case, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction in the
determination of issues on
ownership, which at the same time involves the issue on the right of registration. There
would be a multiplicity of suits or the registration will be prolonged if not impossible
should the cadastral court decide not to pass upon the issue of ownership.
As to the issue of co-ownership:
Joses wife contends that they acquired the lot through acquisitive prescription. This was
rejected by the SC. The Civil Code provides that prescription does not lie against co-
owners, unless the following requisites concur.
a. There is a clear showing that the claimant has repudiated the co-
ownership.
b. He has made known to the co-owners that he is assuming
exclusive ownership over the property.
c. Clear and convincing evidence thereof.
d. His possession is OCEN.
This circumstances were not present in the case at bar. The fact of paying taxes cannot
defeat the right of coowners to their right to enjoy the use of their property, the same does
not confer title upon a claimant.
Nonetheless, the SC granted the petition and have the lands registered under the name of
Jose and his heirs by
virtue of the valid deed of donation inter vivos. The Supreme Court further ruled that the
donation mortis causa did not revoke the first donation. The weight of authority is that a
valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable subject to few exceptions. Finally,
the court said that the disposition in favor of Jose of the subject properties should be
respected.
Section 3. Status of other pre-existing land registration system. The system of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is hereby discontinued and all lands
recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered
as unregistered lands.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish
Mortgage Law may be
recorded under Section 113 of this Decree, until the land shall have been brought under
the operation of the Torrens system. The books of registration for unregistered lands
provided under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
3344, shall continue to remain in force; provided, that all instruments dealing with
unregistered lands shall henceforth be registered under Section 113 of this Decree.
Section 113. Recording of instruments relating to unregistered lands. No deed,
conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument affecting land not registered
under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, unless such
instrument shall have been recorded in the manner herein prescribed in the office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
(a) The Register of Deeds for each province or city shall keep a Primary Entry
Book and a Registration Book. The Primary Entry Book shall contain, among
other particulars,
1. the entry number,
2. the names of the parties,
3. the nature of the document,
4. the date, hour and minute it was presented and received.
5. The recording of the deed and other instruments relating to unregistered
lands shall be effected by any of annotation on the space provided
therefor in the Registration Book, after the same shall have been entered
in the Primary Entry Book.
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(b) If, on the face of the instrument, it appears that it is sufficient in law, the Register
of Deeds shall forthwith record the instrument in the manner provided herein. In
case the Register of Deeds refuses its administration to record, said official shall
advise the party in interest in writing of the ground or grounds for his refusal, and
the latter may appeal the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration in
accordance with the provisions of Section 117 of this Decree. It shall be
understood that any recording made under this section shall be without prejudice
to a third party with a better right.
(c) After recording on the Record Book, the Register of Deeds shall endorse among
other things, upon the original of the recorded instruments, the file number and
the date as well as the hour and minute when the document was received for
recording as shown in the Primary Entry Book, returning to the registrant or
person in interest the duplicate of the instrument, with appropriate annotation,
certifying that he has recorded the instrument after reserving one copy thereof to
be furnished the provincial or city assessor as required by existing law.
(d) Tax sale, attachment and levy, notice of lis pendens, adverse claim and other
instruments in the nature of involuntary dealings with respect to unregistered
lands, if made in the form sufficient in law, shall likewise be admissible to record
under this section.
(e) For the services to be rendered by the Register of Deeds under this section, he
shall collect the same amount of fees prescribed for similar services for the
registration of deeds or instruments concerning registered lands.
REGISTRATION UNDER THE SPANISH MORTGAGE LAW
TITULO DE PROPRIEDAD NO. 4136 The case of Director of Forestry v. Muoz
would soon be the core of subsequent decisions declaring the infamous Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 as a forgery foisted upon the courts and bereft of any validity and
efficacy as evidence of ownership. In this case, petitioners-heirs did not adduce
evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the operation of P.D.
No. 892 despite their
allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. Proof of compliance with P.D. No. 892
should be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered.
REGISTRATION UNDER ACT NO. 3344; ineffective as against 3rd persons
The inscription under Act No. 3344 of a transaction relating to unregistered land was held
not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code, the law on double sale of the
same property. The registration should be made in the property registry to be binding
upon third persons; mere registration of a sale in ones favour does not give him any right
over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having previously sold
the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
CHAPTER II
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION AND ITS REGISTRIES OF DEEDS
Section 4. Land Registration Commission. In order to have a more efficient execution
of the laws relative to the registration of lands, geared to the massive and accelerated land
reform and social justice program of the government, there is created a commission to be
known as the Land Registration Commission under the executive supervision of the
Department of Justice.
Section 5. Officials and employees of the Commission. The Land Registration
Commission shall have a chief and an assistant chief to be known, respectively, as the
Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Land Registration who shall be
appointed by the President.
The Commissioner shall be
duly qualified member of the Philippine Bar
with at least ten years of practice in the legal profession, and
shall have the same rank, compensation and privileges as those of a Judge
of the Court of First Instance.
The Deputy Commissioner, who shall
possess the same qualifications as those required of the Commissioner,
shall receive compensation which shall be three thousand pesos per annum
less than that of the Commissioner.
He shall act as Commissioner of Land Registration during the absence or
disability of the Commissioner and
when there is a vacancy in the position until another person shall have been
designated or appointed in accordance with law.
The Deputy Commissioner shall also perform such other functions as the
Commissioner may assign to him.
They shall be assisted by such number of division chiefs as may be necessary in the
interest of the functioning of the Commission, by a Special Assistant to the
Commissioner, and by a Chief Geodetic Engineer who shall each receive compensation
at the rate of three thousand four hundred pesos per annum less than that of the Deputy
Commissioner.
All other officials and employees of the Land Registration Commission including those
of the Registries of Deeds whose salaries are not herein provided, shall receive salaries
corresponding to the minimum of their respective upgraded ranges as provided under
paragraph 3.1 of Budget Circular No. 273, plus sixty per centum thereof across the board,
notwithstanding the maximum salary allowed for their respective civil service
eligibilities.
The salaries of officials and employees provided in this Decree shall be without prejudice
to such benefits and adjustments as may from time to time be granted by the President or
by the legislature to government employees.
All officials and employees of the Commission except Registers of Deeds shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Land
Registration.
Section 6. General Functions.
(1) The Administrator of Land Registration shall have the following functions:
a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in
land registration proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registers of
Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title;
b) Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and other
personnel of the Commission;
c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision of,
Registers of Deeds;
d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of
the Courts of First Instance throughout the Philippines with respect to the
discharge of their duties and functions in relation to the registration of
lands;
e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative to the
registration of lands
and issue, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules and
regulations therefor;
f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-
subdivision survey plans of properties titled under Act No. 496 except
those covered by P.D. No. 957.
(2) The Land Registration Authority shall have the following functions:
a) Extend speedy and effective assistance to the Department of Agrarian
Reform, the Land Bank, and other agencies in the implementation of the
land reform program of the government;
b) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings;
c) Be the central repository of records relative to original registration of
lands titled under the Torrens system, including subdivision and
consolidation plans of titled lands.
SEC. 7. Office of the Register of Deeds. There shall be at least one Register of Deeds
for each province and one for each city.
Every Registry with a
yearly average collection of more than sixty thousand pesos
during the last three years shall have one
o Deputy Register of Deeds,
and every Registry with a
yearly average collection of more than three hundred thousand pesos
during the last three years, shall have one
o Deputy Register of Deeds and
o one second Deputy Register of Deeds.
The Secretary of Justice shall define the official station and territorial jurisdiction of
each Registry upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Land Registration,
with the end in view of making every registry easily accessible to the people of the
neighboring municipalities. The province or city shall furnish a suitable space or building
for the office of the Register of Deeds until such time as the same could be furnished out
of national funds.
Registry of Property
in accordance with Sec. 51 of PD 1529 which provides that no deed,
mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument except a will- purporting to
convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the
land until its registration. Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding
only between the seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent 3 rd
persons.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned.
Between the two buyers of the same immovable property registered under
the Torrens System, the law gives ownership priority to
1) First registrant in good faith
2) First possessor in good faith
3) Buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title
Effect of Registration
Constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing,
or entering.
SEC. 8. Appointment of Registers of Deeds and their Deputies and other
subordinate personnel; salaries. Registers of Deeds shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Deputy
Registers of Deeds and all other subordinate personnel of the Registries of Deeds shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of
Land Registration. The salaries of Registers of Deeds and their Deputies shall be at the
following rates:
(1) First Class Registries The salaries of Registers of Deeds in first class
Registries shall be three thousand four hundred pesos per annum less than
that of the Deputy Commissioner.
(2) Second Class Registries The salaries of Registers of Deeds in second
class Registries shall be three thousand four hundred pesos per annum less
than those of Registers of Deeds in first class Registries.
(3) Third Class Registries The salaries of Registers of Deeds in third class
Registries shall be three thousand four hundred pesos per annum less than
those of Registers of Deeds in second class Registries.
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(4) The salaries of Deputy Registers of Deeds and Second Deputy Registers of
Deeds shall be three thousand four hundred pesos per annum less than those
of their corresponding Registers of Deeds and Deputy Registers of Deeds,
respectively.
(5) The Secretary of Justice, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of
Land Registration, shall cause the reclassification of Registries based either
on work load or the class of province/ city, whichever will result in a higher
classification, for purposes of salary adjustments in accordance with the
rates hereinabove provided.
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Registers of Deeds and Deputy Registers of Deeds. No
person shall be appointed Register of Deeds unless he has been admitted to the practice of
law in the Philippines and shall have been actually engaged in such practice for at least
three years or has been employed for a like period in any branch of government the
functions of which include the registration of property.
The Deputy Register of Deeds shall be a member of the Philippine Bar. Provided,
however, That no Register of Deeds or Deputy Register of Deeds holding office as such
upon the passage of this Decree shall by reason hereof, be removed from office or be
demoted to a lower category or scale of salary except for cause and upon compliance with
due process as provided for by law.
SEC. 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. The office of the Register of
Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or
unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city wherein such office is
situated.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with
real or personal property
which complies with all the requisites for registration.
He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary and
science stamps and that
the same are properly cancelled.
If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith
o deny registration thereof and
o inform the presentor of such denial in writing,
o stating the ground or reason therefor, and
o advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of this Decree.
Office of the Register of Deeds
Public repository of records of instruments affecting registered or
unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city wherein
such office is situated
NATURE OF THE DUTIES OF LRA
General Rule:Its duty is ministerial those acts of functions that conform to an
instruction or a prescribed procedure. They act under the orders of the court and the
decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the
record. If the LRA is in doubt as to the issuance and preparation of the decree, it is
their duty to refer the matter to the court. In this sense, they act as officials of the
court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings.
The validity of the document is not for the register to determine for it is a function of a
court of competent jurisdiction. Validity is to be decided after the registration in a
litigation. In case of doubt, it shall be referred to the LRA
LRA shall after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be
taken on the doubtful question which shall be conclusive and binding upon
all RoDs
Exception: LRA officials may exercise discretion in the following instances:
a) When obeying the courts order would result to double titling;
b) When there are several copies of title but only one is presented with the
instrument to be registered
c) Where the property is presumed to be conjugal but the instrument of
conveyance bears the signature of only one spouse;
d) Where there is pending case in court where the character of the land and the
validity of conveyance is in issue;
o In this case, the matter of registration may well await the
outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the
interested parties could be protected by the filing the proper
notices of lis pendens.
e) Where required certificates and documents are not submitted
May the RoD be compelled by mandamus?
No. Since the registration is a judicial function, it cannot be compelled by mandamus.
The interested party must resort to the available administrative remedy before he can
have recourse to the courts.
SEC. 11. Discharge of duties of Register of Deeds in case of vacancy, etc.
1) Until a regular Register of Deeds shall have been appointed for a province or city,
or in case of vacancy in the office, or upon the occasion of the absence, illness,
suspension, or inability of the Register of Deeds to discharge his duties, said duties
shall be performed by the following officials, in the order in which they are
mentioned below, unless the Secretary of Justice designates another official to act
temporarily in his place:
a) For the province or city where there is a Deputy Register of Deeds, by
said Deputy Register of Deeds, or by the second Deputy Register of
Deeds, should there be one;
b) For the province or city where there is no Deputy or second Deputy
Register of Deeds, by the Provincial or City Fiscal, or any Assistant
Fiscal designated by the Provincial or City Fiscal.
2) In case of absence, disability or suspension of the Register of Deeds without pay,
or in case of vacancy in the position, the Secretary of Justice may, in his discretion,
authorize the payment of an additional compensation to the official acting as
Register of Deeds, such additional compensation together with his actual salary not
to exceed the salary authorized for the position thus filled by him.
3) In case of a newly-created province or city and pending establishment of a Registry
of Deeds and the appointment of a regular Register of Deeds for the new province
or city, the Register of Deeds of the mother province or city shall be the ex-officio
Register of Deeds for said new province or city.
SEC. 12. Owners Index; reports. There shall be prepared in every Registry an index
system which shall contain the names of all registered owners alphabetically arranged.
For this purpose, an index card which shall be prepared in the name of each registered
owner which shall contain a list of all lands registered in his name.
The Register of Deeds shall submit to the Land Registration Commission within ten days
after the month to which they pertain his monthly reports on collections and
accomplishments. He shall also submit to the Commission at the end of December of
each year, an annual inventory of all titles and instruments in his Registry.
SEC. 13. Chief Geodetic Engineer. There shall be a Chief Geodetic Engineer in the
Land Registration Commission who shall be the technical adviser of the Commission on
all matters involving surveys and shall be responsible to him for all plats, plans and
works requiring the services of a geodetic engineer in said office. He shall perform such
other functions as may, from time to time, be assigned to him by the Commissioner.
PD 239
- Only the LAND MANAGEMENT BUREAU has authority to approve
original survey plans for registration purposes.
- The grant of authority to the LRC to approve original survey plans has
resulted in wasteful overlapping or duplication of functions. There was
therefore a need to centralize in one agency, the LMB, the function of
verifying and approving original survey plans for all purposes in order to
assure compliance with established standards and minimize irregularities in
the execution of land surveys
Survey Plan
- serves to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not
overlap a parcel of land portion thereof already covered by previous land
registration, and to forestall the possibility of which by a subsequent
registration of any adjoining land.
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LABURADA V. LRA
FACTS: Spouses Laburada were the applicants for registration of a parcel of land located
in Mandaluyong City, RTC, acting as land registration court, granted such application.
After the finality of the decision, the Sps filed a motion before the RTC requiring LRA to
issue the corresponding decree of registration, which was then granted by RTC. However,
the LRA refused to do so. To this, the Sps Laburada filed an action for mandamus.
LRA contends that such refusal is grounded on the fact that a portion of the subject
property was a subject of a land decree in court of land registration, that if it will be
pursued, it will result to double titling which destroys the policy and purpose of the
Torrens System. The SG sought to have the petition of the Sps Laburada dismissed after
it found out on its investigation that the title issued for the subject lot cannot be located.
ISSUE: w/n the LRA can be compelled to issue the decree of registration through an
action for mandamus (for ministerial duties)? NO
HELD:
There are three reasons why Mandamus is not the right remedy
1) JUDGMENT IS NOT YET EXECUTORY
- The judgment Sps Laburada seek to enforce is not yet executory and
incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. They do not have any
clear legal right to implement it. It was ruled previously that a judgment of
registration does not become incontrovertible until after the expiration of one
year after the entry of the final decree of registration.
2) A VOID JUDGMENT IS POSSIBLE
- LRAs refusal to issue a decree is based on documents which, if verified,
may render the judgment of the TC void. To this, LRAs hesitation to issue a
decree is understandable, even imperative. If it issues the decree, it will
destroy the integrity of the Torrens System. LRA is mandated to refer to the
courts any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the issuance of
a decree of registration. They are specifically called upon to extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.
Since in this case, the subject property has already been decreed by the court
for registration. Hence, LRA is divested of jurisdiction.
3) ISSUANCE OF A DECREE IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT
- It is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act,
which may be compelled thorough mandamus. This is because it is a judicial
act involving the exercise of discretion. Writ of mandamus can only be had
when the plaintiffs legal right to the performance of the particular act which
is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. But where the right sought
to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus
cannot issue.
ABRIGO V. DE VERA
Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under
the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to
the first registrant in good faith
then, the first possessor in good faith; and
finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.
This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered under
the Torrens system.
FACTS:
Villafania sold a house and lot located Pangasinan to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go
covered by a tax declaration. Unknown, however to Tigno-Salazar and a Cave-Go,
Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved. The said free patent
was later on cancelled by a TCT.
On Oct 16, 1997, Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, sold the house and lot to the Spouses
Abrigo.
On Oct 23, 1997, Villafania sold the same house and lot to de Vera. De Vera registered
the sale and as a consequence a TCT was issued in her name.
De Vera filed an action for Forcible Entry and Damages against Spouses Abrigo before
the MTC.
Spouses Abrigo filed a case with the RTC for the annulment of documents, injunction,
preliminary injunction, restraining order and damages against Villafania.
The parties submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant
(RTC) case that neither of them can physically take possession of the property in question
until the instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case was dismissed.
RTC JUDGMENT
Compromise Agreement approved.
Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy back
the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the previous sale in favor of
Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall
voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any demand. Villafania failed to buy
back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the lot in their name
The RTC rendered the assailed Decision awarding the properties to Spouses Abrigo as
well as damages. Moreover, Villafania was ordered to pay [petitioners and private
respondent] damages and attorneys fees.
Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to the CA].
CA JUDGMENT
In its original Decision, the CA held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one and
hence dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent de Vera. Since Villafania had already
transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale
to De Vera was deemed void. The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses
Abrigo and found no sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
On reconsideration found Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith and for
value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good faith on the Torrens title of
her vendor and must thus be protected.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Who between petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the
property.
HELD: DE VERA
The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double sale. Gloria
Villafania first sold the disputed property to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go, from whom
petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently a second sale was executed by
Villafania with Respondent de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership
shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents
the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered under
the Torrens system.
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered the sale of the
property. Since neither petitioners nor their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go)
knew that the property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their
respective sales under Act 3344 For her part, respondent registered the transaction under
the Torrens system because, during the sale, Villafania had presented the transfer
certificate of title (TCT) covering the property.
Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration must be done in the proper registry in
order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in the present case was already
registered under the Torrens system, petitioners registration of the sale under Act
3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals,24 the Court
upheld the right of a party who had registered the sale of land under the Property
Registration Decree, as opposed to another who had registered a deed of final conveyance
under Act 3344. In that case, the priority in time principle was not applied, because
the land was already covered by the Torrens system at the time the conveyance was
registered under Act 3344. For the same reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale
to Respondent De Vera under the Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must
be upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.
NOTES:
The principle in Article 1544 of the Civil Code is in full accord with Section 51 of PD
1529 which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument
except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land until its registration. Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is
binding only between the seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent third
persons.
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo25 explained the difference in the rules of registration
under Act 3344 and those under the Torrens system in this wise:
Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is without
prejudice to a third party with a better right. The aforequoted phrase has been held by
this Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not give him
any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having
previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals is a case in point. It was held therein that
Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to land not registered under Act
No. 496. Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same
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unregistered land. The first sale was made by the original owners and was unrecorded
while the second was an execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of
money filed against the said original owners. Applying [Section 33], Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, this Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be
invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the latter was a buyer in
good faith and even if this second sale was registered. It was explained that this is
because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only steps
into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latters interest in
the property sold as of the time the property was levied upon.
Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of unregistered land in favor of
petitioner is of no effect because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of
the time of the said execution sale.
3. Good-Faith Requirement
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire the
immovable in good faith and to register it in good faith. Mere registration of title is not
enough; good faith must concur with the registration.We explained the rationale in Uraca
v. Court of Appeals, which we quote:
Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer
does not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544
requires that such registration must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence
teaches us that (t)he governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time,
stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat
the first buyers rights except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second
sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer
does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them, to register first
her purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by the
second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second
sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This is the price
exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace the
first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show
that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first
buyers rights) - from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by and under the conditions laid down by
registration, or failing registration, by delivery of possession.34 (Italics supplied) law.
Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free
from all encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the certificate. Thus, a
person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the registry to
determine the condition of the property, since such condition is noted on the face of
the register or certificate of title.Following this principle, this Court has consistently
held as regards registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires a good title as
against all the transferees thereof whose rights are not recorded in the Registry of Deeds
at the time of the sale.
CHAPTER III
(ORDINARY REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS)
SECTION 14
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by
right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by
law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application
jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an
application for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should
the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration
proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the
latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land
held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.
Registration the entry of instruments or deeds in book or public registry. To register,
means to enter in a register, to record formally or distinctly, to enroll; to enter in a list.
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) The first title issued in the name of a registered
owner by the ROD over a parcel of land registered under the Torrens System by virtue of
a) Judicial or
b) Administrative proceedings.
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Subsequent issuance of ROD pursuant to any
voluntary and involuntary instrument relating to the same land.
Note: Registration proceedings may be in rem or in personam. The following are its
distinctions.
In rem Binds the whole world
In personam To enforce a personal right against a person
Quasi in rem Deals with status, ownership or liability of a particular property. It only
operates on the question between the parties.This is not to ascertain or cut off the rights
or interests of all possible claimants.
SECTION 14 (1) OCENPO
-Registration under the first paragraph of Section 14 requires the concurrence of the
following
REQUISITES:
(1) Land applied for is an agricultural public land classified as alienable and
disposable land at the time;
(2) Application for registration is filed with the proper court;
(3) Applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in
OCENPO thereof, under bona fide claim of ownership;
(4) Such possession and occupation has been effected since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
SECTION 14 (2) PRESCRIPTION
PRESCRIPTION LACHES
an extraordinary mode of acquiring or the unreasonable delay in the bringing of a
losing of ownership and other real rights cause of action before the courts of justice.
through the lapse of time in the manner It is also referred to as sleeping on your
rights
A matter of time A question of equity
It is statutory not statutory
It is based on law based on equity
based on a fixed time the period varies
on a case-to-case basis
The basis for Sec. 14 (2) is found in Article 1113 of the Civil Code
Article 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
Maam: You have to be specific, because not all lands of public domain are inalienable.
Patrimonial properties of the State are still considered public domain.
Patrimonial property Property owned by the State but which is not devoted to public
use, public service, or the development of national wealth. It is wealth owned by the State
in its private capacity.
For private lands, which are patrimonial properties of the State, to be acquired via
prescription, the following must concur:
1) Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription, 10 years possession in good faith and with just
title; or
2) Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription, uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith and just title;
and There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth
MALABANAN V. REPUBLIC
Facts:
In 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of
land located in Silang Cavity. Malabanan claimed that he purchased the land from
Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in OCENPO of
the land for more than 30 years.
Aristedes Velazco, Malabanans witness, testified before the court that the property
originally belonged to a 22- hectare property owned by Lino Velazco, her great-
grandfather. Lino had 4 sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban. Esteban is
Aristedes grandfather. The property was divided among the 4 of them.
In 1996, Magdalena, Estebans wife, became the administrator of all the properties of the
Velazco sons. After Esteban and Magdalena died, their son Virgilio succeded them in
administering the properties, including the subject land, which is owned by his uncle,
Eduardo Velazco. Eduardo sold this to Malabanan.
Also, a certificate issued by CENRO, DENR dated JUNE 1, 2001 was presented
verifying the said land as A and D. RTC ruled in favor of Malabanan. Republic appealed,
now represented by the OSG, CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue/Ruling:
AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND, IN ORDER TO BE
REGISTRABLE UNDER SECTION 14 (1) OF PD 1529, SHOULD HAVE BEEN
CLASSIFIED AS A&D AS OF JUNE 12, 1945.
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The OSG contends that all lands certified as A&D after June 12, 1945 cannot be
registered either under Sec. 14 (1) of PD 1529 sec. 48 (b) of Public Land Act.
The SC said such interpretation renders the mentioned provision virtually inoperative and
even precludes the government form giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public
agricultural lands as A&D. Such unreasonableness
is aggravated of the fact the before June 12, 1945, Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state. The SC cited the case of Naguit. Such decision provides
that the Sec. 14 (1) of PD 1529 only requires the property sought to be registered as
already A&D at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
If the State has not yet released the land as A&D at the time of the application, it is
presumed that the State is still reserving its right to utilize the property. But in this case,
the property was already classified as A&D, this shows an intention of the State to
abdicate its authority over the land.
AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT A LAND CLASSIFIED AS A&D BE
DEEMED PRIVATE LAND AND THEREFORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO
ACQUISITION BY PRESCRIPTION.
In this case, the petitioners primarily based their registration bid on Sec. 14 (2) of PD
1529 or prescription.
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that All things which are within the commerce
of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or
any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
SC said, unlike Sec 14(1), Sec 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription
under existing laws. The SC also said that the rules on prescription under the Civil Code
is applicable in Sec 14 (2).Article 1113 of the Civil Code says that only the patrimonial
property of the state can be subject to prescription. Also it is clear that land which is part
of public dominion cannot be alienated even if it is declared A&D. There must be a
declaration of the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial for the period of prescription to run. Without these, the property remains to
be of public dominion.
Section 14 (1) mandates registration on the basis of possession while
Sec. 14 (2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14
(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land
Act, while registration under Section 14 (2) is made available both by the Property
Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
Also, Registration under Sec. 48 (b) of Public Land Act is based on possession,
Sec. 14 (2) of PD 1529 is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
The rules on prescription under the Civil Code do not apply to Sec 14 (1) since there is no
such intent manifested by the legislature and that PD 1529 is neither superior nor inferior
than Civil Code, legislature is not bound to adhere on Civil Code framework.
AS TO THE ISSUE ON WHETHER OR NOT MALABANAN IS ENTITLED TO
REGISTER THE PROPERTY BASED ON SECTION 14 (1) OR SECTION 14(2)
OF PD 1529 OR BOTH.
The SC said that the evidence presented is insufficient to establish that Malabanan thas
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or his predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the property since June, 12, 1945 or earlier. The
earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, as evidenced a tax declaration, is
to the year 1848. Therefore, they cannot register the land under Sec. 14 (1). Neither can
petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared A&D in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use, public service, or for the development of the national wealth. The
classification of the subject property as A&D land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription
RP V. CA AND NAGUIT
Section 14 (1) merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. A
contrary interpretation renders par. (1) Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public
agricultural lands as A&D.
SEC. 14 (3) ACCESSION AND ACCRETION
A. Accession Refers to the right of an owner of a thing to its products as well as
whatever is inseparably attached thereto as an accessory. The accessory follows the
principal.
Basis in the Civil Code
Article 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything
which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either
naturally or artificially.
Requisites of Accession (applies to lakes, creeks, and streams):
1. That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
2. That it be made through the effects of the current of the water;
3. That the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the
river.
B. Accretion and Alluvion
Accretion defined as the addition of portions of soil, by gradual deposition
through the operation of natural causes, to that already in the possession of the
owner. (Blacks Law)
Alluvion It refers to the accretion made by flow of rivers. A form of accession
natura , which is provided for in Articles 457 and 461.
Article 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Article 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by
the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands
adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value
thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new
bed.
Requisites of Accretion or Alluvion:
1) The change must be sudden;
2) The changing of the course must be more or less permanent, and not
temporary over flooding of anothers land;
3) The change of the river must be a natural one, not by artificial means;
4) There must be definite abandonment by the government;
5) The river must continue to exist, that is, it must not completely dry up or
disappear.
Rationale of the law on accretion:
- It is primarily anchored on the principle or right of accession in Art. 457.
Also, to compensate the owner for the danger of loss that he suffers because
of the location of his lands.
ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP IN ANY MANNTER PROVIDED FOR
BY LAW
o RESERVATION FOR SPECIFIC PUBLIC PURPOSE
GRANDE V. CA
5 SCRA 524
Facts:
Petitioners Grande are the owners of a parcel of land located in the Municipality of
Magsaysay, province of Isabela. They inherited the said land from their mother who
inherited the same from her parents. The land is registered in the name of the parents of
their mother. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration in 1930, the northeastern
boundary was the Cagayan River. Since then, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side
took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River. That by 1958, an alluvial
deposit of 19, 964 square meters, more or less, had been added to the registered area.
In 1958, Grandes filed an action to quiet title to said portion formed by accretion. They
alleged that they and their predecessor-in-interest were formerly in peaceful and
continuous possession of the said land until the Calalungs entered upon the said land
under claim of ownership in 1948. The Calalungs, on the other hand, asserts that they
have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of the land since prior to the
year 1933 up to the present.
RTC ruled in favor of the Grandes and ordered Calalungs to vacate the premises. The
lower court said that the land in question being an accretion to the mother or registered
land, the same belongs to Grandes. That the same cannot be acquired by prescription
since it is considered a registered property under Section 46, Act 496, hence, it could not
be acquired by prescription. CA overturned RTCs decision saying that prescription has
already set in favor of the Calalungs.
Issue: WON Calalungs acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription?
Ruling:
It is undisputed that under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners Grande are the lawful
owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land which it
adjoins. Any alluvial deposits adjoining ones land does not become ipso facto registered
land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under Torrens system of
that ownership is quite another. To obtain the protection of imprescriptibility, the land
must be placed under the operation of the registration laws where in certain judicial
procedures have been provided.
In this case, Grandes never sought registration of said alluvial property until the present
action. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not
entitled to the protection of imprescriptibility, which means it was subject to acquisition
through prescription by 3rd persons. Furthermore, in this case, the CA found that
Calalungs were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934 until 1958. The law
on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of
the Civil Code since the New Civil Code rules on prescription were not yet in force. The
SC finally said that Calalungs acquired
the alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription.
Alluvial formation along the seashore forms part of the public domain
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- It may only be disposed of if there is a formal declaration by the government that the
same is A and D. Its
disposition falls under the exclusive supervision and control of the Land Management
Bureau.
SEC. 14 (4) IN ANY OTHER MANNER PROVIDED FOR BY LAW
1) Presidential proclamation reserving lands for specific public purpose
The president has the authority to set aside lands from sale/public acquisition
and reserve them to public use, even though this might defeat the imperfect
right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry and
may not be the subject of lawful settlement.
Example:
1) Proclamation 791. It set aside a parcel of land for the University of the Philippines
College of Agriculture even though a logger-corporation had been possessing the
land by virtue of a timber license. (International hardwood vs. University of the
Phil.)
2) Proclamation 350 was a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center even though
the occupant possessed a sales patent. (Republic & Mindanao Medical Center vs.
CA)
3) Proclamation 180 set aside a parcel of land upon which a public school was to be
built. The occupant could not prove OCENPO and could not therefore assert a
superior right over the school. (Republic vs. Doldol)
RP BY MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER V. CA
FACTS:
In 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with
Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent of a land situated in Davao City, the subject property
applied for was a portion of what was known as Davao Cadastre. Bureau of Lands
accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the land. The Director of Lands annulled the
auction sale by reason of non-participation of Eugenio due to non-service of notice.
Bidding was held where Eugenio was the lone bidder, he equaled the bid previously
submitted by Dr. Ebro which is P100.50 per hectare. An order of award was then given to
Eugenio. Thereafter, A survey was conductedand the same was approved. In 1936, the
DL ordered the amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio saying that a portion of
the property is needed by the Philippine Army for military campsite. The area excluded
was identified was Lot 1176 B 2, the land in question which consists of 12.8 hectares.
In the same year, President Manuel Quezon issued Proclamation No. 85 withdrawing
the subject lot from sale
and settlement and reserving it for military purposes. Then, Eugenio paid for the
installment for the Sales Patent, this payment did not include the military campsite after it
was excluded from the application. Finally, in 1948, the Sales Patent was awarded to him
by DL and by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Subsequently,
President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 which opened the
subject property to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act for
resettlement of the squatters. However, the same revocation was superseded by another
order reserving the lot for medical center site. In 1969, Mindanao Medical Center
applied for the registration of the land under Torrens System claiming a fee simple
title. Respondents De Jesus opposed the registration on the ground that his father has
prior vested right on the property.
RTC Davao ruled in favor of MMC. CA overturned RTCs decision recognizing De
Jesus alleged vested right.
ISSUE: WON De Jesus has vested right and is consequently entitled to the registration of
the property in dispute?
RULING:
No. President Magsaysays proclamation (No. 350) legally effected a land grant to MMC
of the whole lot and not only a portion thereof. Such land grant amounts to a fee
simple title or absolute title in favor of MMC.
Section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the president to reserve
from sale or other disposition to the private domain of the Government of the Philippines,
the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. The land reserved shall be used for
the specific purposes directed by such Executive Order until otherwise provided by law.
Section 83 of the Public Land Act authorizes the President to issue proclamation to
declare lands reserved for public use or when the public interest requires it.
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege rights, if
any there be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed to prove any
private rights over the property reserved. Wee-settled is the rule that unless the applicant
has shown by clear and convincing evidence that a certain portion of the public domain
was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the acquisition of
public lands, such as grants or patents, the property must be held to be part of the public
domain
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was
executed between Eugenior de Jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would anyway
be void, because Eugenior de jesus held no dominical rights over the site when it was
allegedly donated by him in 1936.
B. LAND ACQUISITION BY PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
Ownership by Corporations
History
1935 It allowed private juridical entities to acquire alienable lands of public
Constitution domain, which shall only be less than 1, 024 hectares.
1973 Section 11, Article 14 of the said constitution stated that no private
Constitution corporation xxx may hold alienable lands except by lease not to exceed
1000 hectares in area.
1987 Section 3, Article 12 retained the 1973 Constitutions limitations, but
Constitution added lease period not exceeding 25 years and renewable for not more
than 25 years.
General Rule: Corporations are disqualified from owning alienable lands of public
domain except through lease.
Exception: Where at the time the Corporation acquired the land, its predecessors-in-
interest have complied with OCENPO as to entitle him registration in his name. The
Constitutional prohibition will no longer apply as the land, by virtue of prescription has
become private. (Suzi vs. Razon)
DOL V. IAC AND ACME PLYWOOD AND VENEER
146 SCRA 509
Facts:
In 1981, Acme Plywood and Veneers Co. Inc. applied for a land registration of 5 parcels
(481, 390 sqm) of land it allegedly acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, both member
of the Dumagat tribe. The Infiels substantiates their ownership saying that their ancestors
have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until it came into
their possession. Acme contended in its application that their adverse and continuous
possession since 1962 and by tacking their possession to that of the possession of the
Infiels, they have already acquired title over it; that the ownership of lands by
corporations is governed by the 1935 Constitution. Acme further proves that the subject
land is a private land after it ownership was given to the non-Christian tribes
pursuant to RA 3872. That also, they have introduced more than 45 million pesos worth
of improvements on the land. Also that their ownership is recognized by Municipality of
Isabela through the donation it made which was accepted by the former.
The Director of Lands opposed to nothing of the allegations except the applicability of
the 1935 Constitution. DL contends that the registration was commenced only in 1981
which was long after the 1973 Constitution took effect.
Article 14 Section 11 of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations or
associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to
exceed 1,000 hectares. This proscription is not found in the 1935 Constitution which was
in force the time Acme bought the land in question. Hence, it cannot be registered under
Sec. 48 of CA 141. RTC and CA ruled in favor of the Director of Lands.
Issue: WON the title Infiels transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of
Acme? And WON 1973 Constitution should apply?
Ruling:
The land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient transferable
title in 1962 when Acme purchased it. Acme also had a perfect right to make such
acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 constitution prohibiting Corporations from
acquiring and owning private lannds. Even if the land remained technically public land
despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor
was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can
be no question to Acmes right to acquire the same since there is no prohibition for
corporation to acquire incomplete or imperfect title. The only limitation was that
corporations could not hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1, 024.
1973 Constitution also cannot defeat a right already vested before the law came into
effect, or invalidate transaction then perfectly valid and proper
What is a Corporation Sole?
It is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy. It consists of
one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), who are
incorporated by law to give them some legal capacity to administer church
properties that come into their possession.
They are not treated as ordinary private corporation. As by the nature of its
incorporation, it is empowered by law to purchase and hold real estate and
personal property.
Vested rights
It is some right or interest in property, which has become fixed and established
and no longer open to doubt or controversy. It cannot be impaired without
violating ones right to due process.
Judicial confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Titles
AYOG VS. CUSI
146 SCRA 15
FACTS:
In 1953, the Director of Lands granted Binan Development Co., Inc. its Sales
Application of the land located in Davao City with an area of 250 hectares. There were
protesters but then their protest was dismissed by the Director and ordered them to vacate
the subject lot. No appeal was made from the decision. Despite that, the squatters
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defied the Director of Lands order to vacate. An ejectment suit was brought which
caused the delay of the issuance of the patent.
The Director of Lands recommended to the Secretary of Natural Resources the approval
of the Sales Patent saying that the Corporation had complied with the said requirements
long before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, that the land in question was free
from claims and conflicts and that the issuance of the patent was legal, and the said
issuance is an exception to the prohibition of ownership by private corporation.
The Secretary of Natural Resources noted that the applicant had acquired a vested right to
issuance. Subsequently, the ejectment suit was decided in favor of the corporation.
However, the squatters alleged that the adoption of the 1973 Constitution was a
supervening fact that will make the issuance of patent illegal since no private
corporation is allowed to hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease
not to exceed 1,000 hectares.
ISSUE: WON BInan Development Corporation may validly acquire the Sales Patent
despite the prohibition embodied in the 1973 Constitution? Yes.
subsequent application by an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the
basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection
(b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended.
HELD:
Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended.
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by
Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative:
- for registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or
- for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and
continuous possession for at least thirty years.
It may be that although they were not actual parties in that previous case the
judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative, since
the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had constructive
notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly pertains to the
Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to be
public land.

RULING: In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by
The said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application such declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited
of Binan Corp. because it has already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public. The basis of
time of the 1973 Constitution took effect. Such vested right has to be respected. It could the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already
not be abrogated by the new Constitution. privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason
of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have
A vested right is defined as when the right to enjoyment has become the property of performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant.
some person as a present interest, or, it is some right or interest in property which has On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary
become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. In this case, personality to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering that they also claim to
it is undisputed that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, the right of the be in possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for its purchase from the
corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was Bureau of Lands.
no longer open to doubt or controversy. Its Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court a
compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law had the effect of segregating quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the private oppositors-
the said land from public domain. The petitioners contention that their predecessors-in- appellees.
interest have possessed the property should fail, the SC said, they should have applied for
patent applications if it is true. JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES
(SECTION 48 (b) of CA 141)
Period of possession for Judicial Confirmation of imperfect title:
ZARA V. DOL Historical Background
FACTS: LAW DATE OF RULE
"application for registration of the parcel of land consisting of EFFECTIVIT
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of 107 hectares Y
parcel of land pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land had PLA- 926 Oct. 17, 1903 OCENPO of agricultural lands for 10 years
been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the before the effectivity of this Act
same under a Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 2nd PLA Nov. 29, 1919 OCENPO of agricultural lands (excluding
1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the Land Registration Act be not 2874 timber and mineral lands) of the public domain,
applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section under bona fide claim of acquisition of
48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and their ownership, since JULY 26, 1894
predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land in RPLA 141 Dec. 1, 1936 Possession and occupation of lands of the public
concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding the application. domain since JULY 26, 1984 only limited to
Filipinos
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by Vicente
RA 1942 June 22, 1957 Possession and occupation for atleast 30 years
V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:
immediately preceding the filing of the
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of 107 application
hectares, more or less, was included in the area of the parcel of land applied for
PD 1073 January 25, Land must be A&D (not anymore agricultural
registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this
1977 lands of the public domain, it must be possessed
Court, which was decided by this same Court through the then incumbent Judge, the
and occupied since June 12, 1945
Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be
registered by the applicants was declared public land in said decision; that they (the
The amendment from agricultural lands to A & D is not a substantial
oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the
amendment because only agricultural lands are alienable. The prevailing rule for
land in question because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas have been
OCENPO is not anymore 30 years. It is now since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The
in possession, and which possession, according to them, was OCENCO that the
amendment was made to jive with Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529.
proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R.
Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the property, barred them
Did PD 1529 and PD 1073 (which removed the 30 yr requirement for OCENPO)
from raising the same issue in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case
preclude application for registration of alienable lands of public domain
No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No.
commenced only after June 12, 1945?
5847-R is concerned, there is already "res-judicata" in other words, the cause of action
No, considering Section 14(2) still allows acquisition of alienable lands of public
of the applicant is now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has no more
domain through prescription. In civil law, prescription is one of the wars of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision of the Court in said case having
acquiring public land. So even if the possession was commenced later than June
transferred to the Director of Lands.
12, 1945, you may still qualify under Section 14(2).
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as
Requirements for Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title
oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its opposition,
1) The land must form part of the A&D agricultural lands of the public domain;
but principally the fact that the land applied for had already been declared public land by
2) Applicant must have been in OCENPO
the judgment in the former registration case.
3) Under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or since June
12, 1945
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by
order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is declared or
adjudged public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject
RA 8371
anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director of
Oct. 29, 1997
Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by homestead."
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor the CARINO V. INSULAR
Facts:
Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee.
Carino applied for the registration of a parcel of land located in Benguet province. Carino
alleges that:
ISSUE:
a. His predecessors has been in the possession of the land for more than 50 years.
whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of Vicente S. de
b. He was inherited the land under the Igorot customs.
Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land, precludes a

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However, it was not shown that Carino has a document of title to prove ownership such
as royal grant. The dispute arose when the government opposed the registration
contending that the land in question belonged to the State.
That the Spanish law provides that all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown (Jura
Regalia), and it could not have been acquired by Carino since prescription does not lie
against the crown.
Issue: WON Carinos application should be granted? YES.
Ruling:
Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title. The Supreme Court of
the United States through Justice Holmes had this to say: It might perhaps be proper and
sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held
by individuals under a claim of private ownership. It will be presumed to have been held
in the same way from before the Spanish Conquest, and never to have been in Public
Land. It was further ruled that Carinos kind of title, a native title, is an exception to
Jura Regalia.
CRUZ V. DENR
FACTS:
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa, petitioners, assailed the constitutionality of certain
provisions of RA 8371 ( Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) together with its
implementing rules and regulations. The OSG also commented that IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous people.
On the other hand, CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens
patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous people. For this reason, it prays that the
petition be dismissed. Petitioners Cruz and Europa countered the constitutionality of
IPRA and its implementing rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources. Also, that the law is in violation of the Regalian Doctrine
embodied in the Constitution.
Also, petitioners contended that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands, it might include private lands found within the
said areas.
Issue:WON IPRA is unconstitutional as it contravenes Regalian Doctrine?
Ruling: NO, IPRA is held to be constitutional.
After due deliberation on the petition, 7 members of the court voted to dismiss the
petition, and 7 members of the court voted to grant the same.
The case was redeliberated upon, however, the votes remained the same. According to the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition has to be dismissed. The constitutionality of IPRA
is upheld.
Justice Panganibans Dissenting Opinion:
Contentions of RA 8371s unconstitutionality:
1. It violates the inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains. That this
is in contravention to Section 2, Art. 12 of the Constitution that only agricultural
lands of the public domain can be considered as alienable and disposable lands.
2. No land area limits are specified - That 4/5 of the countrys natural resources and
1/3 of the countrys land will be concentrated to 12 Million IPs, and while 60
million other Filipinos will share the remaining. These figures violates the
constitutional principle of a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth among Filipinos.
3. It abdicates the State Duty to take Full Control and Supervision of Natural
Resources
4. Public Domains and Natural Resources are owned by the State and Cannot be
Alienated or Ceded
Ancestral Domain- refers to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands,
inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein
Ancestral Land refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals,
families, and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or
traditional ownership
Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains, which, as far back as
memory reaches, have been held under claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs.
Time Immemorial period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain IPs are
known to have occupied, possessed in the concept of owner
IPRA connotes group or communal ownership. Ancestral domains are private, but
community property
Private- since it is not part of the public domain
Community ancestral domain is owned in common and not by 1
particular person
Ownership over the natural resources STILL belong to the State
- ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to manage and conserve them for
future generation. The rights of IPs take the form of management and
stewardship
Modes of Acquisition of Ancestral domains and ancestral lands by the IP
a) Applicant must be a member of indigenous cultural group;
b) He must have been in possession of an individually-owned ancestral land for
not less than 30 years
c) By operation of law (IPRA), the land is already classified as A&D land,
even if it has a slop of 18% hence there is no need to submit a separate
certification that the land is A&D
Transfer of land or property rights
1) Only the members of the ICCs/IPs
2) In accord with customary laws and customs
3) Subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if
the land was transferred to a non-member of ICCs/IPs
Mining Operations on Ancestral Land
General Rule: Not allowed
Exception: If the ICCs concerned consent to it
In the event of an agreement of mining operations
1) Parties shall agree upon the Royalty payment
2) The Royalty payment shall form part of trust fund for the socio-economic
well-being of the ICC
Members of the cultural communities are given priority in awarding of SMALL-SCALE
MINING CONTRACTS- Sec. 7, 7076
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
1) Jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs
o Condition precedent to the acquisition of jurisdictions:
Exhaustion of all remedies provided under their customary laws
and a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the attempt to settle the dispute and that it was
not resolved.
2) It has the authority to issue Certificates of Ancestral Lands Title
(CALT) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)
3) It has OEJ over petition for cancellation of CADT and CALT alleged to
have been fraudulently acquired to any person
4) Issuance of certification as a precondition to grant of permit for
disposition
5) Power to cite for contempt and issue restraining orders
Ancestral Domains Office
- Responsible for identification, delineation, and recognition of ancestral
lands/domains
CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER, EMANCIPATION PATENT,
AFFIDAVIT OF NON-TENANCY
SEC. 104. Provisional Register of Documents. The Department of Agrarian Reform
shall prepare by automate data processing a special registry book to be known as the
Provisional Register of Documents issued under PD-27 which shall be kept and
maintained in every Registry of Deeds throughout the country.
Said Registry Book shall be a register of:
a) All Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) issued pursuant to P.D. No. 27; and
b) All subsequent transactions affecting Certificates of Land Transfer such as
adjustments, transfer, duplication and cancellations of erroneous Certificates of
Land Transfer
SEC. 105. Certificates of Land Transfer, Emancipation Patents.
The Department of Agrarian reform shall pursuant to P.D. No. 27 issue in duplicate, a
Certificate of Land Transfer for every land brought under Operation Land Transfer, the
original of which shall be kept by the tenant-farmer and the duplicate, in the Registry of
Deeds.
After the tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title
under P.D. No. 27, an Emancipation Patent which may cover previously titled or untitled
property shall be issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform.
The Register of Deeds shall complete the entries on the aforementioned Emancipation
Patent and shall assign an original certificate of title number in case of unregistered land,
and in case of registered property, shall issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title
without requiring the surrender of the owners duplicate of the title to be cancelled.
In case of death of the grantee, the Department of Agrarian Reform shall determine his
heirs or successors-in-interest and shall notify the Register of Deeds accordingly. In case
of subsequent transfer of property covered by an Emancipation Patent or a Certificate of
Title emanating from an Emancipation Patent, the Register of Deeds shall effect the
transfer only upon receipt of the supporting papers from the Department of Agrarian
Reform.
No fee, premium, of tax of any kind shall be charged or imposed in connection with the
issuance of an original Emancipation Patent and for the registration of related documents.
TENANT EMANCIPATION DECREE
(PD 27)
(Oct. 21, 1972)
Applicability/Coverage
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This applies to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted conversion clearance from the DAR.
to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease tenancy, whether
classified as landed estate or not Homesteads
While PD No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the
Retention Limits/Award Ceiling bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land
A farmer shall be deemed owner of a portion constituting a family-size farm they till is a sweeping social legislation, it cannot defeat the very
of purpose of the Public Land Act which has been enacted for the
o 6 hectares if not irrigated welfare and protection of the poor.
o 3 hectares if irrigated

Landowner Retention Limit

o 7 hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now Qualified Beneficiaries
cultivate it Landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of
the same municipality in the following order of priority
Cost of Land/Compensation 1) Agricultural lessees and share tenants;
The land shall be equivalent to 2 times the average harvest of 3 normal 2) Regular farmworkers;
crop years 3) Seasonal farmworkers;
It shall be paid by the tenant in 15 equal annual amortizations including 4) Other farmworkers;
interest at the rate of 6% per annum 5) Actual tillers or occupants of public lands
6) Collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries
7) Others directly working on the land
Requisite before the title to the land owned be actually issued to the tenant farmer
Tenant farmer should become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers children of landowners who are qualified shall be given preference. Actual land-
cooperative tillers shall not, however, be ejected or removed therefrom
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude, and ability
Transferability of title acquired to PD 27 to cultivate and make the land as productive as possible
Only through hereditary succession or to the Govt in accordance w/ pertinent laws Support services shall be extended equally to women and men agrarian reform
beneficiaries

Retention Limits of Landowners

COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM
(RA 6657)
Aug. 7, 2009
Agrarian Reform - redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced, to
farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement,
to include the totality of factors and support services designed to lift the economic status
of the beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the physical redistribution of
lands, such as production or profit-sharing, labor administration, and the distribution of
shares of stocks, which will allow beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the
lands they work
o Maximum of 5 hectares
o 3 hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner subject to the
following qualifications
1. Atleast 15 years of age
2. He is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm
Retention limits shall not apply to LGUs acquiring private agricultural land by
expropriation or other modes of acquisition be used for public purposes
Disposition or Sale of retained land by land owner
Valid, as long as the total landholding that shall be owned by the transferee thereof
inclusive of the land to be acquired shall not exceed the landholding ceilings

Agricultural land land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not Award ceiling to beneficiaries
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land. o 3 hectares
o It may be a contiguous tract or several parcels of land cumulate up to the
Agricultural activity cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, prescribed award limits
raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and
other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such Landless Beneficiary owns less than 3 ha. Of agricultural lands
farming operations done by person whether natural or juridical. Determination of just compensation
1. Cost of acquisition of the land
Coverage 2. Value of the standing crop
All public and private agricultural lands including lands of public domain suitable 3. Current value of like properties
for agriculture 4. Its nature, actual use, and income
All lands in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress 5. Sworn valuation by the owner
All other lands owned by the govt devoted to or suitable for agriculture 6. Tax declarations
All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the 7. Assessment made by government assessors
agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon 8. 70% zonal valuation by the BIR
o Except landholdings of landowners with a total area of 5 hectares
below Manner of Payment
It shall be paid by the beneficiaries to the LBP in 30 annual amortization of 6%
Exemptions and Exclusions from CARP coverage interest per annum
1) Lands actually, directly, and exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest Payment for the first 3 years may be at reduced amounts
reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds LBP shall have a lien by way of mortgage on the land awarded, it may be
and mangroves; foreclosed by the LBP for nonpaymnet of an aggregate of 3 annual amortizations
2) Private lands actually, directly, and exclusively used for prawn farms and Beneficiary whose land was foreclosed shall be permanently disqualified from
fishponds, provided that the same have not been distributed and Certificate becoming a beneficiary
of Land Ownership Award issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the
CARP; Transferability of awarded lands (CLOA)
3) Lands actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary for: only through hereditary succession, to the government, or to the LBP, or to other
a. National defense, school sites and campuses, including qualified beneficiaries through the DAR for a period of 10 years
experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes, seeds and seeding research Voluntary Land Transfer
and pilot production center landowners of agricultural lands may enter into a voluntary arrangement to direct
b. Church sites and convents, mosque sites and Islamic centers, transfer of their lands to qualified beneficiaries subject to guidelines set in the law
common burial grounds Payment shall be made by the farmer-beneficiary to the land owner under terms to
c. Penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by inmates be mutually agreed upon by the parties.
d. Government and private research and quarantine centers It shall be binding upon them, upon registration with the approval by the DAR
e. All lands with 18% slope and over, except those already Approval is deemed given, unless notice of disapproval is received by the farmer-
developed beneficiary within 30 days from the date of registration
Agricultural lands reclassified by LGUs into residential, commercial or In case they dont agree on the price, the procedure for compulsory acquisition
industrial uses excluded shall apply
This is based on DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which provides that with LBP may extend financing to the beneficiaries
respect to the conversion of agricultural lands covered by RA No.
6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the DAR to approve
such conversion may be exercised from the date of its effectivity or on When the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural
June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands already classified as commercial, purposes, or that the land will have greater economic value for residential,
industrial or residential before that date no longer need any commercial or industrial purposes
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The DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the land-owner, may authorize the 3) And on the alleged payment of public money as just compensation without the
reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition Provided that the beneficiary corresponding appropriation, the Court said that there is no rule that only money
shall have fully paid his obligation Irrigated and irrigable lands, shall not be subject to already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. The earmarking of
conversion fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial
amount, is actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word initial simply
Jurisdiction of DAR means that additional amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.
a) Adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform
b) Resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems 4) Finally, on the contention that the law is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the
c) Approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less
d) readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed, the Court held that the
and other non-agricultural uses law is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively
limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and
Appeals
perhaps local purpose, but deals with a revolutionary kind of expropriation
DAR decision
(which) affects all private agricultural lands. (S)uch a program will involve not
15 days from the receipt CA by certiorari
mere millions of pesos (but) hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more
Notwithstanding appeal to the CA, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately
indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already
executory.
staggering as it is by our present standards.
Jurisdiction of DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB)
a) Determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
Based on the slogan: Land for the Landless
implementation of CARP
1935 constitution mandated the policy of social justice to ensure the well-being and
b) Cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of EPs and
economic security of all the people, especially the less privileged.
CLOAs which are registered with the ROD.
Art. XIII, Sec. 4
For DARAB to have jurisdiction, there must be a tenancy relationship between the
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
parties which has the following elements:
- founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
1. Parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee
- who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or,
2. Subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land
- in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.
3. Consent between the parties to the relationship
To this end, the State shall
4. Purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production
- encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
5. There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee
- subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may
6. Harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
prescribe,
lessee
o taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
Note: If the action is brought before the trial court, it must determine first the existence of
considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation.
tenancy relationship. If there is, then it should dismiss the case. It there is no such
- In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
relationship, then it has jurisdiction over the case. Finding by DAR of such relationship
landowners.
is merely preliminary and does not bind the courts.
o The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
sharing.
An action to enforce rights as a tenant is barred by prescription
3844 - Agricultural land reform code (aug. 8, 1963)
If not filed within 3 years
Special Agrarian Court designated by the RTC shall have the following original and
PD 27 - compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers
exclusive jurisdiction
and to specify maximum retention limits for land owners (Oct. 21, 1972)
1) All petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and
2) Prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657
EO 228 - full ownership in favor of PD 27 beneficiaries and providing valuation of still
unvalued lands
Titles issued pursuant to PD 27 and RA 6657 shall become indefeasible and
PP 131- CARP and EO 229 providing mechanisms for its implementation
imprescriptible after 1 year from their registration in the ROD
RA 6657 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998, by P. Aquino (June 10, 1988)

Jurisdiction of DAR and DARAB

DAR
Prior to registration with the ROD
Case involving issuance, recall
cancellation of CLOAs and EPs
DARAB NATALIA REALTY V. DAR
After registration with ROD
or Issuance, correction or cancellation of
CLOAs or EPs Lands converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of
CARL are outside its coverage

MODES OF ACQUIRING PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND HELD:

1) Operation Land Transfer Lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These
2) Volutary Offer to Sell include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of
3) Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme CARL by government agencies other than DAR. Thus, for instance, the conversion of
4) Compulsory Acquisition portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision for residential use and developed such prior to
5) Voluntary Stock Distribution in the case of corporation the passage of the law excluded the area for CARL coverage because it ceased to be
devoted to agricultural activity.

Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands
and do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands. Lands converted to non-
agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of RA 6657 are outside its coverage Natalia vs.
DAR
Lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of
agricultural land. It declared as unconstitutional the provision in RA 6657 insofar as it
included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform Luz Farms vs. Secretary of
DAR
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR
is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped
portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.
LUZ FARMS V. SECRETARY
Farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine not covered
in determining the area of land to be excluded, AO No. 9 fixed the following retention
limits, viz.: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be
retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for
every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SAR (1989)

1) the requirement of public use has been settled by the Constitution itself. It noted
that (n)o less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform which is the reason
why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the
prescribed maximum retention limits. The Court also declared that the law is a
valid exercise by the State of the police power and the power of eminent domain.

2) On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have
failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated.

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