Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC,
TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL
RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice,
Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

Before the Court is a contreversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision
in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of national life.

We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power"
revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary
government. Her ascension to and consilidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by
political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of
"Marcos loyalists" and the unseccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries aboard an
aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the
Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the
1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's
presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of
the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There
were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the same a split in the ranks of the
military establishment that thraetened civilian supremacy over military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government
could be at the mercy of a fractious military.

But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos.
There are also the communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr.
Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their own on the areas they effectively control while
the separatist are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up on this groups' determination to wrest
power from the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms but also to through the use of propaganda have they been successful
in dreating chaos and destabilizing the country.

Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr.
Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed
office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses has remained elusive.

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

The Petition

This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty
years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a
class by itself.

This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and
the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.
The Issue

Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of the following issues:

1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and family to the
Philippines?

a. Is this a political question?

2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to
the Philippines, in the interest of "national security, public safety or public health

a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines
is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety or public health?

b. Assuming that she has made that finding

(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding?

(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?

(3) Has there been a hearing?

(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the President's decision,
including the grounds upon which it was based, been made known to petitioners so that
they may controvert the same?

c. Is the President's determination that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is
a clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a political question?

d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of former President Marcos and his family is a
clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have respondents established such
fact?

3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision to bar the return of former
President Marcos and his family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar the return of former President
Marcos and his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.1

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under
the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may
do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do
so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must
be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:

Article 12

1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement
and freedom to choose his residence.

2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law,
are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.

4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political question which is non-
justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:

As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his
family have the right to travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo without
reference to attendant circumstances.

Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos
and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination
by the President that such return and residence will endanger national security and public safety.

It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a political question as it involves
merely a determination of what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand
E. Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the more primordial and transcendental right of the State to
security and safety of its nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court can not consider it.

There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here even if their return and residence here will endanger national security and public safety? this is
still a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.

Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return
to the Philippines and establish their residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable
Court can not decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the President of the
Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]

Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite
Article II of the Constitution, to wit:
 Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call
upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion
of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national
security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of
Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El
Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was
prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for
Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]

The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and its limits. We, however, view
this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties' formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow
confines in arriving at a solution to the controversy.

At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to travel and the import of the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig
v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise
thereof, respectively.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's
country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement
and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct
rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)]
separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the
Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to
leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national
security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It
would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty
of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it
is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the
right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between
executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and
even in American jurisprudence.

Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in the
absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited.

Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of
the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the President has the power under the
Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the
Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Executive Power

The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of government. To recall the words of
Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11,
"[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a
separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive and
judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil.
626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power
means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the
legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the
judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official
the President.

As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII,
Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of
certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute
the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power
to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress
[Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].

The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that
the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se enumerated powers the breadth and scope of
"executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987
Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to
her. Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius[Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument brings to mind the
institution of the U.S. Presidency after which ours is legally patterned.**

Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same problem. He said:

Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution ought to
settle everything beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution
makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision realized.

We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words: "The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers, 17871957, pp. 3-4.]

Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the office from Washington to the
early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's dictatorship, he concluded that "what the presidency is
at any particular moment depends in important measure on who is President." [At 30.]

This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:

For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it remained of course, an agency of
government subject to unvarying demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than most
agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in charge. Each
President's distinctive temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his habits, expectations,
Idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast the WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire government. The
executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color from the character and personality of
the President. The thrust of the office, its impact on the constitutional order, therefore altered from President to
President. Above all, the way each President understood it as his personal obligation to inform and involve the
Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to the nation and
posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened the constitutional order. [At 212- 213.]

We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and
the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of
and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President with
explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the
parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President became even more
powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential
system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among
three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state
as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself
withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It
also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's
foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of
the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of
the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive
power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated,

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue of who
between the Governor-General of the Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the Government to elect
directors in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the
Governor-General to do so, said:

...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board" and "committee" respectively, are
not charged with the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of
performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether the
duties devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that
they are not legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall
within the authority of either of these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of
the remaining one among which the powers of government are divided ....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]

We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find reinforcement for the view that
it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the
Constitution:

The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more
specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ....

xxx xxx xxx

It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and
cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide
the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that
it is, or that the Constitution requires. [At 210- 211.]

The Power Involved

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people"
and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are
empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action
for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider
these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under
the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and
uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social
contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of
the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the
Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II,
Sec. 1.]

The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and
his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are
sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the
preferred freedoms of speech and ofexpression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the
requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.]

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain
individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the
duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but
also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at
153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit
in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author
advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. Rossiter The American
Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in
times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed
with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace
and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds
of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in
the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be
said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been recognized by memembers of
the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members
urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation
and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our
laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his
country.

What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated
as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to
the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

The Extent of Review

Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given
this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court to decide.

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the
Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain
issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people
themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign
government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it
may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of
resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the people.

There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they
did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution
limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment
for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it
would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which
specifically empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964,
December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]

Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our
system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers,
under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and
balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and
when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not
he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.
In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or
to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the
power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it
was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she
has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.

We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers
by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents
were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision..

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized
communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with
impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the
Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of
the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.

As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment has given assurances
that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove
to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted
arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against the State, that
would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to
suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action
against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the
people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an
obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the
laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the
plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the
Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts
to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually
increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and
stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state
of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved
during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the
state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, C.J., concurring:

"The threats to national security and public order are real the mounting Communist insurgency, a simmering separatist movement, a
restive studentry, widespread labor disputes, militant farmer groups. . . . Each of these threats is an explosive ingredient in a
steaming cauldron which could blow up if not handled properly." 1

These are not my words. They belong to my distinguished colleague in the Court, Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. But they
express eloquently the basis of my full concurrence to the exhaustive and well-written ponencia of Mme. Justice Irene R. Cortes.
Presidential powers and prerogatives are not fixed but fluctuate. They are not derived solely from a particular constitutional clause or
article or from an express statutory grant. Their limits are likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law. History and time-honored principles of constitutional law have conceded to
the Executive Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and imperative national emergency. Many terms are applied to these
powers: "residual," "inherent," 44 moral," "implied," "aggregate," "emergency." whatever they may be called, the fact is that these
powers exist, as they must if the governance function of the Executive Branch is to be carried out effectively and efficiently. It is in
this context that the power of the President to allow or disallow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines should be viewed. By
reason of its impact on national peace and order in these admittedly critical times, said question cannot be withdrawn from the
competence of the Executive Branch to decide.

And indeed, the return of the deposed President, his wife and children cannot but pose a clear and present danger to public order
and safety. One needs only to recall the series of destabilizing actions attempted by the so-called Marcos loyalists as well as the
ultra-rightist groups during the EDSA Revolution's aftermath to realize this. The most publicized of these offensives is the Manila
Hotel incident which occurred barely five (5) months after the People's Power Revolution. Around 10,000 Marcos supporters,
backed by 300 loyalist soldiers led by Brigadier General Jose Zumel and Lt. Col. Reynaldo Cabauatan converged at the Manila
Hotel to witness the oath-taking of Arturo Tolentino as acting president of the Philippines. The public disorder and peril to life and
limb of the citizens engendered by this event subsided only upon the eventual surrender of the loyalist soldiers to the authorities.

Then followed the Channel 7, Sangley, Villamor, Horseshoe Drive and Camp Aguinaldo incidents. Military rebels waged
simultaneous offensives in different parts of Metro Manila and Sangley Point in Cavite. A hundred rebel soldiers took over Channel 7
and its radio station DZBB. About 74 soldier rebels attacked Villamor Air Base, while another group struck at Sangley Point in Cavite
and held the 15th Air Force Strike wing commander and his deputy hostage. Troops on board several vehicles attempted to enter
Gate I of Camp Aguinaldo even as another batch of 200 soldiers encamped at Horseshoe Village.

Another destabilization plot was carried out in April, 1987 by enlisted personnel who forced their way through Gate 1 of Fort
Bonifacio. They stormed into the army stockade but having failed to convince their incarcerated members to unite in their cause, had
to give up nine (9) hours later.

And who can forget the August 28, 1987 coup attempt which almost toppled the Aquino Government? Launched not by Marcos
loyalists, but by another ultra-rightist group in the military led by Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan who remains at large to date, this
most serious attempt to wrest control of the government resulted in the death of many civilians.

Members of the so-called Black Forest Commando were able to cart away high-powered firearms and ammunition from the Camp
Crame Armory during a raid conducted in June 1988. Most of the group members were, however, captured in Antipolo, Rizal. The
same group was involved in an unsuccessful plot known as Oplan Balik Saya which sought the return of Marcos to the country.

A more recent threat to public order, peace and safety was the attempt of a group named CEDECOR to mobilize civilians from
nearby provinces to act as blockading forces at different Metro Manila areas for the projected link-up of Marcos military loyalist
troops with the group of Honasan. The pseudo "people power" movement was neutralized thru checkpoints set up by the authorities
along major road arteries where the members were arrested or forced to turn back.

While not all of these disruptive incidents may be traced directly to the Marcoses, their occurrence militates heavily against the
wisdom of allowing the Marcoses' return. Not only will the Marcoses' presence embolden their followers toward similar actions, but
any such action would be seized upon as an opportunity by other enemies of the State, such as the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the NPA'S, the Muslim secessionists and extreme rightists of the RAM, to wage an offensive against the
government. Certainly, the state through its executive branch has the power, nay, the responsibility and obligation, to prevent a
grave and serious threat to its safety from arising.

Apparently lost amidst the debate on whether or not to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is one factor, which albeit, at
first blush appears to be extra legal, constitutes a valid justification for disallowing the requested return. I refer to the public pulse. It
must be remembered that the ouster of the Marcoses from the Philippines came about as an unexpected, but certainly welcomed,
result of the unprecedented peoples power" revolution. Millions of our people braved military tanks and firepower, kept vigil, prayed,
and in countless manner and ways contributed time, effort and money to put an end to an evidently untenable claim to power of a
dictator. The removal of the Marcoses from the Philippines was a moral victory for the Filipino people; and the installation of the
present administration, a realization of and obedience to the people's Will.

Failing in legal arguments for the allowance of the Marcoses' return, appeal is being made to sympathy, compassion and even
Filipino tradition. The political and economic gains we have achieved during the past three years are however too valuable and
precious to gamble away on purely compassionate considerations. Neither could public peace, order and safety be sacrificed for an
individual's wish to die in his own country. Verily in the balancing of interests, the scales tilt in favor of presidential prerogative, which
we do not find to have been gravely abused or arbitrarily exercised, to ban the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting

"The Constitution ... is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes
of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit
of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government." (Ex Parte Milligan, 4
Wall. 2; 18 L. Ed. 281 [1866])

Since our days as law students, we have proclaimed the stirring words of Ex Parte Milligan as self-evident truth. But faced with a
hard and delicate case, we now hesitate to qive substance to their meaning. The Court has permitted a basic freedom enshrined in
the Bill of Rights to be taken away by Government.

There is only one Bill of Rights with the same interpretation of liberty and the same guarantee of freedom for both unloved and
despised persons on one hand and the rest who are not so stigmatized on the other.

I am, therefore, disturbed by the majority ruling which declares that it should not be a precedent. We are interpreting the Constitution
for only one person and constituting him into a class by himself. The Constitution is a law for all classes of men at all times. To have
a person as one class by himself smacks of unequal protection of the laws.

With all due respect for the majority in the Court, I believe that the issue before us is one of rights and not of power. Mr. Marcos is
insensate and would not live if separated from the machines which have taken over the functions of his kidneys and other organs.
To treat him at this point as one with full panoply of power against whom the forces of Government should be marshalled is totally
unrealistic. The Government has the power to arrest and punish him. But does it have the power to deny him his right to come home
and die among familiar surroundings?

Hence, this dissent.

The Bill of Rights provides:

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied, Section 6, Art.
111, Constitution)

To have the petition dismissed, the Solicitor General repeats a ritual invocation of national security and public safety which is
hauntingly familiar because it was pleaded so often by petitioner Ferdinand E. Marcos to justify his acts under martial law. There is,
however, no showing of the existence of a law prescribing the limits of the power to impair and the occasions for its exercise. And
except for citing breaches of law and order, the more serious of which were totally unrelated to Mr. Marcos and which the military
was able to readily quell, the respondents have not pointed to any grave exigency which permits the use of untrammeled
Governmental power in this case and the indefinite suspension of the constitutional right to travel.

The respondents' basic argument is that the issue before us is a political question beyond our jurisdiction to consider. They contend
that the decision to ban former President Marcos, and his family on grounds of national security and public safety is vested by the
Constitution in the President alone. The determination should not be questioned before this Court. The President's finding of danger
to the nation should be conclusive on the Court.

What is a political question?

In Vera v. Avelino (77 Phil. 192, 223 [1946], the Court stated:

xxx xxx xxx

It is a well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the
extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred on the courts by express constitutional or
statutory provisions. It is not so easy, however, to define the phrase political question, nor to determine what
matters fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that he outside the scope of the
judicial power. More properly, however, it means those questions which, under the constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.

We defined a political question in Taniada v. Cuenco (103 Phil. 1051, 1066 [1957]), as follows:

In short, the term 'Political question' connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to 'those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
 regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

The most often quoted definition of political question was made by Justice William J. Brennan Jr., who penned the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr (369 US 186,82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962]). The ingredients of a political
question as formulated in Baker v. Carr are:

It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise
may describe a political question, which identifies it as essentially a function of the separation of powers.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

For a political question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the President or Congress, the
exercise of which the court should not examine or prohibit. A claim of plenary or inherent power against a civil right which claim is
not found in a specific provision is dangerous. Neither should we validate a roving commission allowing public officials to strike
where they please and to override everything which to them represents evil. The entire Government is bound by the rule of law.

The respondents have not pointed to any provision of the Constitution which commits or vests the determination of the question
raised to us solely in the President.

The authority implied in Section 6 of the Bill of Rights itself does not exist because no law has been enacted specifying the
circumstances when the right may be impaired in the interest of national security or public safety. The power is in Congress, not the
Executive.

The closest resort to a textile demonstrable constitutional commitment of power may be found in the commander-in-chief clause
which allows the President to call out the armed forces in case of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law in the event of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

There is, however, no showing, not even a claim that the followers of former President Marcos are engaging in rebellion or that he is
in a position to lead them. Neither is it claimed that there is a need to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim
martial law because of the arrival of Mr. Marcos and his family. To be sure, there may be disturbances but not of a magnitude as
would compel this Court to resort to a doctrine of non- justiceability and to ignore a plea for the enforcement of an express Bill of
Rights guarantee.

The respondents themselves are hard-pressed to state who or what constitutes a Marcos "loyalist." The constant insinuations that
the "loyalist" group is heavily funded by Mr. Marcos and his cronies and that the "loyalists" engaging in rallies and demonstrations
have to be paid individual allowances to do so constitute the strongest indication that the hard core "loyalists" who would follow
Marcos right or wrong are so few in number that they could not possibly destabilize the government, much less mount a serious
attempt to overthrow it.

Not every person who would allow Mr. Marcos to come home can be tagged a "loyalist." It is in the best of Filipino customs and
traditions to allow a dying person to return to his home and breath his last in his native surroundings. Out of the 103 Congressmen
who passed the House resolution urging permission for his return, there are those who dislike Mr. Marcos intensely or who suffered
under his regime. There are also many Filipinos who believe that in the spirit of national unity and reconciliation Mr. Marcos and his
family should be permitted to return to the Philippines and that such a return would deprive his fanatic followers of any further
reason to engage in rallies and demonstrations.

The Court, however, should view the return of Mr. Marcos and his family solely in the light of the constitutional guarantee of liberty of
abode and the citizen's right to travel as against the respondents' contention that national security and public safety would be
endangered by a grant of the petition.

Apart from the absence of any text in the Constitution committing the issue exclusively to the President, there is likewise no dearth
of decisional data, no unmanageable standards which stand in the way of a judicial determination.

Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states categorically that the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law may be impaired only upon a lawful order of a court. Not by an executive officer. Not even by the President. Section 6 further
provides that the right to travel, and this obviously includes the right to travel out of or back into the Philippines, cannot be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
There is no law setting the limits on a citizen's right to move from one part of the country to another or from the Philippines to a
foreign country or from a foreign country to the Philippines. The laws cited by the Solicitor General immigration, health, quarantine,
passports, motor vehicle, destierro probation, and parole are all inapplicable insofar as the return of Mr. Marcos and family is
concerned. There is absolutely no showing how any of these statutes and regulations could serve as a basis to bar their coming
home.

There is also no disrespect for a Presidential determination if we grant the petition. We would simply be applying the Constitution, in
the preservation and defense of which all of us in Government, the President and Congress included, are sworn to participate.
Significantly, the President herself has stated that the Court has the last word when it comes to constitutional liberties and that she
would abide by our decision.

As early as 1983, it was noted that this Court has not been very receptive to the invocation of the political question doctrine by
government lawyers. (See Morales, Jr. .v Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 [1983]).

Many of those now occupying the highest positions in the executive departments, Congress, and the judiciary criticized this Court for
using what they felt was a doctrine of convenience, expediency, utility or subservience. Every major challenge to the acts of
petitioner Ferdinand E. Marcos under his authoritarian regime the proclamation of martial law, the ratification of a new constitution,
the arrest and detention of "enemies of the State" without charges being filed against them, the dissolution of Congress and the
exercise by the President of legislative powers, the trial of civilians for civil offenses by military tribunals, the seizure of some of the
country's biggest corporations, the taking over or closure of newspaper offices, radio and television stations and other forms of
media, the proposals to amend the Constitution, etc. was invariably met by an invocation that the petition involved a political
question. It is indeed poetic justice that the political question doctrine so often invoked by then President Marcos to justify his acts is
now being used against him and his family. Unfortunately, the Court should not and is not allowed to indulge in such a persiflage.
We are bound by the Constitution.

The dim view of the doctrine's use was such that when the present Constitution was drafted, a broad definition of judicial power was
added to the vesting in the Supreme Court and statutory courts of said power.

The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

This new provision was enacted to preclude this Court from using the political question doctrine as a means to avoid having to make
decisions simply because they are too controversial, displeasing to the President or Congress, inordinately unpopular, or which may
be ignored and not enforced.

The framers of the Constitution believed that the free use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos
years to fall back on prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of consequences or a fear that it was
extravagantly extending judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and strike down an exercise of authoritarian power.
Parenthetically, at least two of the respondents and their counsel were among the most vigorous critics of Mr. Marcos (the main
petitioner) and his use of the political question doctrine. The Constitution was accordingly amended. We are now precluded by its
mandate from refusing to invalidate a political use of power through a convenient resort to the question doctrine. We are compelled
to decide what would have been non-justiceable under our decisions interpreting earlier fundamental charters.

This is not to state that there can be no more political questions which we may refuse to resolve. There are still some political
questions which only the President, Congress, or a plebiscite may decide. Definitely, the issue before us is not one of them.

The Constitution requires the Court "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction."

How do we determine a grave abuse of discretion?

The tested procedure is to require the parties to present evidence. Unfortunately, considerations of national security do not readily
lend themselves to the presentation of proof before a court of justice. The vital information essential to an objective determination is
usually highly classified and it cannot be rebutted by those who seek to overthrow the government. As early as Barcelon v. Baker (5
Phil. 87, 93 [19051), the Court was faced with a similar situation. It posed a rhetorical question. If after investigating conditions in the
Archipelago or any part thereof, the President finds that public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, can the judicial department investigate the same facts and declare that no such conditions exist?
In the effort to follow the "grave abuse of discretion" formula in the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the
court granted the Solicitor General's offer that the military give us a closed door factual briefing with a lawyer for the petitioners and
a lawyer for the respondents present.

The results of the briefing call to mind the concurrence of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, (121 SCRA 538, 592
[19831):

How can this Court determine the factual basis in order that it can ascertain whether or not the president acted
arbitrarily in suspending the writ when, in the truth words of Montenegro, with its very limited machinery fit]
cannot be in better position [than the Executive Branch] to ascertain or evaluate the conditions prevailing in the
Archipelago? (At p. 887). The answer is obvious. It must rely on the Executive Branch which has the
appropriate civil and military machinery for the facts. This was the method which had to be used in Lansang.
This Court relied heavily on classified information supplied by the military. Accordingly, an incongruous situation
obtained. For this Court, relied on the very branch of the government whose act was in question to obtain the
facts. And as should be expected the Executive Branch supplied information to support its position and this
Court was in no situation to disprove them. It was a case of the defendant judging the suit. After all is said and
done, the attempt by its Court to determine whether or not the President acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ
was a useless and futile exercise.

There is still another reason why this Court should maintain a detached attitude and refrain from giving the seal
of approval to the act of the Executive Branch. For it is possible that the suspension of the writ lacks popular
support because of one reason or another. But when this Court declares that the suspension is not arbitrary
(because it cannot do otherwise upon the facts given to it by the Executive Branch) it in effect participates in the
decision-making process. It assumes a task which it is not equipped to handle; it lends its prestige and
credibility to an unpopular act.

The other method is to avail of judicial notice. In this particular case, judicial notice would be the only basis for determining the clear
and present danger to national security and public safety. The majority of the Court has taken judicial notice of the Communist
rebellion, the separatist movement, the rightist conspiracies, and urban terrorism. But is it fair to blame the present day Marcos for
these incidents? All these problems are totally unrelated to the Marcos of today and, in fact, are led by people who have always
opposed him. If we use the problems of Government as excuses for denying a person's right to come home, we will never run out of
justifying reasons. These problems or others like them will always be with us.

Significantly, we do not have to look into the factual bases of the ban Marcos policy in order to ascertain whether or not the
respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion. Nor are we forced to fall back upon judicial notice of the implications of a Marcos
return to his home to buttress a conclusion.

In the first place, there has never been a pronouncement by the President that a clear and present danger to national security and
public safety will arise if Mr. Marcos and his family are allowed to return to the Philippines. It was only after the present petition was
filed that the alleged danger to national security and public safety conveniently surfaced in the respondents' pleadings. Secondly,
President Aquino herself limits the reason for the ban Marcos policy to (1) national welfare and interest and (2) the continuing
need to preserve the gains achieved in terms of recovery and stability. (See page 7, respondents' Comment at page 73 of Rollo).
Neither ground satisfies the criteria of national security and public safety. The President has been quoted as stating that the vast
majority of Filipinos support her position. (The Journal, front page, January 24,1989) We cannot validate their stance simply
because it is a popular one. Supreme Court decisions do not have to be popular as long as they follow the Constitution and the law.
The President's original position "that it is not in the interest of the nation that Marcos be allowed to return at this time" has not
changed. (Manila Times, front page, February 7, 1989). On February 11, 1989, the President is reported to have stated that
"considerations of the highest national good dictate that we preserve the substantial economic and political gains of the past three
years" in justifying her firm refusal to allow the return of Mr. Marcos despite his failing health. (Daily Globe, front page, February 15,
1989). "Interest of the nation national good," and "preserving economic and political gains," cannot be equated with national security
or public order. They are too generic and sweeping to serve as grounds for the denial of a constitutional right. The Bill of Rights
commands that the right to travel may not be impaired except on the stated grounds of national security, public safety, or public
health and with the added requirement that such impairment must be "as provided by law." The constitutional command cannot be
negated by mere generalizations.

There is an actual rebellion not by Marcos followers but by the New Peoples' Army. Feeding as it does on injustice, ignorance,
poverty, and other aspects at under-development, the Communist rebellion is the clearest and most present danger to national
security and constitutional freedoms. Nobody has suggested that one way to quell it would be to catch and exile its leaders, Mr.
Marcos himself was forced to flee the country because of "peoples' power." Yet, there is no move to arrest and exile the leaders of
student groups, teachers' organizations, pea ant and labor federations, transport workers, and government unions whose
threatened mass actions would definitely endanger national security and the stability of government. We fail to see how Mr. Marcos
could be a greater danger.

The fear that Communist rebels, Bangsa Moro secessionists, the Honasan ex-soldiers, the hard core loyalists, and other dissatisfied
elements would suddenly unite to overthrow the Republic should a dying Marcos come home is too speculative and unsubstantial a
ground for denying a constitutional right. It is not shown how extremists from the right and the left who loathe each other could find a
rallying point in the coming of Mr. Marcos.

The "confluence theory" of the Solicitor General or what the majority calls "catalytic effect," which alone sustains the claim of danger
to national security is fraught with perilous implications. Any difficult problem or any troublesome person can be substituted for the
Marcos threat as the catalysing factor. The alleged confluence of NPAs, secessionists, radical elements, renegade soldiers, etc.,
would still be present. Challenged by any critic or any serious problem, the Government can state that the situation threatens a
confluence of rebel forces and proceed to ride roughshod over civil liberties in the name of national security. Today, a passport is
denied. Tomorrow, a newspaper may be closed. Public assemblies may be prohibited. Human rights may be violated. Yesterday,
the right to travel of Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Jovito Salonga was curtailed. Today, it is the right of Mr. Marcos and family.
Who will be tomorrow's pariahs I deeply regret that the Court's decision to use the political question doctrine in a situation where it
does not apply raises all kinds of disturbing possibilities.

I must emphasize that General Renato de Villa, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, has personally assured the Court that a
rebellion of the above combined groups will not succeed and that the military is on top of the situation. Where then is the clear
danger to national security? The Court has taken judicial notice of something which even the military denies. There would be severe
strains on military capabilities according to General de Villa. There would be set-backs in the expected eradication of the Communist
threat. There would be other serious problems but all can be successfully contained by the military. I must stress that no reference
was made to a clear and present danger to national security as would allow an overriding of the Bill of Rights.

The Solicitor General's argument that the failure of Congress to enact a statute defining the parameters of the right to travel and to
freely choose one's abode has constrained the President to fill in the vacuum, is too reminiscent of Amendment No. 6 of the martial
law Constitution to warrant serious consideration. Amendment No. 6 allowed Marcos to issue decrees whenever the Batasang
Pambansa failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment required immediate action.
When the Bill of Rights provides that a right may not be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health and further requires that a law must provide when such specifically defined interests are prejudiced or require protection, the
inaction of Congress does not give reason for the respondents to assume the grounds for its impairment.

The fact that the Marcoses have been indicted before American federal courts does not obstruct us from ruling against an
unconstitutional assertion of power by Philippine officials. Let the United States apply its laws. We have to be true to our own.

Mr. Marcos may be too ill to withstand the rigors of a transpacific flight. The agony of traveling while hooked up to machines which
have taken over the functions of his heart, lungs, and kidneys may hasten his death. The physical condition of Mr. Marcos does not
justify our ignoring or refusing to act on his claim to a basic right which is legally demandable and enforceable. For his own good, it
might be preferable to stay where he is. But he invokes a constitutional right. We have no power to deny it to him.

The issuance of a passport may be discretionary but it should not be withheld if to do so would run counter to a constitutional
guarantee. Besides, the petitioners are not asking for passports and nothing else. Any travel documents or any formal lifting of the
Marcos ban as would allow international airlines to sell them tickets would suffice.

With all due respect for the majority opinion, I disagree with its dictum on the right to travel. I do not think we should differentiate the
right to return home from the right to go abroad or to move around in the Philippines. If at all, the right to come home must be more
preferred than any other aspect of the right to travel. It was precisely the banning by Mr. Marcos of the right to travel by Senators
Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores of other "undesirables" and "threats to national security" during that unfortunate
period which led the framers of our present Constitution not only to re-enact but to strengthen the declaration of this right. Media
often asks, "what else is new?" I submit that we now have a freedom loving and humane regime. I regret that the Court's decision in
this case sets back the gains that our country has achieved in terms of human rights, especially human rights for those whom we do
not like or those who are against us.

The respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Raul S. Manglapus has disclosed a list of former dictators who were barred by their
successors from returning to their respective countries. There is no showing that the countries involved have constitutions which
guarantee the liberty of abode and the freedom to travel and that despite such constitutional protections, the courts have validated
the "ban a return" policy. Neither is it shown that the successors of the listed dictators are as deeply committed to democratic
principles and as observant of constitutional protections as President Aquino.

It is indeed regrettable that some followers of the former President are conducting a campaign to sow discord and to divide the
nation. Opposition to the government no matter how odious or disgusting is, however, insufficient ground to ignore a constitutional
guarantee.

During the protracted deliberations on this case, the question was asked is the Government helpless to defend itself against a threat
to national security? Does the President have to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law? Can she
not take less drastic measures?
Of course, the Government can act. It can have Mr. Marcos arrested and tried in court. The Government has more than ample
powers under eixisting law to deal with a person who transgresses the peace and imperils public safety. But the denial of travel
papers is not one of those powers because the Bill of Rights says so. There is no law prescribing exile in a foreign land as the
penalty for hurting the Nation.

Considering all the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

It is my belief that the petitioner, as a citizen of the Philippines, is entitled to return to and live and die in his own country. I say
this with a heavy heart but say it nonetheless. That conviction is not diminished one whit simply because many believe Marcos to be
beneath contempt and undeserving of the very liberties he flounted when he was the absolute ruler of this land.

The right of the United States government to detain him is not the question before us, nor can we resolve it. The question we must
answer is whether or not, assuming that Marcos is permitted to leave Hawaii (which may depend on the action we take today), the
respondents have acted with grave abuse of discretion in barring him from his own country.

My reluctant conclusion is that they have, absent the proof they said they were prepared to offer, but could not, that the petitioner's
return would prejudice the security of the State.

I was the one who, in the open hearing held on June 27,1989, asked the Solicitor General if the government was prepared to prove
the justification for opposing the herein petition, i.e. that it had not acted arbitrarily. He said it was. Accordingly, the Court,
appreciating the classified nature of the information expected, scheduled a closed-door hearing on July 25,1988. The Solicitor
General and three representatives from the military appeared for the respondents, together with former Senator Arturo M. Tolentino,
representing the petitioners.

In about two hours of briefing, the government failed dismally to show that the return of Marcos dead or alive would pose a threat to
the national security as it had alleged. The fears expressed by its representatives were based on mere conjectures of political and
economic destabilization without any single piece of concrete evidence to back up their apprehensions.

Amazingly, however, the majority has come to the conclusion that there exist "factual bases for the President's decision" to bar
Marcos's return. That is not my recollection of the impressions of the Court after that hearing.

In holding that the President of the Philippines has residual powers in addition to the specific powers granted by the Constitution, the
Court is taking a great leap backward and reinstating the discredited doctrine announced in Planas v. Gil (67 Phil. 62). This does not
square with the announced policy of the Constitutional Commission, which was precisely to limit rather than expand presidential
powers, as a reaction to the excesses of the past dictatorship.

I can only repeat Justice Black's wry observation in the Steel Seizure Case (343 U.S. 579) that if it was true that the President had
been granted the totality of executive power, "it is difficult to see why our forefathers bothered to add several specific items,
including some trifling ones, . . . I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power but
regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated."

I have no illusion that the stand I am taking will be met with paeans of praise, considering that Marcos is perhaps the most detested
man in the entire history of our country. But we are not concerned here with popularity and personalities. As a judge, I am not
swayed by what Justice Cardozo called the "hooting throng" that may make us see things through the prisms of prejudice. I bear in
mind that when I sit in judgment as a member of this Court, I must cast all personal feelings aside.

The issue before us must be resolved with total objectivity, on the basis only of the established facts and the applicable law and not
of wounds that still fester and scars that have not healed. And not even of fear, for fear is a phantom. That phantom did not rise
when the people stood fast at EDSA against the threat of total massacre in defense at last of their freedom.

I cannot turn back on the lessons of liberty that I taught for more than three decades as a professor of Constitutional Law. These
principles have not changed simply because I am now on the Court or a new administration is in power and the shoe is on the other
foot.

Like the martyred Ninoy Aquino who also wanted to come back to the Philippines against the prohibitions of the government then,
Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and the liberty of abode that his adversary invoked. These rights are guaranteed by the
Constitution to all individuals, including the patriot and the homesick and the prodigal son returning, and tyrants and charlatans and
scoundrels of every stripe.

I vote to grant the petition.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

I dissent. Already, some people refer to us as a nation without discipline. Are we ready to be also called a society without
compassion?

The issue as to whether or not former President Ferdinand E. Marcos should be allowed to return to the Philippines may be resolved
by answering two simple questions: Does he have the right to return to his own country and should national safety and security deny
him this right?

There is no dispute that the former President is still a Filipino citizen and both under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, he has the right to return to his own country except only if prevented by the demands of
national safety and national security.

Our Armed Forces have failed to prove this danger. They are bereft of hard evidence, and all they can rely on is sheer speculation.
True, there is some danger but there is no showing as to the extent.

It is incredible that one man alone together with his family, who had been ousted from this country by popular will, can arouse an
entire country to rise in morbid sympathy for the cause he once espoused.

It is therefore clear to me, all other opinions to the contrary notwithstanding, that the former President should be allowed to return to
our country under the conditions that he and the members of his family be under house arrest in his hometown in Ilocos Norte, and
should President Marcos or any member of his family die, the body should not be taken out of the municipality of confinement and
should be buried within ten (10) days from date.

If we do this, our country shall have maintained its regard for fundamental human rights, for national discipline, and for human
compassion.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I dissent. As I see it, the core issue in this case is, which right will prevail in the conflict between the right of a Filipino, Ferdinand E.
Marcos, to return to the Philippines, and the right of the Philippine Government to bar such return in the interest of national security
and public safety. In this context, the issue is clearly justiciable involving, as it does, colliding assertions of individual right and
governmental power. Issues of this nature more than explain why the 1986 Constitutional Commission, led by the illustrious former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, incorporated in the 1987 Constitution, the new provision on the power of Judicial Review, viz:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2; (Emphasis supplied)

Mr. Marcos invokes in his favor the specific and precise constitutional right of every Filipino to travel which, in the language of the
Constitution, shall not be impaired "except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law" (Art. III, Sec. 6). That the right to travel comprises the right to travel within the country, to travel out of the country and to return
to the country (Philippines), is hardly disputable. Short of all such components, the right to travel is meaningless. The real question
arises in the interpretation of the qualifications attached by the Constitution to such right to travel.

Petitioners contend that, in the absence of restricting legislation, the right to travel is absolute. I do not agree. It is my view that, with
or without restricting legislation, the interest of national security, public safety or public health can justify and even require
restrictions on the right to travel, and that the clause "as may be provided by law" contained in Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution merely declares a constitutional leave or permission for Congress to enact laws that may restrict the right to travel in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health. I do not, therefore, accept the petitioners' submission that, in the absence
of enabling legislation, the Philippine Government is powerless to restrict travel even when such restriction is demanded by national
security, public safety or public health, The power of the State, in particular cases, to restrict travel of its citizens finds abundant
support in the police power of the state wich may be exercised to preserve and maintain government as well as promote the general
welfare of the greatest number of people.

And yet, the power of the State, acting through a government in authority at any given time, to restrict travel, even if founded on
police power, cannot be absolute and unlimited under all circumstances, much less, can it be arbitrary and irrational.
Mr. Marcos, I repeat, comes before the Court as a Filipino, invoking a specific constitutional right, i.e., the right to return to the
country. 1 Have the respondents presented sufficient evidence to offset or override the exercise of this right
invoked by Mr. Marcos? Stated differently, have the respondents shown to the Court sufficient factual
bases and data which would justify their reliance on national security and public safety in negating the
right to return invoked by Mr. Marcos?

I have given these questions a searching examination. I have carefully weighed and assessed the "briefing" given the Court by the
highest military authorities of the land last 28 July 1989. 1 have searched, but in vain, for convincing evidence that would defeat and
overcome the right of Mr. Marcos as a Filipino to return to this country. It appears to me that the apprehensions entertained and
expressed by the respondents, including those conveyed through the military, do not, with all due respect, escalate to proportions of
national security or public safety. They appear to be more speculative than real, obsessive rather than factual. Moreover, such
apprehensions even if translated into realities, would be "under control," as admitted to the Court by said military authorities, given
the resources and facilities at the command of government. But, above all, the Filipino people themselves, in my opinion, will know
how to handle any situation brought about by a political recognition of Mr. Marcos' right to return, and his actual return, to this
country. The Court, in short, should not accept respondents' general apprehensions, concerns and perceptions at face value, in the
light of a countervailing and even irresistible, specific, clear, demandable, and enforceable right asserted by a Filipino.

Deteriorating political, social, economic or exceptional conditions, if any, are not to be used as a pretext to justify derogation of
human rights. 2

As a member of the United Nations, the Philippines has obligations under its charter. By adopting the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, (Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution), the Philippine government cannot just pay lip
service to Art. 13, par. 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which provides that everyone has the right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to his country. This guarantee is reiterated in Art. XII, par. 2 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights which states that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country." (Emphasis
supplied) "Arbitrary" or "arbitrarily" was specifically chosen by the drafters of the Covenant 3 hoping to protect an individual
against unexpected, irresponsible or excessive encroachment on his rights by the state based on national
traditions or a particular sense of justice which falls short of international law or standards. 4

The Solicitor General maintains that because the respondents, as alter egos of the President, have raised the argument of "national
security" and "public safety," it is the duty of this Court to unquestioningly yield thereto, thus casting the controversy to the realm of a
political question. I do not agree. I believe that it is one case where the human and constitutional light invoked by one party is so
specific, substantial and clear that it cannot be overshadowed, much less, nullified by simplistic generalities; worse, the Court
neglects its duty under the Constitution when it allows the theory of political question to serve as a convenient, and yet, lame excuse
for evading what, to me, is its clearly pressing and demandable duty to the Constitution.

During the oral arguments in this case, I asked the Solicitor General how one could validly defend the right of former Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., a Filipino, to return to the Philippines in 1983 and, at the same time, credibly deny the right of Mr. Marcos,
also a Filipino, to return to the Philippines in 1989. I still have not found a satisfactory answer to that question. Instead, it has
become clearer by the day that the drama today is the same drama in 1983 with the only difference that the actors are in opposite
roles, which really makes one hope, in the national interest, that the mistake in 1983 should not be made to persist in 1989.

To one who owes Mr. Marcos, his wife and followers absolutely nothing, personal, political or otherwise, the following are the cogent
and decisive propositions in this case

1. Mr. Marcos is a Filipino and, as such, entitled to return to die and be buried in this country;

2. respondents have not shown any "hard evidence" or convincing proof why his right as a Filipino to return
should be denied him. All we have are general conclusions of "national security" and "public safety" in
avoidance of a specific demandable and enforceable constitutional and basic human right to return;

3. the issue of Marcos' return to the Philippines, perhaps more than any issue today, requires of all members of
the Court, in what appears to be an extended political contest, the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." It is
only thus that we fortify the independence of this Court, with fidelity, not to any person, party or group but to the
Constitution and only to the Constitution.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I vote to grant the petition.

The only issue that saddles the Court is simply: "whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines." 1 I therefore take exception to allusions 2 anent
"the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar." 3 I have legitimate reason to fear that my
brethren, in passing judgment on the Marcoses (insofar as their "capacity to stir trouble" is concerned),
have overstepped the bounds of judicial restraint, or even worse, convicted them without trial.

I also find quite strained what the majority would have as the "real issues" facing the Court: "The right to return to one's country,"
pitted against "the right of travel and freedom of abode", and their supposed distinctions under international law, as if such
distinctions, under international law in truth and in fact exist. There is only one right involved here, whether under municipal or
international law: the light of travel, whether within one's own country, or to another, and the right to return thereto. The Constitution
itself makes no distinctions; let then, no one make a distinction. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemus.

As the majority would indeed have it, the issue is one of power: Does the Executive have the power to deny a citizen his right to
travel (back to the country or to another)? It is a question that, in essence, involves the application, and no more, of the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution:

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. 4

The majority says, with ample help from American precedents, that the President is possessed of the power, thus:

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific
powers so enumerated. 5

So also:

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the
President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision.
More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in
mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people
have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the
Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become
rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1 . ] 6

And finally:

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the
exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To
paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not
forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demanded [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It
is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a
power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [See Hyman, The
American President, where the author advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is
unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President]. 7

I am not persuaded.

First: While the Chief Executive exercises powers not found expressly in the Charter, but has them by constitutional implication* the
latter must yield to the paramountcy of the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando: "A regime of constitutionalism is thus unthinkable
without an assurance of the primacy of a big of rights. Precisely a constitution exists to assure that in the discharge of the
governmental functions, the dignity that is the birthright of every human being is duly safeguarded. To be true to its primordial aim a
constitution must lay down the boundaries beyond which he's forbidden territory for state action" 8
My brethren have not demonstrated, to my satisfaction, how the President may override the direct mandate of the fundamental law.
It will not suffice, so I submit, to say that the President's plenitude of powers, as provided in the Constitution, or by sheer
constitutional implication, prevail over express constitutional commands. "Clearly," so I borrow J.B.L. Reyes, in his own right, a titan
in the field of public law, "this argument ... rests ... not upon the text of the (Constitution] ... but upon a mere inference
therefrom." 9 For if it were, indeed, the intent of the Charter to create an exception, that is, by Presidential
action, to the right of travel or liberty of abode and of changing the same other than what it explicitly says
already ("limits prescribed by law" 10 or "upon lawful order of the court" 11 the Charter could have
specifically declared so. As it is, the lone deterrents to the right in question are: (1) decree of statute, or
(2) lawful judicial mandate. Had the Constitution intended a third exception, that is, by Presidential
initiative, it could have so averred. It would also have made the Constitution, as far as limits to the said
right are concerned, come full circle: Limits by legislative, judicial, and executive processes.

Obviously, none of the twin legal bars exist. There is no law banning the Marcoses from the country; neither is there any court
decree banishing him from Philippine territory.

It is to be noted that under the 1973 Constitution, the right to travel is worded as follows:

Sec. 5. The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when
necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health. 12

Under this provision, the right may be abated: (1) upon a lawful court order, or (2) "when necessary in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health. 13 Arguably, the provision enabled the Chief Executive (Marcos) to
moderate movement of citizens, which, Bernas says, justified such practices as "hamletting", forced
relocations, or the establishment of free-fire zones. 14

The new Constitution, however, so it clearly appears, has divested the Executive's implied power. And, as it so appears, the right
may be impaired only "within the limits provided by law . 15 The President is out of the picture.

and foreign affairs; 17the Bill of

Admittedly, the Chief Executive is the "sole" judge of all matters affecting national security 16

Rights precisely, a form of check against excesses of officialdom is, in this case, a formidable barrier
against Presidential action. (Even on matters of State security, this Constitution prescribes limits to
Executive's powers as Commander-in-Chief.)

Second: Assuming, ex hypothesis that the President may legally act, the question that emerges is: Has it been proved that Marcos,
or his return, will, in fact, interpose a threat to the national security , public safety, or public health?" What appears in the records are
vehement insistences that Marcos does pose a threat to the national good and yet, at the same time, we have persistent claims,
made by the military top brass during the lengthy closed-door hearing on July 25, 1989, that "this Government will not fall" should
the former first family in exile step on Philippine soil. which is which?

At any rate, it is my opinion that we can not leave that determination solely to the Chief Executive. The Court itself must be content
that the threat is not only clear, but more so, present. 18

is an obligation open to no doubt.

That the President "has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people ... " 19

But the question, and so I ask again and again, is: From whom? If we say "from Marcos," we unravel
chinks in our political armor. It also flies in the face of claims, so confidently asserted, that "this
Government will not fall" even if we allowed Marcos to return.

It flies, finally, in the face of the fact that a good number of the henchmen trusted allies, implementors of martial law, and pathetic
parasites of the ex-first couple are, in fact, in the Government, in the comfort of its offices, and or at the helm of its key agencies. Let
us not, therefore, joke ourselves of moral factors warranting the continued banishment of Marcos. Morality is the last refuge of the
self-righteous.

20 As I indicated, not one

Third: The problem is not of balancing the general welfare against the exercise of individual liberties.
shred of evidence, let alone solid evidence, other than surmises of possibilities, has been shown to justify
the 'balancing act" referred to. Worse, these conjectures contradict contentions that as far as Philippine
society is concerned, Marcos is "history".

The power of the President, so my brethren declaim, "calls for the exercise of the President's power as protector of peace. 21
This is the self-same falsehood Marcos foisted on the Filipino people to justify the authoritarian rule. It also means that we are no
better than he has.

That "[t]he power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of
emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence" 22 is a bigger fantasy: It not only
summons the martial law decisions of pre-"EDSA" (especially with respect to the detestable Amendment
No. 6), it is inconsistent with the express provisions of the commander-in-chief clause of the 1987
Charter, a Charter that has perceptibly reduced the Executive's powers vis-a-vis its 1973 counterpart. 23

II.

The undersigned would be lacking in candor to conceal his dislike, to say the least, for Marcos. Because of Marcos, the writer of it's
dissent lost a son His son's only "offense" was that he openly and unabatedly criticized the dictator, his associates, and his military
machinery. He would pay dearly for it; he was arrested and detained, without judicial warrant or decision, for seven months and
seven days. He was held incommunicado a greater part of the time, in the military stockade of Camp Crame. In his last week in
detention, he was, grudgingly, hospitalized (prison hospital) and confined for chronic asthma. The deplorable conditions of his
imprisonment exacerbated his delicate health beyond cure. He died, on November 11, 1977, a martyr on the altar of the martial law
apparatus.

The undersigned also counts himself as one of the victims of Marcos' ruthless apparatchiki. On August 14, 1979, he was, along with
former President Diosdado Macapagal, and Congressmen Rogaciano Mercado and Manuel Concordia, charged, "ASSOed"and
placed under house arrest, for "inciting to sedition" and "rumor mongering " 24in the midst of the distribution of Ang
Demokrasya Sa Pilipinas (Democracy In the Philippines), a book extremely critical of martial rule,
published by him and former Congressman Concordia, authored by President Macapagal and translated
into Tagalog by Congressman Rogaciano Mercado. In addition, they were also all accused of libel in
more than two dozens of criminal complaints filed by the several military officers named in the
"condemned" book as having violated the human rights of dissenters, and for other crimes, in the office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. It had to take the events at "EDSA" to set them free from house arrest and
these political offenses. I am for Marcos' return not because I have a score to settle with him. Ditto's death
or my arrest are scores that can not be settled.

I feel the ex-President's death abroad (presented in the dailies as 'imminent") would leave him 'unpunished for his crimes to country
and countrymen. If punishment is due, let this leadership inflict it. But let him stand trial and accord him due process.

Modesty aside, I have staunchly and consistently advocated the human right of travel and movement and the liberty of abode. 25
We would have betrayed our own Ideals if we denied Marcos his rights. It is his constitutional right, a right that can not be abridged
by personal hatred, fear, founded or unfounded, and by speculations of the "man's "capacity" "to stir trouble" Now that the shoe is
on the other foot, let no more of human rights violations be repeated against any one, friend or foe. In a democratic framework, there
is no this as getting even.

The majority started this inquiry on the question of power. I hold that the President, under the present Constitution and existing laws,
does not have it. Mandamus, I submit, lies.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Grio- Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, C.J., concurring:

"The threats to national security and public order are real the mounting Communist insurgency, a simmering separatist movement, a
restive studentry, widespread labor disputes, militant farmer groups. . . . Each of these threats is an explosive ingredient in a
steaming cauldron which could blow up if not handled properly." 1
These are not my words. They belong to my distinguished colleague in the Court, Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. But they
express eloquently the basis of my full concurrence to the exhaustive and well-written ponencia of Mme. Justice Irene R. Cortes.

Presidential powers and prerogatives are not fixed but fluctuate. They are not derived solely from a particular constitutional clause or
article or from an express statutory grant. Their limits are likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law. History and time-honored principles of constitutional law have conceded to
the Executive Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and imperative national emergency. Many terms are applied to these
powers: "residual," "inherent," 44 moral," "implied," "aggregate," 'emergency." whatever they may be called, the fact is that these
powers exist, as they must if the governance function of the Executive Branch is to be carried out effectively and efficiently. It is in
this context that the power of the President to allow or disallow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines should be viewed. By
reason of its impact on national peace and order in these admittedly critical times, said question cannot be withdrawn from the
competence of the Executive Branch to decide.

And indeed, the return of the deposed President, his wife and children cannot but pose a clear and present danger to public order
and safety. One needs only to recall the series of destabilizing actions attempted by the so-called Marcos loyalists as well as the
ultra-rightist groups during the EDSA Revolution's aftermath to realize this. The most publicized of these offensives is the Manila
Hotel incident which occurred barely five (5) months after the People's Power Revolution. Around 10,000 Marcos supporters,
backed by 300 loyalist soldiers led by Brigadier General Jose Zumel and Lt. Col. Reynaldo Cabauatan converged at the Manila
Hotel to witness the oath-taking of Arturo Tolentino as acting president of the Philippines. The public disorder and peril to life and
limb of the citizens engendered by this event subsided only upon the eventual surrender of the loyalist soldiers to the authorities.

Then followed the Channel 7, Sangley, Villamor, Horseshoe Drive and Camp Aguinaldo incidents. Military rebels waged
simultaneous offensives in different parts of Metro Manila and Sangley Point in Cavite. A hundred rebel soldiers took over Channel 7
and its radio station DZBB. About 74 soldier rebels attacked Villamor Air Base, while another group struck at Sangley Point in Cavite
and held the 15th Air Force Strike wing commander and his deputy hostage. Troops on board several vehicles attempted to enter
Gate I of Camp Aguinaldo even as another batch of 200 soldiers encamped at Horseshoe Village.

Another destabilization plot was carried out in April, 1987 by enlisted personnel who forced their way through Gate 1 of Fort
Bonifacio. They stormed into the army stockade but having failed to convince their incarcerated members to unite in their cause, had
to give up nine (9) hours later.

And who can forget the August 28, 1987 coup attempt which almost toppled the Aquino Government? Launched not by Marcos
loyalists, but by another ultra-rightist group in the military led by Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan who remains at large to date, this
most serious attempt to wrest control of the government resulted in the death of many civilians.

Members of the so-called Black Forest Commando were able to cart away high-powered firearms and ammunition from the Camp
Crame Armory during a raid conducted in June 1988. Most of the group members were, however, captured in Antipolo, Rizal. The
same group was involved in an unsuccessful plot known as Oplan Balik Saya which sought the return of Marcos to the country.

A more recent threat to public order, peace and safety was the attempt of a group named CEDECOR to mobilize civilians from
nearby provinces to act as blockading forces at different Metro Manila areas for the projected link-up of Marcos military loyalist
troops with the group of Honasan. The pseudo "people power" movement was neutralized thru checkpoints set up by the authorities
along major road arteries where the members were arrested or forced to turn back.

While not all of these disruptive incidents may be traced directly to the Marcoses, their occurrence militates heavily against the
wisdom of allowing the Marcoses' return. Not only will the Marcoses' presence embolden their followers toward similar actions, but
any such action would be seized upon as an opportunity by other enemies of the State, such as the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the NPA'S, the Muslim secessionists and extreme rightists of the RAM, to wage an offensive against the
government. Certainly, the state through its executive branch has the power, nay, the responsibility and obligation, to prevent a
grave and serious threat to its safety from arising.

Apparently lost amidst the debate on whether or not to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is one factor, which albeit, at
first blush appears to be extra legal, constitutes a valid justification for disallowing the requested return. I refer to the public pulse. It
must be remembered that the ouster of the Marcoses from the Philippines came about as an unexpected, but certainly welcomed,
result of the unprecedented peoples power" revolution. Millions of our people braved military tanks and firepower, kept vigil, prayed,
and in countless manner and ways contributed time, effort and money to put an end to an evidently untenable claim to power of a
dictator. The removal of the Marcoses from the Philippines was a moral victory for the Filipino people; and the installation of the
present administration, a realization of and obedience to the people's Will.

Failing in legal arguments for the allowance of the Marcoses' return, appeal is being made to sympathy, compassion and even
Filipino tradition. The political and economic gains we have achieved during the past three years are however too valuable and
precious to gamble away on purely compassionate considerations. Neither could public peace, order and safety be sacrificed for an
individual's wish to die in his own country. Verily in the balancing of interests, the scales tilt in favor of presidential prerogative, which
we do not find to have been gravely abused or arbitrarily exercised, to ban the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting

"The Constitution ... is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes
of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit
of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government." (Ex Parte Milligan, 4
Wall. 2; 18 L. Ed. 281 [1866])

Since our days as law students, we have proclaimed the stirring words of Ex Parte Milligan as self-evident truth. But faced with a
hard and delicate case, we now hesitate to qive substance to their meaning. The Court has permitted a basic freedom enshrined in
the Bill of Rights to be taken away by Government.

There is only one Bill of Rights with the same interpretation of liberty and the same guarantee of freedom for both unloved and
despised persons on one hand and the rest who are not so stigmatized on the other.

I am, therefore, disturbed by the majority ruling which declares that it should not be a precedent. We are interpreting the Constitution
for only one person and constituting him into a class by himself. The Constitution is a law for all classes of men at all times. To have
a person as one class by himself smacks of unequal protection of the laws.

With all due respect for the majority in the Court, I believe that the issue before us is one of rights and not of power. Mr. Marcos is
insensate and would not live if separated from the machines which have taken over the functions of his kidneys and other organs.
To treat him at this point as one with full panoply of power against whom the forces of Government should be marshalled is totally
unrealistic. The Government has the power to arrest and punish him. But does it have the power to deny him his right to come home
and die among familiar surroundings?

Hence, this dissent.

The Bill of Rights provides:

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied, Section 6, Art.
111, Constitution)

To have the petition dismissed, the Solicitor General repeats a ritual invocation of national security and public safety which is
hauntingly familiar because it was pleaded so often by petitioner Ferdinand E. Marcos to justify his acts under martial law. There is,
however, no showing of the existence of a law prescribing the limits of the power to impair and the occasions for its exercise. And
except for citing breaches of law and order, the more serious of which were totally unrelated to Mr. Marcos and which the military
was able to readily quell, the respondents have not pointed to any grave exigency which permits the use of untrammeled
Governmental power in this case and the indefinite suspension of the constitutional right to travel.

The respondents' basic argument is that the issue before us is a political question beyond our jurisdiction to consider. They contend
that the decision to ban former President Marcos, and his family on grounds of national security and public safety is vested by the
Constitution in the President alone. The determination should not be questioned before this Court. The President's finding of danger
to the nation should be conclusive on the Court.

What is a political question?

In Vera v. Avelino (77 Phil. 192, 223 [1946], the Court stated:

xxxxxxxxx

It is a well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the
extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred on the courts by express constitutional or
statutory provisions. It is not so easy, however, to define the phrase political question, nor to determine what
matters fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that he outside the scope of the
judicial power. More properly, however, it means those questions which, under the constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.

We defined a political question in Taniada v. Cuenco (103 Phil. 1051, 1066 [1957]), as follows:
 In short, the term 'Political question' connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to 'those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

The most often quoted definition of political question was made by Justice Wilham J. Brennan Jr., who penned the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr (369 US 186,82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962]). The ingredients of a political
question as formulated in Baker v. Carr are:

It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise
may describe a political question, which Identifies it as essentially a function of the separation of powers.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

For a political question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the President or Congress, the
exercise of which the court should not examine or prohibit. A claim of plenary or inherent power against a civil right which claim is
not found in a specific provision is dangerous. Neither should we validate a roving commission allowing public officials to strike
where they please and to override everything which to them represents evil. The entire Govern ment is bound by the rule of law.

The respondents have not pointed to any provision of the Constitution which commits or vests the determination of the question
raised to us solely in the President.

The authority implied in Section 6 of the Bill of Rights itself does not exist because no law has been enacted specifying the
circumstances when the right may be impaired in the interest of national security or public safety. The power is in Congress, not the
Executive.

The closest resort to a textile demonstrable constitutional commitment of power may be found in the commander-in-chief clause
which allows the President to call out the armed forces in case of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law in the event of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

There is, however, no showing, not even a claim that the followers of former President Marcos are engaging in rebellion or that he is
in a position to lead them. Neither is it claimed that there is a need to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim
martial law because of the arrival of Mr. Marcos and his family. To be sure, there may be disturbances but not of a magnitude as
would compel this Court to resort to a doctrine of non- justiceability and to ignore a plea for the enforcement of an express Bill of
Rights guarantee.

The respondents themselves are hard-pressed to state who or what constitutes a Marcos "loyalist." The constant insinuations that
the "loyalist" group is heavily funded by Mr. Marcos and his cronies and that the "loyalists" engaging in rallies and demonstrations
have to be paid individual allowances to do so constitute the strongest indication that the hard core "loyalists" who would follow
Marcos right or wrong are so few in number that they could not possibly destabilize the government, much less mount a serious
attempt to overthrow it.

Not every person who would allow Mr. Marcos to come home can be tagged a "loyalist." It is in the best of Filipino customs and
traditions to allow a dying person to return to his home and breath his last in his native surroundings. Out of the 103 Congressmen
who passed the House resolution urging permission for his return, there are those who dislike Mr. Marcos intensely or who suffered
under his regime. There are also many Filipinos who believe that in the spirit of national unity and reconciliation Mr. Marcos and his
family should be permitted to return to the Philippines and that such a return would deprive his fanatic followers of any further
reason to engage in rallies and demonstrations.

The Court, however, should view the return of Mr. Marcos and his family solely in the light of the constitutional guarantee of liberty of
abode and the citizen's right to travel as against the respondents' contention that national security and public safety would be
endangered by a grant of the petition.

Apart from the absence of any text in the Constitution committing the issue exclusively to the President, there is likewise no dearth
of decisional data, no unmanageable standards which stand in the way of a judicial determination.

Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states categorically that the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law may be impaired only upon a lawful order of a court. Not by an executive officer. Not even by the President. Section 6 further
provides that the right to travel, and this obviously includes the right to travel out of or back into the Philippines, cannot be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

There is no law setting the limits on a citizen's right to move from one part of the country to another or from the Philippines to a
foreign country or from a foreign country to the Philippines. The laws cited by the Solicitor General immigration, health, quarantine,
passports, motor vehicle, destierro probation, and parole are all inapplicable insofar as the return of Mr. Marcos and family is
concerned. There is absolutely no showing how any of these statutes and regulations could serve as a basis to bar their coming
home.

There is also no disrespect for a Presidential determination if we grant the petition. We would simply be applying the Constitution, in
the preservation and defense of which all of us in Government, the President and Congress included, are sworn to participate.
Significantly, the President herself has stated that the Court has the last word when it comes to constitutional liberties and that she
would abide by our decision.

As early as 1983, it was noted that this Court has not been very receptive to the invocation of the political question doctrine by
government lawyers. (See Morales, Jr. .v Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 [1983]).

Many of those now occupying the highest positions in the executive departments, Congress, and the judiciary criticized this Court for
using what they felt was a doctrine of convenience, expediency, utility or subservience. Every major challenge to the acts of
petitioner Ferdinand E. Marcos under his authoritarian regime the proclamation of martial law, the ratification of a new constitution,
the arrest and detention of "enemies of the State" without charges being filed against them, the dissolution of Congress and the
exercise by the President of legislative powers, the trial of civilians for civil offenses by military tribunals, the seizure of some of the
country's biggest corporations, the taking over or closure of newspaper offices, radio and television stations and other forms of
media, the proposals to amend the Constitution, etc. was invariably met by an invocation that the petition involved a political
question. It is indeed poetic justice that the political question doctrine so often invoked by then President Marcos to justify his acts is
now being used against him and his family. Unfortunately, the Court should not and is not allowed to indulge in such a persiflage.
We are bound by the Constitution.

The dim view of the doctrine's use was such that when the present Constitution was drafted, a broad definition of judicial power was
added to the vesting in the Supreme Court and statutory courts of said power.

The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

This new provision was enacted to preclude this Court from using the political question doctrine as a means to avoid having to make
decisions simply because they are too controversial, displeasing to the President or Congress, inordinately unpopular, or which may
be ignored and not enforced.

The framers of the Constitution believed that the free use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos
years to fall back on prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of consequences or a fear that it was
extravagantly extending judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and strike down an exercise of authoritarian power.
Parenthetically, at least two of the respondents and their counsel were among the most vigorous critics of Mr. Marcos (the main
petitioner) and his use of the political question doctrine. The Constitution was accordingly amended. We are now precluded by its
mandate from refusing to invalidate a political use of power through a convenient resort to the question doctrine. We are compelled
to decide what would have been non-justiceable under our decisions interpreting earlier fundamental charters.

This is not to state that there can be no more political questions which we may refuse to resolve. There are still some political
questions which only the President, Congress, or a plebiscite may decide. Definitely, the issue before us is not one of them.

The Constitution requires the Court "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction."

How do we determine a grave abuse of discretion?

The tested procedure is to require the parties to present evidence. Unfortunately, considerations of national security do not readily
lend themselves to the presentation of proof before a court of justice. The vital information essential to an objective determination is
usually highly classified and it cannot be rebutted by those who seek to overthrow the government. As early as Barcelon v. Baker (5
Phil. 87, 93 [19051), the Court was faced with a similar situation. It posed a rhetorical question. If after investigating conditions in the
Archipelago or any part thereof, the President finds that public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, can the judicial department investigate the same facts and declare that no such conditions exist?

In the effort to follow the "grave abuse of discretion" formula in the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the
court granted the Solicitor General's offer that the military give us a closed door factual briefing with a lawyer for the petitioners and
a lawyer for the respondents present.

The results of the briefing call to mind the concurrence of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, (121 SCRA 538, 592
[19831):

How can this Court determine the factual basis in order that it can ascertain whether or not the president acted
arbitrarily in suspending the writ when, in the truth words of Montenegro, with its very limited machinery fit]
cannot be in better position [than the Executive Branch] to ascertain or evaluate the conditions prevailing in the
Archipelago? (At p. 887). The answer is obvious. It must rely on the Executive Branch which has the
appropriate civil and military machinery for the facts. This was the method which had to be used in Lansang.
This Court relied heavily on classified information supplied by the military. Accordingly, an incongruous situation
obtained. For this Court, relied on the very branch of the government whose act was in question to obtain the
facts. And as should be expected the Executive Branch supplied information to support its position and this
Court was in no situation to disprove them. It was a case of the defendant judging the suit. After all is said and
done, the attempt by its Court to determine whether or not the President acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ
was a useless and futile exercise.

There is still another reason why this Court should maintain a detached attitude and refrain from giving the seal
of approval to the act of the Executive Branch. For it is possible that the suspension of the writ lacks popular
support because of one reason or another. But when this Court declares that the suspension is not arbitrary
(because it cannot do otherwise upon the facts given to it by the Executive Branch) it in effect participates in the
decision-making process. It assumes a task which it is not equipped to handle; it lends its prestige and
credibility to an unpopular act.

The other method is to avail of judicial notice. In this particular case, judicial notice would be the only basis for determining the clear
and present danger to national security and public safety. The majority of the Court has taken judicial notice of the Communist
rebellion, the separatist movement, the rightist conspiracies, and urban terrorism. But is it fair to blame the present day Marcos for
these incidents? All these problems are totally unrelated to the Marcos of today and, in fact, are led by people who have always
opposed him. If we use the problems of Government as excuses for denying a person's right to come home, we will never run out of
justifying reasons. These problems or others like them will always be with us.

Significantly, we do not have to look into the factual bases of the ban Marcos policy in order to ascertain whether or not the
respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion. Nor are we forced to fall back upon judicial notice of the implications of a Marcos
return to his home to buttress a conclusion.

In the first place, there has never been a pronouncement by the President that a clear and present danger to national security and
public safety will arise if Mr. Marcos and his family are allowed to return to the Philippines. It was only after the present petition was
filed that the alleged danger to national security and public safety conveniently surfaced in the respondents' pleadings. Secondly,
President Aquino herself limits the reason for the ban Marcos policy to-41) national welfare and interest and (2) the continuing need
to preserve the gains achieved in terms of recovery and stability. (See page 7, respondents' Comment at page 73 of Rollo). Neither
ground satisfies the criteria of national security and public safety. The President has been quoted as stating that the vast majority of
Filipinos support her position. (The Journal, front page, January 24,1989) We cannot validate their stance simply because it is a
popular one. Supreme Court decisions do not have to be popular as long as they follow the Constitution and the law. The
President's original position "that it is not in the interest of the nation that Marcos be allowed to return at this time" has not changed.
(Manila Times, front page, February 7, 1989). On February 11, 1989, the President is reported to have stated that "considerations of
the highest national good dictate that we preserve the substantial economic and political gains of the past three years" in justifying
her firm refusal to allow the return of Mr. Marcos despite his failing health. (Daily Globe, front page, February 15, 1989). "Interest of
the nation national good," and "preserving economic and political gains," cannot be equated with national security or public order.
They are too generic and sweeping to serve as grounds for the denial of a constitutional right. The Bill of Rights commands that the
right to travel may not be impaired except on the stated grounds of national security, public safety, or public health and with the
added requirement that such impairment must be "as provided by law." The constitutional command cannot be negated by mere
generalizations.

There is an actual rebellion not by Marcos followers but by the New Peoples' Army. Feeding as it does on injustice, ignorance,
poverty, and other aspects at under-development, the Communist rebellion is the clearest and most present danger to national
security and constitutional freedoms. Nobody has suggested that one way to quell it would be to catch and exile its leaders, Mr.
Marcos himself was forced to flee the country because of "peoples' power." Yet, there is no move to arrest and exile the leaders of
student groups, teachers' organizations, pea ant and labor federations, transport workers, and government unions whose
threatened mass actions would definitely endanger national security and the stability of government. We fail to see how Mr. Marcos
could be a greater danger.
The fear that Communist rebels, Bangsa Moro secessionists, the Honasan ex-soldiers, the hard core loyalists, and other dissatisfied
elements would suddenly unite to overthrow the Republic should a dying Marcos come home is too speculative and unsubstantial a
ground for denying a constitutional right. It is not shown how extremists from the right and the left who loathe each other could find a
rallying point in the coming of Mr. Marcos.

The "confluence theory" of the Solicitor General or what the majority calls "catalytic effect," which alone sustains the claim of danger
to national security is fraught with perilous implications. Any difficult problem or any troublesome person can be substituted for the
Marcos threat as the catalysing factor. The alleged confluence of NPAS, secessionists, radical elements, renegade soldiers, etc.,
would still be present. Challenged by any critic or any serious problem, the Government can state that the situation threatens a
confluence of rebel forces and proceed to ride roughshod over civil liberties in the name of national security. Today, a passport is
denied. Tomorrow, a newspaper may be closed. Public assemblies may be prohibited. Human rights may be violated. Yesterday,
the right to travel of Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Jovito Salonga was curtailed. Today, it is the right of Mr. Marcos and family.
Who will be tomorrow's pariahs I deeply regret that the Court's decision to use the political question doctrine in a situation where it
does not apply raises all kinds of disturbing possibilities.

I must emphasize that General Renato de Villa, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, has personally assured the Court that a
rebellion of the above combined groups will not succeed and that the military is on top of the situation. Where then is the clear
danger to national security? The Court has taken judicial notice of something which even the military denies. There would be severe
strains on military capabilities according to General de Villa. There would be set-backs in the expected eradication of the Communist
threat. There would be other serious problems but all can be successfully contained by the military. I must stress that no reference
was made to a clear and present danger to national security as would allow an overriding of the Bill of Rights.

The Solicitor General's argument that the failure of Congress to enact a statute defining the parameters of the right to travel and to
freely choose one's abode has constrained the President to fill in the vacuum, is too reminiscent of Amendment No. 6 of the martial
law Constitution to warrant serious consideration. Amendment No. 6 allowed Marcos to issue decrees whenever the Batasang
Pambansa failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment required immediate action.
When the Bill of Rights provides that a right may not be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health and further requires that a law must provide when such specifically defined interests are prejudiced or require protection, the
inaction of Congress does not give reason for the respondents to assume the grounds for its impairment.

The fact that the Marcoses have been indicted before American federal courts does not obstruct us from ruling against an
unconstitutional assertion of power by Philippine officials. Let the United States apply its laws. We have to be true to our own.

Mr. Marcos may be too ill to withstand the rigors of a transpacific flight. The agony of traveling while hooked up to machines which
have taken over the functions of his heart, lungs, and kidneys may hasten his death. The physical condition of Mr. Marcos does not
justify our ignoring or refusing to act on his claim to a basic right which is legally demandable and enforceable. For his own good, it
might be preferable to stay where he is. But he invokes a constitutional right. We have no power to deny it to him.

The issuance of a passport may be discretionary but it should not be withheld if to do so would run counter to a constitutional
guarantee. Besides, the petitioners are not asking for passports and nothing else. Any travel documents or any formal lifting of the
Marcos ban as would allow international airlines to sell them tickets would suffice.

With all due respect for the majority opinion, I disagree with its dictum on the right to travel. I do not think we should differentiate the
right to return home from the right to go abroad or to move around in the Philippines. If at all, the right to come home must be more
preferred than any other aspect of the right to travel. It was precisely the banning by Mr. Marcos of the right to travel by Senators
Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores of other "undesirables" and "threats to national security" during that unfortunate
period which led the framers of our present Constitution not only to re-enact but to strengthen the declaration of this right. Media
often asks, "what else is new?" I submit that we now have a freedom loving and humane regime. I regret that the Court's decision in
this case sets back the gains that our country has achieved in terms of human rights, especially human rights for those whom we do
not like or those who are against us.

The respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Raul S. Manglapus has disclosed a list of former dictators who were barred by their
successors from returning to their respective countries. There is no showing that the countries involved have constitutions which
guarantee the liberty of abode and the freedom to travel and that despite such constitutional protections, the courts have validated
the "ban a return" policy. Neither is it shown that the successors of the listed dictators are as deeply committed to democratic
principles and as observant of constitutional protections as President Aquino.

It is indeed regrettable that some followers of the former President are conducting a campaign to sow discord and to divide the
nation. Opposition to the government no matter how odious or disgusting is, however, insufficient ground to ignore a constitutional
guarantee.

During the protracted deliberations on this case, the question was asked is the Government helpless to defend itself against a threat
to national security? Does the President have to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law? Can she
not take less drastic measures?
Of course, the Government can act. It can have Mr. Marcos arrested and tried in court. The Government has more than ample
powers under eixisting law to deal with a person who transgresses the peace and imperils public safety. But the denial of travel
papers is not one of those powers because the Bill of Rights says so. There is no law prescribing exile in a foreign land as the
penalty for hurting the Nation.

Considering all the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

It is my belief that the petitioner, as a citizen of the Philippines, is entitled to return to and live-and die-in his own country. I say this
with a heavy heart but say it nonetheless. That conviction is not diminished one whit simply because many believe Marcos to be
beneath contempt and undeserving of the very liberties he flounted when he was the absolute ruler of this land.

The right of the United States government to detain him is not the question before us, nor can we resolve it. The question we must
answer is whether or not, assuming that Marcos is permitted to leave Hawaii (which may depend on the action we take today), the
respondents have acted with grave abuse of discretion in barring him from his own country.

My reluctant conclusion is that they have, absent the proof they said they were prepared to offer, but could not, that the petitioner's
return would prejudice the security of the State.

I was the one who, in the open hearing held on June 27,1989, asked the Solicitor General if the government was prepared to prove
the justification for opposing the herein petition, i. that it had not acted arbitrarily. He said it was. Accordingly, the Court, appreciating
the classified nature of the information expected, scheduled a closed-door hearing on July 25,1988. The Solicitor General and three
representatives from the military appeared for the respondents, together with former Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, representing the
petitioners.

In about two hours of briefing, the government failed dismally to show that the return of Marcos dead or alive would pose a threat to
the national security as it had alleged. The fears expressed by its representatives were based on mere conjectures of political and
economic destabilization without any single piece of concrete evidence to back up their apprehensions.

Amazingly, however, the majority has come to the conclusion that there exist "factual bases for the President's decision" to bar
Marcos's return. That is not my recollection of the impressions of the Court after that hearing.

In holding that the President of the Philippines has residual powers in addition to the specific powers granted by the Constitution, the
Court is taking a great leap backward and reinstating the discredited doctrine announced in Planas v. Gil (67 Phil. 62). This does not
square with the announced policy of the Constitutional Commission, which was precisely to limit rather than expand presidential
powers, as a reaction to the excesses of the past dictatorship.

I can only repeat Justice Black's wry observation in the Steel Seizure Case (343 U.S. 579) that if it was true that the President had
been granted the totality of executive power, "it is difficult to see why our forefathers bothered to add several specific items,
including some trifling ones, . . . I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power but
regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated."

I have no illusion that the stand I am taking will be met with paeans of praise, considering that Marcos is perhaps the most detested
man in the entire history of our country. But we are not concerned here with popularity and personalities. As a judge, I am not
swayed by what Justice Cardozo called the "hooting throng" that may make us see things through the prisms of prejudice. I bear in
mind that when I sit in judgment as a member of this Court, I must cast all personal feelings aside.

The issue before us must be resolved with total objectivity, on the basis only of the established facts and the applicable law and not
of wounds that still fester and scars that have not healed. And not even of fear, for fear is a phantom. That phantom did not rise
when the people stood fast at EDSA against the threat of total massacre in defense at last of their freedom.

I cannot turn back on the lessons of liberty that I taught for more than three decades as a professor of Constitutional Law. These
principles have not changed simply because I am now on the Court or a new administration is in power and the shoe is on the other
foot.

Like the martyred Ninoy Aquino who also wanted to come back to the Philippines against the prohibitions of the government then,
Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and the liberty of abode that his adversary invoked. These rights are guaranteed by the
Constitution to all individuals, including the patriot and the homesick and the prodigal son returning, and tyrants and charlatans and
scoundrels of every stripe.

I vote to grant the petition.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

I dissent. Already, some people refer to us as a nation without discipline. Are we ready to be also called a society without
compassion?

The issue as to whether or not former President Ferdinand E. Marcos should be allowed to return to the Philippines may be resolved
by answering two simple questions: Does he have the right to return to his own country and should national safety and security deny
him this right?

There is no dispute that the former President is still a Filipino citizen and both under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, he has the right to return to his own country except only if prevented by the demands of
national safety and national security.

Our Armed Forces have failed to prove this danger. They are bereft of hard evidence, and all they can rely on is sheer speculation.
True, there is some danger but there is no showing as to the extent.

It is incredible that one man alone together with his family, who had been ousted from this country by popular will, can arouse an
entire country to rise in morbid sympathy for the cause he once espoused.

It is therefore clear to me, all other opinions to the contrary notwithstanding, that the former President should be allowed to return to
our country under the conditions that he and the members of his family be under house arrest in his hometown in Ilocos Norte, and
should President Marcos or any member of his family die, the body should not be taken out of the municipality of confinement and
should be buried within ten (10) days from date.

If we do this, our country shall have maintained its regard for fundamental human rights, for national discipline, and for human
compassion.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I dissent. As I see it, the core issue in this case is, which right will prevail in the conflict between the right of a Filipino, Ferdinand E.
Marcos, to return to the Philippines, and the right of the Philippine Government to bar such return in the interest of national security
and public safety. In this context, the issue is clearly justiciable involving, as it does, colliding assertions of individual right and
governmental power. Issues of this nature more than explain why the 1986 Constitutional Commission, led by the illustrious former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, incorporated in the 1987 Constitution, the new provision on the power of Judicial Review, viz:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2; (Emphasis supplied)

Mr. Marcos invokes in his favor the specific and precise constitutional right of every Filipino to travel which, in the language of the
Constitution, shall not be impaired "except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law" (Art. III, Sec. 6). That the right to travel comprises the right to travel within the country, to travel out of the country and to return
to the country (Philippines), is hardly disputable. Short of all such components, the right to travel is meaningless. The real question
arises in the interpretation of the qualifications attached by the Constitution to such right to travel.

Petitioners contend that, in the absence of restricting legislation, the right to travel is absolute. I do not agree. It is my view that, with
or without restricting legislation, the interest of national security, public safety or public health can justify and even require
restrictions on the right to travel, and that the clause "as may be provided by law" contained in Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution merely declares a constitutional leave or permission for Congress to enact laws that may restrict the right to travel in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health. I do not, therefore, accept the petitioners' submission that, in the absence
of enabling legislation, the Philippine Government is powerless to restrict travel even when such restriction is demanded by national
security, public safety or public health, The power of the State, in particular cases, to restrict travel of its citizens finds abundant
support in the police power of the state wich may be exercised to preserve and maintain government as well as promote the general
welfare of the greatest number of people.

And yet, the power of the State, acting through a government in authority at any given time, to restrict travel, even if founded on
police power, cannot be absolute and unlimited under all circumstances, much less, can it be arbitrary and irrational.

Mr. Marcos, I repeat, comes before the Court as a Filipino, invoking a specific constitutional right, i.e., the right to return to the
country. 1 Have the respondents presented sufficient evidence to offset or override the exercise of this right
invoked by Mr. Marcos? Stated differently, have the respondents shown to the Court sufficient factual
bases and data which would justify their reliance on national security and public safety in negating the
right to return invoked by Mr. Marcos?

I have given these questions a searching examination. I have carefully weighed and assessed the "briefing" given the Court by the
highest military authorities of the land last 28 July 1989. 1 have searched, but in vain, for convincing evidence that would defeat and
overcome the right of Mr. Marcos as a Filipino to return to this country. It appears to me that the apprehensions entertained and
expressed by the respondents, including those conveyed through the military, do not, with all due respect, escalate to proportions of
national security or public safety. They appear to be more speculative than real, obsessive rather than factual. Moreover, such
apprehensions even if translated into realities, would be "under control," as admitted to the Court by said military authorities, given
the resources and facilities at the command of government. But, above all, the Filipino people themselves, in my opinion, will know
how to handle any situation brought about by a political recognition of Mr. Marcos' right to return, and his actual return, to this
country. The Court, in short, should not accept respondents' general apprehensions, concerns and perceptions at face value, in the
light of a countervailing and even irresistible, specific, clear, demandable, and enforceable right asserted by a Filipino.

Deteriorating political, social, economic or exceptional conditions, if any, are not to be used as a pretext to justify derogation of
human rights. 2

As a member of the United Nations, the Philippines has obligations under its charter. By adopting the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, (Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution), the Philippine government cannot just pay lip
service to Art. 13, par. 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which provides that everyone has the right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to his country. This guarantee is reiterated in Art. XII, par. 2 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights which states that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country." (Emphasis
supplied) "Arbitrary" or "arbitrarily" was specifically chosen by the drafters of the Covenant 3 hoping to protect an individual
against unexpected, irresponsible or excessive encroachment on his rights by the state based on national
traditions or a particular sense of justice which falls short of international law or standards. 4

The Solicitor General maintains that because the respondents, as alter egos of the President, have raised the argument of "national
security" and "public safety," it is the duty of this Court to unquestioningly yield thereto, thus casting the controversy to the realm of a
political question. I do not agree. I believe that it is one case where the human and constitutional light invoked by one party is so
specific, substantial and clear that it cannot be overshadowed, much less, nullified by simplistic generalities; worse, the Court
neglects its duty under the Constitution when it allows the theory of political question to serve as a convenient, and yet, lame excuse
for evading what, to me, is its clearly pressing and demandable duty to the Constitution.

During the oral arguments in this case, I asked the Solicitor General how one could validly defend the right of former Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., a Filipino, to return to the Philippines in 1983 and, at the same time, credibly deny the right of Mr. Marcos,
also a Filipino, to return to the Philippines in 1989. I still have not found a satisfactory answer to that question. Instead, it has
become clearer by the day that the drama today is the same drama in 1983 with the only difference that the actors are in opposite
roles, which really makes one hope, in the national interest, that the mistake in 1983 should not be made to persist in 1989.

To one who owes Mr. Marcos, his wife and followers absolutely nothing, personal, political or otherwise, the following are the cogent
and decisive propositions in this case-

1. Mr. Marcos is a Filipino and, as such, entitled to return to die and be buried in this country;

2. respondents have not shown any "hard evidence" or con- vincing proof why his right as a Filipino to return
should be denied him. All we have are general conclusions of "national security" and "public safety" in
avoidance of a specific demandable and enforceable constitutional and basic human right to return;

3. the issue of Marcos' return to the Philippines, perhaps more than any issue today, requires of all members of
the Court, in what appears to be an extended political contest, the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." It is
only thus that we fortify the independence of this Court, with fidelity, not to any person, party or group but to the
Constitution and only to the Constitution.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition.

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:

I vote to grant the petition.

The only issue that saddles the Court is simply: "whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines." 1 I therefore take exception to allusions 2 anent
"the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar." 3 I have legitimate reason to fear that my
brethren, in passing judgment on the Marcoses (insofar as their "capacity to stir trouble" is concerned),
have overstepped the bounds of judicial restraint, or even worse, convicted them without trial.

I also find quite strained what the majority would have as the "real issues" facing the Court: "The right to return to one's country,"
pitted against "the right of travel and freedom of abode", and their supposed distinctions under international law, as if such
distinctions, under international law in truth and in fact exist. There is only one right involved here, whether under municipal or
international law: the light of travel, whether within one's own country, or to another, and the right to return thereto. The Constitution
itself makes no distinctions; let then, no one make a distinction. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemus.

As the majority would indeed have it, the issue is one of power: Does the Executive have the power to deny a citizen his right to
travel (back to the country or to another)? It is a question that, in essence, involves the application, and no more, of the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution:

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. 4

The majority says, with ample help from American precedents, that the President is possessed of the power, thus:

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific
powers so enumerated. 5

So also:

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the
President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision.
More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in
mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people
have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the
Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become
rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1 . ] 6

And finally:

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the
exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To
paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not
forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demanded [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It
is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a
power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [See Hyman, The
American President, where the author advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is
unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President]. 7

I am not persuaded.

First: While the Chief Executive exercises powers not found expressly in the Charter, but has them by constitutional implication* the
latter must yield to the paramountcy of the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando: "A regime of constitutionalism is thus unthinkable
without an assurance of the primacy of a big of rights. Precisely a constitution exists to assure that in the discharge of the
governmental functions, the dignity that is the birthright of every human being is duly safeguarded. To be true to its primordial aim a
constitution must lay down the boundaries beyond which he's forbidden territory for state action" 8

My brethren have not demonstrated, to my satisfaction, how the President may override the direct mandate of the fundamental law.
It will not suffice, so I submit, to say that the President's plenitude of powers, as provided in the Constitution, or by sheer
constitutional implication, prevail over express constitutional commands. "Clearly," so I borrow J.B.L. Reyes, in Ms own right, a titan
in the field of public law, "this argument ... rests ... not upon the text of the (Constitution] ... but upon a mere inference
therefrom." 9 For if it were, indeed, the intent of the Charter to create an exception, that is, by Presidential
action, to the right of travel or liberty of abode and of changing the same other than what it explicitly says
already ("limits prescribed by law" 10 or "upon lawful order of the court" 11 the Charter could have
specifically declared so. As it is, the lone deterrents to the right in question are: (1) decree of statute, or
(2) lawful judicial mandate. Had the Constitution intended a third exception, that is, by Presidential
initiative, it could have so averred. It would also have made the Constitution, as far as limits to the said
right are concerned, come full circle: Limits by legislative, judicial, and executive processes.

Obviously, none of the twin legal bars exist. There is no law banning the Marcoses from the country; neither is there any court
decree banishing him from Philippine territory.

It is to be noted that under the 1973 Constitution, the right to travel is worded as follows:

Sec. 5. The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when
necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health. 12

Under this provision, the right may be abated: (1) upon a lawful court order, or (2) "when necessary in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health. 13 Arguably, the provision enabled the Chief Executive (Marcos) to
moderate movement of citizens, which, Bernas says, justified such practices as "hamletting", forced
relocations, or the establishment of free-fire zones. 14

The new Constitution, however, so it clearly appears, has divested the Executive's implied power. And, as it so appears, the right
may be impaired only "within the limits provided by law . 15 The President is out of the picture.

16 and foreign affairs; 17the Bill of

Admittedly, the Chief Executive is the "sole" judge of all matters affecting national security
Rights precisely, a form of check against excesses of officialdom is, in this case, a formidable barrier
against Presidential action. (Even on matters of State security, this Constitution prescribes limits to
Executive's powers as Commander-in-Chief.)

Second: Assuming, ex hypothesis that the President may legally act, the question that emerges is: Has it been proved that Marcos,
or his return, will, in fact, interpose a threat to the national security , public safety, or public health?" What appears in the records are
vehement insistences that Marcos does pose a threat to the national good and yet, at the same time, we have persistent claims,
made by the military top brass during the lengthy closed-door hearing on July 25, 1989, that "this Government will not fall" should
the former first family in exile step on Philippine soil. which is which?

At any rate, it is my opinion that we can not leave that determination solely to the Chief Executive. The Court itself must be content
that the threat is not only clear, but more so, present. 18

19 is an obligation open to no doubt.

That the President "has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people ... "
But the question, and so I ask again and again, is: From whom? If we say "from Marcos," we unravel
chinks in our political armor. It also flies in the face of claims, so confidently asserted, that "this
Government will not fall" even if we allowed Marcos to return.

It flies, finally, in the face of the fact that a good number of the henchmen trusted allies, implementors of martial law, and pathetic
parasites of the ex-first couple are, in fact, in the Government, in the comfort of its offices, and or at the helm of its key agencies. Let
us not, therefore, joke ourselves of moral factors warranting the continued banishment of Marcos. Morality is the last refuge of the
self-righteous.

As I indicated, not one

Third: The problem is not of balancing the general welfare against the exercise of individual liberties. 20

shred of evidence, let alone solid evidence, other than surmises of possibilities, has been shown to justify
the 'balancing act" referred to. Worse, these conjectures contradict contentions that as far as Philippine
society is concerned, Marcos is "history".

The power of the President, so my brethren declaim, "calls for the exercise of the President's power as protector of peace. 21
This is the self-same falsehood Marcos foisted on the Filipino people to justify the authoritarian rule. It also means that we are no
better than he has.

That "[t]he power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of
emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence" 22 is a bigger fantasy: It not only
summons the martial law decisions of pre-"EDSA" (especially with respect to the detestable Amendment
No. 6), it is inconsistent with the express provisions of the commander-in-chief clause of the 1987
Charter, a Charter that has perceptibly reduced the Executive's powers vis-a-vis its 1973 counterpart. 23

II.

The undersigned would be lacking in candor to conceal his dislike, to say the least, for Marcos. Because of Marcos, the writer of it's
dissent lost a son His son's only "offense" was that he openly and unabatedly criticized the dictator, his associates, and his military
machinery. He would pay dearly for it; he was arrested and detained, without judicial warrant or decision, for seven months and
seven days. He was held incommunicado a greater part of the time, in the military stockade of Camp Crame. In his last week in
detention, he was, grudgingly, hospitalized (prison hospital) and confined for chronic asthma. The deplorable conditions of his
imprisonment exacerbated his delicate health beyond cure. He died, on November 11, 1977, a martyr on the altar of the martial law
apparatus.

The undersigned also counts himself as one of the victims of Marcos' ruthless apparatchiki. On August 14, 1979, he was, along with
former President Diosdado Macapagal, and Congressmen Rogaciano Mercado and Manuel Concordia, charged, "ASSOed"and
placed under house arrest, for "inciting to sedition" and "rumor mongering " 24in the midst of the distribution of Ang
Demokrasya Sa Pilipinas (Democracy In the Philippines), a book extremely critical of martial rule,
published by him and former Congressman Concordia, authored by President Macapagal and translated
into Tagalog by Congressman Rogaciano Mercado. In addition, they were also all accused of libel in
more than two dozens of criminal complaints filed by the several military officers named in the
"condemned" book as having violated the human rights of dissenters, and for other crimes, in the office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. It had to take the events at "EDSA" to set them free from house arrest and
these political offenses. I am for Marcos' return not because I have a score to settle with him. Ditto's death
or my arrest are scores that can not be settled.

I feel the ex-President's death abroad (presented in the dailies as 'imminent") would leave him 'unpunished for Ms crimes to country
and countrymen. If punishment is due, let this leadership inflict it. But let him stand trial and accord him due process.

Modesty aside, I have staunchly and consistently advocated the human right of travel and movement and the liberty of abode. 25
We would have betrayed our own Ideals if we denied Marcos his rights. It is his constitutional right, a right that can not be abridged
by personal hatred, fear, founded or unfounded, and by speculations of the "man's "capacity" "to stir trouble" Now that the shoe is
on the other foot, let no more of human rights violations be repeated against any one, friend or foe. In a democratic framwork, there
is no this as getting even.

The majority started this inquiry on the question of power. I hold that the President, under the present Constitution and existing laws,
does not have it. Mandamus, I submit, lies.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Grio- Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

** The Philippine presidency under the 1935 Constitution was patterned in large measure after the American
presidency. But at the outset, it must be pointed out that the Philippine government established under the
constitutions of 1935, 1973 and 1987 is a unitary government with general powers unlike that of the United
States which is a federal government with limited and enumerated powers. Even so, the powers of the president
of the United States have through the years grown, developed and taken shape as students of that presidency
have demonstrated.

FERNAN, C. J.:
1 From the speech "Restrictions on Human Rights-States of Emergency, National Security, Public Safety and
Public Order" delivered at the Lawasia Seminar on Human Rights, Today and Tomorrow: The Role of Human
Rights Commissions and Other Organs, at the Manila Hotel on August 27, 1988.

CRUZ, J.

1 In addition, he invokes the right as a basic human right recognized by the Universal Declaration ration of
Human Rights. ni

2 S.P. Marks, Principles and Norms of Human Rights Applicable in Emergency Situations: Under development,
Catastrophies and Armed Conflicts, The International Dimensions of Human Rights, Vol. 1 Unesco, 1982, pp.
175-204.

3 P. Hassan, The Word "Arbitrary" as used in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Illegal or Unjust", 10
Harv Int. L.J., p. 225 (1969). 4 FC Newman and IC Vasak Civil and Political Rights, The International
Dimensions of Human Rights, pp. 135-166.

4 F.C. Newman and K.Vasak and Poitical Rights, The International Dimensions of Human Rights, pp. 135-
166.5as to whether the U.S. Federal Government will allow Mr. Marcos to leave the United States, is beyond
the issues in this case; similarly, as to how the Philippine government should deal with Mr. Marcos upon his
return is also outside of the issues in this case.

5 As to whether the U.S. Federal Government will allow Mr. Marcos to leave the United States, is beyond the
issues in this case; similarly, as to how the Philippine Government should deal with Mr. Marcos upon his return
is also outside of the issues in this case.

SARMIENTO, J.:

1 Decision, 4.

2 See supra, 1-4.

3 Supra, 2.

4 CONST., art. Ill, see. 6.

5 Decision, supra, 18; emphasis in the original.

6 Supra, 20-21.

7 Supra, 21-22.

* But see Cruz, J., Dissenting.

8 FERNANDO, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 4 (1972 ed.).

9 Republic v. Quasha, No L-30299, Aug. 17, 1972, 46 SCRA 160,169.

10 CONST., supra.

11 Supra.

12 CONST. (1973), art. IV, sec. 5.

13 Supra.

14 See BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 263 (1987 ED.)
 15 CONST. (1987), art III, sec. 6, supra.

16 See Supra ,Aart VII, sec 18.

17 See Go Tek v. Deportation Board , No. L-23846, September 9, 1977, 79 scra 17.

18 See Lansang v. Garcia, Nos. L-33964, 33965, 33973, 33982, 34004, 34013, 34039, 34265, and 34339,
December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448, 480.

19 Decision, supra, 21.

20 Supra.

21 Supra.

22 Supra, 22.

23 Abraham ("Ditto") Sarmiento, Jr., then Editor-in-Chief, Philippine Collegian (1975-1976), official student
organ of the University of the philippines. He was detained in the military stockade for commoncriminals from
Jan. to Aug, 1976.

24 SPI No. 79-347 ("For: Violation of Presidential Decree No. 90 and Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended the JG.R. No. 54180, Diosdado Macapagal, Rogaciano M. Mercado, Manuel A. Concordia, and
Abraham F. Sarmiento, Petitioners, vs- The Preliminary Investigating Panel in SPI No. 79-347 [Hamilton B.
Dimaya Brigadier General, AFP, The Judge Advocate General, Chairman; Leon 0. Ridao Colonel, JAGS GSC
Deputy Judge Advocate General, Member; and Amor B. Felipe, Colonel, JAGS (GSC) Executive Officer,
Member], and the Minister of National Defense, Respondent Supreme Court.

25 See Santos v. The Special Commottee on Travel, et al., G.R. No. L-45748, June 28, 1977, of which the
undersigned was the counsel of the petitioner.

G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989

FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about
to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar
their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase,
however, does not define what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such
as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making
power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
Marcos v Manglapus
GR No. 88211 September 15, 1989

CORTES, J:

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

FACTS:
(1) This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus to order respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos
and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their
return to the Philippines. This is in response to Marcoss wish to return to the Philippines to die. The petitioners
case is founded on the following provisions in the Bill of Rights:
Section 1.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

And other contentions including:

President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do
so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so.
the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be
legislation to that effect.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law,
are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

(2) The respondents contend primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights, citing
Article II

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call
upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion
of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

and the decision of other countries to ban deposed dictators like Cuba (Fulgencio Batista), etc.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines
(2) Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

HELD:
Petition dismissed. President did not act with abuse of discretion in determining the return of former President
Marcos and his family at the present time since it poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare.

RATIO:
(1) Even from afar, the Marcoses had the capacity to stir trouble to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their
followers.
(2) Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international
law, independent from although related to the right to travel.
(3) "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important measure on who is
President." (Corwin) Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers
so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative
nor judicial has to be executive.
(4) The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve
and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy." The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare
of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

(5) Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of
the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the
Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.