Port of PT Lisas Risk Assessment

POINT LISAS PORT DEVELOPMENT RISK
ASSESSMENT
Prepared for:
Rapid Environmental Assessment Limited
Prepared by:
SENES Consultants Limited

121 Granton Drive, Unit 12
Richmond Hill, Ontario
L4B 3N4
February 2009
Printed on Recycled Paper Containing Post-Consumer Fibre

Point Lisas Port Development Risk Assessment
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
1.0 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1

1.1 Background ..............................................................................................................1
1.2 Objectives ................................................................................................................1
1.3 Scope of the Study ...................................................................................................2
2.0 THE PROPOSED FACILITY .............................................................................................5
2.1 Study Area ...............................................................................................................5
2.2 Process Description ..................................................................................................7
2.2.1 Capital and Maintenance Dredging .............................................................7
2.2.2 Construction Phase.......................................................................................9
2.2.3 Operation phase ...........................................................................................9
3.0 PROCESS OF FACILITY RISK ASSESSMENT ............................................................13
3.1 Screening Level Hazard Assessment Process ........................................................13
3.2 The Facility Risk Management (FRM) Process.....................................................13
3.3 Frequency...............................................................................................................14
3.4 Qualitative Severity Ranking .................................................................................14
3.5 Risk Ranking Process ............................................................................................15
4.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................17
4.1 Sources of Hazards ................................................................................................17
4.2 Identification of Hazard Scenarios.........................................................................18
4.3 Hazard Scenario 1 Conventional Marine Hazards ..............................................19
4.4 Hazard Scenario 2 Fuel Release .........................................................................20
4.5 Hazard Scenario 3 Heavy Equipment Malfunction ............................................22
4.6 Hazard Scenario 4 Road Traffic Accidents .........................................................22
4.7 Hazard Scenario 5 - Release of Small Amount of Flammable Liquid ..................23
4.8 Hazard Scenario 6 - Major Release of Flammable Liquid ....................................25
4.9 Natural Hazards .....................................................................................................25
4.10 Risk Ranking..........................................................................................................26
4.11 Hazard Zone ...........................................................................................................27
5.0 SAFETY MEASURES AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT .....................................29
6.0 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................33
34870 - February 2009 i SENES Consultants Limited

LIST OF TABLES
Page No.
2.1 Westlake Container Shipments ..........................................................................................11
3.1 Frequency Ranking Definition...........................................................................................14

3.2 Consequence Ranking Definition ......................................................................................15
4.1 Potential Hazard Scenarios for Docking and Capital and Maintenance Dredging ............18
4.2 Results of Thermal Radiation Hazard from a Pool Fire ....................................................21
4.3 Risk Ranking of Potential Hazard Scenarios .....................................................................27
4.4 Affected Areas (Hazard Zone) for Identified Hazard Areas ..............................................27
LIST OF FIGURES
Page No.
2.1 Proposed Project Layout ......................................................................................................6
2.2 Schematic Design of a Cutter Suction Dredger ...................................................................8
2.3 Grab Dredger .......................................................................................................................8
3.1 A Typical Risk Ranking Matrix.........................................................................................16
34870 - February 2009 ii SENES Consultants Limited

1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
The Government of Trinidad and Tobago has mandated the National Energy Corporation of
Trinidad and Tobago Limited (NEC) to establish a port at Point Lisas South and East. The NEC
has applied to the Environmental Management Authority (EMA) for a Certificate of
Environmental Clearance (CEC) for:
Capital and maintenance dredging operation to create navigational channel and turning
basin
Construction of docking facilities for cargo vessels
Reclamation for access corridor and materials handling and storage area
This general area on the west coast of Central Trinidad serves as the Point Lisas Indsutrial Estate
which accommodates petrochemical plants responsible for the processing of natural gas, steel
plants, Chlor-Alkali plant, medium sized manufactures and small service companies which
provide support services.
1.2 OBJECTIVES
The objective of this study is to conduct a Risk Assessment to assess the impact of abnormal
conditions of the operation on the health and safety of the operation, employees and member of
the public arising from the proposed establishment of the port facilities at Point Lisas. This
assessment will qualify and partially quantify the risk of occurrence of potential major and
moderate hazards, other than normal operation, related to the following items:
Fire and explosion hazard;

Marine-based traffic accidentals;
Hazards associated with the use of heavy equipment;
Traffic accidents on land;
Fuel/chemical spills and leaks;
Gaseous emissions;
Natural hazards and disasters.
The report will also include a plan for the management (minimization) through prevention and
mitigation.
34870 - February 2009 1 SENES Consultants Limited

1.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The scope of the study was defined based on the objectives mentioned above and the Hazard
and Risk Assessment section of the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) of the proposed project.
The study set up the credible hazard scenarios with potentially moderate to major impacts or
consequences. The analysis of risk included the evaluation of the frequency of occurrence and
severity of the consequences of the hazard scenarios considered. The results of the analysis
included the quantitative identification of the zone of influence/concern where the impact of the
hazard approached the surrounding environment.
More specifically, the scope of the study included
- Dredging operation
- Marine-based traffic activities;
- Land traffic along the causeway;
- Handling and transport of materials
- Mooring facilities
- Use of heavy equipment;
- Natural hazards
This study included a hazard identification exercise that was conducted and documented to
identify the nature and scale of all hazards during the operation of the proposed facility. The
hazard identification was based on the consideration of the following initiating events:
external factors;
human error;
equipment failure; and
natural hazards.
1. This included the impact on the facility of any natural events such as storms,
earthquakes or local flooding. Any determined impact on the facility was also
extended to determine the resultant impact on the surrounding area and/or
community.
2. A set of credible incident scenarios was selected.
3. For those hazard scenarios with potential off-site impact, estimation of potential
hazards was through consequence analysis. The analysis of hazards has quantitative
dimensions with respect to their probable frequency of occurrence and the severity of
the consequences given the occurrence of an event.

4. A risk matrix was prepared which would rank the hazardous events accordingly.
5. An evaluation of the frequency of occurrence of each scenario with the potential off-
site impact was conducted in order to calculate the level of risk in surrounding areas
due to the presence of the proposed facility.
The study also included the formulation of the Health and Safety Management and Emergency
Response Plan, and the additional measures that can be taken to assist in managing safety.


2.0 THE PROPOSED FACILITY
2.1 STUDY AREA
Figure 2.1 shows the overall layout of the proposed development of the port including the dock
and material handling facilities, access and utility corridor, and proposed access channel and
turning basin.
The location of the proposed project is Pt. Lisas South and East Industrial Port, bounded:
on the north by the existing Point Lisas Harbour, Savonetta Channel, and Phoenix Park
Gas Processors Limited
to the South by the Claxton Bay Channel
to the east by the Couva coastline (Mangrove coastline and Southern Main Road)
to the west by the open Sea (Gulf of Paria)
The port location is relatively protected, has stable shorelines and is 935m from the southwest
extremity of the ESSAR site. The port location was selected such that the cost for dredging
which increases closer to shore due to shallower water and the cost for construction of the port
which increases in deeper water is optimum allowing the inter-tidal coastal zone to facilitate
mangroves and circulation with tidal flushing during high and low tides.
The population centres at the vicinity of the propose port facilities are:
Town of Couva
Savonetta Homes
Pranz Gardens
Claxton Bay

FIGURE 2.1
PROPOSED PROJECT LAYOUT

2.2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION
2.2.1 Capital and Maintenance Dredging
The proposed dredging incorporates capital dredging to construct the approach channel and
turning basin. Capital dredging will be undertaken by Boskalis Westminster Overseas.
Maintenance dredging will be required during the normal routing operational phase of the
PLSEIP and this will be undertaken on an as required basis.
For the purposes of evaluating capital dredging requirements for the ports access channel and
turning basin, the governing design vessel characteristics is Panamax vessel, approximately
60,000 DWT with the following dimensions:
LOA = 210m (690ft)

Beam = 34m (111.6ft)
Draft = 12.7m (41.7.ft)
Using methodology advised by the International Navigation Association (PIANC) and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, a design width for the channel and a design depth for the channel and
basin of 135 m and 12.8 m were determined, respectively. The turning basin diameter of 450 m
was also determined. For these access channel and turning basin dimensions, the expected
dredge volume was estimated at 4,000,000 m2 to create a navigation channel and turning basin.
The dredging material type comprises soft to medium clays with some sand.
Maintenance dredging of the approach channel, turning basin and berths will be required over
the life of the project. It is estimated that 300,000 m2 of material will need to be dredged out of
these areas every three years in order to maintain the initial dredge depths. These dredge
materials will be disposed in offshore aquatic dump.
The location of the dredge spoils disposal site requires the dredge material to be transported with
barges as delivery by pumping is not practical. As a result all dredging, capital and future
maintenance, will be done by a TSHD (for approach channel and turning basin) and a Clamp
Shell and Barge Grab Dredger (for area adjacent to Quay Wall). Figure 2.2 shows the typical
configuration of a TSHD and Figure 2.3 shows the typical Clamp Shell and Barge Dredger.

FIGURE 2.2
SCHEMATIC DESIGN OF A TRAILING SUCTION HOPPER DREDGER
FIGURE 2.3
GRAB DREDGER

Prior to the dredging works, a pre-dredge survey will be undertaken in order to establish the
actual depths and the total volumes to be dredged. During the works, intermediate surveys will
be performed in order to closely monitor the production and progress of the dredging works. At
the completion of the works, a post-dredge survey will be conducted in order to determine the
final payable quantities and to confirm that the dredging has been executed to the required
specifications.
Waste resulting from dredging operations will be disposed of at the designated offshore dumping
site. These criteria include a Total Petroleum Hydrocarbon (TPH) content of less than 1%, trace
metal content of 10 mg/kg or less and 100 g/kg or less for lead, cadmium and mercury.
2.2.2 Construction Phase
During the construction phase, power will be produced directly on site via electric generators.
The materials stored on site are typical of construction materials such as cement, sand, and
concrete.
2.2.3 Operation phase
The port primarily supports the throughput from investors in heavy gas based downstream
industries to be sited on the PLSEIE. A materials-handling and storage area 700m long and 116m
wide is constructed using land fill. The apron is 20m wide measured from the quay wall. The
materials handling and storage area is improved with wick drains and stone columns.
The port development master plan recommends the construction of a total of three berths. Berths
one and two will be developed to handle Essars inbound and outbound cargo requirements.
Berth three will be a multi-user berth for use primarily by other tenants at the industrial estate.
The berth service options are envisaged as follows:
Berth one can handle: Ship unloader; ship loader; and coil loader;
Berth two can handle: Ship loader or coil loader; and
Berth three: Coil loader only.
The amounts of imports/exports by Essar Steel plant are as follows:

Import
Iron ore: 5,040,000 tonnes per annum TPA
Bentonite: 36,000 TPA
Petroleum Coke: 59,000 TPA
Limestone: 450,000 TPA
Dolomite: 120,000 TPA

Export
HRC: 3,000,000 TPA
HBI: 3,600,000 TPA (until steel plant commissioning, then occasionally as per available
stocks)
Oxide pellets: 4,500,000 TPA (for the first six months, then intermittently in line with
available stocks)
The total estimated throughput for the Essar facility is therefore in the region of 8.5 million
tonnes at start up for the first 6 months then reducing to approximately 8.5 million TPA at
normal operating run. This volume, however, could increase by approximately 15-20% in the
future due to production growth. Approximately 400 ship travels are expected to occur for Essar
Steel plant imports and exports.
The expected annual Westlake shipments at the liquid loading berth are:
Import
Butene-1: 24,000 TPA
Hexene-1: 16,000 TPA
Octene-1: 6,000 TPA
Cyclohexane: 3,500 TPA
Isobutane: 3,500 TPA
Isopentane: 1,500 TPA
polymer additives / stabilizers: 1,500 TPA
Catalyst cylinders / tanks (80 forty-foot containers)
Miscellaneous chemicals / parts / supplies (38 forty-foot containers)
Exports
Polyethylene pellets: 800,000 tonnes (to be exported in the previously empty containers)
Miscellaneous chemicals (50 twenty-foot containers);
80 forty-foot containers
40 C-1980 cylinders
250 ISO containers
Container shipments are planned at weekly intervals. Table 2.1 shows the planned annual
production, and average and maximum daily and weekly production.

TABLE 2.1
WESTLAKE CONTAINER SHIPMENTS
20-ft 40-ft
Description Total
Containers Containers
1
Annual production (mt) 480,000 320,000 800,000
Annual number of containers 30,000 12,800 42,800
Daily average no. of containers 83 36 119
Daily maximum no. of containers 100 43 143
Daily maximum no. of TEUs 100 86 186
Weekly average no. of containers 581 252 833
Weekly maximum no. of containers 700 301 1001
Weekly maximum no. of TEUs 700 602 1302
1
mt = metric tons (tonnes)
Six trucks will be required for the transfer of containers between the plant and the port on a daily
basis.
Adequate equipment, infrastructure, and provisions will be provided at Essar, liquid, and
container berths. In addition a container Lay-down area will be designed for 1,500 full 20-ft-
equivalent units (TEUs) and 1,500 empty TEUs, with complete separation of the empty and full
units. A diesel fuelling station with an above-ground bunded storage tank with a capacity of
19,000 litres will also be installed. Both container cranes will have their own diesel fuel tank
with a capacity of 7,500 litres each. Approximately 7,500 litres per day of fuel will also be
bunkered for vessels.
Access to the port will be provided by a straight corridor from the Essar site in the industrial
estate. A dedicated 35-m-wide corridor will provide sufficient space for a carriageway and
conveyor system. The length of access corridor is approximately 1 km. Materials will be
conveyed through conveyors, pipework, and trucking.


3.0 PROCESS OF FACILITY RISK ASSESSMENT
3.1 SCREENING LEVEL HAZARD ASSESSMENT PROCESS
In this preliminary risk analysis, it was considered appropriate to carry out a screening-level
hazard review of the project. As such, a screening-level hazard identification was carried out
using available information, in the absence of complete design documentation.
3.2 THE FACILITY RISK MANAGEMENT (FRM) PROCESS
In a general term, risk is defined as the multiplication of the frequency of occurrence and the
severity of the consequence of a hazardous event:
Risk = Frequency * Severity of the consequence
In 1985, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) established the Center for
Chemical Plant Safety (CCPS). CCPS was charged with the preparation of guidelines for hazard
evaluation procedures. The Guideline for Hazard Evaluation Procedures was published by
CCPS in 1985 and has become a primary reference tool for professionals in the hazards
assessment field.
The facility risk management approach is designed to provide a clear definition of the problems,
to screen out trivial issues and to provide a framework for quantifying and mitigating risks from
identified hazards. According to CCPS, the five basic steps in the study are as follows:
Hazard Identification: The identification of physical situations with the potential

for damaging humans, property or the environment, or a combination of these.
Excluded are acts of war and terrorism since the probability of these events is difficult
to quantify.
Frequency Analysis: The estimation of the frequency of occurrence of the hazard
occurring within a specific time period or in specified circumstances.
Consequence Analysis: The identification of the effects of a hazard on humans,
property or the environment.
Risk Estimation and Ranking: The estimation of the consequences of a hazard and
the frequency with which it is likely to occur (Risk = Consequence x Frequency of
Occurrence).
Risk Management: The development of risk mitigation and risk reduction plans for
unacceptable risks.

3.3 FREQUENCY
In this assessment, qualitative ranking of the frequency of occurrence of hazardous events was
used to define the likelihood. The frequency corresponding to each level of likelihood is specific
for each facility. The term likelihood is defined to determine if the occurrence of a hazard
scenario is credible. Table 3.1 provides the frequency associated with the various levels of
likelihood.
In general, it appears that the use of the term "credible" is assumed to be implicitly understood in
the context of the circumstance of its use. One general definition of the classifications of credible
scenarios is as follow:
Almost certain - the event is most likely to occur during the lifetime of the process or
operation (more than 95% for 20 years of lifetime).
Very probable - the event is more than likely to occur during the lifetime (70% to
95% for 20 years of lifetime).
Probable - the event is likely to occur during the lifetime (20% than 70% for 20 years
of lifetime).
Reasonably possible - the chance of occurrence is more than remote, but less than
likely during the lifetime (5% to 20% for 20 years of lifetime).
Remote - the chance of occurrence is slight during the lifetime (less than 5% for 20
years of lifetime).
TABLE 3.1
FREQUENCY RANKING DEFINITION
Likelihood
Ranking Likelihood Frequency
Index
5 Almost certain Possible to occur frequently (1/year)
4 Very probable Possible to occur occasionally (10-1/ year)
3 Probable Possible to occur under unusual circumstances (10-2/ year)
2 Reasonably possible Possible to occur over the lifetime of the plant (10-3 /year)
1 Remote Could occur however not likely over plant life (10-4 /year)
3.4 QUALITATIVE SEVERITY RANKING
The severity ranking was based on the magnitude of the consequences of hazard scenarios. The
consequence of each scenario includes several dimensions such as: human health, economics,

and plant operation. The magnitude of consequence which ranges from none (no measurable
consequence) to catastrophic is shown by a severity ranking index. Table 3.2 indicates an
example of severity ranking. The dollar numbers in this table is typical values based on our
judgement.
TABLE 3.2
CONSEQUENCE RANKING DEFINITION
Severity
Consequence
Ranking Note
Severity
Index
On-site/off-site fatality; >$25 million physical damage; process outage
5 Catastrophic >1 month; significant off-site consequence (property damage,
environmental impact, public health and safety)
On-site fatality; >$5 million physical damage; process outage >1
4 High
week, and < 1 month; off-site alert or response required
On-site reportable injury; reportable environmental release; $1000,000
3 Moderate
physical damage; process outage > 1 day and < 1 week
Below reportable environmental impact; <$100,000 damage; process
2 Low
outage 1 day
1 None No consequence to work safety, public health, or environment
3.5 RISK RANKING PROCESS
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the risk of a hazardous event has two aspects: 1- likelihood and 2-
severity of consequence. Risk tanking matrix is an easy and effective method of ranking the risk
of hazard scenarios. Likelihood and consequence ranking form two dimensions of the risk
ranking matrix. Figure 3.1 indicates the risk-ranking matrix used in this risk assessment. Using
this matrix, each hazard scenario is assigned a risk number. Subsequently, hazard scenarios can
be ranked based on their risk numbers. A hazard risk of 25 represents a very high risk that
requires immediate mitigation, and hazard risk of one represents an insignificant risk that
requires no specific mitigation.

FIGURE 3.1
A TYPICAL RISK RANKING MATRIX
H AZARD R ISK SCORE
Catastrophic 5 5 10 15 20 25
CONSEQUENCE RANKING
H AZARD R ISK SCORE

High 4 4 8 12 16 20
Moderate 3 3 6 9 12 15
Low 2 2 4 6 8 10
None 1 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
Very Probable
Reasonably
Probable
Possible
Remote
Certain
Almost
F REQUENCY R ANKING
A professional judgement should be used to identify the high-risk events in the above risk matrix
which require some level of risk management measure to either reduce the likelihood of the
event or reduce the severity of the consequences of event or both.

4.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS
4.1 SOURCES OF HAZARDS
In order to support the postulation of hazard scenarios, historic accidents associated with
dredging operation has been studied. The United States Army Corp of Engineers (USACE)
reported seven serious accidents on contractor and USACE marine dredging operations in 2005.
These accidents involved 3 fatalities, 2 disabling injuries, and 2 major property damages.
Two of the fatalities were related to drowning and one was related to vessel overturn. Both
injuries were related to the equipment malfunction during the dredging operation. In one
accident, an engine room fire was initiated by ignition of fuel mist and explosion of crankcase.
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) reported that from 1993 through 2002 there
have been thirteen fatal accidents associated with dredging in the mining industry. The cause of
death in twelve of these accidents was drowning. The real tragedy in these accidents is eleven of
these drowning victims were not wearing life vests or any Personal Flotation Devices (PFD's).
Storage and handling of flammable materials are subject to many rules including NFPA and
TDG regulations. The focus of the rules is the control of emission of vapours from storage and
from handling and makes the operations safer.
No major hazard was found for the iron ore transport, except small volume spills from belt
conveyors. Provisions are in place to collect and clean up the spills immediately.
The main concern with loading/unloading of flammable chemicals is the storage and
transportation tank overflow and spill of liquid chemicals. Truck transportation of liquid
chemicals may involve accidents resulting in spills, while major releases from pipes and piping
components and pumps will results in liquid chemical releases.
A review of the process description and the historic accident indicates that the major sources of
hazard in the dredging operation are:
The hazardous working environment;

Traffic of large marine vessels;
Heavy equipment including ship un-loader, ship loader, bridge crane, mobile harbour
cranes, loading arms, forklift trucks.
Large amount of fuel on board and at the site
Loading/ unloading, handling, and transport of flammable liquids

Mooring activities are similar to mooring activities in typical industrial ports. All rules and
regulations applicable to mooring activities will be complied. No sources of hazard associated
with mooring activities, other than those mentioned above, were identified.
4.2 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD SCENARIOS
A review of the dredging process and the sources of hazard described in the previous section
reveal that the major hazard events in dredging operation are results of the following main
causes:
Marine-based traffic activities;

Land traffic activities;
Use of heavy equipment;
Material spill;
Accidental fires;
Natural hazards and disasters;
The credible hazard scenarios analysed in this study are described in Tables 4.1.
TABLE 4.1
POTENTIAL HAZARD SCENARIOS FOR DOCKING AND CAPITAL AND
MAINTENANCE DREDGING
Hazard Scenarios Description
Hazard Scenario 1 Conventional marine hazards, drowning, collision of vessels, and sinking
Hazard Scenario 2 Fuel spill from vessels

Hazard Scenario 3 Heavy equipment malfunctions and human error
Hazard Scenario 4 Road traffic accidents and spill of flammable chemicals
Hazard Scenario 5 Small release of flammable chemical spill from broken pipe
Hazard Scenario 6 Larger release of flammable chemical spill from broken pipe
The frequency analysis and the consequence assessment of the identified hazard scenarios are
presented in the following sections

4.3 HAZARD SCENARIO 1 CONVENTIONAL MARINE HAZARDS
There are a variety of potential conventional marine hazards associated with the dredging and
docking operations. Many of these do not involve the dredging operation but rather, commercial
marine hazards such as:
Minor grounding or sinking;

Minor mechanical failure of the ship components;
Drowning; and
Collision with other vessels.
Factors that can contribute to marine accidents include, among others, mechanical or electrical
failures that might result in loss of steering, environmental factors such as currents, winds and
fog, and human error. Environmental factors that have potential to affect safe dredging operation
include:
strong tidal currents;

strong winds that may affect the navigation of vessels; and
limited visibility arising from fog, amongst others.
In addition, there may be physical constraints on navigability from open waters to the docking
facility, including marine traffic. Location of the dredging area and the density of other industrial
terminals close to the dredging area and docking facility suggest that there is not considerable
marine traffic in the area. As such a formal navigability assessment may not be necessary in
assessing potential hazards from dredging operation.
One safety aspect of marine transport is providing a clear distance around the vessels. The
operational safety zone around the dredging vessels and cargo vessels could be a significant
safety factor.
It is not anticipated that the dredging operating would significantly add to the local traffic.
Frequency Analysis
When the port is in operation, it is expected that port activities at Point Lisas will increase
significantly as large vessels will dock at the port for delivery of raw materials and the
transhipment of product from existing and new industries. The increase in port activities and
marine traffic at the Point Lisas will proportionally increase the risk of marine pollution in and
around the west coasts of Trinidad and Tobago.

The working vessels will be required to operate in an area of substantial commercial marine
traffic and most maritime traffic emanates from other industrial ports along the west coast.
These include the Point Lisas, Couva, the Petrotrin Jetty in Pointe-a Pierre, and the Atlantic LNG
Port, Point Fortin.
Trinidad and Tobago does not have any prescribed navigational control routes such as Vessel
Traffic Separations Schemes since the level of marine traffic does not justify the implementation
of such schemes. However it should be noted that informal arrangements might exist within
companies to identify the most efficient way of vessel transit to and from their ports.
More accurate estimation of likelihood of conventional marine hazards requires analysis of site
specific factors such as marine traffic, meteorological conditions, passageway information,
communications infrastructure and ship specifications. Such an analysis is outside the scope of
this study.
Nevertheless, by looking at the number of recorded historical accidents (both minor and major)
the frequency of conventional hazards, including drowning, resulting in fatality is more than one
per year. Note that the estimated frequency was derived from limited records by USACE and
MSHA.
Consequence analysis
Historical incident records indicate that conventional hazards, as defined above, have resulted in
few fatalities during dredging operations and marine transportation. Other consequences, such as
the release of fuel and oil are discussed under another hazard scenario.
4.4 HAZARD SCENARIO 2 FUEL RELEASE
Conventional marine hazards could potentially result in the release of fuel and oil from dredging
and cargo vessels. A major release of fuel may result in formation of a pool of flammable
material which can ignite and initiate a pool fire. This scenario also bound a release of smaller
amount of fuel in land or during loading and off loading.
Frequency Analysis
Record of accidents cited in the previous section did not indicate any major release of fuel from
dredging operation. One accident involved a fire from small in the engine room and did not
cause any fatality. The frequency of fuel release from dredging and cargo vessels was judged to
be in the order of 10-2 per year. However, it was assumed that less than 1% of the fuel release

scenario may result in a fire. Therefore, the frequency of fire from fuel release is judged to be
less than 10-4 per year. A smaller fuel release on land is more frequent. It is anticipated that small
fuel release as a result of re-fuelling operation on land would occur once a year. However, fire is
not expected in more than 1 percent of fuel spills. Therefore, a fire as a result of small amount of
fuel spill may occur at a rate of 10-4 per year.
Consequence Analysis
Thermal radiation from a pool fire can potentially result in burns or death. The thermal radiation
effects can be estimated using screening models such ad ARCHIE/TSCREEN (U.S. EPA),
EFFECTS/ SAVE II (TNO, Netherlands).
For this study, ARCHIE, an acronym for Automated Resource for Chemical Hazard Incident
Evaluation, was used for vapour-cloud explosion and fireball radiation hazard calculations.
ARCHIE is a computer program that allows for the calculation of discharge rates from tanks,
pipelines or liquid pools. ARCHIE performs release rate, pool evaporation, neutral and dense
gas dispersion, pool fire, jet fire, fireball, and vapour cloud explosion calculations. ARCHIE
was developed by U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) and FEMA for determining
estimates of consequences arising out of accidents involving hazardous or flammable chemicals.
In a postulated hazard scenario, it was assumed that 10 cubic metre of diesel fuel is released.
Released fuel results in a pool fire. The results of the assessment (Table 4.2) indicate that the
fatality zone around a potential pool fire is approximately 24 m from the centre of the pool. This
is considered a local effect and may not have a significant effect on shore and on the population
centres in the areas near the dredging area.
Release hydrocarbons may have temporary and localized adverse effects on the marine life. It is
assumed that the oil spill contingency plan has been prepared, and the spills will be contained
and cleaned up immediately after the release. Smaller amount of releases on soil can be
contained and cleaned easily. The spill site will be remediated shortly.
TABLE 4.2
RESULTS OF THERMAL RADIATION HAZARD FROM A POOL FIRE

4.5 HAZARD SCENARIO 3 HEAVY EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION
Historic records indicated that use of heavy equipment on board of dredging vessels as well as
the operation of the forklift trucks and cranes may results of injuries or dead to the operators and
vessel crews. The injuries or fatalities are potentially results of the following factors:
Equipment malfunction;
Human error in operating the equipment;
Lack of safety measures.
Frequency Analysis
Estimating the likelihood of equipment malfunction requires analysis of site specific and
equipment specific factors. Such an analysis is outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless,
considering the number of recorded historical accidents (both minor and major) the frequency of
equipment malfunction and human error resulting in injuries is more than one per year. Note
that the estimated frequency was derived from limited records by USACE and MSHA.
As mentioned above, historical incident records indicate that equipment malfunction and human
error have resulted in a number of injuries during dredging, construction, and normal operations.
Fatality was much less frequent based on the sources cited.
4.6 HAZARD SCENARIO 4 ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS
Some of the raw materials and products, including flammable liquids, will be transported
between the facilities and the port through access corridor. It is expected that up to 20 truck
travels occur per day. In a postulated scenario, a truck is involved in a traffic accident and part of
the load would be released. There is a possibility that the release chemical catches fire.
Frequency Analysis
Major vehicle accidents involving collisions and rollover were considered in this assessment.
Minor events, such as flat tire and skids which do not compromise the structural integrity of the
truck and the load, were not considered. Major vehicle accidents could potentially lead to a spill
and fire.
The United States Department of Transportation maintains statistical data for vehicle accidents.
The data has been generally similar from year-to-year over the past decade for which data is

available. In 2005, the overall vehicle accident rate was about 2 crashes per million vehicle
miles leading to fatality, injury or property damage, and about 0.4 per million vehicle miles for
large trucks (U.S. DOT 2005). About 25% of these crashes were on roads with speed limit less
than 30 mph (UW DOT 2005, Table 29). Fires were involved in 0.1% of the total crashes;
higher (0.3%) in the large truck crashes (U.S. DOT 2005, Table 38). Similar results were
observed in 2006, the last year for which the data is currently available (U.S. DOT 2006).
This data indicates an accident rate of about 0.5 per million vehicle miles with trucks and lower
speed conditions. However, it still covers a much broader range of circumstances than the
controlled environment on the dedicated access corridor.
Number of trips (both ways) = 2 * 20 * 365 = 14,600 trips per year
Considering 1-km one-way trip, the total transportation distance will be 22,000 km or 8,800
miles.
Therefore, the frequency of accidents will be:
Frequency of major vehicle accidents = 8,800 miles per year * 0.5 accident / 1,000,000 miles =
4x10-3 accidents per year.
At this stage of study no waterway crossing along the transportation route is anticipated. Any
spill of fuel from the truck or spill of flammable liquids during a truck accident has limited
localized effects and will be contained and cleaned up easily. No significant effect on the local
communities is anticipated. The area affected by a potential fire is expected to be smaller than
the areas affected under Scenario 2.
4.7 HAZARD SCENARIO 5 - RELEASE OF SMALL AMOUNT OF FLAMMABLE LIQUID
During an accident, either during loading and unloading operations or from failed pipes or
pumps, small amount of flammable liquid, in the order of less than a cubic metre, is released
forming a pool of 5 m across.
Consequence Assessment
If the flammable liquid spills onto the soil a flammable chemical (e.g. hexane) will contaminate
the soil and may form a flammable pool or runs off into adjacent water bodies. A potential leak
from the tanker during off-loading could result in a release directly into the harbour/channel.

The release of flammable liquid to the harbour was bounded by Scenario 2 and was assessed
above.
Release of flammable liquids on land may create a pool. If the pool is exposed to a source of
heat, it may catch fire. Open pool explosion is much less likely. In case of fire the extent of the
fire is limited to area surrounding the spill location and will be contained without major sever
consequences on the surrounding environment. The site of the spill requires further cleanup and
collection and disposal of the contaminated soil. It was assumed that, in the plant emergency
response plan, the spill management and the provisions for site clean up after the spills and
effective communications with local fire-fighting department have been considered.
Victims of fire accidents have potentially both smoke inhalation and thermal injury. The acute
effects are a combination of asphyxiation because of oxygen deficiency and, pulmonary irritation
due to inhalation of irritants which may include particulate matter and gaseous chemicals. These
effects occur at the close proximity of the fire.
The hazard end point for thermal injury is the thermal load equivalent of 5 kW/m2 for
40 seconds. This is the criterion specified by the U.S. EPA in their 112(r) Risk Management
Program rule (U.S. EPA, 1999, p. E-13) for either workers or members of the public. This
radiation intensity corresponds to second degree burns to the skin of humans exposed to the fire.
The radiation intensity criterion decreases with the duration of exposure time (TNO 1992). The
thermal radiation resulting in lethality was generally taken as 12.5 kW/m2 to 37.5 kW/m2.
There are two primary approaches to modelling thermal radiation from fires. These are the point
source model and the solid flame model. The solid flame model provides better accuracy in the
near field but is more complicated than the point source model and is described in CCPS
document (CCPS 1994).
Application of solid flame model for a typical liquid pitch pool of 5 m in diameter gives a
minimum safe distance of 12 m from the fire. This analysis indicates that the impact of minor
releases of flammable liquid (hexane) is contained locally with no measurable effect away from
the access corridor.
Frequency Assessment
CCPS has published the failure frequencies for a variety of process components. The
information published by CCPS shows that the failure frequencies of a typical piping system for
is in the order of 10-2 per year. The order of frequency of accidents associated with loading and
unloading equipment was also recorded as 10-1 to 10-2 per year. Assuming a conditional

probability of fire of 10% upon a release, the frequency of minor release and fire is in the order
of 10-2 per year.
4.8 HAZARD SCENARIO 6 - MAJOR RELEASE OF FLAMMABLE LIQUID
During a transportation or operational accident, it was assumed that the storage tank or tanker
truck is ruptured, resulting in loss of significant amount of flammable liquid (i.e. more than 30
m3).
Consequence Assessment
Due to vapour pressure, the formation of the explosive mixture is possible but not likely in this
type of scenario. However, fire is possible if the pool of flammable liquid is exposed to the
source of heat such as external fire or ignition source. The site of the spill requires further
cleanup and collection and disposal of the contaminated soil. It was assumed that, in the plant
emergency response plan, the spill management and the provisions for site clean up after the
spills and effective communications with local fire-fighting department have been considered.
Application of solid flame model for a typical flammable liquid pool of 30 m in diameter (due to
release of 30 m3 of flammable liquid) gives a minimum safe distance of 27 m from the fire. This
analysis indicated that, except for a traffic accident on the road, the impact of major releases of
flammable liquid is contained within the plant boundary with no measurable effect offsite. The
impact of traffic accident is limited to close vicinity of the accident location (within 27 m).
Serious burns and injuries are likely in both cases.
Frequency Assessment
Frequency of the major traffic accident was estimated as 4x10-3 per year under Scenario 4. With
a conditional probability 0.1, the frequency of fire would be 4x10-4 per year.
4.9 NATURAL HAZARDS
Eastern Caribbean region are threatened by natural hazards including hurricanes, floods (and
associated hazards such as landslides), volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. Although,
hurricanes, landslides and floods are the most frequent causes of natural disasters in the Eastern
Caribbean and have historically caused significant casualties and property damage, volcanic
eruptions and earthquakes have caused the most serious disasters. In addition to volcanoes,
earthquakes have caused considerable loss of life and economic disruption to Eastern Caribbean
countries in the past.

Trinidad and Tobago is in an earthquake zone and has experienced varying degrees of damage
due to earthquakes. The largest earthquake to affect Trinidad was of magnitude 7.9 in 1766. As
recent as 2006, Trinidad experienced a 5.8 magnitude earthquake. The 2006 earthquake was the
largest on-land earthquake to have affected Trinidad (The University of the West Indies, Seismic
Research Unit web site).
Detailed engineering design for the port facility includes designs for hurricane and earthquake
events based on the CUBIC IV building codes. In addition, NFPA codes have been applied to all
piping and flammable material storage and transmission systems as well as for the fire
prevention and protection systems to be installed at the port.
4.10 RISK RANKING
The frequency and the severity of the consequences of the hazard scenarios are summarized in
Table 4.3.
The above analysis indicated that the hazard scenario 1 (conventional hazards) has the highest
risk, both in terms of frequency and the severity of the consequence. This conclusion is
supported by the statistics of the fatalities during the dredging operation. Hazard scenario 3 (use
of heavy equipment) is next in the ranking scheme. Therefore, the attention should be focused
on the appropriate training in operation of the dredging vessels and heavy equipment.
The analysis also indicated that the risks of minor release of flammable liquids from the
transportation pipeline or from trucks are moderate. Marine vessel fuel release and large
flammable liquid releases have lower risks due to lower probability of occurring. The
emergency management measures concerning the fire safety should focus on the handling of
flammable chemicals (e.g. hexane).
Overall, based on the above analysis hazard scenarios with risk ranking greater than 9 requires
some level of risk management measure to either reduce the likelihood of the event or reduce the
severity of the consequences of event or both.

TABLE 4.3
RISK RANKING OF POTENTIAL HAZARD SCENARIOS
Consequence
Frequency Frequency Risk
Hazard Scenarios Severity
Per Year Ranking Ranking
Ranking
Hazard Scenario 1 1 5 4 20
-4
Hazard Scenario 4 4x10-3 3 3 9
-2
-4
Hazard Scenario 6 4x10 2 4 8
4.11 HAZARD ZONE
Analysis of the consequences of the hazard scenarios indicated that the adverse effects of
accidents associated with loading/unloading, land transportation of the chemicals, the marine
vessel traffic and dredging operation would affect the areas immediately close to the location of
the accidents, dredging vessels, and land transportation route. No hazard scenario was identified
that has significant adverse health effects on the member of the public at the vicinity of the port
operation.
Table 4.4 indicates the affected areas (hazard zone) for identified hazard areas.
TABLE 4.4
AFFECTED AREAS (HAZARD ZONE) FOR IDENTIFIED HAZARD AREAS
Maximum hazard
Identified Hazard distance from the
source of fire
Hazard Scenario 1 -
Hazard Scenario 2 26 m
Hazard Scenario 3 -
The results above indicated that the potential impact resulted from the operation of the port (in
case of an emergency) is relatively small and the impacts are limited to local area less than 30 m
from the operation boundaries. As such the negative impact on the neighbouring communities, as
a result of an accident, is very unlikely.

However the operation will develop emergency response plan to deal with unlikely emergency
situations and to protect the public and the environment from such unlikely events. The outlines
of the emergency management are described in the next section.

5.0 SAFETY MEASURES AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
The port operation involves handling and transportation of hazardous material. Potentially,
handling and transportation of flammable liquids and iron ore and other solid chemicals are
potentially hazardous operations. However, the operation of the port does not occur the under
hazardous operating conditions. Thus occurrences of confined spaces, confined vapour cloud
events, and any number of ignition sources are not part of the routine or non-routine operational
scenarios applicable to this port.
The risk assessed in this study is well below the risks posed by oil refineries, petroleum plants or
other chemical plants. House keeping is the essential element in controlling risk in the operation
of the chemical handling facility. Cleaning up of spills and removing the dust from various
locations reduce the chance of fire and explosion dramatically.
It is important to ensure that the staff is adequately trained and that the plant is operated based on
written down procedures. Further, maintenance will be a key factor to ensuring that plant
equipment and safety interlocks are well maintained to ensure safe operating conditions.
It is also important that the operation prepares the emergency response plan to address the
potential hazards discussed in this assessment. The emergency response plan should address
preventive and mitigative measures to reduce the probability and impact of potential hazardous
events. The emergency response plan should also provide provisions to notify the authorities and
the public in case of such emergencies. The coordination with local and municipal emergency
response authorities should also be a part of the emergency response plan. This is particularly
important during response and evacuation of the public from surrounding areas, if needed.
General House Keeping
MARPOL convention requirements for waste collection and management are being
addressed
Safety and security including compliance with ISPS requirements and building
accommodation for Coast Guard, Immigration, Customs, DEA etc
Fencing and video monitoring and other electronic security measures for intrusion
detection
Site access corridor and site temporary facility access will be regularly watered during
dry periods to minimise dust creation.
Truck wheels will be cleaned upon leaving the site during muddy periods.
Coastal protection to prevent erosion

Lightning protection shall be provided for all tall items of infrastructure such as cranes
and loading arms
Truck Transportation of Flammable Liquids
The access corridor is a dedicated route for transportation of chemicals between the facilities and
the port. No other vehicles are expected on the route.
It is advisable that the following measure be implemented to reduce the risk of traffic accidents:
The access corridor should be maintained properly and should have adequate markings
for dividers. Additional safety measures may include:
o Adequate lighting along roads
o Regular maintenance schedules for Port vehicles
There should be sufficient traffic signs and speed limits (stop, yield, etc.).
Emergency response measure should address the clean up and fire fighting measures.
Loading /Unloading of the Flammable Liquids
Signs in the flammable liquid unloading area should be put up to prevent the hot work
during the unloading and smoking should not be permitted in this area.
The loading/ unloading area should be equipped with fire fighting facility including the
fire hydrants. Any spills in the area should be contained and cleaned immediately.
Possible safety measures may include:
o Routine inspection of cranes and preventative maintenance checks to ensure safe
operations
o Operations at lay down areas and stockyards be performed under strict
supervision from suitably trained personnel
Fire Fighting
The fire protection philosophy assumes one major fire event at any time. The hierarchy of fire
protection is as follows:
Fire and gas detection

Passive fire protection
Active fire fighting systems and equipment- firewater pumps, hydrants, ring main,
portable fire fighting equipment, flood extinguishing Novec 1230, safety equipment,
Safety equipment, escape, evacuation and rescue.

The following measures have been considered to reduce the likelihood of a fire.
A gas detection system to detect hydrocarbon vapours, provided with visual and audio
signals at local and central control levels;
A gaseous nitrogen supply system will be installed. This nitrogen will be used to replace
the cargo removed from the vessels. The flow capacity of the nitrogen supply will be at
least equal to the cargo discharge rate of the tanker;
Two fire monitors with a foam generating capacity connected to the firewater main and
the foam generation unit;
A foam storage tank with a capacity of 3,000 litres; and
Firefighting equipment including:
Firewater header with hydrants spaced at a maximum of 100 m;

Fire water supply system;
Fire hoses;
Foam generation equipment;
Foam storage; and
Two elevated fire monitors at the liquid unloading berth.
Chemical and Oil Spill
Port should be adequately equipped with floating booms at both the shore and the tugs to militate
against spill events. Other provision of the spill control and clean-up equipment may including:
Oil skimmers
Chemicals and detergent
Absorption materials
Small work boat (approx. 40 ft)
A spill collection system for operational spills with a drip pan, discharge line and sump.
The sump will have a working capacity of at least 3 m3. The sump will also have an
alarm connected to the local and central control rooms. A pump-out connection to a
vacuum truck will also be installed

Capital and Maintenance Dredging
Based on the results of the analysis, it is evident that the most important safety measures related
to the dredging operation is the workplace personal safety. These measures may include, but not
limited to the following:
Protection against falling

Provision of railing system standards
Personal protection equipment
Life jackets
Adequate training in operation of heavy equipment
One safety aspect of dredging is providing a clear distance around the dredging vessels and
barges. A safety zone of 50 to 150 m around the vessels around the vessels transiting the waters
of the area is an appropriate precaution.
An effective oil spill contingency plan should be maintained, reviewed frequently, and tested
(e.g. drills). Oil spill containment and clean up should accessible and maintained in a good
working conditions according to the plan.
The area to be dredged should be surveyed to ensure that there are no sub-marine gas lines or
power line in the area.
New dredging technology and procedures are designed and employed internationally to reduce
the wide-area deleterious effects of dredging on the environment.
Marine Transport Accident
In case of a marine vessel accident, procedures should be in place to protect the marine
environment from oil pollution (as mentioned above). When an accident results in serious injury
or death, or the vessel has been damaged enough to make it unseaworthy or unsafe, the owner or
skipper must report full particulars of the accident or fire to the authorities shortly after the
incident. Provisions for removal of damaged vessels should also be in place.

6.0 REFERENCES
American Institute of Chemical Engineering 1985. Guidelines for Process Equipment Reliability
Data 1985. Center for Chemical Process Safety. American Institute of Chemical
Engineering. New York, New York.
Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) 1989. Guidelines for Process Equipment Reliability
Data. New York: American Institute of Chemical Engineers.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Department of Transportation and

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis
Procedures.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Department of Transportation and

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Handbook of Chemical Hazard Analysis
Procedures.
International Labour Organization website, 2007.

http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/safework/cis/products/icsc/dtasht/_icsc14/ics
c1415.htm
Lees, F.P. 1996. Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volume III.
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 1997. Pocket Guide to
Chemical Hazards.
Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) 1992. Methods for the
Determination of Possible Damage. 1st Edition, Committee for the Prevention of
Disasters. The Netherlands. CPR 16E.
U.S. Department of Transportation, NHTSA 2007. http://ops.dot.gov/stats/stats.htm
U.S. Department of Transportation (US DOT). 2005. Traffic Safety Facts 2005: A compilation
of motor vehicle crash data. (www.nhtsa.dot.gov).
U.S. Department of Transportation (US DOT). 2006. Traffic Safety Facts 2006: A compilation
of motor vehicle crash data. (www.nhtsa.dot.gov).
US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) 1999. Risk Management Program Guidance
for Offsite Consequence Analysis. EPA 550-B-99-009. April.

The University of the West Indies, Seismic Research Unit web site,
http://www.uwiseismic.com/Earthquakes/

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POINT LISAS PORT DEVELOPMENT RISK

Rapid Environmental Assessment Limited

SENES Consultants Limited

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1.0 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1

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2.1 Westlake Container Shipments ..........................................................................................11

3.1 Frequency Ranking Definition...........................................................................................14

3.1 A Typical Risk Ranking Matrix.........................................................................................16

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Fire and explosion hazard;

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1.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

More specifically, the scope of the study included

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2.0 THE PROPOSED FACILITY

2.1 STUDY AREA

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2.2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION

2.2.1 Capital and Maintenance Dredging

LOA = 210m (690ft)

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2.2.2 Construction Phase

2.2.3 Operation phase

The amounts of imports/exports by Essar Steel plant are as follows:

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3.0 PROCESS OF FACILITY RISK ASSESSMENT

3.1 SCREENING LEVEL HAZARD ASSESSMENT PROCESS

3.2 THE FACILITY RISK MANAGEMENT (FRM) PROCESS

Risk = Frequency * Severity of the consequence

Hazard Identification: The identification of physical situations with the potential

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3.4 QUALITATIVE SEVERITY RANKING

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3.5 RISK RANKING PROCESS

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H AZARD R ISK SCORE

H AZARD R ISK SCORE

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4.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS

4.1 SOURCES OF HAZARDS

The hazardous working environment;

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4.2 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD SCENARIOS

Marine-based traffic activities;

Hazard Scenarios Description

Hazard Scenario 2 Fuel spill from vessels

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4.3 HAZARD SCENARIO 1 CONVENTIONAL MARINE HAZARDS

Minor grounding or sinking;

strong tidal currents;

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4.4 HAZARD SCENARIO 2 FUEL RELEASE

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4.5 HAZARD SCENARIO 3 HEAVY EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION