Digests of Cases on the Condonation Doctrine

Prepared by: Ramon T. Conducto II

Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992, J.
Nocon:

FACTS:

Rodolfo Aguinaldo elected as Cagayan Governor in 1988

Aguinaldo was involved in the 1989 coup d etat. He was administratively charged
for disloyalty to the Republic.
After investigation by the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government (SILG),
Aguinaldo was guilty and removed from office.
Aguinaldo appealed SILGs findings to SC. While his case was pending, he ran for
Governor of Cagayan in 1992.
COMELEC disqualified Aguinaldo (basis: removal from office).
SC reversed COMELEC disqualification on the ground that the case reviewing his
removal from office (this case) is still pending.
Aguinaldo won in the 1992 Elections as Cagayan Governor by a landslide margin.

ISSUES:

1. Whether SILG correctly found Aguinaldo to be administratively guilty of

disloyalty to the Republic which merited his removal from office.

HELD: Petition MOOT and ACADEMIC. Petitioners reelection to the position of

Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending before Us moot
and academic. Clearly then, the rule is that a public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to
office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no
application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have
committed during the failed coup.

2. Whether SILG has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as
the Presidents alter ego under B.P. Blg. 337 (1983 Local Government Code).

HELD: YES. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government officials
is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative
branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987
Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local
governments, and by the doctrine that the acts of the department head are
presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. The
statutory grant found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, having been

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 enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the 1973
Constitution, Section 2. A similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the
1987 Constitution.

3. Whether proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed before Aguinaldo could be

removed from office due to disloyalty to the Republic.

HELD: NO. Inasmuch as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty to the

Republic which is defined and penalized under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code,
Aguinaldo, however, is not being prosecuted criminally under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, but administratively with the end in view of removing him as
the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to the Republic
where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.

Ombudsman Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals and Binay, Jr., G.R. Nos.

217126-27, November 10, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe:

FACTS:

Binay, Jr. was charged of Plunder and R.A. 3019 in connection with the five
phases of the procurement and construction of Makati City Hall Parking building.
Binay, Jr. was preventively suspended Ombudsman, the Order of which was
served by the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government (SILG).
CA granted TRO on Binay, Jr.s preventive suspension.
Ombudsman appealed to the Supreme Court CAs granting of TRO.
CA subsequently granted Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) on Binay, Jr.s
preventive suspension based on the condonation doctrine.

ISSUES:

1. Whether CA has jurisdiction to issue TRO/WPI over findings or decisions of the

Ombudsman.

HELD: YES. Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act is unconstitutional. Since the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against decision or findings of
the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus similar to the fourth paragraph of
Section 27, RA 6770142 attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Courts
appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded
that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to
the Ombudsmans posturing, Fabian v. Desierto should squarely apply since the
above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in pari materia in that they cover the
same specific or particular subject matter, that is, the manner of judicial review over
issuances of the Ombudsman. Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting
provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives,227 because it does not define,
prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari
cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the
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relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead,
through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was
created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is
both integral and inherent to every courts exercise of judicial power. Without the
Courts consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same
as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor,
there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.

2. Whether the condonation doctrine should still be applied.

HELD: There is really no established weight of authority in the United States (US)
[from where we adopted the doctrine] favoring the doctrine of condonation, In fact,
as pointed out during the oral arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in
the US have abandoned the condonation doctrine. Reading the 1987 Constitution
together with Sections 60, 40(b), and 66(b) of the Local Government Code now
leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft
of legal bases. To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the
corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under
the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local
officials administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can
be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even
another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense,
and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support
the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this
jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the
President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Also, it cannot
be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated
therein cannot anymore be invoked against an elective local official to hold him
administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the
LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is
meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local
position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. In similar
regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification
from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.

-NOTHING FOLLOWS-

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