STUDIU DE CAZ

1.1. Definitia Conceptului de Piraterie

Joanne Marie Fish, Maritime Piracy: North versus South, Old Dominion University, Norflok,
2014,
The general definition of piracy is robbery or illegal violence at sea. Most of the time,
piracy is a crime of opportunity. Pirates must have a target ship and ships are found in port and
along shipping lanes. As early as trade occurred by sea, piracy also occurred. Ships with limited
navigational abilities would travel near shorelines and those who inhabited the shore would
intercept the ship and benefit from the cargo. Such raids were a normal part of survival and
economic development during the early history of man.
The term pirate comes from the Latin pirata and from the Greek peirates meaning attacker.
In describing archaic Eastern Mediterranean societies, Alfred P. Rubin claims The word peirato
and its derivatives seem to be applied to traditional Eastern Mediterranean societies operating in
ways that had been accepted as legitimate for at least a millennium.3 In ancient times, Greco-
Roman laws, developed for and by the Greeks and Romans to instill order and further their
economy were either not recognized and/or understood by non-Greco-Roman societies. By means
of Roman hegemony, Roman rules and laws were imposed on those they traded with or conquered.
This became the base of Western culture. Rubin goes on to explain that the first recorded
references were not bound to piratical acts on the high seas, but to a conception of piratical
villages forming a society [poleis] on land that refused to accept Roman supremacy.4 Thus the
label pirate was as much about an older tradition which was originally viewed as legitimate being
no longer acceptable to the new order. P 3
Eventually, although it is not clear exactly when, the concept of piracy which began for
political purposes as a means of justifying warlike naval activity came to be associated with
criminal activity on the high seas. This is apparent in the current internationally excepted legal
definition. The legal definition is the result of much international debate and compromise, and is
therefore technically more discriminating than the general definition. The mostly widely accepted
legal definition of piracy is Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS):
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and
directed:
o on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft;
o against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction
of any State;
 any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a)
or (b). P 5

1.2. Teorii ale pirateriei
Bruce Elleman, Historical Piracy and its Impact, Chapter 2, Springer Science and Business
Media, New York, 2015.
Throughout written history in Europe, piracy has been considered to be a perfectly normal
occupation. Warfare among the Greeks consisted largely of plundering raids from the sea, with
the most famous raid of allthe siege of Troybeing merely an exception of scale, not of
methods. So long as the raids were not conducted on ones own people, then there was no sense
of wrongdoing: Sea roving or sea robbing in this Greek Bronze Age was largely
indistinguishable from legitimate warfare.6 Although pirates almost certainly predated written
descriptions of their actions, Homer reported an act of piracy in The Odyssey that would have
occurred around 1000 B.C.
The Romans also had to deal with the scourge of piracy. In 102 B.C., Marcus Antonius
was responsible for a campaign to Sicily to locate and destroy pirates.8 Julius Caesar himself was
captured in 76 B.C. and, after paying the ransom for his release, fitted out a squadron of ships to
take his revenge.9 Following the Roman creation of standing fleets at Misenum and Ravenna,
supporting by auxiliary fleets in Egypt, Syria, and, along the coast of modern-day Libya, for the
first time in history the whole of the Mediterranean was adequately patrolled, and the inhabitants
of its coast obtained respite from marauders.
Piracy became such a problem during the early Middle Ages that many major European
cities were built 1020 kms inland for greater protection.12 During this period, piracy was
considered to be the norm, not the exception. This applied in particular to the British, later the
most strident opponents of piracy, but: In the Middle Ages, English seamen in the Channel were
accounted the hardiest pirates in the world.13 As eastwest trade increased in the twelfth century,
spurred on by the Crusades, which once again connected Western Europe with the trade routes
from the Orient, piracy boomed. Much of this was centered on Italy, since the city-states there
controlled the majority of the trade from further east.
Caught between East and West were the well-known pirate communities in Northern
Africa. The Mediterranean Sea was long known as a haven for pirates, and for centuries piracy
was pursued by Christians and Moslems alike. Captives were enslaved and sold throughout
northern Africa. With the Conquest of Granada in 1492, however, and the exodus of tens of
thousands of Moors from Spain throughout the Barbary coast, the number of piracy attacks
increased dramatically: Joined by African Moors and led by Moslem adventurers from the
Levant, these new pirates embarked on a career of plunder and slave-hunting on the Spanish coast.
PP 11-12
 Secolul de aur al Pirateriei
Sonia Benson, Pirates Through the Ages: Almanac, 1st Edition, Gale Cengage
Learning, Detroit, 2011,
The golden age of piracy spanned the years 1690 to 1730. During that time, pirates raided
and plundered (robbed of goods by force) vessels and ports over a huge area, including the
Caribbean Islands, the east coast of North America, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Unlike the
privateers of earlier times, who were authorized to raid enemy ships and ports by their governments
during wartime, most golden-age pirates raided strictly for their own profit. By everyones
standards they were criminals, and often violent ones. Some historians contend, though, that many
young sailors became pirates in an attempt to escape the injustices and oppression they had
experienced as members of the lowest classes in eighteenth-century society. Many pirates of the
golden age ended all connections to their home countries, swearing allegiance only to their
comrades on their pirate ships. Aboard a pirate ship, they formed a very different culture than the
one they had left behind.
According to pirate historian Marcus Rediker, during the peak years of the golden age, the
decade from 1716 to 1726, there were a total of fortyfive hundred to fifty-five hundred pirates,
with perhaps about one thousand to twenty-four hundred on the seas at any given time. The pirates
hailed from many nations and ethnic groups, although the majority came from the British Isles.
An example of this diversity can be seen on the pirate ship Whydah under the command of pirate
captain Samuel Bellamy (c. 16891717). According to Kenneth J. Kinkor, in Black Men Under
the Black Flag, the crew of the Whydah included not only English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, and
British colonials, but also Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Spaniards, Swedes, Native Americans, African-
Americans, and Africans. Pirates came almost exclusively from the lowest classes of European
and colonial society, and most had served as seamen for merchant or naval ships prior to becoming
pirates. All pirates of this age were men, with the exception of only four known women. P.117
The vast majority of golden-age pirates came from the ranks of ordinary eighteenth-century
seamen. The wretched conditions experienced onboard naval or merchant vessels profoundly
influenced them in their later careers. For an English sailor at that time, everyday work aboard ship
was hard and extremely dangerous. Crew members were killed or maimed handling heavy cargo
and climbing up masts in rough weather. Heavy rigging frequently fell from the masts, crushing
sailors below. (Rigging is the system of ropes, chains, and other gear used to support and control
the masts and sails of a sailing vessel.) In winter the seamen worked in freezing, windy weather in
wet clothing. If the risky work did not kill the sailors, illness often did. The ships were full of rats,
cockroaches, and other vermin (small insects or animals that cause harm and annoyance) that
spread infectious diseases, such as dysentery, which caused severe diarrhea, and typhus, which
caused high fever, rash, and delirium. P.119
 Sailors who joined pirate ships signed on as equal members of the crew. Almost all pirate
ships practiced a rough form of democracy, following customs of social organization in which
every shipmate had a say in important decisions. There were no social classes onboard, and the
power that the ships captain held over the crew was very limited. When pirates spotted a merchant
ship they wished to attack, they usually began by raising the Jolly Roger. Merchant vessels, even
the large ships, tended to have small crews of only about ten to eighteen men. The crews were not
well armed or trained to fight. Pirate vessels, on the other hand, were likely to have seventy or
more heavily armed pirates aboard. Most merchant ships surrendered without resistance when they
saw a Jolly Roger raised. Some merchant ships did resist pirate attacks, and for good reason.
Certain pirate captains were known for their violence and gruesome torture techniques. There was
no guarantee; even if a ship surrendered to the pirates without fighting, it still might suffer a terrible
fate. Therefore, some merchant ships, when they could not escape from pirates, prepared to fight.
Battle began when the merchant ship fired its cannons at the pirate vessel, which usually caused
the pirates to counterattack with full force. They tried to do as little damage to the ship as possible,
since it would soon be in their possession and might be of value to them. They were not always as
careful with the lives of the merchant ships crew. P.127.

Pirateria in secolul XX
Peter Chalk, Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Scope, Dimensions, Causes and Responses,
Brown Journal of World Affairs, Rhode Island, 2010,
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in the late 1980s it was
confidently assumed that the international system was on the threshold of an era of unprecedented
peace and stability. Politicians, academics, and diplomats alike increasingly began to forecast the
imminent establishment of a new world order that would be managed by liberal democratic
institutions and which would develop within the context of an integrated global economy based on
the principles of the free market.1 As this unprecedented inter-state structure emerged and took
root, it was assumed that destabilizing threats to national and international security would decline
commensurately.
The maritime realm is particularly conducive to these types of threat contingencies given
its vast, largely unregulated, and opaque nature. Covering approximately 139,768,200 square
miles, most of this environment takes the form of high seas that lie beyond the strict jurisdiction
of any single state.3 These over the horizon oceans are fringed and linked by a complex lattice
of territorial waters, estuaries, and riverine systems, which in many cases are poorly monitored
and, in terms of internationally recognized jurisprudence, exist as entirely distinct and independent
entities.
The re-emerging specter of maritime piracy, a scourge long thought consigned to the annals
of history, is increasingly animating the minds of security analysts, politicians, and law
enforcement and intelligence officials. Although problems have been manifest since the late
1990sespecially in the waters of Southeast Asiaattention has become particularly marked over
the last two years in reaction to attacks perpetrated by gangs operating in and around the wider
Somali basin. Incidents in this region have reached unprecedented proportions and are now
influencing the perceived viability of key sea lanes of communication that are of critical
importance to the global maritime commercial system. Pp. 89-90.
Matthew Fiorelli, Piracy in Africa: The Case of the Gulf of Guinea, KAIPTC, Cantonments,
2014.
Historically, piracy reflects the governance situations of coastal states. Between 1970 and
1980, piracy reappeared as a serious threat to commercial shipping, and over the course of the last
decade, pirate attacks have tripled. Motivated by economic factors and encouraged by the lack of
law enforcement, pirates largely originate from countries with unstable government and due to
ineffective law enforcement face few consequences (Tepp, 2012: 183). Inaction off the Horn of
Africa only changed when pirates began directly attacking international ships throughout the last
decade, focusing global attention to the threat of piracy in the region (Vrey, 2009: 21). However,
even as piracy has decreased off the Horn of Africa due to mounting international pressure, it has
grown rapidly throughout the Gulf of Guinea. P.5.
Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and maritime Terrorism, Routledge, London,
2007.
Reasons for piracy
Piracy is a low-risk criminal activity that pays well. It occurs for one overriding reason:
opportunity. Poverty is often cited as the main motivator, but this is simplistic. Certainly diversions
of trade flows away from particular regions have in the past caused affected groups in those regions
to resort to piracy; equally today, changes in financial circumstances will encourage some to try
their hand, but economic necessity is not a first cause? In most eras and in most places piracy has
been dominated by organised gangs that have treated it as a business.8 Seven major factors enable
piracy to flourish:
Legal and jurisdictional weakness
Favourable geography
Conflict and disorder
Under-funded law enforcement/inadequate security
Permissive political environments
Cultural acceptability
Promise of reward p.13
Efecte si atacuri ale piratilor
Types of ship attacked
Large vessels on international voyages are not pirates' prime targets. There were a number of
attacks on such ships during the 1990S, particularly in Southeast Asia, which caught the attention
of the international press, but few have taken place more recently, perhaps because large ships now
pass through known pirate areas on high alert and with less cash on board. A study of attacks in
the Malacca Strait between 2000 and 2005 showed an overall reduction in assaults on ships above
20,000 gross registered tonnes (GRT).31 Nonetheless, large ships remain vulnerable, due to the
trend towards reducing crew sizes that began in the 1960s and accelerated dramatically in the late
1970S and early 1980s as a result of containerisation, automation and downward pressures on cost.
Smaller crews mean more work and higher levels of fatigue for those who remain. Pirates in the
Malacca and Singapore Straits and elsewhere in the region appear to favour bulk carriers among
large ships, probably because they have low freeboards, as well as minimal crews. But pirates on
the whole prefer to attack smaller vessels. The crews of smaller ships also tend to be more at risk
of being kidnapped; during the period of the study of attacks in the Malacca Strait, only five
abductions took place on vessels of more than 1,000 GRT, compared to 26 on smaller vessels. The
study also highlighted the fact that most attacks are on local craft rather than on vessels engaged
in international trade. P.18.

Methods of boarding and attack

Ships stationary in ports, harbours or anchorages are usually pirates' favoured targets,
mainly because they are the easiest to board. Mark Farley, a lieutenant commander in the US Navy
who conducted an analysis of Office of Naval Intelligence (ON I) data on piracy from 1989 to
1993, found that stationary ships (of all sizes) were boarded successfully in more than 90% of
cases, but this figure dropped to 62% when ships were under way. Traditionally, the most common
method used against ships under way is to approach the stern with a fast boat at night. Although
this appears still to be the most commonly used technique in Southeast Asia, even here it has been
replaced on occasion, as it has been elsewhere, by the use of multiple fast-moving boats to weave
in front of and around a target to distract the bridge while accomplices board at the back (a
consequence of the wider availability of powerful outboard motors) and by the use of actual or
threatened gunfire aimed at the bridge or wheelhouse to force vessels to stop and lower a ladder.
The availability of cheap weapons such as AK-47 automatic rifles and rocket-propelled
grenades has substantially increased the threat pirates are able to pose even to large ships. Cheap
and powerful outboard motors have greatly facilitated pirate operations, lengthening the time
pirates can spend in target areas by reducing transit times and giving them the speed to catch and
hold station with large ships, and the endurance to sustain an attack for several hours if
necessary.P-19.
The nature of the offence
There is simply no doubt that an act of piracy is an act of terrorism. One interpretation of terrorism
given by the courts is that terrorism does not violate international law on the grounds that
accusations of terrorism are often met not by a denial of the fact of responsibility but by a
justification of the challenged actions.3 This judgment clearly shows that there is no consensus
among the world community that terrorism is an offence against established principles of law. It
also infuses to the heart of the offence a core of legitimacy that is often considered incontrovertible,
giving rise to the dichotomy that the need for a solution does not arise in the absence of a problem.4
There is ostensibly a flavour of this attitude in Somalia where gangs of thugs have descended to
the vicinity of the hijacked oil tanker with a view to grabbing a share of the ransom demanded.
P.64.

The earliest forms of terrorism against international transportation was piracy. Pirates are
considered by international law as common enemies of all mankind. The world has naturally an
interest in the punishment of offenders and is justified in adopting international measures for the
application of universal rules regarding the control of terrorism. The common understanding
between States has been that pirates should be lawfully captured on the high seas by an armed
vessel of any particular State, and brought within its territorial jurisdiction for trial and punishment.
P.66

Tari unde se manifesta pirateria

Alexa K. Sullivan, Piracy in the Horn of Africa and its effects on the global supply chain,
Springer Science Business Media, Akron, Ohio,2010
Piracy in the Horn of Africa Although maritime piracy is a worldwide problem, there are
several areas that track particularly high levels of pirate activity. These areas are the Gulf of Aden,
near Somalia and the southern entrance to the Red Sea, the Gulf of Guinea, near Nigeria and the
Niger River delta, the Malacca Strait between Indonesia and Malaysia, and the Indian
subcontinent, particularly between India and Sri Lanka (Hanson 2010). Of these highly pirated
locations, the Gulf of Aden attracts the most pirate activity and most traffic passing through the
Gulf of Aden is going to or coming from the Suez Canal. This analysis refers to the Horn of
Africa as the Gulf of Aden and the surrounding area, specifically the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea,
the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and Oman, all of which have been heavily affected by Somali
pirates.
There are five categories of ships that account for most of the worlds maritime activity:
container ships, bulk carriers, tankers, ferry boats and cruise ships, and special ships, which include
tugs, ice breakers, and research vessels (Marisec 2009). Of these five types of ships, the bulk carrier
and tanker ships are most affected by maritime piracy worldwide. Bulk carriers often transport
solid raw materials such as coal and iron ore. In fact, coal comprises 24% of bulk carriers cargo.
Tankers carry liquid raw materials such as petroleum products, which account for 32% of its cargo,
chemicals, and crude oil. PP.3-4
Lauren Ploch, Christopher M. Blanchard, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, Congressional
Research Service, Washington D.C., 2011, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf
Piracy has reemerged as a global security threat, most recently in the waters off the Horn
of Africa, but also in West Africa, the waters off India, the South China Sea and the Strait of
Malacca, and the Caribbean. Pirates tend to operate in regions with large coastal areas, high levels
of commercial activity, small national naval forces, and weak regional security cooperation
mechanisms. These characteristics facilitate other maritime security threats, including terrorism,
weapons and narcotics trafficking, illegal fishing and dumping, and human smuggling operations.
Worldwide rates of piracy began to increase in the early 1990s, peaking at roughly 350 to
450 reported attacks per year during the period 2000-2004, then declining by almost half by 2005.
In 2007, almost half of the worlds reported pirate attacks took place in African waters, mainly
near Nigeria and Somalia. The number of attacks in Somali waters doubled in 2008, accounting
for an estimated 40% of the 293 pirate attacks reported worldwide.
The recent increase in pirate attacks off Somalia has caused the total number of worldwide
pirate attacks to return to the levels of 2000-2004: of the 406 worldwide attacks in 2009, 217 of
them occurred off the coast of Somalia. In 2010, 219 of the 445 reported attacks took place in the
waters off the Horn. Moreover, high-profile attacks on high-value vessels in the Gulf of Aden and
the west Indian Ocean have brought renewed international attention to the problem of piracy in
these waters. The U.S. National Maritime Security Strategy, issued in 2005, stated that the safety
and economic security of the United States depends upon the secure use of the worlds oceans,
and identified well organized and well equipped pirates and criminals as threats to international
maritime security. P.4.

Pirateria in Somalia
Dominila Kunertova, European Anti-piracy Strategy: Somalian Piracy: Todays Challenge
Addressed by an EU Initiative, NewSecEU, 2010, https://tu-
dresden.de/zis/ressourcen/dateien/newseceu/outcomes/papers_folder/MilSec_EU-anti-piracy-
strategy.pdf?lang=en
While Piracy has been an issue that has plagued the seas and oceans for hundreds of years,
the problem of Somali piracy is a relatively new phenomenon and has very distinct characteristics
and causes when compared to other areas of the globe where the problem persists. What must be
initially considered is that the form in which this seabased crime exists is more of financial threat
then a life threatening one to its potential victims. Somali pirates are not known for murder, torture
or inhumane treatment of their captives, rather piracy is treated as lucrative business, it is in the
best interests of the pirates to secure the safety of the cargo and their crew and exchange them for
a monetary ransom.
The initial causes of piracy in the region can be dated back to 1991 and the collapse of the
Somalia State, the following 19 years has seen no central authority and a as a result no forms of
state security or national defence that would have otherwise monitored and protected the Somali
coast. The integrity of the coastline has been severely infringed, as a result what was once a rich
source of food and income for the population through an efficient and sustainable fishing industry
has now been and continues to be systematically exploited by international fishing vessels. It is
estimated that more then 300 million worth of tuna, shrimp, and lobster 12is being stolen from
Somali waters each year. P.5.
 Piracy emerged from the initial response of Somalia fishermen organizing themselves to
deter foreign vessels and protect their coastal integrity; vessels were often boarded and asked to
pay a levy or tax for compensation before being allowed to leave. This initial substitution for
loss of income quickly developed into a profitable business, and one in which the earnings are
shared amongst the local population. A Ukrainian ship which was held and released by the
Somalis in 2009 garnered a multimillion-dollar payment by the owners, which is reportedly being
utilized to clean up the waste being dumped in the area.16 Piracy is perceived by the local
population not as a crime but in effect as a form of acquiring justice and insuring compensation
for years of exploitation from elements within the international community. The pirates appear to
have "extended their reach, threatening not only the Gulf of Aden and east coast of Somalia, but
also the southern region of the Red Sea, the Bab el Mandab Straits and the East Coast of Oman"
Piracy has evolved into a lucrative well-organized business, initially emerging out of the Puntland
region it involves essentially four groups of personnel:
- Firstly the financiers, these are the businessmen who set up the operations and finance
them in return for the largest portion of the ransom. Such people are often very wealthy individuals
who are able to move quickly and freely across states.
- Ex Fishermen who are considered the brains of the operation because of their knowledge
of the sea
- Militiamen, who are considered the muscle having fought in the civil war with experience
in combat and arms
- Technicians who operate sophisticated harder and software such as GPS, satellite phone
and military equipment. Pp.6-7

Alexandre Maouche, Piracy along the Horn of Africa, An Analysis of the Phenomenon within
Somalia, PiraT, Hamburg, 2010.
Although the phenomenon of piracy along the coasts of Somalia started in the 1990s, it is
its intensification at the beginning of the 21st Century which has attracted the attention of the
international community. In recent years it has become a major concern in the field of international
security, pushing many international actors to take action. The necessity of fighting piracy in the
area has led to a consensus between the main world powers rarely seen among sensitive security
topics.
Most parts of Somalia have been in an ongoing state of war since 1991. The downfall of
dictator Siad Barre after 21 years of rule led to a devastating conflict and the complete collapse of
state institutions. The international community tried to stabilize the situation several times by
intervening in the 1990s, but all such attempts failed. Since then, Somalia tends to be seen in
foreign eyes as an anarchic territory dominated by warfare. The country has undoubtedly gone
through several extremely violent conflicts and humanitarian crises, but its internal situation is
much more complex and caused a number of problems.
 Piracy started as a succession of isolated attacks but soon grew to become a well-structured
and well-organized criminal activity. Research about piracy in the area has developed considerably
in the past years. It can be seen as a result of the internal situation of the country, but it in turn
exerts its own influence back on the domestic theatre. Some view its birth as a direct consequence
of the security vacuum left after the collapse of state institutions and the absence of the rule of law,
which enables criminals to act freely (Hansen 2009: 11). Others stress an economic perspective,
saying that widespread poverty resulting from the absence of state actors capable of organizing
economic life pushed fishers to turn to illegal activities in order to ensure their survival. Pp -6-7.
Traditionally, the large number of clans living on the Somali ground and the scarcity of
resources have been the source of many conflicts. The Somali clan structure has undergone major
changes during the 19th and 20th century related to the political evolution of the country. The
centralized state structures created by western powers during colonization fundamentally
contradicted the traditional Somali system. This caused major upheavals in the organization of the
whole society. Yet the most important changes occurred during the reign of Siad Barre. Officially,
his government wanted to break the traditional social structure of Somalia, which was seen as an
obstacle to the modernization and development of the country. It launched massive nationalization
and sedentarization campaigns.
Just like any form of social organization in Somalia, piracy relies on rules defined by the
clan structure. It plays a role on two different levels: in the building and internal organization of
pirate groups and in their relations with other actors. Hierarchy within the groups is also based on
Somali traditions. It also plays a major role in the behavior of pirates towards other actors. In case
of a conflict, they are expected to show loyalty to their sub-clan and support important personalities
in their community. Pp. 17-18.

AICI!!!!! James Phillips, Somalia and al-

Qaeda: Implications for the War on Terrorism, The Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C., 2002,
Somalia is a failed state whose lawless anarchy would permit terrorists to operate relatively
freely. Al-Qaeda has operated there in the past and has worked with a radical Somali group, al-
Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI or Islamic Unity), since the early 1990s. Somalia also has a long
seacoast with numerous unpatrolled ports that could provide easy entry for al-Qaeda terrorists
fleeing from Afghanistan via Pakistan or Iran by sea. If it were to intervene in Somalia, the United
States would discover that Somalias anarchy, which makes it fertile ground for Islamic extremists,
also makes it an extremely unpredictable arena for military operations..
The Clinton Administration discovered this when it expanded a 1992 humanitarian food
relief operation in Somalia into a failed nation-building experiment. U.S. peacekeeping troops
became a lightning rod for attacks by bin Ladens terrorists and his Somali allies. On October 3,
1993, 18 American special forces troops were killed in a battle with Somalis trained by bin Ladens
supporters. The subsequent withdrawal of the U.S. peacekeeping forces from Somalia in 1994 was
perceived as a triumph for bin Laden and probably encouraged him to launch increasingly
devastating terrorist attacks against the United States to drive American forces out of Saudi Arabia,
bin Ladens home country. P.1.
The failure of the Somali government contributed to the fracturing of the Somali nation.
Rival clan leaders mobilized armed followers to carve out competing fiefdoms. Southern Somalia
descended into a brutal civil war as warlords struggled for power and territory, particularly in the
war-torn capital of Mogadishu. There, the warlord most responsible for ousting the Barre regime,
General Mohammed Farah Aideed, gained a precarious dominance over rival warlords Muse Sude
Yalahow and Ali Mahdi Mohammed. By 1992, chronic factional fighting had exacerbated the
growing humanitarian crisis. Farmers hampered by intermittent drought, economic chaos, and
political violence increasingly were unable to plant and harvest food crops. An estimated 300,000
Somalis died of starvation during the early 1990s.6 The United Nations Security Council launched
an emergency food relief operation in August 1992 but was unable to assure the distribution of
food supplies because of the deteriorating security situation, particularly in the south. Somali
warlords ruthlessly plundered relief supplies to feed and subsidize their own militias. Pp.2-3

Marina Reyskens, Somali piracy and terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Routledge Taylor and
Francis Group, Ldondon, 2015,
Somali piracy attacks surged between 2005 and 2011. Although maritime piracy is as old
as seaborne trade, and currently pirates also prey on ships in the Straits of Malacca and the waters
of Southeast Asia, the Caribbean seas, and the Gulf of Guinea, what is unique about Somali pirates
is the high frequency of attacks. Piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia rose dramatically after
2005 and reached a high of 243 in 2011 but then plunged in 2012 to 63 reported attacks and 15
hijackings as of September. Somali pirates almost exclusively attack vessels to hold cargos and
crews hostage and negotiate their release in exchange for ransom. Since the first known Somali
hijacking in April 2005, 149 ships have reportedly been ransomed for an estimated total of
US$315US$385 million
The international community has mobilized to combat the surge of piracy off the Horn of
Africa. Over 40 countries are involved in military counter-piracy operations, in a national capacity
or through three coalitions: the European Union Naval Force Somalia through Operation Atalanta,
the Standing Naval Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through Operation
Ocean Shield, and Combined Task Force 151. Since 2008, the United Nations (UN) Security
Council has adopted 13 resolutions to support counter-piracy action off the Horn of Africa. Beyond
the UN, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the League of Arab States, and NATO
have all moved to fight piracy off the Horn.. P.11.

Combaterea Pirateriei din Somalia

R. Chuck Mason, Piracy: A Legal Definition, Congressional Research Service, Washington
D.C, 2010,
Contemporary Proceedings
The international community has responded to the threat of piracy in the waters off the
Horn of Africa with multinational naval patrols, diplomatic coordination efforts, and enhanced
private security efforts by members of the commercial shipping industry. However, questions
regarding legal jurisdiction, due process for detained pirate suspects, and the role of foreign
military forces in anti-piracy law enforcement activities may complicate current U.S. and
international rations against pirates in the Horn of Africa region. The most immediate legal concern
associated with anti-piracy operations is jurisdictional questions that arise based on the location of
pirate attacks and/or international naval interventions, the nationalities of crew members, and the
countries of registry and/or ownership of any seized vessels. Recent reports suggest that some of
the Somali pirates are teenage minors,40 and therefore could have a defense of infancy in certain
jurisdictions that may assert jurisdiction over the offense. Pp.4-5.
Marianne Riddervold, A Geopolitical Balancing Game? EU and NATO in the Fight Against
Somali Piracy, ARENA, Oslo 2014,
Against this background, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) called for states
and international organizations to take action against piracy outside Somalia in a number of
resolutions (UNSCR). Responding to the situation, the United States of America (the US)
established a coalition of the willing Combined Maritime Task Force1 (CTF-151) designated to
fight piracy as part of enduring freedom. And following a direct request from the UN
SecretaryGeneral, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched the humanitarian
operation Allied Provider to protect WFP shipments in October 2008. P.1

European Union Navel Force, European Union Operation HQ Northweood Headquarters,

site: www.eunavfor.eu
http://eunavfor.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/20150112_EU-Naval-Force-Operation-Atalanta-
Information-Booklet-EN-hyperlinks.pdf
Data collated since 2008 demonstrate that EU NAVFOR, in cooperation with her counter-
piracy partners, has become highly effective in preventing attacks before they happen. Taken
together, intelligence-led operations, a robust and proactive stance, as well as the continued effort
to impress upon the maritime industry and the merchant community the importance of self-
protection measures, have decreased the success rate of those attacks which are mounted.
At the height of Somali piracy in January 2011, 736 hostages and 32 ships were being held
by pirates. By December 2014 that number has dropped to 30 hostages and no ships being held.
Since the launch of the Operation in 2008, EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA has: Had a
100% success rate in providing protection to WFP vessels delivering food / aid to the Somali
people and to AMISOM shipments critical to the success of the African Union operation in
Somalia. Ensured the protection of other vulnerable shipping within the IRTC and the High Risk
Area. Contributed to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery
at sea off the coast of Somalia. P 18.

Alexandru Voicu, Ruxandra Laura Bosilca, Maritime Security Governance in the fight against
piracy off the coast of Somalia: A focus on the E.U. Response, EURINT Proceedings,
Iasi,2015,
In terms of multilateral naval missions, the EU NAVFOR-Operation Atalanta, Operation
Ocean Shield by NATO and the US-led Combined Maritime Task Forces (CMF) have played a
vital role in fighting piracy. Since 2008, NATO has been one of the first and most active actors in
counter-piracy in the region launching three successive operations, namely Allied Provider, Allied
Protector and Operation Ocean Shield. Within this framework, NATO has escorted WFP charted
ships, has conducted deterrence patrols and surveillance tasks, has prevented and disrupted
hijackings and armed robbery and more recently, it has broadened its focus to include not only at-
sea counter-piracy activities, but also regional capacity building initiatives.
The North Atlantic Alliance`s operations have been carried out in coordination with other
counterpiracy initiatives undertaken by the EU, the US, China, India or South Korea. NATO also
has an important role in the dissemination of information on maritime issues. For instance, the
NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) represents the main point of contact between NATO`s naval forces
and the maritime community for exchanging merchant shipping information, supporting NATO,
national and multinational maritime operations; the NSC also provides information to merchant
shipping about potential maritime risks and seeks to foster co-operation between military
commanders and commercial shipping operators.1 Several regional inter-governmental
organizations are also vehicles of governance in the counter-piracy field, with a higher or lesser
degree of influence:
The African Union, the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the
East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and
Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as Indian Ocean Commission (IOC).
Among these, the African Union (AU) has been the most prominent actor. Its counter-piracy
initiatives include the African Maritime Transport Charter and Maritime Transport Plan of Action,
the Durban Resolution on Maritime Safety. Solutions to the problem of piracy have been sought
outside formal settings as well. For instance, the Oceans beyond Piracy program (OBP), a project
launched in 2010 by the One Earth Future Foundation (OEF) - a private non-profit organization
based in the US - gathers a wide network of experts through its meetings and workshops and
provides research and analysis. The response of OBP revolves around three core areas: gathering
the support of stakeholders from the maritime community; developing close partnerships between
the public and the private sectors, and contributing to the deterrence of piracy through a strong rule
of law (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2013). . Pp 377-378.