CAPISONDA, CLAIRE IRIS J.

JD-3A
2014-120266

claire.iris.capisonda@gmail.com

PP v. YATAR
G.R. No. 150224
May 19, 2004

FACTS: On June 30, 1998, at 9:00 am, Judilyn Pas-a, left, the victim, Kathylyn
Uba, her 17 year old cousin, alone at her grandmother's house, Isabel
Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga to go to their farm in Nagbitayan. Earlier
that morning, the victim handed a letter written by their aunt, to the accused-
appellant, Joel Yatar, husband of the latter, who used to live in the said house
prior to their separation.

An hour later, Anita Wania stopped by the house of Isabel, and saw appellant at
the back of the house. She asked the appellant what he was doing there, and he
replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.

At 12:30 pm, Judilyn arrived and she saw appellant., wearing a white collared
shirt and black pants, descend the ladder from the second floor of the house.

At 1:30 pm, she again, saw appellant when he called her near her house and this
time wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he
would not be getting lumber he had stacked, and that she could use it. She
noticed that appellant's eyes were "reddish and sharp".

In the evening, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her
house were off. As she went uptairs, he noticed that the door was tied with a
rope, which she used a knife to open. Behind it she found the lifeless, naked,
cold and rigid body of Kathylyn with her intestines protruding out of her stomach.

Consequently, appellant, who denied any knowledge of the victim's

death, was placed under the custody of the police.

He was charged with Rape with Homicide and was accordingly sentenced to
Death.

Hence, this automatic review.

ISSUE: Whether or not circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict an

accused in the absence of an eye witness.

HELD: Yes. The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in

light of the well-settled rule which provides that an accused can be convicted
even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is
presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed
the crime.

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an

unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the
accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine
whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur:
(1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen found in the victims

vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as
being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant
and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim,
Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellants wife left the house because of their
frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter
from his estranged wife in the early morning of June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was
seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998
near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a
dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder
of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30
p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the
husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw
appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on
the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor
of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba,
lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra,
underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination
revealed sperm in the victims vagina (Exhibits H and J); (11) The stained or
dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12)
DNA of slide, Exhibits J and H, compared with the DNA profile of the appellant
are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was
subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.

BRILLANTE v. CA
G.R. No. 118757; G.R. 121571
October 19, 2004

FACTS: Roberto Brillante, then a candidate for the position of councilor in

Makati City held a press conference where he accused Jejomar Binay, a
candidate for mayoralty in Makati, and Nemesio Prudente of plotting an
assassination plot against Augusto Syjuco, another mayoral candidate in
Makati. Several journalists wrote articles regarding the same and an open
letter was published as well. Later, Binay and Prudente both filed libel
charges against Brillante. The trial court found Brillante guilty of four
counts of libel, which decision the CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the offense charged had already prescribed when
the information was filed.

HELD: No. The one-year prescriptive period for libel reckons from the date of filing of
the complaints with the office of the prosecutor as clarified by the Court
in Olarte and Francisco and as stated in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended in 1988, and not at the time the infomation was filed.
SALAMERA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 121099; 303 SCRA 217
February 17, 1999

FACTS: Ponciano Benavidez filed a complaint for theft against the petitioner, Mayor
Fidel Salamera of Casiguran Aurora before the Sandiganbayan.

It was regarding the Smith & Wesson revolver gun that was mortgaged to him by
barangay chairman Antonio Benavidez and which was owned and licensed to Ponciano
Benavidez. When the owner demanded the return of his gun the latter cannot produce
the item because it was conficted by the police during the checkpoint when Mayor
Salamera and his security went to Manila. The Sandiganbayan convicted the Mayor for
the crime of Malversation of Public Property.

Petitioner made restitution of the gun to the private owner, Ponciano Benavidez,
which value was fixed by the Sandiganbayan based on the judicial notice it took of its
market value.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan was correct in fixing the value of the gun.

HELD: No. The Sandiganbayan could not take judicial notice of the value of the gun. It
must be duly proved in evidence as a fact. The court cannot take judicial notice of a
disputed fact. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which
are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions.7 Otherwise, the court must receive evidence of disputed facts
with notice to the parties.8 This is an innovation introduced in the Revised Rules of
Evidence the Supreme Court adopted on July 1, 1989, which should not be unknown to
the lower courts.9 The new rule of evidence governs this case, since it was decided in
1995, six years after its effectivity.

PP v. ENCINADA
G.R. No. 116720
October 2, 1997

FACTS: That on or about May 21, 1992, in the City of Surigao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in
gross disregard of the prohibition of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control dried marijuana
leaves weighing 800 grams, more or less, which he transported to Surigao City
from Cebu City aboard a passenger ship, well knowing that such acts are
expressly prohibited by law.

Before arraignment, appellant, assisted by Counsel Antonio Casurra, offered to plead

guilty to a lesser offense, i.e., illegal possession of prohibited drugs. The trial court
requested the prosecution to study the offer, but the records do not show any agreement
on such proposal.

Upon his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. After the prosecution
presented its evidence, the defense filed, with leave of court, a Demurrer to Evidence
dated September 1, 1993, questioning the admissibility of the evidence which allegedly
was illegally seized from appellant. The court a quo denied the motion, ruling:

For resolution is the demurrer to evidence dated September 1, 1993 of the accused, Roel
Encinada, praying that he be acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of the
inadmissibility of the evidence for the prosecution consisting of the marijuana (seized)
from him by the police. The accused raised the following issues, to wit: (1) Whether the
arrest and search of the accused without a warrant would fall under the doctrine of
warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest; and, (2) Whether the subject
marijuana is admissible in evidence against the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not the seized marijuana is admissible in evidence, when such seizure
was neither effected through a valid search warrant nor a lawful warrantless search.

HELD: No. The item seized is inadmissible as evidence. Without the illegally seized
prohibited drug, the appellants conviction cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient
evidence remaining to convict him. That the search disclosed a prohibited substance in
appellants possession, and thus confirmed the police officers initial information and
suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and
then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search.

PP v. PACIS
130 SCRA 540

FACTS: On November 15, 1967 in the municipality of Sanchez Mira, province of

Cagayan, the accused conspired together, armed with guns, with the intent to kill,
with treachery and with evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior
strength and feloniously attacked and shot Manuel Franco which caused his
instantaneous death.

Pacis, one of the appellants and Negre were contenders for the position of mayor in
Mira. Pacis was the candidate of the Nacionalista party and was the incumbent mayor,
Negre was the candidate of the Liberal party. Franco, the deceased was the incumbent
vice-mayor of Pacis but now the campaign manager of Negre.

In the morning of November 15, 1967, the day of the election, Franco and Basco went to
Namunac Elementary school to get the election results from the precincts. Of which the
two contenders met and from which the firing of gunshots came about.

Agdeppa denied participation in the commission of crimes and interposed an alibi.

According to him, he was in Taguiporo where he was employed in the Agricultural
Extension Office, at the time of the shooting incident occurred in Namuac. To support
the alibi, he presented in evidence the time record he had accomplished and testimony
of Jose Tabian who allegedly rode with him on his motorcycle.

The CFI, however, rejected the defense saying that the evidence of the prosecution is
more worthy of credence. CFI specially cited the testimony of Basco which, is to its
mind, more credible. Counsel for the appellant now contends that the CFI erred in
convicting the appellant, citing the maxim of falsus in uno falsus in omnibuss [false in
one thing is false in everything]

However, the maxim is not a positive law, neither is it an inflexible one of universal
application. The testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part.
The counsel for the appellant also claims that the bullet marks on the cement
conclusively show that the shooting came from the street and not from the truck where
Pacis, Navarro and Agdeppa were standing. The trial court discounted the theory.

ISSUE: Whether or not falsus in uno falsus in omnibus applies.

HELD: No. The maxim of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, however, is not a positive rule
of law. Neither is it an inflexible one of universal application. If a part of a witness
testimony is found true, it cannot be disregarded entirely. The testimony of a witness
may be believed in part and disbelieved in part.
The trial court rejected the defense saying that the evidence for the prosecution is more
worthy of credence, more natural in the light of human conduct and behavior, more
credible, than that for the defense. The trial court specially cited the testimony of
Macario Basco which, to its mind, is very natural, credible and from a witness who told
nothing but the truth.

PP v. DUCAY
G.R. No. 86939
August 2, 1993
FACTS: Father and son Santos and Edgardo Ducay, were charged with the complex crime
of double murder and multiple frustrated murder. Upon arraignment, both accused
entered a plea of not guilty. In due course, the trial on the merits proceeded. Lina and
Edwin Labos, both seriously injured in the incident, were among the witnesses
presented by the prosecution. Lina testified that at about 5:00 oclock in the morning of
12 October 1986, Santos Ducay and his son, Edgardo entered her home armed with a
shot gun and a .45 caliber pistol respectively. They then began shooting at Manuel,
Linas husband, and Pacita, her mother-in-law. Both were killed.

The accused also shot at her, Edwin, and Ma. Cristina, her six month old daughter. They
three would have been killed as well if not for medical assistance. Lina was able to
identify the two accused. Edwin corroborated Linas testimony. Erwin Labos, brother of
Edwin, also made a statement, duly subscribed and sworn to, positively identifying
appellant [Santos] as the shooter. However, two days after the shooting, he executed a
supplemental statement alleging that the second assailant was a tall man with curly hair
and mestizo features. The trial court found Santos Ducay guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged but acquitted Edgardo Ducay on the ground of reasonable
doubt.

The trial court expressed that two murders and three frustrated murders were
committed but did not impose the corresponding penalties because the information to
which the accused pleaded is only one crime of double murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Santos Ducay then filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration/Or New Trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence in the form of the lab result of a paraffin test.
The motion was denied for lack of merit. He then filed a Notice of Appeal, thus, the
present case.

ISSUE: Whether the supplementary and contemporaneous statements made by Erwin

should have been admitted.

HELD: No. Firstly, Erwin was not called by the defense as its witness. Whatever
declaration he made to any party, either written or oral, is thus hearsay. Besides, the
supplementary statement was not under oath while his first statement implicating the
appellant was duly subscribed and sworn to.

Moreover, the rule on spontaneous statements as part of the res gestae is stated in Sec.
42, Rule 130 of the Rules of court: statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to
the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae
provided that: (1) that the principal act be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statement
was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
The alleged contemporaneous statement was made two days after the shooting
incident. In no way can it be said that Erwin was under the stress of an exciting event or
condition.

PP v. GARCIA
G.R. No. 1107010
April 18, 1997
FACTS: In 1993, Carlos Garcia, Patricio Botero, and Luisa Miraples were accused
of illegal recruitment. It was alleged that they represented themselves as the
incorporators and officers of Ricorn Philippine International Shipping Lines, Inc.;
that Ricorn is a recruitment agency for seamen; that Garcia is the president, Botero
is the vice-president, and Miraples (now at large) is the treasurer. It was later
discovered that Ricorn was never registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and that it was never authorized to recruit by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). Botero and Garcia were convicted. Botero
appealed.
In his defense, Botero averred that he was not an incorporator; that he was merely
an employee of Ricorn in charge of following up on their documents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court the testimony of witness Esclada is inadmissible
for being inconsistent

HELD: Accused-appellant Botero wants this court to apply the doctrine of falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus (false in one part, false in everything) and to disregard the entire
testimony of Esclada. Under present jurisprudence, this maxim of law is rarely adhered to
by the courts. It is possible to admit and lend credence to the testimony of a witness
whom the Court has earlier found to have willfully perjured himself. The testimony of a
witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, depending upon the
corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case. In the case
at bar, we hold that the trial court did not err in giving credence to the testimony of
Esclada against appellant Botero since it was corroborated on its material points by the
testimony of other witnesses. In fact, Escladas testimony against Botero is trustworthy
as he gave it after his conscience bothered him for not telling the truth.

PP v. BANDIN
G.R. No. 104494
September 10, 1993
FACTS: In the afternoon of June 24, 1991, an informer reported to the police stationed at
Camp Simeon Ola in Legazpi City that drug trafficking by a pusher named Abling was
rampant at Bagtang Terminal, Daraga, Albay.

Upon receipt of the report that a certain Abling was a rampant pusher in Albay, a buy-
bust operation was organized by the NARCOM.

The informer approached the appellant, Paul Bandin alias Abling, who was seated in a
trimobile, and asked him if he had marijuana for sale. The appellant replied that he had.
The informer left and returned after a short while with Sgt. Tuzon, who, acting as poseur-
buyer, bought a tea bag of marijuana from the appellant. As payment, Sgt. Tuzon gave
him the marked bills amounting to P20.00

Thereafter, Sgt. Tuzon Jr. gave the pre-arranged signal to his companions by combing his
hair. The latter approached the appellant and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents.
A body search was conducted on the appellant which resulted in the recovery from him
of the marked money bills and a stick of marijuana cigarette.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Receipt of Property Seized signed by the accused
may be admitted as evidence of his admission of guilt.
2. Whether or not the testimony of the forensic expert is admissible.

HELD: No. As the Court reiterates its ruling in People vs. Rualo, 152 SCRA 635,
that when an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a
police station, he does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to
any incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the
accuseds being booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of an arrest.
It is a police report and may be useful in charges of arbitrary detention against
the police themselves. It is not an extrajudicial statement and cannot be the basis
of a judgment of conviction.

The field test conducted by Sgt. Tuzon is judicially admissible. This Court has
held that a chemical analysis is not an indispensable prerequisite to the
establishment of whether a certain substance offered in evidence is a prohibited
drug. The ability to recognize these drugs can be acquired without a knowledge
of chemistry to such an extent that testimony of a witness on the point may be
entitled to great weight. Such technical knowledge is not required, and the
degree of familiarity of a witness with such drugs only affects the weight and not
the competency of his testimony.

PP v. MAUYAO
207 SCRA 732

FACTS: On 20 April 1987, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, after relating
with an informant who admitted having acted as a runner for the accused-
appellant Arturo Mauyao , P/Sgt. Jimmy Carbonell formed a raiding team
composed of himself as team leader, and four (4) others as members, among
them, Pat. Rizal Papa and Pat. Ramon Alferos. Pat. Alferos would be the poseur
buyer and thus, was handed two (2) ten-peso bills, both initialled by Pat. Papa.
P/Sgt. Carbonell would be the arresting officer, while the others would act as
back-up security.

The apprehending party then boarded a civilian Ford Fiera and proceeded to Leyte del Sur
Street, stopping a few meters away from where the suspect was expected. Pat. Alferos
walked with the informant towards the residence of the accused-appellant. P/Sgt.
Carbonell, who was then in short pants and slippers, positioned himself on the other side
of the street across the residence of the accused-appellant, pretending to buy fish balls
from a fish ball stand. He was, more or less, four (4) meters away from where the
transaction was to take place. The others likewise took their respective positions.

Upon seeing the accused-appellant, who was just standing outside his house at 923 Leyte
del Sur Street, the informant introduced Pat. Alferos. Pat. Alferos was described to the
accused-appellant as a drug addict. Pat. Alferos then told the accused-appellant that he
wanted to buy five (5) tea bags. Pat. Alferos gave him the two (2) marked ten peso bills.
The accused-appellant, in turn, handed over to Pat. Alferos five (5) tea bags and two (2)
sticks of marijuana cigarettes as free.

At this point, Pat. Alferos introduced himself as a police officer and arrested the accused-
appellant. Meanwhile, after witnessing the exchange, P/Sgt. Carbonell, who was across
the street, immediately ran towards the suspect, (accused-appellant) and assisted the
poseur-buyer to arrest the suspect. The other team members, upon seeing P/Sgt.
Carbonell, also closed in on the accused-appellant.

The accused-appellant then voluntarily surrendered the red clutch bag tucked to his waist
which turned out to contain ten (10) more tea bags of marijuana leaves and four (4) more
sticks of marijuana cigarettes. The two (2) marked ten pesos bills and some other bills
were likewise recovered from him. The place where the transaction took place was well-
lighted by a street light. There was no search and seizure warrant for the subject
operation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonies may still be given credence despite their
improbabilities and inconsistencies.

HELD: It was rule by the Supreme Court that Minor inconsistencies and
contradictions in the declaration of witnesses do not destroy their credibility, but
even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony.

Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details

and collateral matters do not affect either their substance of their declaration, their
veracity or the weight of their testimony.

Supreme Court will not disturb the findings of the Trial Court except in case of an evident
abuse thereof. This Court, in a long line of decisions, has repeatedly held that the findings
of fact of a trial judge who has seen the witnesses testify and who has observed their
demeanor and conduct while on the witness stand are not disturbed on appeal, unless
certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, may
affect the outcome of the case.
PP v. TURLA
167 SCRA 278

FACTS: The evidence shows that on September 23,1984 at around 3:00 o'clock
in the afternoon, Sgt. Venusto Jamisolamin of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit,
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga received information from an informer
that at dawn the following day a drug pusher was going to steal a car at the
vicinity of 3rd Street, Balibago, Angeles City.
"On the same date, Sgt. Ruben Bazar, also of the 3rd Regional Narcotics Unit, with the aid
of an informer, met the herein accused at the Hongkong Restaurant in Angeles City. In
that meeting, Sgt. Bazar, who pretended to be a civilian, proposed to buy from the
accused a kilo of marijuana for P1 ,000.00. It was then agreed that the accused would
deliver the marijuana on the following day between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock in the morning
at the Pampanguea Restaurant in San Fernando, Pampanga.

"Acting on the information supplied by his informant, Sgt. Jamisolamin together

with Sgts. Daniel M. Guillermo and one Sgt. Nava, left Camp Olivas at around 3:45
in the morning of September 24, 1984 for the purpose of arresting the would be
thief. On reaching 3rd Street, Balibago, Angeles City, at around 4:10 in the
morning, the three PC sergeants, together with Sgt. Jamisolamin's informer, who
was already waiting for them, positioned themselves inconspicuously near the
place where the Toyota car was parked. After waiting for about fifteen minutes, a
man appeared, proceeded to the car, opened its left door and drove the car away.
Sgt. Jamisolamin recognized the man as the same man he had previously arrested
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. That man was Danilo Turla, alias Danny
Bangus. The PC sergeants attempted to pursue the accused but lost sight of him
when their car developed engine trouble. Having failed to apprehend the accused,
the PC soldiers, together with the informer, decided to return to San Fernando,
Pampanga to assist Sgt. Bazar in arresting a drug pusher whom the latter would
meet at the Pampanguea Restaurant. Upon reaching Barangay Dolores, San
Fernando, Pampanga, the informer noticed the red Toyota Corona, which they had
earlier pursued, parked at a Shell gasoline station. The PC soldiers, after their
attention was called to such fact, immediately drove to the gasoline station to effect
an arrest. There, the soldiers confronted the accused as to the ownership of the
car and asked him to show his driver's license and the car's registration papers.
The accused could not show neither of the documents asked but explained to the
soldiers that the car belonged to his sister. The PC soldiers then directed the
accused to open the back compartment of the car. At first, the accused hesitated
but finally opened it. Inside the trunk, the PC soldiers found a sack. Upon further
inspection, the sack yielded a plastic bag containing dried marijuana leaves
weighing at about one kilo (Exhibit E-1). When asked as to the ownership of the
marijuana leaves, the accused declared that he does not know anything of the
articles.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient to support a
finding that he is guilty of the crime charged, since he was not caught in the act of selling
marijuana, and his ownership or possession of the marijuana leaves, said to have been
found inside the trunk compartment of the car, has not been duly proved.

HELD: It is claimed for the defense that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
contradictory and conflicting so that they do not deserve credence. It would appear,
however, that the contradictory and conflicting statements pointed out by counsel for
the accused-appellant refer to minor details which cannot destroy the credibility of
witnesses. Again, the issue posed is one of credibility of witnesses which, as this Court has
often said, is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial judge, who had
first-hand opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses
both for the prosecution and the defense, at the time of their testimony. We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial judge.
PP v. ARAPOK
G.R. No. 134974
December 8, 2000

FACTS: That on or about the 29th of November, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with four (4) other persons whose
true names and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one
another, armed with firearms with intent to gain and by means of force, violence against
and intimidation of persons, to wit: by entering the residence of one Mesiona located at
No. 044 Gold Street, Barangay Commonwealth, this City and once inside by poking their
firearms at the persons inside the said house and announcing that it was a holdup did
then and there steal and carry away personal properties of the victims.

Senior Inspector Macerin testified that nine operatives including himself were dispatched
to Barangay Commonwealth to conduct surveillance. The operatives went to different
places in the barangay. At 9:45 p.m., while cruising along Fabian street, they heard
gunshots approximately 30 to 40 meters away. They alighted as they were alarmed. When
they got down they saw three male persons running towards their direction, and one was
carrying a plastic bag. He could not identify the one carrying the supot. They identified
themselves as police officers and immediately one of them fired at him. He retaliated and
also fired. There was a running gunfight, but they stopped chasing and attended to
Calcitas who was wounded. During the firefight he noticed that they wounded two of the
suspects. They were able to apprehend all but one of the wounded suspects right then
and there. Subsequently, they received a call from a police station about a male person
with a gunshot wound confined at the National Orthopedic Hospital. Upon verification, it
was found out that the person with a gunshot wound was registered as Reynaldo Reyes.
On cross-examination, he testified that he was not actually present when the house of
Claudelia Mesiona was robbed; that he saw Arapok in the hospital in Banawe in December
but did not recover any of the stolen items from him. He didnt know that Danilo Arapok
was at the scene of the crime.8

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-
appellant considering that he was not clearly positively identified and absent any
proof of conspiracy.

HELD: Yes. In seeking the conviction of an accused in a criminal case, the first, if
not the basic foundation upon which the prosecution builds its case against the
former is proof beyond reasonable doubt that it is the said accused who
committed the crime charged. In other words, the identity of the accused is the
first duty of the prosecution.

In cases such as the instant one, where the identification made by the principal
eyewitness Claudelia Mesiona was uncertain, a little extra effort on the part of the
prosecution to acquire appropriate corroborating evidence goes far towards achieving
the proper ends of justice. Whatever flaw attended the out-of-court identification of
accused-appellant could have easily been cured by a subsequent positive identification
in court by Editho Mesiona himself. Stated in another way, inadmissibility or
unreliability of an out-of-court identification should not necessarily foreclose the
admissibility of an independent in-court identification.
Once again we stress that the correct identification of the author of a crime should be
the primal concern of criminal prosecution in any civilized legal system. Corollary to this
is the actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of the accused.
All these must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its
evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense. Thus, even if the
defense of the accused may be weak, the same is inconsequential if, in the first place,
the prosecution failed to discharge the onus on his identity and culpability. The
presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the people to demonstrate guilt and not
for the accused to establish innocence.
AGUENZA v. METROBANK
G.R. No. 74336
April 7, 1997

FACTS: On February 28, 1977, the Board of Directors of Intertrade, through a

Board Resolution, authorized and empowered petitioner and private respondent
Vitaliado Arrieta, Intertrades President and Executive Vice-President,
respectively, to jointly apply for and open credit lines with private respondent
Metrobank. Pursuant to such authority, petitioner and private respondent Arrieta
executed several trust receipts from May to June, 1977, the aggregate value of
which amounted to P562,443.46, with Intertrade as the entrustee and private
respondent Metrobank as the entruster.

On March 14, 1977, petitioner and private respondent Arrieta executed a Continuing
Suretyship Agreement whereby both bound themselves jointly and severally with
Intertrade to pay private respondent Metrobank whatever obligation Intertrade incurs,
but not exceeding the amount of P750,000.00.

In this connection, private respondent Metrobanks Debit Memo to Intertrade dated

March 22, 1978 showed full settlement of the letters of credit covered by said trust
receipts in the total amount of P562,443.46.

On March 21, 1978, private respondents Arrieta and Lilia P. Perez, a bookkeeper
in the employ of Intertrade, obtained a P500,000.00 loan from private respondent
Metrobank. Both executed a Promissory Note in favor of said bank in the amount
of P500,000.00. Under said note, private respondents Arrieta and Perez promised
to pay said amount, jointly and severally, in twenty five (25) equal installments of
P20,000.00 each starting on April 20, 1979 with interest of 18.704% per annum,
and in case of default, a further 8% per annum.

Private respondents Arrieta and Perez defaulted in the payment of several

installments, thus resulting in the entire obligation becoming due and demandable.
In 1979, private respondent Metrobank instituted suit against Intertrade, Vitaliado
Arrieta, Lilia Perez and her husband, Patricio Perez, to collect not only the unpaid
principal obligation, but also interests, fees and penalties, exemplary damages, as
well as attorneys fees and costs of suit.

More than a year after private respondent Metrobank filed its original complaint, it
filed an Amended Complaint dated August 30, 1980 for the sole purpose of
impleading petitioner as liable for the loan made by private respondents Arrieta
and Perez on March 21, 1978, notwithstanding the fact that such liability is being
claimed on account of a Continuing Suretyship Agreement dated March 14, 1977
executed by petitioner and private respondent Arrieta specifically to guarantee the
credit line applied for by and granted to, Intertrade, through petitioner and private
respondent Arrieta who were specially given authority by Intertrade on February
28, 1977 to open credit lines with private respondent Metrobank. The obligations
incurred by Intertrade under such credit lines were completely paid as evidenced
by private respondent Metrobanks debit memo in the full amount of P562,443.46.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts appreciation of the facts and pieces of evidence
presented is incorrect.

HELD: The Court says we note that the only document to evidence the subject transaction
was the promissory note dated March 21, 1978 signed by private respondents Arrieta and
Lilia Perez. There is no indication in said document as to what capacity the two signatories
had in affixing their signatures thereon.

It is noted that the subject transaction is a loan contract for P500,000.00 under terms and
conditions which are stringent, if not onerous. The power to borrow money is one of
those cases where even a special power of attorney is required. In the instant case, there
is invariably a need of an enabling act of the corporation to be approved by its Board of
Directors. As found by the trial court, the records of this case is bereft of any evidence
that Intertrade through its Board of Directors, conferred upon Arrieta and Lilia Perez the
authority to contract a loan with Metrobank and execute the promissory note as a
security therefor. Neither a board resolution nor a stockholders resolution was presented
by Metrobank to show that Arrieta and Lilia Perez were empowered by Intertrade to
execute the promissory note.

GARCIA v. CA and SECURITY BANK

G.R. 119845
July 5, 1996

FACTS: On November 19, 1980, respondent Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC) granted
Dynetics, Inc. a short-term EXPORT loan line in the amount of P25 million pursuant to an
Advisory Letter-Agreement. The loan was secured by a deed of assignment with pledge
on export letters of credit and/or purchase orders equivalent to 100% of their face value.
The said credit line was subsequently renewed on various dates and in various amounts,
the last renewal having been made on January 24, 1985 in the increased amount of P26
million evidenced by the Renewal Credit Line Agreement.
Pursuant to said Renewal Credit Line Agreement, Dynetics availed itself of the export loan
for the period of February to May 1985 in the total amount of P25,074,906.16, executing
and signing for said purpose 34 promissory notes of various dates covering the
aforementioned period, and trust receipts.

Prior to this 1985 availment, particularly on April 20, 1982, Dynetics obtained another
credit accommodation or SWAP loan from SBTC in the amount of $700,000.00. To secure
payment thereof, petitioner Antonio Garcia, with Vicente B. Chuidian, executed an
Indemnity Agreement in favor of SBTC on April 26, 1982.

It appears that Dynetics did not avail itself of this SWAP loan. Subsequently,
however, in 1983, the SWAP loan facility was renewed in the reduced amount of
$500,000.00 and it was this loan which Dynetics availed of in 1985 and concerning
which it issued a promissory note. The SWAP loan was renewed in 1984, this time
on a quarterly basis, the last quarterly renewal having been made on April 22,
1985. By this time, SBTC required Dynetics to execute a continuing suretyship
undertakingin accordance with, and in pursuance of, which petitioner Garcia bound
himself jointly and severally with Dynetics to pay all the latters obligations with
respondent SBTC. Subsequent thereto, however, and without the consent and
knowledge of Garcia, SBTC required Dynetics to execute a chattel mortgage over
various pieces of machinery to secure the SWAP loan.

Dynetics failed to pay the SWAP loan upon its maturity on July 22, 1985, prompting
SBTC to foreclose on the chattel mortgage. The mortgaged chattels were sold at
public auction on September 15, 1985 to SBTC as highest bidder for the amount
of P6,850,861.30. This amount was applied as partial payment of the SWAP loan,
leaving a deficiency balance of P3,596,758.72.

Dynetics also defaulted in the payment of the EXPORT loan which amounted to
over P464 million, exclusive of attorneys fees and costs, as of June 30, 1989.

ISSUE: Whether or not the admission on cross-examination is conclusive against the

private respondent.

HELD: Yes. Judicial admissions verbal or written made by the parties in the pleadings or
in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence
being required to prove the same and cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (Philippine
American General Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194; 204 [1992])
We cannot allow SBTC at this time to water down the admission it made in open court,
more so after the opposing party relied upon such judicial admission and accordingly
dispensed with further proof of the fact already admitted. An admission made by a party
in the course of the proceedings does not require proof. The record here does not show
any attempt on the part of SBTC to contradict such judicial admission on the ground of
palpable mistake.
LA YEBANA v. SEVILLA
G.R. No. L-4123
November 16, 1907

FACTS: The complaint filed in this action alleges that on February 23, 1907, the defendant
Timoteo Sevilla was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of P4,363.42; that on that day the
defendant admitted this indebtedness and promised to pay the same; and that, although
demand had been made for payment, neither the amount due nor any part thereof had
been paid at the time of the filing of the complaint.

The defendant Sevilla in his answer admitted the truth of the allegations of the complaint,
but alleged by way of special defense that, while it was true he had promised to pay the
debt, the plaintiff had agreed to accept payment either at the rate of P500 weekly until
the entire amount was paid or from time to time in such sums as he, Sevilla, might be able
to collect or recover from the owners of certain stores in the Province of Bataan who had
received on credit goods furnished Sevilla on commission.
Counsel for the plaintiff thereupon prayed for judgment upon the pleadings; and the trial
court, without taking evidence as to the truth of the allegations of the defendant, gave
judgment against Sevilla and in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P4,362.42, with
interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of the filing of the complaint. In support
of this judgment the trial judge holds in his opinion "that the special defense set up by
the defendant Sevilla, in so far as it consists of allegations of facts, alleges the existence
of an agreement by virtue of which Sevilla had the right to pay his indebtedness in weekly
installments of P500," and that, the complaint having been filed on the 21st day of March,
1907, "it is evident that, admitting the truth of the allegations set up by the defense, the
debt in controversy has become due and payable."

ISSUE: Whether or not the existence of an agreement, by virtue of which Sevilla had the
right to pay his indebtedness in weekly installments.

HELD: Yes. The Court would be compelled to reverse the judgment upon the mere
allegation of the defense of the existence of an agreement, by virtue of which Sevilla
had the right to pay his indebtedness in weekly installments of P500, without an
allegation as to an alternative mode of payment. It appears from the pleadings that the
alleged agreement as to the mode of payment of the admitted indebtedness was
entered into on the 23d day of February, 1907. The complaint was filed on the 21st day
of March, 1907, so that not quite four weeks had elapsed from the date of the alleged
agreement to the date of the filing of the complaint. Where a debt is payable in
installments, recovery can be had only for those installments due and payable when the
action was commenced, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the
contract. (La Compania General de Tabacos vs. Araza, 7 Phil. Rep., 455; Artadi y
Compania vs. Chu Baco,1 5 Off. Gaz., 711.) It is evident, therefore; that, since it does not
appear from the pleadings that it was expressly stipulated that upon the failure to pay
any one of the weekly installments the whole debt should thereupon become at once
due and payable, the most that could be recovered would be the sum of P1,500, being
the weekly installments of P500 for the three full weeks which had elapsed from the
date of the agreement to the date of the filing of the complaint. The judgment appealed
from should be, and is hereby, reversed without costs in this instance to either party.

PP v. LARRAAGA
G.R. No. 138874-75
July 21, 2005

On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed to
come home on the expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found
dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her
breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with
masking tape and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was
identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced
and admitted before the police having participated in the abduction of the sisters.
He identified appellants Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen
Adlawan, Alberto Cao, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew
Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial
court:

1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and
told him to ride with them in a white car. Following them were Larraaga, James
Anthony and James Andrew who were in a red car. Josman stopped the white
car in front of the waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline were
standing and forced them to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen
handcuffed them jointly.

2) That after stopping by a safehouse, the group thereafter headed to the South
Bus Terminal where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by
the former. They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the
South Bus Terminal.

3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot
session. Later, they started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter
raped Jaqueline.

4) That Josman intructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push
her into the ravine.
The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as
an accused and became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never
found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The appellants assailed the said
decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there was consipiracy.
James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old when the crimes were
committed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in making Rusia a state witness hence affecting
the competency and quality of the testimony of defendant

HELD: No. The fact that Rusia was convicted of third degree burglary in Minessotta does
not render his testimony inadmissible. In People vs. De Guzman, we held that although
the trial court may have erred in discharging the accused, such error would not affect
the competency and the quality of the testimony of the defendant. In Mangubat vs.
Sandiganbayan, we ruled: Anent the contention that Delia Preagido should not have
been discharged as a state witness because of a previous final conviction of crimes
involving moral turpitude, suffice it to say that this Court has time and again declared
that even if the discharged state witness should lack some of the qualifications
enumerated by Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, his testimony will not, for that
reason alone, be discarded or disregarded. In the discharge of a co-defendant, the court
may reasonably be expected to err; but such error in discharging an accused has been
held not to be a reversible one. This is upon the principle that such error of the court
does not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of the discharged
defendant.
LAPU-LAPU FOUNDATION v. CA
G.R. No. 126006
January 29, 2004

FACTS: Elias Q. Tan, then President Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained four loans from
Allied Banking Corporation covered by four promissory notes in the amounts of P100,
000 each. When the entire obligation became due, it was not paid despite demands by
the bank. The Bank filed with the RTC a complaint seeking payment by Lapulapu
Foundation and Elias Tan, jointly and solidarily, of the sum representing their loan
obligation, exclusive of interests, penalty charges, attorneys fees and costs.

The Foundation denied incurring indebtedness from the Bank alleging that Tan obtained
the loans in his personal capacity, for his own use and benefit and on the strength of the
personal information he furnished the Bank. The Foundation maintained that it never
authorized petitioner Tan to co-sign in his capacity as its President any promissory note
and that the Bank fully knew that the loans contracted were made in Tans personal
capacity and for his own use and that the Foundation never benefited, directly or
indirectly, there from.

For his part, Tan admitted that he contracted the loans from the Bank in his personal
capacity. The parties, however, agreed that the loans were to be paid from the proceeds
of Tans shares of common stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corporation, a real estate
firm. The loans were covered by promissory notes which were automatically renewable
(rolled-over) every year at an amount including unpaid interests, until such time as
petitioner Tan was able to pay the same from the proceeds of his aforesaid shares.

ISSUE: May the Foundation correctly raise as a defense that it did not authorize Tan to
obtain the loans involved and therefore it may not be held solidarily liable for them?

HELD: NO. The Court agrees with the CA that the petitioners cannot hide behind
the corporate veil under the following circumstances:
The evidence shows that Tan has been representing himself as the President of
Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. He opened a savings account and a current account in the
names of the corporation, and signed the application form as well as the necessary
specimen signature cards twice, for himself and for the foundation. He submitted a
notarized Secretarys Certificate from the corporation, attesting that he has been
authorized, inter alia, to sign for and in behalf of the Lapulapu Foundation any and all
checks, drafts or other orders with respect to the bank; to transact business with the
Bank, negotiate loans, agreements, obligations, promissory notes and other commercial
documents; and to initially obtain a loan for P100, 000.00 from any bank. Under these
circumstances, the Foundation is liable for the transactions entered into by Tan on its
behalf.

The parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject petitioner Tans claim
regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank
on the payment of the obligation Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that [w]hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it
is to be considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.