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Laurel vs.

77 Phil. 856

FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by
giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was
suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his
acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.

HELD: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign.
No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine government still had the power. Moreover,
sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasnt
suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance.
Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since the sovereign the Filipino people is still the
same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the

Laurel vs Misa

Facts: the Supreme Court, in a resolution, acted on the petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed by petitioner anastacio
laurel based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the
Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the revised
penal code for the reason that 1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and consequently,
the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens ther to was then suspended; and 2) that there was a change of sovereignty
over these islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine republic.

Issues: Whether or not the allegiance of the accused as a Filipino citizen was suspended and that there was a change of
sovereignty over the Phil Islands.

Held: No, a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which
consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government of sovereign. The absolute and permanent
allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not
transferred thereby the occupier. Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Govt,
in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the US as
well as against the sovereignty of the Phil Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of govt from commonwealth to
republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the commonwealth,
bec it is an offense against the same govt and the same sovereign people.

Lawyers League vs Aquino

FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power
of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people are the judge. The Court further held that the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in
effective control of the entire country. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
Bara Lidasan vs Commission on Elections

Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed. Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios
located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman
of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter
registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being
unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in
its territory several barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato to be
spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?

HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such
title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of
Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from
their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out
later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of RA 4790.

Macariola Vs. Asuncion 114 SCRA 77


On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of an appeal.

On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of lots was not
signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola.
The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.

One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as Lot 1184 A E.
Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of certificate of Title No, 2338 of the
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn Lot 1184-E to the
Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and his wife Victoria was the
Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the corporation.

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the following provisions:
Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also
known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against Asuncion.


Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.


No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge" but was reminded
to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Galapon who
earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon
after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated
October and November, 1963. The said property was no longer the subject of litigation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent.
Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce,
which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have been abrogated because whenever there is a
change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted
by Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers cannot partake in
any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official capacity. The Judge and his wife had
withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that
the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches
of the Court of First Instance from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12,
1966 up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation contravenes
against Canon 25

Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands

The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work. One day, while
he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the
ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely
injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even
earn at least half of what he used to earn.

In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized Merritt to sue the
government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the
Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The
lower court then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.

HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability
to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right
to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible
for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in
the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts
through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a
definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.

In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a special agent
hence, there can be no liability from the government. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person
the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.
Ministerio vs The Court of First Instance of Cebu

FACTS: Petitioners sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot alleging that in 1927 the National
Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material possession of it and used it for the
widening of a national road, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There
was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public
Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants are immune from suit.

HOLDING: NO. Where the judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in
favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded
as one against the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the court except
with the consent of said Government. In as much as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts
of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose
rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit.

NOTE: When the government takes any property for public use, which is condition upon the payment of just
compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. The Court may
proceed with the complaint and determine the compensation to which the petitioner are entitle

Marcelo Montenegro vs Castaeda

In October 1950, Montenegros son was arrested by military agents. Three days after the arrest, PP 210 was proclaimed
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court to have his son be set free
for his arrest was w/o cause and that the said PP should not be applied retroactively to his son for it would then constitute
a violation of the constitutional prohibition against bill of attainders. Montenegro then filed a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus demanding the detainers to bring his sons body and explain his detention. Castaeda et al argued that the court
has no judicial authority over the matter invoking the PP and the previous ruling inBarcelon vs Baker.

ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegros petition should be granted.

HELD: As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegros petition is likewise denied. The constitutional authority of
the President to suspend in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article 7 may not correctly
be placed in doubt.

Jose Mondano vs Fernando Silvosa

Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and concubinage. The
information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Consequently,
Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended
Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.

In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that he, as part of the executive and by
virtue o the order given by the Assistant Executive Secretary, is with direct control, direction, and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . . and to that end may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any
person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee
or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of control over a mayor.

HELD: No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered him to
investigate Mondano).

The Constitution provides:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over
all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the power
of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control
and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus
and offices under his jurisdiction.

Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office
under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments
over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law.

If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the
corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that
reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation
would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution.

In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law
to make them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial
governor who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect
of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
involving moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the
provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in
such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge
be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to
the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of municipalities.

In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to Mondanos office. If the issue is not related
to his office but involves a rime of moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must first be a final
conviction before a suspension may be issued. The point is, the governor must suspend a mayor not because hes acting
as an agent of the Executive but because of the power granted him by the Revised Administrative Code.

Judge David Nitafan vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court seek to prohibit the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such
would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the
Court en banc had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice which directs the continued withholding of taxes of
the justices and the judges of the judiciary but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the issue once
and for all.

ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income tax.

HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their deliberations, was NOT to exempt justices
and judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just like members of the other branches of the government,
are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased
during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress.
But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased?

Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the judiciary and such increase will
immediately take effect thus the incumbent members of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the law increasing their
salary) shall benefit immediately.

Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary but such will only be applicable to
members of the judiciary which were appointed AFTER the effectivity of such law.

Note: This case abandoned the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and in Endencia vs David.