International Phenomenological Society

On the Early History of `Ontology'

Author(s): Jos Ferrater Mora
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Sep., 1963), pp. 36-47
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2104491 .
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 ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF 'ONTOLOGY'*

ChristianWolff popularized(in philosophicalcircles) the word 'ontol-

ogy' (ontologia, Ontologie). The word appears in the title of his Philo-
sophia prima sive ontologia methodo scientifica pertractata, qua omnes
cognitionis humanae principia continentur, first published in 1730. Onto-
logia seu philosophia prima is defined as scientia entis in genere, quatenus
ens est (op. cit., ? 1). Ontologyuses a "demonstrative[i.e., rationaland
deductive]method" (ibid., ? 2), and purports to investigatethe most
general predicates of all entes as such (ibid., ? 8). Following Wolff,
Alexander Baumgarten (Metaphysica, 1740) defined ontology (also called
ontosophia, metaphysica, metaphysical universalis, architectonic, philo-
sophia prima) as "the science of the most general and abstract predicates
of anything" (op. cit., ? 4), in so far as they belong to the first cognitive
principles of the human mind (ibid., ? 5). Kant launched an epoch-
makingattack againstrationalontologyin the sense of Wolff and Baum-
garten; for ontology was to him both a pseudo-science and a temptation.
He was convincedthat he had succeeded in eliminatingit by the "tran-
scendental Analytic." The whole Critique of Pure Reason is, in a way,
the work of a man who was obsessed,and deeply distressed,by ontology.
On the other hand, the expression'ontologicalproof' (ontologischerBe-
weis) used by Kant is not a mere alternativeexpressionto 'Anselmian
proof'; it is/intended to emphasizethe very nature of the proof. Since
Kantis at the crossroadsof modem thought,it is importantto know what
he had in mind when he decidedto overthrowthe ambitiousprojectsof
rational ontologists. An examinationof the origins of the concept of
ontology is an indispensablestep in the clarificationof Kant's thought.
Althoughthe concept of ontologyprecededthe word 'ontology,'it can
be assumedthat only when such a word (or the alternativeword 'onto-
sophy') came into use, could philosophersbegin to understandfully all
the implicationsof the concept.
Aristotle and the commentatorsof Aristotle in the Middle Ages and
at the beginningof the Modem Age (e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Jacobus
Zabarella,CardinalCajetan et al.) recognizedthat ens can be said in

* I wish to thank the AmericanPhilosophicalSociety for a grant receivedto

carryon this project.

36
various ways. We can talk, for example, about ens as such, and also
about ens in specific (even if always most general) ways. Indeed, from
the very beginningof Meta td physika there was a possible groundfor
the distinctionbetween Metaphysicsand what was later called "Ontol-
ogy." Aristotleeven coined a name for the study of the natureand first
principlesof ens qua ens: "firstphilosophy."There was, however,a great
deal of uncertaintyabout the concepts of "firstphilosophy"and "meta-
physics."In most instances,they were supposedto be the same, or were
declared to be very similar. Only when Scholastic philosophersbegan
substitutingsystematicexpositions of Metaphysicsfor commentarieson
Aristotle'sMetaphysica,and when philosophicalrather than theological
speculationswere promoted,did the relativelysharp distinctionbetween
a scientiade ente and a scientiaabout specific (althoughvery generaland
abstract)types of entes come to the fore. This happenedparticularlyin
the metaphysicalworks of two modem Schoolmen:FranciscoSuarezand
Pedro Fonseca.
To be sure, neitherSuareznor Fonseca thoughtit necessaryto coin a
new term to designatea science dealing with Being as such, or with the
principlesof this Being. The word 'ontology'- or any such similarword -
does not occur in either author. Metaphysicawas consideredquite suf-
ficient. Suarez' MetaphysicaeDisputationes are quite conservative in
respect to vocabulary.Any new term to designate the aforementioned
scientia de ente should occur in Disputationes 1-4, and in particular in
Disputatio 1, but it does not. An examinationof the series of the
Conimbricensesdoes not revealany fundamentaldeparturefrom tradition
in the above respect.Neither does an examinationof the work of Fon-
seca's in which the scientia de ente is most thoroughlyinvestigated:the
Commentatorium Petri Fonsecae Lusitani ... in libros Metaphysicorum
Aristotelis Stagiritae [in libros quatuor et quintum] (2,vols., 1594 1595).
Fonseca uses only the word Metaphysicaas equivalentto primaphiloso-
phia: ... unde collige subjectum Metaphysicae esse ens per se, ac reale,
quatenus dicitur non modo de entibus vere unius essentiae, sed etiam alio
modo per se (Comm. in IV, 1594, p. 648). Metaphysica as prima philos-
ophia is declared to be "indivisibile," but there are plures scientiae meta-
physicae (loc. cit.). As an indivisible science, sola prima Philosophia &
Dialectica in toto entis genere versantur (Comm. in V, 1595, p. 424).
It will be noted that the word Dialectica is introducedhere, and this is
importantin so far as Fonseca takes into account that metaphysical
(later: "ontological")principlesand logical principlesare often the same.
Fonseca raises the old question: utrum ens, quatenus est commune Deo,
& creatures,sit Metaphysicae subjectum, and his answer is that Metaphysica
as prima philosophiaprecedesall other metaphysicalsciences (including
Theology),in so far as it is concernedwith ens qua ens. But he does not
go any further;indeed,he tends to restatethe problemin the same terms
as ThomasAquinas.As IEtienneGilson has pointedout, both Suarezand
Fonsecaseem to acknowledgethe need for a new philosophicaldiscipline,
but fail to admit that such a discipline is differentfrom Metaphysica.
They do not see, therefore,any need to coin a name for it.
Unless I have missed the pertinenttexts, a new name for a new dis-
ciplineof the characterstated above - which is at the same time "a new
name for some old ways of thinking"- occurredonly in the Seventeenth
Century.It was proposed by philosopherswho did not belong to the
Schbols,but who had been directlyor indirectlyinfluencedby the Scho-
lastic traditionsupplementedby the modem rationalisttradition.A num-
ber of historians (R. Eucken, E. Gilson, Hans Pichler, Max Wundt,
Heinz Heimsoeth)mentionJohannClaubergas the first philosopherwho
used the new term we are looking for: the term 'ontology.'This is not
the case. The first instanceoccurs in Rudolf Goclenius(Lexiconphiloso-
phicum, quo tanquam clave philosophies fores aperiuntur, Informatum
opera studio Rodolphi Goclenii. Francoforti, 1613). In his Wirterbuch
der philosophischen Begriffe, Rudolf Eisler refers to this instance, but
fails to indicateits significance.In a way, Eisler was right,becauseit has
no significance.' The word 'ontology' occurs in Goclenius's Lexicon on
page 16 as follows: "6'vtrooyia, philosophia de ente." This is all. Fur-
thermore, it occurs on the left margin of the article "Abstractio,"in
materiaeaccording
which the authordiscusses the concept of abstraction
to Alexanderof Hales. If this were not enough, Gocleniusdoes not even
include an article on Metaphysicsor First Philosophy in his Lexicon.
There is, indeed, an article on Philosophy(Philosophia)which contains
various definitions,among them the following one: Philosophy can be
understood per excellentiam as prima philosophia (definition 4). There-
fore, if it is true that Goclenius actually used the word 'ontology'
(Ovro~oyia),he did very little with it. Neither does he mention such
a word in his Isagoge (Rod. Goclenii ... Isagoge in peripateticorum et
Scholasticorum primam philosophiam quae vulgo dicitur Metaphysica,
Francoforti,1612). Here the expressionprima philosophiais introduced
as a technical term for the more "common"Metaphysica.Goclenius
writes to this effect: "1. Duae sunt communissimae disciplinae liberates:
Logica, & Metaphysica, quae sapientia dicitur ... 3. Metaphysica seu
prima philosophia cognitio communes est eorum, quae sunt altissimis

t Jean Ecole, in an article on Wolff's Ontologia (Rivista di Metafisica, XVI

[1961], 114-25), published after the present one was written, also mentions Gocle-
nius. For further information regarding Ecole's interesting findings, see next note.
(Ecole's article is a French version of the author's Latin "Introductio"to his critical
edition of Wolff's Philosophia prima, Hildesheim: Olms, 1962).
 ON THE

causes & prima principia; ... 9. Prima philosophic scientia de Ente qua
ens, hoc est, universaliter sumto" (P.A. 4). He therefore relapsed into a
relativelylong establishedtraditionin philosophicalterminology,but 'to
relapseinto' is probablytoo strong an expressionwhen he had scarcely
done anythingto produce a new terminology.At any rate, his introduc-
tion of the word 'ontology'in the Lexicon does not seem to be the result
of a carefulplan; it looks more like a purely casual and inconsequential
remark.
Any researchon the origins of the use of a technicalterm is likely to
become tedious. Before strikingon positive instancesthe researcherwill
strike more often than not on negative instances. There is no reason,
however, why the presentationof his research should be as tedious as
the researchitself. Describingnegativeinstanceswould be as wearisome
as it is unfruitful.Therefore,I will confine myself to mentioningwhere
and when the term 'ontology'was used for the first time with a sufficient
understandingof its meaning and, above all, of its consequences.Con-
trary to the contentionsof Gilson, Eucken, and Pichler, this happened
before 1647, namely,before JohannClaubergpublishedhis Ontosophia.
But in order to grasp the implicationsof the introductionof 'ontology'
as a new term for a new - or supposedly new - scientia, some preliminary
remarksare needed.
Neitherthe works of Gocleniusnor the Latin philosophicalbooks and
dictionariespublishedup to approximately1635 containmany new terms
to designate"new"philosophicaldisciplinesor, in general, branchesof
learning.From 1635 on, however, there seems to be a growinginterest
in classifyingphilosophy or, for that matter, learning or knowledge in
general into differentbranchesand subbranches.Coupled with this in-
terestis a tendencyto proposenew philosophicaldisciplines,and to coin
new names - often, ratherstartlingnames - to designatethem. Divisions
proposed are intendedoften to cover all the sciences accordingto two
main branches:logic and metaphysics.'Logic' is the name of a science
(or ars) that studies no objects, but only the way, or ways, in which
objects are studied by other sciences. Therefore, 'logic' (logica) is the
name for the ancient (or medieval) scientia sermocinalis.'Metaphysics'
(Metaphysica) is often another name for philosophia realis, particularly
if the latter is supposedto deal with objects - "real objects,"in a most
generalsense of 'real,'namely, as whatevercan become the subjectof a
true or false proposition.It is often assumed(as JohannClaubergforce-
fully pointed out) that whereasMetaphysicais comparableto the semen
or porta of knowledge, Logica is comparable to a manus or a via. Meta-
physica is a discipline theoretical & contemplatrix, whereas Logica ad
practices & operatrices accedit. Both disciplines are, indeed, primae, but,
writes Clauberg, inter Metaphysicae ac Logicae subjectum infinite est
distantia, quatenus nullum esse reale commune habent. In short, Meta-
physica omnia scit, Logica nihil scit (Ontosophia, pp. 235-311, especially
p. 297). Now, most divisionsare presentedas branchesof the "theoreti-
cal" ("real")science, which is philosophiarealis and, at its apex, Meta-
physica. Among other brancheswe find, besides Physica, Medicina and
Theologia - clearly traditional -, Angelosophia (on angels), Anthroposo-
phia (on man), Aperantologia(on the reality that is both created and
infinite). The three last names were coined by Juan Caramuelde Lob-
kowitz (op. cit., infra) to designatethree different,and in his opinion
quite importantbranches,of Metaphysics.J. Micraeliusdivided Meta-
physica into Gnostologia (omne scibile qua tale), Hexologia (habitus in-
tellectuales exponentem), Technologia (variatum disciplinarum naturam
& ordinem inculcante), Archiologia (principia disciplinorum indagantem),
and Didactica (Lexicon philosophicum terminorum philosophies usitato-
rum, 1653, s.v.0 "Philosophia").He also spoke, as we shall see later, of
Ontologia and Pneumatologia (this one divided into Theologia, Angelo-
graphiaand Psychologia).Understandablyenoughhe was quite uncertain
about the difference between Gnostologia and Ontologia, since both
were concerned with omne scibile qua tale - although I assume that
Micraelius,as well as Calovius,beganto wonderwhetherit wouldnot help
to consider ens in general from two viewpoints:as it is, and as it is
knowable. Other examples could be added. But the ones given will, I
hope, suffice to make it clear that some philosophersof this period were
not at a loss for new philosophicalbranches,and names for them. Most
of the names have, of course, been forgotten,but some of them (Psy-
chology, Gnoseologyand, of course, Ontology)are still in use.
Let us add that the tendencyto coin new names to designatenew, or
supposedlynew, philosophicaldisciplineswas confinedduringthe Seven-
teenth Centurymostly to workswritten in Latin. During the Eighteenth
Century,the tendencyspreadto works writtenin moderntongues, espe-
cially in German. Let us only rememberLambert(Dianoiologie, Alethi-
ologie, Phdnomenologie) and Crusius (Thelematologie).
Now, the term we are interestedin, 'Ontology,'appears within the
context of these attemptsto classify and organize sciences and branches
of knowledge.We may assume, therefore,that the new term was intro-
duced not only to make more precise the traditionalmeaning of "first
philosophy,"but also, and sometimesabove all, to "organize"knowledge
in a neater, and supposedlymore rational,manner.The concept of on-
tology will appearas designatingthe "theoreticalscience"in so far as it
has not yet been divided into branches.Unfortunately,this does not yet
sufficientlyclarify the meaningof 'Ontology'as it was first introduced,
for, despite the claims that the "theoreticalscience" in question is, as
Claubergonce maintained,"at an infinitedistance"from "rational[purely
rational,namely,logical] knowledge,"it will be increasinglycommon to
cram logicalprinciplesinto "ontologicalprinciples."This is probablydue
to the fact that Ontologywas also consideredas purelyrational,but since
Ontologywas to deal with reality (althoughwith realityas such, and not
any specific types or parts of it), the distinctionbetween Ontology and
Logic appearedconsiderablyless clear than the differencebetween On-
tology and Metaphysicsproper.
The first book in which the word 'ontology' occurs is, as we said,
Goclenius'sLexicon. But the occurrencehad no consequences- indeed,
no importance.After Goclenius,the word 'ontology'and the equivalent
word 'ontosophy' appear in two books: Abraham Calovius' (Calov's)
Metaphysicadivina,a principiisprimiseruta,in abstractionsEntis reprae-
sentata, ad S.S. Theologicamapplicata,monstrans,Terminorumet con-
clusionum transcendentiumusum genuinum abusum a hereticum,con-
stans (1636) 2 and Juan Caramuelde Lobkowitz'sRationalis et realis
philosophia(1642), eleven and five years respectivelybefore the much
more talkedabout Clauberg'swork. By the way, none of the other philo-
sophical,or pseudo-philosophical works of Caramuel's- Mathesisaudax,
Mathesis biceps, Metalogica, etc. - refer to ontosophy or to ontology.
Unless the contraryis proved, it is safe to assume that Calovius and
Caramuelde Lobkowitz (and not Clauberg)were the first authors to
proposea new name for what later became a most important,and con-
troversial,philosophicaldiscipline.Accordingto Calovius,the scientiade
ente is called Metaphysicain respect to "the order of things,"a rerum
ordine, being called (more properly) 6'v-oAoyla in respect to the object
or subject matter, ab objecto proprio. Caramuel seems to be more
explicit than Caloviusabout the nature and function of ontology (or, in
his case, ontosophy). According to Caramuel, "Metaphysicaobjectum
est ENS, ide6que"6vroaoptIadicitur, quae est 6v-rogaoqt'aseu ENTIS
SCIENTIA. Differt a Facultatibus alijs, quod ipsa investiget objecti
praedicata ? differentias essentiales, illae non nisi proprietates,pas-
siones, attribute. Supponiturab universesArtibus, nullam supponens.
Exorbitantiaegravi obnoxius,qui Theologiae,Phisiologiae,aut Medicinae
insudat,ni a Metaphysiceseminentinotitidmanuducatur.Non potest non
esse doctissimusin omnia scientia, qui exact? Ontosophiampercallet"
(Rationalis,etc., p. 65). This seems to be clear enough, even if Meta-
physica is consideredto be the same as Ontosophia;what it means is
that only as Ontosophycan Metaphysicsbecome a true primaphilosophia
- perhapswithouttheologicalcomnnitments. And this is not a mere after-

2 This I have found confirmed in Jean tcole's article (see supra). In both cases

the reference has been taken from Calovius's Scripta philosophica (1654).
42 RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY

thought (as it seemed to be in the case of Goclenius's usage), for

Caramuel goes on to discuss the meaning and merits of Ontosophia: ...
periculos? aedificat qui probabilia; stolid~e,qui dubbia supponit. Plurimi
Idgas Idgis superstruentes Ontosophiam erexe'te Academiam, quae vel
mole sua postmoduim corruit nemine arietante (op. cit., p. 66). He does
more than that - something that he seems to be the first to have done -;
he lays down a set of principlesthat can be said to be "ontological(or
"ontosophical").We cite four of these principles:"I. Impossibiliest dari
duas contradictorias simul veras. IL. Impossibile est dari duas contradic-
torias simul falsas ... XI. Omnia quod est, dum est necesse est esse . . .
XIII. Impudenter procedit, qui multiplicat Entia absque necessitate. It
can be seen that such principleshave one common characteristic:they
are "general"and at the same time "universal."But beyond that they
seem to have little in common. Some principlesbelong to generallogic
(I, II); some, to modal logic (XI); some are pragmaticrules (XIII). The
aim of Caramuel,and of all the first "ontologists,"was apparentlyto list
all the possible generalrationalprincipleswhich they thought could be
appliedto all reality as such.
It would seem somewhatsurprisingthat Clauberghas been mentioned
as the first one who used such words as ontologia and ontosophiawith
an awarenessof their importanceand implications,since Clauberghim-
self recognized in his Elementa philosophies sive ontosophia, scientia
prima, de iis quae Deo creaturisque seu modo communiter attribuntur,
publishedin 1647, that he was not the first one to use them. Scholars
who have dealt with this question have probablybeen quite impressed
by the title of Clauberg'sbook, and have not botheredtoo much about
its contents. This happens sometimes,even in highly reputablescholar-
ship. Now, if it is true that at the beginningof the Elementa Clauberg
describes ontologia - or, as he on the other hand prefers, ontosophia -
as a scientia prima or a prima philosophia, and defines it as scientia quae
speculator Ens, rout Ens, without mentioning any antecedent use, at the
end of the same book ("Diacritica,"? 89) he writes as follows: "Nomina
atque titulos utrique disciplinae distinctos admodum iudicere Sapientes.
Logicen Dialecticam, rationis artem, organum, ko'yavov, 6'eydvov, Sc:
appellitdrunt: Metaphysicam dixere primam, supremam, transnaturalem,
philosophiam, divinam, catholicam, universalem scientiam: novissime
Ontosophiam Caramuel Lobkowitz, Ontologicam post alios Abr. Calovius,
aptissime uterque, nominaverunt."
It should be pointed out that Calovius did not confine himself to the
introduction of the sole word 'ontology' to designate "the first rational
(or theoretical) science" from the viewpoint of its object. He coined
another name for a similar, if not identical, discipline: Noologia. In the
Desumpta Exercitationes ... Editio 11 (1666), published together with
Georg Gutke's Habitus primorumprincipiorumseu intelligentiae...,
CaloviuspresentsNoologia as somethingapproachingCaramuel'sonto-
sophy, Clauberg'sontosophy and ontology, and Calovius own ontology.
Noology as equivalentto "archeology"was used by Micraelius[supra],
but only as one among other possible "metaphysicalbranches")in so far
as it designatesthe science of the "supremeprinciples."Noology has the
same aims as ontology in so far as it is previousto all "real sciences,"
includingMetaphysicsin the traditionalsense. This is due to the fact that
de principiisagit ex quibus Metaphysicaesuas deducitconclusiones(op.
cit., p. 286). Indeed, noology must never be confused (ne confuntur)
with metaphysics.It is unfortunate,but quite in tune with the peculiar
mixtureof neatnessand confusioncharacteristicof all these writers,that
a little later Calovius maintainsthat omne axiomatavere Metaphysicae
sunt Noologiaq.
WhetherNoology differs from Ontologyin that the latter gathersits
principles from being itself, whereas the former obtains its principles
from the mind (and its rationalstructure)is an interestingquestion,but
one that we cannot discusshere. It would be possibleto claim that Kant's
"TranscendentalAnalytic" was an attempt to reformulateCalovius's
"Noology" (and perhaps Micraelius's"Gnostology")by purifyingit of
all unwarranted"ontological"assumptions,even if little justice would be
done to the complexity of Kant's theory of knowledge by linking it
exclusivelyto such attemptsas those of Caloviusor Micraelius.
When all is said, however,it is safe to assumethat Claubergwas more
aware than any of his predecessorsof the importanceof the new disci-
pline - and of the new name. In his Metaphysicade Ente, quae rectiu's
Ontosophia (1656; apud Opera omnia philosophical 1691) Clauberg
explainsin some detail what Ontosophyis about. Ontosophyis quaedam
scientia, quae contemplatorens quatenusens est, hoc est, in quandam
intelligiturhabere naturamvel naturae gradum, qui rebus corporeis&
incorporeis,Deo & Creaturis,omnibusqueadeo & singulis entibus suo
modo inest. To be sure, it is commonly(vulgo) called Metaphysica,but
aptijis Ontologiavel scientia Catholica,eine allgemeine Wissenschaft&
Philosophiauniversalisnominator.The ens with which ontology deals
can be consideredfrom three angles: as what can be thought (intelligi-
bile), as something(aliquid),and as the thing (substantial.Emphasison
the ens cogitabilenow seems to point to some similaritybetween Onto-
logy and Noology: Quamvisautem Ens in tertiasignificationeacceptum,
sit potissimumillud, quod in Ontologia per sua attribuaac divisiones
explicatortamen ad melioremhujus notitiamcomparandamnonnullade
Ente in prima & secunda aceptionepermittemus,inchoaturiuniversalem
philosophiamab Ente cogitabili, quemadmoduma singularls incipiens
prima philosophia nihil prius consideratmente cogitante. The subject
matter of ontology is everything,and/or anything (aliquid), and as a
consequence,also nothing (nihil), for what mattershere is not whether
somethingreally exists or not, but whetherit can be thoughtor not, can
be talked about or not. At this point Claubergintroducesa formula (in
German)to define ens as the subjectmatterof Ontology:Alles was nur
gedachtund gesagt werdenkann. For ita dico Nihil, & cum dico cogito,
& cum cogito, est illud in intellect meo. All this is certainlygoing much
furtherthan Caramuel.The problemof thoughtand not only the problem
of being - or rather,the problem of being in so far as it is, or can be,
thought- now comes to the fore, and Ontology seems to be on its way
to becoming a new science and not only an alternativename for prima
philosophia.In the 1694 edition of the Elementa,now entitled Ontoso-
phia quae vulgo Metaphysicavocatur, Claubergreaffirmshis position,
claims that the term Ontosophiais increasinglybeing accepted despite
the resistanceof some learnedmen.
Micraeliusprobablycontributedgreatly to a wider acceptanceof the
new term, for his Lexicon (see supra), first publishedin 1653, with a
second printingin 1662, was a relativelysuccessfulbook. Micraeliusdid
not introducean articleon Ontologyin the Lexicon, but the term Onto-
logia (also written in Greek characters: 6'vTo)oyia) was presentedin
the article "Philosophia"as one of the subdivisionsof Metaphysica.He
defined the term as designatinga peculiarisdisciplinephilosophica,quae
tractatde ente, but added quod tamen ab alis statuiturobjectumipsius
metaphysicae,a most unfortunate"regression"in respect to Clauberg,
and even in respect to Caramuel, since it somehow presupposesthat
ontologia and metaphysicaare largely interchangeable.A full incorpo-
rationof the termsOntologiaand Ontosophiain the philosophiclanguage
took place only at the very end of the SeventeenthCenturyand beginning
of the EighteenthCentury.It was probablyE~tienne(Stephanus)Chauvin
who did most to make these terms palatablefor philosophiccircles. His
Lexicon philosophicumwas publishedin 1692 (with the following title
under cover: Lexicon rationale sive Thesaurus philosophicus ordine
alphabetico digests, which explains why it is quoted sometimes as
Lexicon philosophicumand sometimes as Lexicon rationale).. In this
Lexicon, of which a second edition was publishedin 1713 (with some
changes,proudlyanouncedas quasi novum opus in lucensprodeat,which
do not affect our question)Chauvin introducesan article on "Ontoso'
phia," which is thus defined: ONTOSOPHIA... ooqfia6wroc sapi-
entia seu scientia entis. Aliais Ontologia, doctrine de ente. This says,
indeed, little. But in his article on "Metaphysics"Chauvin goes much
further.It is worth quotinga substantialpart of the article:
Metaphysica:si latino interpreteris,post-naturalem,super-naturalem
autpraeter-naturalemn sonat;potestquecitraincommodumquaelibetillarum
 45

interpretationum admitti ... vulgo spectator tanquamcatholica scientia

seu universalisquaedamPhilosophia,quia quae rebus omnibus, Deo &
creatures,spiritibus corporibusquecommunia sunt persequitur;quidni
dicaturdisciplinepraeter-naturalis,
inquantuimpraeterea quae pertinent
ad Physicam,quae sunt considerationispraedicamentalis,alia tractatad
humanaecognitionisperfectionem& intellectusinformationemqyaimplu-
rimuIm facientia ...; super-naturalis philosophia ... inquantuim con-
siderat ea, quae dicatur transcendentalla,generalia, quae categoriarum
limitibus non clauduntur ... etc.
All this seems quite "traditional." Now:
Ab aliis diciturOntosophia,vel Ontologia,& quidemrectlus.Quando-
quidem utraqueilla vox integraedefinitionismunere non infelicitefun-
gitur. Est ens vulgarisMetaphysica,scientia entis, quatenis est ens: at
Ontosophia,quasi dixeris, ao9-p'a'v&-og,est sapientia seu scientia entis;
adeoque genus discipline, differentiam ex objecto sumptam innuit.
Ontologia vero dicitur, quasi Aoyta vel )o6Vog6'v-ro', sermo seu doctrina
de ente. Quanquacm hoc observandum,quod voce Ontosophiae,com-
modius scientia entis; voce autem Ontologiaesystema, methodicamde
ente doctrinacomplectenssignificatur.
The differencebetweenOntologyand Ontosophywas not pursuedany
further. Indeed, after Chauvin practicallyno one ever used the term
'Ontosophy'again. Leibniz used Ontologiain his "Introductioad Ency-
clopaediam arcanam"(apud L. Couturat,ed., Opuscules et fragments
inaditsde Leibniz, 1913, p. 512), and definedit as scientia de aliquo et
nihilo, ente et non ente, re et modo rei, substantiaet accident, in a way
similarto Clauberg's.P. Geny (Questionsd'enseignementde philosophic
scolastique, 1913, apud M. Grabmnann, MittelalterlichesGeistesleben,
1926, p. 547) has pointed out that Jean Baptiste Du Hamel used the
word Ontologiain his work, Philosophiavetus et nova, ad usum scholae
accommodatae,in regia Burgundia olim pertractata(Editio 3 multo
emendatior),2 vols., 1684, sometimes called Philosophia Burgundica.
This is true, but Du Hamel does not seem to be greatlyconcernedwith
ontologyas a first science. The first and second editions of the Philoso-
phia Burgundica,respectively entitled De consensu veteris et novae
philosophiaelibri duo (1663) and De consensuveteris et novae philoso-
phiae libri quatuor, seu Promotae per experiment philosophies pars
prima (1675), are still less concerned with "Ontology."On the other
hand, AntonioGenovesi[Genovese]used the termOntosophiain his work
Elementa metaphysicaemathematicumin morem adornata.Pars prior.
Ontosophia(1743), and Francis Hutcheson used the term Ontologiain
his work Synopsis Ontologiamet Pneumatologiamcomplectens(1742,
2 nd ed., 1744, 3rd ed., 1749, 4 th ed., 1756, 5th ed., 1762, 6th ed.,
1774). Moreover,the term Ontologiawas introducedas a technicalterm
in philosophyby Jean Le Clerc or JoannisClericusin the Second Trea-
tise, entitled"Ontologiasive de ente in genere"of his Operaphilosophica
in quatuorvoluminadigesta (5th ed., 1722). This happenedeight years
before Wolff finally gave his definitive, and influential,approvalto the
new term and to the new - althoughin his time alreadyless new - dis-
cipline. So Jean colee is right when he writes: "Ainsi donc, lorsque
l'ouvragede Wolff parfit,l'ontologie6taitune conquetede la philosophic
vieile deja d'a peu pres cent ans."3
The aim of these pages has been to trace the originsand early history
of the word 'ontology.'This early historyends,with Wolff, who, Pichler
claims, was probablyinducedto develop his system of Ontologythrough
the influenceof Clauberg[in the Elementa, 1647] and of Leibniz [in De
primae philosophiaeemendatione,publishedin Acta eruditorum,1694]
As Pichler points out, Wolff himself acknowledgesthese Anregungenin
Ontologia ? 7. (ErnstLewalter,on the other hand, assumesthat Wolff's
"way" was paved not only by Eighteenth-CenturyJesuit philosophers,
and some Seventeenth-CenturyFrench "Scholastics," but also by
"German-Lutheranmetaphysicians"following Suarez: Jakob Martini,
ChristophScheibler,Daniel Stahl, and others, but, of course, one thing
is to pave "Wolff's,way," and anotheris to use specifically,and techni-
cally, a given word). I will only mention that between Wolff and Kant,
the first editionof whose Critiqueof Pure Reason was publishedin 1781,
there is a curious, and rather neglected, referenceto Ontology in the
article "Ontologie"of the Encyclopedie ou Dictionnaireraisonne des
sciences, des Arts et des Me'tiers,t. XI, N-PAR (Neufchastel, 1765).
The anonymousauthorwritesthat amongthe Schoolmen"ontology"was
the same as Philosophiaprima,but that it was a purelyverbal"science."
As a consequence,"des que la doctrinede Descarteseut pris le dessus,
l'ontologie scholastique tomba dans le mepris, devint l'objet de la
risee publique ... On n'envisageadonc plus [afterDescartes]l'ontologie
que comme un dictionnairephilosophiquebarbare,dans sequelon expli-
quoit des termes dont nous pouvions fort bien nous passer."But things
changed: "L'ontologie .... qui n'etoit autrefois qu'une science de mots,
prit une toute autre face entre les mains des philosophermodernes,ou,
pour mieux dire, de M. Volf; car le cours de cette science qu'il a public,
dst le premier jusqu'a present l'unique oi' elle soit proposee d'une
manierevraimentphilosophique."It would seem that the French philos-
ophes (or the anonymous,Voltairian-lookingauthor of the,article "On-
tologie"in the Encyclopaedia)were ratheruncriticalof Wolff's Philoso-
phia prima sive ontologla, and did not bother too much about the

3 In the "Introductio"(see supra): "Ergo, cum Wolffii opus editum est, onto-
logiam philosophia fere centum ante annis sibi comparaverat."
 ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF 'ONTOLOGY' 47

"dogmaticway of thinking"(K.r.V. B xxxvii), providedit looked "rati-

onal." It would also seem that they were not impressed by Wolff's
predecessors,if they had, indeed, any knowledgethat such predecessors
existed. We may blame the French philosopherfor lack of historical
sense, if not historicalinformation.But it may well happenthat by 1765
Calovius, Caramuel,Clauberg,Micraelius,Chauvin et al., had already
been forgotten,or else overshadowedby Wolff. It has been the purpose
of the present article to try to recognize the history of thought, and
specificallythe history of philosophic concepts, as the embarrassingly
complex thing it is.

JOSE FERRATER MORA.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.