ABAKADA Guro Party List v.

Ermita
GR No. 168056, October 18, 2005

Facts
1.) They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106,
107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
a.) Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties.
b.) Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods
c.) Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties

2.) These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1,
2006:
a.) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
b.) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 %)

3.) Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of
its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
Article VI, Section 28(2): The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to
fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
Issues
One of the substantive issues is whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections
106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution specifically
Article VI, Section 28(2) for ABAKADA Guro vs Ermita.

Held
Petitioners contend:
1.) Delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism.
2.) The law also effectively nullified the Presidents power of control, which includes the authority to
set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the
fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is instructive for the following contentions. The principle of
separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.

A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as
expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which means what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such as delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality
of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that the Legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly,
or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has
been described as the authority to make a complete law complete as to the time when it shall take effect
and as to whom it shall be applicable and to determine the expediency of its enactment.

Delegation is only permissible on the following premises: If the law

(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate;
(b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
In Wayman vs. Southard, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the legislature may delegate
a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power
which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or
conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law.

Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts
or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms,
made to depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their
authority. While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement
and administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to determine
the existence of facts on which its operation depends.

The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of legislation
is not of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating
information and making recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity which the legislature may
perform through its members, or which it may delegate to others to perform.

The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent
upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon
factual matters outside of the control of the executive.

The Court finds no merit to the contention of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that the law
effectively nullified the Presidents power of control over the Secretary of Finance by mandating the fixing
of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.

WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 168056,
168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED.
U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho
G.R. No. 17122, February 27, 1922
Johns J.

FACTS
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing
the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary
circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with
the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an
appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:

Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting
in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the
Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act.

Section 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders and decrees
promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousands pesos,
or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Pursuant thereto, on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at
which rice should be sold and penalizing the violation thereof.

On August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale
of rice at an excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months'
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower
court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused
guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.

The defendant questions the validity of the proclamation by the Governor-General pursuant to Act No.
2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold.

ISSUE
Whether or not the proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold confers an unconstitutional
delegation of powers

HELD
Yes. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the
discretion of the Governor-General.

The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause," and leaves
the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General.

The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
corn." That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. It does not specify or define what is a
temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures
shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect.
All these are left to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-General. The law is thus incomplete
as a legislation.

It is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Before any
rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any
price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law
fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime.

That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must
follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without
the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was not a crime.

The Governor-General cannot, by proclamation, determine what act shall constitute a crime or not. That
is essentially a legislative task.

HELD
Allocation of governmental powers. - The doctrine declares that governmental powers are divided
among the three (3) departments of government, the legislative, executive, and judicial, and broadly
operates to confine legislative powers to the legislature, executive powers to the executive department,
and judicial powers to the judiciary, precluding one branch of the government from exercising or
invading the powers of another.
Villena v. Secretary of Interior
G.R. No. L-46570, April 21, 1939
Laurel J.

Facts
The Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of the
Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the petitioner, as a result of which the latter was found
to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the law
profession. The respondent, therefore, on February 8, 1939, recommended to the President of the
Philippines the suspension of the petitioner to prevent possible coercion of witnesses, which
recommendation was granted, according to the answer of the Solicitor-General of March 20, 1939,
verbally by the President on the same day. The Secretary of the Interior suspended the petitioner from
office on February 9, 1939, and then and thereafter wired the Provincial Governor of Rizal with
instruction that the petitioner be advised accordingly. On February 13, 1939, the respondent wrote the
petitioner a letter, specifying the many charges against him and notifying him of the designation of
Emiliano Anonas as special investigator to investigate the charges.

Issue
whether the Secretary of the Interior has the legal authority (a) to order an investigation, by a special
investigation appointed by him, of the charges of corruption and irregularity brought to his attention
against the mayor of the municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, who is the petitioner herein, and (b) to
decree the suspension of the said mayor pending the investigation of the charges

Held

Section 79 (C) of the Administrative Code provides as follows:

The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, repeal or
modify the decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus of offices when advisable in the public interest.

The Department Head may order the investigation of any act conduct of any person in the service of any
bureau of office under his department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate
an official or person who shall conduct such investigations, and such committee, official, or person may
summon, witness by subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, administer oath and take testimony relevant
to the investigation.

The above section speaks, it is true, of direct control, direction, and supervision over bureaus and offices
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, but this section should be interpreted in relation to
section 86 of the same Code which grants to the Department of the Interior executive supervision over
the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions.
Therefore, the Secretary of the Interior is invested with authority to order the investigation of the charges
against the petitioner and to appoint a special investigator for that purpose.

Administrative Code which provides that The provincial governor shall receive and investigate
complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or
other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral
turpitude. For minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment
seems to be desirable he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board,
furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in
such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his
opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension is
thus effected, the written charges against the officer shall be filed with the board within five days. The
fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative
Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the
Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power.

The suspension of the petitioner should be sustained on the principle of approval or ratification of the act
of the Secretary of the Interior by the President of the Philippines.

Under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental
organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our
Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Philcomsat v Alcuaz
G.R. No. 84818, December 18, 1989
Regalado, J

FACTS
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) was granted the authority to construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to
deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or
terminals in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe Mackay
(now Globe) and PLDT.

Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation
of the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
However, Executive Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under
the jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire permit to operate from the NTC
in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however
directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO
546.

PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and
holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were constitutionally required, hence,
there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC.
PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of NTC and
granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC, can
it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory
powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a
reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the
exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.

ISSUE
Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.

RULING
No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by the requirements of
public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than
satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. Fundamental is the rule that
delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its
exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the
exercise of the delegated power.

Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must
both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature;
otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case
of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for
the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been
held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be
implied.

However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due process since
no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.

RATIO
What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of sound business judgment based
upon the evidence it is a question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair,
enlightened and independent judgment. In determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also
to consider the given situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility. A method often employed
in determining reasonableness is the fair return upon the value of the property to the public utility.
Competition is also a very important factor in determining the reasonableness of rates since a carrier is
allowed to make such rates as are necessary to meet competition.
Pelaez v. Auditor General
G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965
Concepcion J.

FACT
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this was
purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change
the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the
auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that
the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by
Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law,
cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since
barrios are units of municipalities?

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being
created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created
without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated
such power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE
Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of
the RAC.

HELD
No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b)
fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy,
which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which
would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require is present,
still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what
the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence,
the proper interpretation is the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of government may be changed by
the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).
Chiongbian v. Orbos
G.R. No. 96754, June 22, 1995
Mendoza J.

Facts

1. Pursuant to Sec. 18, Art X of the Constitution, Congress passed RA No. 6734
2. RA No. 6734 called for a plebiscite to be held in the following provinces: Basilan, Cotabato,
Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur; and the following
cities: Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Prinsesa,
and Zamboanga
3. Four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Sulu, Tawi-tawi
4. The cities and provinces not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region were under Art XIX, Sec.
13 of the RA 6734:
That only provinces and cities voting favorably in plebiscites shall be included in the
ARMM. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided,
however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
5. With this provision, President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 429, Providing for
theReorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.
6. Petitioners, members of the Congress, wrote to Corazon Aquino, contending that theres:
o No law authorizing the President to pick certain provinces and cities to be restructured to
new administrative regions
o Some of the provinces and cities in the regions did not even take part in the plebiscite
o The transfer of provinces is an alteration of existing governmental units or
reorganization. The authority to merge doesnt include the authority to reorganize.
7. The inauguration of the New Administrative Region IX went ahead.
8. Congress brought the suit for prohibition and certiorari; petitioner Jaldon brough a suit as
resident of Zamboanga City, taxpayer and citizen of the Republic.

Petitioners:
1. Section 29 of RA 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates legislative power to the
President by authorizing him to merge existing region and provides no standard for the exercise
of the power delegated; and,
2. The power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.

Respondent Solicitor General:

1. The exercise of power is traditionally lodged in the President (Abbas v Comelec) and as a mere
incident of his power of general supervision over local governments and control of executive
departments, bureaus, and offices (Art X, Sec. 16 and Art VII, Sec. 17 of Constitution)
2. There is no undue delegation of power but only a grant of power to fill up or provide the details
of the legislation, bec Congress did not have the facility to provide for them.
3. The grant to the President to merge existing regions is fairly embraced in the title of the RA No.
6734, because it is germane to it. Power extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the
establishment of the autonomous region.
 4. PD 1416, as amended by PD 1772, provides that the President shall have the continuing authority
to reorganize the National Government, guided by the framework of more effective planning
implementation, greater decentralization, etc. The President may create abolish, consolidate units
of the National Government.

Issues

1. WON the power to merge administrative regions is legislative or executive in character (and
whether Sec. 23 of Art. 29 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the Presidents
discretion)
2. WON the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute
3. WON the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions and provinces that did
not take part in the plebiscite
4. WON the power granted includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region XI from
Zamboanga to Pagadian

Held

1. Nature of administrative regions and the purpose of their creations:

o RA 5435 authorizing the President, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization
to reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus, etc.
o Reorganization Commission submitted an Integrated Reorganization Plan which divided
the country into 11 regions (1969)
o PD No. 1 the Reorganization Plan was approved and made part of the law of the land
(1972)
o PD No. 773 divided Region IX into two grpups
o PD No. 1555 transfer of regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga
The Creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the
President pursuant to the authority granted to him b the law. The choice of President is
logical because the division intended to facilitate the administration of executive departments
and local governments. It has been traditionally lodged in the President.
By conferring the President the power to merge exising regions, Congress merely followed a
pattern set in previous legislation. There is no abdication by Congress of its legislative power
in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions.
Sufficient standard by which President is to be guided in the exercise of power
o Standard can be gathered or implied
o Standard can be found in the same policy underlying grant of power to the President in
RA No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department: to promote
simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the government to enable it to pursue its programs
consisted with the national goals for accelerated social and economic development.

2. The constitutional requirement that every bill shall be passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof has always been given a practical
rather than a technical construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the
bill. It is sufficient if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to
the subject, such as the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions.
3. There is a qualification in Sec 13, Art XIX, which states that the President may by administrative
determination merge the existing regions. While non-assenting provinces are to remain in their
regions, they may nevertheless be regrouped into contiguous provinces forming other regions as
the exigency of the administration may require.

The regrouping is done only on paper and is no more than a redefinition or redrawing of the
lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative
supervision of LGUs and insuring efficient delivery of services. There is no transfer of local
governments. It is not even analogous to redistricting or to the division or merger of local
governments.

4. The reorganization of administrative regions is based on relevant criteria (EO 429):

o Contiguity of graphical features
o Transportation and communication facilities
o Cultural and language groupings
o Land area and population
o Existing regional centers
o Socio-economic development programs
o Number of provinces and cities

The change of regional center from Pampanga to Pagadian is based on the power of the President
(by virtue of the Executive Order) . The transfer is addressed to the wisdom, not the legality of
the President. The Court cannot interfere.
Ynot v. IAC
G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
Cruz, J.

FACTS

Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcoss Executive Order No. 626-A is assailed. Said order
decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this shall be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in
the case of carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director of
Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had transported six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo. These were confiscated by the police for violation of the above order. He sued for
recovery, which the RTC granted upon his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the
merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they can no longer be produced,
directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the constitutionality of the executive
order, on the grounds of want of authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court, such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main,
petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation, and that
its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is imposed without giving the owner a right to be heard
before a competent and impartial courtas guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE

Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

HELD

YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the interests of
the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b)
that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v. Toribio, the
Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above requirementsthat is, the carabao, as a poor mans
tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order, and
that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if
female upon issuance of a permit adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or
breeding, and prevention of their improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful
subject, it fails to observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed
measure is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in
another. Obviously, retaining them in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more that
moving them to another will make it easier to kill them there. Even if assuming there was a reasonable
relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation,
denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the
property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the
government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed
with, such as summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure
is present. The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated property also presents a case of invalid
delegation of legislative powers since the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI
respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said
officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it
as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
De Llana v. Alba
G.R. No. L-57883, March 12, 1982
Fernando C.J.

FACTS
Petitioners sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and
characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of
the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed

ISSUE
Whether or not BP 129 entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for
Other Purposes" is constitutional

HELD
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg 129 not having been shown, this petition is
dismissed. No costs.

RATIO:
1. Petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as tax payers, their standing to sue has
been amply demonstrated.

2. Confronted with what appears to be a crisis situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa
had no choice. It had to act, before the ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet
it did not hesitate to be duly mindful, as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. (3) There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms,"
characterized in the Report as "both pressing and urgent."

3. Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. Stress
was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would, firstly, result in the attainment
of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the improvement in the quality of justice
dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary consequence of the easing of the court's dockets.
Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction
and the revision of the rules of procedure, are designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of
the present day Philippine society, and hopefully, of the foreseeable future."

4. Nothing is bettersettled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a
legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. This conclusion flows from the
fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganiz e them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments
and commissions.

5. Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. The Supreme Courten banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
6. The challenged statute creates an intermediate appellate court, regional trial courts, metropolitan trial
courts of the national capital region, and other metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts in
cities, as well as in municipalities, and municipal circuit trial courts. There is even less reason then to
doubt the fact that ex isting inferior courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the
establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to the grave and urgent
problems that pressed for solution. Certainly, there could be differences of opinion as to the
appropriate remedy.

7. I t is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever
legislation may be necessary to carryout national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the
majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v . Labang it was stressed that with the
provision transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a
greater need "to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present,
where to all intents and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative
branches."

8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides with
the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X , Section 7 of the
Constitution. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of
the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. I n case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise

9. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to re organize inferior
courts and in the process to abolish ex isting ones.

10. Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant
of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
appointed. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows:
"Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, municipal Trial
Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such receive such compensation and
allowances as may be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of
Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1597." The existence of a standard is thus clear.

11. The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body. The work of
justices was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for
reorganization. That is more in the nature of scholarly studies.
Edu v. Ericta
G.R. No. L-32096, October 24, 1970
Fernando J.

FACTS
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule squarely on the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law in this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition against
respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the enforcement of the aforesaid statute,
in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C.
Galo assailing; the validity of such enactment as well as such administrative order.

Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect
reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: "No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make,
class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either
be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The
luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by
a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night." 35 Then came a section on dimensions,
placement and color.

As to dimensions the following is provided for: "Glass reflectors Not less than 3 inches in diameter
or not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The
painted or taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner." Provision is then made as
to how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted."

There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or
painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted
in front and those in the rear end of the body thereof. The color required of each reflectors, whether
built-in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any
motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on the sides and in the rear shall all be red.

Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: "Non-compliance with the
requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the motor
vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration maybe suspended in pursuance of the
provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; Provided, however, that in the case of the violation of Section 1
(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos
shall be imposed.

ISSUE
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 is contrary to the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power

RULING
No. It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to
promote public safety.
To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process
can go forward.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least
that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the
criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative
office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety.

This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not
long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been
made to adapt itself the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England
but in practically all modern governments."

Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the
approval of the practice by the courts.

It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that
corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for
the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved
for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

RATIO
Delegation to Administrative Agencies. The legislature must declare a policy and fix a standard in
enacting a statute conferring discretionary power upon an administrative agency, but the agency may
be authorized to "fill up the details" in promoting the purposes of the legislation and carrying it into
effect. When the legislature laid down the fundamentals of a law, it may delegate to administrative
agencies the authority to exercise such legislative power as is necessary to carry into effect the general
legislative purpose. The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode of
proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted and it cannot be extended to amend or
expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
Davide Jr. J.

FACTS

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative,
filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the
petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published.
After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed
Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days.
On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel
Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments,
among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed
by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution,
unlike in the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE

WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative.

WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON
the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.

WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such
initiative?

WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition
would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.

WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.

WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending
case before the COMELEC.

HELD

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The
people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part,
the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws,
ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative
and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main
thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were
intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith
dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

SBMA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996
Panganiban J.

FACTS

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the
declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the
Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,
particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by
the American navy.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed PambayangKapasyahanBilang

10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to
join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annulPambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10, Serye 1993.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyangBlg. 10 for Morong to
join the Subic Special Economi Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.

The Sangguniang BayanngMorong acted upon the petition by promulgating

PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain
provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject
thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of
the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 and 2848, adopting a
"Calendar of Activities for local referendumand providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the
conduct of the referendum

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution
No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes
an amendment of a national law

ISSUE
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which
governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal PambayangKapasyahanBlg. 10

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong
to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

HELD

1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec
made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.

In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is
repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as
a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents
were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots
themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in
said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them
at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right
reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative
body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process
itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the
people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of
legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal
stage and not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the
people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people
have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations
can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or
prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may
decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.

In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No.
2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same
authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or
passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on
Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings.
The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence,
there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court
could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.
Pimentel Jr. vs. Executive Secretary
GR. No. 158088, July 6, 2005
Puno, J

Facts
This is a petition of Senator Aquilino Pimentel and the other parties to ask the Supreme Court to
require the Executive Department to transmit the Rome Statute which established the International
Criminal Court for the Senates concurrence in accordance with Sec 21, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution.

It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and
international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department to
transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with
respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the Philippines has a ministerial
duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary international law. Petitioners invoke
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining the states to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless
they have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.[5]
The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting for the respondents, questioned the standing of the
petitioners to file the instant suit. It also contended that the petition at bar violates the rule on
hierarchy of courts. On the substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue that the
executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.

Issue
Whether or not the executive department has a ministerial duty to transmit the Rome Statute (or any
treaty) to the Senate for concurrence.

Held
The petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court ruled that the the President, being the head of state,
is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole
representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the
countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain
diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In
the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members
of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making process in this
wise:
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of
the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication
under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between
the parties.

Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to
his authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full
powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is
standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with
the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The negotiations may be
brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even collapse in case the parties are
unable to come to an agreement on the points under consideration.

If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature.
This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of
symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of
the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in
accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on the
copy which he will bring home to his own state.

Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the
provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the
contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be
bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are
made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other than that which
negotiated them.

The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which
usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the
parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the
instrument is deemed effective upon its signature.

Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with
ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two
separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is
primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of
the parties. It is usually performed by the states authorized representative in the diplomatic mission.
Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions
of a treaty concluded by its representative.

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the
President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification,
refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf
is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the
President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has
no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.
Mariano Jr vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995
Puno J.

FACTS
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail
Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which contends the
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and
concerned citizen.

ISSUES
Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating
sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical
descriptions

Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a new corporate existence
will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by
the Constitution

Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the

reapportionment cannot be made by a special law

HELD
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall
comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over
which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of
Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros
and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the
northwest, by the City of Manila.

Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even by
an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the
requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not
an end in itself.

Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of becoming
a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be
left to the courts to decide.

Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
 functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have
already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising
their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the
City of Makati.

Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the
occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties
to raise this abstract issue.

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised
of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus
worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a
law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.
Montejo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995
Puno J.

Facts
Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the
annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the
ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation.

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd
district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan,
Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.

Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act
No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the
subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and
all the territories comprised therein.

On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular
province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd
district composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd
district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the
1990 census.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in
the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent
representatives of the province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it
promulgated the assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd
district of Leyte.

Issue
Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting
and reapportionment is valid or not.

Held
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.

The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was
denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding
the first elections after the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the
reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was given
to the Congress.
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the
source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make
laws. Said ordinance states that:

Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the
reapportionment herein made.

Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be createdThe number of Members apportioned to
the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population
has so increases, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission
on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before
the election.

Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error
in the correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still
in the territory of one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to
make minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC
any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power
granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)

Notes:

Petitioner also prayed for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the 1st district to the 2nd
district. It is likewise denied.
Bagabuyo v COMELEC
G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008
Brion J.

FACTS
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman
Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was
passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the
validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC
from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district
was created without a plebiscite which he averred was required by the Constitution.

ISSUE
Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

HELD
No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no
such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit
took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oros territory,
population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here was a
reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative districts. Reapportionment is
the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its
population of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one
congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing
250,000 of the citys population. This easily means better access to their congressman since each
one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.
Aquino III v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez J.

Issue
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of
the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an
additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first
and second legislative districts of the province.

The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed
among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first
and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of
the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The
provision reads:

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.

The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with
a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a
new legislative district in a province?

Held
We deny the petition.

Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that
must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand from the phrase or each province point to no other
conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a
province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a
province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus,
Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation.

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices
and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an

alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Aldaba vs. COMELEC
G.R No. 188078, January 25, 2010
Carpio, J

Facts
This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591),
creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.

On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a separate
legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos
City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an
undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that the
projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population
growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.

Issue
RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to
merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

Held
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution

Ruling
YES. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.

House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III
of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos will be
254,030 by the year 2010. The Certification states that the population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1,
2000 is 175,291. The Certification further states that it was issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A.
Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone
congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.

First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official
by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic
projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third,
intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.

Moreover, the Certification states that the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is
175,291. The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year
between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in
2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an
official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population
projection would be unreliable or speculative.