Part One begins naturally with man, for Hobbes believes that the commonwealth is nothing but an "artificial

man." Beginning his argument at the most basic level, he argues that man exists in the external world as a reactive
creature that senses objects and is driven to act by the constant motions of the world. These constant motions lead to
man's constant and insatiable desires and wants, which in a state of nature pits everyone against another in a perpetual
state of war. Here men are equal in that anyone can kill anyone else, and as such men live in a constant state of fear an
anxiety. Since man's main goal in life is to protect his own life through his rational capacities he reasons that the best
way to do this is to establish a state with a power great enough to protect all who consent to live under it. Thus, a state
or commonwealth is established with the sole purpose of protecting the lives of those who live within it.
Part Two is devoted to explaining the citizen's obligations to this state, or 'Leviathan', and its proper form and
functions. According to Hobbes, the best form of government is a monarchy, since in any other form of government
the sovereign power is not strong enough to protect the subjects from outside invaders and from themselves. A
subject's duty to the sovereign is total, and acting otherwise is only hurting oneself, since the commonwealth is
established for the self-preservation of its subjects. Of course one has the option of leaving the commonwealth if one
finds it too oppressive, but to leave the commonwealth is to re-enter the state of war that characterizes pre-social man.
This is the worst possible outcome, since here there is no right or wrong, no justice or injustice, and man is constantly
defending himself.
Part Three answers the question: is obedience to a sovereign authority consistent with obedience to a divine
authority? Hobbes reasons that there is no conflict between obeying civil and divine laws, but that men are often led
to in such a conflict through the false claim that God is present in the world as it exists. According to Hobbes, the
Kingdom of God exists wholly outside the natural world, despite the frequent claims that a group has special access to
the divine. Because God is totally supernatural, then, and because no person can claim to have communication with or
to be a representative of God, members of the commonwealth cannot possibly subscribe to a religious authority. The
only power that exists for man, Hobbes claims, is sovereign power. There is no religious power manifest on earth that
is greater. In careful interpretation of scripture, Hobbes claims that there is no eternal soul that is punished or
rewarded eternally in hell or heaven, and that there are no incorporeal spirits interacting with this world. In fact, he
concludes, all that is necessary for proper worship of God is to obey civil laws in his absence, and to maintain faith in
Him.
Lastly, in Part four Hobbes paints a stark picture of what human life is like when not lived according to the
principles he has set forth. He calls this benighted social state the Kingdom of Darkness, which is not 'hell' as
conceived in religious dogma, but which is instead life of ceaseless manipulation by others. Hobbes argues that the
main causes of "spiritual darkness" are the belief in the presence of the Kingdom of God on earth, and the
philosophical and historical doctrines that perpetuate this falsehood. In particular, Hobbes attacks Aristotle's
philosophy of essentialism for giving credence to the belief in eternal souls and immaterial spirits, as well as many
tenets of Catholicism, especially the papacy.
Summary and Analysis of Book I: Introduction, Chapters 1-5
Summary
Hobbes saw the purpose of the Leviathan as explaining the concepts of man and citizenship; he conceved of
the work as contributing to a larger, three-pronged philosophical project that would explain nature in addition to these
two phenomena. To begin his project, Hobbes argues that to understand the state we first need to understand mankind,
since the state is nothing but an artificial man. To extend the metaphor, the sovereign of the state is like the soul of a
man; the magistrates of the state like a man's joints; and the rewards and punishments doled out by the state like the
nerves of man. According to Hobbes, the proper way to understand all men is to turn our thoughts inward and study
one man (namely oneself), for to understand the thoughts, desires, and reasons of ourselves is to understand them in
all mankind.
The natural starting point for understanding the thoughts of man is sense, since "there is no conception
in mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense." In other words, all
thought and knowledge is in some way derived from our sensing the objects and matter of the external world. Central
to the idea of sense is motion, for as Hobbes has laid out previously in his work on nature, the external world is
nothing but a series of motions where objects chaotically interact with each other. Human beings, ourselves parts of
the external world, are no different than these objects and interact with the external world through such motion.
Specifically, when we sense objects, we do so because the motions of an object "press upon" or interact with our
sensory organs, which in turns sets off another set of motions within our body that eventually end at our brain, and
leave us with a feeling of the object sensed being hot or cold, loud or quiet, light or dark, etc.
 The concept of motion explains how Hobbes goes from sense to what he calls "imagination" or "decaying
sense." According to the prevailing Aristotelian physics during Hobbes' time, an object's natural state was rest. Yet
Hobbes argued exactly the opposite: objects are constantly in motion, or to put it in Newtonian terms (which was to
be later formulated 1687), an object in motion will remain in motion unless acted upon by an outside force. Now,
after an object induces motion (and hence, sense) within us is removed, the feelings or impression it left us with do
not automatically disappear. The motion set off by originally sensing this object gradually goes away, or decays, over
time when some other sense or offsetting motion occurs. For example, you can still picture the image of something
you experienced when your eyes are closed, and can still imagine a stove being hot even when you are not touching it.
In other words, just because we are not directly sensing something does not mean that we have lost the feeling or
impression it originally left us with. We can imagine things we no longer directly sense, and have memories of
feelings past, which make up our experience.
While animals have, in some respect, memories and imaginations of their own, what distinguishes humans
from other animals, according to Hobbes, is understanding or thought. Thought, or the transition from one
imagination or memory to another, is not as random as it sometimes seems, and can be divided into two types: guided
and unguided. Unguided thoughts, like those in a dream, may appear to be disconnected, but in reality are quick
successions of thoughts connected by experience. For example, you might pass a hair salon and start to crave
meatloaf. This might seem random at first, but if you think hard about a hair salon you might remember having to sit
quietly at the salon in your hometown while your mom got her hair done; and having spoken to your mother earlier in
the day, you might remember the meatloaf she made for you back as a child.
Regardless of how outlandish and random a thought may seem, Hobbes argues it can be traced back to a
perfectly logical train of thought (which goes along with Hobbes' thesis about constantly interacting motions in our
mind). Guided thought concerns ends and means, and can itself be divided into two subsets: 1) when we begin with a
desire - or end - and think of what means will bring about this desired end, and 2) when we are in possession of some
general means, and then think about what sorts of ends we can achieve with it.
Thoughts are internal, and the way we express thoughts is through speech, which helps us to remember our
past thoughts and express them to others. Hobbes identifies four main uses of speech: 1) to remember cause and
effect relations, 2) to show others our knowledge, 3) to express our will and desire to others, and 4) for sheer pleasure.
Note that in all four cases, speech is conceived pragmatically. It is a practical instrument for expressing our thoughts
to others.
Speech is also the basis of truth, as "truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations." For
example, "A man is a living creature" is a true statement, but only insofar as people share the same definitions of what
the meanings of the words, "man," "is," and "living creature." We can see from this definition of truth the necessity of
settling upon agreed definitions. Hobbes believes that geometry, "the only Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to
bestow upon mankind," provides a model that philosophy should emulate. Specifically, geometry begins first by
establishing agreed upon definitions, and from these proceeds logically through reason to build further principles and
conclusions.
Additionally, Hobbes argues that truth, or the validity of reason, which he defines as the "Reckoning (that is,
Adding and Subtracting) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon," is not established because a great
number of people agree upon something, or (contrary to Plato and his Philosopher King in The Republic) because a
particularly enlightened person says so. No man's reason is infallible, and so man's reason should be trusted without
proof. Therefore, reason - proceeding from one statement to the next in a logical order - can only be verified by
oneself individually.
Thus, since definitions, truth, first-principles and reason cannot be founded upon natural science, general
consensus or a particularly enlightened person, Hobbes argues that there must be some agreed-upon judge or body
that establishes such things. One should note that establishing an agreed-upon body does not contradict Hobbes'
earlier argument against truth by consensus. Hobbes objects to inherited or traditional forms of truth. In other words,
something is not true for Hobbes simply because many people believe it to be true, or because it has been traditionally
considered true. Truth for Hobbes, rather, must follow from consent. When people consent to join a larger body of
truth, that larger body is legitimated. Foreshadowing his argument for an agreed-upon sovereign, Hobbes claims that
establishing sovereignty by consent is the only way to avoid conflict among people.
Analysis
Throughout Leviathan, Hobbes argues against the "Scholastic" philosophy of Aristotle. This is particularly the
case in the early parts of Leviathan, where Hobbes argues directly against Aristotle's' philosophy of essentialism.
According to this school of thought, objects in the external world have a certain "essence" that gives them the
qualities that humans experience through their senses. For example, when we see a red apple there is an inherent
"redness" to the apple that is transmitted to us through sense. Thus, there is some objective essence or meaning to
objects that we experience. Contrary to this, Hobbes argues that our sensory experience is entirely subjective. He
argues that to speak of any sort of essence like "redness" in the absence of an object is absurd, since we can only
experience that which we can sense. When we see an apple we are not privy to some ethereal "redness," but instead
just see a color that we have come to call "red." Following from this, what gives an object meaning is not some
essence inhering in an object, but our own subjective experience of external bodies.
Hobbes' discussion of speech and truth is in stark contrast to philosophers like Plato who espouse universalism
with regard to truth. According to these schools of thought, there is an objective truth that humans can know, which
should serve as the basis for any philosophical system. Hobbes' argument that truth is a social construct and founded
upon language has a anti-elitist strain to it, particularly his claim that no man's reason is infallible, regardless of how
esteemed the man is, or how entrenched in tradition their thoughts may be. Hobbes argues that a human being can
only know the world through his or her own sensing organs. Thus he or she is the only standard through which
rational social organization can be measured.
One might think that because Hobbes' argument starts with sense, his philosophy should begin with natural
science - that is, with definitions and first principles derived from our knowledge of the external world. Yet in
defining sense as he has, Hobbes implicitly denies humans access to objective truth. We experience the external world
subjectively, and contrary to Aristotle, do not experience some objective "essence" of external bodies. Since our
knowledge of the external world is entirely subjective, it may differ from one individual to another, and thus the
external world, for Hobbes, serves as a poor foundation for philosophy.
Hobbes' argument that all experience, and hence, all knowledge comes from sense can also be seen as an
argument against innate knowledge, and for the tabula rosa (blank slate) model of the human mind. This model
proposes that we enter the world without knowledge, and accumulate knowledge only through contact with external
stimuli. Yet if the mind is nothing but a blank slate, how can we imagine things that we have never sensed? To use a
famous counter-example, surely we can all imagine a unicorn - just take a horse and put a horn on it - even though
they do not exist. How can this be? Hobbes argues that such imaginative entities are the result of "compounded
imagination": i.e., you take two objects or qualities you have direct experience with (which is a form of your "simple
imagination") and combine them in your mind to create this new image. Horn plus horse equals unicorn.
Finally, it's important to note that Hobbes' argument in the early parts of Leviathan unfolds like a geometric
proof. Hobbes carefully defines terms like sense, memory, and reason, and proceeds step-by-step, each definition
building upon the last. He sees geometry as the model by which all logic can be judged, and so follows suit. Some
readers might sense a contradiction in this approach: Hobbes argues that truth can only be established by a common
authority, so how can he ask us to accept his argument, which proceeds without such an authority but only from one
man's (Hobbes' own) mind? In this regard, Hobbes invites the reader to 'bear with him' for the duration of the
argument, and then to see if the conclusions and principles he derives make sense. In other words, Hobbes hopes that
he can attain "common authority" in retrospect, once his arguments have been weighed and argued by society.
However philosophically imperfect this may seem, in the absence of objective truths, this is the only way for any
theory to proceed: people must temporarily grant the argument clout and judge it 'after the fact'. Thus, it is all the
more important that Hobbes not merely advance conclusions that readers agree with, but rather show the validity of
his reasoning through careful logic.
Summary and Analysis of Book I: Chapters 6-12
After having described how the external world affects humans (i.e., through motion) and gives us sense,
memory, and experience, Hobbes now turns his attention to the internal mechanisms that affect human behavior.
Hobbes claims that within animals like ourselves there are two types of internal motions: 1) vital motion, which can
be thought of as essentially involuntarily bodily functions like our heart pumping, respiration, digestions, etc.; and 2)
voluntary motion, like walking, talking, and general movement, which have specific ends in mind.
Humans have no control over their vital motions, which arise due to the body's physical makeup, but our
voluntary motions are rooted in thought, and more specifically, thoughts about our appetites and aversions. An
appetite drives us towards some desired end, whereas an aversion drives us away from some unwanted end. For
example, we may voluntarily hurry across a crosswalk upon the sight of an oncoming car due to our aversion to pain.
According to Hobbes, there are some appetites that are born in us (for example, an appetite for pleasure), and
some that we acquire through experience (for example, an appetite for our favorite dish). From our appetites and
aversions come the human passions, such as hope, courage, anger, benevolence, and a host of others that Hobbes
defines. In addition to basing the passions on our appetites and aversions, Hobbes also defines good an evil with
respect to them. Specifically, that which is good "is the object of any mans Appetite," and that which is evil is "the
object of his Hate, and Aversion."
Turning from the passions to the intellect of man, Hobbes argues that intelligence or wit can be divided into
two types: 1) natural wit, which is not something innate but something we get through experience, and which is
mainly exhibited in ordering thoughts towards a particular end; and 2) acquired wit, which we get through instruction
and method, and "is grounded on the right use of Speech; and produceth the Sciences." Reason, then, is a type of
acquired wit - in fact, it is the type of acquired wit. Differences in human intellects comes from differences in passion
(mainly the desire for power), and differences in education. In other words, some men have an appetite for
knowledge, while others do not.
This fundamental passion, namely, power, is defined as man's "present means, to obtain some future Good."
Of this there are two kinds: 1) original or natural power, namely, the faculties of the body and mind, like strength,
intellect, eloquence, etc; and 2) instrumental power, the means to acquire further power, for example, riches,
reputation, esteem, etc. Following from these definitions, if I have a desire for food, I can use my natural power - for
example, my brute strength - to rob a man of loaf of bread I want; or I could use my instrumental power - for
example, my vast riches - to pay him for this loaf of bread. Power, in other words, is a means to an end. The value or
worth of man is how "much would be given for the use of his powers." From this definition of worth, we can see that
worth is a subjective quality. A rich man might be useless to another rich man, but is priceless to someone in debt.
What drives all humans to action is our constant and unquenchable desire for power "that ceaseth only in
Death." Even when we have furthered our original powers, whether natural or instrumental, we are never satisfied
with our present amount of power, "because [man] cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath
present, without the acquisition of more." Offsetting this fundamental appetite is a fundamental human aversion,
namely, a fear of pain and death. Due to our "fear of Death, and Wounds," we are naturally disposed to seek peace
through society, since society is the only "way by which a man can secure his life and liberty."
While all men are fundamentally driven by our desire for power and our aversion to pain, the differences in
the "manners" or behaviors of men stem from a lack of proper (philosophical) knowledge of how to achieve such
peace. This is precisely the project that Hobbes is undertaking. Only by understanding the nature of our desire for
power, which Hobbes has carefully argued for beginning with his definition of sense, can we have a proper
understanding of how to achieve peace. Hobbes believes that past philosophical treatments of the topics of man and
human nature have not employed such a rigorous philosophical treatment, and have instead relied upon custom (that
which has always been taught as true) or esteem (that which is taught by those with supposed unique insight into
truth) without properly examining the ordering of conditions and relations between cause and effect.
Since we know that acquired wit is the kind used in reasoning and science, it is important to note what
precisely Hobbes means and does not mean when he refers to science. Science is, according to Hobbes "conditionall
Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words." Beginning with established definitions is integral to
science. When an argument does not begin with definitions, or moves improperly from step-to-step, its end product is
but opinion. Again, the type of science Hobbes seeks to establish with his philosophy does not claim absolute truth,
as "no discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to come. For, as the knowledge if Fact,
it is originally, Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of Consequence, which I have said before is
called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall." Additionally, there are two types of knowledge, one of which has
its place in science, the other of which does not. Knowledge of fact comes from sense and memory, and serves as the
basis of history. Knowledge of consequence, "the Knowledge required in a Philosopher," is conditional and
composed of if-then statements, which serves as the basis of Science.
Fear serves not just as the driving force behind our desire for peace, but is also the foundation of religion.
According to Hobbes, the natural cause of religion is anxiety of the future, which is furthered by ignorance of cause
and effect relations. Religion comes from three sources: 1) curiosity into the causes of events; 2) curiosity of the
causes of these causes; 3) forgetting the order of things and past causes and effects, which is then attributed
elsewhere, i.e., to God. In other words, when we see an event and cannot discern the natural cause of it, we attribute
this to a supernatural or divine power.
Unfortunately, religion has been misused to make men obedient to a self-serving authority. When a state falls
upon famine or economic hardship, religious 'authorities' will claim this is because of divine causes, or because the
citizens have not been pious enough. Not knowing the true causes of their conditions (for example, poor agricultural
policy or government corruption), citizens will not fault their government for their hardships. Not only does this
offend true religion, since it is a perversion of proper religious doctrine, but this is also counter-productive to a
society's well-being, as mismanagement and chaos are remain unchecked and run rampant throughout the public.
 Analysis
In these chapters one can see Hobbes' geometry-inspired methodology at work again. Since the external world
is constantly in motion, and their motions set off corresponding motions within our bodies that we experience as
sensations, we experience constant and insatiable appetites and desires, which put us in perpetual competition with
other men for the objects of these desires. If bodies were naturally at rest, then man's appetites would also be finite,
and we could peacefully coexist in a state of nature. Thus, Hobbes' premise regarding motion is the cornerstone of this
argument, and as we will come to see, of the entirety of his argument concerning man and government.
From these chapters one can see the importance that fear plays in Hobbes' philosophy. Yet precisely what this
fear is of is a subject of debate. Generally speaking, it is "at once the principal cause of war and the principle means to
peace...[and] the basis both of man's most urgent plight and his only possible escape" (Blits). At its fundamental level,
it is not a fear of other men or (as will later be elucidated) of God or spirits. As Blits argues, both of these fears derive
from man's basic fear of the unknown. Without experience or knowledge of the external world, and compounded with
an ignorance of the causes of events, we have a fear of anything that is unfamiliar to us. That is to say, upon birth we
have a fear of everything, and only later do we come to fear particular objects like other men.
In a particularly short chapter (IX) Hobbes lays out in diagrammatic form the manner in which the branches of
knowledge are organized. Given Hobbes admiration for the accomplishments and methods of geometry, one might
expect to find all knowledge emanating from geometry or general mathematics. Yet in Hobbes' tree of knowledge
geometry does not serve as the roots, but is instead one of its branches. In fact, he places geometry as one of the small
branches on the side of natural philosophy, (knowledge of fact), and his project of politics/civil philosophy on the side
of knowledge of consequences. These two divisions fall under the most general heading of science. What is revealing
about this is that Hobbes does not believe philosophy emanates from, or should be grounded in geometry, but rather
that the same strict methodology used in geometry should be applied to philosophy.
Contrast this with Descartes' Discourse on Method (1637). For Decartes, who sought to base philosophy on his
famous principle, "I think, therefore I am," the tree of knowledge began with metaphysics as its roots, physics as its
trunk, and ethics, medicine, and other subjects as its branches. In other words, physics or natural philosophy sprung
from metaphysics, in contrast to Hobbes' division of these two fields of knowledge. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
(1781) included another attempt to apply mathematical principles to philosophy. Kant sought to bring philosophy "on
equal footing" with mathematics, similar to Hobbes, by applying its rigorous methodology and exact definitions.
One criticism of Hobbes is that his definitions of good and evil are entirely amoral. Indeed, by making good
and evil inherently subjective qualities, Hobbes comes to the conclusion that "There being nothing simply absolutely
so [good or evil]; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves."
Whether this implies a form of moral relativism is besides the question. Hobbes is not concerned with how men ought
to act according to some objective morality, but instead grounds obligation on man's inherent desire for self-
preservation. Pragmatically speaking, this makes for a much more efficacious normative philosophy. Hobbes does not
explore normativity further than simply saying, "If you want to preserve your life, you ought to do X." Indeed, he
explicitly denies the existence of some universal moral truth ("any common Rule of Good of Evill"), so any
arguments progressing from such a principle with be invalid.
Summary and Analysis of Book I: Chapters 13-16
In the previous chapters, Hobbes has laid out a general case for how humans come to live in society, namely,
that they are driven to it by fear. In order to have a more thorough picture of how society comes about, Hobbes directs
his attention to human nature, so that we can precisely understand how humans go from this state of nature to society.
As has already been noted, people are constantly moved by appetites and aversions, and as such, have certain ends in
mind which they strive to attain. Since one or more men may desire the same end (for example, food or shelter), they
are in a constant state of conflict and competition with one another. If man's appetites were finite this would not be so
problematic, but as Hobbes argued in the above chapters, we are never satisfied with any amount of power (the means
to attain certain ends), and are thus always in a constant power struggle with others.
While it may seem that in such a state of nature the strong would naturally triumph over the weak and
some sort of natural equilibrium would be reached, due to the peculiar nature of power this can never be so. Men are
by nature equal in their powers, as even "the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret
machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger as himself." From this equality in the state of
nature where even the weak can kill the strong, combined with a finite amount of resources and distrust of other men,
arises a perpetual state of conflict. Without a common power to mediate amongst men and distribute resources, the
state of nature is nothing but a state of constant war, where "the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short.
 Some people might object to Hobbes' rather pessimistic view of human nature, but he urges the reader to look
at experience and judge whether he is correct. After all, he reasons, you lock your doors when you are away from
home, and carry arms to defend yourself when you are traveling. Doesn't that reveal that humans by nature are
distrustful of one another and constantly competing with each other for desired ends? One might also object that
Hobbes' state of nature never existed. Here Hobbes admits that while such a period of time may never have occurred
and is merely hypothetical, we can see evidence of this during times of civil war, and even when we look at the way
of life of the "savages" in the Americas. Whether this state of nature actually existed is inconsequential, since Hobbes'
argument here is psychological rather than historical. Again, Hobbes believes his argument can be validated
recursively, so we should wait and see if what he derives from this theory of human nature is valid.
Hobbes' state of nature is purely descriptive rather than normative, that is to say, he does not believe there is
anything necessarily wrong with the passions and desires that propel us towards war with one another. In fact, in a
state of nature where there is no common power, "nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice
and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law; where no Law, no injustice." As
Hobbes' stated before in his initial treatment of the passions, what inclines us toward peace is a general fear of death.
The terms of peace that men come into agreement upon, which are dictated to us by reason, are called the Laws of
Nature.
To understand the Laws of Nature one must first understand the fundamental right of nature these are based
upon. The right of nature is the liberty each person has to do anything within their means for self-preservation.
Correspondingly, a law of nature is a rule, discovered by reason that forbids one to anything to hurt oneself, or to take
away the means of self-preservation. Through reasoning that in the state of nature we are at war due to our quest for
self-preservation, we discover the first fundamental law of nature, that man should "seek Peace, and follow it." The
second fundamental law of nature derives from this first one, and states that we should lay down this absolute right
of nature "and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself." In
other words, we should restrain ourselves from pursuing ends by any means necessary, insofar as other people agree
to do the same.
In observing this second law of nature, humans "lay down" their right of nature. This can either be done by
simply renouncing it - stating, 'I no longer have the right to do whatever it takes to stay alive regardless of who
benefits from this action' - or by transferring it: placing this right in someone else's hands for some specific benefit.
Merely renouncing the right to nature is a violation of the first law of nature, since you give up the right to defend
yourself without good reason. But transferring this right to a mutually agreed upon power, namely, through a
contract, follows from both laws of nature. You agree not to attack someone so long as they agree not to attack you,
and both people transfer their rights of self-preservation to a common authority. A covenant is a contract made
whereby one or more parties are bound to some future obligation (a contract can be a simple exchange of goods for
services, which ends after the transaction ends).
It should be noted that Hobbes believes a covenant is only valid if a common power can enforce the terms of
the contract. If two people simply agree not to attack one another without something to enforce this they have no
reason to obey the covenant. One might argue that the desire for peace could be enough to enforce the terms of the
contract, but in this case, the desire to cheat and, say, attack the other person once their guard is down would be too
tempting. In fact, not only would it be tempting, it would also be the most rational course of action.
For example, if I have $10 and agree not to steal your $10 on the condition that you do the same, I have every
reason to still try to attack you and steal your money. In the worst case scenario I fail in my offensive and am left with
$10; and in the best case scenario I conquer you and have a total of $20. This is exactly the state of affairs between us
prior to agreeing to our pact of non-aggression. But if there is a common power to enforce this covenant that would
punish me for trying to steal your $10, then the situation is radically different. If there is a fine of $30 for trying to
steal from others, the risk of attacking you (lose $30) is now greater than the reward of not attacking you (gain $20).
Thus, it is only when a common power is there to enforce the terms of an agreement can a covenant be valid.
(Correspondingly, a contract or covenant made in the state of nature, that is, in the absence of a power, is void).
From these first two laws of nature, Hobbes then deduces the third law of nature, "that men perform their
Covenant made; without which, covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and the Right of all men to all things
remaining, wee are still in the condition of Warre." In other words, it is in our interest to obey our covenants, since the
rewards for doing so (peace) outweighs the risk of breaking them (war). From this law of nature comes justice, so that
to obey a covenant is justice, and to break it is injustice. With these first three laws of nature in hand, Hobbes then
goes on to offer nineteen total laws that are derived from these initial three. These range from, but are not limited to,
graciousness, revenge, pride, arrogance, and many others, which in the most general sense are similar the golden rule:
"do not that to another, which thou wouldst not have done to thyself." These nineteen laws make up moral
philosophy, which according to Hobbes, "is nothing else but the science of what is good, and evil, in the conversation,
and society of mankind."
The last chapter of Book I sets the stage for Hobbes' analysis of "The Commonwealth" in Book II. When a
covenant is made between two or more men it is said to be made between two or more persons, namely, one whose
actions and words are either one's own (natural person) or represents the words and actions of another (artificial
person). With regard to an artificial person, the actor is the person (or body) that performs a given act, while the
author is the person (or persons) whose actions these are. (In the case of a natural person, the actor and author are the
same.) In going from the state of nature to society, a set of natural persons agree to a covenant, whereby a common
power is established as an artificial person to enforce the terms of the contract. This artificial person serves as the
representative or actor of all those who agreed to the covenant. Thus, all signatories of the covenant are the authors of
any and all actions performed by the artificial person.
Analysis
Hobbes' social contract theory is one of Leviathan's most lasting contributions to philosophy, as it sets the
stage for later contractarians like Locke (Two Treatises on Government, 1689), Rousseau (The Social Contract,
1762), and more recently, John Rawls (Theory of Justice, 1971). Locke's social contract differs from Hobbes' mainly
in that he views human nature as naturally peaceful, and does not believe that man in this state would be naturally
driven by warring desire and appetites. Equality also takes on a different meaning for Locke in his state of nature, for
equality exists in this state not because anyone has the power to kill anyone else, but because no one is subordinate to
any one person or power. Eventually people are forced to leave the state of nature when a state of war breaks out,
which occurs when one man tries to subordinate another man and take his goods. Once the state of nature is corrupted
by this state of war man must set up a government to protect one's goods.
Similar to Locke, Rousseau believes that in the state of nature man is born free and no man is naturally
subordinate to another. Due to human nature the state of nature is untenable for a man's self-preservation - a point that
all three philosophers agree upon - hence the need to establish a state. After men form the social contract, they
substitute moral equality for the natural equality that existed in the state of nature. That is to say, each man has a right
to be treated equally by the sovereign. Rousseau wavers somewhat in his description of man in the state of nature. In
his earlier work, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1754), he describes the state of nature as a relatively peaceful
state where men live within their means. Later in his life, particularly in his Confessions (1770), Rousseau would
return to this theme - partly out of frustration with the politics of the day that attacked him philosophically and
personally - and express a desire to return to this idyllic state of nature where man is not corrupted by society.
One of the criticisms Rousseau made of Hobbes's state of nature is that Hobbes describes man existing in the
state of nature as pre-social, yet many of the qualities of man in this state are social ones. For instance, he describes
men as being driven by pride, which can only happen in a social environment; indeed, most of the qualities Hobbes'
ascribes to man in the state of nature are inherently inter-personal. In fact, Hobbes says that man can never be content
with any amount of resources, since he may see his neighbor has more and feel either threatened or envious. He
therefore presupposes neighbors. Thus, to claim that man's life is "solitary and brutish" is misleading. Whether this
threatens Hobbes' overall argument is up to the reader. Rousseau believed this showed evidence of some form of
society existing in the state of nature, although Hobbes would likely argue that if this was indeed a societal form,
there was still a need to establish a more complex and ordered society around a sovereign.
While much has been said of the place of fear in Hobbes' philosophy, one should take particular notice of the
place of reason within it. While perhaps not stated explicitly, by tying the social contract to our desire for self-interest
Hobbes is implying that it is rational for one to enter into society, and to perform the obligations it requires of us.
Justice and rationality become then intertwined, as evidenced in his claim that "Justice therefore, that is to say,
Keeping a Covenant, is a Rule of Reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life." As will
become particularly apparent in his later treatment of a subject's specific obligations to the sovereign, Hobbes' will
base these "rules of reason" almost entirely on self-interest, taking the form "if you wish to preserve your life, you
ought to do..."
This emphasis on rationality is one of the aspects of Hobbes' philosophy that prefigures the Enlightenment.
Historically, Hobbes may not have lived or published in the time period commonly known as the Enlightenment, but
his belief that proper reasoning shows man the way out of the state of nature, as well as his constant emphasis on
subjecting any traditional thought or opinion to our own individual reasoning, sets the stage for thinkers like Locke
and Rousseau. Even his concept of the natural equality of man, though this inheres in man's equal right to kill one
another, is one of the central tenants of the political thought that follows him. Again, Hobbbes therein breaks from the
philosophy of the Greeks. Aristotelian thought claimed that some men are naturally slaves and others are naturally
masters, while Plato advanced the idea of man's place in society arising from his "natural strengths," with a
Philosopher King - who has superior rational abilities - ruling over his contemporaries.
Summary and Analysis of Book II: Chapters 17-21
Having analyzed man in Book I, and in particular how man is compelled to enter into society (that is, through
fear), Hobbes turns to a form of artificial man established through a covenant, namely, a commonwealth. As stated
before, in order for a covenant to be valid a common power or a sovereign authority must enforce the terms of the
contract, for "covenants without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all." Such an authority
is then established when a group of men say, "I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man,
or to this Assembly of man...on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him." This sovereign power, or
Leviathan, is "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutual Covenants one with another, have made
themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think
expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence."
This sovereign is imbued with the powers of all who agree to the covenant, and all the actions of this
sovereign are the actions of its subjects. The subjects are then the author of any and all actions undertaken by the
sovereign. All the liberties that man once enjoyed in the state of nature are transferred to the sovereign, whose duty it
is to ensure the preservation of itself, and hence, of its subjects, by any means necessary. The only exception is the
right to self-preservation, since that can never be given up completely, and was the initial reason for establishing the
commonwealth. Instead, men grant their various means towards self-preservation, like attacking ones neighbors and
generally infringing on others' self-preservation, to the sovereign.
A sovereign can attain power in two ways: 1) through natural force, or acquisition, when power is used to
force someone to submit to the sovereign; or 2) through mutual covenant, or institution, when people voluntarily
agree to subject themselves to a sovereign power. An example of the former is parental control over children, where a
parent might threaten to punish their child unless they obey them; and an example of the latter is the transition from a
state of nature to a commonwealth.
As for the specific rights of the commonwealth by institution, the first and foremost among them is that the
subjects cannot change the sovereign without the sovereign's permission. Doing so would be to break one's
obligations under the covenant, which is to commit an injustice. The second right is that the sovereign cannot ever
forfeit its own power. To do so would be analogous to committing suicide, since this would be to act against the self-
preservation of the artificial man that is the sovereign, and would also send the subjects back to a state of war.
Thirdly, to protest against the sovereign is unjust, since in instituting the sovereign one binds oneself to its
actions, and makes oneself the author of any of its acts. To protest against this would be to protest against the initial
covenant. Fourthly, a sovereign is incapable of injustice against his subjects. This is because the covenant that
establishes the sovereign is not a contract between the sovereign and the subjects, but between the subjects
themselves. After all, the sovereign is a creation of this covenant. Anything done by it is done with the authority of all
who agreed upon the covenant, and hence, is just. Accusing the sovereign of injustice is accusing yourself of injustice.
From these four main rights of the sovereign Hobbes derives several others-for example, that the sovereign is
the judge of what is necessary to ensure peace, and the sovereign has a right to choose ministers and distribute
rewards and punishments to its subjects-but his main point is that the sovereign has absolute authority over its
subjects. To take away any of these rights is to take away the sovereign itself. To the objection that given such a
sovereign a subject lives in a miserable state of being, Hobbes responds that regardless of how bad this may seem, it
is far better than the continual civil war that characterizes the state of nature without this sovereign. As he will argue
later, the absolute power of the sovereign is necessary for maintaining peace, and taking away any of these rights will
result in the collapse of the commonwealth.
Of a commonwealth by institution, there are three (and only 3) different forms the commonwealth can take: 1)
monarchy, where the sovereign is one natural person; 2) democracy, where the sovereign is a popular assembly drawn
from all natural persons; and 3) aristocracy, where the sovereign is an assembly or body drawn up from select natural
persons. In contrast to the scholastics who saw some form of democracy as the ideal type of government, Hobbes
argued that a monarchy is the best form of commonwealth for four main reasons.
First, since humans will always choose the private over the public good, the best way to ensure peace when
choosing a sovereign is to have these united. In a democracy and aristocracy the private goods outweigh public ones,
which only encourages infighting and corruption within government. In contrast, in a monarchy public and private
goods are united, since "no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or
contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies." Second, you can
have secret counsel in a monarchy, whereas in a democracy or aristocracy you cannot. (As Hobbes will later argue,
one gets better advice through secret counsel, since one is not apt to use rhetorical tricks or generally perform in front
of the pubic at the expense at truth.) Third, a monarchy is more consistent. Since the monarch is one person and
humans are not perfectly consistent, the commonwealth changes only as human nature dictates. In a democracy and
aristocracy, because more natural bodies compose the sovereign, the commonwealth is more subject to human
inconsistency as well as the inconsistency that comes from a change in the makeup of the sovereign, which happens
with each election cycle or new member of the aristocracy. Lastly, in a monarchy there is no infighting or warring
factions caused by envy, self-interest, or any other human imperfections.
Obviously not all commonwealths are founded by agreement through sovereignty by institution - after all,
once a commonwealth is established people have children who then become subjects - so the question remains
whether what has been said above applies to a commonwealth by acquisition. The main difference between a
sovereign by institution and by acquisition is that the latter is chosen out of fear rather than consent. Establishing
sovereignty in this way may seem illegitimate, as Hobbes previously said a covenant made out of fear or coercion is
void. Yet the covenant that established a sovereign by institution is also made out of fear, namely, the fear of other
human beings. Thus, to say a covenant is illegitimate due to the mere presence of fear makes both forms of all forms
commonwealth impossible. Not only this, when but sovereignty by acquisition is established after conquering lands,
those who are conquered do in fact have a choice as to whether they agree to the terms of the covenant. Their fear of
the sovereign may be greater than the fear the original subjects had when establishing the commonwealth, but these
annexed subjects still have a choice. Thus, the rights and duties of the sovereign are equal whether the commonwealth
be established through acquisition or institution.
Hobbes' furthers his argument that sovereignty established by force (acquisition) carries the same rights as
when it is established by agreement (institution) in his treatment of dominion. A sovereign's dominion can be
acquired in two ways: 1) through generation, or paternal dominion; and 2) through conquest, or despotical dominion.
Just like a family, paternal dominion is not automatic, meaning that a child does not obey his parents just because they
gave birth to him. Rather, at some age when his reasoning capacities have matured enough, he implicitly agrees to
their dominion in exchange for nourishment. The same goes for new generations becoming subjects of the sovereign.
Similarly, despotical dominion is not automatic, and those who are conquered in a war do not become subjects of the
commonwealth by virtue of being vanquished. They agree to the terms of the covenant to avoid being killed or
enslaved.
Hence, the rights of subjects gained through paternal or despotical dominion are the same, and additionally, in
both of these cases the sovereign has the same rights and duties as it does under a commonwealth through acquisition
or institution. In essence, this follows from the fact that in all of these cases, one agrees to a covenant out of the need
for self-preservation. Again, while the rights of the sovereign may seem overbearing, Hobbes believes the benefits of
subjecting to a sovereign far outweigh the costs of not doing so: "though of so unlimited Power, men may fancy many
evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor,
are much worse."
While it may seem that the absolute power of the sovereign Hobbes depicts leaves the subject with little or no
freedom, Hobbes argues that this is not the case. Liberty, according to Hobbes, is "the absence of Opposition; (by
Opposition, I mean external Impediments of motion)," and a free man "is he, that in doing those things, which by his
strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to do." A man who is chained is not free to
act, since there are physical impediments to his actions. What follows from this definition of freedom is that fear and
liberty can coexist. To use Hobbes' example, a man who throws something overboard for fear of the ship sinking does
so freely. Such is also the case for actions done out of the fear of laws and their punishments. Just as the sovereign is
an artificial man, civil laws are artificial chains (and also ones created by the subjects in establishing a covenant). You
are free to disobey the laws or the sovereign, and when you choose to obey these you do so freely, since the unlimited
power of the sovereign is consistent with the liberty of its subjects.
With all that has been said about the power of the sovereign, what liberties do the subjects enjoy? The amount
of liberty subjects enjoy does not differ from one form of government to the other, and there are three absolute
liberties that all subjects in any government have, all of which derive from the laws of nature (self-preservation): 1) to
defend oneself; 2) to refuse to hurt oneself; 3) to refuse to accuse oneself of a crime. All other liberties depend on the
sovereign and the terms of the covenant that established the commonwealth.
In all cases, a subject cannot rightfully complain about a punishment handed down by the sovereign, since the
sovereign is merely enforcing the laws established in a covenant to which the subject agreed. As Hobbes has argued, a
sovereign cannot commit an injustice to one of its subjects, and the subject never has the authority to overthrow the
sovereign. Not only this, but the sovereign also does not have the right to forfeit its power. This means that the only
time when subjects are absolved of the duty to obey the sovereign is when the commonwealth collapses and the
sovereign can no longer protect them. In other words, once the benefit of establishing the covenant is no longer
present (namely, self-preservation), the covenant becomes void.
Analysis
The point of departure for other contract theorists such as Locke and Rousseau is Hobbes' advocacy of
monarchy. All three philosophers agree that man sets up a government for their own protection, but they disagree
about what form of government best serves this purpose. For Hobbes a democracy is the worst of all possible options,
whereas for Locke and Rousseau a democracy is not only the best option, but the most just. Although Hobbes offers
logical proof to back up his claims, he was obviously shaped by his historical studies - in particularly, of the Greeks
and Romans - and believed these ancient democracies' demises followed from citizens and elected officials constantly
quibbling with one another.
Despite this, Hobbes' arguments in these chapters have had a profound impact on modern democracy. In
particular he introduces the concept of representation, and in the modern world where states are too large to function
as direct democracies, this idea is a key component of any functioning democracy. Even the Leviathan that Hobbes
describes, with its absolute power over all its subjects, is a representative of all the people in the commonwealth.
Absolute monarch or not, a subject must still consent to live under the Leviathan. Yet Hobbes' description of
consent may seem somewhat problematic, particularly when applied to children or the vanquished of war. With
regard to children, while Hobbes does say that they are not automatically subjects of their parents just because they
were born, saying they consent when their rational faculties are fully developed leaves open the question of whether
they can fully consent until their physical faculties are fully developed. An eleven-year old boy may understand the
consequences of leaving his family to fend for himself well enough, but if he cannot physically fend for himself there
is no alternative. Hobbes might answer that the child is still "free" to opt out of his family since he is not physically
shackled to his parents, and even in the original contract people agreed to form a state precisely because they could
not physically defend themselves.
In these chapters Hobbes considers an objection to his argument about the necessity of a commonwealth. If
one looks around at other animals, he specifically notes ants and bees, they appear to live harmoniously with one
another without any sort of state or society. If they can do so, why can't men, who after all, are animals themselves?
Hobbes offers several reasons why men cannot live in this way, the main one being that men, unlike animals, are
rational creatures. If we lived in some pre-societal harmony with others reason would lead us to devise ways to cheat
and make ourselves better off than others. Animals, furthermore, don't possess speech, and so are not able to mislead
one another about their wants and desires (another form of cheating). Hobbes also claims that animals naturally agree
with one another while humans do not, which is essentially begging the question of why this is so. Basically, this is
because human nature is competitive, and to those who disagree with this, Hobbes suggests they look inside
themselves and at civil wars for evidence.
Lastly, Hobbes argues that the only possible circumstance in which a subject is justified in disobeying the
sovereign is when the commonwealth no longer protects its subjects. This seems to invite a certain degree of
relativism into Hobbes argument: at what specific point in a commonwealth's life can it be said to no longer protect its
subjects? If a commonwealth is no longer able to protect its subjects, that would mean that one is living without a
state, and thus, being reduced to a state of nature, there is no sovereign to disobey. On the other hand, if you
encourage people to disobey a sovereign "right before" it seems like the commonwealth is about to collapse, this
makes the measure of a state's protection dangerously subjective.
Summary and Analysis of Book II: Chapters 22-31
Summary
Having laid out the theoretical case for the absolute power of the sovereign, Hobbes devotes the rest of Book
II to explaining in more detail how this commonwealth should function. Building upon the metaphor of the Leviathan
as an artificial person, Hobbes shows how the commonwealth is organized around different "systems." Systems are
groups of individuals joined together by a common interest, such as a town, or the most basic system in a
commonwealth, a family. A regular or regulatory system has a representative of all its members, while an irregular
system does not.
In the "political system" that is the commonwealth, the sovereign is the sole representative and has
absolute power, so the representatives of these regulatory systems only have limited power. Such a representative can
be a deputy or minister allotted a portion of the sovereign's domain, and is analogous to the nerves and tendons that
make up the body. Public ministers, or those appointed by the sovereign, represent the sovereign in these smaller
systems, and hence the subjects have a right to obey them accordingly. Public ministers can also serve as
representatives of issue-specific systems rather than region specific ones. For example, there may ministers and
appointees for the military, the treasury, civics, ambassadors, the judiciary, etc.
Just as a body needs nourishment, the commonwealth needs goods and resources to remain functioning and to
maintain peace. The distribution of land and resources is decided by the sovereign, not by what subjects may wish for
or claim to have had prior to the existence of the commonwealth. After all, property and resources are given meaning
only within a commonwealth, since in a state of nature anyone can take anything from another at any time. Only once
men give up their right to amass as much land and goods as they see fit through a covenant can one be said to
"possess" anything. Other things relating to "nourishment" of the body, like imports and exports, rules regarding
commerce and even monetary policy are set by the sovereign in such a way as to maintain the peace and security of
the commonwealth.
In addition to public ministers, the sovereign can also employ private ministers, namely, counselors or
advisors. While the advice these counselors gives the sovereign relates to the public, the sovereign has a right to hear
counsel from such people in secret (that is, in private). Indeed, Hobbes argues that secret counsel is a far better type of
counsel than one in which the sovereign's advisors testify to him in public, whether that be in front of other advisors
or other subjects in general. Given human nature, such public counsel becomes not advice, but exhortation or
dehortation, which involve inflaming the passions, using oratorical tricks, and other things done out of the counselor's
interest rather than that of the counselee (in this case, the commonwealth). In fact, Hobbes believes that such public
counsel strays so far from proper advice that it is better for the sovereign to act without any counselors than to employ
counsel that is not strictly private and secret.
The advisors to the sovereign offer him counsel, which are recommendations the sovereign is in no way bound
to follow. In contrast to counsel, a command carries with it obligation and duty. Law, in general, is a type of
command between two or more men who are obliged to act in accordance with this law. Civil law "is to every
Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath Commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of
the Will, to make use of, for the Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary to the Rule." In
other words, one is bound by civil laws not because one is a subject of any particular commonwealth, but of a
commonwealth in general.
While the sovereign may appoint ministers to make laws or judges to enforce them, the sovereign is the
ultimate legislator and judge. Following from this, the sovereign, even when the sovereign is an assembly, is not
subject to civil laws, since when a covenant was initially made between subjects it established the sovereign as the
law. Thus, to say the sovereign is bound to some law is like saying the sovereign is bound to itself, which is nonsense.
Additionally, to subject the sovereign to civil laws presupposes another arbitrator or common power. Not only does
this lack sense, since the sovereign does not make a covenant with the subjects, this also undermines the authority of
the sovereign, and hence undermines its ability to protect its subjects.
Since civil laws come about through consensus, namely, through a covenant, it is imperative that the civil laws
be known and understood so that they are properly enforced. Still, this does not mean that ignorance of or failure to
communicate a law is an excuse for violating it. Civil laws are discoverable and can be known through reason, as civil
laws have as their basis the laws of nature, the latter of which need not be published. This is not to say the civil laws
and the laws of nature are the same thing, since in a state of nature there is no justice or injustice (as there is no
common power). The laws of nature are "qualities that dispose men to peace, and obedience. When a Common-wealth
is once settled, then they are actually Lawes, and not before."
All laws need interpretation, but that authority ultimately rests with the sovereign, not with legal scholars,
lawyers, or philosophers. To put the power of interpretation elsewhere would be to undermine the sovereign's
authority, and hence, undermine the peace of the commonwealth. This is not to say there can be no judges in a
commonwealth. Indeed, laws can be both authorized and verified. The former comes from the sovereign, while the
latter comes from judges. Just as ministers and counselors are appointed by the sovereign, so also are judges.
According to Hobbes, a good judge is one that has a good understanding of the fundamental laws of nature, has
contempt for riches, has an ability to look at things in an unbiased manner, and has both patience and a good memory.
In order to enforce the covenant, the sovereign must have the right to punish and reward certain acts.
Accordingly, a crime is the act of doing something the law forbids, or failing to do something it commands. Crimes
arise from three main sources: 1) a defect in understanding, or ignorance); 2) error in reasoning, or false opinion; and
3) sudden passion. This last source, sudden passion, Hobbes claims is the most common cause of crime. Yet of all of
the specific passions that cause men to commit crimes, the passion that least often makes man violate the laws is fear.
Fear, after all, is the basis for establishing a commonwealth, and it is the fear of punishment that keeps men acting
justly in accordance with laws. When a crime is committed, this meets with a punishment, namely, an evil "inflicted
by public authority...to the end that the will of men may thereby be better disposed to obedience." But where does the
right to punish come from? After all, doesn't every man have the right to defend himself from harm?
When a person establishes a commonwealth this subject lays down his right to do whatever he sees fit for self-
preservation - in other words, he lays down the absolute right of nature that drives men to harm each other - thus
granting to the sovereign his right to self-preservation. Thus the sovereign attains absolute power to do anything
necessary for the self-preservation of the commonwealth; this power includes inflicting punishment on those who
commit crimes. Of course a subject could try to avoid punishment by "opting out" of the commonwealth, but this
would put them back into the worst of all states, the chaotic state of nature, where laws and justice have no meaning,
and the types of "evil" similar to punishments can occur at any time. Additionally, once a subject explicitly denies the
authority of the commonwealth, any rules regarding punishment are moot, as these are reserved for subjects only.
Hence, a subject that chooses to opt out of a commonwealth not only has to compete with the powers and wills of
other humans in the state of nature, but the far stronger power and will of this commonwealth.
Continuing his analogy of the commonwealth as a body, Hobbes describes the various defects or "diseases"
that make a commonwealth fail. First and foremost among these causes is the failure of the sovereign to rule with
absolute power. When the sovereign defers to other bodies or assemblies (for example, the church), this leads to a
power struggle, and eventually civil war, when the sovereign must retake some of these powers in order to preserve
peace (which, Hobbes reasons, the sovereign must inevitably attempt at some point).
Seditious doctrines may also infect the body of the commonwealth, and in time weaken it to the point of
collapse. Examples of such doctrines are: the judges of what is good and evil, just and unjust, are private subjects
rather than public authority; importing or imitating doctrines of other nations; that one does not have to obey a law if
it is contrary to one's conscience; and emulating the stories of revolt and regicide of the Greeks and Romans.
Additionally, placing religion above civil laws, subjecting the sovereign to civil laws, dividing the sovereign between
two monarchs or a monarch and an assembly, and anything that undercuts the absolute authority of the
commonwealth infects the body like a disease and serves to weaken it.
These are all institutional weaknesses that Hobbes likens to a defect in birth in the body, but lack of proper
nourishment can also bring about the collapse of a commonwealth. Namely, a lack of goods and resources, corruption
and embezzlement of politicians, or the concentration of power or goods in one specific area of the state. Lastly, a
human can be killed by external forces, such as if someone attacks or conquers him. Similarly, war between
commonwealths can bring about the failure of the state when a commonwealth is conquered and the former subjects
have the choice between returning to the state of nature or joining the commonwealth of their conquerors.
Hobbes devotes the penultimate chapter of Book II to the office of the sovereign, and offers advice on how
this should function in order to avoid the collapse of the commonwealth. To begin with, the sovereign needs to keep
the subject informed of the subject's obligations to the sovereign and the rights the sovereign enjoys. As has been
already spelled out, the office of the sovereign exists to "procure the safety of the people," and to weaken the
sovereign is thus to weaken the commonwealth as a whole. Subjects should not only be kept informed of their rights
and duties, but should also understand the reasons for these, lest they be seduced into disobedience or rebellion. To
accomplish this Hobbes advances the idea of civic instruction for all subjects in the commonwealth. In addition to
civics, Hobbes says that laws should be applied by the sovereign equally. To do otherwise would be to upset certain
segments of the population, and thus to incite factions and infighting. Generally, the sovereign should enforce good
laws, that is to say, laws that are necessary for and further the well-being and safety of the populace.
Hobbes ends Book II by dealing with the question of whether obedience to the sovereign is compatible with
obedience to God. For in the case that a civil law commands one to do something that one believes is contrary to a
divine law, which authority is a subject to obey? After all, is one is confronted with the choice of obeying a civil law
that will result in eternal damnation, the obvious choice would be to disobey the civil law. Not only do situations like
these present moral dilemmas, practically speaking, their possibility undermines the authority of the sovereign.
To begin with, before jumping into the question of when one can disobey a civil law due to a divine
obligation, one need to know the precisely what the divine laws are. According to Hobbes, divine laws are known to
us through three sources: reason, revelation, and prophecy. The first of these are none other than moral philosophy,
and are the civic laws we discover through sense and our own natural reason, which Hobbes has already discussed at
length. The latter two law outside the bounds of natural reason, as they are known to us either through a supernatural
revelation or through a prophet. These will be the focus on Book III, but Hobbes also argues that such divine laws
concern both how men should act towards one another, and how men should act towards God. One need not worry
about offending God through observing a civic law, since to worshiping God is a strictly internal act. If the sovereign
commands you to renounce the existence of God that is only an external renunciation, and one which man can do
while still having faith in God and properly worshiping him.
AnalysisA common justification Hobbes uses in discussing the proper functions of the commonwealth, for example
why secret counsel is preferable to counsel by assembly, is that such things are necessary to maintain the
absolute power of the sovereign. Without this absolute power, the argument goes, the commonwealth could be
weakened, and subjects run the risk of devolving into civil war. Yet in some regards Hobbes might not give
sufficient justification for the main premise of this argument: that the absence of absolute authority leads to
instability. The main rationale for this seems to be psychological rather than philosophical: men are inherently
fallible, and the more people involved in decision-making the more this fallibility is compounded (a variation of
the saying "too many chefs will spoil the broth"). In other words, human nature as it exists leads to the need for
the absolute power of the sovereign. One critique Rousseau had of Hobbes was that human nature is not static,
but can actually change over time. In this regard, if man "progresses" and becomes better-disposed towards
other men, then perhaps an absolute monarchy is not the best form of government. Hobbes might reply that this
is to attribute a social characteristic to man as he exists in a pre-social order, but as already noted, Rousseau did
not believe Hobbes' state of nature was pre-social.
While Hobbes lengthily discusses relations between subjects and between subjects and the sovereign, there is
very little in Leviathan about relations between commonwealths. In arguing that once a subject is outside the
commonwealth he is also outside of justice implies that inter-state relations are also war-like and chaotic. Since there
is no justice or injustice, right or wrong, in the state of nature between men, a state of nature and perpetual war must
exist between states. In the absence of a social contract between commonwealths, there would be no such thing as
international law. Even if there were to be treaties amongst commonwealths, in the absence of an international
organization with the power to punish transgressors these agreements would have no validity.
One objection that Hobbes deals with in these chapters is that the type of state he describes is wholly
impractical and has never existed in all of world history. Hobees admits this objection, but cleverly points out that
perhaps the fact that no such states have existed is the reason why states keep dissolving into civil war. Additionally,
he argues that his project is not historical. He is not scouring the annals of history in the hope of piecing together the
elements of the best possible state. Hobbes is engaged in a philosophical study of the commonwealth, and uses careful
reasoning and agreed-upon definitions to come up with a valid conclusion. Interestingly, Orbell and Rutherford did
take Hobbes' argument and put it into practice by measuring the "leviathanness" of a state to compare it to the
corresponding levels of violence and commodiousness of a state. In their study of 113 countries they found no
practical support to the claim that the more Leviathan-esque a state is the more peaceful it is.
Additionally, some may say that the various obligations and reasons for obeying the sovereign are far too
complex for subjects to understand. Having some sort of civil instruction may be helpful, but the overall project is so
philosophically sophisticated that some people will likely not comprehend it; thus they might be encouraged to rebel
against the sovereign. To this objection, again sounding like a true Enlightenment philosopher, Hobbes says that the
only reason people do not or could not understand these things follows from lack of interest. He previously said that
the differences in men's intellects comes from differences in their passions, so if they only devote sufficient time and
energy to understanding Hobbes' project they will be able to do so. On top of this, Hobbes also makes a somewhat
veiled criticism of religion in saying that if men can understand the complexities of religious thought - which he
notes, often times runs contrary to reason - they can surely understand rational philosophic thought like his own.
Despite Hobbes dismissals of criticisms that his work may be impractical, he is not writing the book merely
for philosophy's sake, or for the edification of a select group of academics. He has a decidedly practical project in
mind, which he explicates at the end of book II: "I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of mine,
may fall into the hands of a Sovereign, who will consider it himselfe, (for it is short, and I think clear) without the
help of any interested, or envious interpreter; and by the exercise of entire Sovereignty, in protecting the Public
teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice." One common commentary of Hobbes'
Leviathan is that it was written primarily in response to the English Civil War. While Hobbes' work cannot be
completely reduced to his context - especially since the Civil War began shortly after Leviathan's publication - quotes
such as these show that he wrote his treatise not just for the edification of a select group of academics, but with a
larger practical purpose in mind.