ASP v.

Ong

FACTS: The complainant, then an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, filed an affidavit-complaint charging Justice Ong, Justice Hernandez
and Justice Ponferrada, as the Members of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan
with: (a) grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and conduct grossly
prejudicial to the interest of the service (grounded on their failing to hear cases as a
collegial body during the scheduled sessions of the Fourth Division held in Davao City
on April 24-28, 2006, with Justice Ong hearing cases by himself and Justice Hernandez
and Justice Ponferrada hearing other cases together; and on their having unreasonably
flexed their judicial muscle when she objected to the procedure); (b) falsification of public
documents (grounded on their issuance of orders relative to the hearings in Davao City,
signed by all three of them, that made it appear as if all of them had been present during
the particular hearing acting as a collegial body, when in truth they were not); (c)
improprieties in the hearing of cases that amounted to gross abuse of judicial authority
and grave misconduct (grounded on Justice Ong and Justice Hernandezs making
intemperate and discriminatory utterances during the hearings of their Division in Cebu
City sometime in September 2006), to wit:

(a) We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is
already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by
that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.;

(b) You are better than Director Somido? Are you better than Director Chua? Are
you here to supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds for one prosecutor
who is doing nothing.;

(c) Just because your son is always nominated by the JBC to Malacaang, you are
acting like that! Do not forget that the brain of the child follows that of their
mother; and

(d) Justice Ong often asked lawyers from which law schools they had graduated,
and frequently inquired whether the law school in which Justice Hernandez had
studied and from which he had graduated was better than his (Justice Ongs) own
alma mater.

and (d) manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law (grounded on the fact that
Criminal Case No. 25801, entitled People v. Puno, was dismissed upon a demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused upon a finding that the assailed contracts subject of the
criminal case had never been perfected contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution, the
dismissal order being signed by all three respondents).
Maintaining their innocence of the charges, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez filed
their joint comment. Although admitting having tried cases in the provinces by
apportioning or assigning the cases scheduled for hearing among themselves, they
emphasized that they had nonetheless ensured at the outset that: first, there was a
quorum, i.e., all the three members of the Division were present in the same courtroom
or venue, thereby preserving the collegial nature of the Division as required by law,
specifically Section 3 of PD 1606; second, the members of the Division were within hearing
or communicating distance of one another, such that they could readily confer with each
other in order to address or resolve any issue that arose in the cases separately being
heard by them; and, third, the parties did not object to the arrangement, and thus could
not later on assail the proceedings to which they had given their full assent, based on the
equitable principle of estoppel.

Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez averred that their arrangement had been adopted in
the best interest of the service, because they had thereby expedited the disposition of their
cases, resulting in considerable savings in time, effort, and financial resources of the
litigants, lawyers, witnesses, and the court itself; but that they had meanwhile
discontinued the arrangement after it had piled up so much work at a much faster pace
than the Fourth Division could cope with. They argued that even
assuming, arguendo, that the arrangement had been irregular, it could only be the subject
of a petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, not an administrative complaint, due to its amounting only to a
mere procedural lapse.

Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez refuted the complainants allegation on their use of
intemperate and discriminatory language by attaching the transcript of stenographic
notes to prove that there was no record of the intemperate and discriminatory utterances
on the date specified by the complainant. Justice Ong dared the complainant to produce
a copy of the order that contained his following alleged utterance:

We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want to do, your contempt is
already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will appeal, by that
time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.

Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez admitted having asked the lawyers appearing
before them about the law schools they had graduated from, but explained that they had
done so casually and conversationally, with the scenario playing out between two
Justices teasing each other from time to time. They claimed that their queries were usually
made in jest, and were intended to break the monotony and seriousness of the courtroom
setting.

Justice Hernandez denied having shouted at Prosecutor Tujan-Militante, but conceded

the possibility of having observed that her presence in Cebu City was a waste of
government funds, because she was not one of the Prosecutors assigned to prosecute any
of the scheduled cases.

On the charge of gross ignorance of the law amounting to manifest partiality (relating to
the grant of the demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 25801), Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez pointed out that the Supreme Court had already sustained their action by
dismissing the petition for review of the Special Prosecutor through the resolution issued
in G.R. No. 171116 on June 5, 2006.

Justice Ponferradas separate comment echoed his co-respondents assertions in their joint
comment.

In his report dated October 6, 2009, then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, now a
Member of the Court, recommended the dismissal of the charges for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Justices Ong, Hernandez and Ponferrada are guilty of the charges
against them

HELD:

The Supreme Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the Court
Administrator.

a. Respondents Violation of the Provisions of PD 1606 and Revised Internal Rules of

the Sandiganbayan
The procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial hearings
was in blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and
the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their
adoption of the procedure arbitrarily denied the benefit of a hearing before
a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan to all the affected
litigants, including the State, thereby rendering the integrity and efficacy of
their proceedings open to serious challenge on the ground that a hearing
 before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan was of the very
essence of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process of law.

b. Unbecoming Conduct of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez

Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary clearly enjoins that: Judges shall maintain order and decorum in
all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge
deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or
control.
Publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and
graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have
even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias
for or against some lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible,
consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may
reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or
partiality in their personal relations with individual members of the legal
profession who practice regularly in their courts.

c. Respondent Justices Not Guilty of Manifest Partiality

The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the
demurrer to evidence of the accused in Criminal Case No. 25801 is
dismissed. As already mentioned, this Court upheld the assailed resolution
on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by declaring the petition of the Office of
the Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have "failed to sufficiently
show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the
questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction."

In the exercise of his powers as Chairman of the Fourth Division, Justice Ong exuded an
unexpectedly dismissive attitude towards the valid objections of the complainant, and
steered his Division into the path of procedural irregularity; and wittingly failed to
guarantee that proceedings of the Division that he chaired came within the bounds of
substantive and procedural rules.

To be sure, Justice Hernandez and Justice Ponferrada did not direct and control how the
proceedings of the Division were to be conducted. Their not being responsible for the
direction and control of the running of the Division and their having relied without
malice on the Justice Ongs direction and control should not be reproved as much as
Justice Ongs misconduct. Hence, their responsibility and liability as Members of the
Division were properly diminished.
Belga v. Buban

FACTS: Nestor B. Belga, then Chief of Police of Tabaco, Albay, filed an Information for
Illegal Possession of Firearms against one Noel Bodota de Rama which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. T-2497 and raffled to respondent Judge Mamerto M. Buban of the
Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 18. Upon arraignment, accused pleaded
not guilty.

The findings of fact by the trial court may be summarized as follows: Accused Noel
Bodota de Rama was driving at a fast speed so that he almost sideswiped one of the
policemen standing at the side of the road. The policemen, using the police car, chased
the accused until they finally caught him at the intersection of the road. One of the
policemen went near the accused and got his gun. A scuffle ensued for about 5 minutes.
Finally, accused gave his gun, a .38 caliber, to the police. He was invited to the police
station and was found to be positive for alcohol. He was likewise requested to produce
any document to prove his authority to carry firearm. He presented a Mission Order No.
020, series of 1993 from the NBI which stated "Proceed to National Capital Region or
Bicol." He had no permit to carry a firearm.

On October 29, 1995, respondent Judge Buban rendered a decision acquitting the accused
for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The present administrative case was filed by complainant Nestor Belga charging
respondent Judge Mamerto M. Buban of gross ignorance of the law and violation of
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) in rendering
the judgment of acquittal.

Complainant avers that in acquitting the accused, respondent judge "caused undue injury
to the government and gave the accused Noel Bodota de Ramas an unwarranted
benefit(s), advantage or preference in the discharge of his judicial functions through
manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence". He makes reference to the
reasoning of respondent judge in acquitting the accused.

In his Comment, respondent Judge Buban alleges that no law was ignored in rendering
the judgment of acquittal. He claims that the charge of "gross ignorance of the law"
stemmed from the finding in the decision "that the accused had a mission order"; that
while it is true that Atty. Rogelio Mamaril, head of the office of the NBI, Legazpi Agency,
testified that the NBI Regional Director has no authority to issue a Mission Order to a
civilian since that authority is vested only on the NBI National Director, respondent
stated that he had to consider the testimony of Atty. Carlos Carillo, NBI Supervising
Agent of Legazpi Agency to the effect that the Chief of Office in any sub-office or regional
officer is authorized to sign a mission order; and that there being conflicting claims of
two (2) lawyers from the NBI, the doubt had to be resolved in favor of the accused.
The Court Administrator submitted his recommendation finding respondent judge
guilty of ignorance of the law and negligence in the performance of his duties in
rendering an "erroneous" decision in Criminal Case No. T-2497. The Court Administrator
found that, while there may be no corruption involved in rendering the judgment of
acquittal, the respondent judge was negligent in his study of the facts of the case and of
the law and that upon a careful reading of the decision of respondent judge, no law or
jurisprudence has been applied in arriving at the judges conclusion. He is of the opinion
that the respondent judge did not exert his utmost effort to study the law and
jurisprudence on the matter as he merely relied on the existence of the mission order in
acquitting the accused in the criminal case. The Court Administrator recommends that
respondent judge be meted the penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 with warning
that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely.

Issue: Whether the respondent judge, in rendering the judgment of acquittal, was guilty
of gross ignorance of the law

Held: From the facts, there is no question that accused Noel Bodota de Ramas is a civilian;
his name does not appear in the records as an agent of the NBI. The firearm, a .38 caliber
revolver, is a personal firearm as it was not issued by the NBI. At the time of his
apprehension, accused admitted that he had no license nor Permit to Carry Firearm
Outside of Residence as the same had already expired. He had in his possession a mission
order issued by the NBI stating: "Proceed to National Capital Region or Bicol" but he did
not make any report thereon. As can be gleaned from the decision of the respondent
judge, the acquittal of the accused was based primarily on the fact that the accused was
in possession of a mission order. It is clear from P.D. 1866 that a license is necessary in
order to possess a firearm. As held in the case of Pastrano vs. Court of Appeals,[1] a
mission order cannot take the place of a license. Verily, respondent judge committed an
erroneous conclusion in acquitting the accused in the criminal case. Scmis

Ordinarily, judges may not be administratively sanctioned for mere errors of judgment,
absent any bad faith or malice. Nonetheless, they have an obligation to keep abreast of
all basic laws and principles. There is no excuse for ignorance of elementary notions and
jurisprudence. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal
principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive for
excellence, exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification
of justice and the Rule of Law. We reiterate the pressing responsibility of judges to keep
abreast with the law and changes therein, as well as with latest decisions of the Supreme
Court. The role of justices and judges in the administration of justice requires a
continuous study of the law and jurisprudence lest public confidence in the judiciary
would be eroded by the incompetent and irresponsible conduct of judges. This is
consistent with the standard that magistrates must be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence.

The Court cannot countenance the failure of respondent judge to inform himself of recent
jurisprudence. While we recognize his error to be an honest one, such error should never
happen again. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for erroneous judgments
rendered in good faith but this defense has been all too frequently cited to the point of
staleness. However, the penalty recommended by the Court Administrator is too harsh
and the same should be reduced.
Liwanag v. Lustre

Facts: A proceeding for the violation of BP 22 was filed by the complainant with the
Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, presided by herein respondent. Complainant
Lualhati M. Liwanag alleges that on several occasions, respondent Judge Paterno Lustre
required of her sexual favors in return for the processing of complainants case filed with
the respondent Judge. In one of the several occasions that respondent Judge allegedly
had molested the complainant, respondent allegedly caressed complainants breast and
required her to perform fellatio for him; and, in one instance, had taken her to
Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna and, as complainant said, He ordered me to
perform "fellatio" on him and I obeyed. There was blood that oozed from his penis. I
also saw black rashes on his body, especially on his legs. Before we left, he told me to see
him again on July 10 in his office. Succeeding sexual favors were requested by the
Respondent and, when complainant refuses to do so, respondent would allegedly delay
the trial for her case.

Respondents defense is anchored on denial. He strongly denie(d) the charges leveled

against him and dismissed them as the vile products of (complainant's) malicious and
prejudiced mind. According to him, complainant and her common-law husband thought
of filing charges against him when he refused to bend to, and accommodate, (their)
haughty and arrogant demands to hastily schedule, try continuously, finish and decide
arbitrarily within a very short period of time the B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) cases
filed by complainants husband. The complaint was, according to respondent, likewise
prompted by respondents refusal to accept complainants offer to reward him with five
percent of the P3.5 million her husband seeks to recover.
Respondent claimed that he could not have been in his chambers as early as 7:00 in
the morning as alleged by complainant since he usually arrives for work some five to ten
minutes before 8:00 in the morning. Moreover, he said the door to his room is never
locked -- thus, the impossibility of him engaging in illicit sexual conduct within its
confines -- since the only comfort room in the courtroom is inside his room and anyone
who wants to use it may enter his room freely.
Respondent further pointed out that at age 67, with a heart ailment and diabetes,
(s)ex is beyond (his) physical capacity. He said he is no longer capable of what ordinary
men indulge in, lest (he) die in the attempt. He sought the dismissal of the complaint filed
against him.
In support of his claims, respondent submitted the following documentary
evidence: (1) affidavit executed by Rodelio A. Alcaraz, a utility worker, stating that
respondent usually arrives at the office at 7:45 in the morning; (2) affidavit executed by
Atty. Benjamin A. Alonzo, Sr., a private practitioner based in Calamba, attesting to
respondents fine work ethics and moral uprightness; and (3) certification from Dr. Elmer
S. Sayoc stating that respondent is being treated for coronary artery diseases, atrial
fibrillation, and diabetes mellitus.
Judge Geraldez recommended dismissal of the complaint against respondent since
complainant failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Judge Geraldez
recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Memorandum dated September 1, 1998, took
a position directly opposite that of Judge Geraldez.

The OCA recommended that the case be formally docketed as an administrative

complaint and that respondent be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the
government, including government-owned and -controlled corporations.

Issue: Whether or not Respondent has committed impropriety in the performance of his
duties

Held: Yes. Respondent has failed to live up to the high standard of conduct required of
members of the bench. He grossly violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the
judiciary and to avoid impropriety not only in his public but in his private life as well; all
to the grave prejudice of the administration of justice.

Respondent does not deny that he is the one appearing with complainant in the
photographs submitted as evidence by the Complainant. He conveniently testified that
somebody else had posed for the photograph, but this is obviously an afterthought.
Respondent made this assertion almost a year after complainant filed her complaint. He
could have done it as early as October 1995 in his comment to complainants charges. If
the pictures were not taken at Riverview, where were they taken and why was
respondent with complainant at that time? If, indeed, there was a legitimate reason for
complainant and respondent to be seen together at the time and place depicted in the
photographs, respondent would have wasted no time explaining where they were taken
and under what circumstances, in order to extricate himself from his present
predicament. This, he failed to do. The reason for this, the Supreme Court believes, is
that he could not simply offer any plausible explanation why he was seen with
complainant coming out of what is apparently a private room. The Court cannot
countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every level in the
administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the publics faith and trust
in the judiciary. Respondents disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions even if he has
already retired as of November 1, 1998. For the serious misconduct of respondent, the
penalty provided for in Rule 140, Section 10, of the Rules of Court, by way of fine in the
maximum amount should be imposed.
Aquino v. Acosta

Facts: On November 21, 2000, petitioner reported for work after her vacation in the U.S.,
bringing gifts for the three judges of the CTA, including respondent. In the afternoon of
the same day, he entered her room and greeted her by shaking her hand. Suddenly, he
pulled her towards him and kissed her on her cheek.

On December 28, 2000, while respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by
phone, saying he will get something in her office. Shortly thereafter, he entered her room,
shook her hand and greeted her, "Merry Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and
kissed her. She was able to free herself by slightly pushing him away.

On the first working day in January, 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she
could see him in his chambers in order to discuss some matters. When complainant
arrived there, respondent tried to kiss her but she was able to evade his sexual attempt.

Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of the
CTA, while complainant and her companions were congratulating and kissing each
other, respondent suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her.

In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent called complainant, requesting her to go
to his office. She then asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany
her. Fortunately, when they reached his chambers, respondent had left.

The last incident happened the next day. At around 8:30 a.m., respondent called
complainant and asked her to see him in his office to discuss the Senate bill on the CTA.
She again requested Ruby to accompany her. The latter agreed but suggested that they
should act as if they met by accident in respondents office. Ruby then approached the
secretarys table which was separated from respondents office by a transparent glass. For
her part, complainant sat in front of respondent's table and asked him what he wanted to
know about the Senate bill. Respondent seemed to be at a loss for words and kept
glancing at Ruby who was searching for something at the secretary's desk. Forthwith,
respondent approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking for and stepped out of the
office. When he returned, Ruby said she found what she was looking for and left.
Respondent then approached complainant saying, me gusto akong gawin sa iyo
kahapon pa. Thereupon, he tried to grab her. Complainant instinctively raised her hands
to protect herself but respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her towards him and
kissed her. She pushed him away, then slumped on a chair trembling. Meantime,
respondent sat on his chair and covered his face with his hands. Thereafter, complainant
left crying and locked herself inside a comfort room. After that incident, respondent went
to her office and tossed a note stating, sorry, it wont happen again.
 In his comment, respondent judge denied complainants allegation that he sexually
harassed her six times. He claimed that he has always treated her with respect, being the
head of the CTA Legal Staff. In fact, there is no strain in their professional relationship.
On the first incident, he explained that it was quite unlikely that complainant would
ask him to go to her office on such date in order to give him a pasalubong.
With respect to the second incident on December 28, he claimed it could not have
happened as he was then on official leave.
Anent the third incident, respondent explained that he went to the various offices of
the CTA to extend New Years greetings to the personnel. He also greeted complainant
with a casual buss on her cheek and gave her a calendar. In turn, she also greeted him.
As to the fourth episode, he averred that he and complainant had been attending the
deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee at the Senate on the bill expanding
the jurisdiction of the CTA. Hence, when the bill was finally approved that particular
day, respondent, in jubilation and in the presence of other people, gave complainant a
spontaneous peck on her cheek. He could not recall any resentment on her part when he
kissed her. She even congratulated him in return, saying Justice ka na Judge. Then he
treated her to a lunch to celebrate the event. Respondent recounted several times when
they would return to the CTA in the evening after attending the committee hearings in
Congress to retrieve complainants personal belongings from her office. Surely, if he had
malice in his mind, those instances would have been the perfect opportunities for him to
sexually harass her.
As to the fifth incident, respondent alleged that he did not call complainant to harass
her, but to discuss with her and Elizabeth Lozano, HRMO III, and Elsie T. Forteza,
Administrative Officer, the health plan for the CTA officers and employees. The fact that
such meeting took place was confirmed by a Certification issued by Lozano.[4]
Regarding the sixth incident, respondent narrated his version as
follows: Complainant arrived in his office past 9 a.m. that day, followed by another court
employee, Ruby Lanuza. He proceeded to discuss the CTA Expansion Bill with
complainant. Then he went for a while to the rest room. When he returned, Ruby had
already left but complainant was still there. Forthwith, he remarked that he forgot to
greet her on Valentines Day, the day before. He approached complainant to give her a
casual buss on the cheek. But she suddenly stood and raised her arms to cover her face,
causing her to lose her balance. So he held her arms to prevent her from falling. Her
rejection came as a surprise to him and made him feel quite embarrassed. Shortly,
complainant excused herself and left the room. Stunned at the thought that she might
misinterpret his gesture, he sent her a short note of apology. Respondent further
explained that the structure of his office, being seen through a transparent glass divider,
makes it impossible for anyone to commit any improper conduct inside.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Acosta is guilty of sexual harassment

Held: No. Judge Acosta is not guilty of sexual harassment. He is exonerated of the charges
against him and is advised to be more circumspect in his deportment.

A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favor and does not fall within
the purview of sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877. Section 3 (a) thereof provides, to
wit:

'Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training - related Sexual Harassment Defined. - Work, education
or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager,
supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any
other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a
work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any
sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement
for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed

when:

1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-
employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said
individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions or privileges;
or the refusal to grant sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying
the employee which in anyway would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employees;

2) The above acts would impair the employee's right or privileges under existing labor
laws; or

3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment

for the employee.'

"Clearly, under the foregoing provisions, the elements of sexual harassment are as
follows:

1) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,

instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person has authority, influence
or moral ascendancy over another;

2) The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a working environment;

 3) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, or any other person having authority, influence or
moral ascendancy makes a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.

In her Complaint-affidavit, Reply and Sur-rejoinder, complainant did not even allege that
Judge Acosta demanded, requested or required her to give him a buss on the cheek
which, she resented. Neither did Atty. Aquino establish by convincing evidence that the
busses on her cheek, which she considers as sexual favors, discriminated against her
continued employment, or resulted in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment. In fact, complainant continued to perform her work in the office with the
usual normalcy. Obviously, the alleged sexual favor, if there ever was, did not interfere
with her working condition. Moreover, Atty. Aquino also continued to avail of benefits
and leaves appurtenant to her office and was able to maintain a consistent outstanding
performance. On top of this, her working area which, is at the third floor of the CTA, is
far removed from the office of Judge Acosta located at the fourth floor of the same
building. Resultantly, no hostile or intimidating working environment is apparent.

Based on the foregoing findings, there is no sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty
that Judge Acosta committed the acts complained of; that Atty. Aquino's determination
to seek justice for herself was not substantiated by convincing evidence; that the
testimony of respondent judge and his witnesses are credible and therefore, should be
given weight and probative value; that the respondent's acts undoubtedly do not bear
the marks of misconduct, impropriety or immorality, either under R.A. No. 7877 or the
Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that respondent judge demanded,
requested or required any sexual favor from complainant in exchange for favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or privileges specified under Section 3 of
R.A. 7877. Nor did he, by his actuations, violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics or the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
OCA v. Pascual

Facts: Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of
the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities and
corruption were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.

The letter was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in order that an
investigation on the alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may be
conducted. Ordered to conduct a discreet investigation by the then NBI Director Epimaco
Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang,
SI Florino Javier and SI Jose Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look
for Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious
character. In view of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of
Candido Cruz, an accused in respondents sala.

In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward Villarta, Cruz declared that
he was the accused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated
Murder. Respondent judge, after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case,
decided that the crime he committed was only physical injuries and so, respondent judge
assumed jurisdiction over the case. Cruz believed that he was made to understand by the
respondent that, in view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum
of P2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in all probability, would
need money to serve his vice.

In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused respondent judge to
be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in flagrante
delicto. NBI agents Villarta and Olazo filed the following report:

On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ met with Judge PASCUAL
at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is
attending the graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL that he
already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL
did not receive the money because according to him there were plenty of people around. He then
instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him (Judge PASCUAL) at his office the following day.

At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993), CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded
to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat
handed to him four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope previously
marked and glazed with fluorescent powder.

In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room and after about 15 minutes,
CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room and signaled to the Undersigned that Judge PASCUAL
had already received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered the room and
informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied having received anything from
CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough search, the marked money was found inserted between
the pages of a blue book on top of his table.

Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he was subjected to
ultra violet light examination. After finding Subjects right hand for the presence of
fluorescent powder, he was booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with
our Standard Operating Procedure (S.O.P.).

On even date, the results of our investigation together with the person of Judge FILOMENO
PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined
and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. (Rollo, pp. 47-48.)

On May 11, 1994, by resolution of the Third Division of this Court, this case was referred
to Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon for investigation, report and recommendation.

In connection with this investigation, respondent filed a Memorandum, dated July 28,
1995, wherein respondent presented his version of the case:

Sometime in February 1993, one Ceferino Tigas, a fictitious person according to the NBI,
wrote a letter to Court Administrator Ernani Pao of the Supreme Court, alleging
irregularities committed by the accused. Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L.
Suarez endorsed the letter to the NBI Director requesting `discreet investigation of the
Tigas letter. An NBI tandem of Agents Edward Villarta and Reynaldo Olazo proceeded
to Angat, Bulacan, to investigate. Said tandems assignment was merely to conduct
discreet investigation supposedly, but it led to incriminatory machinations, planting
evidence, unlawful arrest, illegal search and seizure. They contacted Candido Cruz who
was mentioned in the letter. They, however, discovered that Ceferino Tigas, the alleged
letter writer, was an inexistent person, fictitious as shown by the synopsis report of the
NBI agents (Exhibit 8). Having contacted Candido Cruz, the NBI agents persuaded him
to participate in what they called `entrapment operation. The NBI agents prepared an
affidavit, then a supplementary affidavit and had them signed by Candido Cruz. They
also went to the NBI Headquarters and had four (4) P500 bills dusted with fluorescent
powder which they used in theoperation against the accused.

In the afternoon of March 25, 1993, the NBI, along with Candido Cruz, proceeded to the municipal
building of Angat, Bulacan, where the accused judge was holding office. However, they learned
that the accused judge was not in his office but was then attending the graduation rites of his son
at the nearby Colegio de Sta. Monica, and so they decided to move their operation to the school
grounds. The ceremonies had not yet begun. Candido Cruz saw the accused in one corner of the
compound and approached him. He tried to give the accused an envelope allegedly containing
money, but the judge refused to accept it and angrily drove Candido Cruz away. Rebuffed, the NBI
agents decided to reset their operation the following day.

At around 9:30 in the morning of March 26, 1993, the NBI agents and Candido Cruz
arrived at the municipal building of Angat, Bulacan. Cruz, as planned, entered the
accused judges chambers and placed an envelope, allegedly containing marked money,
right on his (judges) desk. He thought it was a pleading for filing and he told Candido
Cruz to file it with the office of the clerk of court at the adjacent room. Cruz replied that
it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing the reply, the accused suddenly
erupted in anger, he grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it to Cruz. The
envelope fell on the floor, the accused picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of
Cruzs polo shirt and drove him out of the chamber.

Just seconds thereafter, agents Villarta and Olazo entered the door of the chamber which
door was open at that time. They introduced themselves and told the accused that the
money that Cruz gave him was marked. Accused told them that he did not receive or
accept money from Cruz. But they proceeded to search the room, the table, its drawers,
and every nook and cranny of his room, including the pockets of the accuseds
pants. After scouring the place, the agents failed to find the envelope with the marked
money. And so, one of the agents called for Candido Cruz who was waiting outside at a
waiting shed fronting the municipal building, and asked him where the envelope
was. Cruz came back to the room and, together with agent Olazo, approached the cabinet
and said heto pala.

Then, the accuseds humiliating experience began. Thereafter, despite the strident protestations of
the accused, the envelope, which came from the pocket of Cruzs polo shirt, was placed on top of the
table of the judge, pictures were taken, and the accused was arrested by the NBI agents.

On August 11, 1995, Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon submitted the following report
and recommendation:

The Investigating Judge respectfully submits her findings based on the evidence at hand.

As against the respondent judges denials, the undersigned submits that the sworn affidavits of
complainants and NBI Agents and documentary proofs attached to the records are more
convincing and nearer to the truth. They have no motive for fabricating this charge, except to bring
justice. Credence should be given to the testimony of the NBI Agents coming as it does from an
unpolluted source. These Agents had no reason to testify falsely against the respondent
judge. They were just doing their duty. On the other hand, the respondent judge had to protect
himself against the testimonial and technical/scientific evidence that he had received the envelope
and to reject its implications of such evidence.

Furthermore, his defense that he was just instigated to commit a crime is likewise untenable. The
principle evolved from the cases appears to be that in a prosecution for an offense against the public
welfare, such as accepting bribe, the defense of entrapment cannot be successfully interposed; x x
x.

One may well wonder over the manner the envelope containing the money was proffered to the
respondent judge as he narrated his story on how he got mad at Candido Cruz when he proffered
the said envelope, how he threw, picked it up and placed it in the pocket of the latter and how he
drove him away. He even testified that it was just planted by the NBI Agents when the latter
allegedly placed the envelope inside a directory which was placed on top of a cabinet.

x x x. Why was he not surprised that somebody barged into his chamber or was he really
accustomed with people directly dealing or negotiating at his chamber, as what Cruz did,
instead of dealing with his staff. His angry words and his actuations, according to his
testimony, were not convincing at all to show that he was that fuming mad at Candido
Cruzs offer. More so, his claim that NBI Agents connived with Candido Cruz just for their
own personal glory was not even persuasive. His excuse of the presence of fluorescent
powder on his hand was flimsy and incredible.

The act of the respondent shows that he can be influenced by monetary considerations. This act of
the respondent of demanding and receiving money from a party-litigant before his court
constitutes serious misconduct in office. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct, no
matter how nominal the amount involved on the part of those who are charged with the
responsibility of administering the law that will surely erode the peoples respect for law and lose
faith and trust in the courts which are expected to render fair and equal justice to all.

Such act go against Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which state: A Judge
should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities and a judge
should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.

With the above, the Investigating Judge respectfully recommends that appropriate
penalty be imposed upon the respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Filomeno Pascual is guilty of the charge of
bribery against him

HELD: No. The evidence on record does not warrant conviction.

We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive
Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of
the respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case
of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded
the right to open trial wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and
present evidence in his defense.
This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases,
demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any
graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived
from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no
less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation
and after presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in
character. The above-quoted Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had
fallen short of the requirements of due process.

The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of

principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material
points.

It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who must have had an
ax to grind against the respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or lack of
evidence to put up a righteous case, did not come out in the open and instead wrote an
anonymous letter. The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify
crimes committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged respondent with anomalies in
general terms. Respondent judge could not have been expected to make a valid answer
or to otherwise defend himself from such vague accusations.

While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas letter,
ordered the NBI investigating team to make a discreet investigation of respondent, the
NBI team had instead caused an instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not
having found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists, they sought
out an accused before respondents court who could possibly be respondent judges virtual
victim. Approached by the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought
before the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the
charge of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge gave judgment to the effect that the
crime committed by Candido Cruz was that of physical injuries merely. He declared then
that he had original jurisdiction to try the case.

But, respondents action in this regard was perpetrated some time before Candido Cruz
was persuaded to participate in what they (the NBI agents) called entrapment operation.
The opportune time to bribe the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing
Cruz criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked
then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask for it on the date of the entrapment on
March 26, 1993, the favorable verdict having been rendered already.

It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted that, despite the fact that he
scoured the table of the respondent in search of the envelope, with marked money in it,
no envelope was found and so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so
that Cruz can locate the envelope.
In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the allegations of
respondent judge in his defense that, at around 9:30 oclock in the morning of March 26,
1993, Candido Cruz, along with the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat,
Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judges chambers, located thereat,
and placed before respondent judge an envelope containing marked money. Respondent
judge thought that what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told
Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room adjacent to
his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was asking
for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed
the envelope on the desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on the
floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of Cruz polo
shirt and drove him out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and Olazo immediately
entered the door of the judges chambers, introduced themselves, and told respondent
judge that the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told them that
he did not receive or accept money from Candido Cruz. After respondent judge said this,
the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the room, examined tables, drawers,
and every nook and cranny of respondents chambers, and the pockets of the pants of
respondent judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers of respondent, the NBI Agents
failed to find the envelope containing marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz
to respondent judge.

Candido Cruz, who had gone down to the waiting shed, was called for by one of the
agents. Candido Cruz was asked as to the whereabouts of the envelope containing
money. Candido Cruz went back to the judges chambers and made the motions of
conducting a search. Eventually, he went straight to the top of a cabinet and, in the
manner of a magician, produced the envelope with marked money, saying, heto pala.

Thereafter, photographs were taken of respondent judge who was humiliated no end by
the fact that the envelope with marked money was placed on top of his desk with
respondent judge in front of it.

In his testimony before the Sandiganbayan, NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo stated that the
marked money used in their entrapment operation actually came from Candido Cruz and
not from the NBI;[9] and he was not able to see what actually transpired between
Candido Cruz and respondent judge inside the chambers of the judge. He was outside
the judges chambers and entered it only after Candido Cruz gave the signal that the
money was already delivered by him to the respondent.[10] Candido Cruz, on the other
hand, testified that the marked money used in the alleged entrapment operation was
given to him by the NBI[11] and, when he went out of the judges chambers after giving
the money, he signaled to one, Col. Javier, who was then positioned immediately outside
the chambers.[12]
In view of the foregoing facts, it is easy to conclude that the acts of the NBI agents which
triggered the incident that transpired inside respondent judges chambers constituted
instigation and not entrapment as claimed by the prosecution. It is evident that Candido
Cruz was induced to act as he did in order to place respondent judge in a compromising
situation, a situation which was not brought about by any request of respondent judge. It
is surprisingly strange that an accused in a case would simply barge into the judges
chambers without rhyme or reason, place bribe money on top of the judges desk without
so much as explaining what the money was for. Respondent judges action on Candido
Cruzs case which favored Cruz was effected long before. We can believe the fact that,
under the circumstances, respondent judge did react in anger and threw the envelope at
the accused Candido Cruz. The judge must have given back the money to Candido Cruz
and literally drove Cruz out of his chambers bringing the money with him. This explains
the reason why the NBI Agents notwithstanding a relentless search did not find the
money inside the chambers. Four (4) NBI Agents made the search and they were unable
to find the envelope with the marked money in it. This fact NBI Agent Olazo in effect
admitted because he had to call back Candido Cruz in order to make Cruz divulge as to
where the bribe money was placed. When, after all, Candido Cruz produced the money
when he went back to the judges chambers, it became obvious that the money when
offered to respondent judge was not received by the latter.

The foregoing set of facts smacks of unlawful prosecution and planting of evidence
amounting to persecution. It is reprehensible to say the least that NBI agents should
entrap the respondent judge by illegal means, besmirch his reputation by the planting of
evidence against him and make public the foregoing charges of bribery against him in
the face of the unjustified and illegal incriminatory machinations perpetrated by the NBI
agents in connivance with Candido Cruz.

We, thus, hold respondent Judge Filomeno Pascual blameless of the charge of bribery
against him.

It should be noted that Candido Cruz insisted that he had participated in the alleged
entrapment operation only because of the fact that the NBI agents made him believe that
there was an order therefor from the Supreme Court.[13] Considering that he is illiterate
and is already more than 70 years of age, it is understandable why he was easily
persuaded by the NBI agents to cooperate without need of any threat
whatsoever. Inconsistencies in his testimony is likewise attributed to his aforesaid
personal circumstances for it does not jibe with practical experience that a person telling
the truth will still have to struggle to remember everything that transpired, he having
been a participant in the operation. Gross mistakes on very important points not easily
forgotten are very strong indicia of the falsity of the story given by a witness.[14]

We reiterate the ruling in the case of Raquiza v. Castaneda, Jr.,[15] that:

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such
is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect,
corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal
trials apply.

Reasonable doubt is the inability to let the judicial mind rest easy upon the certainty of
guilt after a thorough investigation of the whole evidence.[16] The principle of reasonable
doubt being applicable in the instant case, therefore, we find that the alleged act of bribery
committed by respondent has not been sufficiently and convincingly proven to warrant
the imposition of any penalty against respondent.
Macalintal v. Teh

FACTS: In a letter, Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal related to the Court the actuations of Judge
Angelito C. Teh, Executive Judge and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas, relative to Election Case No. R-95-001.

It would appear that Judge Teh issued a resolution adverse to the client of Atty.
Macalintal in an election case. Atty. Macalintal questioned the resolution, via a petition
for certiorari, before the COMELEC. While the case was pending at the COMELEC, Judge
Teh actively participated in the proceedings by filing his comment on the petition and,
still later, an urgent manifestation. Complainant lawyer forthwith filed a motion to
prevent respondent Judge from further acting on Election Case No. R-95-001. Instead of
acting on the motion for inhibition, Judge Teh hired his own lawyer and filed his answer
before his own court, with the prayer:

"1. That Judgment be rendered dismissing the Motion for Inhibition for lack of sufficient
factual and legal basis;

"2. Ordering the movant to pay the undersigned respondent in the amount of P100,000.00
as attorney's fees and expenses for litigation;

"3. Cost of this suit.

"Respondent respectfully prays for such other reliefs and remedies as may be deemed
just and equitable in the premises."

In its resolution of 19 August 1996, the Court required respondent to comment on the
letter-complaint.

In his comment, dated 20 September 1996, respondent Judge admitted that he had filed
his own pleadings with the COMELEC out of respect and in deference to the order of 16
November 1995 of the COMELEC En Banc requiring respondents to comment on the
petition. The urgent manifestation he filed was meant to rectify the assertion of
complainant that he had erroneously cited Section 8, Rule 35, of the Omnibus Election
Code. Attached to his comment before this Court was his resolution, dated 31 July 1996,
where respondent Judge, ruling on the motion for inhibition, held:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court hereby rendered
this resolution on the pending incidents to wit:

"1. The protestee's unverified Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Out Opposition are
hereby DENIED for lack of sufficient legal and factual basis;
"2. The Motion for Inhibition is likewise DENIED for lack of sufficient legal and factual
basis;

"3. And for compelling the respondent Judge to engage the services of counsel who
prepared the Answer to the Motion for Inhibition, the Protestee's counsel, Atty. Romulo
B. Macalintal is hereby ordered to pay P100,000.00 as Attorney's Fees and litigation
expenses incident to his Motion for Inhibition.

"SO ORDERED."

In its resolution, dated 12 March 1997, the Court resolved to:

"(a) DIRECT Judge Angelito Teh to ACT on the motion for inhibition in accordance with
the procedure prescribed in Section 2, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court;

"(b) TREAT the letter dated April 1, 1996 of complainant as an administrative complaint
against Judge Angelito Teh and docket accordingly;

"(c) CONSIDER the comment dated September 20, 1996 of Judge Teh filed in compliance
with the resolution of August 19, 1996 as comment on the complaint; and

"(d) require the parties to MANIFEST within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof whether
they are willing to submit this case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already
filed herein."[3]

In his manifestation, dated 29 April 1997, respondent Judge expressed his willingness to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of his comment which he repleaded and
reproduced. He also made his observation that the complaint of Atty. Macalintal had not
been under oath.

In his compliance, dated 24 April 1997, complainant informed the Court that his letter of
01 April 1996 was not intended as an administrative complaint but that he was leaving
the matter of treating it as such to the discretion of this Court in the exercise of its
administrative control and supervision over the members of the judiciary. He likewise
manifested his willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
already filed. He, in passing, informed the Court that the resolution of 31 July 1996 issued
by respondent judge was found by the COMELEC to be "irrational."

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Angelito C. Teh is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

HELD: While Rule 140 of the Rules of Court requires that complaints against Judges
should be sworn to, the Court deems it proper to dispense with the requirement since the
letter of Atty. Macalintal, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator, has heretofore been treated as an administrative complaint and
considering, further, that respondent Judge, in his comment, practically admitted all
pertinent allegations of complainant. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court
may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show
gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct.

Section 5, Rule 65, of the Rules of Court provides:

"Sec. 5. Defendants and costs in certain cases. - When the petition filed related to the acts
or omissions of a court or judge, the petitioner shall join, as parties defendant with such
court or judge, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court;
and it shall be the duty of such person or persons to appear and defend, both in his or
their own behalf and in behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings, and costs
awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the person or
persons in interest only, and not against the court or judge."

Evidently, the active participation of respondent judge, being merely a nominal or formal
party in the certiorari proceedings, is not called for. In Turqueza vs. Hernando, the Court
has explained:

"x x x (U)nder Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a judge whose order is challenged
in an appellate court does not have to file any answer or take active part in the proceeding
unless expressly directed by order of this Court. It is the duty of the private respondent
to appear and defend, both in his/her behalf and in behalf of the Court or judge whose
order or decision is at issue. The judge should maintain a detached attitude from the case
and should not waste his time by taking an active part in a proceeding which relates to
official actuations in a case but should apply himself to his principal task of hearing and
adjudicating the cases in his court. He is merely a nominal party to the case and has no
personal interest nor personality therein."

Respondent's folly did not stop there. When complainant filed a motion for respondent's
inhibition in Election Case No. R-95-001, the latter, instead of acting thereon in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 137, of the Rules of Court, hired his own lawyer, filed his answer to
the motion and forthwith denied the same, ordering, at the same time, Atty. Macalintal
to pay P100,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and litigation expenses "for compelling the
respondent Judge to engage the services of counsel who prepared the Answer to the
Motion for Inhibition." Respondent Judge, in fine, acted both as a party litigant and as a
judge before his own court.

In the Court's resolution of 12 March 1997, respondent was directed to act on the motion
for inhibition in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 2, Rule 137,[9] of
the Rules of Court. Respondent Judge either misunderstood or chose to misunderstand
the directive for, in his order, dated 17 April 1997, he granted the motion for inhibition
"in compliance with the resolution" of the Court. Clearly, the Court, in its resolution of
12 March 1997, merely required respondent Judge to act on the motion for inhibition in
accordance with the Rules, i.e., "to either proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom,
in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification." Certainly,
he was not directed by the Court either to grant or deny the motion.

Respondent judge should be reminded that decisions of courts need not only be just but
must be perceived to be just and completely free from suspicion or doubt both in its
fairness and integrity. Judges, being the visible representation of the law and, most
importantly, of justice, should be the embodiment of independence, competence, and
integrity. Once again, the Court would also wish to say that a member of the bench must
continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments and show
acquaintance with statutes, procedural rules and authorities doctrines. Not for a moment,
indeed, does the learning process in law cease.

In the case before us, respondent's gross deviation from the acceptable norm for judges
is clearly manifest. In Castaos vs. Escao, Jr., the Court has had occasion to state:

"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a
law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In
both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the administration of
justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot
justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles."
Lagcao v. Gako

FACTS: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the complaint of Doroteo,
Diosdado and Ursula Lagcao against respondent Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, Branch 5.

Complainants are the registered owners of lot no. 1029, a 4,048 sq. m. parcel of
land situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City. They filed an ejectment case against the settlers
occupying the lot sometime in 1997. The case was filed in the MTCC, Cebu City, Branch
1. In April 1998, the MTCC rendered a decision in favor of complainants, ordering
defendant settlers to vacate the lot. On appeal to the RTC of Cebu, the decision was
affirmed. Hence, the MTCC issued a writ of execution. This was followed by an order for
the demolition of certain structures of the settlers who refused to leave.

On February 22, 1999, before the demolition order could be enforced, the MTCC
suspended its implementation for 120 days in deference to a written request of then City
Mayor Alvin B. Garcia who cited humanitarian reasons and asked for time to look for a
relocation site for the settlers. The court granted this request.

In the meantime, the settlers organized themselves and formed Green Pasture
Homeowners Association, Inc. (association), a non-stock corporation.

On June 30, 1999, during the period of deferment of the demolition order,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772 entitled An
Ordinance Further Amending Ordinance No. 1656 as amended by Ordinance No. 1684
otherwise known as the 1996 Revised Zoning Ordinance of the City of Cebu, by
Incorporating therein a New District called Socialized Housing Sites. This ordinance
identified subject lot no. 1029 as included in the Socialized Housing Sites pursuant to RA
7279 or the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. Subsequently, Ordinance No.
1843 was approved on August 2, 2000 authorizing the expropriation of the lot.

Thereafter, the association filed a complaint for injunction, prohibition and

damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC of
Cebu against complainants. It prayed that complainants and the MTCC be enjoined from
ejecting its members and demolishing their structures. In a resolution penned by
respondent, the RTC of Cebu granted the writ of preliminary injunction. The
complainants' motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated May 22, 2000.

Complainants elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via petition for
certiorari. The CA, in a decision, set aside respondent's March 27 and May 22, 2000
resolutions. It held that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued
the writ of preliminary injunction in the absence of a clear legal right of the
association. Reconsideration sought by the association was denied. Thereafter, another
writ of demolition was issued. However, on February 26, 2002, respondent issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) stopping the demolition scheduled on that day.

Meanwhile, the association filed an amended complaint alleging a supervening

event (i.e., the subsequent sale of the lot to the association) that would make execution of
the decision of the MTCC inequitable. It also applied for another writ of preliminary
injunction which respondent denied in an order dated March 15, 2002. On March 18, 2002,
respondent voluntarily inhibited himself from the case.

Complainants charged respondent with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse
of authority and grave misconduct for issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in his
March 27, 2000 resolution and TRO in his February 26, 2002 order. They argue that
respondent was aware that the MTCC's judgment was already final and executory as in
fact there was already a writ of execution and demolition order yet he still issued a writ
of preliminary injunction.[20] Moreover, the TRO issued in his February 26, 2002 order
was in brazen defiance of the CA's ruling.

In his defense, respondent claimed that he issued the writ of preliminary

injunction because there was a Cebu City Ordinance No. 1772 converting complainants'
lot no. 1029 into a socialized housing site and making the members of the association
program beneficiaries under RA 7279. He granted the writ to prevent the demolition of
the structures in the lot so as not to render the main action of the association for
injunction, prohibition and damages moot and academic.

While the OCA did not consider respondent's act of issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction in his March 27, 2000 resolution as tantamount to gross ignorance of the law,
still it found him administratively liable for ignorance of the law when he issued a TRO
in his February 26, 2002 order in defiance of the CA's decision. Thus, it recommended
that respondent be suspended for two months for ignorance of the law with a warning
that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 5, is guilty of grave abuse of authority for defying a decision of a higher
court

HELD: Yes. A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply
them properly in all good faith. They are expected to keep abreast of prevailing
jurisprudence. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not
only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but should also be motivated by bad
faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty.
 A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy aimed to protect the complainant's
substantive rights and interests during the pendency of the principal action. It is proper
only when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the
complaint. Thus, there are two conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction: (1)
a clear right to be protected exists prima facie and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are
violative of that right. The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court.

We agree with the OCA that respondent had legal basis in issuing the writ in his
March 27, 2000 resolution. It is true that complainants had in their favor a final and
executory decision by the MTCC which had become immutable and
unalterable.[33] However, one of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final
judgments is the existence of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which
transpire or new circumstances which develop after the judgment acquires finality,
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.[34]

Respondent considered Ordinance No. 1772 as one such supervening event and
we do not think he committed grave abuse of discretion in doing so. The ordinance did
include lot no. 1029 as one of its socialized housing sites and indicated the association as
potential beneficiaries for being occupants thereof.[35] The implementation of the
demolition order would have resulted in the destruction of the structures on the lot built
by the members of the association who may become entitled to the lot later on by virtue
of the ordinance. An ordinance is presumed valid unless repealed or declared invalid by
the courts.[36]

With the foregoing, we cannot say that respondent acted with bias, arbitrariness
or prejudice in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.

Bias and partiality can never be presumed.... The Court has to be shown acts
or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before
the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Similarly,
bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order
is adverse to a party.... There being absolutely no evidence to the contrary,
the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties
will prevail.[37]

At worst, it was an error of judgment or a deficiency in prudence and discretion which

may be corrected by proper recourse to available judicial remedies.[38] In fact, the CA, in
its November 19, 2001 decision, set aside respondent's resolutions
after complainants filed a petition questioning it.[39] However,
 [a]s a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity do not
always constitute misconduct although said acts may be erroneous.[40]

Respondent's issuance of a TRO in his February 26, 2002 order was a different
matter. By this time, there was already a CA decision setting aside the injunctive writ that
he had issued. Yet he persisted in issuing a TRO which had the same effect as the writ.
This act was clearly an act in defiance of the CA decision. Respondent should have known
his place in the judicial hierarchy:

xxx. Inferior courts must be modest enough to consciously realize the

position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. Occupying as he does a court much lower in
rank than the Court of Appeals, respondent judge owes respect to the latter
and should, of necessity, defer to the orders of the higher court. The
appellate jurisdiction of a higher court would be rendered meaningless if a
lower court may, with impunity, disregard and disobey it.[41]

This utter disrespect for the judgment of a higher court constituted grave abuse of
authority.[42]

It appears that this was not respondent's first offense. As the OCA enumerated:

In Joselito Rallos, et al. vs. Judge Ireneo Gako (A.M. No. RTJ-99-1484-A; 17
March 2000) respondent was held liable for failing to resolve the
complainants Motion to Remove the Administrator, for changing the date
of a hearing without notifying the complainants and making it appear in
his order that complainants and their counsel were present; and for
retaliating against the stenographer who testified against him. For these
infractions, he was fined in the amount of P10,000.00.

In Ronaldo B. Zamora vs. Judge Ireneo Gako (RTJ 99-1484; 24 October 2000),
respondent took cognizance of an injunction case the subject matter of
which are articles seized by the Bureau of Customs and granted the
application for issuance of a writ of injunction. He was held guilty of Gross
Ignorance of the Law and suspended for three (3) months.[43]

In both cases, he was sternly warned that the commission of similar acts in the future
would be dealt with more severely. We will take into consideration the fact that,
including this case, we would have found respondent administratively liable three
consecutive times.

Indifference or defiance to the orders or resolutions of higher tribunals may be punished

with dismissal, suspension or fine as warranted by the circumstances.[44] The penalty of
suspension recommended by OCA can no longer be imposed considering that
respondent retired from the judiciary on September 20, 2006. Having previously warned
him, we deem it fair and reasonable to impose on him a fine of P20,000 which is the
maximum amount that a division can impose.[45]

Respondent's retirement from office did not render the present administrative case moot
and academic. Neither does it free him from liability. Complainants filed the case on July
18, 2002, before respondent retired from office. As such, the Court retains the authority
to pursue the administrative complaint against him. Cessation from office because of
retirement does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against
him while he was still in the service.[46] Hence, the imposed fine shall be deducted from
the proceeds of his retirement benefits.

All members of the bench are enjoined to behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.[47] Respondent's act of issuing
a TRO in blatant defiance of a higher court's decision failed to live up to such high
standards of judicial conduct.
Balderama v. Alagar

FACTS: Spouses Edmundo and Carmelita Balderama filed a letter-complaint

against respondent Judge Adolfo Alagar of the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City,
La Union, Branch 66 with the Office of the Court Administrator for partiality and bias
and impropriety.

Complainants charged respondent Judge for impropriety as he was seen fraternizing

with the private complainants in the criminal case, Spouses Jamie and Bernarda Ader,
who are their neighbors in Barangay Pandan, Bacnotan, La Union.

1) On February 20, 1997 at about 8:30 in the morning, they saw Judge Alagar riding in his
car with Plate No. ABL-368 and fetched the private complainants to attend the scheduled
hearing in his sala. This was repeated on February 26, 1997, and March 5, 1997;

2) On March 11, 1997 at 11:30 in the morning, Judge Alagar, riding in an LTO Service Car,
visited the private complainants at their residence;

3) On March 15, 1997, Judge Alagar and some of his friends attended a party at the
residence of the private complainants.

They filed a Motion for Inhibition against respondent Judge Alagar which was denied.

On July 9, 1997, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo required respondent Judge to

comment on the verified complaint.

In his Comment, respondent Judge answered that:

xxx

4) The allegations of accused that the undersigned had been going to the residence of
private complainants in said cases for so many times as enumerated in their Complaint
is pure hearsay because in truth and in fact the undersigned have (sic) not been to the
residence of said complainants, but to the seashore of Barangay Pandan, Bacnotan, La
Union, which undersigned came to know later (from the instant Complaint) that said
place is the residence of both parties in the aforementioned Criminal Cases;

xxx

5) If ever my car was used by complainants as a ride in my coming to San Fernando, I am

not personally aware of it; however, upon investigation after receiving the instant
Complaint, I found out that my Court Aide/driver has once or twice allowed the
complainants, including one or two of their relatives to ride with him while coming back
from buying fish in the morning; and that he had been parking my car in front of the
complainants house allegedly because it would be safer there since they could oversee it
while he (my driver/Court Aide) is on the seashore waiting for fishermen to dock their
boats with their fish catch and/or while buying fish in the seashore;

Respondent Judge Alagar, thereby, moved for the dismissal of the instant complaint for
lack of merit. Likewise, affidavits executed by Alpenio Q. Fontanilla and Court Aide
Oscar D. Bugain were submitted by respondent Judge to bolster his claim of impartiality
in dealing with the complainants in connection with the case pending before his sala.

On October 20, 1997, respondent Judge filed an "Addendum to Comment" attaching

therein the affidavit of Atty. Celso Alex Laudenorio, former counsel of herein
complainants.

On June 28, 1999, the Court resolved to docket the case as a regular administrative
proceedings and to require the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit
the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed. In compliance with the resolution,
respondent Judge manifested his intention to argue his case before the Court.

Acting on the manifestation, the Court referred the instant case to Associate Justice
Corona Ibay-Somera of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.

On January 13, 1999, the Investigating Justice submitted her report with the following
findings and recommendation:

In sum, the undersigned Investigator finds public respondent to have acted with
impartiality and propriety in dealing with the complainants in Criminal Case No. 4252
but attributes fault in failing to supervise the conduct and behavior of his court employee
for the latters improper use of his vehicle.

In view of the foregoing premises, the undersigned Investigator respectfully

recommends that respondent Judge be REMINDED to strictly observe and maintain
competence in his bounden duty to supervise his court personnel and to be more
circumspect in his actuation bearing in mind that his conduct in and outside the
courtroom is under constant observation and scrutiny.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a reasonable ground to believe that respondent judge
transgressed the high standard of moral ethics mandated of magistrates by allowing
himself to be seen at the residence of the private complainants

HELD: Yes. The following facts have been established: (1) respondent Judge Alagar sent
his driver with his car twice or three times a week, to buy fish at the seashore
of Barangay Pandan, Bacnotan, La Union, which place was near the residence of both
Spouses Balderama and the Spouses Ader, the private complainants in all the
aforementioned criminal cases for Estafa through Falsification filed against herein
complainants; (2) on at least two occasions Oscar D. Bugain, driver of respondent
Judge Alagar, offered the Spouses Ader a ride to the court wherein they had a hearing
before the sala of respondent Judge, (3) there were also times when Oscar
D. Bugain would park respondent Judge Alagarscar in front of the
Spouses Aders residence while buying fish in the area.

What has not been clearly proven, however, was whether or not Judge Alagar had
knowledge of his drivers actuations, and also whether or not he ever personally went to
the Spouses Aders residence or fetched them for a hearing any time. Notwithstanding
this lack of direct proof of fraternizing with the party litigants in a case pending before
his sala, this Court holds that Judge Alagar should nonetheless have exercised a greater
degree of diligence in the supervision of his driver, Oscar Bugain. Investigating
Justice Ibay-Somera was correct when she stated:

It should be added likewise that it is of no legal consequence whether or not it was

actually Mr. Bugain who gave a free lift to the private complainants on board public
respondents vehicle on his way to the courtroom. The fact remains that respondent
Judges vehicle has been positively identified by the complainants and on this score, it is
an elementary tenet that a judge is tasked and enjoined to closely supervise his employees
(Fernandez vs. Imbing, 260 SCRA 586). As such, he is responsible for the proper
discharge of the official functions of his court personnel (Yaranon vs. Rulloda, 242 SCRA
522), monitors their activities and behavior from time to time to ensure that no vestige of
partiality, corruption, irregularity would be alluded to the court of justice which will
erode and undermine the faith of the people in the system.x x x

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should avoid not only
actual acts of impropriety, but equally also the appearance thereof in all his activities,
whether inside or outside of the courtroom. A judges official conduct should be free from
the appearance of impropriety; and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in
the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life should be beyond
reproach. This is premised on the truism that a Judges official life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence and that upon a Judges attributes
depend the public perception of the Judiciary.

Unfortunately, these standards were not met by respondent Judge Alagar in this case
having tolerated unknowingly his employee to fraternize, receive or give personal favors
no matter how small, with party litigants in a case pending before his sala.

Thus, while this Court finds the respondent Judge to have acted with impartiality and
propriety in dealing with the complainants in Criminal Case No. 4252, we find fault on
his part in failing to supervise the conduct and behavior of his court employee for the
latters improper use of his vehicle, to the detriment of the courts image.
Pertierra v. Lerma

FACTS: Maria Cristina Olondriz Pertierra filed a complaint charging the respondent
Judge Alberto L. Lerma, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City with
conduct unbecoming a judge, bias, partiality, impropriety, and lack of integrity to
continue as a member of the judiciary. This complaint alleged that on June 19, 2002, she
arrived at 12:30 p.m. in the courtroom of Branch 256 for her hearing scheduled at 1:00
p.m. and chanced upon the respondent judge talking and having lunch with Atty.
Felisberto L. Verano, Jr., counsel for her estranged husband, Arturo B. Pertierra. The
respondent judge was shocked to see her, and despite not having finished his lunch, the
respondent judge stood up to head for his chambers. Atty. Verano, Jr., for his part, left
the courtroom with his face down.

Respondent judge explained that Atty. Verano, Jr.s presence in the courtroom on June
19, 2002, was due to the invitation of the Branch Clerk of Court to come and share in the
celebration of the birthdays of two court personnel, namely, Lawrence Panganiban and
Dina Azamar. The respondent asserted that he was merely chatting with Atty. Verano,
Jr., on trivial matters and that it was erroneous for the complainant to brand it improper.

In its memorandum dated January 7, 2003, the OCA, through Deputy Court
Administrator Christopher O. Lock, recommended that the respondent judge be found
guilty of the light offense of fraternizing with lawyers and penalized with a fine of P1,000
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Alberto L. Lerma, Presiding Judge of Branch 256 of the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, is liable for a light offense constituting conduct
unbecoming a judge

HELD: Yes. There is no dispute that on June 19, 2002, the respondent judge was seen in
the act of having lunch with Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr., the counsel for the petitioner
in Civil Case No. 99-266, in which complainant is a party. What is at issue is the propriety
of the respondent judges act of associating socially with a counsel who has a pending
case before his court.

Under Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, we find this admonition: It is not
necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges live in retirement or
seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their
work will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not
discontinue their interest in or appearance at meetings of members of the bar. A judge
should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously
careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion that his
social or business relations or friendship constitute an element in determining his
judicial course.

For respondent judge to eat lunch with counsel is not wrong per se. The Canons, however,
provides that as much as possible he should be scrupulously careful to avoid any
suspicion that his social or business or friendly relationship is an element in determining
his judicial course. Knowing that Atty. Verano, Jr., is counsel of the petitioner in an
annulment case pending before him, the respondent judge should have thought twice
about joining counsel for lunch, especially in the courtroom at that.

Respondent judge also cannot feign ignorance of the continued suspicion cast upon him
by the complainant because the alleged bias or favorable treatment given to Atty. Verano,
Jr., was already raised in her first complaint. Respondent judge ought to have been more
scrupulous in his acts in order not to give her ground for another complaint.

A judge is human, although he is expected to rise above human frailties. At the very least,
there must be an earnest and sincere effort on his part to do so. Considering that a judge
is the visible representation of the law and of justice, the citizenry expects his official
conduct as well as his personal behavior to always be beyond reproach.

In this instance, however, there is no showing that the respondent judge acted with
malice or bad faith. But his action constitutes an instance of fraternizing with lawyers and
litigants, which is conduct unbecoming a judge. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
such conduct of fraternizing with counsel who has a pending case in his sala, is
punishable by a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000
pesos and/or censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning. The OCA recommends
that respondent judge be penalized with a fine of P1,000. In the light, however, of his
inhibition from the case, per Order dated August 7, 2002, which obviates further
suspicion of bias or prejudice to a party, the alternative penalty of reprimand appears to
us sufficient.