Humes Analysis of Causation (Section VII)

In this section Hume offers an analysis of event A caused eventB governed by his empiricist principles (see the first set of notes
on Hume). We use causal language all of the time, for example:

The cue balls hitting the 8-ball caused the 8-ball to roll across the table
Pressing on the brake pedal caused the car to slow down
Flipping the switch caused the light to turn on
Taking the medicine caused his sinuses to dry out

So, what does it mean to say eventA caused eventB?

Causation and Necessary Connection

Many philosophers and ordinary people think that to say event A caused eventB implies there is a necessary connection
between eventA and eventB such that, if eventA occurs, eventB must necessarily occur. For example, to say flipping the switch
caused the light to turn on implies that, if the switch is flipped, the light must necessarily turn on.

So, Hume sets out to examine the notion of necessary connection. Given Humes empiricist principles, the question is: From
what experience is the idea of necessary connection derived?

Part I

In this part Hume goes on an impression hunthe is searching for the experience (or, in his terms, the impression) that is
the source of the idea of necessary connection. His general conclusion is, so long as we consider individual event pairs, we have
no experience (impression) of necessary connection.

The idea of necessary connection cannot be derived from either:

1) an outer experience (observing an event pair with our five senses)

What do we observe?
eventA is prior to eventB (e.g., flipping the switch occurs prior to the light coming on)
eventA and eventB are contiguous (e.g., flipping the switch and the light coming on are near one another in
space and time)
eventA and eventB are two discrete events (e.g., flipping the switch and the light coming on are two distinct
events)
What do we not observe?
A necessary connection between eventA and eventBthe glue that holds eventA and eventB together
2) An inner experience (introspection), involving either:
voluntary bodily movements: will (event A) action (eventB), or
the mind-body connection is not understood
we do not understand why we can move some body parts not others
we do not understand all of the intermediate events that lead from thought (event A) action (eventB)
voluntary thinking or imagining: will (event A) thought (eventB)
how the will works is mysterious
we do not understand why we have more control over some thoughts than others
we do not understand why we have more control of our thoughts at some times than others

Conclusion: all events seem entirely loose and separatethey seem conjoined but not connected

Part II

In Part I of Section VII, Hume argued that our belief that there are necessary connections between certain events is not
rationally justified, since, properly speaking, we have no idea of necessary connection (since there is no corresponding
experience). In Part II of Section VII, Hume offers a psychological explanation for our belief that there are necessary connections
between certain events. He contends that the idea of necessary connection is a product of our imagination.
Hume claims that our idea of necessary connection is the product of the Principle of Associationa psychological principle (that
is, a principle about how our minds work). Hume formulates the principle this way: [A]fter a repetition of similar instances [of a
constant conjunction between typeA-events and typeB-events] the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event,
to expect its usual attendant and to believe that it will exist. This connection, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this
customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we
form the idea of power or necessary connection. (p. 563)

The idea of necessary connection (a feeling) is formed as a matter of custom, habit, or association
This feeling is projected onto the worldbecause of this feeling in our minds, we make the (unjustified) assumption
that there really are necessary connections between events and these connections are independent of our minds
So, Hume rejects Causal Realismthe view that causal connections exist in nature independent of the mind

Humes Definition of Causation

Note: Hume actually presents two distinct definitions of causation, but we only had time to consider his first definition.

Definition-1: [W]e may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are
followed by objects similar to the second. (p. 563)

eventA causes eventB =df. i) eventA is followed by eventB, and

ii) typeA-events are regularly followed by typeB-events

For example, it is correct to say flipping the switch (event A) caused the light to turn on (eventB) just in case i) flipping the
regularly switch on this particular occasion was followed by the light turning on, on this particular occasion, and ii) switch-
flipping is followed by light-turning-on.

Humes Regularity Theory of Causation

Hume's definition of causation makes no reference whatsoever to necessary connection. The essence of causation is constant
conjunction or regular succession.

Question: Can Hume distinguish between genuine causal relations and accidental, non-causal relations? Consider:

EventA: Bob gets out of bed

EventB: Bob goes to the bathroom

Lets suppose that there is a constant conjunction between these two eventsthat is, i) event A is followed by eventB, and ii)
typeA-events are regularly followed by typeB-events; hence, according to Humes analysis, we must say that Bobs getting out of
bed causes Bob to go to the bathroom. But this sounds really odd.