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By CHAIM
FERSHTMAN
A N D KENNETHL. JUDD*
W e examine the incentives that owners of competing jirms give their managers.
W e show that, in equilibrium, each manager will be paid in excess of his
decision's marginal projit in a Cournot-quantity game, but paid less than the
marginal projit in a price game. In the Cournot case, deviations from projit
maximization are reduced by ex ante cost uncertainty and increased by cor-
relafion in the jirms' costs.
Orthodox economic theory treats firms as view that owners want to maximize profits,
economic agents with the sole objective of the incentive scheme they design may imply
profit maximization. Some have criticized managerial incentives different from prof-
this view of the firm as being simplistic, it maximization. For a monopolistic firm,
arguing that real firms may consistently strive the owner-manager relationship can be de-
toward a different goal. For example, Wil- scribed as a standard principal-agent prob-
liam Baumol (1958) suggested sales max- lem. Such analyses have yielded rich insights
imization as a possible objective function of into the structure of agents' incentives.' For
firms. Later, when economists more seriously example, Bengt Holmstrom (1977) showed
considered the fact that the modern cor- that compensation in optimal contracts
poration is characterized by a separation of would likely use information other than final
ownership and management, their attention profits.
focused on managerial objectives (see Her- However, when we discuss oligopolistic
bert Simon, 1964; Oliver Williamson, 1964; markets, the individual owner-manager re-
Michael Jensen and William Meckling, 1976; lationships must be examined within the
and the principal-agent literature, such as context of rivalrous owner-manager pair-
Stephen Ross, 1973). ings. More generally, whenever the profit
It is generally argued that a proper analy- accruing to a principal-agent pair depends
sis of the firm's objective function should be on decisions that other rational agents make,
based on the analysis of the owner-manager the potential interactions must be consid-
relationship. A manager's objective depends ered. In this paper we examine the incentive
on the structure of the incentives that his contracts that principals (owners) will choose
owner designs to motivate him. Owners often for their agents (managers) in an oligopolis-
index managerial compensation to profits, tic context, focusing on how competing
sales, output, quality, and many other owners may strategically manipulate these
variables. Even if we accept the traditional incentive contracts and the resulting impact
on the oligopoly outcome. This analysis will
yield different insights as to why managerial
compensation contracts may not depend
*Department of Economics, Tel Aviv University. solely on realized profits, and also examine
Israel, and Department of Managerial Economics and
Decision Sciences, J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of
Management. Northwestern University, Evanston. IL
60201. respectively. The authors would like to thank 'The principal-agent approach ( R o s , 1973; James
Steve Matthews, John Panzar, and Mark Satterthwaite Mirrlees. 1976; Bengt Holmstrom, 1977; Milton Harris
for their comments. Professor Judd also gratefully and Artur Raviv, 1979: Roger Myerson, 1982; and
acknowledges the financial support of National Science many others) assumes that a principal chooses an
Foundation grant nos. SES-8409786 and SES-8606581, incentive structure for agents which maximizes his
the Sloan Foundation, the Hoover Institution, and the welfare subject to information constraints and adequate
Kellogg Graduate School of Management. compensation for the agents.
928 T H E AMERICA% ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 1987
Also, many of our results continue to hold Before continuing, we should note that
when incomplete information and a mor- our analysis is equivalent to another view of
al hazard manager determine the informa- the market for manager^.^ Some will argue
tion available for contracting purposes (see that instead of shareholders hiring managers,
Fershtman and Kenneth Judd, 1987). it is managers who propose incentive struc-
Section I describes the general framework tures to the capital market, which then
we examine. Section I1 examines the results chooses among the competing managerial
for a Cournot industry with random demand, proposals. Even if one views the managers as
whereas Section I11 examines the case of making the first move, the resulting game is
random costs. Section IV studies the case of equivalent to our game as long as any
n Cournot firms. Section V examines price contract whlch the managers can propose
competition in a differentiated product mar- can also be proposed to the managers in our
ket. Section VI summarizes t h s study's game, and vice versa. The order of who
results. proposes the incentive contract, firm or
potential managers, is not important. The
I. The Basic Model crucial assumption is that the firm gets all
the rent from the relationship, an outcome
Our model assumes two firms, each with that will occur in either situation as long as
an owner and a manager. When we say there are a large number of potential manag-
"owner," we mean a decision maker whose ers per firm: if the firm proposes an incen-
objective is to maximize the expected profits tive scheme in a take-it-or-leave-it fashlon, it
of the firm. This could be the actual owner, a need offer a manager only his opportunity
board of directors, or a chief executive officer. cost; whereas if there are many manag-
"Manager" refers to an agent that the owner ers with similar opportunity costs making
hires to observe demand and cost conditions proposals to the shareholders, competition
and make the real-time decisions concerning among them will leave the winner only with
output and/or price. While we will refer to his opportunity cost, and in both cases an
the profit-maximizing agent as the owner, he outimal scheme from each firm's voint of
in turn could be an employee who has been view will be proposed and accepted. In some
given incentives to maximize firm profits. respects, t h s alternative formulation is at-
We examine a two-stage game. In the first tractive since a crucial assumption of our
stage, the owners of each firm simultaneously analysis is that the "owners" observe only
determine the incentive structure for its profits and sales, and do not bother learning
manager, knowing the true probability dis- about the day-to-day details of the firm's
tributions governing demand and costs. Each operation, an assumption which is a plausi-
owner must offer his manager a contract ble description of shareholders. In any case,
under which the manager expects to receive we will stick with the more common theo-
his opportunity cost of participation; at this retical structure of an owner proposing a
stage the manager shares his employer's un- contract and the manager responding.
certainty about demand and costs and the The assumption that each firm's manager
belief about the incentives under which the in stage two knows the other firm's manager's
opposing manager will work. In the second incentive contract and costs is a natural one
stage, the competing managers play an in this context. We view the manager's
oligopoly game, with each firm's manager contracts as being infrequently altered and
knowing his incentive contract and those of in force for a substantial amount of time.
competing managers. In the second stage, Repeated play would presumably cause
the realized nature of demand and costs
facing all firms will be perfectly known and
common knowledge among the managers.
After all sales have been made, each owner 'We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out
observes the costs and sales, and hence prof- this alternative view of the interaction between the
its, of his firm. capital and managerial markets.
9 10 7IICA2;lFRICA\ ECOVOMIC REI ILL+ D F C f MRLR 19x7
managers eventually to learn one another's relationship. The linearity restriction is not
true incentives even if they were not initially descriptively unreasonable. Furthermore,
common knowledge. However, despite this tractability demands that some restriction be
appeal to repeated play, we are assuming a put on the space of contracts since in similar
single-shot game with common knowledge in generalized -principal-agent problems it is
stage two among managers about their known that equilibrium may not exist in
incentives. A true repeated play specification unrestricted contracts (see Roger Myerson,
of the managers' game would clearly generate 1982). While this is an unfortunate limita-
many interesting new possibilities, but be- tion of our analvsis. it will be clear that it is
cause of the intractable inference problems not the reason for the qualitative nature of
and the multiple-equilibria problems that our results.'
arise in repeated games, it is beyond the Another crucial element of our model will
scope of this paper to move beyond our be the assumption that there is uncertainty
two-period specification. Moreover. it will be about crucial market parameters describing
clear in this two-stage game that each owner demand and costs at the time the incentives
will want its manager's incentives to be com- are determined. Such uncertainty from the
mon knowledge. For these reasons, we re- owners' perspective is natural and also gives
gard this critical information specification as the managers a role as observers of these
appropriate and the two-period specification random variables. Uncertaintv is also crucial
a reasonable one in which to study the issues to our focus on equilibria in whlch incentives
on which we want to focus. are distorted away from profit maximization.
We assume that the incentive structure We will argue that if we had no uncertainty
takes a particular form: risk-neutral manag- about the ex Dosr state of the market. then
ers are paid at the margin in proportion to a our analysis would be unconvincing since
linear combination of profits and sales. More there would be no justification for ignoring
formally, firm i's managers will be given quantity- or price-indexed contracts that
incentive to maximize would force the usual Cournot and Bertrand
outcomes. However, simple deterministic
forcing contracts will not be desired by
owners when they face nontrivial uncertainty
where .rr, and S, are firm 1's profits and since each owner will want his manager to
sales.3 This formulation is moderately gen- react to the eventual environment. There-
eral in that it is equivalent to maximizing fore, uncertainty is necessary to make the
linear combinations of profits and costs or use of linear contracts in ~ r o f i t sand sales
sales and costs. We make no restrictions on reasonable and superior to contracts which
a,, allowing even negative values. We are yield the usual oligopoly outcomes.
assuming that, after the managers have acted The implicit restriction that i's manager's
and sales and production have been realized, compensation depends on only firm i's sales
the firms' owners can (or choose to) observe and profits, not its competitor's, is motivated
only profits and sales figures, not realizations by a couple of realistic considerations. First,
of demand parameters or number of units
sold. We allow managers to do whatever is
in their best interest given their options and
incentives, making the owner-manager rela- 'Recent work has indicated that the restriction to
tionship a delegation relationship, not a team linear contracts is reasonable and does not mislead us.
Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1987) show that
linear contracts are optimal in some realistic con-
t i n u o ~ \ - t i m cpr~ncipal-agentproblems. Fershtman and
Judd (1087) showed that the basic insights of this paper
30,will not be a manager's reward in general. Since continue to hold when moral hazard considerations also
his reward is linear in profits and sales, he is paid entcr into the contracting problems of a duopolist. The
A , + B,O, for some constants A , , B,, with B, > 0. Since focus on linear contracts here allows us to address
he is risk-neutral, he acts to maximize 0, and the values quchtions that are intractable uhen u e combine shirking
of A, and B, are irrelevant. b! agents with a more cornplex dynamic structure.
V O L . 77 NO. 5 FERSHTMA N AND JUDD: EQUILIBRIL'M INCENTIVES 931
a firm has much better information about its where p is market price and Q is total
profits and sales than about its competitor's. output. q, denotes the output of firm I ,
Second, giving one's manager any incentive I = 1,2. Firm I will have constant unit cost
to increase a competitor's profits could pos- c, 2 0, I =1,2. Both a or b are possibly
sibly be illegal because of its clear role as a unknown to all in stage one, but revealed to
device to facilitate collusion. Thrd, even if the managers at the beginning of stage two.
we did allow cross effects in compensation, it We will make no special assumptions about
will be clear that our main result of incentive the distribution of a and b other than as-
manipulation would continue to hold true sumptions on the support of their distri-
since each firm wants the other manager to butions necessary to assure that each firm's
operate in a cooperative fashlon, but not its output will be positive in equilibrium. We
own manager.5 see no reason to burden the reader with the
We examine the subgame-perfect Nash extra algebra that would be needed when
equilibrium of our two-stage game. In the zero output is a possible equilibrium out-
second stage, we compute the Nash equi- come, particularly since our interest is in the
librium that results when the firms' manag- study of active oligopolies. The exact nature
ers make simultaneous choices of their of such assumptions will be made explicit in
strategc variables, knowing one another's the statements of the theorems below. In this
incentive contract and the realized nature of section, c, and c, are known perfectly by all
demand and costs. Below, we will examine in both stages.
cases in which the strategic variable is either We solve for the incentive equilibrium in
price or quantity and make various as- the standard backward fashion. In stage two,
sumptions concerning the information each the manager of each firm observes a, b, c,,
firm has in the contract-writing stage about c,, a,, and a,, and chooses q, to maximize
the eventual costs and demand. In the first 0,.In this case, 0, becomes
stage, each owner simultaneously chooses its
a , , the relative weight it forces the manager
to give to profits, with Nash equilibrium
describing the outcome. In this game among
the owners, each knows the payoff structure
of each possible second-stage game as a Given a , and a,, the Cournot reaction
function of the a's. We will refer to the functions in quantity are
stage-one equilibrium choice of the a , and
the resulting probability distribution of
output and prices as the incentive equi-
librium. We now move to the determination
of incentive equilibria in several contexts. and symmetrically for firm two. Note that a ,
just affects the manager's perspective on
11. Incentive Equilibrium with Cournot costs. If a , < 1, that is, firm one's manager
Competition and Random Demand moves away from strict profit maximization
toward including consideration of sales, then
We first examine the issue of oligopolistic firm one's reaction function moves out in a
incentive structures for managers in a model parallel fashlon since the managers view alcl
of duopoly Cournot competition in a homo- as the marginal cost of production. There-
geneous good market. For reasons of tracta- fore, as the owner of firm one changes a,, he
bility, demand is assumed to be linear: essentially changes his manager's reaction
function. Symmetric results hold for firm
two. These facts play the crucial role in the
results below.
For values of a,, i =1,2, inherited from
5 ~ e r s h t m a nand Judd (1987) demonstrate this in a the outcome of stage one, stage-two equi-
simple model. librium in terms of demand, cost, and
932 THE A,WERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER I987
contract. Therefore, multiple equilibria often Section I1 has demonstrated the basic
result if both forcing and linear incentive insight in our analysis: profit-maximizing
contracts were possible. owners may not want to give profit-maximiz-
In many cases of multiple equilibria, there ing incentives to their managers because an
is no reason to choose one over the other. owner can influence the outcome of the com-
However, the incentive equilibria would not petition between the managers in his favor
be the natural one to focus on here in the by distorting his manager's incentives. T h s
absence of uncertainty. To argue t h s , we result does not rely on asymmetric informa-
appeal to focal point considerations. Since tion considerations as in Holmstrom, since a
our incentive equilibrium often results in less firm in this model will choose profit-maxi-
profit for both firms (and surely will if costs mizing contracts if it faces no competition.
are identical), the incentive equilibrium T h s result shows that internal relationshps
would often be strictly Pareto inferior. In and incentives can be distorted and manipu-
such cases, focal point considerations argue lated for interfirm strategic reasons, giving a
that the owners would realize that it is in new and fundamentally different role for
their mutual interest to act according to the internal contracts. In the following sections
simple Cournot allocation implemented by we elaborate on t h s theme for the cases of
forcing contracts. Therefore, the incentive random costs, multiple-firm oligopoly, and
equilibria lose much of their appeal in de- price competition in differentiated markets.
terministic versions of our model.
However, if there are nontrivial levels of 111. Incentive Equilibrium with Cournot
uncertainty, then such noncontingent quanti- Competition and Random Costs
ty-forcing contracts would not be desirable
since the owner would want the manager to The case of random costs is substantially
be able to respond to contingencies that the different. We examine it because new results
owner does not observe, but which do affect concerning the impact of inter-firm heter-
his profits. Such flexibility could be partially ogeneity are obtained.
attained in this context by a profit-maxi- Suppose that c , and c2 are identically
mizing contract. If both firms chose profit- distributed with mean p, variance a 2 , and
maximizing contracts, then the state-con- correlation coefficient r. Let u = a/p be the
tingent Cournot outcomes would result. coefficient of variation. Again, we will as-
However, once firms chose such contracts sume that the cost randomness is contained
for their managers, each manager will react so that output for each firm is positive in
to deviations in the other's incentive con- each state of the world. We assume that each
tract. Therefore, by assuming uncertainty, manager knows the other's costs in stage
we have both given a function to the manager two. In this section, we assume that a and b,
and also increased the plausibility of our the demand parameters, are known perfectly
incentive equilibrium relative to one im- in both stages. Therefore, the stage-two reac-
portant perturbation of our game. tion functions are given by (3). In stage one,
These comments also apply to the trade owner i chooses a, to maximize expected
policy analyses in the papers by Brander and profits given his expectation of Ex-
Spencer (1983, 1985). Their models will also pected profits are given by ex ante expecta-
have additional equilibria in similarly ex- tion of (4c). Stage-one reaction functions are
tended strategy spaces, with the extra equi-
libria sometimes being mutually preferable
to both nations; however, uncertainty about
the underlying profit opportunities will again
make the linear contract equilibria the more
plausible ones. The nature of our results also
generalizes, implying that the strategic trade Understanding the dependence of t h s
interventions will tend to be less valuable in reaction function on r, u , and p is crucial to
the presence of uncertainty. understanding the equilibrium results. If
101 77 2'0 5 FI. R S I f T M A b A L D J C D D EQUILIBRIC M ISCL Y T I V E S 935
there were no reaction by firm two's man- and r rise, and ( i i ) a < 1 for r sufficiently
ager to firm one's incentive structure, there close to 1 and u sufficiently close to zero.
would be no gain to the owner from distort- The case of random costs is somewhat
ing his manager's incentives. The marginal richer but more difficult to analyze com-
gain to firm one's owner of increasing a , by pletely. If the equilibrium a is less than
da,, assuming firm two's manager does not unity, then an increase in the uncertainty of
react to this change in h s opponent's incen- costs and their correlation will cause firms to
tives, is move closer to profit maximization because
it is more difficult to choose the right a
conditional on the realized costs. We are not
able to prove that a is always less than 1,
which is zero at a , = 1, the profit-maximizing but we know of no case in which it is not.
contract. However, since the manager of firm The formula for a would seem to indicate
two will react in the stage-two equilibrium that a could exceed one, but only if the
by increasing output as a , is increased, the variance of costs is large and costs are not
marginal loss of increasing a , arising from perfectly correlated. This situation could
t h s reaction is possibly lead to negative output according to
(6b) and violating the nonnegativity con-
dition on output. To determine whether this
occurs, one would have to impose specific
which is positive if q, is positive for all c,, c2 distrihutions on the random variables. We
realizations. The reaction function chooses want to confine the analysis in t h s study to
a,. whlch equates the marginal gain and loss cases in which examination of the random
of an increase in a,. As the variance, a 2 , variables' first and second moments and weak
increases, marginal losses due to deviations conditions on their support is sufficient. Since
from profit-maximizing incentives increase, the nonnegativity constraints on output are
pushing the optimal a , toward 1. Also, if a , satisfied for r close to one or when the
is near its optimal value given a,, the gains support for costs is small, yielding a u nearly
from such deviations fall as a 2 rises. Hence, zero, the formula for a in Theorem 3 is valid
we see that as u 2 rises, firms move toward a in these cases and ( i i ) of Theorem 3 holds,
profit maximization. Similarly, as costs are showing that Theorem 3 applies for a non-
more correlated, the benefits of deviations trivial set of cases.
from profit-maximizing incentives rise, im- This section shows how cost shocks affect
plying that the optimal a , falls. Also, as a / p the equilibrium nature of incentives. If cost
rises, that is, the choke price rises relative to shocks are commonly experienced, as in the
mean cost, the profit margin is greater and case of an uncertain price for a common
firms move away from profit-maximization input, then the owners decide to distort
incentives, as was the case for determinis- incentives. However, if shocks are not com-
tic c. monly experienced, then deviations from
Theorem 3 follows directly from an ex- profit maximization are reduced. Similarly, if
amination of the reaction functions. there is too much variance in costs, then
owners are not as willing to distort incen-
T H E O R E M 3: Wirh ex ante uncertain and tives away from profit maximization.
identicalk distributed costs, if q, and q2 are
nonnegative in equilibrium for all realizations IV. Equilibrium with Many Firms
of ( c , , c?), then in equilibrium,
We saw above in a duopoly that owners
may distort their managers' incentives if each
firm's manager reacts to distortions in the
competing managers' incentives. It is natural
to ask next if these distortions of owners'
Therefore, ( i ) a rises as a / p falls and as u incentives disappear as the industry is less
936 T H E A MERICAN ECONOMIC R E V I E W DECEMBER 1987
concentrated. We establish this formally in From (14) we can calculate the price
the case of perfectly correlated uniform costs.
The same results for the cases of uncertain a
and b are easily proven.
(12) ( a - 2bq, - b e , ) - a l e = 0,
2hAE+ aAE+ a q c h - 4 h 2 c + a 2 c + 2 h 2 a , c
n, = E
where E is a common shock to demand. We 4h2 - a 2
assume E = 1. Also b > a , implying that the
effect of a firm's own price on sales is greater
than the effect of its rival's price. Thls is
equivalent to concavity in the implicit
linear-quadratic consumer utility function. By differentiating (22) with respect to a,
Owners know that the strategic variable in and equating it to zero, we find the reaction
the competition between managers in the function of firm i ' s owner to firm j = 3 - i
second stage is price. Thus, given an incen- to be
tive structure which is a linear combination
of profits and sales, firm i ' s manager will act
so as to maximize
where
Finally, the argument that incentive equi- There are a variety of directions whch
libria in the deterministic quantity compe- further research should pursue. The major
tition case with no uncertainty were not weakness of the analysis above is the as-
plausible for focal point reasons when we sumption of linear contracts and the absence
expand the space of possible contracts does of a detailed asymmetric information struc-
not apply here. Since firm profits are in- ture which motivates the existence of con-
creased by incentive contracts, such con- tracts in the first place. Thls study is offered
siderations argue in favor of the incentive as an imperfect but intuitive and suggestive
contracts over forcing contracts (which here analysis of the possibilities that arise when
would be interpreted to force the manager to we jointly examine managerial incentives and
choose a certain price) even when both were market structure. A more recent paper by
equilibria in the expanded contract space. the authors (Fershtman and Judd, 1987) ex-
These arguments indicate that our theory of amines a model with a more standard in-
incentive equilibria may be more relevant for complete information and moral hazard
the case of differentiated markets. structure, which demonstrates that the intui-
tive results derived above continue to hold
VI. Concluding Comments within a more standard principal-agent struc-
ture.
Thls paper has examined the interactions We also assumed that the managers play
of internal contracting and external strategic a simple Nash noncooperative equilibrium
considerations. We found a principal (firm when they compete. An alternative theory of
owner) will want to distort the incentives of their behavior would be to have them bargain
his agents (firm managers) in order to affect toward some outcome that is cooperative
the outcome of the competition between his from their point of view. While t h s may
agent and competing agents. The general substantially affect the outcome of the man-
implications of our analysis are clear. In agers' game for any given set of managerial
general, the owner of a firm will alter hls incentives, the owners would still take into
managers' incentives in that direction which account the impact their decisions have on
will cause opposing agents to change their the outcome of the managers' decision-
behavior in beneficial directions. For ex- making process. For example, if the manag-
ample, if advertising will cause opposing ers were known by the owners to bargain in
firms to reduce their advertising, then a firm's accordance with a "split the gains from
owner will give his managers extra incentive trade" rule, then each owner will strive to
to advertise. T h s can be implemented by increase his profits by demanding a large
explicit incentives or by hiring agents who bond from the manager and then contract to
are known to be inclined to aggressively give a large portion of it back whether
advertise. In some cases, various asymme- bargaining succeeds. T h s will raise the
tries may cause the owners to distort their manager's threat point, making the agree-
managers' behavior in opposing directions. ment point more favorable to his firm, and
For example, if in the differentiated products increase the owner's profits. In any case,
case firm one is a price setter, but firm two, strategic manipulation of managerial incen-
for some technical reason, fixes h s quantity, tives will be valuable to owners as long as
then firm one's manager will be paid to the manager's incentives affect the joint al-
overproduce in order to get firm two's location of profits in the manager's game, a
manager to reduce his output, but firm two's feature which appears in most cooperative
manager may be paid to keep his price high modes of interaction as well as noncooper-
and output low in order to encourage firm ative.
one's manager to allow the market prices to This paper has demonstrated that com-
be high. The variety of problems that can be peting firms' owners will often distort their
analyzed by focusing on t h s joint deter- managers' objectives away from strict profit
mination of internal incentives and external maximization for strategic reasons. This
environment is obvious. initial analysis made several simplifying as-
940 T H E A M E R I C A N ECONOMIC R E V I E W DECEMBER 1987