PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, G.R No.

187167

HON. EDUARDO ERMITA

On 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the
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maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law followed the
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framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958
(UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their
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territorial sea, the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill
this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II)
proved futile.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now
under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant
with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III
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prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States
like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended
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continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one

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baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago
and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.

The Issues

The petition raises the following issues:

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail
the constitutionality of RA 9522.

2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and
taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative
prerogative nor misuse of public funds, occasioned by the passage and
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implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners locus standi as

citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the
case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent
resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably
difficult to find other litigants possessing a more direct and specific interest to bring
the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing. 17

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e.,
the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from
the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was
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the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to

codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine
areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited
span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional
international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties
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on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land
features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general
international law.26

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and
continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines
in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national
interest.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

G.R. No. L-26379 December 27, 1969

WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

It appears that petitioner, a citizen of the United States and an employee of Bendix Radio, Division of
Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provides technical assistance to the United States Air Force, was
assigned at Clark Air Base, Philippines, on or about July 7, 1959 ... . Nine (9) months thereafter and
before his tour of duty expired, petitioner imported on April 22, 1960 a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car with
accessories valued at $6,443.83, including freight, insurance and other charges."4 Then came the
following: "On July 11, 1960, more than two (2) months after the 1960 Cadillac car was imported into
the Philippines, petitioner requested the Base Commander, Clark Air Base, for a permit to sell the
car, which was granted provided that the sale was made to a member of the United States Armed
Forces or a citizen of the United States employed in the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. On
the same date, July 11, 1960, petitioner sold his car for $6,600.00 to a certain Willie Johnson, Jr.
(Private first class), United States Marine Corps, Sangley Point, Cavite, Philippines, as shown by a
Bill of Sale . . . executed at Clark Air Base. On the same date, Pfc. Willie (William) Johnson, Jr. sold
the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000.00 as evidenced by a deed of sale executed in Manila."5

As a result of the transaction thus made, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, after
deducting the landed cost of the car as well as the personal exemption to which petitioner was
entitled, fixed as his net taxable income arising from such transaction the amount of P17,912.34,
rendering him liable for income tax in the sum of P2,979.00. After paying the sum, he sought a
refund from respondent claiming that he was exempt, but pending action on his request for refund,
he filed the case with the Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum of P2,979.00 plus the
legal rate of interest.

The only issue submitted for our resolution is whether or not the said income tax of P2,979.00 was
legally collected by respondent for petitioner."6 After discussing the legal issues raised, primarily the
contention that the Clark Air Base "in legal contemplation, is a base outside the Philippines" the sale
therefore having taken place on "foreign soil",
his country's jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been
preserved. As to certain tax matters, an appropriate exemption was provided for.

Petitioner could not have been unaware that to maintain the contrary would be to defy reality and
would be an affront to the law. While his first assigned error is thus worded, he would seek to impart
plausibility to his claim by the ostensible invocation of the exemption clause in the Agreement by
virtue of which a "national of the United States serving in or employed in the Philippines in
connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases and residing in the
Philippines only by reason of such employment" is not to be taxed on his income unless "derived
from Philippine source or sources other than the United States sources."

By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents
that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a
matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or
divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein."

his provision is not and can not on principle or authority be construed as a limitation upon the rights
of the Philippine Government. If anything, it is an emphatic recognition and reaffirmation of Philippine
sovereignty over the bases and of the truth that all jurisdictional rights granted to the United States
and not exercised by the latter are reserved by the Philippines for itself."25

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals of May 12, 1966 denying the refund of
P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed. With costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.

In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case
and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half
miles from the shores of the city.

Issues:

The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not; and
it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense.

The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one
herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1aw ph!l.net

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this
court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said
territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:

Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the
courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same
rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the
vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is committed
with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of
the crime, no court other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the
courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same
rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the
vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is committed
with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of
the crime, no court other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.