javellana

Constitutional Law Political Question Validity of the 1973 Constitution Restriction to Judicial
Power

In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a
Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from
implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same
was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by
the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not
a free election there being intimidation and fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.

HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the
view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the
exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and
intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the
1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was
left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such
acquiescence.

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION vs. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455, January 7, 1986

FACTS:
Petitions were filed questioning the validity of BP 883, calling a special election for President
and Vice-President on February 7, 1986. The law was enacted following the letter of
President Marcos to the BP that he was "irrevocably vacating the position of President
effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as
Pres. by taking his oath of office ten days after his proclamation." The principal ground for
the challenge to the validity of the statute was that the conditional resignation of the
President did not create a vacancy required by Article VII, Sec. 9 which authorized the calling
of a special election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not BP 883 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court should allow incumbent President Marcos to run on
that said special election.

HELD:
After deliberating, 7 Justices voted to dismiss. On the other hand, 5 Justices voted to
declare the statute unconstitutional. In accordance with Javellana v. Executive Secretary, of
the view that as there were less than ten votes for declaring BP 883 unconstitutional. The
petitions should be dismissed.

On the second issue, it turned out to be a political question. It can only be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election. Thus, it is outside the ambit of
the courts. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their
ballot, either to the give the incumbent president a new mandate or elect a new president.

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 Amendment vs Revision

Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an initiative petition to amend the
1987 Constitution. That said number of votes comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered voters
with each legislative district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters. This has
been verified by local COMELEC registrars as well. The proposed amendment to the constitution seeks to
modify Secs 1-7 of Art VI and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled Transitory
Provisions. These proposed changes will shift the president bicameral-presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of
the Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs COMELEC. Lambino et al contended that
the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties within that case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2 ArtXVII of the 1987
Constitution.

HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the
signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties
who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the
people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments
against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering
the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the
full text of the proposed amendments. The proponents failed to prove that all the signatories to the
proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the petition contains. Petitioners merely
handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto the full text of the proposed
amendments.

Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a mere amendment. This is
also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed amendment should only contain one issue. The
proposed amendment/s by petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-
be parliament to enact more rules.

There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided upon other facts. The
rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long as there are other means to resolve an issue
at bar.

***NOTE: On November 20, 2006 in a petition for reconsideration submitted by the Lambino Group 10
(ten) Justices of the Supreme Court voted that Republic Act 6735 is adequate.

HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:

Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given
when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to
amend the Constitution thru a peoples initiative.

As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis. See discussion here

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****RA 6735: An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds
Therefor

Santiago case

Political Law Revision vs Amendment to the Constitution

On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift
Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set
the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the
said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners
and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil
action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues among others that the Peoples Initiative
is limited to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the
term limits of those in power (particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the
power of peoples initiative.

ISSUE: Whether the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to the constitution or does it
constitute a revision.

HELD: The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would involve a change from a political philosophy
that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to
be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State
policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties.
A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution, is limited to amendments. The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits
provided for all other national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, to
open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership,
to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote
effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the common good;
hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

March/June 1997

Amendment to the Constitution

On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift
Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set
the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the
said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners
and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil
action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on
peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress
and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of
initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms

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of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were
specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of peoples
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo
Tolentino.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the constitution
and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the constitution but is
unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the Constitution provides:
Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The Congress
shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right This provision is obviously not self-
executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Con-Con stated without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this
mode of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional action in the
last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in the
cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise
such right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its
implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled that
RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution
which reads in part:

Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given
when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to
amend the Constitution thru a peoples initiative.

As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis

655 SCRA 476 Political Law National Territory RA 9522 is Constitutional

In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was
enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of
the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in
February 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that
the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their
particular arguments are as follows:

a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties this also
resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;

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b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, terms the Philippine waters a archipelagic waters which, in
international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent
passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions;

c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal ( bajo de
masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire,
or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or
diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the
international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution
of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.

The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law
amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The
area that it covered was 440,994 nautical miles 2. But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive
economic zone, the extent of our maritime are increased to 586,210 nautical miles2. (See image below for
comparison)

If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

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Anent their particular contentions:

a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in
this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has
acquired dominion and sovereignty.

b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term it as our internal
waters, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS
itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of
others of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely

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forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.

c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands
did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes
of islands, they generate their own maritime zones in short, they are not to be enclosed within the
baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that,
then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS
that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.

Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective
occupation.

NOTES:

Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-
based rights:

a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty

b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).

c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone

Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered by Article 77 of the
UNCLOS.

Monday, April 9, 2012

PhiIippine Constitution- ARTICLE II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

A. PRINCIPLES

This article in the 1935 Constitution uses the phraseology "Declaration of Principles" only. The
new Constitution has added the phrase "and State policies".

This portion of the Constitution might be called the basic political creed of the nation. It lays

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down the policies that the government is bound to observe. With the exception of Section @
which refers to the duty of citizens to serve the State, these provisions prescribe the
fundamental obligations of the government, particularly the legislative and the executive
departments as its policy-determining organs.It is incumbent on the people to demand
fulfillment of these government duties through the exercise of the right of suffrage. But
indirectly some of these principles may aid the court in determining the validity of statutes or
executive acts in justiceable cases.

Where the Government through the Executive Department fails in its duty to enforce these
provisions, the remedy provided therefore is not judicial but political. The people here is
called upon to avail of the remedy through the ballot, not through the court.

This is not to say that the provisions did not have their usefulness in litigation. The same also
obligated the judiciary to be guided by the same provisions in the exercise of the power of
judicial review.

Section I. The Philippines is a democratic and Republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.

This article is a reproduction of Article II, Section I of the 1935 Constitution, maintained
under Section I, Article II of the 1973 Constitution.

The requirements of a democratic and republican state are as follows:

a) Cardinal rights embodied in the Bill of Rights;

b) The principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men;
c) The principle that the State cannot be sued without its consent;
d) The principle that the legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws;
e) Election through popular will;
f) The principle that an office is a public trust;
and
g) The rule against undue delegation of legislative power.

SOVEREIGNTY

-is the supreme power of the state to command obedience from all the inhabitants, whether
citizen or alien. This power resides in the people.. Therefore, they have the right to
constitute their own government, define and provide the powers it may exercise within legal
limits. This right may be exercised directly or indirectly.

Direct exercise of sovereignty

It is the people that exercises actual sovereignty through what is called the popular will - the
election of the people's representatives in a clean and honest electoral process.

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The aforecited is in accord with the constitution mandates of a government that is
representative or republican in nature and a Philippine state that is representative democracy
or a republican state.

Indirect exercise of sovereignty

The constitutional mandate that sovereignty resides in the people does not mean the Filipino
people govern themselves directly exercising acts of government - like the making of
laws,enforcing the same or deciding cases involving life, liberty or property. The making of
laws, is left to the lawmaking body composed of the people's representatives chosen through
the electoral process; enforcing the laws is left to the executive department; and deciding
cases is left to the courts.

The people exercise this acts of government through the officers and employees constituting
the government set up by them as mandated by the Constitution.

People's Rights to Change their Public Officers

This declared constitutional principle is best exemplified in the systems of recall, referendum
and initiative. All these have made possible greater participation of the people in the affairs
of government. This is further evidenced by the constitutional provisions on sectoral
representation, multi-party systems and the right of the people to amend the constitution
which they, themselves, ordained and promulgated.

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

Section 2 is a substantial reproduction of the contents of Section 3, Article II of the 1935

Constitution. This particular proviso is divided into three parts:

a) Renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy;

b) Adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land;and
c) Adherence to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations.

Renunciation of war as a national policy

In renouncing war as an instrument of national policy expressly declared in the Constitution,

the Philippines affirms the 1934 and the 1971 Constitutional Convention's belief that an
effective means of outlaw war is to prohibit the same in the Constitution.

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This particular proviso contemplates, as it was contemplated under the 1935 Constitution,
defensive war, not aggressive war. This was inspired by the Kellog-Briand Pact of 27 August
1928 which renounces wars of aggression.

The power to wage a defensive war is an inherent part of sovereignty. The explains the
reason why the Constitution makes defense of the state the prime duty of government under
section 4 of Article II of the charter. At the same time, section 22 of the same article,
empowers the Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses, in joint session assembles, to
declare the existence of a state of war.

Adoption of international law

The second part of the provision is the constitutional declaration that the Philippines
conforms to the generally accepted principles of international law in its relation with others
states. This simply means that whenever a state is admitted into the family of nations, it
becomes incumbent upon it to observe these accepted principles within its jurisdiction and,
at the same time, enforce them before its courts involving the same, in the absence of any
statutory law, provisions of any treaty, or any provision of the Constitution to the contrary.
These principles of international law that form part of the laws of the Philippines which are
generally accepted by civilized states include those rules on diplomatic and foreign State
immunity, those provisions of the United Nations Charter to which member nations conform,
including the implementing international agreements. Treaties therefore, entered into by the
Philippines with other states must confirm to generally accepted principles of international
law which the Constitution declares as a part of the laws of the land.

International relations

The third part of the provision as a declared constitutional principle - a policy of "peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity" is a necessary consequences to the
Philippine adherence to the law of nations requiring that states

a) should be at peace with each other;

b) should settle their international disputes or difference not by war but by peaceful means;

c) that war may be resorted to only when disputes can no longer be settled by diplomatic
channels; to retorsion, reprisal, and other means short of war, and in extreme cases by war,
but in this case, still the conduct of war must be governed by rules - the laws of war.

Regardless of their respective national ideologies, member countries of the international

community are equal, free, irrespective of their size, population and wealth, consequently,
each one is equally entitled to the rights and subject to the obligations of membership in the
United Nations. It follows that policies of the Philippines in its relation with other states as
enshrined in the Constitution must be consistent with the rules and principles of international

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law which seeks peace and amity among nations.

Consequently, it is thus provided in the Constitution that the Philippines pursues and
independent foreign policy that will maintain national sovereignty, territorial integrity,
national interest and the right of self-determination. The national policies then must be
directed towards the observance of international cooperation, considering that at this stage
of world history, there exists an ever growing interdependence among independent states.

Supremacy of the Civilian Authority

Section 3 Civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military.

Supremacy of civilian authority over the military is inherent in democratic and republican
states. Superiority of civilian authority over the military is regarded as an essential
constituent of the fabric of political life.

The President of the Philippines is always a civilian. At the same time, he is the Commander-
in-Chief of all the Armed Forces; the army, the navy and the air force, including the Cap;ital
command. Appointment to the higher echelons in the armed forces is vested in the President,
a fact that precludes the emergence of the military take over in the affairs of the civil
government. For the role of the military is spelled out clearly in the Constitution.

Role of the Armed Forces

The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to
secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

Prime Duty of Government

Section 4. The prime duty of government is to serve and protect the people. The Government
may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may
be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.

It is the right of a state to exact compulsory military service of its citizen and such exaction
does not violate the principle of involuntary servitude. This proviso was incorporated in view
of the recognized inadequacy of a voluntary system both in terms of military effectiveness
and in terms of equality between the rich and the poor.

Maintenance of Peace

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of
the blessings of democracy.

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For the Filipino people to secure unto themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence and democracy as envisioned in the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution, it is
necessary for the Government -

1) to maintain peace and order;

2) protect life, liberty and property; and
3) promote the general welfare

The maintenance of peace and order rests on the military establishment, to be

complemented by the judiciary for the protection of life, liberty and property within the
context of due process. The promotion of the general welfare requires the cooperative efforts
of those in government in the attainment of the greatest good for the greatest number.

Separation of Church and State

Section 6. The separation of the church and state shall be inviolable.

The union of the church and the state is prejudicial to both. The provisions of the 1987
Constitution that compliments the principle of separation of the church and state are found
under-

1) Section 5, Article III which provides, among other things, that no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;

2) Section 29 (2) of Article VI which prohibits the appropriation of public money or property to
be applied, paid, or employed directly or indirectly for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution or system of religion, or any priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium;

3) Section 28 (3) of Article VI which exempts charitable institutions, churches, and parsonages
or convents appurtenant there, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and
improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational
purposes from taxation;

4) Section 28 (3) of Article IX-C which prohibits the registration of religious denomination and
sects.

Religious freedom, according to Justice Laurel, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of

profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs.

Notwithstanding the principle of separation of church and state, still both can work together
in harmony to serve the welfare of the people. According to the late Jaime Cardinal Sin: the

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Church and the State are two entities that play an important role in our life. Let us keep
them separate, by all means,but let us not interpret separation as segregation. Let us believe
that they can work hand in hand, separate but parallel like two tracks on the railroad leading
to the same destination.

TANADA v. ANGARA

October 26, 2012 Leave a comment

272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as
Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities
for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country.
These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a
free market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair
Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution
was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of
our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is
not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it
is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United
Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as
autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise
is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said
agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the
political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO
remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development
of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the
people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

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Wednesday, July 11, 2012

Taada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

DECISION

(En Banc)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence

by the Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement
violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to)
promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
Further, they contended that the national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO
Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos
and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of our Constitution, and render
meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.

II. THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine
Senate of the Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]

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 NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a
global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify
the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the
rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words,
the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by
Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly
aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not
mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international
community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national
economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and
public utilities.

The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without
discrimination cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality
and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
equality and reciprocity, the fundamental law encourages industries that are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries
that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free

15
trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the
Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State
to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect
and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is
equally true that such principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in
themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy
that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of industries which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the
alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced
by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its
consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate
exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or
despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to
surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it
is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that
is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its
decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and
duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such
exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is
a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join
the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our
people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows
withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.

TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent.

TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent.
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in
Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established
principle that antedates this Constitution. 27 It is as well a universally
recognized principle of international law that exempts a state and its organs
from the jurisdiction of another state.28 The principle is based on the very

16
essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.29 It also rests on reasons of public policy that public service
would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority
could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and,
consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required
for the proper administration of the government. 30

What are the various forms of state immunity from suit?

The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various
forms, namely:
a suit against the Republic by name;
a suit against an unincorporated government agency;
a suit against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the
agencys performance of governmental functions;
and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where the
ultimate liability will fall on the government.

In the present case, the writ of attachment was issued against a government
agency covered by its own charter. As discussed above, TESDA performs
governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its
function of developing and establishing a system of skills standardization,
testing, and certification in the country. From the perspective of this
function, the core reason for the existence of state immunity applies i.e.,
the public policy reason that the performance of governmental function
cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use
and disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions.
In Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines,31 we
said:
[A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored
for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss
of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted.
With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at
the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against
law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an
effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.
PROVI argues that TESDA can be sued because it has effectively waived its
immunity when it entered into a contract with PROVI for a commercial
purpose. According to PROVI, since the purpose of its contract with TESDA is
to provide identification PVC cards with security seal which TESDA will

17
thereafter sell to TESDA trainees, TESDA thereby engages in commercial
transactions not incidental to its governmental functions.
TESDAs response to this position is to point out that it is not engaged in
business, and there is nothing in the records to show that its purchase of the
PVC cards from PROVI is for a business purpose. While TESDA admits that it
will charge the trainees with a fee for the PVC cards, it claims that this fee is
only to recover their costs and is not intended for profit.

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006

Facts:

MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the taxable
years 1992 to 2001. MIAAs real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million.

The City of Paraaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the
Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the
Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.

MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain the City of
Paraaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport
Lands and Buildings.

Paranaques Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax
exemption privileges of government-owned and-controlled corporations upon the effectivity of the
Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the
express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among the
exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA
cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.

MIAAs contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax
itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public
advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.

Issue:

WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws? Yes.
Ergo, the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of Paraaque, and all proceedings taken pursuant
to such assessments, are void.

Held:

18
1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation

MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National

Government and thus exempt from local taxation.

MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no
stockholders or voting shares.

MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-stock corporation must have
members.

MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its
governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that
MIAA is vested with corporate powers.

When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not
become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate
powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the
levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises all the powers of a corporation under the
Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive
Order.

2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic

a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the
State or the Republic of the Philippines.

No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, are owned by the State. The
term ports includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port
constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are
properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and
other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as
properties for public use.

The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public
dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one intended for
public use. The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to
airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such
fees does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed users

19
tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the
public including those who never use the particular public facility.

b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man

The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be
the subject of an auction sale.

Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition
through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of
public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if
properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will
happen if the City of Paraaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of
the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.

c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic

MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section 48,
Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real
properties owned by the Republic. n MIAAs case, its status as a mere trustee of the Airport Lands and
Buildings is clearer because even its executive head cannot sign the deed of conveyance on behalf of the
Republic. Only the President of the Republic can sign such deed of conveyance.

d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization

The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was not
meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was
merely toreorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a separate and autonomous body.
The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned
solely by the Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over MIAAs assets adverse to the Republic.

e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable

Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its
political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person following are exempted from payment of the real property tax.

However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt
from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to private
corporations is subject to real estate tax.

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

20
x - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG,
and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to
cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts
of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office
of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created
under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species
even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No.
141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form
such bodies.

21
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation
but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ,
because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant
or erode the latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong
as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and
direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing
is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right
in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason
in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise

22
of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of
the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate
funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source
of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to
existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement
of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.

23
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered.
Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

MMDA v. Garin, 456 SCRA 176, GR 130230 (2005)

Facts: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who
was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license confiscated for
parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then
MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing
his preference for his case to be filed in court.

Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary
injunction, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f)
of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their
licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating
the due process clause of the Constitution.

The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose
unspecified and therefore unlimited fines and other penalties on erring motorists.

The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.

Issue:

1. WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police
power.

24
 HELD: Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as
well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once
delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by
the national lawmaking body.

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. 15 A
local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and
has substantial control of local affairs." 16 Local government units are the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the
passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special
development and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services
affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus:

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created
for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government
agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions
are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself

* Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila
Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install
and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds
of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and
regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605 to the contrary
notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and
regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of
the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members
of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such
conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose."

1. Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission, G.R. No. 175220, February 12,

2009

Lesson: Requisites, explained.

SCs words: The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed

guidelines, hinges on compliance with the following requisites:

25
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
4. It must be reasonable.
All the prescribed requisites are met as regards the questioned issuances.
Philracoms authority is drawn from P.D. No. 420. The delegation made in the
presidential decree is valid. Philracom did not exceed its authority. And the
issuances are fair and reasonable. Xxx

P.D. No. 420 hurdles the tests of completeness and standards sufficiency.

Philracom was created for the purpose of carrying out the declared policy in Section
1 which is to promote and direct the accelerated development and continued
growth of horse racing not only in pursuance of the sports development program
but also in order to insure the full exploitation of the sport as a source of revenue
and employment. Furthermore, Philracom was granted exclusive jurisdiction and
control over every aspect of the conduct of horse racing, including the framing and
scheduling of races, the construction and safety of race tracks, and the security of
racing. P.D. No. 420 is already complete in itself.

Clearly, there is a proper legislative delegation of rule-making power to Philracom.

Clearly too, for its part Philracom has exercised its rule-making power in a proper
and reasonable manner. More specifically, its discretion to rid the facilities of MJCI
and PRCI of horses afflicted with EIA is aimed at preserving the security and
integrity of horse races.

Petitioners also question the supposed delegation by Philracom of its rule-making

powers to MJCI and PRCI.

There is no delegation of power to speak of between Philracom, as the delegator

and MJCI and PRCI as delegates. The Philracom directive is merely instructive in
character. Philracom had instructed PRCI and MJCI to immediately come up with
Clubs House Rule to address the problem and rid their facilities of horses infected
with EIA. PRCI and MJCI followed-up when they ordered the racehorse owners to
submit blood samples and subject their race horses to blood testing. Compliance
with the Philracoms directive is part of the mandate of PRCI and MJCI under
Sections 11 of R.A. No. 7953 and Sections 1 and 2 of 8407.

As correctly proferred by MJCI, its duty is not derived from the delegated authority
of Philracom but arises from the franchise granted to them by Congress allowing
MJCI to do and carry out all such acts, deeds and things as may be necessary to
give effect to the foregoing. As justified by PRCI, obeying the terms of the
franchise and abiding by whatever rules enacted by Philracom is its duty.

As to the second requisite, petitioners raise some infirmities relating to Philracoms

guidelines. They question the supposed belated issuance of the guidelines, that is,
only after the collection of blood samples for the Coggins Test was ordered. While

26
it is conceded that the guidelines were issued a month after Philracoms directive,
this circumstance does not render the directive nor the guidelines void. The
directives validity and effectivity are not dependent on any supplemental
guidelines. Philracom has every right to issue directives to MJCI and PRCI with
respect to the conduct of horse racing, with or without implementing guidelines.

On publication: Petitioners also argue that Philracoms guidelines have no force and
effect for lack of publication and failure to file copies with the University of the
Philippines (UP) Law Center as required by law.

As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an administrative

agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require notice and hearing, In
Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, this Court had the occasion to rule that prior
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations issued in
the exercise of quasi-legislative powers since there is no determination of past
events or facts that have to be established or ascertained.

The third requisite for the validity of an administrative issuance is that it must be
within the limits of the powers granted to it. The administrative body may not
make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which
created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.

The assailed guidelines prescribe the procedure for monitoring and eradicating EIA.
These guidelines are in accord with Philracoms mandate under the law to regulate
the conduct of horse racing in the country.

Anent the fourth requisite, the assailed guidelines do not appear to be unreasonable
or discriminatory. In fact, all horses stabled at the MJCI and PRCIs premises
underwent the same procedure. The guidelines implemented were undoubtedly
reasonable as they bear a reasonable relation to the purpose sought to be
accomplished, i.e., the complete riddance of horses infected with EIA.

It also appears from the records that MJCI properly notified the racehorse owners
before the test was conducted. Those who failed to comply were repeatedly warned
of certain consequences and sanctions.

Furthermore, extant from the records are circumstances which allow respondents to
determine from time to time the eligibility of horses as race entries. The lease
contract executed between petitioner and MJC contains a proviso reserving the right
of the lessor, MJCI in this case, the right to determine whether a particular horse is
a qualified horse. In addition, Philracoms rules and regulations on horse racing
provide that horses must be free from any contagious disease or illness in order to
be eligible as race entries.

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All told, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Philracom in issuing the
contested guidelines and on the part MJCI and PRCI in complying with Philracoms
directive.

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