(Arash Pashakhanlou) - Realism and Fear in International Relations

Realism and Fear in International
Relations
Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou
Realism and Fear

in International
Relations
Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer Reconsidered
Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou
Shefeld Hallam University
Shefeld, United Kingdom
ISBN 978-3-319-41011-1 ISBN 978-3-319-41012-8 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41012-8
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To Homa and Farzaneh Pashakhanlou
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I could not have completed this monograph on my own and would like to
take this opportunity to show my gratitude and appreciation to those who
helped me along the way. First and foremost, I would like to thank my
mother, Farzaneh Pashakhanlou, and my sister, Homa Pashakhanlou.
They have been there for me since day one and deserve credit for all of
my accomplishments thus far. This book is dedicated to them. The rest of
my family and relatives should also be acknowledged in this regard.
Academically, I owe the greatest debt to David Galbreath, Adrian Hyde-
Price, Ainius Laas and Campbell Craig. Without their guidance, help and
support this manuscript would have never materialized. I am also thankful
to the external reviewers whose comments helped improve this study. The
interlibrary loan team and the subject librarian, Katy Jordan, at the
University of Bath were also instrumental to my research. Their efforts
were essential in making this book the most comprehensive evaluation of
the works of Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer to date. Finally, I want
to thank the University of Bath and Shefeld Hallam University for
providing me with the nancial support and resources needed to carry
out this research project.
vii
CONTENTS
1 Realism and Fear in International Relations 1
2 Fear in the Works of Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer 23
3 Morgenthau and Fear 45
4 Waltz and Fear 71
5 Mearsheimer and Fear 91
6 Fear in Realism and Beyond 117
Bibliography 143
Index 169
ix
CHAPTER 1
Realism and Fear in International Relations
INTRODUCTION
A world of fear and treachery is torment, a world of trampling and being
1
trampled upon, a world which will grow not less but more merciless as it
renes itself.2 The citation is from George Orwells classic novel 1984 but
could have just as well been a grim fear-based trajectory of world politics.
Indeed, fear has been employed by different intellectual traditions such as
feminism, postcolonialism, poststructuralism, constructivism, liberalism
and realism to shed light on this dominion.
Feminism makes use of fear to account for gendered relations, which is at
the heart of the feminist project.3 From this perspective, Cynthia Enloe and
Joshua Goldstein have argued that rape is an instrument of war used to
inbreed fear in the enemy.4 Postcolonial studies tend to emphasize the
asymmetric relations between the West and the rest. They refer to fear in
examining this issue. As an example, Vivienne Jabri maintains that the
twenty-rst-century mode of colonialization where the subjects suffer from
violence, intimidation and humiliation creates a continual state of fear
among the victims of postcolonialism.5 Fear is evoked in poststructuralism
as well. It informs their analyses of discourses and practices.6 In this regard,
David Campbell suggests that Christendom requires discourses of danger to
sustain itself and uses its power to manufacture and dene what we should
fear.7 Leading constructivists such as Alexander Wendt and Richard Ned
Lebow argue that fear characterizes relations of enmity where competition,
conict and war prevail. Conversely, the absence of this emotion promotes
The Author(s) 2017 1

A.H. Pashakhanlou, Realism and Fear in International Relations,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41012-8_1
2 REALISM AND FEAR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
more peaceful international interactions, according to these scholars.8

Similarly, the lack of fear between democracies has been utilized to explain
the separate peace that exists between them in the liberal tradition by
Andrew Moravcsik.9
Despite the fact that different schools of thought in International
Relations (IR) evidently use fear in their narratives, it is realism that has
become synonymous with this emotion in the discipline. This is perhaps
not surprising since many of its supposed forefathers make famous refer-
ences to fear in their classic works. Thucydides is a case to the point. In an
oft-quoted passage of The History of the Peloponnesian War, he maintains
that it was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused
in Sparta that ultimately brought about this war in the fth-century
B.C.10 One of Niccol Machiavellis most memorable and controversial
advices to The Prince is that it is better to be feared than loved.11 In
Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes notably claims that in the state of nature
there is no [a]rts; no [l]etters, no [s]ociety; and which is worst of all,
continuall feare, and danger of violent death; [a]nd the life of man,
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.12
If we fast-forward to the post-World War I era, when IR rst became an
institutionalized academic discipline in its own right, realism has contin-
ued to be strongly associated with fear.13 This may appear reasonable
considering that its characteristically pessimistic worldview seemingly
lends itself to a fear-based trajectory.14 Moreover, out of the four issue
areas in IR that rely heavily on fear, that is, the ethnic conict,15 terror-
ism,16 nuclear weapons17 and the security dilemma18 literature, the latter
two are dominated by realist thinking. Indeed, it has been argued that the
nuclear peace envisioned by realism is rooted in fear19 and that this
emotion is pivotal to realist theorising of security dilemmas.20
In more general terms, fear is widely regarded as the most important
emotion in realist analysis of international politics.21 In fact, it is com-
monly considered as one of the central drivers in the realist tradition
overall. According to Lebow, [f]ear is absolutely central to [the] realist
paradigm.22 Numerous prominent critics23 and proponents24 of realism
concur and emphasize the prominent conceptual, theoretical, empirical
and logical role of fear within this school of thought. According to the
literature, the highly inuential classical realism of Hans Morgenthau, the
defensive realism of Kenneth Waltz and the offensive realism of John
Mearsheimer are no exceptions in this regard, as will be evidenced later.
That is why this book is dedicated to the task of uncovering these four
1 REALISM AND FEAR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3
facets of fear in the aforementioned realists writings. Especially since this

is a timely topic that has received little serious attention thus far.
The remainder of this chapter is designed to help prepare the ground
for this examination. Section The existing literature provides an over-
view of the existing literature on realism and fear and situates the present
investigation within this body of work. Section Realism discusses the
realist school of thought, its various strands and their interrelationship.
The selection criteria are presented and justied in the Section The
selection criteria: Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer, along with the
emphasis on Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer. Fear is the subject of
the Section Fear. Here, its role in human affairs, in general, and IR, in
particular, is highlighted. The conception of fear that informs this inquiry
is also unveiled here. This is followed by an overview of the method that
will be adopted in this study to locate and analyze fear in the writings of
the selected scholarsfully integrated content analysis.25 Furthermore,
this section presents the analytical framework that claries how the con-
ceptual, theoretical, empirical and logical dimensions of fear will be
assessed. A synopsis of the entire book is provided in the Section
Overview of the book. A brief summary of the preceding points informs
the nal part of this chapter.
As specied in the roadmap provided above, the next stop in this
investigation is however a review of the existing literature. It is to this
topic that we now turn our attention to.
THE EXISTING LITERATURE

Considering how central realism has been in the study26 and practice27 of
IR, it is not surprising to nd that there is already an enormously vast
secondary literature on this school of thought.28 If we only consider the
literature on the leading realist thinkers covered here, namely
Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer, there is still an extensive body of
work dedicated to these scholars.29 Despite the fact that there is such an
immense literature on realism and the above-mentioned theorists, there is
hardly any publication on the relationship between this intellectual tradi-
tion and fear. This is not surprising considering that fear itself has been
heavily understudied in IR.30 Although the literature frequently refers to
fear, it seldom studies it. Scholars typically appeal to this emotion without
providing any further elaboration, before quickly moving on to the next
topic.31 One of the main reasons why fear has been neglected is due to the
fact that the literature on emotion in IR, the natural place for the study of
fear, only seriously started to emerge around the new millennium. As such,
it is still in its embryonic stages.32
Nonetheless, there have been two serious attempts to discuss fear in
relation to realism: Shiping Tangs 2008 article Fear in International
Politics: Two Positions and Ioannis Evrigeniss 2007 monograph Fear
of Enemies and Collective Action. In his piece, Tang makes a distinction
between offensive realism and all of the other major theories of interna-
tional politics. He argues that offensive realist theory assumes that states
expect the worst about the intentions of others in an attempt to cope with
the fear of death. In contrast, this emotion does not impel states to assume
the worst about others, according to nonoffensive realist positions.33
Evrigeniss discussions, on the other hand, are restricted to scholars he
labels as realists. Specically, he traces the concept of metus hostil or the
fear of enemies in their writings. In doing so, he argues that the fear of
enemies is indispensable for the creation and maintenance of political
groups since it helps to overcome collective action problems.34
As should be evident, there is not much that the present monograph
shares with the works of Tang and Evrigenis, besides the fact that they
all consider fear in realism, broadly dened. First, neither Tang nor
Evrigenis focus on the conceptual, theoretical, empirical and logical role
of fear in the selected realist thinkers writings as the summary of their
publications above illustrates. Second, Tang refers to one of
Morgenthaus and Waltzs publications and four of Mearsheimers
works.35 Evrigenis, on the other hand, only examines Morgenthau out
of the realist scholars considered in this inquiry and only refers to eight
of the German-Jewish migr scholars publications.36 In stark contrast,
this comprehensive investigation evaluates 237 of Morgenthaus, 54 of
Waltzs and 109 of Mearsheimers texts, making it by far the most
complete examination of their writings to date.37 Third, Tang only con-
siders the fear of death, whereas Evrigenis is merely concerned with the
fear of enemies. This study however adopts a more holistic approach and
considers different facets of this concept. Finally, Tang and Evrigenis do
not develop the concept of fear by drawing on the psychology and
neuroscience literature, unlike the present inquiry.
In sum, there is little overlap between the present investigation and that
of Tang and Evrigenis. As such, this book addresses an important gap in
the literature and makes a substantial original contribution to the study of
international politics.
REALISM
Having situated the present study within the existing literature on realism
and fear, it is incumbent to contextualize the forthcoming discussions by
providing an overview of the main themes of this inquiry, starting with
realism. As implied in the introduction, realism is sometimes traced back
to the writings of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides and political
philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes.38 It was however not until
the aftermath of World War I in 1919 that IR rst became an institutio-
nalized academic discipline in its own right in Aberystwyth, Wales.39 This
marks the starting point for this investigation.
The rst generation of self-identied realist thinkers in IR emerged
during the interwar and wartime era, and this intellectual tradition has
come to pervade the eld ever since.40 Realists are united by the belief that
power is essential in international politics41 and that nation-states that
pursue their own interests are currently the most important actors in the
international system.42 Great powers are deemed particularly signicant as
they have the biggest inuence in shaping international affairs due to their
exalted position.43 Realists are also pessimistic regarding the possibilities
of a universal escape from power politics manifested in the form of
competition, conict and war.44 These are the shared worldviews that
makes realism a distinct approach in the study of international politics.
These commonalities should however not distract us from the signi-
cant differences that also exist within the realist school of thought. Indeed,
disagreements among realists are the reason why this intellectual tradition
is frequently divided into different brands, branches or subschools. In fact,
the subschools themselves are not exempt from internal divisions either.
Hitherto, claims have been made for all sorts of different types of realisms,
including subaltern realism,45 contingent realism,46 generalist rea-
lism,47 specic realism48 and willful realism,49 to mention a few.
None of these types of realisms have however had a strong following or
become deeply engrained in the literature. The only well-established forms
of realism frequently referred to in the literature are classical realism (also
known as human nature realism) and structural realism (also known as
neorealism), which is further divided into defensive and offensive realism.
Finally, there is also neoclassical realism.50
Nowadays, the rst generation of realist scholars are collectively known as
classical realists. The principal realist scholars within this brand are E. H.
Carr,51 Reinhold Niebuhr,52 Arnold Wolfers,53 Raymond Aron54 and, most
prominently, Morgenthau. According to the classical realism or human

nature realism of Morgenthau, power politics is the result of imperfections
within human beings and he thus offers a bottom-up understanding of world
politics.55
This view was challenged by Waltz, who explained these outcomes in
terms of structural pressures induced by the anarchic international system.
In such a world, there is no 911 to call for help. He thus privileged a top-
down approach to the study of IR in his seminal work from 1979 Theory of
International Politics, which ushered realism into a new era.56 Due to its
major breakaway from previous realist work, this new version of realism
became increasingly known as neorealism or structural realism.57 The
neorealism advocated by Waltz and his most prominent colleagues such
as Stephen Walt,58 Stephen Van Evera,59 Stephen Krasner,60 Jack
Snyder,61 Robert Jervis62 and Barry Posen63 however came under attack
from another form of structural realism with a grimmer worldview.
To accommodate these different views, the approach advocated by
Waltz and his associates, was labeled as defensive realism. The more
pessimistic structural realists led by Mearsheimer and other scholars such
as Colin Elman,64 Eric Labs65 and Christopher Layne66 became known as
offensive realists.67 The main line of division between the two branches of
structural realism lies in how much power they assume that states require.
Defensive realism contends that states should acquire an appropriate
amount of power necessary for them to thrive. They should however not
maximize their relative power in a quest to become hegemons. Such a
behavior is counterproductive and will provoke the formation of an
opposing coalition that will undermine their position.68 In contrast,
offensive realism maintains that states should maximize their relative
power to become hegemons, if they have the opportunity to do so. In
this view, power preponderance is the best safeguard for states survival.69
Neoclassical realism is the latest perspective in the realist tradition and
represented by the works of Randall Schweller, William Wohlforth, Thomas
Christen, Fareed Zakaria, etc.70 As its name indicates, neoclassical realism
draws on its classical realist and neorealist predecessors.71 Just like neoreal-
ism, neoclassical realist analysis starts with a consideration of the structural
pressures that states face and their relative capabilities in particular.72
Neoclassical realism however regards a strict focus on structural factors
insufcient to explain foreign policy. Consequently, it supplements them
with individual and unit-level attributes such as decision-makers percep-
tions and domestic factors as in classical realism.73 As such, neoclassical
realism combines the top-down approach of neorealism and the bottom-up

approach of classical realism.74
After this overview of realism in IR, it should be clear that it is a vast
intellectual tradition. As such, the entire canon cannot be subjected to a
systematic and rigorous examination of fear. A selection criterion must
therefore be devised to determine which realist formulations to concen-
trate upon.
THE SELECTION CRITERIA: MORGENTHAU, WALTZ

AND MEARSHEIMER
The criteria that are appropriated for this purpose are outlined next:
1. The chosen scholar must be the most inuential representative of

his/her branch of realism. This criterion is necessary as realism is not
a unitary monolithic bloc and there are central differences between
and within its different branches, as has been illustrated.75 By focus-
ing on a particular scholars works, a far more accurate, sophisticated
and nuanced view of their treatment of fear can therefore be
attained. This is preferable to the alternative approach of arbitrarily
lumping together a wide variety of different perspectives under the
false pretention that they all share the same view. Focusing on the
most inuential scholar within each brand is also advantageous.
These scholars have by denition had the biggest impact in shaping
their subschools and the realist thought as a whole. As a result, their
treatment of fear is of particular signicance to realism.
2. The chosen scholar must have formulated a general theory of inter-
national politics. The second criterion is essential. If the study is to
investigate the theoretical dimension of fear, theories must evidently
be a part of the inquiry. Considering general theories that have the
broadest scope is particularly helpful as they already accommodate
various middle-range theories, hypotheses and statements. As such,
they enable the most thorough analysis of the theoretical dimension
of fear in realism.
3. Fear must be considered signicant to the chosen scholars thinking
on international politics by the secondary literature. The need for
the third criterion is rather self-explanatory. Since the monograph
is partially justied on the premise that fear is vital to realism, it is
sensible to also examine the works of realist scholars for whom fear is
said to be important in the literature. Otherwise, the justication

that this study is based on will remain unsubstantiated. That is why
this criterion is included.
With that said, an overview of the available evidence demonstrates

that Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer are the only scholars that
satisfy the tripartite criteria that will become apparent as they are dealt
with in turn next:
1. The aforementioned academics are indeed the most inuential

thinkers in their respective subschools. Morgenthau was consid-
ered the single greatest contributor to the eld in a survey con-
ducted among IR faculty in the USA published in 1972.76 The
continuing inuence of Morgenthau is apparent in a global survey
among IR faculty from 2009. Although this study was conducted
29 years after the passing of Morgenthau, he still ranked on the
18th place among the scholars that have had the biggest inuence
in the eld for the past 20 years.77 He was the only classical realist
to make the list and was only surpassed by scholars who were still
alive at the time of the survey. Disciplinary historians also unan-
imously regard Morgenthau as the leading classical realist in IR.78
Waltz ranked as the third most inuential scholar in IR in the
past 20 years in the latest TRIP survey from 2012 that conducted
polls among IR faculty from 20 different countries.79 He was
only surpassed by Alexander Wendt80 and Robert Keohane.81
This is astonishing considering that Waltzs most inuential
work, Theory of International Politics,82 appeared in 1979, 33
years before the survey was conducted.83 This also makes Waltz
the most inuential defensive realist (and the most inuential
realist in general) in the view of scholars conducting research in
the eld.
Mearsheimer is ranked as the fth most inuential IR scholar
in the past 20 years in the eld in the rst TRIP survey.84 He
maintains the same position in the second TRIP and moves up one
place in the third.85 In the latest TRIP survey that ranks Waltz as
the third most inuential IR scholar, Mearsheimer is placed in the
fth place.86 Mearsheimer is the only offensive realist to be included
in any of these lists.
2. The selected scholars have all developed general theories of interna-

tional politics in accordance with the second criterion. Morgenthau
writes that he purports to present a general theory of international
politics.87 As Brian Schmidt also conrms, Morgenthaus Politics
Among Nations is the rst book in the eld to unequivocally take
on the task of setting forth a general theory of international poli-
tics.88 Similarly, Waltz conrms that he proposes a general theory
of international politics89 and other scholars concur.90
Mearsheimer follows in the footsteps of his realist predecessors and
advances a general theory of his own,91 a point that is validated by
the secondary literature92 as well.
3. In line with the requirements of the third criterion, there is a body of
work that considers fear vital to Morgenthaus, Waltzs and
Mearsheimers trajectories. For instance, it has been argued that
Morgenthau considers fear a prime mover in human relations93
and similar remarks are evident in the literature.94 Likewise, Jack
Donnelly argues that balancing is driven by fear of predation rather
than anarchy in Waltzs defensive realism and that fear trumps
polarity in his account.95 Cynthia Weber maintains that fear is
both a crucial and an externalized component of Waltzs anarchy
myth96 and that it is this emotion that makes Waltzs world con-
ictual rather than cooperative.97 Finally, fear has been regarded as
the sole emotional catalyst in Mearsheimers offensive realism and it
has been claimed that the logical coherence of his theory is depen-
dent on high levels of fear.98 Indeed, statements about the impor-
tance of fear in Mearsheimers work are afuent.99
As these discussions clearly demonstrate, Morgenthau, Waltz and

Mearsheimer are the only scholars that satisfy the tripartite criteria. That
is why they are chosen as the representatives of classical realism, defensive
realism and offensive realism, respectively. At this point, one may however
wonder why no representative has been selected from neoclassical realism.
It is after all one of the main brands of realism. The reason for this is that
no neoclassical realist has formulated a general theory of international
politics to date.
Gideon Rose, who rst coined the term neoclassical realism, even
suggests that this is not the purpose of neoclassical realism. Its task is
instead to afford an explanation for the foreign policy of states and only
middle-range theories have been devised for this purpose.100 There are
therefore no neoclassical realists that fulll the second criterion.101
The fact that neoclassical realism is not covered is further alleviated by
the fact that none of its proponents have ever been listed as one of the
most inuential IR scholars in the TRIP surveys, unlike Morgenthau,
Waltz and Mearsheimer.102 Finally, neoclassical realism synthesizes classi-
cal realism with neorealism, as we have seen.103 Since classical realism is
already a part of the examination along with the two major strands of
neorealism, the omission of neoclassical realism does not have any serious
impact on the coverage of realism either.104
Having provided an overview and justication of the selection criteria
and demonstrated that Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer are the only
scholars that fulll these standards within the main branches of realism, it
is appropriate to shed light on the other central tenet of this studyfear.
This is the subject of the next section.
FEAR
Fear is the initial emotion that the rst humans as conceived by the Bible,
Adam and Eve, experience in the Garden of Eden.105 Scientic evidence
also suggests that fear has been instrumental in human affairs ever since its
inception.106 According to ndings in evolutionary psychology, it is fear
that stops us from undertaking various hazardous actions such as carelessly
approaching predators or steep cliffs and has therefore helped to ensure
the survival of the human species.107 Moreover, research has found that
fear strongly affects our sense of agency and the way we perceive and react
to our environment. Indeed, fearful individuals feel unprotected, experi-
ence limited control over their surroundings and see themselves at the
mercy of powerful others.108 With these points in mind, it is not hard to
see why Charles Darwin regarded fear as one of the six basic emotions.109
A proposition that has been well supported by modern psychology where
fear is considered a primary emotion that exerts a great deal of inuence on
human affairs.110
Evidence suggests that world politics is not an exception. Leading
American policymakers during the Cuban Missile Crisis such as Robert
McNamara and McGeorge Bundy have both candidly expressed their
overwhelming fear of being held responsible for the death of hundreds
of thousands of Americans in a nuclear war.111 But it is not only the
genuine fear of decision-makers that pervades the international level.
Their use of this emotion as a political tool to implement policies of their

liking also testies to the prominence of fear in IR. For instance, it has
been argued that fear of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism were
used as instruments by the governments of the USA and the UK to sell the
2003 Iraq war.112
The examples provided above highlight some of the ways in which fear
affects the international realm. For the purposes of this monograph, it is
however necessary to develop a clear conception of fear that can be applied
to the analysis of the selected realist scholars writings. Since fear is heavily
understudied within IR, the literature from psychology and neuroscience
will also inform the conception of fear as they are at the forefront of the
study of this emotion. Their research will be made relevant to the inter-
national realm to make them suitable for the present examination.
On the basis of these ndings, fear is dened as a spontaneous reaction
to a perceived threat or danger that creates an intense urge to defend
oneself from that threat or danger.113 Self-protection can be pursued
through aggression (competition, conict and war) and restraint (avoid-
ance of competition, conict and war). Restraint is the preferred option
under the condition of fear, if the circumstances allow it. It would be
inconsistent with fear to favor aggression over restraint, if the latter option
is present.114 In fact, we would refrain from calling such an actor fearful in
the rst place.115 In some situations, restraint may however not be a viable
option and fear may therefore promote aggressive behavior toward the
source of threat and danger instead.116
Since fear is a defensive mechanism against perceived threats and dangers, it
is only compatible with defensive aggression rather than offensive aggres-
sion.117 In other words, fear only applies to situations where aggression is
pursued against the perceived threat and danger for the sake of self-protection.
Offensive aggression aimed at self-aggrandizement is motivated by other
factors than fear such as glory,118 greed,119 honor120 or appetite121. For
these reasons, fear can only account for the aggression of status quo-oriented
actors when they act like revisionists to ensure their security.
Although the immediate causes of fear in international politics vary
greatly, its necessary and sufcient conditions are capabilities and security.
Actors must be perceived to have the capability and the potential will to use
them for fear to emerge. In the absence of these conditions, international
actors have no reason to fear one another. Moreover, the actors must be
concerned with their own security. Otherwise, the fact that others might
use their capacities against them would not bother them. Additionally,
actors would have no incentives to defend themselves against the perceived

threat and danger. This is also a fundamental dimension of fear, as we have
seen. For these reasons, both capabilities and security are necessary condi-
tions of fear. Together they form the sufcient conditions of fear in IR.122
Finally, it should be noted that the level of fear can vary. As the
testimonies of McNamara and Bundy indicate, their fears were exceed-
ingly high during the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis. This does not
however mean that their sense of fear were always this strong. In fact, the
available evidence suggests that many other episodes in the Cold War
itself did not provoke the same intense fears.123 Indeed, it is hard to
imagine that the perceived threat and danger would be consistent over
time and space, irrespective of the prevailing conditions. Fear should
therefore be treated as a variable rather than a static concept.
It is this notion of fear that will be appropriated to evaluate the classical
realism of Morgenthau, the defensive realism of Waltz and the offensive
realism of Mearsheimer. The question of how fear will be located and
analyzed throughout their works is considered next.
METHOD AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This investigation makes use of quantitative, qualitative, manual and
computer-assisted content analysis and is the rst study to incorporate all
these aspects of the method within a single research project in IR. In other
words, this is the premier example of fully integrated content analysis.124
In order to carry out this inquiry, references to fear must be detected in the
texts of Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer. Since the English language
is rich and fear can be expressed in numerous ways, it is not sufcient to
merely locate the explicit use of this word across these scholars publica-
tions.125 For this reason, the Merriam-Webster thesaurus is used126 along
with the IR, psychology and neuroscience literature to identify the terms
that are synonymous or closely related to fear. This provides us with a list
of the following words: afraid, alarm, anger, anxiety, distrust/mistrust,
dread, fearfulness, fright, hatred, horror, insecurity, panic, risk, scare,
suspicion, risk, terror, trepidation, uncertainty and worry.127
To enhance the validity of this research project, the words listed above
are tested against Morgenthaus, Waltzs and Mearsheimers most inu-
ential works. That is, Politics Among Nations,128 Theory of International
Politics129 and The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.130 Through this
procedure, it becomes evident which of these expressions that these
scholars themselves use synonymously or interchangeably with fear. The

results from these samples illustrate that Morgenthau uses afraid and
anxious, Waltz insecurity and Mearsheimer alarm, anxious, scare and
worry, synonymously or interchangeably with fear.131 Consequently,
these terms, along with their corresponding derivatives, will also be uti-
lized to locate references to this emotion in their texts.
Computer software is used to detect all instances of fear across the
400 examined publications since it is far more efcient and reliable for
this task than the unaided human eye. However, the employed soft-
ware does not apprehend the meaning of fear in the given context. As
one analyst puts it, computer-aided content analysis cannot distin-
guish among the various senses of words with more than one meaning,
such as mine. Does this refer to a hole in the ground, the process of
extraction, or a possessive pronoun?132 For the purpose of textual
interpretation, the human mind is currently far superior than the
computer. This is why a close reading of the relevant passages ensues
in order to establish the conceptual, theoretical, empirical and logical
elements of fear. In all, these procedures signicantly enhance the
validity of the study and the accuracy of the analysis.
These discussions clarify how fear will be located in the selected scho-
lars writings. More needs to be said of how the conceptual, theoretical,
empirical and logical aspects of this emotion will be evaluated in their
respective realist statements however. An analytical framework needs to be
formulated for this purpose. This is what the remainder of this section
seeks to do.133
Conceptually, the inquiry will uncover Morgenthaus, Waltzs
and Mearsheimers understandings of fear. This task will be accom-
plished by examining any potential denitions of the term and any
general insights they might offer on this concept in their writings.
Merely focusing on formal denitions of fear is insufcient for
this purpose. Aron once stated that fear needs no denition134 and
Morgenthau, Waltz and/or Mearsheimer may subscribe to the same
view. Moreover, they might shed important light on the concept of
fear in various segments of their works that would go missing by only
staring blind on denitions of the term. In short, the proposed
approach provides the most complete overview of these scholars
understandings of fear. Also, it enables an evaluation of the proposi-
tion that fear is an explicit but unsystematic and unproblematized
component of realism.135
At the theoretical level, the investigation will initially consider

whether Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer explicitly incorporate
fear to their frameworks, and if so, whether they afford it a central or
peripheral role. What constitutes as the core and the periphery of their
theories will be determined through an evidence-based interpretation of
the aforementioned scholars publications that must also gain external
validity in the secondary literature. Additionally, the causes and effects
of fear in the classical realism of Morgenthau, the defensive realism of
Waltz and the offensive realism of Mearsheimer will be identied.
Altogether, these efforts provide a comprehensive account of the theo-
retical role of fear in these scholars works. An investigation that also
enables us to consider whether fear is central to their theories as pro-
claimed in the secondary literature.136
The theoretical results will subsequently be weighed against the empiri-
cal data to uncover whether the theoretical role that these scholars assign
to fear is consistent with their empirical use of this emotion in terms of its
causes and effects. This approach does not only produce a rich account of
the empirical dimension of fear, but also allows us to verify whether this
emotion is empirically vital to realism as claimed by its detractors137 and
advocates138 alike.
The logical element of fear will be explored in two main ways. First,
equipped with the notion of fear developed in this chapter, it will be
determined whether this emotion is logically needed, unnecessary or
counterproductive in bringing about the realist worlds of Morgenthau,
Waltz and Mearsheimer. Second, it will be considered whether these
thinkers use of this emotion is logically consistent with the rest of their
frameworks. Besides shedding light on these issues, the obtained data can
assess the accuracy of the claim that fear is logically signicant to the
examined realist narratives as suggested by the literature.139
With that said, fear will be considered logically important if it is essential
to bring about the realist worlds that these theories assume. However, this
is only sufcient to make fear signicant as an autonomous unit. Theories
are complex phenomena that include more than one concept, as has
already been mentioned. If fear is to be regarded as logically essential to
the entire framework as a whole, it must therefore be compatible with
other aspects of the theory as well. Should fear be logically redundant
in bringing about the behavior the theories envision, but compatible
with the rest of the framework, it will be considered insignicant. Under
these circumstances, it is of no logical utility after all. If fear is logically
detrimental and/or unnecessary in bringing about the realist worlds as

well as incompatible with other elements of the framework, fear is not only
unimportant but also logically harmful to the theory.
Altogether, this robust method and analytical framework can yield
reliable and valid results. Before these ndings are revealed in later seg-
ments of the monograph, it is however appropriate to take a closer look at
the content of these forthcoming chapters.
OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

Specically, the remainder of the book is divided into ve different chap-
ters, the rst of which takes a closer look at the background and works of
the three selected realist scholars. It draws out the main themes of their
works in chronological order and explains the role that they afford fear in
these publications. By doing so, it contextualizes the analyses that take
place in later segments of the monograph.
In the three following chapters, the four facets of fear are evaluated in
the classical realism of Morgenthau, the defensive realism of Waltz and
the offensive realism of Mearsheimer. All these chapters adopt the same
overarching format in order to maintain consistency in the analysis. First,
these scholars conceptions of fear are unpacked. Second, the potential
theoretical role of fear is established within their framework. Third, the
empirical dimension of fear is evaluated in terms of causes and effects.
Fourth, the investigation considers whether fear is logically necessary to
generate the outcomes that these theories presume and is internally
consistent with the rest of these frameworks.
The results of these efforts are presented side by side in Chap. 6,
where the conceptual, theoretical, empirical and logical aspects of fear in
these theorists works are compared and contrasted. In doing so, this
chapter reveals that fear is severely under-conceptualized across the
board. Meanwhile, whereas Morgenthau and Waltz afford this emotion
a peripheral role in their theories, fear is found at the centre of
Mearsheimers framework. Empirically, all of these scholars use fear in
their analysis of international politics to account for a wide variety of
issues, including those that are central to their respective realisms.
Furthermore, a major discrepancy between their theoretical and empiri-
cal use of fear is noted with regard to its causes and effects. Finally, the
examination makes clear that the inclusion of fear is logically counter-
productive for all of the examined theories. This is particularly the case
for Mearsheimers offensive realism. That is so, despite the fact that he
affords this emotion a central role in his theory.
Subsequently, the ndings of this study are discussed in relation to the
claims that critics and advocates of realism have advanced regarding the
role of fear within this school of thought. The chapter also considers what
incentives these scholars might have to include fear in their realist trajec-
tories of international politics, despite the fact that this emotion is logically
unhelpful to their theories. Lastly, a guideline is provided of how realism
can incorporate fear more successfully with its framework. These pointers
bring this book to a closure. The present chapter however ends with a
summary of the preceding points.
SUMMARY
In this introductory chapter, the main components of this monograph have
been presented, explained and justied. It was maintained that both realism
and fear have been instrumental in the study and practice of IR. In this
book, these two themes are united into a single research project that
evaluates the conceptual, theoretical, empirical and logical aspects of fear
in the realisms of Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer. Four hundred of
their publications will be analyzed as a part of this inquiry that will be
informed by the conception of fear, fully integrated content analysis and
the analytical framework presented in this chapter. At this point, it is
however appropriate to contextualize the inquiry by considering the writ-
ings of Morgenthaus, Waltzs and Mearsheimers and provide an overview
of fear in their works. The next chapter is dedicated to this essential issue.
NOTES
1. In this book, fear is dened as a spontaneous reaction to a perceived threat
or danger which creates an intense urge to defend oneself from that threat or
danger.
2. Orwell 1949, 220, emphasis added.
3. Pain and Smith 2008, 3.
4. Enloe 2000; Goldstein 2001.
5. Jabri 2012, 54.
6. Campbell 1998, 48; Shapiro 1992, 137, 139.
7. Campbell 1998, 48.
8. Lebow 2008, 89; Wendt 1992, 400, 415416; Wendt 1999, 359363.
9. Moravcsik 1997, 541.

10. Thucydides 1972, 49, 103, emphasis added.
11. Machiavelli 1988, 59, emphasis added.
12. Hobbes 1947, 6465, emphasis added.
13. Donnelly 2000; Wohlforth 2008, 132; Guzzini 1998, 9; Porter 1972, ix;
Vasquez 1983, 13.
14. Carr 1939, 10; Mearsheimer 2001c, 9.
15. Lake and Rothchild 1998; Lischer 1999; Melander 2009; Petersen 2002.
16. Altheide 2006; Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, and Shapiro 2011.
17. See for example, Craig 2007; Jervis 1989; Sagan and Waltz 2003.
18. See for example, Booth and Wheeler 2008; Buttereld 1951; Herz 1959;
Glaser 1997; Jervis 1976; Tang 2010a.
19. Craig 2007, 170172; Tannenwald 2007, 7.
20. Bleiker and Hutchison 2008, 116.
21. Crawford 2000, 156; Ross 2006, 197; R 2013, 15; Saurette 2006, 499;
Solomon 2012, 216.
22. Lebow 2008, 158.
23. Crawford 2000, 116, 119, 156; Donnelly 2000, 43; Freyberg-Inan 2004,
13; Gross Stein 2013, 202; Rathbun 2007, 539, 540 nn. 5, 541, 553554.
24. Brooks 1997, 449; Craig 2004, 144; Craig 2007, 13; R 2013, 15;
Schweller 1996, 109; Sterling-Folker 2002, 72; Tang 2010a, 69.
25. Pashakhanlou Forthcoming.
26. Alker and Biersteker 1984; Maliniak, Peterson, and Tierney 2012, 12.
27. Hoffmann 1977, 4748; Wallace 1996.
28. Donnelly 2000; Guzzini 1998; Haslam 2002; Molloy 2006; Smith 1986;
Tjalve 2008; Vasquez 1998.
29. Booth 2011; Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993; Cozette 2008; Elman 2004;
Frei 2001; Humphreys 2013; Jtersonke 2010; Keohane 1986a; Layne
2002; Pashakhanlou 2009; Pashakhanlou 2013; Pashakhanlou 2014;
Schroeder 1994; Schweller 1996; Snyder 2002; Toft 2005; Tucker 1952;
Valeriano 2009; Wendt 1992; Williams 2007.
30. Booth and Wheeler 2008, 63.
31. For rare exceptions, see for example, Booth and Wheeler 2008; Petersen 2002.
32. Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Crawford 2000; Mercer 2010; Ross 2006;
Sasley 2011.
33. Tang 2008.
34. Evrigenis 2007.
35. Tang 2008, 469471.
36. Evrigenis 2007, 214.
37. Not all of these 400 publications are listed in the bibliography since some of
them do not contain any relevant references to fear or contain any other
information that has been included in the monograph.
38. Donnelly 2000; Lebow 2003; Wohlforth 2008, 132.

39. Guzzini 1998, 9; Porter 1972, ix; Vasquez 1983, 13.
40. Wohlforth 2008, 132.
41. Donnelly 2000, 79; Gallarotti 2010, 13, 1720; Molloy 2006; Nye 2004;
Schmidt 2007; Sheehan 1996, 410.
42. Gilpin 2011, 1617; Hobson 2000, 5; Jackson 1993, 79; Kapstein and
Mastanduno 1999; Spegele 1996, 8586; Wagner 2007, x; Zakaria 1998,
3542.
43. Copeland 2000, 13, 1116; Layne 2006, 1519; Miller 2007, 35;
Simpson 2004, 14, 72; Thayer 2004, 6165; Wang 2011, 21.
44. Buzan 1996, 61; Dienstag 2008; Freyberg-Inan 2004, 1113, 5861,
101105, 181182; Kolodziej 2005, 127; Krasner 1996, 119.
45. Ayoob 2002.
46. Glaser 1994.
47. Rosecrance 2001.
48. Ibid.
49. Williams 2005.
50. Jtersonke 2010, 6; Levy and Thompson 2010, 19561957; Mearsheimer
2010d, 78; Snyder 2002, 149; Wohlforth 2008, 136140.
51. Carr 1939.
52. Niebuhr 1932.
53. Wolfers 1962.
54. Aron 1966.
55. Morgenthau 1954b, 4.
56. Waltz 1979a, 65, 68.
57. Ashley 1986.
58. Walt 1987.
59. Van Evera 1999.
60. Krasner 1999.
61. Snyder 1991.
62. Jervis 1976.
63. Posen 1993.
64. Elman 2004.
65. Labs 1997.
66. Layne 2002.
67. It was Snyder 1991, 1112, that rst introduced the distinction between
defensive realism and what he referred to as aggressive realism. Mearsheimer
however preferred the term offensive realism for his brand of realism and this
is the label most widely used in the literature.
68. Donnelly 2000, 6364; Grieco 1988; Layne 2000, 106; Mastanduno 1997,
79 n. 13; Mearsheimer 2009a, 243; Waltz 1988b; Waltz 2008, 79.
69. Donnelly 2000, 6364; Labs 1997; Layne 2000, 106; Mearsheimer 2010, 78.
70. Schweller 2003; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Christensen 1999; Zakaria
1998.
71. Rose 1998.
72. Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009, 4; Rathbun 2008, 307; Rose 1998,
146; Schweller 2003, 316.
73. Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009, 4; Rathbun 2008, 307; Rose 1998,
151152, 168, 170; Schweller 2003, 316, 319; Wohlforth 1994, 107.
74. Rose 1998, 154.
75. Wohlforth 2012, 3841.
76. Finnegan 1972, 9.
77. Jordan et al. 2009, 43.
78. Vasquez 1998, 36.
79. Maliniak, Peterson, and Tierney 2012, 49.
80. Wendt 1992; Wendt 1994; Wendt 1995; Wendt 1999; Wendt 2003; Wendt
2004.
81. Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Keohane 1975; Keohane 1984; Keohane
1986b; Keohane 1990.
82. Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993, 1; Donnelly 2000, 16; Vasquez 1998, 4.
84. Peterson, Tierney, and Maliniak 2005, 19.
85. Maliniak et al. 2007, 17; Jordan et al. 2009, 43.
87. Morgenthau 1954, 5; Morgenthau 1958a, 4748.
88. Schmidt 2011, 90.
89. Waltz 1979, 73.
90. Donnelly 2000, 57; Engel and Olsen 2005, 1; Freyberg-Inan 2004, 73;
Popolo 2011, 93.
91. Mearsheimer 2001, 910, 403404 n. 5.
92. Tang 2010a, 3.
93. Iverson 2013, 3637.
94. Crawford 2009, 272; Gross Stein 2013, 202; Holsti 2000, 119120;
Johnson 1996, 243.
95. Donnelly 2000, 118, 118 n. 20.
96. Weber 2010, 16. Also see, 22.
97. Weber 2001, 31.
98. R 2013, 45.
99. Brooks 1997, 449450; R 2013, 45 Also see,; Dierauer 2013, 32; Schmidt
2013, 233234; Schuett 2010, 77.
100. Rose 1998, 145.
101. Ibid.
102. Peterson, Tierney, and Maliniak 2005; Maliniak et al. 2007; Jordan et al.
2009; Maliniak, Peterson, and Tierney 2012.
103. Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009, 4.

104. Brooks 1997, 449450; Craig 2004, 144; Dierauer 2013, 32; Jordan et al.
2009, 43; Maliniak et al. 2007, 17; Maliniak, Peterson, and Tierney 2012,
49; Mearsheimer 2001, 910, 22; Peterson, Tierney, and Maliniak 2005,
19; R 2013, 45; Schmidt 2013, 233234; Schuett 2010, 77; Tang
2010a, 3.
105. Robin 2004, 1.
106. Hankiss 2001, 89.
107. Marks 1969; Seligman 1971; hman and Mineka 2001, 483.
108. Jackson 2006, 257.
109. Booth and Wheeler 2008, 6263.
110. Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006, 367368.
111. Blight 1992, 8, 80, 83; Blight, Allyn, and Welch 2002, 51.
112. ODriscoll 2008, 347.
113. Halperin et al. 2008, 234 Also see,; Crawford 2009, 277, 282.
114. Dumont et al. 2003, 1519 Also see,; Hall 2008, 20.
115. Gray 1987, 3334.
116. Halperin, Sharvit, and Gross 2011 Also see,; Hall 2008, 18.
117. Lickel 2012, 92.
118. Jervis 2001.
119. Glaser 2010.
120. Lebow 2010.
121. Lebow 2008.
122. These discussions assume the existence of interaction between two or more
actors.
123. Blight, Allyn, and Welch 2002, 8, 51, 80, 83, 9697.
124. Pashakhanlou Forthcoming.
125. Krippendorff 2013, 106.
126. The use of this American-English thesaurus is particularly useful since all of
the examined theorist were mainly based in the US at the time of their
scholarly activities in IR and wrote their main works in the discipline in
American-English.
127. Brosschot, Gerin, and Thayer 2006, 114; Cheung-Blunden and Blunden
2008, 127; Crawford 2000, 116, 122; Fein and Hilton 1994, 168169;
Fischer and Manstead 2010; Jackson 2006; Merriam-Webster 2013;
Rathbun 2007, 533; Ross and Jang 2000, 406; Tang 2010b, 1, 1 nn. 1,
66; hman 2008, 709.
128. Finnegan 1972, 9.
129. Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993, 1; Donnelly 2000, 16; Vasquez 1998, 4.
130. Layne 2006, 17; Little 2007, 14; Wohlforth 2008, 132.
131. Mearsheimer 2001, 32, 4243, 376, 195; Morgenthau 1948a, 8, 7879;
Waltz 1979, 42.
132. Weber 1990, 21.

133. At this point, it is important to emphasize that the distinction between the
conceptual, theoretical, empirical and logical aspects of fear are not absolute
and there are overlaps between them. That is particularly evident between
the empirical and logical segments that are intimately connected to the
theoretical discussions. That should however not distract from the differ-
ences of emphasis between these factors. In this investigation, a concept is
understood as a notion consisting of different elements or characteristics.
Theories as a set of interlinked concepts used to shed light on the phenom-
ena of interest. The empirical data is made up of cases derived from experi-
ence or observation. Logic is dened as the use of valid and consistent
reasoning. As these discussions illustrate, there are thus valid scholarly
grounds from separating these factors. Doing so, also enhances the read-
ability of the text and its presentation.
134. Cited in Robin 2004, 9.
135. Crawford 2000, 116, 118, 155; Rathbun 2007, 538.
136. Crawford 2000, 121, 272; Dierauer 2013, 32; Holsti 2000, 119120;
Schmidt 2013, 233234; Tang 2010a, 452.
137. Donnelly 2000, 109, 118 nn. 20, 157; Freyberg-Inan 2004, 13, 99, 203 nn.
93, 204 94; Santoro 2010, 110.
138. Brooks 1997, 466; Grieco 1988, 487, 498499, 499 nn. 61, 500 64; Tang
2008, 456, 467; Tang 2010a, 18, 69.
139. Brooks 1997, 449; Donnelly 2000, 118; Iverson 2013, 3637; Rathbun
2007, 539, 540 nn. 5, 553554; Weber 2001, 31.
CHAPTER 2
Fear in the Works of Morgenthau,

Waltz and Mearsheimer
INTRODUCTION
In doing so, the publications of Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer are
separated into various categories. The distinction between them is how-
ever not absolute and areas of overlap exist. They are distinguished to
provide a better overview of the main themes of their studies. Moreover,
since references to fear appear thousands of times in these scholars writ-
ings, all of these cases cannot be discussed here due to space limitation.
Only the relevant and most signicant cases will be covered in more depth.
In total, this investigation spans over nine sections. The opening four
segments are devoted to Morgenthau. First, his writings in foreign lan-
guages, besides English, will be considered. The Section Morgenthaus
works in English on international law explores his work on international
law in English and the use of fear in these publications. The ensuing
section proceeds in the same manner as it unpacks Morgenthaus writings
in the eld of IR. The coverage of Morgenthau ends with a discussion
regarding the publications that will be scrutinized in this book and the
various editions of his texts. The Sections Waltzs works and Analysis
of Waltzs works unveil Waltzs discussions regarding fear across his
writings. Furthermore, they clarify which of his texts will be scrutinized
in this monograph and settle issues regarding editions. The Sections
Mearsheimers works and Analysis of Mearsheimers works are dedi-
cated to the identication of fear in Mearsheimers texts. Additionally,
they shed light on the publications that will be investigated here, in

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41012-8_2
particular his major statement of offensive realism, The Tragedy of Great

Power Politics. The chapter ends with a brief summary of the main points.
MORGENTHAUS WORKS IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES

As mentioned in the introduction, Morgenthau did not write solely in
English. At the beginning of his career, the German realist trained in law,
wrote mostly in his native German but also in French and a piece in
Spanish. The fact that Morgenthau favored German during this period is
hardly surprising as he received all of his education in the country up until
the completion of his doctorates in international law.1
Morgenthau however left his home country by 17 February 1932 and
entered the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva to
complete his Habilitation dissertation. According to Oliver Jntersoke,
Morgenthau started publishing in dreadful French during this period, as
that was the working language of the institution.2 But international law
remained his eld of study. In Geneva, norms, sanctions and the decen-
tralized nature of international law were his main areas of investigation,
instead of disputes, the topic that had preoccupied him in Germany.
By 1935, Morgenthau left Geneva and Switzerland for the Madrid
Institute of International and Economic Studies in Spain to teach inter-
national law for a year. It was during this period that Morgenthau pro-
duced his rst piece in Spanish entitled Derecho Internacional Publico:
Introduccin y Conceptos Fundamentales.3 During this period,
Morgenthau started to advocate a radical legal realism4 designed to
replace the traditional legal positivism that dominated the eld.5
Morgenthau did not however get the opportunity to develop his research
in Madrid. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War forced him to conduct
his work elsewhere.
On 17 July 1937, Morgenthau and his wife boarded the SS Knigstein
in Antwerp, bound for New York. At this point, he had not started to write
in English. His only two publications for the year were in his native
language. His publications in English appeared the following year with
the publication of The End of Switzerlands Differential Neutrality and
Plans for Work.6
In this inquiry, the works of Morgenthau written in German, French
and Spanish will not be analyzed as I do not master any of these languages.
This omission will not pose any major difculties for the purposes of this
book. Morgenthaus early work in German, French and Spanish did after
2 FEAR IN THE WORKS OF MORGENTHAU, WALTZ AND MEARSHEIMER 25
all focus on international law rather than international politics, as we have

seen. To be sure, Morgenthau did publish in these languages after 1937 as
well.7 These works are however few and far between. The vast majority of
Morgenthaus writings are in English after this date. Moreover,
Morgenthau did not write any major works in any language besides
English after 1937. In fact, it is very probable that his writings in
German, French and Spanish after this date appeared in one form or
another in his English texts as well. As such, Morgenthaus multilingual
writings do not pose an insurmountable barrier for this investigation. This
is especially true as 237 of his writings are already covered in this study.
With that said, one of Morgenthaus French publications from 1933,
La Notion du Politique et la Thorie des Diffrends Internationaux (The
Concept of the Political), has recently been translated into English. In this
volume, three references are made to fear. None of them are however
from the actual manuscript. Instead, they are found in Morgenthaus
biography that has been reprinted in the English version to contextualize
the discussions in The Concept of the Political. In these passages,
Morgenthau reveals his personal fears, but no references are made to this
emotion in his analysis of the political.8
MORGENTHAUS WORKS IN ENGLISH ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

Having crossed the Atlantic Ocean and settled in the USA, the German-
Jewish migr scholar, Morgenthau, continued to advance the research
project he established in Spain. This is apparent in his 1940 article
Positivism, functionalism and international law. In this piece,
Morgenthau continues to attack traditional legal positivism, but instead
of seeking to overturn it by his legal realism, Morgenthau calls for a
functional theory of international law. These changes were mostly cos-
metic as Morgenthaus functionalism differed more in name than content
from his previous legal realism.9
There were other international lawyers working on the functionalist
approach at the time as well. Most notably, Harold Lasswell and Myers
McDougal pursued this line of research. They thus covered much of the
ground that Morgenthau sought to address.10 Morgenthau thus had little
left to contribute to international law. Moreover, even from the early
stages of Morgenthaus career, he had considered politics as an essential
component of international law. This is revealed by the English title of his
1933 monograph, The Concept of the Political, discussed earlier. With
these points in mind, it is not hard to see why he gradually turned away
from international law and moved toward the newly developed eld of IR
instead.
Morgenthaus rst article in a political science journal appeared in 1939
with the title The resurrection of neutrality in Europe in American
Political Science Review.11 International law however remained his main
preoccupation as his only other publications from 1939 to 1944 in poli-
tical outlets were four brief book reviews that were published in Political
Science Quarterly, Journal of Political Economy and American Political
Science Review, respectively.12 Instead, it is Morgenthaus tenure at
University of Chicago in 1945 that marks his full transition to an IR
specialist. In this year, he only published one short book review in
Harvard Law Review,13 all of his other writings are in politics and philo-
sophy journals. Nonetheless, Morgenthau did continue to produce work
within law in later stages of his academic career as well. But he did so very
sporadically.14 It is clear that from 1945 onward IR was his main
preoccupation.
With that said, out of all the publications Morgenthau produced in
international law from 1938 to 1944 in English examined here, only one
reference is made to fear. Here, Morgenthau argues that China and Russia
abstained from voting on a resolution allowing Swiss neutrality within the
League of Nations because they were afraid to admit formally that
collective security is no longer the guiding principle for all members of
the League and thus is about to cease to be collective at all.15 References
to this emotion are far more common in his texts on IR.
MORGENTHAUS WORKS IN IR
Morgenthaus ambitions in IR were initially predominantly theoretical. In
his classic monograph from 1946, Scientic Man vs. Power Politics,
Morgenthau made it abundantly clear what approaches he shuns.
Scientism where the social world is equated with the natural world and
rational liberalism with its nave, dangerous utopianism rooted in scientic
progress, technological development, rule of law and free market econ-
omy. Instead, Morgenthau claimed that a more accurate understanding of
politics can be attained by regarding this sphere as a struggle for power
rooted in the political mans animus dominandi.16 He developed these
ideas into a realist theory of international politics in his magnum opus
from 1948, Politics Among Nations.17
In Scientic Man vs. Power Politics, fear appears 11 times in total but
only twice is this emotion used by Morgenthau to account for interna-
tional events. In the rst instance, he identies fear as one of the psycho-
logical causes of social conict. Morgenthau subsequently draws on this
insight, when he ascribes Americas involvement in World War I to its fear
of being unable to recoup the loans they provided to the European
belligerents.18 In his other major theoretical piece, Politics Among
Nations, fear is mentioned 90 times and he builds upon his previous
ideas developed in Scientic Man vs. Power Politics. This is apparent as
he identies fear as the underlying cause of war between status quo
powers. Moreover, he considers fear as the major cause of World War I
in general.19
Although Morgenthau continued to regularly revise Politics Among
Nations throughout the decades20 and wrote new pieces on IR theory,21
his main preoccupation in the 1950s became American politics and foreign
policy rather than theoryan issue he initially explored a decade earlier
and continued to write about in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s as well.22 His
rst major monograph on this issue was In Defence of the National Interest
from 1951 in which Morgenthau upheld legalism, utopianism, sentiment-
alism and isolationism as the four major aws of US foreign policy.23
Morgenthau also wrote specic pieces on Americas foreign policy
against Western Europe, Africa, the Soviet Union but particularly in
relation to the Vietnam War.24 His initial publication on Vietnam
appeared the same year as the outbreak of the war in 1956 with the title
The 1954 Geneva conference: an assessment.25 Nevertheless, it was not
until the 1960s that Morgenthau became increasingly focused on the
conduct of his new home country during the Vietnam War. In this regard,
he argues that the US involvement in Vietnam is inherently counterpro-
ductive and undermines its national interest. These views are expressed in
his monograph Vietnam and the United States and in articles such as U.S.
misadventure in Vietnam.26 Morgenthaus stance on this issue continued
in the 1970s and was advanced in his writings, including The new
escalation in Vietnam, The lessons of Vietnam, The intellectual,
political, and moral roots of U.S. failure in Vietnam and Vietnam and
Cambodia.27
If we consider the publications of Morgenthau that are explicitly con-
cerned with different aspects of American politics and foreign policy that
are examined here, fear appears 197 times.28 In these writings,
Morgenthau strongly emphasizes the pervasive fear of public opinion in
the USA. In his view, this fear is unjustied and has negative implications
as it promotes paralysis, risk avoidance and overly conservative policies.29
Fear is also particularly evident in Morgenthaus texts on USSoviet
relations. Here, the predominant theme is their mutual fear of nuclear
Armageddon. In Morgenthaus analysis, this state of affairs effectively
restrains their foreign policies in terms of direct military confrontation
and escalation.30
This brings us to another major strand of Morgenthaus work that
grapples with the implications of the atomic age that began with the
publication of the article The H-bomb and after in 1950.31 In a piece
from the same decade, Morgenthau maintains that limited nuclear war is
possible. This is achieved by a combination of diplomacy and a careful,
almost clinical, use of atomic weaponry.32 In the 1960s, Morgenthau
abandoned this position and argued that there is no escape from total
war in the nuclear age.33 This is a view that Morgenthau held onto during
the 1970s when he warned about the dangers of a general nuclear war.34
Fear appears 31 times in these publications that are part of the present
investigation.35 Most notably, Morgenthau uses fear in relation to the use
of force in these writings. Generally, he contends that the fear of nuclear
war restricts interstate violence. Specically, Morgenthau argues that the
United States decision to refrain from intervening in the Hungarian
revolution in 1956 was driven by this fear. Moreover, he maintains that
the fear of a nuclear showdown compelled both sides of the conict to
behave with moderation during the Korean War.36
During the 1960s and 1970s, Morgenthau increasingly turned his
attention to the Jewish question and Israel. According to Morgenthaus
own account, he rst visited Israel in the 1950s. At this point, he regarded
it as a nation of freeloaders that lived off the US and the Jewish diaspora.
Morgenthau claims he became far more sympathetic to Israel and the
Jewish cause after its triumphant victory in the Six-Day War over its
Arabic adversaries. In Morgenthaus view, this war demonstrated that
Israel is a nation that can stand on its own feet.37
In his 1961 lecture, The tragedy of German-Jewish liberalism,
Morgenthau, for instance, maintains that the Jewish minority managed
to make signicant intellectual, moral and economic contributions to
Europe, even in the face of severe discrimination.38 In the 1970s,
Morgenthau hailed Israeli democracy, defended its right to use force and
blamed the Arabs for the war. Furthermore, he advocated a pro-Israeli
American foreign policy and criticized Henry Kissinger for putting too
much pressure on the Israeli state. Morgenthau even invoked liberal

principles and human rights to ensure the rights of the Jewish
community.39
In the publications assessed here, Morgenthau uses fear on two occa-
sions. In the rst case, he maintains that during the 1935 Italio-
Ethiopian conict, Great Britain and France refrained from imposing an
oil embargo against Italy, despite the call for sanctions by the League of
Nations, because they were afraid Mussolini would have to go to war over
it.40 Second, he persists that it is both futile and misleading to listen
anxiously for voices of moderation from Arab heads of state, let alone the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).41
THE ANALYSIS OF MORGENTHAUS WORKS

From these discussions, it should be clear that Morgenthau covered a
broad range of different topics during his scholarly career and employed
fear in all of them. As mentioned earlier, his works in German, French and
Spanish will not be analyzed in this book, unless an English translation
exists. Not every single publication that Morgenthau has written in
English can be analyzed in this study either due to issues of availability
and accessibility. These exclusions aside, this book considers the vast
majority of Morgenthaus scholarly publications written in English and
all of his most famous writings. As such, this is the most systematic and
rigorous treatment of his body of work to date.
Two of these writings appear in different editions. The rst edition of
Politics Among Nations was published in 1948. The most recent seventh
edition appeared in 2005, 25 years after Morgenthaus death. The fth
edition from 1973 was the last one revised by Morgenthau himself.42 The
sixth edition was edited by his former student and research assistant
Kenneth Thompson. The seventh edition also included David Clinton as
an editor. As they were not nalized by Morgenthau himself, these edi-
tions should be avoided, as Chris Brown wisely suggests.43
The most signicant modication in the editions amended by
Morgenthau himself occurred in the second edition. That is when he
rst added the famous Six principles of political realism in consultation
with his editors to make the book more commercially successful. The
strategy worked and the principles were featured in the subsequent edi-
tions of Politics Among Nations as well.44 Because of availability, the rst
edition of Politics Among Nations will be the primary source for locating
fear in this publication. The Six principles of political realism will how-
ever be included in the analysis by drawing on later editions of this volume
as well.
The Purpose of American Politics was rst published in 1960 by Alfred
A. Knopf. The vintage edition appeared in 1964 with a new preface by
Morgenthau. The third version from 1982 contains a novel foreword by
Thompson.45 The present inquiry utilizes the original edition because of
availability. Issues of this kind also arise in relation to Waltzs writings.
They will be considered next.
WALTZS WORKS
Despite his status within the eld of IR, Waltz did not publish as much as
other leading gures in the discipline. According to Jervis, this is because
he worked with great care and read extensively before writing.46 His
body of work is therefore not as extensive as that of Morgenthau or
Mearsheimer but he still managed to produce a wide range of works on a
broad set of issues. Waltzs background is in political theory and IR. This
is apparent in his PhD project from 1954 entitled Man, the state, and
the state system in theories of the causes of war. The thesis was pub-
lished ve years later in the form of a monograph with the revised title of
Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis.47 Unlike Morgenthau,
Waltz only wrote in English and was a trained political scientist that
became predominantly concerned with IR when writing his doctoral
dissertation.
Considering Waltzs background, it is not surprising to nd that his early
publications in IR draw on political theory.48 In Man, the State and War,
Waltz relies on classical western philosophers such as Baruch Spinoza,
Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau to identify the causes of interstate
war and peace. In doing so, he differentiates these authors (as well as other
scholars) on the basis of which level of analysis or image, as Waltz prefers to call
it, they privilege in their analysis of war; human nature (rst image), the state
(second image) or the anarchic structure of the international system (third
image). Waltz argues that the rst and the second images are the immediate or
efcient causes of war. They help to explain specic wars or the direct reasons
for why state A chooses to attack state B. The third image is however the
permissive or underlying cause of war. It explains why interstate war is always a
possibility and reoccurs without explaining any given war.49
In these publications that are scrutinized here, fear is mentioned 49

times in its various manifestations.50 Most importantly, Waltz identies
fear as an immediate cause of war, in general, and World War I, in
particular. This is evident in Waltzs hypothetical scenario where [s]tate
A becomes the aggressor in the present because it fears what state B may
be able to do in the future and contends that World War I was a case to
the point.51 Indeed, he insists that [t]o understand the coming of the
First World War one must look to the vulnerabilities and strengths, the
ambitions and fears, of all the states involved.52
The next major area of investigation for Waltz was the study of foreign
policy, with an emphasis on America and Britain. His major work in this
area is his least known monograph, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics:
The American and British Experience. The main argument of this book is
that the American Presidential system is better suited for formulating
effective domestic and foreign policy than the British Parliamentary
government.53
Altogether, 150 instances of fear can be detected in these works on
foreign policy that are analyzed here.54 This emotion animates foreign
policy in two major ways in Waltzs analysis. First, there is the fear that
foreign policy will become subject to party contention that will be detri-
mental to the national interest.55 Second, Waltz shares Morgenthaus
emphasis on the fear of public opinion in American foreign policy. In
stark contrast to Morgenthau, Waltz however notes that the fear of public
opinion does not actually have any major impact on US foreign policy
decision-making. In fact, he maintains that such concerns are misplaced.56
The 1960s is the decade Waltz rst started to write about the balance of
power in a systematic way. His rst article on this issue is The stability of a
bipolar world from 1964. Here, he challenges the conventional wisdom
of the time that suggested that multipolar systems are more peaceful than
bipolar ones. Waltz attempts to revise this proposition by contending that
bipolarity provokes fewer wars than multipolarity. He does so by arguing
that dangers are more concentrated in a bipolar world, whereas responsi-
bilities and the vital interests of the two parties are clearer than a multi-
polar order where more actors are involved.57 Waltz also held on to this
idea throughout his academic career. His argument regarding the stability
of bipolarity arguably remains his main contribution to the balance of
power literature.58
There are 32 references to fear in these publications analyzed here.59
According to Waltz, interstate cooperation may not ensue even when
mutual absolute gains can be attained for fear of how the other side might
use its increased capability.60 Waltz also insists that the advantages of
multipolar exibility are exaggerated since they are rooted in an unwar-
ranted fear of a sudden technological breakthrough by one of the great
powers that will upset the balance of power.61 He does however acknowl-
edge that in bipolarity the two great powers focus their fears on one
another, distrust each others intentions and impute offensive intentions
to the defensive measures of their competitor.62
Another topic that Waltz grappled with throughout his academic career
from 1970 and onward is the issue of interdependence, or globalization, as
he calls it in his later works.63 Again, Waltz challenged the conventional
wisdom of his time. In contrast to those who claimed that the interde-
pendence of the post 1945 world is unprecedented, Waltz maintains that
the interdependence among states is low. In fact, he argues that the
interdependence is equivalent to the 1910 level, if measured by trade or
capital ows, even less in terms of labor and lower still in military relations.
Moreover, he challenges the view that interdependence promotes peace,
prosperity and democracy. Instead, Waltz persists that more interactions
between states actually promote tension and conict and offer more
opportunities for war. Waltz never changed his mind on this issue.64
Fear only appears four times in these writings that are a part of this
investigation.65 Initially, Waltz agrees with Thomas Friedmans statement
that wars become rare when they are perceived to be immensely costly but
are not abolished since even the strongest economic forces cannot con-
quer fear or eliminate concerns for national honor. Waltz however dis-
misses Friedmans claim that all politics has become global and every
government fears the world public opinion.66
The next major area of research of Waltz was IR theory. These efforts
culminated in his magnum opus from 1979, Theory of International
Politics, where he offered his most comprehensive account of neorealism,
as previously stated.67 Waltzs ambitions are not merely conned to theory
development however. He also provides insights on the nature of theory
and discusses meta-theoretical issues.68 Moreover, he provides insights on
how theories should be tested.69 Finally, he has vigorously defended and
supported his neorealism as well.70
Fear is mentioned 48 times throughout these works assessed here.71
The most central statements he makes in relation to this emotion here are
threefold. First, Waltz admits that exceedingly insecure states may pursue
absolute rather than relative gains, even though it is inconsistent with his
general position on this issue, as we have already seen.72 Second, he posits

that fear of unwanted consequences propels states to act in accordance
with the principles of balance of power.73 Finally, Waltz contends that the
fear of a common adversary typically brings states into each others arms.74
The last major issue Waltz dealt with during his academic career is
nuclear weapons. He rst began exploring this issue systematically in the
1980s. In typical fashion, Waltz challenged the orthodox view and did not
make any signicant emendation to his view on nuclear weapons in his
main treaties on this topic.75 Waltz claims that when both sides possess
nuclear weapons and have the ability to retaliate against a nuclear strike by
the other in a dyad the logic of mutual assured destruction (MAD)
manifests itself. Under this predicament, states have very strong incentives
to avoid ghting one another as the use of nuclear weapons would lead to
their demise that they strive to avoid at all costs. Controversially, Waltz
thus regards nuclear weapons as instruments of peace and argues that their
spread should be welcomed rather than feared.76
Fear is mentioned 196 times in this category of work that is examined
here.77 This emotion is also afforded a central role in Waltzs writings on
nuclear weapons. As he himself points out, nuclear deterrence does not
depend on rationality. It depends on fear. To create fear, nuclear weapons
are the best possible means.78 It is thus the fear of nuclear war under the
condition of MAD that leads to the nuclear peace Waltz envisions.79
Indeed, Waltz even contends that it was fear that propelled Kennedy
and Khrushchev to end the [Cuban Missile] [C]risis quickly.80
This marks the end of the discussions regarding fear in the publica-
tions of Waltz and the beginning of a discussion regarding his texts that
fall within and outside of this inquiry. This is the next stop in this
investigation.
THE ANALYSIS OF WALTZS WORKS

Although there are no language barriers, there are still edition issues in
need of elucidation with regard to Waltzs monographs. Waltzs Man, the
State and War has appeared in two editions so far. There is the original
1959 version and the revised 2001 version. To my knowledge, the only
difference between the two editions is the fact that the latter contains a
new preface by Waltz where he reects on his rst monograph. The rest of
this publication should be intact. In this monograph, the 2001 version is
used due to accessibility. This is also why the second edition of Waltzs
coauthored book, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, is used here. The third
edition that contains updated discussions regarding North Korea, Iran and
Iraq and the potential for a world free of nuclear weapons is not available
for analysis. This does not have any signicant impact on the inquiry as the
vast majority of the content is identical across these two editions.81
At this point, it is important to note that although all of Waltzs
writings are in English, his entire catalog is not examined here due to
the lack of availability. There is also the possibility that posthumous
publications will appear since Waltz passed away only a few years ago.
On 12 May 2013 to be exact. As no posthumous writings have yet
appeared, they will not be dealt with in this investigation. Despite these
exclusions, this exploration offers the most comprehensive analysis of
Waltzs bibliography to date. The same is true of Mearsheimers publica-
tions that will be scrutinized next.
MEARSHEIMERS WORKS
Unlike his predecessors, Mearsheimer comes from a straight IR background
and earned both his masters and doctoral degrees in the discipline. His
earliest writings from 1979 to 1989 focus on military strategy, in general,
and deterrence, in particular.82 Mearsheimer does however continue to
address these issues after this period as well.83 Mearsheimers writings on
this topic also tend to be policy oriented. They make prescriptions on how
NATO should deter the Soviet Union in the Cold War context. His interest
in these topics is not surprising considering his military background.
Mearsheimer was enlisted in the US Army from 1965 to 1966. He subse-
quently entered West Point, where he spent ve years serving as an ofcer in
the US Air Force.84
Academically, Mearsheimer maintains that the conventional deterrence
does not favor the USSR as much as the prevailing wisdom suggests. As
such, he argues that NATO can bridge some of the gap, if it prioritizes its
air and ground forces, instead of the navy. This is however insufcient by
itself as conventional deterrence must be combined with nuclear deter-
rence. In Mearsheimers view, this strategy offers the best prospect for
ensuring that the Cold War does not turn hot.85
Mearsheimer refers to fear on 41 different occasions in these writings
evaluated here.86 Most signicantly, he considers the fear of nuclear war as
the greatest deterrent between the Western and Eastern bloc. In the
absence of such fears, Mearsheimer predicts that Washington and
Moscow could have clashed on numerous occasions. In this regard, he

concurs with the analysis of Leslie Gelb.87
The next major research theme of Mearsheimer from the 1990s and
onward concerns the prospects for peace in Europe after the end of the
Cold War. Mearsheimer mainly attributes the peace during the Cold War
to the bipolar distribution of capabilities in the continent and the pre-
sence of MAD between the two great powers, the USA and the Soviet
Union, in Central Europe. Mearsheimer predicts that the end of the Cold
War will make Europe multipolar and lead to the removal of American
and Russian nuclear arsenals from Central Europe. Under such condi-
tions, Europe would once again become rifed with major crisis, conict
and war.88
In his later writings on the topic, Mearsheimer however acknowledges
that Europe has been peaceful after the fall of the Berlin Wall. He explains
that this is due to the fact that the USA has kept substantial military forces
in the region even after the Cold War. This has also allowed the European
powers to help America police the globe rather than ghting among
themselves. Should the USA leave the continent, Europe would once
again return to its violent past.89
Fear features prominently in Mearsheimers narrative on this issue. In
fact, it appears 78 times in the works analyzed here.90 First, Mearsheimer
makes use of fear to account for the difculties of attaining a more
cooperative and peaceful post-Cold War Europe. In this regard, he
observes that states worry about relative rather than absolute gains since
they fear that the other might convert its gain to military strength, and
then use this strength to win by coercion in later rounds.91 Cooperation
is further complicated by the fact that states do not want to become
dependent on others for fear of cutoff or blackmail.92 Moreover,
Mearsheimer expects that the Soviet Union and Germany will be the
dominant powers in a nuclear-free Europe. In his analysis, the band of
small independent states in Eastern Europe that lie between them would
likely fear the two giants equally. Consequently, this will make them
unwilling to cooperate with the Soviets to deter potential German
aggression.93
Second, Mearsheimer relies on fear to explain why the American paci-
er has created peace in Europe. According to Mearsheimer, without
American forces on the European continent, Germany would have been
more inclined to dominate central Europe in fear of Russia controlling the
important buffer zone between them. Reversely, Russia would have the
same fear of Germany. These dynamics would likely lead to a serious

security competition between them for control of central Europe, creating
conditions that would drag other states such as France into the conict as
well.94 Moreover, Mearsheimer claims that with the USA acting as a night
watchman fears about relative gains among the Western European states
are mitigated. In turn, this makes a tight economic interdependence in the
region possible.95 How compatible these explanations are with his offen-
sive realist theory of international politics is however an issue that
Mearsheimer does not address here.
This may appear surprising since from the mid-1990s Mearsheimer
increasingly turns his attention to theoretical debates and theory develop-
ment within IR. In this regard, Mearsheimer has been on the offense and
attacked the main competitors of realism and defended this intellectual
tradition.96 He has also posited that there is much hostility toward realism
and realists in academia.97 Most importantly, Mearsheimer has developed
his own offensive realist theory, which will be discussed in depth in
Chapter 5.98 In more general terms, Mearsheimer has argued that theory
development is the most important task of the social sciences.99
Mearsheimer refers to fear 259 times within this body of work analyzed
here; the way he uses this concept in his works theoretically is treated at
length in the chapter dedicated to his work.100
Since the dawn of the new millennium, Mearsheimers scholarly efforts
have been directed toward criticizing American foreign policy and analyz-
ing the implications of the rise of China. With regard to the former,
Mearsheimer has strongly voiced his disapproval of the United States
actions in the Middle East and criticized its pursuit for global hege-
mony.101 In relation to China, Mearsheimer asserts that this Asian
power is in no position to threaten Americas exalted position today, but
if its impressive growth continues, it will be able to do so in the next
decades. This will not bode well for international stability as Chinas rise
will be anything but peaceful.102
Mearsheimer relies on fear to account for all these issues and the notion of
fear appears 244 times in its various manifestations in these publications.103
In the Middle East, Mearsheimer claims that President George W. Bush
deliberately used fearmongering to scare the American people into support-
ing an unnecessary war in Iraq.104 Moreover, he claims that the fear of The
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and like-minded groups
impels American congressmen who have nothing to gain and potentially
much to lose by opposing Israel or lobbying to follow their line of policy.
They do so despite the fact that it seriously undermines American interests in

the region.105 Moreover, Mearsheimer states that the fear of Iran, Iraq and
Syria in the USA is propelled by Americas close ties to Israel.106
Globally, Mearsheimer argues that an exaggerated fear of foreign
threats permeates the American national security establishment.
Consequently, they perceive every nook and cranny of the globe to be of
great strategic signicance and see imaginary threats to US interests every-
where.107 According to Mearsheimer, these misplaced fears help to fuel
Americas misguided pursuit for global hegemony. Instead, he favors the
grand strategy of offshore balancing where the USA only intervenes in
other parts of the world when there is a serious competitor that local
powers cannot contain by their own efforts.108
Mearsheimer identies China as that challenger of the USA in the
future if its growth continues. Fear of China is not mistaken but justied
in Mearsheimers analysis. He suggests that it is not only America that will
fear the preeminence of this Asian giant in the making but its neighbors
fear its rise as well. They too will do whatever they can to prevent the
Chinese from achieving regional hegemony. Mearsheimer maintains that
there is substantial evidence that countries like India, Japan, Russia and
Australia, as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea and
Vietnam, are worried about Chinas ascendancy and are devising strategies
to contain it. In the end, Mearsheimer predicts that they will join an
American-led balancing coalition against China.109
These are the main strands of Mearsheimers work to date and the role
that fear is assigned to them. The question regarding which of them that
will be scrutinized for fear here and issues regarding editions is addressed
in the next section.
THE ANALYSIS OF MEARSHEIMERS WORKS

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics is evidently Mearsheimers main state-
ment of offensive realism to date. As of 7 April 2014, it is now also
available in a second edition. The new edition only appears to contain
updated discussions regarding the rise of China while leaving all the other
discussions intact. The minor revisions are thus of little importance for the
purposes of this study. The fact that the present monograph makes use of
the rst edition to locate fear in this volume should therefore have no
major implications on the ndings. The earlier edition is used here due to
accessibility.
This also raises another issue. Since Mearsheimer is the only realist scholar
covered here who is still alive and active, he will presumably continue to
produce work. In Morgenthaus and Waltzs cases, their entire catalogs are
already complete. This is unless posthumous writings are released or any of
Morgenthaus works in foreign languages are translated to English. This
means that a temporal delimitation must be made with regard to
Mearsheimers works. In this regard, the study does not consider any of
Mearsheimers writings that appear after his book chapter Israel and aca-
demic freedom in the edited volume Whos Afraid of Academic Freedom?
that appeared in print in February 2015.110 It does however cover all of
Mearsheimers postdoctoral academic writings to that point with the excep-
tion of his rst two monographs, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History and
Conventional Deterrence, making it the most thorough examination of
Mearsheimers body of work to have ever been conducted.
With that said, the tasks set for this chapter have been completed. Fear
has been located and its use highlighted in the different strands of
Morgenthaus, Waltzs and Mearsheimers works. The only thing that
remains to be done is to provide a summary of the major points that
have been advanced. This follows next.
SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the texts of Morgenthau, Waltz and
Mearsheimer in relation to fear. With regard to Morgenthau, it was
maintained that he started off as an international lawyer during his early
career in Europe where he mainly wrote in German and French. It was not
until he was offered tenure at the University of Chicago that his main eld
of inquiry became international politics. Almost all of his writings in this
newly formed discipline were written in English. All of Morgenthaus
publication in this language that is accessible will be covered here. But
not those in the foreign languages that Morgenthau wrote in. The only
exception in this regard is The Concept of the Political, which is readily
available in an English translation.
The investigation also highlighted that fear appears in all the major
strands of Morgenthaus publications that encompasses international law,
IR theory, American politics and foreign policy, the implications of
nuclear weapons and the Israeli question. Fear is particularly prevalent in
his discussions regarding IR theory and American politics and foreign
policy.
In contrast to Morgenthau, all of Waltzs writings have been in English

and dealt with international politics, even though he majored in political
theory in graduate school. This is especially apparent in his earlier publica-
tions. Waltzs relatively small body of work has primarily dealt with war and
peace, foreign policy, the balance of power, IR theory and nuclear weapons.
With that said, fear is particularly signicant in his writings on nuclear
weapons.
As opposed to his realist colleagues, Mearsheimer was already an IR
specialist in graduate school at Cornell University. Since Mearsheimer is still
an active scholar, he might even venture into new areas. The present investi-
gation will nevertheless not consider any publication released after his 2015
book chapter entitled Israel and academic freedom. Thus far, his main areas
of research have been military strategy and deterrence, the issue of peace in
Europe in the post-Cold War era, IR theory, American foreign policy and the
rise of China. Fear evades Mearsheimers thinking on all these topics and
appears most frequently in the last two categories of work listed above.
As this chapter has provided an overview of the selected realist scholars
works in relation to fear, it is incumbent to take a closer look at the
conceptual, theoretical, empirical and logical dimensions of this emotion
in their writings. The analysis proceeds in a chronological manner, starting
with Morgenthau.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Morgenthau 1929; Morgenthau 1935; Morgenthau 1936.
2. Jtersonke 2010, 77.
3. Morgenthau 1935.
4. Not to be mistaken for the political realism that he would later develop in
the United States.
5. Jtersonke 2010, 115.
6. Morgenthau 1938b; Morgenthau 1938a.
7. See, for example, Morgenthau 1952b; Morgenthau 1957a; Morgenthau
1960b.
8. Morgenthau 2012, 910.
9. Morgenthau 1940b.
10. Lasswell and McDougal 1942; Lasswell and Macdougal 1992.
11. Morgenthau 1939.
12. Morgenthau 1940a; Morgenthau 1944c; Morgenthau 1944b; Morgenthau
1944a.
13. Morgenthau 1945a.
14. See, for example, Morgenthau 1946a; Morgenthau 1948b; Morgenthau

1952a.
15. Morgenthau 1938b, 562, emphasis added.
18. Morgenthau 1946b, 90, 185.
19. Morgenthau 1948a, ix, 4546, 140.
20. Morgenthau 1954b; Morgenthau 1960a; Morgenthau 1967a; Morgenthau
1973a.
21. See, for example, Morgenthau 1954c; Morgenthau 1955a; Morgenthau
1958a; Morgenthau 1959; Morgenthau 1964b.
22. Morgenthau 1949a; Morgenthau 1960c; Morgenthau 1971; Morgenthau
1983.
24. Morgenthau 1955b; Morgenthau 1957b; Morgenthau 1965c; Morgenthau
1968; Morgenthau 1971; Morgenthau 1972b; Morgenthau 1973c;
Morgenthau 1975; Chomsky, Morgenthau, and Walzer 1978.
25. Morgenthau 1956c.
26. Morgenthau 1965c; Morgenthau 1968.
27. Morgenthau 1972b; Morgenthau 1973c; Morgenthau 1975; Chomsky,
Morgenthau, and Walzer 1978.
28. Morgenthau 1950a, 111; Morgenthau 1956b, 147148; Morgenthau
1957b, 23; Morgenthau 1958b, 4; Morgenthau 1960c, 59, 69, 137, 146
147, 152, 155, 167, 175, 267, 271, 298, 305306, 317, 322, 329;
Morgenthau 1962b, 203, 220, 222223; Morgenthau 1962e, 11, 51, 81,
101, 126, 147, 157158, 194195, 198, 222223, 319322, 324325,
329, 338, 340, 360, 362363; Morgenthau 1962f, 46, 48; Morgenthau
1971, 430, 433, 437, 441; Morgenthau 1972b, 10; Morgenthau 1973c, 20.
29. Morgenthau 1949a, 160; Morgenthau 1960c, 305; Morgenthau 1962b,
223; Morgenthau 1962d, 67, 74.
30. Morgenthau 1956b, 148; Morgenthau 1971, 430, 433, 437, 441.
31. Morgenthau 1950c.
33. Morgenthau 1961a; Morgenthau 1964a.
34. Morgenthau 1976.
35. Morgenthau 1964a, 2324; Morgenthau 1976, 123; Morgenthau 1961b,
4, 7; Morgenthau 1962a, 15; Morgenthau 1950c, 7778; Morgenthau
1950b, 168, 173174.
36. Morgenthau 1961b, 4; Morgenthau 1962a, 15; Morgenthau 1964a, 2324.
38. Morgenthau 1962c, 247256.
39. Morgenthau 1973b; Morgenthau 1977.

42. Little 2007, 14.
43. Brown 1997, 38.
44. Jtersonke 2010, 1011, 175, 181.
45. Morgenthau 1960c; Morgenthau 1964c; Morgenthau 1982a.
46. Art and Jervis 2013.
47. Waltz 2001, viiviii.
48. Waltz 1959b; Waltz 1959a; Waltz 1962; For later publications on this topic,
see, Waltz 1990c.
49. Waltz 1959a.
50. Waltz 1959b, 61; Waltz 1962, 331, 334, 337; Waltz 2001, xxi, 131132,
209, 218, 234236.
51. Waltz 2001, xxi, 234.
52. Ibid., 218.
53. Waltz 1967a Also see; Waltz 1968; Hermann and Waltz 1970; Waltz 1974;
Waltz 1991a.
54. Waltz 1959c, 413, 417; Waltz 1965, 732, 737738; Waltz 1967a, 2, 7, 10,
1215, 40, 44, 5859, 6364, 7072, 82, 88, 93, 100, 105, 121, 131, 145,
177, 182, 185, 187, 198199, 202203, 220, 235, 251, 259, 263, 267,
269, 272, 285287, 289, 291, 293, 296, 301, 304, 310, 325, 330; Waltz
1967b, 201, 208; Waltz 1970, 212; Waltz 1971, 460, 465466, 471472;
Waltz 1974, 24, 3536; Waltz 1980, 54, 5758, 61, 71, 73; Waltz 1981,
56; Waltz 1988a, 31; Waltz 1991a, 669670; Waltz 1991b, 17, 19, 2122;
Waltz 1993a, 4445, 51, 59, 64, 67; Waltz 1993b, 188189; Waltz 2000c,
78, 1011, 13, 22, 24, 3031, 3, 38, 40; Waltz 2002, 349, 351, 353.
55. Waltz 1967a, 6364.
56. Ibid., 286287, 289, 291.
57. Waltz 1964a.
58. Waltz 1982; Waltz 1985; Waltz 2000b.
59. Waltz 1964a, 896, 902, 904905, 907; Waltz 1982, 92, 95, 102, 104;
Waltz 1985, 61; Waltz 1990a, 213; Waltz 2000b, 3, 6, 1014.
60. Waltz 1985, 58.
61. Waltz 1964a, 902.
62. Waltz 1985, 61; Waltz 1990a, 213.
63. Waltz 1970.
64. Waltz 1978; Waltz 1999; Waltz 2000a.
65. Waltz 1970, 212; Waltz 1999, 694696.
66. Waltz 1999, 694696.
67. Waltz 1979a Also, see, Waltz 1988b; Waltz 1996.
68. Waltz 1992.
69. Waltz 1997a; Waltz 2003.
70. Waltz 1986; Waltz 2004a.

71. Waltz 1975, 3940, 4849; Waltz 1979a, 4142, 64, 70, 103105, 109,
112, 118, 166167, 170, 174176, 182, 195, 201, 205; Waltz 1986, 330,
341; Waltz 1988b, 620621, 628; Waltz 1992, 36; Waltz 1997a, 915;
Waltz 2004a, 5.
72. Waltz 1997a, 915.
73. Waltz 1992, 36.
74. Waltz 1988b, 620621.
75. In his earlier writings, before Waltz started to study the implication of
the nuclear age thoroughly, he did not consider the advent of these
weapons as constituting a major revolution in international affairs. Waltz
came to re-evaluate this position in his later writings. Indeed, in his
major works on nuclear weapons, Waltzs line of argument has been
consistent. For Waltzs earlier views on nuclear weapons, see for exam-
ple, Waltz 1959a.
76. Sagan and Waltz 2003; Waltz 1981, vol. 21; Waltz 1990b; Waltz 1995;
Waltz 1997b; Waltz 2004b; Waltz 2012.
77. Waltz 1979b, 171172, 177, 182185, 187, 189, 193; Waltz 1981,
vol. 21, 35, 78, 1014, 1721, 2325, 28, 30; Waltz 1990b, 735, 742
743; Waltz 1995, 410, 1214; Waltz 1997c, 311, 313316; Sagan and
Waltz 2003, viii, xi, 6, 1012, 14, 16, 17, 1920, 23, 25, 27, 33, 3537,
3940, 42, 4445, 109, 111, 114, 118, 129130, 132, 134137, 144146,
148149, 154155; Waltz 2004b, 118, 120124, 127128, 131132.
78. Sagan and Waltz 2003, 154.
79. Craig 2007; Sagan and Waltz 2003, 5.
80. Waltz 1995, 9.
81. Sagan and Waltz 2012.
82. Mearsheimer 1983a; Mearsheimer 1988a.
83. Mearsheimer and Walt 2002.
84. According to Mearsheimer himself, it was during his time in West Point he
rst became interested in IR and especially international security.
Mearsheimer 2006b, 105106.
85. Mearsheimer 1979; Mearsheimer 1980; Mearsheimer 1981; Mearsheimer
1982; Mearsheimer 1983b; Mearsheimer 1984; Mearsheimer 1985;
Mearsheimer 1986; Mearsheimer 1988b; Mearsheimer 1989b; Mearsheimer
1989a.
86. Mearsheimer 1982, 5 nn. 8, 67, 28, 39; Mearsheimer 1984, 2122, 25
26, 29 nn. 25, 31 31, 44, 46; Hardin and Mearsheimer 1985, 412;
Mearsheimer 1985, 162; Mearsheimer 1986, 7, 15, 27 nn. 59, 36, 42,
45, 52, 56; Mearsheimer 1988b, 177; Mearsheimer 1989b, 144;
Mearsheimer 1993, 51, 5354, 5961; Mearsheimer and Walt 2002, 6, 8.
87. Mearsheimer 1984, 2122, 26.
88. Mearsheimer 1990b; Mearsheimer 1990a; Hoffmann, Keohane, and

Mearsheimer 1990; Russett, Risse-Kappen, and Mearsheimer n.d.;
Mearsheimer 1992.
89. Mearsheimer 1998b; Mearsheimer 2001b; Mearsheimer 2010g.
90. Mearsheimer 1990a, 33, 35, 39, 4445, 47, 4950; Russett, Risse-Kappen,
and Mearsheimer n.d., 220222; Mearsheimer 1990b, 3942, 4547;
Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1996; Mearsheimer 1998a, 17; Mearsheimer
1998b, 221, 224, 229, 231232, 241 n. 39; Mearsheimer 2010g, 388389,
393394, 396; Mearsheimer 2014d, 12, 4, 69; Mearsheimer 2014b,
176178.
91. Mearsheimer 1990b, 44.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., 41.
96. Mearsheimer 1995b; Mearsheimer 1995a.
97. Mearsheimer 2002b; Mearsheimer 2005a; Mearsheimer et al. 2005.
98. Mearsheimer 2001c; Mearsheimer 2004b; Mearsheimer 2010d.
99. Mearsheimer 2004a; Mearsheimer and Walt 2013.
100. Mearsheimer 1995b, 6, 11, 13, 1718, 2025, 2831,; Mearsheimer
1995a, 93; Mearsheimer 2001c, xii, 23, 19, 3132, 35, 4145, 49, 52,
56, 69, 78, 81, 8586, 89, 110, 117118, 125, 128129, 131133, 141,
144146, 150151, 153, 160161, 164, 166, 169, 174, 177178, 187,
189190, 197, 214, 222, 225, 235236, 248, 251, 255, 260, 266, 292
293, 297, 299, 308, 311, 317, 319, 322325, 340341, 345347, 361,
367, 370371, 373, 375376, 378, 382, 391, 395, 399, 401, 408409 nn.
35, 414 8, 424425 19, 449 121, 455 4, 469 45, 470 47, 474 7778, 474
81, 488 19, 491 39, 491 39, 493 60, 496497 87, 497498 93, 514 139,
529 63, 531 77, 532 83; Mearsheimer 2002b, 27; Mearsheimer 2004b,
184, 186190, 193195; Mearsheimer 2005a, 140, 145148; Mearsheimer
2009a, 251252, 254 nn. 3, 255 15; Mearsheimer 2010d, 80, 83, 8788,
9092; Mearsheimer 2011b, 428429; Mearsheimer and Walt 2013, 447,
452 n. 25.
101. Mearsheimer 2002a; Mearsheimer and Walt 2002; Mearsheimer and Walt
2003a; Mearsheimer 2004c; Mearsheimer 2005b; Mearsheimer and Walt
2007; Mearsheimer and Walt 2009b; Mearsheimer and Walt 2009a;
Mearsheimer 2011a; Mearsheimer 2014a.
102. Brzezinski and Mearsheimer 2005; Mearsheimer 2006a; Mearsheimer
2008b; Mearsheimer 2010a; Mearsheimer 2010e; Mearsheimer 2014c.
103. Mearsheimer 2001a, 13; Mearsheimer and Walt 2003b, 15; Mearsheimer
and Walt 2003a, 56, 59; Mearsheimer 2005b, 2, 5; Mearsheimer 2005c;
Mearsheimer 2006a, 160, 162; Mearsheimer and Walt 2006a, 16, 23, 34,
37, 47, 52, 65 n. 61; Mearsheimer and Walt 2006b, 3334, 37, 44, 47, 49,
5051, 54, 58, 66 nn. 20, 66 21, 73 83, 74 96, 77 133, 81 170, 82 184, 87
223; Mearsheimer et al. 2006, 66; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 67, 12
13, 36, 41, 43, 55, 59, 62, 7376, 83, 87, 8990, 95, 100, 111, 118119,
137, 145, 164, 181, 187188, 190192, 195196, 199, 201, 205206,
214, 217, 229230, 232236, 241, 251, 254, 273274, 281, 283284,
293, 295, 299, 305, 317318, 325, 336, 340, 361 nn. 4, 381 36, 382 48,
384 60, 385 73, 395 26, 402 141, 406 51, 408 72, 408 72, 418 6, 418 13,
421 65, 424 109, 426 2, 427 17, 428 27, 432 87, 448 67, 449 80, 450 87,
450 89, 451 101, 457 58, 458 68, 460 112; Mearsheimer and Walt 2008;
Mearsheimer 2008a; Mearsheimer and Walt 2009a, 6667; Mearsheimer
2009b, 5; Mearsheimer and Walt 2009b, 266; Mearsheimer 2009c, 22;
Mearsheimer 2010a; Mearsheimer 2010b; Mearsheimer 2010e, 381382,
387388, 390392, 394; Mearsheimer 2010f; Mearsheimer 2010c, 10;
Mearsheimer 2011a, 17, 26, 29, 32, 34; Mearsheimer 2012a;
Mearsheimer and Stephen 2012; Mearsheimer 2012b, 138, 143, 145,
147, 151; Mearsheimer 2014a, 910, 1213, 1516, 19, 26, 29;
Mearsheimer 2014c, 31, 34, 3639; Mearsheimer 2015, 320, 323, 326.
104. Mearsheimer and Walt 2002, 7.
105. Mearsheimer and Walt 2009a, 67.
106. Mearsheimer and Walt 2006b, 33.
107. Mearsheimer 2014a, 26.
108. Mearsheimer 2011a, 17, 26, 29, 32, 34.
109. Mearsheimer 2010a; Mearsheimer 2014c, 34.
110. Mearsheimer 2015.
CHAPTER 3
Morgenthau and Fear
INTRODUCTION
The assessment of Morgenthaus conception of fear proceeds in the
following manner. The Section Morgenthaus conception of fear
considers the denition and the general insights that Morgenthau
provides on this emotion. This is followed by an overview of his
classical realism and the role of fear within it in the three succeeding
sections. These insights inform the Section The empirical aspect of
fear in Morgenthaus works dedicated to the empirical aspect of fear
in thinking. The logical dimension of fear is the subject of the Sections
The logical need of fear in Morgenthaus classical realism and The
logical consistency of fear in Morgenthaus classical realism. These two
segments evaluate the logical need and compatibility of fear in
Morgenthaus framework. The chapter ends with a summary of the
main arguments and ndings.
MORGENTHAUS CONCEPTION OF FEAR

An in-depth scrutiny of Morgenthaus writings reveals that he never denes
fear in any of his 237 publications examined in this book. Although does
not offer a formal explanation of what he means by these terms, a close
reading of his works provides some insights on his conception of fear.
First, Morgenthau makes it clear that he considers fear an emotion in
international politics. This is apparent in his discussion regarding

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41012-8_3
nationalism where he contends that National Socialism focused existing

fears, insecurities and frustrations upon two foreign enemiesthe Treaty
of Versailles and bolshevism. Indeed, Morgenthau claims that it chan-
neled all those unsatised emotions into one mighty stream of nationa-
listic fanaticism. In his view, the consequence of this emotional impetus
has been an unparalleled aggression at the international scene in the
modern era.1
This is also conrmed in another passage where Morgenthau notes that
[s]o long as men seek to dominate each other, to take away each others
possessions, fear and hate each other, they will try to satisfy their desires and
to put their emotions to rest. In a society of sovereign nations, however,
which by denition constitute the highest authority within the respective
national territories, the satisfaction of those desires and the release of those
emotions will be sought by all the means which the technology of the
moment provides and the prevailing rules of conduct permit. These means
may be arrows and swords, guns and bombs, gas and directed missiles,
bacteria and atomic weapons.2
As these passages reveal, Morgenthau also regards fear as an emotion that

can be transferred from the individual to the state level and thus constitute
both actors. This is particularly apparent when he contends that personal
fears can be transformed into anxiety for the nation and that the identi-
cation with the nation can alleviate individual fears by projecting them
onto the international scene.3 Morgenthau even makes explicit use of the
term collective fear in his discussion of public opinion and the grip it holds
on policymakers.4
Building on these insights, Morgenthau conrms that fear is a primi-
tive, psychological and negative emotion in international politics.5 He
even goes as far as arguing that fear stimulates all that is bad between
nations and depresses all that is good.6 Nevertheless, Morgenthau does
not regard fear as an all-pervading feature of interstate relations. This is
apparent when Morgenthau withholds that the USA fears the arms of
Russia but not that of Great Britain.7 Or that the leading powers in
bipolarity need not fear anything unexpected from actual or prospective
allies and that [n]o such fears and considerations need restrain ambi-
tions and actions.8 At another point, Morgenthau might appear to retract
from this position when he writes that in a balance-of-power system all
nations live in constant fear of being deprived at the rst opportune
moment, of their power position by their rivals.9
3 MORGENTHAU AND FEAR 47
Although this statement might at rst glance seem to contradict his

previous assertion regarding the possibilities of escaping fear in interna-
tional politics, this is not necessarily the case. That is because Morgenthau
adds a qualifying statement in this latter case, which claries that the fear is
generated by their rivals. This does not contradict Morgenthaus pre-
vious assertions that the USA does not need to fear Great Britain and great
powers of their allies since they are by denition not rivals. Hence,
according to this reading of Morgenthau, fear pervades rivals, but not
allies. Put differently, countries can occasionally evade fear in some areas of
international affairs in Morgenthaus world.
In sum, Morgenthau generally considers fear a primitive negative
emotion that can operate at both the individual and collective/state
level. Furthermore, this emotion can be escaped by non-rivaling states,
at least in some contexts. These are the only generic insights about fear
that can be inferred from Morgenthaus body of work. As such, it is
evident that he does not shed much light on this concept. The fact that
Morgenthau contends that fear is a primitive negative emotion is not
particularly revealing since there are other so-called primitive negative
emotions as well such as hatred or anger.10 Neither does he attempt to
make things clearer by, for instance, highlighting how fear relates to
these emotions in any detail or provide any further clarication on
these aspects of fear.
The fact that Morgenthau maintains that fear can operate at both
the individual and collective/state level is also underspecied. That is
because Morgenthau does not go beyond this assertion and afford any
further elucidation on this issue. He does not compare and contrast
fear at these levels of analysis either. Neither does he explain how
individual fear becomes collective. All of these factors are unaccounted
for, which is another testimony of how empty Morgenthaus concep-
tion of fear really is.
The last point Morgenthau makes with regard to the prospects of
overcoming fear suffers from the same type of shortcoming. Morgenthau
merely proclaims that the USA fears the arms of Russia and not that of
Britain. Moreover, he persists that the two great powers in bipolarity need
not fear anything unexpected from actual or prospective allies, as we have
seen. The reasons why that is and what factors that contribute to the rise
and fall of fear at the international level are however left untouched. Even
in this regard, the vague and imprecise account of fear in Morgenthaus
writings is thus evident.
In short, Morgenthau does not offer any denition of fear and his
claims that fear is a primitive, negative and escapable emotion that oper-
ates at both the individual and collective/state level are underdeveloped
and leave much out from the discussions. Evidently, Morgenthau shows
little interest in unpacking the concept of fear, which is reected in the
shallowness of his understanding of it. The question is whether fear is
similarly neglected in his classical realism. Before this issue is examined at
length, it is however appropriate to rst provide an overview of his
framework.
MORGENTHAUS CLASSICAL REALISM

Morgenthaus theoretical is mainly designed to explain the world as it is
but also considers how it is ought to be. In other words, it is both
descriptive and normative.11 In Morgenthaus view, any attempts to trans-
form the world must however be rooted in the existing reality rather than
abstract ideals that have no chance of succeeding.12 Although
Morgenthaus aims are predominantly descriptive, he does not attempt
to explain the entire world and present a theory of everything. His objec-
tives are more modest and he connes his theoretical analysis to the
political sphere in the rst instance. In order to do so, Morgenthau
distinguishes between politics, economics, law and ethics. He claims that
politics is different from these other realms since it is governed by interest
dened as power. This makes it qualitatively different from economics
where the emphasis is on wealth, law, which is concerned with the con-
formity of action with legal rules, and ethics, which focuses on the con-
formity of action with moral principles.13
That is why Morgenthau only emphasizes the political dimension of
human nature in his theory even though he realizes its other aspects as
well. Indeed, Morgenthau claims that real man consists of economic
man, political man, moral man, religious man, etc. Although he
clearly recognizes the diverse sets of traits that characterize human beings,
Morgenthau removes all other aspects of human nature, with the excep-
tion of political man who is assumed to be driven by the animus dom-
inandi or the desire to power, for the sake of theory building. He does so
because he is convinced that politics must be understood on its own terms
and analyzed by the standards most appropriate to it.14
At this point, Morgenthau makes another delimitation to his theory.
Although Morgenthau persists that both domestic and international
politics are characterized by the struggle for power, he notes a fundamen-

tal difference between the two realms.15 Whereas domestic politics is
managed in a hierarchical fashion by the sovereign, this mechanism is
absent from the international scene where states are judges in their own
cases.16 According to Morgenthau, the existing mechanisms at the domes-
tic level can help to contain the political mans desire to power. There is
however no centralized authority to suppress the political mans ambitions
at the international level. As a result, this stage is characterized by an
unrestrained struggle for power.17 It is this untamed pursuit for power
his theory is designed to explain.
Nonetheless, Morgenthaus theory does not purport to account for the
entire eld of international politics either. Specically, Morgenthau con-
tends that his classical realism is only applicable to its rational dimensions
and not its irrational aspects characterized by contingent elements such as
emotions, prejudice or subjective preferences. Morgenthau is well aware of
the fact that international politics may not always follow a rational course
of action. He however maintains that for the sake of theorizing, it is
necessary to emphasize its rational elements in order to make reality
intelligible for theory. Morgenthau also contends that a rational foreign
policy is equivalent to a good foreign policy. It maximizes benets and
minimizes risks. As such, it complies with the moral principle of prudence
and the political requirement of success.18
States are the referent objects of Morgenthaus theory. He claims that
the animus dominandi within the political man is transferred to these
political units at the international scene. As a result, states pursue their
national interest dened in terms of power.19 Morgenthau insists that even
when states seek other objectives such as freedom, security and prosperity
they always do so by accumulating power.20 This might give the impres-
sion that he adopts a very thin conception of international politics but that
is certainly not the case.
That is because Morgenthaus notion of power and national interest is
almost boundless. Indeed, he maintains that power may comprise any-
thing that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Power
can be everything from physical violence to the most subtle psychological
ties by which one mind controls another.21 Political power is somewhat
more narrowly dened. It is considered to be a psychology relationship
between the party exercising it and the one over whom it is exercised.
Under these conditions, the former gains control over the latters
actions.22 Likewise, the national interest can be any objective that any
nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue in the future.23 As these
discussions illustrate, Morgenthau has an extremely broad understanding
of international politics even though his classical realism is restricted to the
national interest dened in terms of power.
In this struggle for power, states may attempt to either keep their
power (status quo states), to increase their power (imperialist states) or
to demonstrate their power (states pursing a policy of prestige).24
Unlike the policy of status quo and imperialism, Morgenthau maintains
that prestige is rarely an end in itself. More frequently, the policy of
prestige is one of the instrumentalities through which the policies of
the status quo and of imperialism try to achieve their ends.25
Morgenthau therefore restricts his subsequent theoretical discussions
to status quo and imperialist nations. In this respect, he maintains that
these states desire to either maintain or improve their positions in the
distribution of power, leading to the creation of the balance of power
in the international system.26 Indeed, the balance of power is the result
of states efforts to maintain or increase their own power while attempt-
ing to check or reduce the power of others as states are concerned with
relative power.27
In Morgenthaus classical realism, balancing can be pursued in two
different ways. This is accomplished by diminishing the weight of the
heavier scale or by increasing the weight of the lighter one.28
Morgenthau argues that a multipolar order with three or more great
powers is more stable and peaceful than a bipolar system. That is so
since multipolarity allows for external balancing or alliance formation.
Indeed, under this constellation states can join the weaker side to attain
equilibrium and thereby minimize the risk of aggression from the pre-
ponderant side. In bipolarity, the superiority of the two great powers
means that other states are incapable of opposing them. This diminishes
opportunities for external balancing. As such, the two major powers no
longer need to restrain their ambitions and actions as they cannot be
constrained by third parties.29 The grimmest outcome of this balance of
power politics is war. This is always a possibility since states are constantly
worried that their power position may be threatened by others. As a result,
they may resort to war to prevent this from happening.30 Even states in the
position of actual or perceived supremacy may pursue war if the other
party refuses to yield to their demands.31
Since Morgenthaus classical realism is concerned with normative
issues, he also considers various paths for peace. In a world characterized
by a relentless struggle for power, the prospects for peace are nevertheless
limited, as one might expect. Morgenthau makes this argument in relation
to the balance of power, international law, international morality and
world public opinion.32 Indeed, the balance of power cannot preserve
peace since it is not guided by a restraining moral consensus. International
law is limited since it is decentralized and lacks enforcement mechanism.
With the triumph of nationalism over internationalism, there is no ground
for establishing peace through international morality either. Morgenthau
notes that there has not been any case in which world public opinion has
managed to constrain state behavior either.33 None of these measures are
thus considered adequate for upholding international peace, according to
Morgenthau.
Morgenthau therefore also considers the possibilities of peace through
limitation, peace through transformation and peace through accommoda-
tion.34 Peace through limitation includes disarmament, collective security,
judicial settlement, peaceful change and international government.
Morgenthau discards the rst option since he is of the persuasion that it
is not arms that make wars but that arms are made to wage wars. The
disarmament proposition thus puts the cart before the horse and fails to
address the root causes of war.35 Collective security has no chance of
succeeding in practice since it can only work if the struggle for power is
tamed. This is nothing but a lofty dream.36 Since war is usually caused by
political rather than legal disputes, judicial settlements are inadequate for
bringing about peace.37 Peaceful change is not likely to succeed either
since there are no mechanisms that can assure such a transformation.38
International government does not bring about peace either. According to
Morgenthau, this is exemplied by the inability of the Holly Alliance, the
League of Nations and the United Nations to bring about a peaceful
order.39
Peace through transformation is achieved through the establishment of a
world state. Morgenthau persists that a world state must be based on a
world community that does not exist. This is unattainable under the current
moral, social and political conditions.40 The last hope for international
harmony therefore rests on peace through accommodation or diplomacy.
Even diplomacy is however doomed to fail in the absence of great states-
men. These wise men possess knowledge of the eternal laws that moves
men and has insights of a higher and different kind than mere scientic
knowledge. Morgenthau thus considers wise, knowledgeable and great
statesmen as the most viable path to peace at the international level.41
FEAR IN THE CORE OF MORGENTHAUS THEORY

After this synopsis of classical realism, it is time to consider the theoretical
use of fear in his framework. This is accomplished by examining whether
fear is incorporated into his classical realism and, if so, whether it is
afforded a central or peripheral role in the model. The investigation starts
with the core elements of the theory.
As has been illustrated, Morgenthaus classical realism purports to be a
state-centric, primarily descriptive theory of international politics rooted in a
universal, pluralistic and static conception of human nature.42 It considers
the animus dominandi within the political man as the prime driver of states
who dene their national interest in terms of power. The main feature of
this world is balance of power politics that occasionally provokes war. These
are the core explicit elements of Morgenthaus classical realism.43
This reading of Morgenthaus theory nds much support in his writings
and the secondary literature. The rst of Morgenthaus six famous princi-
ples of political realism states that [p]olitical realism believes that politics,
like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in
human nature.44 As Morgenthau also claries, the root of conict and
concomitant evil stems from the animus dominandi, the desire for power
that animates state behavior as well.45 The secondary literature also widely
considers human nature and the animus dominandi central to
Morgenthaus theory. That is why his approach is sometimes labeled as
human nature realism in IR, as has already been noted.46
The fact that states the national interest and power are central to
Morgenthaus theoretical framework is also evident in the second and
third principles of political realism. Here, Morgenthau argues that the
main signpost that helps political realism to nd its way through the
landscape of international politics is the concept of interest dened in
terms of power.47 To this Morgenthau adds that [r]ealism assumes
that its key concept of interest dened as power is an objective category
which is universally valid.48 Finally, he contends that [w]hat is true of
the general character of international relations is also true of the nation
state as the ultimate point of reference of contemporary foreign policy.49
The secondary literature also tends to view these three elements as key
concepts in Morgenthaus theory.50
Morgenthau himself regards the balance of power as a vital component
of his theory as he considers it as a necessary outgrowth of power
politics and an inevitable and essential element of international
politics.51 Richard Little conrms that the balance of power is one of the
central pillars of Morgenthaus classical realism. Other scholars in the eld
also agree with this assessment.52
War is undoubtedly the last core explicit element of Morgenthaus
classical realism. In his analysis, the history of the nations active in
international politics shows them continuously preparing for, actively
involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of
war.53 In Martin Grifths view, one of Morgenthaus central aims was
to identify the causes of war.54 This is a widely held view within the eld as
a whole as well.55
As can be seen, fear is nowhere to be found among the core explicit
components of Morgenthaus theoretical edice. What about Ole Holstis
statement that man is largely motivated by passions such as fear in
Morgenthaus world56 and Neta Crawford who claims that Morgenthau
emphasizes fear as one of the main drivers of man?57 Do their accounts not
undermine the reading of Morgenthaus classical realism advanced here?
The short answer is no. The problem with Holstis and Crawfords con-
tentions is that they do not provide any evidence for their claims. Neither
do they identify any publications where Morgenthau supposedly makes
the claims they attribute to him. As such, they do not actually present any
data that suggests that fear is a core component of Morgenthaus notion of
human nature or political man.
In contrast, Thomas Johnson does present evidence for his claim that
Morgenthaus description of the rise of the Great War is based on the
timelessness of fear in human nature.58 Johnson posits that man is instinc-
tively fearful of others as he recognizes that others are also driven by the
desire to dominate. Johnson subsequently quotes Morgenthau to bring
the argument home: [m]an is born to seek power . . . [but] his actual
condition makes him a slave to the power of others. This is because
[t]he desire to dominate, in particular, is a constitutive element of all
human associations.59
As is apparent, none of the passages of Morgenthaus works that Johnson
cites in order to substantiate his point even mentions fear. Instead, they
clearly suggest that Morgenthaus conception of political man is rooted in
the animus dominandi, the desire for power, as this inquiry maintains.
Neither does Johnson provide any explanation of how Morgenthaus state-
ment regarding the fact that man is designed to seek power supports his
contention that Morgenthaus notion of human nature is based on fear.
Johnson thus evidently fails to support his assertion with any sound evidence.
A thorough and systematic exposition of Morgenthaus writings how-

ever reveals passages that might be interpreted as evidence for Holstis,
and Johnsons positions. Writing about Nationalist Socialist Germany,
Morgenthau contends that they focused their fears on their foreign ene-
mies and engaged in an unprecedented level of aggression as a result.60
With regard to the situation in the Soviet Union, he contends that
personal fears against the capitalist enemy were elevated and projected
onto the international scene by this totalitarian regime.61
As can be inferred from these passages, Morgenthau only makes these
statements with regard to the populations of Nationalist Socialist Germany
and the Soviet Union. These traits are thus contextual attributes of these
two nations rather than universal theoretical principles in Morgenthaus
analysis. He also explicitly contends that the national fanaticism in
Nationalist Socialist Germany is unprecedented in the history of civiliza-
tion. This reafrms the point that these fears are rooted in a historically
contingent phenomenon in Morgenthaus view.62 In the case of Soviet
Union, he anchors the fear in the individual Russian and his enmity toward
capitalism rather than universally valid principles. As a result, it is clear that
Morgenthau regards these as two empirical examples rather than as gen-
eral principles that he bases his conception of human nature or political
man upon.
Nevertheless, there are other examples in Morgenthaus work where
he does not restrict the fear of men to a specic time or place. Here, he
speaks of fear in universalistic terms that may be taken as evidence for
Holstis, Crawfords and Johnsons assertions. In this regard,
Morgenthau writes that [s]o long as men seek to dominate each
other, to take away each others possessions, fear and hate each other,
they will try to satisfy their desires and to put their emotions to rest. In
a society of sovereign nations, however, which by denition constitute
the highest authority within the respective national territories, the
satisfaction of those desires and the release of those emotions will be
sought by all the means which the technology of the moment provides
and the prevailing rules of conduct permit. These means may be arrows
and swords, guns and bombs, gas and directed missiles, bacteria and
atomic weapons.63 To this, Morgenthau adds that [s]ince . . . all
nations live in constant fear lest their rivals deprive them, at the rst
opportune moment, of their power position, all nations have a vital
interest in anticipating such a development and doing unto the others
what they do not want the others to do unto them.64
In these citations, it is apparent that Morgenthau lists fear as one of

the general causes of war among nations and initially roots it in human
nature. Even in these trajectories, it is however the desire for power
rather than fear that is at the heart of Morgenthaus explanation.
Morgenthau does after all begin his explanation of war by rst attribut-
ing it to mens desire to dominate each other and in the second
instance to take away each others possessions. Only in the third and
fourth instance does he mention fear and hate as driving forces. On
both occasions, Morgenthau also rst mentions these desires and only
subsequently the emotions. Indeed, he states that they will try to
satisfy their desires and to put their emotions to rest and the satisfac-
tion of those desires and the release of those emotions will be sought
by all the means which the technology of the moment provides and the
prevailing rules of conduct permit.65
In the second passage, he also suggests that all nations live in con-
stant fear lest their rivals deprive them, at the rst opportune moment, of
their power position. This argument clearly illustrates that Morgenthau
considers fear an offshoot of the power struggle and not vice versa.
Power is thus primary and fear secondary in Morgenthaus story.
Altogether, these analyses highlight that fear is related to core compo-
nents of Morgenthaus theory such as his conception of man, power and
war, but is not by itself a prime mover in his classical realism. As we have
seen, the only core explicit assumption that Morgenthau makes with
regard to political man is that he is driven by the animus dominandi
or the desire for power, not fear. Neither does Morgenthau claim that
this desire for power is rooted in fear. On the contrary, these quotes
clearly suggest that fear is merely an effect of the desire for power and the
ensuing power politics. In other words, there is simply no evidence that
suggests that fear is an explicit core element of Morgenthaus classical
realism. As we will see, however, Morgenthau does indeed afford fear an
explicit peripheral role in his theory. He does so in order to explain the
rise of war, just as the passages quoted above suggest. How Morgenthau
goes about doing so is the subject of the next section.
FEAR IN THE PERIPHERY OF MORGENTHAUS THEORY

In the struggle for power, states may attempt to either keep their
power (status quo states) or to increase their power (imperialist states),
as previously mentioned.66 The central objective of states is therefore
to detect whether their competitors are status quo oriented or imperi-

alists and respond accordingly. In the words of Morgenthau, it would
be fatal to counter imperialistic designs with measures appropriate to a
policy of the status quo. Similarly, it would be only a little less risky
to deal with a policy seeking adjustments within the status quo as
though it were imperialistic.67 In this regard, Morgenthau lists appea-
sement as the awed status quo policy that states pursue when con-
fronted with an imperialist. Fear is one of the factors that lead states to
inaccurately adopt the policy of imperialism against status quo
powers.68
In the latter scenario, which is of interest for the purposes of this book,
a status quo power (state A) misidenties state B as an imperialist nation.
In reality, state B is also a status quo power. But since state A wrongfully
believes that state B is an imperialist, it fears it. As a result, state A applies
confrontational polices suitable for dealing with imperialist nations against
state B. This includes building armaments, fortications and alliances. In
turn, this makes state B fearful of state A and impels it to adopt its own
imperialist policies. Out of these initial errors regarding each others type
and the ensuing mutual fear, a vicious cycle of imperialism sets off between
the two states: nations that initially only wanted to preserve the status quo.
At this point, their interaction can unfold in two different ways. Either
these countries eventually correct their initial misperceptions and pursue
peaceful policies toward one another or continue on their misguided path
and end up ghting each other. According to Morgenthau, both the
Franco-German War of 1870 and World War I in 1914 were rooted in
these security dilemma dynamics.69
From these discussions, it is evident that Morgenthau explicitly incor-
porates fear into his theoretical framework. It is mistaken fear that initially
leads status quo states to adopt imperialist policies against one another.
Their misperception may be resolved peacefully if these inaccuracies are
detected, or war, if they persist. This is the role Morgenthau affords fear in
his theory. This reading of Morgenthaus classical realism is further sup-
ported by the fact that fear is listed alongside appeasement under the
rubric of how to detect and counter an imperialistic policy in the table
of contents of Politics Among Nations where these above-mentioned
arguments appear.70
The original cause of fear in Morgenthaus classical realism is thus
misperception of the others type. It is this faulty belief that makes status
quo powers wrongfully fear one another under the suspicion that the other
is an imperialist. The effects of this fear are also clearly spelled out in
Morgenthaus classical realism. It compels states to pursue the imperialist
policies of armaments, fortications and alliances against their competitor.
In short, misperception is the original cause of fear while imperialist
policies (armaments, fortications and/or alliances) are the effects of fear
in Morgenthaus theoretical edice.
As Morgenthau explains, these dynamics lead to a vicious circle where
the fear of the others suspected imperialism bred imperialism in reaction,
which, in turn, [gives] substance to the original fear.71 In other words,
Morgenthau claims that there is a feedback loop at work. The original
cause of fear, misperception of the others type, provokes imperialist poli-
cies such as armaments, fortications and alliances. These effects can in
turn also produce fear as the vicious cycle ensues. Simply put, while
misperception of the others type is the cause of fear in the rst instance,
its imperialist effects can also promote fear as the interaction between the
parties is reiterated beyond the initial encounter. These dynamics are
possible since the causes and effects of fear do not have a simple one-way
relationship in Morgenthaus classical realism.
The fear that imperialism evokes should however not be mistaken for
the original source of fear. No imperialism would after all have taken place
had it not been preceded by fear in the rst instance. Since causes cannot
succeed effects in time, it means that imperialism cannot be regarded as
the original cause of fear in the classical realism of Morgenthau The
original cause of fear in Morgenthaus theory is misperception of the
others type. Imperialism in the form of armaments, fortications and
alliances are the effects of fear.
Morgenthaus incorporation of misperception and fear is understand-
able.72 The inclusion of these factors does after all enable him to provide a
plausible explanation for the rise of imperialism and war among status quo
powers. In this narrative, status quo states come to wrongfully misperceive
one another for imperialists in the condition of uncertainty. Subsequently,
they fear each other and may pursue imperialism and war if this vicious
cycle continues. Peace can of course also be explained through these
mechanisms. In this case, peace ensues if the status quo powers correct
their initial misperception and recognize that the other also favors the
status quo. This will dampen their fears for one another as a result and
bring an end to their mutual imperialism.
Altogether, these discussions reveal that fear (along with mispercep-
tion) plays an important intervening role in Morgenthaus theoretical
edice. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that fear is only afforded a periph-

eral part in the theoretical framework as a whole. As has already been
established, fear is not incorporated at the core of the theory. By deni-
tion, this emotion can thus not be central to the theory. Second, although
the issue he attempts to explain by the use of fearwaris at the core of
his theory, it does not make this emotion central to Morgenthaus classical
realism by association. As we have seen, it is the struggle for power that is
at the heart of Morgenthaus explanation of war, not fear. This emotion is
merely used as a peripheral factor, among others, in this regard. Finally,
Morgenthau only uses fear to explain the behavior of only one subset of
states, the status quo powers. Specically, he employs fear to explain the
ensuing security dilemma dynamics between them. He does not however
use fear in relation to the imperialist powers in his theory.
It remains to be seen whether this is also consistent with Morgenthaus
empirical employment of this emotion. This is one of the issues that will be
explored in the next section dedicated to the empirical dimension of fear in
his writings.
THE EMPIRICAL ASPECT OF FEAR IN MORGENTHAUS WORKS

Since Morgenthau makes such an extensive use of fear to account for
international events, they cannot all be discussed here. Instead, the ambi-
tion is to provide an overview of Morgenthaus empirical account of fear in
IR and its consistency with the theoretical role he affords this emotion in
his classical realism. With that in mind, an in-depth scrutiny of
Morgenthaus publications reveals he does consider misperception and
imperialist policies, including armaments, fortications and/or alliances,
in his empirical analysis of fear as well. This is clearly in line with his
theoretical use of this emotion as demonstrated below.
Misperception and fear appear in Morgenthaus empirical analysis as
well as he maintains that these two factors brought about the Franco-
German War of 1870 and World War I in 1914.73 Moreover, Morgenthau
insists that the Napoleonic wars were motivated by the fear of French
imperialism.74 However, these wars did not eradicate anxieties regarding
France. The fear of a renewed French imperialism is one of the conditions
that called into being the morality of the Holy Alliance with its blend of
Christian, monarchical, and European principles.75 Morgenthau also
asserts that Germany partly used the fear of Russian imperialism, which
obsessed the Western powers, as a weapon with which to strengthen its
own position.76 Germany could however not exploit this fact during
World War II. That is because their own imperialism, along with that of
their Japanese allies, was the source of fear this time around. In fact, it was
this fear that prompted the conict between the Allies and the Axis Powers
in Morgenthaus analysis.77
Armaments appear in Morgenthaus empirical assessment of interna-
tional politics as well. In the rst instance, he maintains that Germany
fortied itself with armaments to cope with its fears of the future after the
Franco-German War of 1870.78 In turn, Morgenthau contends that
throughout much of modern history Russia has been afraid of German
armaments or rearmaments.79 During the Cold War, Morgenthau insists
that the USA and the Soviet Union feared one anothers armaments as
well and could not disarm as long as this mutual fear persisted.80 Most
importantly, Morgenthau claims that the enormous growth of arma-
ments in Europe [and] the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them
made World War I inevitable.81
Alliances are particularly prevalent in Morgenthaus empirical delibera-
tions on fear. In this regard, Morgenthau, for instance, argues that
the fear of hostile alliances led to the formation of the Triple Alliance. Then,
the fear of the latters dissolution led to the severance, on the part of
Germany, of the friendly relations with Russia. Finally, the fear of the
intentions of the Triple Alliance brought about the Franco-Russian
Alliance. It was the mutual fears of these two defensive alliances and the
general insecurity created by the erratic character of the imperialistic utter-
ances of William II which inspired the diplomatic maneuvres during the two
decades before the First World War.82
Morgenthau claims that fear affected alliance formation as well. In the

Second World War where the decision of countries, such as Italy, Spain,
or Turkey, or even of France, to join or not to join one or the other side
were mere episodes, welcomed or feared, to be sure, by the belligerents,
but in no way even remotely capable of transforming victory into defeat, or
vice versa.83 The Cold War was no exception in Morgenthaus view.
Indeed, he asserts that the elite in the Soviet Union was obsessed with
the fear [that] the Americans will gang up with the Chinese.84
As this examination illustrates, the original source of fear, mispercep-
tion, along with imperialism and its various manifestations, is found in
Morgenthaus empirical assessment of this emotion. That is consistent
with the role he assigns fear in his classical realism. Nevertheless,

Morgenthaus empirical discussion regarding the causes and effects of
fear is full of examples that fall outside the theoretical role ascribed to
this emotion. For instance, fear of revolution is commonplace in
Morgenthaus writings.85 In these cases, Morgenthau specically refers
to the fears of revolution during and after the Napoleonic wars,86 German
exploitation of the widespread fear of Bolshevist revolution87 and
American interventionism in fear of communist revolutions across the
world during the Cold War.88 Morgenthau also frequently refers to the
fear of public opinion as a driver of American foreign policy. In this regard,
he writes that the fear of public opinion deters the executive branch from
embarking upon new initiatives in foreign policy and animates the conduct
of the Congress as well. Moreover, Morgenthau argues that the fear of
public opinion leads to damaging inefciency and conformity in US
foreign policy.89
To be sure, there are plenty of other empirical accounts of fear in
Morgenthaus writings that do not match the theoretical role he assigns
this emotion.90 But what is most interesting is the fact that Morgenthau
even identies numerous empirical cases in which fear does not merely
deviate from its supposed effect of imperialism but actively promotes the
opposite behaviorrestraint. This is evident when Morgenthau states that
Great Britain and France refrained from imposing an oil embargo against
Italy, despite the call for sanctions by the League of Nations, because they
were afraid Mussolini would have to go to war over it.91 According to
Morgenthau, this behavior was even more prevalent during the Cold War.
Indeed, the USA and the Soviet Union were restrained by their mutual
fear of atomic war that could only result in mutual annihilation. 92 In the
words of Morgenthau himself, [t]he fear of mutual destruction through
nuclear war has imposed effective restraints upon the foreign policies of
the superpowers in two respects: the avoidance of direct military confron-
tation and, when it inadvertently occurs, its speedy liquidation. 93
Specically, Morgenthau contends that the mutual fear of an all-out
atomic war restrained both antagonists actions during the Cuban Missile
Crisis and the Korean War. Moreover, this fear propelled the USA to stay
out of Eastern Europe during, for instance, the Hungarian revolution of
1956. It also limited its objectives during the Vietnam War. In the case of
the USSR, this fear made them accept the status quo in West Germany.
Furthermore, it stopped them from seeking territorial expansion in
Europe, according to Morgenthau.94
Altogether, this evaluation highlights that there is some consistency

between Morgenthaus theoretical and empirical adoption of fear. This is
apparent as this emotion is used in conjunction with misperception and
imperialism in both instances. Nevertheless, this examination also illus-
trates that Morgenthaus empirical use of fear extends far beyond these
theoretical boundaries. He, for instance, uses this emotion to account for
revolutions and public opinion, etc. In fact, Morgenthau goes as far as
attributing the restraint exhibit by states during major international events
such as World War II and the Cold War to fear. This is diametrically
opposed to the imperialism that this emotion is supposed to generate,
according to his classical realism. In short, Morgenthaus empirical use of
fear is far more expansive than the limited peripheral theoretical role he
assigns it in his classical realism.
THE LOGICAL NEED OF FEAR IN MORGENTHAUS

CLASSICAL REALISM
As has already been established, Morgenthau can generate competition,
conict and war among status quo states through the use of fear, mis-
perception and uncertainty. These measures are however not needed to
create Morgenthaus world of classical realism. Indeed, Morgenthau can
account for these outcomes by relying on the core of his theory instead. As
we have seen, Morgenthaus classical realism is rooted in a universalistic,
static and pluralist conception of human nature. Morgenthau only focuses
on the political man who has an innate desire for power in his theory. In
his account, this animus dominandi drives all state behavior. Since these
states are concerned with relative power, they pursue balance of power
politics. As a result, they engage in competition, conict and war in the
name of the national interest dened in terms of power.
As is apparent, this power-centric explanation based on the core ele-
ments of Morgenthaus classical realism can logically bring about
Morgenthaus world. There is no need for fear. A factor that is also
peripheral to the theory. There is yet another advantage with the power-
centric explanation. Since Morgenthau assumes that states, irrespective of
type, are driven by the desire for power, this narrative can account for
competition, conict and war among all states.95 In contrast, Morgenthau
restricts the fear-based explanation to status quo powers. This is what
makes it incapable of accounting for the behavior of imperialist nations
within his framework.96
The power-based explanation is thus grounded in the main principles of

Morgenthaus theoretical framework and has also a greater explanatory
range than the fear-centric explanation. Evidently, fear is not needed to
logically bring about Morgenthaus classical realist world. It can therefore
not be considered important in this regard. To make things worse, this
emotion is not even consistent with other dimensions of the theory. This
will be illustrated in the next section.
THE LOGICAL CONSISTENCY OF FEAR IN MORGENTHAUS

CLASSICAL REALISM
Indeed, although both the fear and the power-based explanation can
create Morgenthaus world, the former model is logically inconsistent
with Morgenthaus own theoretical framework. To start with, the
inclusion of status quo powers makes little sense even if we analyze
Morgenthaus theory on its own terms. In a world where all states are
assumed to be innately driven by the desire for power, there should be
no room for status quo powers. The universal animus dominandi
should make all states imperialists by Morgenthaus own denition of
the term. Morgenthau never claries how status quo powers can even
exist under these conditions. Morgenthaus incorporation of status quo
powers is thus inconsistent with the underlying assumption of his own
theory.
Scholars such as Wolfers and Mearsheimer also consider the inclusion of
status quo powers logically inconsistent with Morgenthaus own theory.97
Morgenthau does after all write that states have a limitless aspiration for
power and that the desire to attain a maximum of power is universal.98
In addition, Morgenthau claims that [s]ince . . . all nations live in constant
fear lest their rivals deprive them, at the rst opportune moment, of their
power position, all nations have a vital interest in anticipating such a
development and doing unto the others what they do not want the others
to do unto them.99 If this is the case, no status quo states could possibly
exist in Morgenthaus world. At least not until a sole state has managed to
conquer the entire planet.
With these points in mind, it is not hard to see why Michael Spirtas,
who distinguishes the realist tradition into the evil and tragedy
school, rmly places Morgenthau in the former. The evil school to
which Morgenthau belongs is supposed to view the causes of international
competition, conict and war as a consequence of aws within the human
nature. The tragedy school of Waltz and Mearsheimer (among others)

supposedly regards these unintended outcomes as by-products of interna-
tional anarchy and the security dilemma among status quo powers.100
The fact that Morgenthau uses fear in conjunction with the security
dilemma to explain the rise of imperialism among status quo powers
thereby makes Morgenthaus position even more odd. That is because
his conception of international politics should be based on human nature
and not the security dilemma. The fact that this study has found that
Morgenthau actually draws on security dilemma dynamics in relation to
fear is astonishing. This is something that has not been recognized in the
literature before despite the incredibly vast amount of literature that exists
on Morgenthaus work. Indeed, John Herz is usually accredited as the
founding father of the security dilemma. This concept rst appeared in his
1950 article Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma. Herz
himself nevertheless claims to have started working on the security
dilemma in the late 1930s.101 The present investigation illustrates that
Morgenthau actually explicitly referred to the same security dilemma
dynamics two years earlier than Herz in the rst edition of Politics
Among Nations. Morgenthau did not however use the term security
dilemma.
Just like Spirtas, Herz is seemingly unaware of this aspect of
Morgenthaus writings. Yet, Herz is right to emphasize that Morgenthaus
human nature explanation is inconsistent with the security dilemma. As
such, Herz explicitly differentiates his security dilemma-centric understand-
ing of international politics from that of Morgenthau and others in the
evil school. Indeed, after making his initial statement regarding the
security dilemma, Herz declares that whether man is by nature peaceful
and cooperative, or domineering and aggressive, is not the question. The
condition that concerns us here [the security dilemma] is not a biological
or anthropological but a social one.102 By making this argument, Herz
attempts to distinguish his position from Morgenthaus animus domi-
nandi explanation and similar descriptions of others. According to Herz,
explanations provided by Morgenthau and like-minded scholars are based
on particular notions of human nature. His own account of the will to
power is instead rooted in the social constellation of the security
dilemma.103
In short, the inclusion of status quo powers and the ensuing security
dilemma dynamics amongst them that lie at the heart of Morgenthaus
fear-based explanation of war are clearly at odds with his own theoretical
framework. Nonetheless, it is not only the status quo states and the
security dilemma that Morgenthau uses in conjunction with fear that
clashes with his own classical realist assumptions. Fear itself is also logically
inconsistent with Morgenthaus own theory. As was briey noted earlier,
Morgenthau purports to present a rational theory of international politics.
Indeed, Morgenthau persists that [p]olitical realism presents the theore-
tical construct of a rational foreign policy and that the purpose of Politics
Among Nations is to present a rational theory of international
politics.104
These statements may appear peculiar since Morgenthau is widely
known for his irrational conception of international politics in the second-
ary literature. In his inuential reading of Morgenthau, Michael Williams,
for instance, writes about Morgenthaus radical criticism of rationalism.105
Similarly, Martti Koskenniemi argues that Morgenthau thought that mod-
ern war was irrational in its essence.106 Finally, Freyberg-Inan maintains
that Morgenthau considered the will to power both innite and irra-
tional.107 If these interpretations of Morgenthaus thought are accurate,
then why does he claim to advance a rational theory of international
politics? The answer to this question is provided by the man himself.
As Morgenthau makes clear, not all foreign policies have always fol-
lowed so rational, objective, and unemotional a course. The contingent
elements of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the
weaknesses of intellect and will which esh is heir to, are bound to deect
foreign policies from their rational course. Nevertheless, Morgenthau
still persists that a theory of foreign policy which aims at rationality
must for the time being, as it were, abstract from these irrational elements
and seek to paint a picture of foreign policy which presents the rational
essence to be found in experience, without the contingent deviations from
rationality which are also found in experience.108 Hence, although
Morgenthau clearly recognizes the irrationalities of international politics,
he removes their inuence from his rationalist realism. Grifths also
reaches a similar conclusion in his analysis of Morgenthaus theory.109
Nevertheless, Morgenthaus conception of a rational theory of interna-
tional politics is incompatible with his understanding and inclusion of fear
to his classical realism. First, Morgenthau explicitly states that a rational
theory of international theory must follow an objective, and unemotional
a course.110 As we have seen, however, Morgenthau himself explicitly
considers fear to be an emotion. This means that fear should not have any
place in his rational theory of international politics.111
Second, the role of fear in Morgenthaus classical realism is restricted to

a context in which status quo states wrongfully come to regard one
another as imperialists. As a result, they begin to fear each other and set
off security dilemma dynamics that may even spark war between them.
This situation is inherently irrational. These states have after all no objec-
tive reasons to fear, pursue imperialist policies or ght one another. They
do so because of the initial irrational misperception. As such, it is not only
the inclusion of fear that is incompatible with Morgenthaus classical
realism. The actual role Morgenthau affords it is also logically inconsistent
with his own rational theory of international politics.
As a whole, this inquiry illustrates that status quo states and the security
dilemma, which are the concepts that Morgenthau uses in relation to fear
in order to explain war, are incompatible with the assumptions that under-
pin his theory. Moreover, fear itself is logically inconsistent with
Morgenthaus theory and so is the role he affords it in his classical realism.
Although Morgenthau can use fear to create his classical realist world, he
certainly does not need to. In fact, Morgenthau could simply remove all
these superuous factors and provide a far more coherent, parsimonious
and consistent explanation for the grim outcomes of international politics.
This can be done by restricting the analysis to the imperialist powers and
attributing their ensuing competition, conict and war to their shared
animus dominandi. Since Morgenthau does not need fear to make his
story logically compelling and this emotion is actually inconsistent with
other aspects of his framework, fear is not only logically insignicant but
actually counterproductive to his classical realism.
As the four facets of fear in Morgenthaus thought have been
addressed, the only remaining task is to provide a summary of the main
ndings. This follows next.
SUMMARY
Indeed, the present chapter has examined the conceptual, theoretical,
empirical and logical dimensions of fear in Morgenthaus publications. In
light of this evaluation, it has been argued that fear is left undened and
little light is shed on the concept as a whole. Similarly, fear is only given a
peripheral explicit role in Morgenthaus theory to explain the rise of war
between status quo states through security dilemma dynamics. Empirically,
Morgenthau however affords a prominent role to fear in order to account
for a wide variety of signicant international events. Morgenthaus empirical
use of fear goes far beyond the theoretical role he ascribes this emotion. In
fact, fear is even actually used to explain restraint in state behavior, the
opposite behavior that his theory hypothesizes.
Logically, Morgenthau does not however need this emotion to make
his narrative plausible. He can ignore fear altogether and bring about his
classical realist world by relying on states desire for power instead. Such an
explanation would also have numerous advantages over a fear-based
account. Relatedly, the security dilemma between status quo powers that
Morgenthau seeks to explain by fear is inconsistent with Morgenthaus
own theoretical framework. That is because he claims that all states are
driven by the animus dominandi and relentlessly attempt to maximize
their relative power, leaving no room for either the security dilemma or
status quo states. Fear itself and Morgenthaus use of this emotion is also
incompatible with his rational classical realism. This is evident as
Morgenthau claims that emotions are irrational and affords fear an irra-
tional role in his theory. Needless to say, fear is logically counterproductive
to the classical realism of Morgenthau.
The results of this investigation are thus clear. Fear is underconceptua-
lized, theoretically marginalized, empirically prominent and often incon-
sistent with his classical realism and logically destructive to Morgenthaus
theoretical edice. The next chapter will consider whether the same holds
true for Waltzs defensive realism.
NOTES
1. Morgenthau 1948a, 78, emphasis added.
2. Ibid., 327, emphasis added.
5. Morgenthau 1946b, 114, 185; Morgenthau 1950b, 78; Morgenthau
1950a, 173.
6. Morgenthau 1950b, 78; Morgenthau 1950a, 173.
7. Morgenthau 1962e, 147.
10. Cheung-Blunden and Blunden 2008; Harrington 2003.
12. Morgenthau 1973a, 10, 15.
13. Ibid., 5. How Morgenthaus distinction between politics and ethics affects
the normative aspirations of his theory is not explained.
14. Morgenthau 1946b, 192; Morgenthau 1973a, 14. As Morgenthau himself

puts it: [t]his realist defense of the autonomy of the political sphere against its
subversion by other modes of thought does not imply disregard for the
existence and importance of these other modes of thought. It rather implies
that each should be assigned its proper sphere and function. Political realism is
based upon a pluralistic conception of human nature. Real man is a composite
of economic man, political man, moral man, religious man, etc . . . .
Recognizing that these different facets of human nature exist, political realism
also recognizes that in order to understand one of them one has to deal with it
on its own terms. That is to say, if I want to understand religious man, I
must for the time being abstract from the other aspects of human nature and
deal with its religious aspect as if it were the only one . . . It is exactly through
such a process of emancipation from other standards of thought, and the
development of one appropriate to its subject matter, that economics has
developed as an autonomous theory of the economic activities of man. To
contribute to a similar development in the eld of politics is indeed the
purpose of political realism.
15. Morgenthau 1962c, 77.
16. Ibid., 79.
17. Morgenthau 1946b, 198; Morgenthau 1960a, 102.
18. Morgenthau 1973a, 78.
19. Morgenthau 1948a, 13; Morgenthau 1978, 11.
24. Morgenthau 1948a, 2122. As we will see in later parts of this chapter, the
inclusion of status-quo states is logically incompatible with the premises of
Morgenthaus own theory.
25. Ibid., 50.
26. Ibid., 125.
27. Ibid., 175.
28. Ibid., 134.
29. Ibid., 273.
30. Ibid., 155.
31. Ibid., 130.
33. Ibid., 256270.
34. Morgenthau 1948a, xiiixv.
35. Morgenthau 1962c, 408, 411.
36. Ibid., 414.
37. Ibid., 434.
38. Ibid., 435.

39. Ibid., 497498.
40. Ibid., 513, 520, 536.
41. Morgenthau 1946b, 212, 220, 236.
43. At this point, it might be objected that the drivers of peace should also be
considered as central elements of Morgenthaus theoretical framework. As we
have already seen, however, Morgenthau dismisses most paths to peace such as
disarmament, collective security, judicial settlement, peaceful change and
international government. He considers the presence of great statesmen the
best hope for international peace but they are few and far in between in
Morgenthaus world. Otherwise, his portrayal of international politics would
have been far more benign.
45. Morgenthau 1945b, 13, 16, emphasis in original.
46. Jtersonke 2010, 13 Also see,; Buzan 1996, 50; Williams 2005, 5; Wolfers
1962, 8384.
50. Gilpin 2011, 16; Schmidt 2012, 112; Schmidt 2011, 92.
52. Little 2007, 91 Also see,; Lebow 2010, 25; Levy 2004, 29.
54. Grifths 1992, 9.
55. Craig 2007; Wallace 1999, 7576; Zimmer 2011.
56. Holsti 2000, 119120.
57. Crawford 2009, 272.
58. Johnson 1996, 243.
59. Ibid.
62. Ibid., 6480, 116119, 184208.
66. Ibid., 2122.
67. Ibid., 43.
68. Ibid., 4346.
69. Ibid., 45.
70. Ibid., ix.
71. Ibid., 4546.
72. Misperception presumes uncertainty since there would be no room for

misperception in the condition of absolute certainty in the present or in
the future. Uncertainty is however not explicit in Morgenthaus discussions
on this issue.
74. Ibid., 138.
75. Ibid., 165.
76. Ibid., 377.
77. Ibid., 138.
78. Morgenthau 1950b, 78; Morgenthau 1950a, 173174; Morgenthau
1962e, 126.
79. Morgenthau 1954a, 160; Morgenthau 1962d, 218; Morgenthau 1962f,
325, emphasis added.
80. Morgenthau 1962e, 147, 319.
82. Morgenthau 1948a, 46, emphasis added. Also, see ibid, 45.
83. Ibid., 272; Morgenthau 1948b, 159, emphasis added.
84. Morgenthau 1971, 433, emphasis added.
85. Morgenthau 1948a, 104; Morgenthau 1967b, 427.
86. Morgenthau 1948a, 165, 376.
87. Ibid., 377.
89. Morgenthau 1949a, 160; Morgenthau 1960c, 305306; Morgenthau
1962b, 223; Morgenthau 1962d, 67, 74; Morgenthau 1970, 179.
90. See, for example, Morgenthau 1938b, 562; Morgenthau 1948a, 60;
Morgenthau 1958d, 16; Morgenthau 1960c, 317, 322, 329; Morgenthau
1962c, 387; Morgenthau 1962f, 194195, 321; Morgenthau 1964a, 23;
Morgenthau 1965a, 124; Morgenthau 1970, 75, 439.
92. Morgenthau 1951b, 6; Morgenthau 1954c, 84; Morgenthau 1961b, 4;
Morgenthau 1962d, 129; Morgenthau 1962f, 158; Morgenthau 1965b, 3.
94. Morgenthau 1957c, 105; Morgenthau 1962a, 15; Morgenthau 1962d, 29,
44; Morgenthau 1962f, 156157; Morgenthau 1964a, 23; Morgenthau
1971, 430; Morgenthau 1972a, 132.
96. Ibid., 45.
97. Mearsheimer 2001c, 408409 n. 35; Wolfers 1962, 8486.
99. Ibid.
100. Spirtas 1996.
101. Herz 2003, 412.
102. Herz 1950, 157.

103. Herz 1951, 4.
105. Williams 2005, 183.
106. Koskenniemi 2002, 437.
107. Freyberg-Inan 2004, 68.
109. Grifths 1992, 6970.
111. Morgenthau 1948a, 78, 327.
CHAPTER 4
Waltz and Fear
INTRODUCTION
Determining the standing of fear in Waltzs works is thus the subject of
this chapter. This is a task that is carried out over six sections. The rst of
these sections offers an overview of Waltzs conception of fear. The
Section Waltzs defensive realism presents Waltzs theory of defensive
realism. Subsequently, fear is traced in Waltzs writings to assess whether it
is at the core of his theoretical framework in the Section Fear in the core
of Waltzs theory. Since the answer is negative, the Section Fear in the
periphery of Waltzs theory continues the investigation to establish
whether fear is given an explicit peripheral theoretical role. The Sections
The empirical aspect of fear in Waltzs works and The logical need of
fear in Waltzs defensive realism examine whether this emotion is neces-
sary to bring about Waltzs defensive realist world and logically consistent
with other aspects of his theory. The chapter ends with a summary of the
preceding points.
WALTZS CONCEPTION OF FEAR

It however starts with Waltzs notion of fear. An in-depth scrutiny of his
works reveals that he does not provide any denition of this primary
emotion. In fact, there are only two passages in his publications where
he does offer some general insights on his conception of fear. First, Waltz

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41012-8_4
claims that [a]lliance leaders are free to follow their own line, which may
of course reect their bad as well as their good judgment, their imaginary
as well as their realistic fears, their ignoble as well as their worthy ends.1
As this passage makes clear, Waltz persists that fear may be both real and
imaginary. Second, Waltz contends that even the strongest economic
forces cannot conquer fear.2 Although this citation does not explain
whether or not fear can be overcome at the international level, it does
suggest that this emotion trumps economic factors in international
politics.
From these discussions, it is evident that Waltz only offers a very thin
conception of fear as he does not provide further elucidation on these
issues. For instance, Waltz does not consider the sources of realistic or
imaginary fears in IR. Neither does he explain how they relate to one
another. Waltz does not even support his proposition by backing it up
with any evidence. In other words, Waltz merely asserts that fear can be
real and imaginary. Likewise, Waltzs contention that fear trumps eco-
nomics at the international stage is not sustained by any data either. It is
only proclaimed. Neither does Waltzs statement clarify whether fear can
be overcome in interstate relations and/or how important it is in compar-
ison to other factors affecting international life.
Overall, it is evident that Waltzs generic writings on fear only provide
an extremely vague, unclear and imprecise elucidation of the concept. The
next section reveals what issues he does unpack by taking a closer look at
his defensive realism.
WALTZS DEFENSIVE REALISM

Waltz recognizes the similarities within the realist tradition. At the same
time, he is keen to differentiate his defensive realism from classical realism,
in general, and Morgenthaus theory, in particular. First, Waltz notes that
even though Morgenthau attempts to develop a theory of international
politics, he fails to do so. According to Waltz, even though Morgenthau
manages to develop concepts such as the national interest and power,
the German-Jewish migr scholar only provides elements of a theory,
rather than a complete one. Second, Waltz asserts that although
Morgenthau recognized the autonomy of politics, he failed to develop
this idea and apply it to the study of international politics. Waltz claims
that the combination of these factors dampened Morgenthaus theoretical
aspirations.
4 WALTZ AND FEAR 73
Third, Waltz accuses Morgenthau for conating the study of foreign

policy and IR. In Waltzs view, Morgenthaus inductive behaviorist
approach where outcomes are explained through the actions and interac-
tions of the units is conducive to understanding foreign policy rather than
world politics. Fourth, Waltz claims that Morgenthaus argument that the
desire for power is rooted in human nature and that power is an end in
itself is undermined by the empirical record.3 Fifth, Morgenthaus expla-
nation of conict and war that he regards as an offspring of the political
mans qualities Waltz dismisses as hypothetical and logically awed.
According to Waltz, we cannot empirically verify the essence of human
nature and a constant such as human nature cannot explain variation. If
human nature was the cause of war in 1914, it was by the same token the
cause of peace in 1910.4
As a result, Waltz develops a theory that attempts to overcome what he
regards as deciencies in Morgenthaus classical realism. Instead of basing
his conception of international politics on elements of human nature,
Waltz emphasizes the anarchic nature of the international system.5
Moreover, power is regarded as a means to an end. Finally, Waltz advances
a structural deductive approach to the study of IR instead of a behavioralist
inductive approach.6
The theory he offers does not purport to account for the accidental or
unexpected. Instead, it seeks to explain the regularities and repetitions that
occur at the international stage.7 Moreover, Waltzs defensive realism
claims to offer a systemic and state-centric theory of international politics.
The structural components of Waltzs defensive realism consist of anarchy
dened as the absence of government and the distribution of capabilities
across the system. In doing so, Waltz strips away other features of the
international order and every attribute of states except their capabilities
from his theory.8 Waltz only makes two explicit assumptions regarding
statesthat they are unitary actors who only differ in their capabilities and
at minimum pursue policies to ensure their own survival.9 Survival is
essential since it is the prerequisite for the attainment of all other goals
that states might want to attain. In Waltzs world, security is the highest
end. Power is merely a means that states will pursue as long as it is
compatible with their security concerns.10 Furthermore, states balance
against the power of their competitors. It is after all the capabilities of
their rivals that might come to jeopardize their survival.11
The balance of power is thus the dynamic part of Waltzs otherwise
static theoretical model. He contends that the number of great powers,
who possess the greatest capabilities, make up the balance or the poles of
the international system and shape its character.12 In this regard, Waltz
differentiates between unipolar, bipolar and multipolar systems.13 In a
unipolar world, there is only one great power. The balance is maintained
by two great powers in bipolarity and three or more in a multipolar
system.14 In a unipolar world, there is by denition no other great
power that can constrain the behavior of the hegemon. This makes it the
most instable form of power conguration, according to Waltz, as the
dominant state is free to behave as it pleases.15
Under the conditions of bipolarity, the two great powers have no
choice but to engage in internal balancing and rely on their own capabil-
ities to balance against the other great power. In contrast, multipolarity
affords the great powers the opportunity to engage in external balancing.
They can join forces through alliances to balance against a third party.
Waltzs defensive realism maintains that internal balancing is more reliable
and precise than external balancing. That is because states are less likely to
misjudge the relative strength of their own capabilities than that of any
potential alliance partners.16 In more general terms, Waltz contends that
bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity since uncertainties about who
threatens whom, about who will oppose whom, and about who will gain
or lose from the actions of other states accelerate as the number of states
increases.17 That is why Waltz considers bipolarity more peaceful than
multipolarity. The former power conguration dampens the uncertainties
and miscalculations he holds responsible for war.18
In his later writings, Waltz also contends that nuclear weapons have a
major implication on the probability of war and peace. In fact, Waltz goes
as far as to claim that the presence of thermonuclear weapons almost
guarantees international peace. These weapons are however not included
in his defensive realism as they are not structural factors that can be
accommodated by his theory.19
FEAR IN THE CORE OF WALTZS THEORY

From these expositions, the principal elements of Waltzs defensive realism
can be identied. In Waltzs world, the main feature of the international
system is its anarchic character. He populates this realm with states moti-
vated by the desire to survive. Under these conditions, states pursue
balance of power politics that may even provoke war at worst. According
to Waltzs theory, this outcome is more likely under multipolarity than
4 WALTZ AND FEAR 75
bipolarity.20 The central components of Waltzs defensive realism are thus

anarchy, states, survival, the balance of power and war.21
There is little doubt that the factors listed above are among the main
elements of Waltzs theory. As Waltz himself conrms, the essential
structural quality of the system is anarchythe absence of a central mono-
poly of legitimate force.22 Other scholars in the eld also widely agree
that anarchy is the principal force shaping the motives and actions of
states in Waltzs world.23 States themselves are another core element of
Waltzs theory. This is evident when he claims to offer a state-centric
view of international politics. Waltz mentions other actors but focuses on
states since they are the major ones.24 The secondary literature also
conrms that states are imperative to Waltzs theoretical edice.
Consequently, they contend that states are the principal actors in the
system in his defensive realism.25
Moreover, it is evident that Waltz considers survival as the main motive
of states. This is apparent when he writes that his theory assumes that
states seek to ensure their survival since it is a prerequisite to achieving
any goals that states may have.26 Other scholars in the discipline also
accept this reading of Waltzs defensive realism. Joo Resende-Santos, for
instance, claims that at the heart of this argument is Waltzs claim that all
states wish for survival.27 Robert Schuett maintains that Waltzs realism
is based upon the fundamental assumption that states want to survive.28
As Waltz conrms, the balance of power animates his understanding of
international politics. In this regard, he persists that if there is any
distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-of-power
theory is it.29 Again, this is conrmed by the secondary literature where
it is claimed that contemporary realist writers still place great emphasis on
the balance of power mechanism, and Waltz in particular considers it to be
of fundamental importance.30 Finally, Waltz contends that his neorealist
theory is designed to explain wars dismal recurrence through the mil-
lennia.31 John Vasquez and others also argue that one of the central
topics of inquiry of Waltz has been to produce an adequate explanation
of war.32
These discussions suggest that fear is not a central component of
Waltzs defensive realism. But what about Donnellys argument that
balancing is driven by fear of predation rather than anarchy in Waltzs
world?33 At one point, it appears as if Waltz endorses this view. This is
apparent when Waltz writes that [a] self-help system is one in which
those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than
others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer.
Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways
that tend toward the creation of balances of power.34
This is also the segment of Waltzs work Crawford cites in order to
demonstrate the importance of fear in his defensive realism.35 What
Donnelly and Crawford however do not consider is that at another point
Waltz rejects the argument that fear is necessary to bring about the balance
of power that is at the heart of his theory. Balance-of-power politics
prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the
order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.36
Evidently Waltzs claims are internally inconsistent in this regard.
Depending on which of these two citations one privileges in the analysis,
one can argue that fear is either essential or unnecessary to bring about the
balance of power, according to Waltz himself.
The most plausible interpretation on the basis of the available evidence
suggests that Waltz does not regard fear crucial in evoking the balance of
power. First, in the last quotation, he strongly emphasizes that only two
factors are needed to provoke balance of power politics: anarchy and
survival. As we have seen, both these factors are also among Waltzs
theoretical assumptions. It is therefore theoretically consistent to uphold
these two elements as the initiators of the balance of power. In contrast,
fear is nowhere to be found among Waltzs assumptions. Relying on this
emotion to bring about this state of affairs would therefore make the
theory internally inconsistent. For these reasons, it is more plausible to
regard anarchy and survival rather than fear as the catalysts of balancing in
Waltzs world.
Nevertheless, these discussions do not address Donnellys other claim:
Waltzs account of the impact of nuclear weapons underscores the dom-
inance of fear over polarity.37 There is no doubt about the fact that
nuclear weapons play a central role in Waltzs later work on IR, as we
have already seen.38 As Waltz himself points out, nuclear deterrence does
not depend on rationality. It depends on fear. To create fear, nuclear
weapons are the best possible means.39 Evidently, the fear of nuclear
war under the condition of MAD is the foundation of the nuclear peace
Waltz envisions.40 Indeed, Waltz even contends that it was fear that
propelled Kennedy and Khrushchev to end the [Cuban Missile] [C]risis
quickly.41
Evidently, Waltz considers nuclear weapons and the fear they evoke
imperative in his later writings. But that does not necessarily mean that
4 WALTZ AND FEAR 77
this emotion is crucial to his theory as well. In fact, nuclear weapons

themselves are omitted from Waltzs defensive realism. The reason for
this is simple. Waltz rightfully regards the possession of nuclear weap-
ons a unit-level attribute that does not belong to his structural theory
of international politics.42 As a matter of fact, Waltz dismisses non-
structural theories that include unit-level factors as reductionist and
criticizes them at length.43 The inclusion of nuclear weapons to his
theory would therefore lead to reductionism, which is exactly what
Waltz wants to avoid. This would also make his theory internally
inconsistent.44 For these reasons, nuclear weapons are never incorpo-
rated to Waltzs defensive realism. As he himself puts it: although
neorealists admit that unit-level causes are important, they refuse to
include them in their accounts.45 If nuclear weapons themselves are
omitted from Waltzs theory so is the fear they are supposed to
provoke.
As these discussions highlight, fear is never explicitly incorporated at
the center of Waltzs theory. Nevertheless, it still remains to be seen
whether this emotion can be found in the periphery of his defensive
realism. This is considered next.
FEAR IN THE PERIPHERY OF WALTZS THEORY

As has already been mentioned, the most valid interpretation on the basis
of the available evidence suggests that the balance of power should be
attributed to anarchy and states desire for survival rather than fear in
Waltzs theory. Nonetheless, fear does affect balancing in another way in
his defensive realism. On at least three different occasions, Waltz partly
attributes external balancing to fear. In the rst case, Waltz contends that
[w]ith more than two parties, hostility and fear may lead A and B to seek
the support of C.46 Hence, Waltz argues that fear is one of the factors
that promotes alliance formation. At another point, Waltz maintains that
[w]here a number of states are in balance, the skilful foreign policy of a
forward power is designed to gain an advantage over one state without
antagonizing others and frightening them into united action.47 In other
words, Waltz contends that mutual fear of a common foe may bring states
together and provoke external balancing. In the last instance, Waltz points
out that [a]lliances are made by states that have some but not all of their
interests in common. The common interest is ordinarily a negative one:
fear of other states.48
As these citations clearly demonstrate, Waltz considers fear as a driver of

external balancing or alliance formation. But in none of these three
examples is fear solely responsible for this outcome. In the rst two
cases, Waltz also identies hostility and antagonism as the causes of
alliance formation. In the nal instance, he claries his previous statements
by contending that it is common interest that promotes external balan-
cing. Fear, hostility and antagonism are different types of common inter-
ests that promote alliance formation. Mutual fear only happens to be the
most important common interest that prompts this behavior.
In these passages, Waltz also reveals what the causes and effects of fear
are in his theory. Indeed, Waltz explicitly contends that [i]nterdepen-
dence breeds hostility and fear. With more than two parties, hostility and
fear may lead A and B to seek the support of C.49 It is thus interdepen-
dence that causes fear in Waltzs framework. The effect of this fear is as has
already been implied external balancing or alliance formation.
Altogether, this narrative emerges in relation to fear in Waltzs work.
Interdependence dened in terms of mutual vulnerability50 breeds fear
and hostility. These factors, along with antagonism, are among the com-
mon interests that bring states together to pursue external balancing or
alliance formation against their shared source of concern. Fear is the
primary common interest that impels states to join forces against the
third party. This is the explicit theoretical role fear plays in Waltzs theo-
retical framework.
Moreover, this investigation reveals that fear is peripheral to Waltzs
theoretical edice. As we have seen, this emotion is not explicitly incorpo-
rated at the core of the theory that makes it peripheral by default.
Furthermore, Waltz only uses fear as the main common interest to explain
external balancing or alliance formation. As such, fear is given a far more
limited role in Waltzs theory than its core componentsanarchy, states,
survival, the balance of power and war. At this point, it might be objected
that fear should still be regarded as a core element of Waltzs defensive
realism. It is after all the main factor that contributes to alliance formation
that is a signicant aspect of international politics.
Counterarguments of this kind are misguided. The issue is not whether
fear is used to explain important things at the international level. Rather,
the objective is to determine whether Waltz himself affords this emotion a
key role in his defensive realism. In this regard, fear is merely used as the
primary common interest that is found at the periphery of the theory. This
clearly illustrates that this emotion is not theoretically central in Waltzs
4 WALTZ AND FEAR 79
defensive realism. How his theoretical role of fear matches with his
empirical use of this emotion is explored in the next section.
THE EMPIRICAL ASPECT OF FEAR IN WALTZS WORKS

First, Waltz never refers to a concrete case where fear is brought about as a
result of interdependence empirically, as he does in his theory. However,
Waltz does discuss fear in relation to empirical cases of alliance formation.
In one example, Waltz seems to attribute external balancing to common
interest rooted in fear as in his defensive realism. On this occasion, Waltz
contends that the Western Defense Community was, in large part at least,
motivated by fear of Soviet power and intentions and is intended to deter
the Soviet Union from using that power in wars of aggression.51 To be
fair, Waltz does discuss fear in relation to alliance formation on other
occasions as well but does not regard this emotion as the promoter of
external balancing. This is, for instance, apparent when Waltz suggests
that Bismarcks scepticism about a possible alliance with Russia was based
in part on fear of her internal instability.52
In the other empirical cases, Russia or the Soviet Union is the fearful
party. But alliance formation is not attributed to this emotion in these
examples either. In this regard,Waltz argues that the Russians have good
reasons to fear that NATO will not only admit additional old members of
the WTO but also former republics of the Soviet Union.53 In addition,
Waltz notes that Secretary Albright thinks it ridiculous of Russia to fear
NATOs inclusion of a distant Hungary, but the distance between addi-
tional members of the alliance and Russia would be shorter. Anyway, it is
not so much new members that Russia fears as it is Americas might moving
ever closer to its borders.54 Also, Waltz contends that America too would
be fearful if it was in Russias shoes. It had after all lost the Cold War and
had its main adversary expanding in its region through alliance building.55
It is thus clear that there is one concrete empirical case of fear in Waltzs
writings examined here that overlaps with the role he assigns this emotion
in his theory. There are however instances where he uses fear to account
for empirical phenomena that transcend interdependence and alliance
formation. Indeed, he refers to this emotion in his analysis of war,56
invasion,57 arms race,58 foreign policy formulation,59 military capacity,60
defense spending61 and peace,62 among others. As has been mentioned,
fear is particularly prevalent in Waltzs discussions regarding nuclear
weapons.
With regard to the spread of these weapons, Waltz insists that if

countries feel insecure and believe that nuclear weapons would make
them more secure, Americas policy of opposing the spread of nuclear
weapons will not prevail.63 Relatedly, Waltz notes that throughout the
nuclear age, fear of nuclear proliferation has been pervasive even though
we have yet to witness the phenomenon. Rather than proliferating, nuclear
weapons have spread glacially. From 1945 to 1970, only ve countries,
counting Israel, followed the United States into the nuclear world.64
Despite his relaxed attitude toward the possibility of nuclear prolifera-
tion, Waltz notes that even though some countries will fear the effects
that may follow if Germany and Japan go nuclear. There is however little
that can be done to stop them should they choose to pursue this path.65
Waltz explains that Japans and Germanys desire to acquire nuclear
capacity is fueled by their fears of a nuclear blackmail by existing nuclear
states. They also deem the possession of such capability essential to be fully
recognized as a great power.66 In the case of Great Britain, Waltz contends
that the Brits decision to go nuclear was fueled by their fear that their
American allies would not retaliate against a nuclear strike on the
European continent.67 Likewise, Pakistans quest to become a part of
the nuclear club stemmed from its fear of its larger neighbor India.68
Waltz notes that as early as the Cold War Russia feared the possibility
of a West Germany equipped with nuclear weapons.69 But West Germany
was not the only source of worry. According to Waltz, the nuclear
superiority enjoyed by America in the early 1950s created in Europe a
fear that the United States would too easily succumb to a temptation to
retaliate massively.70 Russian fears of the Americans diminishing their
deterrent may also impel them to place more warheads on their land-
based missiles.71 But during most of the Cold War, Russia and the USA
feared one anothers nuclear capacity, according to Waltz.72 In Waltzs
view, it is this fear that explains the peaceful resolution of the Cuban
Missile Crisis.73
For this reason, Waltz also considered fears of IndiaPakistan going to
the brink of war unfounded. He is convinced that nuclear deterrence
effectively stops such adventurous pursuits.74 Similarly, Waltz dismisses
Senator John McCains claim that North Korea would be able to attack
without fear of failure because a South Korean and American counter-
attack would have to stop at the present border for fear of North Korean
nuclear retaliation. In response, Waltz sarcastically notes that [o]ur vast
nuclear forces would not deter an attack on the South, yet the dinky force
4 WALTZ AND FEAR 81
that the North may have would deter us!.75 Indeed, Waltz considers the
fear of a nuclear response so powerful that it motivated Egypt and Syria to
limit their combined attack on Israel during the Arab-Israeli wars.76
As can be seen, there is only one single empirical case of fear in Waltzs
writings that is consistent with the theoretical role he assigns this emotion
in his defensive realism. In the vast majority of instances, he uses fear to
empirically account for international events beyond interdependence and
alliance formation. In this regard, he particularly uses fear in relation to
nuclear weapons. Waltz himself thus makes extensive use of fear to explain
international relations. The question is whether he needs this emotion to
make his theory logically compelling as well. This is discussed in the next
section.
THE LOGICAL NEED OF FEAR IN WALTZS DEFENSIVE REALISM

Weber contends that Waltzs defensive realism is indeed logically depen-
dent on fear. Specically, Weber argues that it is fear rather than the
structural properties of the international system that helps to bring
about Waltzs world characterized by balance of power politics. Without
fear, none of the behavior his theory predicts would have been possible.77
In making these arguments, Weber relies on her own interpretation of the
lm Lord of the Flies that also depicts interactions in an anarchic order.
Weber claims that in this movie anarchy is by itself insufcient to cause or
even allow for conict. Only when fear is introduced do these realist
tendencies become apparent. From this analysis, Weber infers that [w]
ithout fear, there is nothing in the lm or Waltzs myth that suggests that
anarchy would be conictual rather than cooperative.78
Nevertheless, Webers arguments rest on shaky grounds even if we
agree with her interpretation of Lord of the Flies. First, Weber implicitly
assumes that this motion picture is correct in its representation and since
Waltzs narrative differs from Lord of the Flies, his theory must be awed.
Yet, Weber offers no evidence for why we should privilege her interpreta-
tion of the lm over Waltzs theory. Second, Weber does not explain how
the relationship of a group of boys in an isolated island is applicable to
Waltzs theory that focuses on interstate interactions in the international
system. Instead of relying on Lord of the Flies, the present investigation will
therefore focus on Waltzs own theory and the conception of fear outlined
in this monograph to determine whether this emotion is needed to gen-
erate the world he envisions.
As we have seen, Waltz develops his defensive realism on the basis of

anarchy, the distribution of capabilities and the assumption that states are
unitary actors that at minimum strive to survive. Schweller, who concurs
with Webers argument that Waltzs world cannot be deduced from his
assumptions, scrutinizes Waltzs theory on its own terms instead. In doing
so, Schweller refers to the passage where Waltz claims that [b]alance-of-
power politics prevail whenever two, and only two, requirements are met:
that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to
survive.79
Schweller however refutes these arguments. He contends that these
conditions are insufcient to generate balance of power politics. If all
states merely want to survive, they do not pose any security threats to
one another and have consequently no incentives to balance each others
power either. In the words of Schweller, Waltz describes a world of all
cops and no robbers, that is, all security-seeking states and no aggressors.
Subsequently, he argues that Waltz needs to bring in revisionist goals
beyond survival to make his theory work.80 Nonetheless, Schweller claims
that Waltz cannot do so since that would be inconsistent with his struc-
tural theory of international politics. Such a revision would require the
incorporation of unit-level factors that Waltz objects to.81
At rst sight, Schwellers arguments seem entirely plausible. Why should
a group of states who all want to pursue survival in the condition of anarchy
come to see one another as threats if they do not harbor any aggressive
intentions or have any incompatible interests? The best way for states to
retain their shared goal of survival is evidently to live in peace. Engaging in
competitive balance of power politics may lead to war, as Waltz himself
claims. These outcomes are clearly counterproductive to status quo states
and wars could potentially lead to their demise. Although Schwellers argu-
ments are sound in this regard, his discussions of Waltzs survival assump-
tion are underdeveloped and in need of further elaboration.
Indeed, Schweller ignores Waltzs contention that his survival assump-
tion allows for other ambitions as well, including revisionist goals. In this
regard, Waltz writes that [b]eyond the survival motive, the aims of states
may be endlessly varied; they may range from the ambition to conquer the
world to the desire merely to be left alone.82 Additionally, Waltz persists
that this assumption allows for the fact that no state always acts exclu-
sively to ensure its survival.83
Additionally, it is unclear whether Waltz considers survival the main
goal of states. In at least one passage, he claims that survival is not always
4 WALTZ AND FEAR 83
the primary objective of states. This is evident when Waltz argues that the
survival assumption allows for the fact that some states may persistently
seek goals that they value more highly than survival.84 On at least two
other occasions, Waltz contradicts himself by suggesting that survival is
indeed the chief goal of states. In the rst instance, Waltz claims that [i]n
anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states
safely seek such other goals as tranquillity, prot, and power . . . The rst
concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions
in the system.85 In the second case, Waltz contends that [i]nsofar as
they [states] are in a self-help situation, survival outranks prot as a goal,
since survival is a prerequisite to the achievement of other ends.86
There are thus two central issues with regard to Waltzs survival
assumption that must be solved here before the rest of the analysis can
proceed. Should survival be regarded as the single motivator of state
behavior in Waltzs defensive realism as Schweller argues or does it allow
for other ambitions as Waltz himself claims? If we accept Waltzs position,
should survival be regarded as the main goal of states or can it be trumped
by other factors as Waltz also claims.87
The way in which these questions are settled have major consequences
for the subsequent analysis. If we accept Schwellers argument that survival
is the sole motivator of Waltzian states, his and Webers contentions
regarding the logical insufciency of Waltzs theoretical edice are correct.
States that only wish to survive have after all no valid reason for behaving
aggressively toward one another. As a result, Waltz would have to bring in
other factors to account for the outcomes his theory envisions. Fear could
potentially be one of them as Weber claims.
Should we instead nd that Waltzs theory actually incorporates revi-
sionist goals that states may value higher than survival, his defensive
realism is logically sound as it is. Factors such as greed, honor or interest,
etc., could then explain the rise of security competition, conict and war in
Waltzs defensive realism. Greedy states may, for instance, forsake their
security to attain what they covet. In this interpretation, Waltz would
evidently not need to rely on fear to create his world as Weber claims
either. His revisionist goals would be perfectly adequate to generate the
outcomes that his theory envisions. It is therefore essential to nd an
answer to these questions, starting with whether survival should be
regarded as the single driver of state behavior in Waltzs theoretical edice.
In this case, this investigation sides with Schwellers interpretation.
Even if we accept Waltzs fall-back argument that his survival assumption
allows for other motives as well, he does not actually incorporate any of
them to his theory. As such, his defensive realism is inherently unequipped
to account for state behavior rooted in other motives besides survival.
Waltzs other contention that states at minimum, seek their own pre-
servation and, at maximum, drive for universal domination88 does not
help either. As Donnelly correctly notes, survival and domination are two
qualitatively distinct motives. They cannot vary quantitatively along a
single dimension as the pursuit for domination may risk the prospects of
survival.89 In general, the survival assumption cannot include other
motives as none of the other ambitions are reducible to survival.
Evidently, the interpretation where survival is taken as the sole and
thereby also primary aim of Waltzian states is thus the most reasonable
one. Since it is the second reading of defensive realism that is adopted in
this thesis, Webers and Schwellers arguments still hold. Waltz cannot
generate his world on the basis of his underlying assumptions. For our
purposes, it is therefore necessary to evaluate whether Weber is right in her
contention that Waltz needs fear to create his conictual world.
It may at rst appear as if fear can at least spark the balance of power
politics Waltzs defensive realism envisions. In an anarchic world where all
states have the capability to harm one another, mutual fear can ensue. Fear
does after all spring from perceived threat and danger and it is evident that
other capabilities and potential willingness to use their weapons offensively
in an anarchic condition can provoke these reactions. However, if states
would know that their opponents were only driven by the desire to
survive, they would have no reason to fear one another in Waltzs world.
Under these conditions, they would be safe in the absolute knowledge
that even though other states have the capability to harm them in an
anarchic environment they would never do so as they lack the necessary
resolve to do so.
In other words, uncertainty rather than fear is needed to promote
conict. Under the condition of present and future uncertainty, states
can never fully know whether other states also have survival as their highest
end and do not harbor any aggressive feelings toward them. In such a
world, it is always possible for status quo powers to mistake one another
for revisionists and react accordingly. Hence, without uncertainty, status
quo states with fully compatible peaceful goals would have no reason to
misperceive one another for aggressors and engage in hostilities.
As these discussions imply, uncertainty is a necessary but not a sufcient
condition for creating Waltzs world. That is because even if interstate
4 WALTZ AND FEAR 85
relations take place under the condition of uncertainty it is still possible for
status quo state to get it right and recognize one another as partners in
peace and live side by side without engaging in conict. States must also
mistake one anothers objectives under uncertainty for these outcomes to
become possible. As we have seen, Morgenthau uses misperception to
explain the rise of rivalry between status quo powers. Waltz would also
have to introduce misperception to impel states to behave in suboptimal
ways to generate competition, conict and war to make his defensive
realism work logically.90
In contrast, fear is neither a necessary or sufcient condition to generate
Waltzs world. It is true that fear could also be used in this narrative as we
have seen in the case of Morgenthaus classical realism. Nevertheless, it is
equally apparent that this emotion is logically superuous in the Waltzian
framework. Uncertainty and misperception are necessary conditions and
are together sufcient conditions to make Waltzs defensive realism work
logically. Fear is not.91 According to these analyses, Webers insistence
that fear is absolutely necessary to create Waltzs defensive realist world is
thus inaccurate.
THE LOGICAL CONSISTENCY OF FEAR IN WALTZS

DEFENSIVE REALISM
In fact, incorporating fear into Waltzs theoretical framework is not ben-
ecial for the internal consistency of his defensive realism either. As we
have already seen, Waltz strongly emphasizes that his theory of interna-
tional politics is structural and that it does not consider unit-level attri-
butes.92 Moreover, Waltz criticizes nonstructural explanations at length as
they supposedly fail to account why the patterns of international politics
constantly reoccur even though nonstructural factors are in a constant
change.93 According to Waltzs own famous tripartite level of analysis
framework, his defensive realism is a third image theory. It explains inter-
national politics on the basis of its structure rather than human nature
(rst image) or state characteristics (second image).94
The problem is that fear is not a structural factor in Waltzs analysis.
This is obvious when he contends that
[o]ne may object that the third image alone, because unable to explain why
any country should mobilize in the rst place, cannot explain the coming of
the war. The objection is valid. To understand the coming of the First World
War one must look to the vulnerabilities and strengths, the ambitions and
fears, of all the states involved. Any explanation of these factors must focus
upon the rst and second images.95
It is thus abundantly clear that Waltz does not consider fear as a third
image concept. Consequently, this emotion cannot be consistent with his
structural theory of international politics. The inclusion of fear to the
defensive realism of Waltz thus creates logical inconsistencies within the
theoretical framework itself.
In sum, this investigation demonstrates that fear does not have to be
included in the theory of Waltz to make it logically sound. As such, these
ndings undermine Webers statement that fear is logically indispensable
to Waltzs defensive realism. In stark contrast, the inclusion of fear actually
creates logical problems for Waltzs theory. As he himself maintains, this
emotion belongs to either the rst and/or the second image and is there-
fore inconsistent with his third image theory of international politics. The
incorporation of fear thus creates international inconsistencies within
Waltzs own theoretical framework and leads to the reductionism his
theory is supposed to overcome. In short, fear is logically counterproduc-
tive to the defensive realism of Waltz.
With that said, the examination of the conceptual, theoretical, empirical
and logical role of fear in the works of Waltz has been completed. A
summary of the major points found in relation to these issues is therefore
in place.
SUMMARY
At the conceptual level, the enquiry revealed that this emotion is unde-
ned in his work. Waltz merely asserts that fear can be both imaginary and
real and trumps economic factors. Beyond this, Waltz sheds no further
light on his underdeveloped notion of this emotion. As such, it is not
surprising to nd that Waltz does not explicitly incorporate fear at the core
of his theory either. Nevertheless, he does incorporate it at the periphery
of his theory but not as a catalyst for the balance of power as Crawford
maintains. Instead, fear is caused by interdependence and is the primary
indicator of common interest that is responsible for external balancing or
alliance formation in Waltzs defensive realism. Only one empirical case in
Waltzs writings however matches his theoretical use of fear. In all other
instances, Waltz refers to fear to account for other aspects of international
4 WALTZ AND FEAR 87
politics that tend to revolve around nuclear weapons that Waltz himself
identies as a unit-level factor inconsistent with his theory.
This primary emotion is not needed to generate Waltzs world either, as
Weber wrongfully claims. Rather it is uncertainty and misperception that
are the essential missing pieces of Waltzs theory. Together, these factors
can explain the rise of security competition, conict and war among
Waltzs status quo states. In fact, the inclusion of fear causes more logical
problems than it solves. It is considered a nonstructural factor by Waltz,
which makes it logically inconsistent with his structural realism. Hence,
fear is logically counterproductive to the defensive realism of Waltz.
In sum, all the available evidence points to the fact that fear is
marginal to Waltzs work at the conceptual, theoretical and logical
level but is frequently used to explain major international events. The
next chapter will consider whether the same is true of Mearsheimers
offensive realism.
NOTES
1. Waltz 1979a, 170, emphasis added.
2. Waltz 1999, 694.
3. Waltz 1992, 26, 33, 35.
4. Waltz 1959a, 28.
5. As we have already seen, Morgenthau does consider the effects of interna-
tional anarchy but his explanation of international politics is more heavily
rooted in human nature and the political man.
6. Waltz 1992, 3336.
7. Waltz 1988b, 615.
8. Waltz 1979, 99.
9. Ibid., 9192, 105, 118.
10. Ibid., 126.
11. Ibid., 105, 118.
12. Ibid., 129130, 144.
13. Waltz makes no mention of unipolarity in Theory of International Politics.
He only starts to grapple with this issue in his writings after the end of the
Cold War. For the devastating consequences of unipolarity for the explana-
tory power of Waltzs defensive realism, see, Pashakhanlou 2014.
14. Waltz 1979, 161.
15. Waltz 1997a, 916; Waltz 2004, 4.
16. Waltz 1979, 168.
17. Ibid., 165.
18. Ibid., 168.

19. Waltz 2004, 5. This point will be developed in greater length in later parts of
this chapter.
20. Unipolarity is heavily undertheorized in the works of Waltz in comparison to
bipolarity and multipolarity and undermines his theory. See, Pashakhanlou
2014.
21. Security competition and conict are not as important as war in the Waltzian
balance of power. In fact, security competition and conict matter the most
when they eventually escalate to war.
22. Waltz 1988, 618.
23. Grieco 1988, 488. Also see, Schmidt 1998, 39; Teschke 2003, 14.
24. Waltz 1979, 93.
25. Resende-Santos 2007, 52. Also see, Brauch 2003, 279; Glaser 1996, 127;
Hyde-Price 2007, 31; Lott 2004, 15.
26. Waltz 1979, 91.
27. Lott 2004, 16.
28. Schuett 2010, 68. Also see, Snyder 2011, 13.
29. Waltz 1979, 117.
30. Trachtenberg 2012, 30. Also see, Levy 2004, 31; Sheehan 1996, 192.
31. Waltz 1988, 620.
32. Vasquez 1998, 203. Also see, Kaufman and Williams 2010, 21; Suganami
1996.
33. Donnelly 2000, 118, 118 n. 20.
34. Waltz 1979, 118, emphasis added.
35. Crawford 2000, 121.
36. Waltz 1979, 121.
37. Donnelly 2000, 118, 118 n. 20.
38. Waltz 1981, vol. 21; Waltz 1990b; Waltz 1995; Sagan and Waltz 2003.
40. Craig 2007; Sagan and Waltz 2003, 5.
41. Waltz 1995, 9.
42. Waltz 2000c, 5.
43. Waltz 1979, see especially chapter 2.
44. Ibid., 65, 74.
45. Waltz 2004a, 3.
46. Waltz 1979, 174.
47. Ibid., 171.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., 174. Also see ibid., 171.
50. Waltz 1979, 139.
51. Waltz 2001, 209.
52. Ibid., 225226.
4 WALTZ AND FEAR 89
53. Waltz 2000c, 12.

54. Waltz 2000b, 31.
55. Ibid.
56. Waltz 2000c, 40.
57. Waltz 2000a, 13.
58. Waltz 2002, 351; Sagan and Waltz 2003, 148.
59. Waltz 1967a, 70, 72.
60. Waltz 1974, 2425.
61. Waltz 1980, 58.
62. Waltz 1995, 12; Sagan and Waltz 2003, 132; Waltz 2000c, 7.
64. Waltz 1995, 5.
65. Waltz 1991b, 22.
66. Ibid., 21; Waltz 1993a, 64; Waltz 2000a, 6.
67. Waltz 1981, vol. 21, 7; Waltz 1995, 5.
68. Waltz 1995, 12; Waltz 2000a, 1314; Sagan and Waltz 2003, 111.
69. Waltz 1974, 2425.
70. Waltz 1964a, 896; Waltz 1967, 145; Waltz 1968, 17.
72. Waltz 1981, vol. 21, 25; Waltz 1983, 132; Sagan and Waltz 2003, 36.
73. Waltz 1995, 9; Sagan and Waltz 2003, 144.
75. Waltz 1995, 8.
76. Waltz 1997b, 315; Waltz 2000a, 10.
77. Weber 2001, 3132.
78. Ibid., 31.
79. Schweller 1996, 91.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., 9192.
82. Waltz 1979, 91.
83. Ibid., 92.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., 126.
86. Ibid., 134.
87. This second question only needs further exploration if the rst one is settled
in Waltzs rather than Schwellers favour. If survival is the only state ambi-
tion in Waltzs defensive realism as Schweller contends, it is also by default
the main goal of states as there is by denition no other ambition that can
possibly trump it. As such, it automatically answers the second question as
well.
88. Waltz 1979, 118.
89. Donnelly 2000, 55.
90. Misperception or false perception also encompasses miscalculation, misjud-

gement and misunderstanding etc. that may provoke suboptimal behaviour
among states.
91. States must of course also act on their misperception for competition,
conict and war to emerge.
92. Waltz 1979, 65, 74; Waltz 2004, 3.
93. Waltz 1979, 6265, 74.
94. Waltz 1959, 210.
95. Waltz 2001, 218, emphasis added.
CHAPTER 5
Mearsheimer and Fear
INTRODUCTION
Mearsheimers offensive realism is the last theory to be examined in
relation to fear. This analysis spans over seven sections. The Section
Mearsheimer's conception of fear considers the denition and concep-
tion of fear in the works of Mearsheimer. The Section Mearsheimers
offensive realism takes a closer look at Mearsheimers framework. The
Section Fear in the core of Mearsheimers theory evaluates whether
Mearsheimer incorporates fear in the core of his offensive realism. As
this section reveals that fear is indeed central to his theory, the Section
The role of fear in Mearsheimers offensive realism considers the precise
role of fear within his framework. The Section The empirical aspect of
fear in Mearsheimer's works explores Mearsheimers empirical use of fear
in his analysis of international politics. The Sections The logical need of
fear in Mearsheimers offensive realism and The logical consistency of
fear in Mearsheimers offensive realism examine the logical implications
of fear in offensive realism. They do so by evaluating whether this emotion
is necessary to bring about security competition, conict and war in
Mearsheimers offensive realism and whether fear is logically consistent
with the rest of the framework. A brief summary brings this chapter to a
closure.

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41012-8_5
MEARSHEIMERS CONCEPTION OF FEAR

An investigation of Mearsheimers body of work reveals that he never
denes fear. He does however make some generic statements regarding
fear and fearmongering that provide some insights of his understanding of
this emotion. In his latest monograph, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About
Lying in International Politics, Mearsheimer develops the concept of
fearmongering that is closely related to fear. Here, he repeatedly empha-
sizes that fearmongering is induced by threat inations.1 These statements
clearly indicate that Mearsheimer considers fear as a response to threat.
Mearsheimer also regards fear a dynamic and an inherent factor of inter-
national life. Indeed, he conrms that the level of fear varies across time
and space but cannot be reduced to a trivial level.2 These three state-
ments are the only general insight Mearsheimer offers on this emotion.
Two of these points are not developed any further either. Mearsheimer
does not explore the relationship between threat and fear or provide any other
further elucidation on this topic. That is so despite the fact that the point about
threat generating fear is repeated like a mantra throughout Mearsheimers
book. Mearsheimers contention that fear cannot be overcome or reduced to
inconsequential levels is not supported by any evidence. In fact, this is merely
an assertion that Mearsheimer makes, before moving on to other subjects.
In stark contrast, Mearsheimer claries which factors that alter the levels
of fear at the international level. They will be discussed at greater length
below. In this regard, Mearsheimer also justies why and how these factors
affect the intensity of fear. He even provides evidence for the validity of his
arguments on this issue.3 It is only in this regard that fear is adequately
addressed in the works of Mearsheimer.
Overall, this inquiry illustrates that fear is not dened by Mearsheimer
and that he only makes three different generic statements about this emo-
tion, two of which are undeveloped and one that is well developed. The
comprehensive discussions are made with regard to the level of fear. Before
the role of fear is examined any further in his works, it is necessary to provide
an overview of his offensive realism that is provided in the next section.
MEARSHEIMERS OFFENSIVE REALISM

Mearsheimers offensive realism explicitly synthesizes his classical and
defensive realist predecessors theories. He adopts Morgenthaus idea
that states maximize relative power as opposed to Waltz, who claims that
5 MEARSHEIMER AND FEAR 93
states only seek an appropriate amount of power. Contra Morgenthau,

Mearsheimer does not attribute this aspect of international life to political
mans animus dominandi. Rather, he follows Waltz and locates the driving
force of state behavior at the systemic level. Moreover, Mearsheimer agrees
with Waltz in that bipolar systems are more peaceful than multipolar system,
in sharp contrast to Morgenthau.4 Furthermore, Mearsheimer treats states
as unitary actors who pursue strategies for survival, just like Waltz.5 In
addition, Mearsheimer assumes that all states have the capability to harm
one another, which he maintains is implicit in Waltzs framework.6
Drawing on Schweller, Mearsheimer claims that Waltzs defensive rea-
lism suffers from a status quo bias. According to Mearsheimer, Waltzs
assumptions are insufcient to generate the security competition his theory
envisions. For this reason, Mearsheimer adds the uncertainty assumption
that persists that states can never fully know whether their competitors are
status quo or revisionist powers.7 Mearsheimer does not stop there. He also
persists that Waltzs omission of the rational actors assumption creates
three major problems for his defensive realism. It makes his theory incap-
able of accounting for state behavior, international outcomes and portrays
an overly benign view of international politics. That is why Mearsheimer
also includes this assumption to his own theory.8 That is how Mearsheimer
situates his theory vis--vis that of Morgenthau and Waltz.
The stated purpose of Mearsheimers own offensive realism is primarily
to explain international outcomes and the foreign policy behavior of
nation-states in the Westphalian order.9 As has already been mentioned,
Mearsheimer makes the following ve bedrock assumptions to achieve
this feat:
1. The international system is anarchic as far as there is no global

Leviathan to offer states protection.
2. States always possess an offensive capability that enables them to
hurt and potentially destroy one another.
3. International relations take place in the existential condition of
uncertainty, making assessments regarding others intentions with
absolute certainty impossible. Consequently, no state can be fully
assured that its rivals will not turn their military apparatus against it
at any given time.
4. Survival is the primary goal of sovereign states as it is the prerequisite
for the attainment of all other ends.
5. States are rational actors pursuing strategies for survival.10
Mearsheimer maintains that when these assumptions are married

together fear, self-help, and power maximization ensues.11 Fearful
states in a self-help system maximize their relative power since power
preponderance offers the best guarantee for survival under these condi-
tions. As a result, states that merely seek to be secure clash with one
another in their quest for power.12
The concept of power is thus at the heart of offensive realism.
Mearsheimer equates power with material capabilities and distinguishes
between latent power and military power. The former consists of the
socioeconomic factors that go into building military power: population
and wealth. A large population is needed for the purpose of raising big
armies while wealth enables states to equip, train and modernize their
military forces and ght costly wars. Indeed, military power is the main
currency of international politics for Mearsheimer and is assessed by the
size and strength of armies, air and naval forces. According to
Mearsheimer, armies are the most vital ingredient of military power.
That is because international affairs currently take place in a world of
territorial states where conquering territory and controlling borders is
most effectively accomplished by land forces.13
When a state enjoys military superiority and is the only great power in
the international system, it has reached the pinnacle of powerhegemony.
A hegemon ceases to act as a revisionist that attempts to maximize
relative power. Instead, it turns into a regular status quo power that merely
seeks to prevent rivals from attaining the same status so that they do not
become mighty enough to threaten its exalted position.14
In this regard, offensive realism distinguishes between global hegemons
and regional hegemons. The former rules the world while the latter
dominates a region and possibly controls another region of the world as
well if it is nearby and accessible over land. Mearsheimer argues that global
hegemony is practically unattainable and can only be achieved through
nuclear superiority, which is very unlikely to ever happen. Other means of
attaining global hegemony are insurmountable because of the stopping
power of water. This makes power projection over the worlds oceans
exceptionally challenging. Consequently, the principal strategic aim for
great powers is to achieve regional hegemony. The USA is the only great
power in modern history to reach this elevated position by dominating the
Western Hemisphere. According to Mearsheimer, regional hegemons
such as the USA tend to act as offshore balancers in other parts of the
world. They leave the task of stopping an arising state to local powers.
Should the local powers be unable to do so, the hegemon moves in to

contain its potential peer competitor. This is however a last resort
measure.15
Mearsheimer lists three strategies great powers can pursue to attain
enough power to become hegemons: war, blackmail and bait and bleed.
War is the most straightforward way of maximizing relative power. This is
nonetheless a dangerous and destructive enterprise. As a result, it will
only be pursued if states calculate that the benets of war outweigh the
costs of peace. One potential benet of war is the wealth that the victor
can generate by levying taxes, conscating industrial output or the
industrial plant of a defeated state. Conquerors can also attain vital
natural resources such as oil and foodstuffs from occupied territory.
Finally, a successful military campaign can shift the balance of power in
the aggressors favor by eliminating its defeated competitor from great
power status.16
A less rewarding strategy is blackmail. Here, military force is not used
but merely threatened. The problem with this strategy is that it is unlikely
to succeed against great powers with formidable strengths that are able to
resist such intimidations. Rather, this is a strategy great powers can employ
against weak states without any great power allies.17
Bait and bleed is the last strategy that may be used in the pursuit of
power. The aim is to cause a dyadic war between great power rivals and let
the two parties bleed each other while the baiter sits by with its military
strength intact. In practice, it is nevertheless difcult to start a war between
states that have no intention of ghting each other. Decisions in favor of
war are not taken lightly as they involve enormous costs and risks.
Furthermore, one side may actually achieve a quick and decisive victory
and gain greater power in the process. This will effectively enhance the
distribution of power in its favor vis--vis the baiter.
Bloodletting is a modied version of the above-mentioned strategy
where no baiting takes place. Instead, the plan is to make sure that wars
between rivals become as costly as possible for both parties. This is
ensured by consistently balancing and supporting the weaker side so
that neither party gets the upper hand and a prolonged war with no
winner ensues.18
Since states are concerned with relative power, they not only attempt to
gain power at their rivals expense but also strive to prevent their compe-
titors from doing the same. Checking power is thus an important task in
Mearsheimers offensive realist world. There are two principal ways of
checking predatory states: balancing and buck-passing. The former can be

achieved by deterring or ghting a potential aggressor through internal or
external balancing. Internal balancing refers to a situation where the states
own additional resources are mobilized to stop the potential aggressor
while the burden of containing the aggressor is shared with allied states in
external balancing.19
In contrast, buck-passers remain on the sideline and leave the respon-
sibility of deterring or ghting aggressors to others. Buck-passers favor an
outcome where they stand aside while competitors engage in vicious
conicts that reduce their material capabilities. However, buck-passing is
a gamble with high stakes. In reality, the buck-catcher may end up
defeated, leaving the buck-passer alone with an even increasingly assertive
aggressor. Even if the buck-catcher ends up stopping the aggressor, it may
increase its relative power compared to the buck-passer, leaving the latter
more vulnerable than before.20 Hence, the allure of buck-passing is
potentially accompanied by great danger.
Consequently, balancing power is the prevailing mode of operation in
international affairs. The balance of power can effectively take four differ-
ent forms in offensive realism: unipolarity,21 bipolarity, balanced multi-
polarity and unbalanced multipolarity. According to the offensive realism
of Mearsheimer, unipolarity is the most peaceful power conguration.
There is by denition only one great power that makes security competi-
tion and war between great powers impossible. Moreover, the smaller
states would not dare to gang up on the leading power for fear of being
decisively defeated. Nevertheless, Mearsheimer insists that unipolarity
does not amount to world peace. Security competition and war can still
ensue since the hegemon can do as it please and smaller states may still
ght one another.22
As we have already seen, Mearsheimer considers bipolarity more stable
than multipolarity. He does so for three reasons. First, the former only
contains one potential conictual dyad instead of at least three in the
latter, offering fewer opportunities for war. Second, bipolar systems are
more likely to be well balanced since there is a higher possibility that two
actors will have roughly the same capability than three or more. This
stable balance makes deterrence easier and war less likely. Third, miscal-
culations are less common in bipolarity since the problems of shifting
coalitions and assessment of several states capabilities vanish. As a result,
great powers are unlikely to enter into war because of misperception.
Mearsheimer maintains that unbalanced multipolar systems are especially
war prone. That is due to the fact that these systems contain a potential
hegemon with a substantial power advantage over its rivals. During these
circumstances, the preponderant power has a strong incentive to bid for
regional hegemony by violent means, undermining international order in
the process.23
FEAR IN THE CORE OF MEARSHEIMERS THEORY

The analysis carried out above provides the basis for determining the core
of Mearsheimers offensive realism. His theory is underpinned by the ve
assumptions of anarchy, capability, uncertainty, survival and rationality.
The combination of these factors also impels states that are the referent
objects of the theory to fear one another and maximize their relative power
in this self-help world. Under these conditions, balance of power is the
main concern of states and the most noteworthy outcome of these
dynamics is war. In short, the core elements of Mearsheimers offensive
realism are the ve assumptions, states, fear, self-help, relative power
maximization, the balance of power and war.
The fact that the ve assumptions are instrumental to the theory of
Mearsheimer is undeniable. He conrms this interpretation when he
writes that [m]y explanation for why great powers vie with each other
for power and strive for hegemony is derived from ve assumptions about
the international system. None of these assumptions alone mandates that
states behave competitively. Taken together, however, they depict a world
in which states have considerable reason to think and sometimes behave
aggressively.24 Furthermore, Mearsheimer contends that each of these
ve assumptions is a reasonably accurate representation of an important
aspect of life in the international system.25 Other scholars in the eld also
support this rendering of Mearsheimers theory. This is apparent when
they contend that offensive realism makes ve key assumptions to
explain international politics.26
States are the units that populate this international system in
Mearsheimers offensive realism. As Mearsheimer contends, realists
treat states as the principal actors in world politics.27 In the secondary
literature, it is also a well-established fact that Mearsheimers offensive
realism offers a state-centric theory of international politics.28 These states
also fear and maximize their relative power under the condition of self-
help. In this regard, Mearsheimer persists that his theory is designed to
provide compelling explanations for the behaviors and the outcomes that
lie at the heart of the theory.29 He subsequently identies the three

general patterns of behavior that his theory envisions fear, self-help,
and power maximization.30 In short, he regards these three elements as
central. The secondary literature also accepts this interpretation of
Mearsheimers offensive realism.31
Likewise, the balance of power is a central concern of Mearsheimers
offensive realism. Indeed, he maintains that great powers care deeply
about the balance of power.32 The fact that the balance of power is
central to Mearsheimers theoretical edice is also widely shared in the
discipline.33
Finally, war is clearly imperative to the offensive realism of
Mearsheimer. As Mearsheimer himself puts it, his theory seek[s] to
explain the causes of great-power war and an entire chapter of his The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics is dedicated to this issue.34 Samuel Barkin
goes as far as describing Mearsheimers offensive realism as a theory of
war.35 Other scholars also conrm that explaining war is a core concern
of Mearsheimers theory.36
THE ROLE OF FEAR IN MEARSHEIMERS OFFENSIVE REALISM

As these discussions highlight, fear is afforded a central role in
Mearsheimers theory. The fact that fear is a key component of his offen-
sive realism is reinforced by various statements. On one occasion,
Mearsheimer claims that the fact great powers fear each other is a central
aspect of life in the international system.37 Similarly, Mearsheimer per-
sists that [f]ear is endemic to states in the international system.38 In
another passage, Mearsheimer contends that the possible consequences
of falling victim to aggression further amplify the importance of fear as a
motivating force in world politics.39 Mearsheimer also maintains that
how much states fear each other matters greatly, because the amount of
fear between them largely determines the severity of their security compe-
tition, as well as the probability that they will ght a war.40
At this point, it stands clear that fear is a central component of
Mearsheimers theory and is supposed to be generated on the basis of
offensive realisms assumption(s). There are however controversies
regarding which of these assumption(s) that are actually essential to
produce fear among states due to Mearsheimers inconsistencies. At
one point, Mearsheimer asserts that only three features of the interna-
tional system are necessary to generate fear, namely anarchy, capability
and uncertainty.41 On another occasion, he removes capabilities from the

equation and replaces it with states desire for survival instead.42 In the
third instance, Mearsheimer claims that only capability, uncertainty and
survival are necessary to bring about fear.43 At other times, Mearsheimer
persists that anarchy and uncertainty about other states intentions create
an irreducible level of fear among states.44 It is also suggested that the
combination of capabilities and uncertainty is all that is required to bring
about fear.45 According to the sixth explanation, anarchy is seemingly all
that is needed to breed fear.46 A seventh version of the narrative can also
be detected in the works of Mearsheimer. Here he suggests that uncer-
tainty is enough to bring about fear in interstate relations.47 These
inconsistencies in Mearsheimers arguments open it up for multiple inter-
pretations. No wonder why there are disagreements on what factors
generate fear in offensive realism in the literature.48
The reading that will be privileged here is that all these ve assumptions
are necessary to bring about fear in offensive realism. This is the inter-
pretation most consistent with Mearsheimers theory. In his most com-
prehensive statement of offensive realism, Mearsheimer is careful to point
out that only when all of the ve assumptions are married together does
fear (along with self-help and power maximization) become evident, as we
have seen. He also maintains that none of these assumptions alone can
account for the behavior of offensive realist states.49 The reading offered
here thus seems the most plausible in light of the available evidence. All of
the ve assumptions, that is, anarchy, uncertainty, survival, capability and
rationality, will therefore be considered as the causes of fear in offensive
realism.
There are also inconsistencies with regard to the types of effects that
this emotion is supposed to generate in Mearsheimers offensive realism.
On at least two different occasions, Mearsheimer maintains that fear leads
to competition for power, which he equates with relative power maximi-
zation. This is evident when he argues that the great powers that shape
the international system fear each other and compete for power as a
result.50 Or when he persists that [f]ear is endemic to states in the
international system, and it drives them to compete for power so that
they can increase their prospects for survival in a dangerous world.51 In
these two cases, Mearsheimer clearly considers the effects of fear in terms
of power competition.
At another point, however, Mearsheimer claims that [g]reat powers
fear each other and always compete with each other for power.52 It is
noteworthy that Mearsheimer does not attribute the power competition

to fear in this case. Instead, he describes fear and power competition as
two dening characters of great power relations. Moreover, Mearsheimer
contends that when the ve assumptions are married together, they
create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively
with regard to each other. In particular, three general patterns of behavior
result: fear, self-help, and power maximization.53 Here Mearsheimer
argues that the power competition in which states attempt to maximize
their relative power vis--vis one another is rooted in his ve assumptions
rather than fear. Again, Mearsheimer identies fear and power maximiza-
tion (along with self-help) as two distinguishing features of great power
relations.
These inconsistencies open the offensive realism of Mearsheimer to
different readings. In this monograph, the interpretation in which fear
acts as the catalyst of power maximization is dismissed. Instead, fear and
power maximization are regarded as the effects of offensive realisms of the
ve assumptions. This reading is more consistent with the core elements of
the theory where these assumptions are identied as the drivers of state
behavior, as has been established.
If fear is not the facilitator of power maximization, then what work does
it do in Mearsheimers offensive realism? In this regard, Mearsheimer is
consistent. He maintains that the level of fear determines the intensity of
the security competition and the probability of war among states. The
more fearful the states are, the more intense the security competition and
the possibilities of war become and vice versa.54
To establish how the level of fear varies in interstate relations,
Mearsheimers offensive realism insists that one has to turn away from
anarchy and uncertainty and root it in capabilities instead. The reason is
that the two former factors are regarded to be constant features of inter-
national life that cannot explain variation. The latter is dynamic and can
therefore account for the variation in the levels of fear.55 Specically,
Mearsheimer maintains that three different concepts related to states
capabilities affect the levels of fear in IR: MAD, large bodies of water
and the balance of power.
As has been noted, Waltzs defensive realism maintains that MAD
generates unprecedented fear. Mearsheimer makes the opposite claim.
His offensive realism persists that MAD actually decreases the levels of
fear while its absence enhances interstate fear. Mearsheimer argues that
MAD decreases fear since both states realize that they will face their doom
if they use their nuclear weapons against one other under these conditions.
Realizing that their competitor will not jeopardize their own survival by
launching offensive attacks against them that may escalate to nuclear war,
states become less fearful of each other.56 In other words, since MAD
decreases the prospects of conict in offensive realism it is hypothesized to
bring the levels of fear down.
Large bodies of water is the second factor that affects the level of fear in
IR, according to Mearsheimers offensive realism. In this regard,
Mearsheimer asserts that when states are separated by large bodies of
water they have less to fear than in cases where this geographical barrier
does not exist. Large bodies of water limits states power projection cap-
abilities and makes it considerably harder for them to attack and conquer
one another. Conversely, these acts of aggression are far easier to carry out
when states share land and especially common borders.57
Finally, the offensive realism of Mearsheimer maintains that the balance
of power in the international system has major implications on the level of
fear as well. Mearsheimer maintains that bipolarity does not magnify the
fear that already exists in interstate relations. There is usually rough power
symmetry among the two great powers in such a constellation. This makes
it harder to beat the opposition and makes deterrence more robust.58 In a
balanced multipolarity, where there is no potential hegemon,59 the level of
fear rises. Power asymmetries are typically more apparent in interstate
relations during these conditions that weaken the constraints on the
most powerful state in such a system. An unbalanced multipolarity in
which a potential hegemon is present generates the greatest amount of
fear. There is a substantial power asymmetry between the potential hege-
mon and the rest that may impel the potential hegemon to behave
aggressively.60
It is apparent from these discussions that Mearsheimers offensive
realism equates fear with aggression. That fear needs to be met with
aggression is also explicitly conrmed by Mearsheimer himself.61 As has
already been noted, Mearsheimer claries exactly what type of aggression
fear provokes at the international level. How much states fear each other
matters greatly, because the amount of fear between them largely deter-
mines the severity of their security competition, as well as the probability
that they will ght a war. The more profound the fear is, the more intense
is the security competition, and the more likely is war.62 It is thus clear
that the effect of fear is aggression in the form of security competition and
war, according to offensive realism.
Altogether, this investigation illustrates that the ve assumptions

bring about fear in the rst place. They are thus the causes of fear
in Mearsheimers offensive realism. As these discussions also reveal,
Mearsheimer considers security competition and war as more intense
and probable when the level of fear is high. In short, Mearsheimer
equates the effects of fear with aggression in the form of security com-
petition and war.
THE EMPIRICAL ASPECT OF FEAR IN MEARSHEIMERS WORKS

An in-depth scrutiny of Mearsheimers publications reveals that he does
attribute the cause of fear to some of his bedrock assumptions and its effect
of aggression in his empirical analysis of international politics as well.
Starting with anarchy, Mearsheimer maintains that states still fear each
other in the post-Cold War world as a result of this structural factor.63
Survival appears more frequently in Mearsheimers empirical writings on
the cause of fear. Specically, Mearsheimer argues that Austria and France
passed the buck in the period of 18641870. They did so as a result of
their fear of a unied Germany on their doorstep that would pose a direct
threat to their survival.64 According to Mearsheimer, this emotion also
pervaded great power relations during the Cold War. Indeed, both the
USA and the USSR feared a nuclear war that would lead to their destruc-
tion.65 Finally, Mearsheimer notes that if Saddam Hussein would have
covertly supplied Al Qaeda with weapons to attack the USA he would have
to fear his own destruction.66
Capability is the most prominent bedrock assumption that Mearsheimer
most frequently uses as a cause of fear in his depiction of international
politics. According to Mearsheimer, Germany has been a cause of fear in
Europe since at least the 1870s. In this regard, Mearsheimer notes that the
latent capabilities of Wilhelmine Germany consisting of a large population
and a dynamic economy was enough to scare other European Great powers
such as the UK, France and Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In fact, these fears helped to create the Triple Entente between
the aforementioned states.67
Once, World War I was a fact, Mearsheimer contends that the Brits
lived in constant fear of German submarines, even when they were in
home port. But they were especially fearful of venturing into the North
Sea and being drawn near the German coast, where submarines might be
lying in wait.68 Before the outbreak of World War II, Mearsheimer notes
that the Soviets became increasingly fearful of Germany as their power had
grown remarkably during the 1930s.69
Mearsheimer hypothesizes that in a nuclear-free post-Cold War Europe
the minor Eastern European powers that lie in Germanys path to Russia
would come to fear its might.70 Mearsheimer insists that if Germany was
to seriously enhance its military capacity in the post-Cold War era it would
provoke fear in Paris.71 This would also be the case if the USA withdrew
from Europe. In turn, Germany would also come to fear France, causing
competition between them.72
Soviets capabilities have also been a great source of fear, according to
Mearsheimers analysis. In this regard, Mearsheimer claims that many in
the West feared that its wealth would surpass that of the USA during the
rst half of the Cold War.73 In fact, Mearsheimer contends that France,
West Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and eventually China considered the
Soviet Union, not the USA, to be the most powerful state in the system
and feared its army. That is why they allied with the USA rather than the
Soviet Union.74 The American leaders themselves were especially con-
cerned about the USSRs scientic achievements such as the launch of
the Sputnik satellite in 1957. The Americans saw this as an indication that
the Soviets latent capabilities might come to exceed that of their own.75
As a response to fears of a Soviet invasion of the oil-rich Iran that would
enhance its rivals power further, the USA created its Rapid Deployment
Force in the late 1970s, according to Mearsheimer.76 Finally, he persists
that the power of the Soviet Union would continue to spark fears among
small East European states that stand in its way to Germany.77
Mearsheimer also refers to the fear of NATO and the USA. Here,
Mearsheimer discusses the Soviet Unions fear of NATOs development
of a counteroffensive capability78 and conventional forces moving closer to
its border.79 Moreover, Mearsheimer notes that Soviet fears of US power
was the most important constraint on Stalins expansionism.80 Similarly,
both Russia and the USA feared Japans growing power. The latter sought
to contain it by keeping Russia strong and using it as a balancing force
against Japan.81 Mearsheimer also notes that virtually every country fears
even the thought of Japan seriously rearming itself.82
Mearsheimer often refers to the fear Chinas rise and latent capabilities
invoke among its neighbors in the post-Cold War era, including India,
Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, Vietnam and Australia as well as
the USA. That impels them to contain this East Asian giant in the mak-
ing.83 In the Middle East, Irans nuclear program along with its growing
inuence sparks fear that it might become powerful enough to coerce or

invade other countries in the region.84
In contrast, the uncertainty and rationality assumptions do not appear
as causes of fear in Mearsheimers empirical writings on international
politics. Aggression itself along with its manifestations of security compe-
tition and war however all appear in Mearsheimers empirical analysis.
With regard to the former, Mearsheimer contends that Germany feared
that Russia would supersede it in the near future. That is why they decided
to crush the Russians when World War I broke out.85 In the following
World War, Mearsheimer notes that America feared that Japan would help
the Germans to destroy the Soviet Union. If they were to succeed in this
endeavor, Germany would become the hegemon of Europe and Japan a
potential hegemon in Asia. This is a situation that the USA could not
tolerate. Therefore, they decided to move their military forces to Asia in
the fall of 1941 to deal with the Japanese threat.86
Without American presence in Europe, Mearsheimer hypothesizes
that Germany and Russia would fear that the other side would come
to dominate the critically important buffer zone between them.
Subsequently, this would likely lead to a serious security competition
between them for control of central Europe.87 Mearsheimer argues
that the absence of the American pacier would have similar effects on
Berlin and Paris and make them more competitive toward one
another.88 Similarly, Mearsheimer contends that the arms race
among East Asian powers is largely motivated by growing fear in
the region that the American pacier will not be there for the long
haul.89
According to Mearsheimer, the USA itself worried about the alleged
missile gap between them and the Soviets at the heights of the Cold War.
As a result, the Americans decided to signicantly escalate their ongoing
arms race.90 Moreover, Mearsheimer predicts that the long, unprotected
and shared border between Russia and Ukraine might provoke competi-
tion between them.91 Serious conict among these two countries might
also cause fear in Germany regarding growing Russian inuence in Eastern
Europe and lead to increased security competition.92 Finally, Mearsheimer
argues that the deep-seated fear of Japan in Asia that is partly a legacy of its
behavior between 1895 and 1945 may intensify the security competition
in this region.93
In relation to the Crimean War, Mearsheimer insists that Britain
invaded Russias Crimean Peninsula since it feared that Russian expansion
in the Black Sea region would threaten its lines of communication with
India.94 He also hypothesized that Russias and Ukraines fear of one
another makes war more likely between the two parties.95 Impressively,
he did so long before the 2013 Crimean Crisis took place. Mearsheimer
also predicted that the Russians might attempt to reconquer some of its
territory lost after the end of the Cold War. Under such conditions, the
Germans, Americans or Chinese could get dragged into wars for fear of a
Russian victory.96 With regard to the First Gulf War, Mearsheimer insists
that the US involvement was driven by their fear that other states might
conclude that they can get away with conquests. That is why the
Americans set out to stop Saddam Husseins invasion of Kuwait.97 This
war was also launched in the midst of Saudi Arabian pressures and the fears
of many American policymakers that this country would be invaded next if
they did not put an end to Iraqs ambitions.98 In the Second Gulf War,
Leslie Gelb admitted that his support of this campaign was rooted in
fear.99 Bush, on the other hand, attempted to scare the American popula-
tion into supporting this war.100
Like his realist predecessors, Mearsheimer also uses fear to account for
empirical phenomena that have little to do with his theoretical usage of
this primary emotion. For instance, fear is used in relation to lying,101
demographic issues,102 secrecy,103 cooperation,104 buck-passing,105 aid-
ing,106 etc. Moreover, Mearsheimers empirical use of fear sometimes even
contradicts the theoretical role he assigns this emotion. Whereas ration-
ality is one of the underlying causes of fear according to his theory, it never
appears in his empirical analysis of IR, as we have seen. Nevertheless,
Mearsheimer actually uses the opposing phenomena, irrationality, to
explain international events. This is clear when he writes that US leaders
feared Chinas acquisition of nuclear weapons because they thought Mao
Zedong was an irrational leader who might be willing to risk tens of
millions of people in a nuclear exchange.107
Furthermore, whereas aggression is supposed to be the effect of fear
according to the offensive realism of Mearsheimer, he frequently uses this
emotion to explain the opposite behavior at the international level
restraint. Specically, fear provokes the following responses on these
occasions: compels America to refrain from an amphibious assault against
Japan,108 averts war between China and Japan,109 prevents war among the
European allies of the USA,110 restraints Soviet expansionism,111 makes
Japan cautious in Southeast Asia,112 makes America reluctant to expand
into Europe and Asia,113 makes America unwilling to maintain troops in
Europe,114 urges Washington to arrange a ceasere between Israel and its

adversaries,115 leads to an opposition of American invasion of Iraq,116
propels peace between the Soviet Union and the USA,117 makes other
states in the Western Hemisphere reluctant to ght the USA,118 impels
China to behave more cautiously against its competitors119 and the British
military to avoid war.120
Overall, it is clear that there is overlap between Mearsheimers theore-
tical and empirical use of fear. The only causes of fear that do not appear in
his empirical analysis are uncertainty and irrationality. He does however
use this emotion to explain other areas of IR as well that is unrelated to the
role he affords fear in his theory. In fact, Mearsheimer even adopts this
emotion in ways that clashes with the place of fear in his offensive realism.
This is evident when he attributes the fear of Mao to his irrationality and
numerous cases where fear promotes restraint rather than aggression.
These are the empirical facets of fear in his work but its logical aspects
have yet to be explored. The next section looks into this issue by evaluat-
ing whether his theory is logically dependent on this emotion as well.
THE LOGICAL NEED OF FEAR IN MEARSHEIMERS

OFFENSIVE REALISM
At this point, it is important to point out that Mearsheimers offensive
realism suffers from a status quo bias, as I have already demonstrated at
length elsewhere. The aggressive behavior and power struggles that it
expects cannot be logically deduced from the theories ve assumptions,
the security dilemma or fear.121 The ve assumptions of offensive realism
cannot do so because rational states pursuing strategies for survival in the
condition of anarchy would hold their re until one of their rivals (whose
intentions are uncertain) threatens them with their offensive capability.
This time will however never come in Mearsheimers hypothetical offen-
sive realist world. States that cherish survival above everything else have no
incentives to draw rst blood and expose themselves to unnecessary harm.
At this point, one might argue that uncertainty is so prevalent that
even rational status quo powers may decide to strike preemptively
when the balance of power is in their favor according to the principle
of better safe than sorry. Such conclusions can however not be drawn
from Mearsheimers theoretical perspective. First, this reading suggests
that Mearsheimer gives higher weight to his uncertainty assumption
than either his rational actors or survival assumption but nowhere
does Mearsheimer makes such claims. The only hierarchical scheme

Mearsheimer outlines is with regard to state objectives where he main-
tains that [s]urvival is the number one goal of great powers, accord-
ing to my theory.122
Hence, one cannot claim that uncertainty trumps state rationality or the
desire for survival in Mearsheimers offensive realism. As such, one cannot
argue that uncertainty may impel the rational status quo powers of
Mearsheimer to behave aggressively either. Every time states engage in
violence, they risk undermining their prospect for survival, which is their
sole and primary assumed goal, according to Mearsheimers theory. This is
the case even when the balance of power favors the aggressor. Throughout
international history, weaker powers have after all occasionally defeated super-
ior foes. Sometimes, David does beat Goliath, in the international system.123
Furthermore, states equipped with nuclear weapons can more easily
destroy one another than ever before. Since only a few nuclear missiles
were successfully launched against the major cities of another state, it is
usually sufcient to abolish it. Under these conditions, even small
nuclear-armed states can thus undermine the survival of far larger
nations.124 As a result, even mighty rational status quo powers have no
rational reasons for engaging in aggression in Mearsheimers offensive
realism. Indeed, the shared rational pursuit for survival of all states can
best be attained if they all simply refrain from aggression. As Mearsheimer
himself points out, states engage in calculated aggression and weigh
the costs and risks of offense against the likely benets. If the benets do
not outweigh the risks, they sit tight and wait for a more propitious
moment.125 In Mearsheimers hypothetical world of all rational status
quo states, the benets of peace always trump the risks associated with
aggression.
The security dilemma cannot help offensive realism in this regard
either. Staying true to the logic of this concept, Mearsheimer conrms
that he do[es] not assume that states have aggressive intentions.126
Instead, he starts with the premise that states are benign rational actors
and that the structure of the international system forces them to behave as
revisionists.127 Status quo powers who have little to gain and everything to
lose by engaging in security competition should then just sit tight and
avoid this form of self-defeating behavior, as Mearsheimer himself points
out in the passage quoted earlier.
Out of the factors that Mearsheimer considers in relation to the security
dilemma, only miscalculation can create the world of offensive realism.
Most importantly, however, the inclusion of miscalculation would be at

odds with its rational actors assumption. Indeed, Mearsheimer contends
that offensive realism can only account for state behavior when they act
rationally, that is, in accordance with the dictates of offensive realism.
When they act irrationally, their actions pose anomalies for the theory.
This is, for instance, the case when states make miscalculations.128 Since
miscalculation would be at odds with his own theory, Mearsheimer expli-
citly contends that offensive realism does not account for international
politics on the basis of this irrational factor.129 As a result, offensive realism
cannot create its world on the basis of miscalculation in the security
dilemma either.
This brings us to the last factor that can save offensive realism
logicallyfear. The inclusion of this emotion does not nevertheless
help Mearsheimers theory to overcome its status quo bias. In fact, it
is counterproductive as it only reinforces the status quo bias of his
offensive realism. The reason for this is simple. Fear is a defensive
mechanism. The preferred option in the state of fear is defensive beha-
vior rather than offensive behavior if the circumstances allow it. Only
when this option is absent does fear promote aggressive behavior.130
In Mearsheimers world, there is no need to resort to violence when in
fear since all states are assumed to be rational status quo powers that
merely seek to ensure their own survival. Consequently, they have no
rational reason to ght one another in the rst place and the circumstances
clearly favor a nonaggressive response to fear. Mearsheimers uncertainty
assumption is not sufcient to save him in this regard either. As we have
seen in the chapters on Morgenthau and Waltz, uncertainty must also
provoke irrational behavior among states if fear is to provoke aggression
among status quo powers. As has already been established, the only
irrational factor that Mearsheimer considers in this regard, miscalculation,
is not incorporated into his theory. In fact, it clashes with his rational
actors assumption. With these points in mind, it is not hard to understand
why Mearsheimer himself explicitly denies explaining international politics
on the basis of miscalculation. At this point, there is therefore nothing left
in Mearsheimers narrative that can impel his status quo power to behave
aggressively toward one another under the inuence of fear. On the
contrary, fear will create even stronger incentives for Mearsheimers status
quo states to avoid aggressive behavior under the conditions he himself
portrays. That is why the inclusion of fear is counterproductive in gener-
ating Mearsheimers world.
One might object to these conclusions and claim that since the ight
option does not exist at the international level states have no option but to
ght under the condition of fear. This argument cannot even withstand
the scrutiny of Mearsheimers own empirical analysis of fear in IR. As we
saw in the previous section, Mearsheimer points out to a wide variety of
international events where fear promoted restraint rather than aggression
in practice. Even Mearsheimers own empirical evaluation thus under-
mines his equation of fear with aggression. Furthermore, if fear cannot
be escaped or reduced to a trivial level in international politics, as
Mearsheimer claims and invariably promotes aggressive behavior, then
we would have never experienced peace at the international scene. This
is clearly empirically false and shows that fear does stimulate restraint in IR
as well.
In sum, this inquiry illustrates that the available evidence does not
support Mearsheimers equivalence of fear with aggression. On the con-
trary, the data demonstrates that fear will lead to restraint in Mearsheimers
world. As such, this emotion only reinforces the status quo bias of his
theory. Fear is thus not only unnecessary for making his offensive realism
work logically but is actually counterproductive in this regard.
THE LOGICAL CONSISTENCY OF FEAR IN MEARSHEIMERS

OFFENSIVE REALISM
Not only is fear logically redundant and detrimental to Mearsheimers
offensive realism but is also logically incompatible with it. Just like Waltzs
defensive realism, Mearsheimers offensive realism is also a structural
theory of international politics.131 Mearsheimer explicitly makes clear
what the structural factors of his theory are, anarchy and the distribution
of power.132 Nowhere is fear listed as a structural element. Moreover,
Mearsheimer argues that because of the strict focus on structural dynamics
offensive realism faces anomalies when unit-level factors dominate a
states decision-making process.133 Since Mearsheimer does not consider
fear a structural factor in his theory, it must operate at the unit level or any
other level of analysis that his theory is not designed to explain. Either
way, its inclusion is logically inconsistent with Mearsheimers framework
as it is evidently not a structural factor.
At this point, it might be argued that fear has structural roots in
Mearsheimers offensive realism. It is after all generated by the theories
of ve assumptions. Out of these premises, it is however only anarchy that

is structural. Since fear arises as a result of all of the ve assumptions and
not solely due to anarchy, it cannot be claimed that the sources of fear in
offensive realism are entirely structural either.134 As we have also seen, the
level of fear varies with states capabilities in the form of MAD, large
bodies of water and the balance of power, according to Mearsheimer.
Although the distribution of capabilities is a structural factor, capabilities
in general are not. Indeed, as Waltz points out, capabilities are unit-level
attributes that tells us something about units and do not belong to the
structure. It is only the distribution of capabilities that may be considered
as a structural variable as Mearsheimer himself also concurs.135
This makes balance of power the only structural variable out of the
three elements of capabilities that affect the level of fear.136 MAD and
large bodies of water are however not structural factors. MAD refers to
dyads where both parties are equipped with nuclear weapons.
Mearsheimer himself sensibly acknowledges that MAD only exists
between some states such as the USSR and the USA but not between
Athens-Sparta or Rome-Carthage since nuclear weapons were rst
deployed in 1945.137 In short, Mearsheimer does not consider it as a
systemic factor. Similarly, large bodies of water is not a structural factor
either. Mearsheimer claims that only insular states such as the UK, Japan
and the USA are separated from other states by large bodies of water.
Continental states such as France, Germany and Russia are not.138 In
other words, this geographical factor is not treated as a structural concept
in Mearsheimers offensive realism either. As such, the level of fear is only
partly rooted in structural factors.
Altogether, these ndings suggest that fear is logically inconsistent with
Mearsheimers own framework. Fear itself is not a structural factor in
offensive realism, making it incompatible with this systemic approach.
Even the vast majority of the assumptions that are supposed to bring
about fear are not structural. The same is true with regard to the level of
fear. Balance of power is the only structural factor that impacts the level of
fear. MAD and large bodies of water are not. Fear is thus undoubtedly
logically incompatible with Mearsheimers offensive realism. Since fear is
both logically counterproductive to create Mearsheimers world and is
incompatible with other dimensions of his theory, this emotion could
not have been anymore logically detrimental to his offensive realism. A
summary of not only the logical aspect of fear in Mearsheimers work but
the entire chapter as a whole follows next.
SUMMARY
The current chapter has investigated the role of fear in Mearsheimers writ-
ings. Only a few generic statements are made with regard to this emotion in
Mearsheimers body of work. From these discussions, it is apparent that he
considers it as a response to threat that cannot be overcome but whose level
varies. The level of fear is explored at greater length and Mearsheimer
identies capabilities consisting of MAD, large bodies of water and the
balance of power as its drivers. Moreover, fear, in general, and the level of
fear, in particular, are central to his offensive realism. Specically, higher
levels of fear make security competition more intense and war more likely.
The lower the level of fear, the more peaceful interstate relations become.
Just as in his theory, fear is also empirically used in relation to his
bedrock assumptions of anarchy, survival and uncertainty as well as aggres-
sion in the form of security competition and war. The uncertainty and
rationality assumption do not however appear as causes of fear in
Mearsheimers empirical writings on international politics as they do in
his theory. He does however go beyond his theoretical restriction and uses
this emotion to account for a wide variety of issues in IR, including those
that clash with his own theoretical assumptions. In this regard,
Mearsheimer employs fear to account for irrational behavior and identies
numerous empirical cases where fear promotes restraint rather than
aggression in international politics.
Moreover, fear is detrimental to Mearsheimers framework. Indeed,
fear only impels his rational status quo states to shy away from confronta-
tion rather than actively seeking it, as Mearsheimer wrongfully assumes.
That is because fear is a defensive mechanism where restraint is preferred if
the circumstances allow it. In Mearsheimers world of all rational status
quo powers, such a response is clearly viable. This interpretation is rein-
forced by Mearsheimers own analysis that suggests that fear has prompted
restraint at the international level. Mearsheimers inclusion of fear to his
theory is therefore counterproductive in producing the aggression that
offensive realism presumes. Furthermore, fear is logically incompatible
with Mearsheimers own structural theory. This is evident since fear itself
is not identied as a structural variable by Mearsheimer and most of the
assumptions that bring about fear or affect the level of fear are not listed as
structural factors either.
By now the role of fear in the publications of Morgenthau, Waltz and
Mearsheimer has been identied. At this point, it is therefore appropriate
to compare and contrast them with one another and draw out the implica-
tions of this study. This is the subject of the nal chapter.
NOTES
1. Mearsheimer 2011c, 2122, 46, 59, 6162, 9091.
3. See, ibid., 4245.
4. Ibid., 5, 15, 1922.
5. Mearsheimer however abandons his unitary actors assumption in practice.
See, Pashakhanlou, Back to the Drawing Board, 216217.
6. Mearsheimer 2006c, 231.
7. Ibid.
8. Mearsheimer 2009a.
9. Mearsheimer 2001b, 17, 422 60. Special attention is afforded to great
powers as they have the largest impact on international events and shape
the world in their own image. Mearsheimer claims that there is a prescriptive
element to his theory as well as [s]tates should behave according to the
dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a
dangerous world. Ibid., 11, emphasis in original.
10. Mearsheimer 2006b, 112, 122.
11. Mearsheimer 2001b, 32. As we will see in later parts of this chapter,
Mearsheimer is actually inconsistent on which of his ve assumptions that
are needed to bring about fear in his offensive realism.
12. Mearsheimer 2006b, 112, 122.
13. Mearsheimer 2001b, 5556, 6061.
15. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 152153.
18. Mearsheimer, Tragedy, p. 155.
20. Ibid., 157159.
21. Just as in Waltzs defensive realism, unipolarity is heavily under-theorized in
Mearsheimers offensive realism. Again, unipolarity also undermines the
explanatory power of Mearsheimers theory. See, Pashakhanlou 2014.
23. Ibid., 8588.
25. Ibid., 30.
26. Al-Tamimi 2013, 6 Also see,; Phythian 2011, 131; Wagner 2007, 13.
28. Brown 2012, 76; Rudolph and Rudolph 2008, 53 n. 15; Al-Tamimi 2013, 6.
30. Ibid., 32.
31. Dierauer 2013, 32; Schmidt 2013, 233; Fettweis 2010, 64.
32. Mearsheimer 2001b, 52 also see, 34, 46, 50, 361.
33. Davis 2011, 7; Lemke 2004, 54; Little 2007, 218.
34. Mearsheimer 2001b, 334, chapter 9.
35. Barkin 2010, 128.
36. Kydd 2005, 15; Thayer 2004, 65; Wohlforth 2010, 13.
38. Ibid., 345.
39. Ibid., 32.
40. Ibid., 42.
41. Mearsheimer 1995b, 30; Mearsheimer 2001b, 3, 43; Mearsheimer 2004,
184, 187; Mearsheimer 2006c, 231.
42. Mearsheimer 1995, 11; Mearsheimer 2001b, 32.
44. Ibid., 43.
47. Mearsheimer 1995, 31; Mearsheimer 2006c, 232.
48. Dierauer 2013, 32; Geunwook Lee 2002, 200 n. 14; Tang 2008, 10 n. 3;
Thayer 2004, 65.
50. Ibid., xi.
51. Ibid., 345.
52. Ibid., 2.
53. Ibid., 32.
54. Ibid., 4243.
55. Ibid., 43.
56. Ibid., 44.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., 4445, 338, 346.
59. A potential hegemon is a states that has the most formidable army as well as
the most latent power among all the states located in its region by a
relatively large margin. Ibid., 45.
60. Ibid., 4445.
63. Ibid., 361.
64. Ibid., 292.
65. Mearsheimer 1984, 25; Mearsheimer 2001b, 151.
66. Mearsheimer and Walt 2003b.

67. Mearsheimer 2001b, 144, 188, 214, 297.
68. Ibid., 117118.
69. Ibid., 43; Mearsheimer 2004, 187.
72. Ibid., 117.
74. Ibid., 85.
75. Ibid., 56.
76. Ibid., 150.
77. Mearsheimer 1990, 39.
78. Mearsheimer 1984, 31 n. 31.
80. Ibid., 474 n. 78.
81. Ibid., 177178.
83. Mearsheimer 1998a sec. 4; Mearsheimer 2001b, 144; Mearsheimer 2005c;
Mearsheimer 2006a, 162; Mearsheimer 2010a; Mearsheimer 2010b, 90;
Mearsheimer 2010c, 382, 390391; Mearsheimer 2010d.
85. Mearsheimer 2001b, 470 n. 45.
87. Mearsheimer 2001a, 53; Mearsheimer 2001b, 395; Mearsheimer 2010e,
396.
89. Mearsheimer 1998a.
92. Ibid.; Mearsheimer 2010e, 396.
94. Mearsheimer 1998b, 241 n. 39; Mearsheimer 2001b, 497498 n. 93.
96. Ibid., 53.
100. Mearsheimer and Walt 2002, 7; Mearsheimer and Walt 2003a, 56.
101. Mearsheimer 2011, 3133, 38, 45, 6364, 67.
102. Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 87, 8990, 217.
103. Ibid., 76.
104. Mearsheimer and Walt 2006b, 236.
105. Mearsheimer 2001b, 292, 296.

106. Ibid., 324; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 43.
109. Ibid., 177.
110. Ibid., 340341.
111. Ibid., 474 n. 78.
112. Ibid., 221.
113. Ibid., 235.
116. Ibid., 254.
121. Pashakhanlou 2013.
123. Shaohua 2009.
124. Sagan and Waltz 2003.
127. Mearsheimer 2001b, 414 n. 7.
128. Mearsheimer 2009, 244246.
129. Mearsheimer 2001b, 422 n. 2; Mearsheimer 2006c, 241.
130. hman 2008, 709.
132. Ibid., 10.
133. Ibid., 11.
134. As has already been established, the alternative readings where only one or a
few of the ve assumptions are responsible for bringing about this emotion
have already been dismissed.
135. Waltz 1979a, 9798.
137. Ibid., 358359.
138. Ibid., 126.
CHAPTER 6
Fear in Realism and Beyond
INTRODUCTION
Indeed, the opening section of this chapter is dedicated to the task of
detecting similarities and dissimilarities with regard to the conceptual role
of fear in the works of the three selected realist thinkers. The following
three sections accomplish the same task with reference to the theoretical,
empirical and logical aspect of fear in the aforementioned theories. These
ndings are subsequently related to the prevailing wisdom within the eld
that regards fear as vital to realism. In doing so, it debunks the myths that
exist in the eld and considers why they have come to pervade the eld.
These tasks are accomplished in the Section The literature on fear in
realism. An explanation of why these scholars might incorporate this
emotion in their frameworks even though it is logically counterproductive
is addressed over the three succeeding sections. Subsequently, a roadmap
is provided of how realism can successfully address fear. A summary briey
recaps the discussions of this chapter.
THE CONCEPTION OF FEAR

The results of the inquiry indicate that fear is never dened in the works of
Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer considered in this monograph.
Nonetheless, they do make some generic statements about this emotion.
Morgenthau explicitly treats fear as an emotion that operates at both the
individual and collective (state) level that can in some conditions be

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41012-8_6
escaped in international politics, at least among non-rivaling states.1

Morgenthau never develops these assertions any further.
Waltzs sheds light on his notion of fear when he claims that it can be
both real and imaginary. He also conrms that fear cannot be overcome
even by the strongest economic forces on the international scene.2 These
are the only general insights he offers on this emotion. Waltzs conception
of fear is thus even thinner than that of Morgenthau.
Mearsheimer is more insightful. He regards fear as a response to threats
and an inescapable feature of international politics. In addition, he con-
siders it a concept whose level can vary across time and space.3 The rst
two statements are not elaborated upon, but Mearsheimer provides a
detailed account of how the level of fear alters. He attributes this to
three factors related to capabilities, namely MAD, the balance of power
and large bodies of water.4 This aspect of fear is well developed in
Mearsheimers work.
The common denominator between all these scholars is thus that none
of them dene fear but provide some insights on whether fear can be
overcome at the international level. Morgenthau suggests that it can be
escaped under certain conditions, Waltz contends that no economic fac-
tors can override it, while fear is inevitable in Mearsheimers world. As
such, Morgenthaus position is more optimistic about the prospects of
overcoming fear in international affairs than that of Mearsheimer.
Mearsheimers claim that fear can never be reduced to trivial level in
international politics suggests that this emotion always inuences state
behavior. This stands in contrast to Morgenthaus analysis in which fear
is absent from interstate relations at times. These differences could explain
why Mearsheimer places the level of fear at the center of his theory,
whereas this emotion is peripheral to Morgenthaus theory. Fear is after
all always evident in Mearsheimers world but not in that of Morgenthau.
Moreover, Morgenthau only uses fear in references to status quo powers
in his theory. That gives him even less incentives to place this emotion at
the heart of his theory since it only applies to these state types and not the
imperialist powers.
Waltzs stance is too underdeveloped to allow for a direct comparison
with that of Morgenthau and Mearsheimer on this issue. The statement
that fear trumps economy does not clarify whether this emotion is ulti-
mately escapable at the international stage. Insights on this topic can
however be gained by examining the theoretical role he assigns fear in
his defensive realism. Fear is only used in relation to external balancing or
6 FEAR IN REALISM AND BEYOND 119
alliance formation in Waltzs defensive realism. As Waltz also makes clear,

external balancing or alliance formation is only possible in multipolarity,
where there is at least another great power that the other parties can form
alliances with. In unipolarity and bipolarity, this option is not available
since there is by denition no third party to build coalitions with. As Waltz
himself puts it, [t]he external game of alignment and realignment
requires three or more players.5
As a result, fear can only be a part of Waltzs world under multipolarity
and not under unipolarity and bipolarity. Since Waltz himself conrms
that unipolar and bipolar systems have existed throughout the course of
history and are possible, it means this emotion cannot be an inherent
factor of international politics in his theoretical framework.6 This could
also explain why Waltz only affords fear a marginal role in his defensive
realism. This emotion is after all only possible in multipolarity and only
becomes evident when they engage in external balancing due to mutual
fear.
Overall, the evidence unanimously indicates that the level of fear in the
works of Mearsheimer is the only aspect of this emotion that is well
developed. In other respects, the three realist scholars provide very little
insight on the nature of fear. These tendencies can also be discerned in the
different theoretical role they afford this emotion in their respective realist
statements.
THE THEORETICAL ROLE OF FEAR

Morgenthau reserves fear to the interactions between status quo powers at
the margins of his classical realism. In his narrative, fear arises when status
quo states mistake one another for revisionist powers and consequently
come to pursue imperialist polices toward one another. Unless this mis-
perception is corrected in time, these status quo powers will inevitably
clash in an unnecessary war.7
The original cause of fear in Morgenthaus classical realism is thus
misperception of the others type. It is after all this mistaken belief that
breeds fear among status quo powers that wrongfully regard one another
as imperialists. The effects of this emotion are the pursuit of imperialist
policies such as armaments, fortications and alliances. Due to the cyclical
nature of these dynamics, the policies of armaments, fortications and
alliances can however also generate fear in subsequent interactions.8
These discussions also highlight that fear is used alongside misperception
to provide an explanation of why even status quo states might ght wars
with one another and pursue imperialist policies.
Fear plays an even more marginal role in the defensive realism of Waltz.
Specically, fear is the primary common interest that brings about alliance
formation or external balancing. This is evident when Waltz maintains that
[i]nterdependence breeds hostility and fear. With more than two parties,
hostility and fear may lead A and B to seek the support of C.9 Alliances
are made by states that have some but not all of their interests in common.
The common interest is ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states but
may also be harbored by antagonism.10 In other words, the cause of fear is
interdependence while its effect is external balancing or alliance formation
in Waltzs theory.
Fear is one of the three key behaviors (along with self-help and power
maximization) that are supposed to follow from the ve assumptions of
Mearsheimers offensive realism.11 The level of fear varies with states
capabilities: MAD, large bodies of water and the balance of power. The
severity of security competition and prospect of war varies exponentially
with the level of fear. The more fearful the states are, the more intense their
security competition becomes and the more likely war becomes.12 The
causes of fear in Mearsheimers offensive realism are thus its ve assump-
tions, which include anarchy, uncertainty, capability, rationality and survi-
val. Its effect is aggression in the form of security competition and war.
All of these theories thus use fear in relation to status quo powers even if
the inclusion of these states is suspect in Morgenthaus theoretical frame-
work, as highlighted in Chap. 3. In Waltzs and Mearsheimers theories,
there is no room for the inclusion of different state types. That is so since
they both treat states as security-seeking unitary actors, even though at
least Mearsheimers offensive realism abandons its unitary actors assump-
tion in practice, as I have highlighted elsewhere.13 This is the only simi-
larity that all these scholars share with regard to the theoretical role they
ascribe to fear in their respective realist statements.
Further parallels only exist between Morgenthaus and Mearsheimers
theoretical usages of fear. Both these scholars attempt to explain war
through fear, although they evidently do so in different ways. Otherwise,
there is little overlap between the examined realist statements.
Morgenthau associates fear with imperialist policies, Waltz with external
balancing and Mearsheimer with security competition and war. In contrast
to his realist predecessors, Mearsheimers offensive realism also pays close
attention to the variation in the level of fear.
For our purposes, the most crucial nding is that fear is peripheral to
Morgenthaus classical realism and Waltzs defensive realism, whereas this
emotion is afforded a central role in Mearsheimers offensive realism.
Although fear is peripheral to both Morgenthau and Waltz, it is evident
that the former attaches a greater signicance to fear than the latter. That
is so since Waltz only considers fear as the primary common interest to
account for external balancing. In contrast, fear is used to explain the
central issue of war among status quo states in Morgenthaus classical
realism.
THE LOGIC OF FEAR

Although it is apparent that all of the examined scholars include fear in
their theoretical frameworks, none of them actually need to incorporate it
in order to create their respective realist worlds. In the case of
Morgenthau, the fearful status quo powers caught in the security dilemma
are not even compatible with his own theoretical framework. As all states
are assumed to be driven by the animus dominandi and seek to maximize
their power, they should all be imperialists by his own denition of the
term. Morgenthau fails to provide an explanation of how status quo
powers could possibly exist in such an order.14 Even if we disregard the
incompatibility of status quo powers with Morgenthaus classical realism,
he still does not need to rely on fear to make his theory work logically.
Instead, he can simply stick to the core of his theory and argue that it is the
struggle for power that generates balance of power politics and occasion-
ally provokes war between states. This provides a more logically consistent
and parsimonious account of the outcomes Morgenthau envisions.
Furthermore, the inclusion of fear itself is not even compatible with his
theoretical framework. Indeed, Morgenthau himself explicitly claims that
emotions such as fear are irrational while he purports to present a rational
theory of international politics. Furthermore, he gives fear an irrational
role in his theory as it is used along misperception to explain unnecessary
wars among status quo powers. The supposed rationality of his theory of
international politics is thus discordant with his irrational understanding
and treatment of fear. It is thus evident that Morgenthau does not need
this emotion to make his classical realism work logically and its inclusion
is actually damaging as it generates internal inconsistencies within the
framework. From a logical point of view, his inclusion of fear is thus
counterproductive.
Waltz does not need fear to make his theory work either, despite
Donnellys and Webers claims to the contrary.15 Schwellers and
Webers statements regarding the inability of Waltz to generate his defen-
sive realist world on the basis of his explicit assumptions are accurate.
Status quo states that are merely concerned with their own survival have
no valid reasons to engage in balance of power politics that might end up
in war. Instead, they can all attain their shared goal of survival by simply
living in peace and harmony with one another. Webers solution of adding
fear to the story does not however solve this problem. In an anarchic
environment of all status quo powers, states would have no reason to fear
one another if they could all be sure that the others did not wish to harm
them and were only concerned with their own survival.
The missing ingredient in Waltzs narrative is not fear but uncertainty.
It needs to be supplemented with misperception to provoke suboptimal
state behavior. Together, uncertainty and misperception can explain the
rise of security competition, conict and war among status quo powers. In
this story, status quo states come to misperceive one another types and
wrongfully believe that they are confronted with a revisionist power under
the condition of uncertainty as in Morgenthaus narrative. In turn, this
state of affairs may provoke hostility among them and generate conict
between them. This undermines Webers and Donnellys contention
regarding the necessity of fear for bringing about balance of power politics
in Waltzs world.
In fact, incorporating fear to Waltzs defensive realism only accentuates
the problems of the theory. That is because Waltzs theory is supposed to
be a structural theory of international politics that is not supposed to
include unit-level factors in order to avoid reductionism. As Waltz himself
explicitly contends however, fear is not a structural factor but belongs to
either the rst and/or the second image. As such, this emotion should not
have any place in his defensive realism and its incorporation only creates
internal inconsistencies within the theory. Since fear is unnecessary to
generate the outcomes Waltzs defensive realism presumes and is incon-
sistent with his model, this emotion is counterproductive to his
framework.
Mearsheimers offensive realism also suffers from a status quo bias. The
aggressive behavior and power struggles that it presumes cannot be logi-
cally deduced from the theories ve assumptions, fear or the security
dilemma.16 The addition of fear only reinforces the status quo bias of
offensive realism. That is because fear is a defensive mechanism and
encourages restraint rather than aggressive behavior under permissible

conditions. In Mearsheimers world of all rational status quo states, this
option is readily available. In fact, Mearsheimer himself refers to numer-
ous empirical cases in international politics where fear leads to restraint
rather than aggression. If there is an irreducible fear in the international
system as Mearsheimer persists, the rational status quo states of offensive
realism who merely want to survive have even stronger incentives to
avoid aggressive behavior.17 The inclusion of fear is therefore not only
unnecessary for making Mearsheimers theory work but is actually logi-
cally counterproductive.
To make things worse, fear is not even compatible with Mearsheimers
theory. His offensive realism is supposed to be a structural theory of
international politics revolving around anarchy and the distribution of
capabilities. Fear is however never mentioned as a structural variable by
Mearsheimer. Four out of the ve assumptions that are supposed to bring
about fear are not structural either, with the exception of anarchy. Neither
are two out of the three factors that are supposed to affect the levels of
fear, namely MAD and large bodies of water. Only the balance of power is
structural. Incorporating fear is thus not only counterproductive in gen-
erating Mearsheimers offensive realist world but actually creates further
logical aws within the theory by making it internally inconsistent.
The results of this study thus clearly illustrate that none of these
scholars actually need fear to create their respective realist worlds.
Additionally, this emotion is inconsistent with their respective frame-
works. In the case of Morgenthaus classical realism, it would have
been logically advantageous to focus exclusively on imperialist states
and their ruthless power competition to make his narrative compelling.
Fear also clashes with his desire to formulate a rational theory of
international politics since he regards emotions as irrational. For
Waltzs theory, it is uncertainty and misperception that are needed to
promote suboptimal behavior among his status quo states and not
fear.18 The incorporation of this emotion is also inconsistent with his
structuralism. The offensive realism of Mearsheimer fares worst in this
regard. Not only is fear logically superuous but its inclusion actually
reinforces the status quo bias of the theory and is incompatible with
the structural pretenses of his theory.
It is noteworthy that none of the scholars actually gain anything logi-
cally by adding fear to their respective brands of realism. In fact, fear is
logically counterproductive to all of the examined theories. Interestingly,
Mearsheimer, who attributes fear the most central role in his theory,
actually loses the most logically by incorporating this emotion to his
offensive realism.
THE LITERATURE ON FEAR IN REALISM

These ndings support and challenge claims made regarding fear in rea-
lism. At the conceptual level, these revelations support the contention that
fear is explicit in realism.19 However, it partly challenges the claims
regarding the underdeveloped and implicit assumptions of fear in rea-
lism.20 Mearsheimers discussions regarding the levels of fear are after all
systematic and all of the selected realists make explicit assumption regard-
ing this emotion as well. The suggestion that realists neglect fear due to
their rational conception of international politics is even more proble-
matic.21 Both Morgenthau and Mearsheimer make the rational actors
assumption but that does not stop them from drawing on this emotion.
Morgenthau does so even though he explicitly argues that emotions such
as fear are irrational.
Furthermore, the arguments regarding the centrality of fear in realist
theory are too generic to hold true across all cases.22 In fact, this proposi-
tion only holds true with regard to Mearsheimers offensive realism where
the level of fear is particularly prominent. This contention is however
problematic in relation to the classical realism of Morgenthau and espe-
cially the defensive realism of Waltz where fear is only afforded a marginal
role. The IR literature thus tends to exaggerate the centrality of fear in
realist theory. Although, propositions regarding the centrality of fear in
Mearsheimers specic theory are accurate.23
Both the detractors24 and advocates25 of the realist tradition are also
right to emphasize the empirical importance of fear within this school of
thought. Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer all make extensive use of
fear to explain major international events, including some of the biggest
wars in history such as World War I and World War II. Although this
evaluation cannot verify whether this applies to realism at large, fear is
undoubtedly central to its prominent representatives covered in this study.
Generics claims about the logical importance of fear in realism in
general or the specic realisms dealt in this book are all problematic.26
That is because fear is not only logically insignicant to all of the examined
realist theories but also counterproductive as it creates various inconsisten-
cies within the frameworks. In other words, fear is not logically helpful
but harmful across the board. The statements regarding the logical signi-
cance of fear made in the literature could thus not be any further from
the truth.
At this point, on may wonder why the secondary literature misinter-
prets the role of fear in realism to this grave extent. There are different
reasons for this. First, there have not been any systematic and rigorous
attempts to study this issue. The current understanding is at best based on
impressionistic analysis of realist texts and cherry-picking of realist quotes.
At worst, they rely on stereotypical images of realism and empty assertions,
as we have seen on numerous occasions. This is not a viable method for
attaining accurate results.
Second, the literature has suffered from the tendency of treating realism
as a single unied monolithic block. Indeed, many scholars make wide
generalizations about the role of fear in realism on the basis of claims made
by Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes or any other thinker associated with
realism. These analyses fail to realize that the rich realist tradition cannot
be reduced to a single or handful scholars. Neither is there a unied
position on fear in realism. For instance, although there are some simila-
rities between Morgenthaus, Waltzs and Mearsheimers usages of fear,
there are major differences between them as well. This also explains why
analyses that restrict their arguments about fear in relation to specic
realist statements usually fare better than those that make broad
generalizations.
Third, the secondary literature does not tend to provide a rigorous
conception of fear that is applied to their analysis of realism. That does of
course make it very difcult to determine how fear affects realism. It is
hard to make accurate inferences if one has not clearly established what
fear is and what its implications are. In other words, these analyses of fear
are either based on thin air, an unaccounted and/or underdeveloped
notion of fear. Neither of these approaches satises scholarly requirements
for serious investigations.
Fourth, the realist scholars themselves bear responsibility for creating
confusion in the literature. Morgenthaus, Waltzs and Mearsheimers
writings all contain inconsistencies and so do their claims about fear.
That makes their works susceptible to different interpretations and may
lead to a misunderstanding of their positions. These issues make it more
difcult to accurately establish the relationship between realism and fear.
Realists themselves must therefore also bear some of the responsibility for
the invalid claims that pervade the literature.
The question that might emerge at this point is why the examined
realist scholars afford fear the particular role they ascribe it in their the-
ories. The next three sections will be directed at answering this question
with regard to all these realist thinkers, starting with Morgenthau.
WHY FEAR? MORGENTHAU

The main reason Morgenthau decides to include status quo powers and
fear into his framework is most likely rooted in his empirical analysis of
international politics. Indeed, it is obvious from Morgenthaus writings
that he considers both status quo powers and fear as essential elements of
interstate relations. He, for instance, attributes both the Franco-German
War of 1870 and World War I in 1914 to fear-induced security dilemma
dynamics among status quo powers.27 As Morgenthau himself puts it, the
other fundamental error into which those responsible for the conduct of
foreign affairs are most likely to fall is to mistake a policy of the status
quo for a policy of imperialism. Morgenthau subsequently suggests that
the history of European diplomacy between the Franco-German War of
1870 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 illustrates this
situation.28
Nonetheless, Morgenthau subsequently leaves the Franco-German War
aside and only expands on the outbreak of World War I. In a passage
worth quoting at length, Morgenthau demonstrates how central he con-
siders fear to be in this war.
[T]he fear of hostile alliances led to the formation of the Triple Alliance.
Then, the fear of the latters dissolution led to the severance, on the part of
Germany, of the friendly relations with Russia. Finally, the fear of the
intentions of the Triple Alliance brought about the Franco-Russian
Alliance. It was the mutual fears of these two defensive alliances and the
general insecurity created by the erratic character of the imperialistic utter-
ances of William II which inspired the diplomatic maneuvers during the two
decades before the First World War. These maneuvers sought either new
combinations destructive of existing alignments or the support of powers,
thus far aloof, for the existing alliances. In the end, the general conagration
in 1914 was made inevitable by the fear that the other side would change
the power relations decisively in its favor if not forestalled by such a change
in ones own favor. In the two antagonistic blocs, Russia and Austria
especially were animated by this fear. The fear of the others suspected
imperialism bred imperialism in reaction, which, in turn, gave substance to

the original fear.29
At another point, Morgenthau also gives a fear-centric account of the

rise of World War I.
After 1870 Germany had no reason to be afraid, but she fortied herself
with armaments and the Triple Alliance in order that she might never have
reason to be afraid in the future. France naturally was afraid after 1870, and
she made her military preparations and the Dual Alliance (with Russia).
Britain, with a very small Army and a very large Empire, became rst
uncomfortable and then (particularly when Germany began a big-Beet
programme) afraid of isolation. She made the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,
made up her quarrells with France and Russia, and entered into the
Entente. Finally, Germany became afraid that she would presently be
afraid, and struck the blow, while she believed her power to be still
invincible.30
Indeed, the alliance formations in the buildup of World War were fear-
driven in Morgenthaus analysis.
In 1879, Germany and Austria concluded an alliance for mutual defense

against Russia, and, in 1894, France and Russia entered into a defensive
alliance against the German-Austrian combination. The mutual fear lest the
other alliance be intent upon changing the status quo while professing to
maintain it was one of the main factors in bringing about the general
conagration of the First World War.31
The arms race that preceded the war was also rooted in fear, according
to Morgenthau.
The necessary corollary of the armaments race is a constantly increasing

burden of military preparations devouring an ever greater portion of the
national budget and making for ever deepening fears, suspicions, and inse-
curity. The situation preceding the First World War with the naval competi-
tion between Germany and Great Britain and the rivalry of the French and
German armies illustrates this point.32
Similarly, the balance of power politics that animated World War I also
had its origins in fear.
In the years immediately preceding the First World War, the balance of
power in the Balkans increased in importance; for, since the Triple Alliance
between Austria, Germany, and Italy seemed approximately to balance the
Triple Entente between France, Russia, and Great Britain, the power com-
bination which gained a decisive advantage in the Balkans might easily gain a
decisive advantage in the over-all European balance of power. It was that
fear which motivated Austria in July 1914 to try to settle its accounts with
Serbia once and for all and which induced Germany to support Austria
unconditionally. It was the same fear which brought Russia to the support
of Serbia, and France to the support of Russia.33
On the basis of these insights, Morgenthau draws the conclusions that
the First World War had its origins exclusively in the fear of a disturbance of
the European balance of power which was threatened in two regions:
Belgium and the Balkans.34
Hence, Morgenthau is convinced that status quo states do exist and that
they at times wrongfully perceive one another as imperialists in IR. This
impels them to wage wars on the basis of misperception and fear as in the
Franco-German War of 1870 and World War I. With this point in mind, it is
not surprising to nd that this is the role he affords fear in his theory.
Otherwise, his classical realism would not be able to explain these central
international events. This is particularly evident with regard to World War I
where Morgenthau argues that fear animates virtually every aspect of the
war. Had he not included fear into his theory in the way he does, this major
war would have become a very serious anomaly to his classical realism,
according to his own historical account of this war. Since Morgenthaus
theory is mainly descriptive and purports to explain the world as it is, this
use of fear is essential to account for signicant interstate wars.35
That explains why Morgenthau employs fear in his theory and ascribes
it the particular role he does. This nding however provokes another
question. Why did Morgenthau not make his theoretical framework con-
sistent with the inclusion of status quo states, fear and security dilemma
dynamics if he consider them important to international life? The reason
for this lies in the fact that there is at times a strong discrepancy between
Morgenthaus empirical and theoretical analysis of international politics.
For instance, it has been widely noted in the literature that
Morgenthaus theoretical position is inconsistent with his own analysis
of American foreign policy. Indeed, Morgenthau claims that his classical

realism explains international politics as it is, yet he criticizes the behavior
of the USA for not following the course set out by his theory. As an
example, Morgenthau strongly opposed to the Vietnam War as he
regarded US actions inconsistent with the principles of his classical realism.
That is why scholars such as Jervis,36 Jaap Nobel37 and Bruce Kuklick38
have claimed that Morgenthaus own examination of US foreign policy
undermines his theoretical framework.
The same basic principle applies to his discussions regarding status quo
powers, fear and the security dilemma dynamics. There should be no room
for these factors in Morgenthaus classical realism if it is to remain con-
sistent with its own principles. That does not however stop Morgenthau
from incorporating them into his theory in an attempt to explain the
empirical realities of international politics, as he sees them. It is for reasons
such as these that Morgenthau has been called an extraordinarily sloppy
and inconsistent theorist39 and that his main theoretical work Politics
Among Nations is now often taken for granted to be a deeply awed
work.40 Jtersonke supports this view when he contends that
Morgenthaus popularity was not based on scholarly innovation, cut-
ting-edge research or astute theory-building, but on his skills as public
intellectual.41 The ndings of this investigation provide further evidence
for these charges.
WHY FEAR? WALTZ

Waltz is not as open as Morgenthau in his theoretical discussions about
fear. Further investigation is therefore required to uncover the rationale
behind his use of fear. Since it has been established that he uses fear to help
account for external balancing or alliance formation, this information can
be used to trace his thought in an attempt to understand why fear is
assigned this particular role in his theoretical framework.
As we have seen, Waltzs defensive realism is rooted in an anarchic self-
help system where the individual units act for themselves and fulll their
own interests by whatever means they can muster.42 Waltz claims that
this state of affairs compels the units to avoid dependence on others
wherever they can and that these factors limit the prospects for coopera-
tion between nations.43 In Waltzs world, there is thus no scope for states
to cooperate for altruistic reasons and pursue external balancing for any
other reason than self-interest. This means that states can only come to
cooperate with one another and engage in external balancing or alliance

formation when their interests overlap with one another.
Waltz makes this point clear on at least three occasions. In self-help
systems, external forces propel the weaker parties toward one another.
Weaker parties, our theory predicts, incline to combine to offset the
strength of the stronger.44 At another point, Waltz writes that [w]hen
on occasion some of the great powers did move toward cooperation, they
did so in order to oppose other powers more strongly.45 Finally, he
claims that [i]n a multipolar world, states often pool their resources in
order to serve their interests. Roughly equal parties engaged in coopera-
tive endeavors must look for a common denominator of their policies.46
Taking these points into account, it is rather apparent why Waltz
maintains that external balancing or alliance formation is rooted in com-
mon interest. That does not however explain why Waltz considers fear as
the central indicator among the common interests that bring about alli-
ances. The answer to this question can be found in his rst monograph,
Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. Here, he approvingly cites
a passage from Thucydidess History of the Peloponnesian War. In this
segment, the Greek historian maintains that it is folly to make alliances
unless they are rooted in the interest of all members. Indeed, mutual fear
is the only solid basis of alliance.47
Hence, the evidence suggests that Waltzs attribution of external bal-
ance or alliance formation to common interests and fear is inuenced by
his reading of Thucydidess History of the Peloponnesian War. This can also
explain why Waltz privileges fear over the other indicators of common
interest just like Thucydides. The interpretation advanced here gains
further credence as there are cases in which Waltz himself points out fear
as the cause of external balancing or alliance formation.
In line with Morgenthaus historical analysis, Waltz also considers the
alliance formation in the prelude to World War I rooted in the common
fear of the enemy.48 He also notes similar tendencies during the Cold War
when he argues that it was the fear of American power that drew China
close to Russia after World War II. This tendency persisted until the
United States seemed less, and the Soviet Union more, of a threat to
China.49 Likewise, Waltz notes that the Western Defense Community
was, in large part at least, motivated by fear of Soviet power and intentions
and is intended to deter the Soviet Union from using that power in wars of
aggression.50 Finally, Waltz writes that [i]n France, fears of American
imperialism were widely expressed and debated. In early September of
1991 foreign minister Roland Dumas remarked that American might

reigns without balancing weight, and Jacques Delors, president of the
European Community Commission, cautioned that the United States
must not take charge of the world. Both of them called on the United
Nations and the European Community to counterbalance American
inuence.51
Waltz thus evidently nds Thucydidess position on this issue attractive
and nds support for the hypothesis of the ancient Greek historian in his
own analysis of international politics. This can explain why Waltz uses fear
as the primary indicator of common interest to account for external
balancing or alliance formation in his theory.
WHY FEAR? MEARSHEIMER

What about Mearsheimer? What incentives does he have to include fear in
his offensive realism in the rst place? It does not after all t neatly with his
attempt to construct a structural material theory of international politics.
Neither is this emotion helpful to make his rational status quo power
behave aggressively toward one another, it merely reinforces the status
quo bias of his theory. We must therefore take a closer look at this issue if
we are to nd a compelling answer to this question.
First, Mearsheimer cannot rely on his underlying assumptions to
explain variation in security competition and war since constants cannot
explain variation, as he himself points out.52 As Mearsheimer argues, [a]
narchy alone . . . cannot account for why security competition sometimes
leads to war but sometimes does not. The problem is that anarchy is a
constant the system is always anarchic whereas war is not. To account
for this important variation in state behavior, it is necessary to consider
another structural variable: the distribution of power among the leading
states in the system.53
So why does Mearsheimer not simply rely on the changing distribution
of power to account for variation in security competition and war? That
would after all be fully compatible with the structural elements of his
theory. As such, it would save his offensive realism from internal incon-
sistencies and avoid reinforcing the status quo bias of his theory. The
reason Mearsheimer does not restrict his analysis to the balance of power
is due to the fact that he also wants to provide a rationale for his claims that
a unipolar system is the most peaceful power conguration, followed by
bipolarity, balanced multipolarity and unbalanced multipolarity.54
The incorporation of the levels of fear to offensive realism allows

Mearsheimer to accomplish this task. This variable enables him to argue
that bipolarity is more peaceful than multipolarity since it provokes less
fear. Alternatively, unbalanced multipolarity is the most war-prone system
as it generates the most amount of fear.55 Since Mearsheimer (wrongfully)
equates fear with aggression, the inclusion of the levels of fear allows him
to provide a neat explanation for the intensity of security competition and
likelihood of war. More fear equals more security competition and war and
vice versa.
That does not however explain why Mearsheimer privileges fear over
other factors in this regard. The answer to this question is provided by
Mearsheimer in another passage. To begin with, great powers fear each
other. There is little trust among them. They worry about the intentions
of other states, in large part because they are so hard to divine [uncer-
tainty]. Their greatest fear is that another state might have the capability as
well as the motive to attack them. This danger is compounded by the fact
that states operate in an anarchic system, which means that there is no
nightwatchman who can rescue them if they are threatened by another
country [survival]. When a state dials the emergency services for help,
there is nobody in the international system to answer the call.56
Mearsheimer is thus convinced that fear is the inevitable result of his
suppositions. That is why he subsequently reafrms that when the ve
assumptions are married together, they create powerful incentives for
great powers to . . . fear one another.57 Hence, since Mearsheimer con-
siders fear as the rational response to the conditions his offensive realism
presumes, he has strong incentives to include it in his framework. Indeed,
it is rational for states who seek to ensure their survival in an uncertain
anarchic order where others have the capability and potentially also the
will to harm them to fear each other. Mearsheimers arguments are
entirely sound in this regard. As Mearsheimer rightly recognizes, the
level of fear can also vary. By treating it as a dynamic factor,
Mearsheimer can thereby use this emotion to explain variation in the
security competition and likelihood of war. As such, fear helps
Mearsheimer to explain one of the main puzzles of offensive realism.
It is thus clear that Mearsheimer has two main reasons for bringing in
fear to his theoretical framework. First, this emotion ts well with his
account of international politics and he can provide a compelling story
of how fear arises in interstate relations. Second, since fear is a dynamic
emotion, he can use the variation to explain why security competition and
war are more prevalent under some conditions than in others.
At this point, it might be objected that anger is particularly useful to
Mearsheimers theoretical ambitions. That is because in contrast to fear
where restraint is the preferred option, if the circumstances allow it,
aggression is privileged under the presence of anger.58 Anger would
therefore be far more appropriate for Mearsheimers objective to generate
aggression among rational status quo states than fear. Although it is true
that anger would have the advantage of helping offensive realism to over-
come its status quo bias, it would create three other severe problems for
the theory.
First, anger does not follow from the assumptions of offensive realism.
Why would states be angry at one another in the rst instance? Surely, the
combination anarchy, uncertainty, capabilities, rationality and survival
does not generate anger. That would hardly be a rational response under
these conditions. In other words, these assumptions cannot create incen-
tives for states to have this initial disposition toward one another before
interaction. For this reason, it would make little sense to incorporate anger
in favor of fear as the latter is far more compatible with the world
Mearsheimer depicts.
Second, the revisionist essence of anger makes it ill-suited for explaining
security competition and war in Mearsheimers framework. As
Mearsheimer himself explains, [t]he claim that states might have benign
intentions is simply a starting assumption. I argue subsequently that when
you combine the theorys ve assumptions, states are put in a position in
which they are strongly disposed to having hostile intentions toward each
other.59 Hence, states do not have innate revisionist intentions in offen-
sive realism as offensive realists reject Morgenthaus claim that states are
naturally endowed with Type A personalities.60
As Mearsheimer also claries in the subsection on hierarchy of state
goals, offensive realism certainly recognizes that great powers might
pursue non-security goals, but it has little to say about them, save for
one important point: states can pursue them as long as the requisite
behaviour does not conict with balance-of-power logic, which is often
the case.61 These sentiments are expressed in even clearer terms when
Mearsheimer insists that offensive realism do not assume that states have
aggressive intentions.62 Instead, the argument is that the ve bedrock
assumptions of offensive realism is the cause of this aggressive frame of
mind in stateshostile intentions and revisionist goals are absent from

these postulations.
Moreover, the reliance on revisionist goals to generate security compe-
tition would be antithetical to offensive realisms tragic view of world
politics. This situation which no one consciously designed or intended,
is genuinely tragic. Great powers that have no reason to ght each other
that are merely concerned with their own survival nevertheless have little
choice but to pursue power and seek to dominate the other states in the
system.63 This tragic outlook on international politics is also deeply
embedded in the theory and its removal would create major inconsisten-
cies in offensive realism. Indeed, this tragic viewpoint is so central to
offensive realism that the main pamphlet of this school of thought is called
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.64
Hence, there is no room for anger in the nonrevisionist and tragic
worldview of offensive realism. The offensive aggression that anger pro-
vokes is inherently incompatible with the security-driven explanation of
security competition and war provided by Mearsheimers theory. Fear is
far more compatible with the logic of offensive realism in this regard. That
is so since this emotion is only compatible with defensive aggression,
which is ideal for the purposes of Mearsheimer.65
Third, whereas fear is related to uncertainty evaluations, anger tends to
be associated with certainty appraisals.66 It is after all hard to feel anger
toward the unknown but it is common to fear it. Anger does therefore t
awkwardly with Mearsheimers narrative where uncertainty is a central
element. Fear is however fully compatible with it in this respect. This
creates even further incentives for Mearsheimer to privilege fear over
anger.
After this examination, it stands clear that despite the theoretical and
logical problems that the inclusion of fear generates in offensive realism,
Mearsheimer has sound reasons for including this emotion to his theory as
well. The level of fear does after all offer an eloquent solution to the
problem of explaining variation in security competition and war. It is
also far more compatible with the offensive realist framework than anger,
even though the latter can help to overcome the status quo bias of the
theory. Despite the drawbacks of incorporating fear into offensive realism,
it does clearly have its benets as well. Mearsheimer does therefore have
valid reasons for affording it a role in his offensive realism. Nonetheless,
had he been aware of the fact that fear impels his rational status quo states
to pursue pacist policies rather than aggression, he would have hardly

afforded it a central role in his offensive realism.
FEAR IN REALISM REVISED

Nevertheless, since fear is empirically imperative for all the realist scholars
examined here and they seek to primarily advance descriptive theories of
international politics, it is clear that they need this emotion to explain
interstate relations.67 The attempt to account for international politics
through fear is however not unique to the selected realists but is wide-
spread across this intellectual tradition, as we have seen. For this reason, it
is imperative to address fear more competently within realism than
Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer have done so far. A guideline of
how that might be accomplished is provided below.
First, realism must utilize irrational factors evident in, for instance, the
security dilemma or update its notion of rationality. As has been noted,
Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer all have to emphasize factors such as
uncertainty and misperception to explain the suboptimal behavior of their
fearful status quo states. Additionally, Morgenthaus and Mearsheimers
rationality assumptions clash with irrational portrayals of international
affairs. To make their trajectories viable, realists must therefore proceed
in one of the two following ways. Either they have to abandon their
rational account of international politics as some of its most prominent
advocates of the security dilemma have for instance done.68 Alternatively,
realists such as Morgenthau must update their notion of rationality.
Indeed, there is a widespread belief among political scientists in general
that emotions are irrational and therefore antithetical to rationality.69 That
is however not the case. As research in neuroscience has forcefully shown,
emotions are imperative to rational behavior. Without emotions, we
behave in foolish, self-defeating and counterproductive ways. Studies
have shown that even cognitively intelligent people who are emotionally
at are unusually poor decision-makers.70 Without the emotion of fear, we
would even jeopardize our survival by carelessly approaching grave sources
of threat and danger such as predators or steep cliffs. This means that
realists (and others) that cling on an outdated conception of rationality
and emotion need to revise their understanding of this phenomenon. This
would not only bring realism in line with contemporary science but also
make room for fear in a rationalist framework.
Second, realism needs to become more ideational. In the words of

Mearsheimer, [r]ealists believe that state behaviour is largely shaped by
the material structure of the international system.71 Although
Mearsheimers statement may hold true in the neorealist age, this has
not always been the case in the realist tradition. As his classical realist
predecessor, Morgenthau, was, for instance, keen to point out, the key
concept of power cannot be equated with material military capability but
must be understood in immaterial terms as well.72 In more general terms,
Wendt also argues that neorealism tends to be far more materialistic than
classical realism.73
With the rise of neoclassical realism, the realist school of thought is
however again moving more toward ideational factors in its analysis of
international politics. Nevertheless, commentators note that even this
brand of realism tends to privilege materialism.74 If realism is to success-
fully employ a central role for a psychological nonmaterial factor such as
fear, it is must nonetheless move toward ideationalism. That means more
classical and less neo realism.
Third, realism needs to reconsider its conception of the level of analysis.
All of the examined realists restrict their use of fear to relations among
status quo powers. Morgenthau claims that fear can be overcome in
cooperative relations. On the other hand, Waltz and Mearsheimer rely
heavily on this emotion to explain MAD, which is an inherently relational
phenomenon. Despite the fact that all these realists consider fear in inter-
action among states, this level of analysis is missing in the realist trajectory.
As has been noted, classical realism emphasizes the individual level, neo-
classical realism of the domestic level while neorealism provides a struc-
tural analysis of international politics. The relation or interaction level has
however gone missing.
As Vasquez and Barry Buzan have correctly noted, this level of analysis is
not even included in Waltzs highly inuential tripartite scheme of the
images of international politics.75 That is so despite the fact that this level
of analysis has been the most fruitful empirically and theoretically in IR,
according to Vasquez.76 For our purposes, it is sufcient to acknowledge
that the interaction level must be incorporated to the realist framework if fear
is as central at the relational level as three of its leading proponents suggest.
Fourth, realists must realize that fear is a defensive mechanism. All the
realist theorists considered here use fear in relation to status quo powers
and issues relating to competition, conict and war. These topics also tend
to animate realist investigations in general. Because of the fact that realists
tend to employ fear in order to account for these grim outcomes, it is

particularly important to realize that this emotion is a defensive mechan-
ism.77 Restraint rather than aggression is the preferred response to fear if
the circumstances allow it. An unawareness of this issue can create major
logical problems and create or reinforce an existing status quo bias as in
the case of Mearsheimers offensive realism.
Finally, realists need to study fear far more seriously and consider it in
relation to their overall framework. As all of the previous points collec-
tively suggest, the examined realist scholars misunderstand the nature of
fear and its implications. Moreover, they use it in inconsistent ways and
this emotion is incompatible with all of their own theories. A careless use
of fear is not going to help advance realist understandings of international
politics. In fact, this sloppy (ab)use of fear undermines rather than
strengthen realist analysis. If fear is to play a constructive and productive
role in realist thought, these shortcomings must therefore be addressed.
As all the objectives of this chapter have been fullled at this point, it is
appropriate to bring it to an end by providing a summary of its major points.
SUMMARY
This chapter started by comparing and contrasting the conceptual, theo-
retical, empirical and logical elements of fear in the works of Morgenthau,
Waltz and Mearsheimer. At the conceptual level, it was maintained that
only Mearsheimers treatment of the level of fear is rigorous. No other
dimension of fear is explored at any length in his works or that of his realist
predecessors. Similarly, whereas fear, in general, and the level of fear, in
particular, are central to Mearsheimers theoretical edice, the opposite is
true of Morgenthaus classical realism and Waltzs defensive realism.
Empirically, all of the realist thinkers use fear to explain major interna-
tional events. Interestingly, although Mearsheimer relies most heavily on
fear in his framework, his theory suffers the most logically by drawing on
this emotion. This is evident as fear merely accentuates the status quo bias
of his offensive realism. Nonetheless, fear is logically counterproductive to
the theories of Morgenthau and Waltz as well, albeit to a lesser extent.
These ndings both conrm and dispute some of the claims made about
fear in realism in the existing literature. Conceptually, the assertion that fear
is explicit in realism is supported, whereas the contention that fear is under-
developed and implicit due to realisms commitment to rationality is not
entirely true. The arguments regarding the centrality of fear in realist theory
are even more problematic as they are only valid in the case of Mearsheimers
offensive realism. The empirical signicance of fear in realism is however
evident in all the examined realist scholars and thereby fully supported. The
most problematic contentions revolve around the logical importance of fear
in realism. These statements could not have been any further from the truth.
These discussions regarding the secondary literature were followed by a
consideration of why the aforementioned scholars include fear in the way that
they do in their realist frameworks. In the case of Morgenthau, it was argued
that he seemingly brings in fear to explain major international events, espe-
cially World War I. Waltzs use of fear is clearly inuenced by Thucydides and
the latters insistence that mutual fear is at the heart of alliance formation
between political units. A proposition Waltz nds empirically sound and
thereby also accepts. Finally, fear is compatible with the underlying assump-
tions and tragic worldview of offensive realism and enables Mearsheimer to
use this dynamic factor to account for variation in security competition and
war. This could explain the specic role he assigns fear in his framework.
Finally, a roadmap was provided on how to more successfully accom-
modate the primary emotion of fear into realism. According to this view,
realism needs to either provide irrational explanations of international
politics or update its conception of rationality to make this emotion
compatible with the realist framework. Additionally, realism should
become more ideational and start considering the relational level, if it is
to use fear in the same way as Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer.
Lastly, realism needs to acknowledge that fear is a defensive mechanism
and study this emotion in a far more systematic and rigorous way than it
has done thus far. In doing so, it must also consider how this emotion ts
within the overall framework to avoid the inconsistencies that have pla-
gued the works of the examined realist scholars. Only by taking these
measures can fear come to play a fruitful role in realism. Time will tell
whether realists are up for this task and succeed in this endeavor.
NOTES
1. Morgenthau 1948a, 7879, 327; Morgenthau 1948b, 160; Morgenthau
1960c, 305; Morgenthau 1962e, 147.
2. Waltz 1979a, 170; Waltz 1999, 694.
3. Mearsheimer 2001c, 33; Mearsheimer 2011c, 2122, 46, 59, 6162,
9091.
5. Waltz 1979a, 118.

6. Waltz 2000b.
8. Ibid., 45.
9. Waltz 1979a, 174.
10. Ibid., 171.
12. Ibid., 4246.
13. Pashakhanlou 2013, 216217.
15. Donnelly 2000, 118, 118 n. 20; Weber 2001, 3132.
16. Pashakhanlou 2013.
17. Mearsheimer 2001c, 3, 414 n. 7; Mearsheimer 2006b, 122.
18. In the other interpretation of the theory that was eventually dismissed,
Waltzs defensive realism operates adequately even without fear.
19. Rathbun 2007, 538.
20. Crawford 2000, 118, 155.
21. Ibid., 116118.
22. Ibid., 116, 119, 121, 156; Dierauer 2013, 32; Holsti 2000, 119120;
Schmidt 2013, 233234; Schweller 1996, 109; Tang 2010a, 69, 452.
23. Dierauer 2013, 32; Freyberg-Inan 2004, 77; Kydd 2005, 14; Pervez 2013,
37.
24. Donnelly 2000, 109, 118 nn. 20, 157; Freyberg-Inan 2004, 13, 99, 203
nn. 93, 204 94; Santoro 2010, 110.
25. Brooks 1997, 466; Grieco 1988, 487, 498499, 499 nn. 61, 500 64; Tang
2008, 456, 467; Tang 2010a, 18, 69.
26. Brooks 1997, 449; Donnelly 2000, 118; Iverson 2013, 3637; Rathbun
2007, 539, 540 nn. 5, 553554; Weber 2001, 31.
28. Ibid.
30. Morgenthau 1962e, 126, emphasis added.
35. Ibid., 34.
36. Jervis 1994, 859860.
37. Nobel 1995, 85.
38. Kuklick 2007, 78.
39. Donnelly 2000, 35.
40. Little 2007, 94.
41. Jtersonke 2010, 188, emphasis added.

42. Waltz 1979a, 90, 110.
43. Ibid., 105107, 155.
44. Ibid., 202.
45. Ibid., 70.
46. Ibid., 170.
47. Waltz 2001, 211. This reading partly supports Inan-Freybergs claim that
realists in IR have adopted some of their conceptions of fear from
Thucydides classic account of the Peloponnesian War. This point nds
support in the works of Waltz. Freyberg-Inan 2004, 25.
48. Waltz 1979a, 166.
49. Waltz 2000a, 31; Waltz 2000b, 38.
50. Waltz 2001, 209.
51. Waltz 1991a, 669.
53. Ibid., 334335.
54. Ibid., 335; Mearsheimer 2010d, 8687.
55. Mearsheimer 2001c, 4445. Since Mearsheimer tends to neglect unipolar-
ity, he does not engage in these discussions with reference to this power
conguration.
56. Mearsheimer 2010d, 80.
58. Cheung-Blunden and Blunden 2008, 127; Coget, Haag, and Gibson 2011,
478; Macht 1999, 130; Petersen 2002, 19, 29.
60. Ibid., 21.
61. Ibid., 46.
63. Mearsheimer 2001c, 3. What is tragic or genuinely tragic is of course
ultimately determined by ones own value judgments. I am merely repri-
nting what Mearsheimer regards as tragic or genuinely tragic above, as they
express his position on this issue.
65. Gray 1987, 253254.
66. Coget, Haag, and Gibson 2011, 479.
67. That is so even in Morgenthaus classical realism and Mearsheimers offen-
sive realism that both explicitly claim to have normative dimensions as well,
albeit in different ways.
68. See, for example, Jervis 1968; Jervis 1976; Jervis 1988; Jervis 1978; Snyder
1984; Snyder 1985.
69. Mercer 2005.
70. Clore and Gasper 2000; Damasio 1994; Elster 1999.

73. Wendt 1999, 30.
74. Caverley 2013, 158; Rathbun 2008, 303.
75. Buzan 1995; Vasquez 1998, 194195.
76. Vasquez 1998, 194195.
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INDEX
A Concept of the Political, The, 25, 38

Aron, Raymond, 5, 13 Contingent realism, 5
Conventional Deterrence, 38
Crawford, Neta, 5354, 76
B Cuban Missile Crisis, 60
Balance-of-power theory, 75
Balancing, power checking task in, 95
Barkin, Samuel, 98 D
Bloodletting, 95 Darwin, Charles, 10
Bolshevist revolution, 60 Defence of the National Interest, In, 27
Brown, Chris, 29 Defensive mechanism
Buck-passing, power checking fear as, 136
task in, 95 Defensive realism, 6, 120, 122
Bush, George W., 36 fear in, 120
Buzan, Barry, 136 Waltzs, 122
Defensive realism, Waltzs, 72
Delors, Jacques, 131
C Donnelly, Jack, 9, 7576, 84, 122
Campbell, David, 1
Carr, E. H., 5
Christen, Thomas, 6 E
Christendom Elman, Colin, 6
fear and, 1 Emotion
Classical realism, Morgenthaus, as political tool, 10
48, 50, 52, 123 Empirical aspect of fear in
balance of power, 52 Morgenthaus works, 58
Clinton, David, 29 Enloe, Cynthia, 1
Collective Action, 4 Evrigenis, Ioannis, 4

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-41012-8
170 INDEX
F power checking task in,

Fear, 10 balancing, 95
conception of, 117 power checking task in, buck-
denition, 11 passing, 95
in international relations, 1 security dilemma and, 107
logic of, 121 Soviet fears of US power, 103
logical element of, 14 Soviets capabilities, 103
in realism revised, 135 theoretical and empirical use of
theoretical framework, 132 fear, 106
theoretical role of, 119 Tragedy of Great Power Politics,
Fear concept, in Mearsheimers The, 37
works, 23, 34, 3638, 91, on Waltzs works, 93
100104, 106107, 131 war in pursuit of power, 95
analysis of, 37 Whos Afraid of Academic
assumptions, 93 Freedom?, 38
bait and bleed in pursuit of Fear concept, in Morgenthaus
power, 95 works, 23, 126
balancing power, 96 analysis of, 29
bipolarity in, 96 as balance of power, 50
blackmail in pursuit of power, 95 bolshevism, 46
Crimean War, 104 classical realism, 48, 65
empirical aspect of fear in, 102 classical realism, logical need
fear in the core of, 97 for fear in, 61
fear of China, 37 conception of fear, 45
fearmongering, 36, 92 Concept of the Political, The, 25
generic statements, 92 Defence of the National Interest,
Liddell Hart and the Weight of In, 27
History and Conventiona in domestic politics, 48
Deterrence, 38 dreadful French, 24
multipolarity in, 96 as emotion in international
of nuclear war, 34 politics, 4546
offensive realism, 131 empirical aspect of, 58
as offensive realism, 91, 98, 101: The End of Switzerlands
equating fear and Differential Neutrality, 24
aggression, 101 in English on international law, 25
as offensive realism, assumptions, 98 fear in the core of, 52
as offensive realism, logical need fear in the periphery of, 55
of, 106 fears of revolution, 60
as offensive realism, Mearsheimers, in foreign languages, 2324
inconsistensies in, 100 French publications, 25
as offensive realism, states and, 97 generated by their rivals, 47
power and, 9495 The H-Bomb and After article, 28
INDEX 171
hate as driving force, 55 Foreign Policy and Democratic

on international law, 23 Politics, 31
in international politics, 48 Man, the State and War: A
in IR, 26 Theoretical Analysis, 30
logical consistency of fear in, 62 Morgenthaus approach and, 73
as misperception, 57 multipolarity conditions and, 74
in Nationalist Socialist Germany, 54 nuclear weapons in, 80
Plans for Work, 24 real or imaginary, question of, 72
Politics Among Nations, 26, 29 Schweller on, 82
as primitive negative emotions, 47 Spread of Nuclear Weapons,
Purpose of American Politics, The, 33
The, 30 state as a core, 75
rational theory of international survival assumption and, 83
politics conception and, 64 Theory of International
Scientic Man vs. Power Politics, 32
Politics, 26 Fear of Enemies, 4
as security dilemma, 56 Feminism
in Soviet Union, 54 fear and, 1
in Spanish language, 24 First World War in 1914, 56, 58, 126
status quo policy, 56 Franco-German War of 1870,
The Tragedy of German-Jewish 56, 5859, 126
Liberalism lecture, 28 Freyberg-Inan, Annette, 64
Treaty of Versailles, 46 Friedman, Thomas, 32
Vietnam and the United States, 27
Fear concept, in Waltzs works,
23, 3033, 71, 129 G
The American and British Gelb, Leslie, 35, 105
Experience, 31 Generalist realism, 5
analysis, 33 Goldstein, Joshua, 1
balance of power and, 73 Grifth, Martin, 53
bipolarity conditions and, 74
defensive realism, 7273, 75
defensive realism, logical H
consistency of fear in, 85 Herz, John, 63
defensive realism, logical need of History of the Peloponnesian
fear in, 81 War, 130
emotional relation, 32 History of the Peloponnesian War,
emotion role in defensive The, 2, 130
realism, 78 Hobbes, Thomas, 2, 5, 125
empirical aspect of fear in, 79 Holsti, Ole, 5354
far in the core of, 74 Human nature realism, 5
fear in the periphery of, 77 Hungarian revolution, 60
172 INDEX
I Logical need of fear in Morgenthaus

Intellectual traditions fear and, 1 classical realism, 61
International relations (IR) Logic of fear, 121
fear in, 1 Lord of the Flies lm, 81
global survey, 8
literature, 3
method and analysis framework, 12 M
realism and fear in, selection Machiavelli, Niccol, 2, 5, 125
criteria, 7 Man, the State and War: A Theoretical
realism in, 1 Analysis, 30
self-identied realist thinkers in, 5 McCain, John, 80
TRIP survey, 8 McDougal, Myers, 25
McGeorge, Bundy, 10, 12
McNamara, Robert, 10, 12
J Mearsheimer, John, 12, 3, 4, 6, 810,
Jabri, Vivienne, 1 1216, 23, 30, 3439, 62,
Jervis, Robert, 6, 129 91111, 117125, 131138
Johnson, Thomas, 5354 metus hostil concept, 4
Jntersoke, Oliver, 24 Moravcsik, Andrew, 2
Morgenthau, Hans, 12, 3, 4, 6, 810,
1216, 2331, 3839, 4566,
K 7273, 85, 9293, 108, 111,
Kant, Immanuel, 30 117130, 133, 135138
Keohane, Robert, 8 Mutual Assured Destruction
Knopf, Alfred A., 30 (MAD), 33
Korean War, 60
Koskenniemi, Martti, 64
Krasner, Stephen, 6 N
Kuklick, Bruce, 129 Napoleonic wars, 60
Ned Lebow, Richard, 1
Neoclassical realism, 6, 9, 136
L Neorealism, 56
Labs, Eric, 6 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 5
Lasswell, Harold, 25 Nobel, Jaap, 129
Layne, Christopher, 6
Leviathan, 2
Liddell Hart and the Weight of O
History, 38 Offensive realism, Mearsheimers, 102,
Literature on fear in realism, 124 106, 109, 120, 122123, 132
Little, Richard, 52 balanced multipolarity, 96
Logical consistency of fear in bipolarity, 96
Morgenthaus classical realism, 62 empirical aspect of fear in, 102
INDEX 173
fear role in, 98 Robert, Jervis, 30

global hegemons versus regional Rose, Gideon, 9
hegemons, 94 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 30
logical consistency of fear in, 109
need of fear in, 106
unbalanced multiipolarity, 96 S
unipolarity, 96 Schmidt, Brian, 9
Offensive realists, 6 Schuett, Robert, 75
Orwell, George, 1 Schweller, Randall, 6, 8284,
93, 122
Scientic Man vs. Power
P Politics, 2627
Palestine Liberation Organization Secondary literature, misinterpreting
(PLO), 29 role of fear, 125
Peace through transformation, 51 Snyder, Jack, 6
Politics Among Nations, 9, 12, 2627, Specic realism, 5
29, 129 Spinoza, Baruch, 30
Posen, Barry, 6 Spirtas, Michael, 6263
Postcolonial studies on fear, 1 Spread of Nuclear Weapons, The, 33
Primitive negative emotion as fear, 47 States, in Morgenthaus work, 49
Prince, The, 2 Structural realism, 56
Principles of Purpose of American Subaltern realism, 5
Politics, The, 30
T
R Tang, Shiping, 4
Realism Theoretical role of fear, 119
and beyond, fear in, 117 Theory of International Politics, 6, 8,
contingent realism, 5 12, 32
in international relations, 1, 5 Third image theory, 85
literature on fear in, 124 Thompson, Kenneth, 29
logical importance of fear in, 124 Thucydides, 125, 130131
neorealism, 5 Tragedy of Great Power Politics,
realism, 5 The, 12, 24, 37, 98, 134
as a single unied monolithic
block, 125
specic realism, 5 V
structural realism, 5 Van Evera, Stephen, 6
subaltern realism, 5 Vasquez, John, 75, 136
types, 5 Vietnam and the United States
willful realism, 5 monograph, 27
Resende-Santos, Joo, 75 Vietnam War, 60, 129
174 INDEX
W Wilful realism, 5
Walt, Stephen, 6 William, Thompson, 30
Waltz, Kenneth, 12, 3, 4, 6, 810, Williams, Michael, 64
1216, 23, 3034, 3839, 62, 66, Wohlforth, William, 6
7187, 9293, 100, 108111, Wolfers, Arnold, 5, 62
117125, 129131, 135138 World War I, fear-centric
Weber, Cynthia, 9, 84, 122 account of, 127
Wendt, Alexander, 1, 8
Whos Afraid of Academic
Freedom?, 38 Z
Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Zakaria, Fareed, 6
Lying in International Politics, 92 Zedong, Mao, 105

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Realism and Fear in International

Realism and Fear

ISBN 978-3-319-41011-1 ISBN 978-3-319-41012-8 (eBook)

The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017

Cover design by Samantha Johnson

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

1 Realism and Fear in International Relations 1

2 Fear in the Works of Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer 23

3 Morgenthau and Fear 45

4 Waltz and Fear 71

5 Mearsheimer and Fear 91

6 Fear in Realism and Beyond 117

Realism and Fear in International Relations

The Author(s) 2017 1

more peaceful international interactions, according to these scholars.8

facets of fear in the aforementioned realists writings. Especially since this

THE EXISTING LITERATURE

prominently, Morgenthau. According to the classical realism or human

realism combines the top-down approach of neorealism and the bottom-up

THE SELECTION CRITERIA: MORGENTHAU, WALTZ

1. The chosen scholar must be the most inuential representative of

said to be important in the literature. Otherwise, the justication

With that said, an overview of the available evidence demonstrates

1. The aforementioned academics are indeed the most inuential

2. The selected scholars have all developed general theories of interna-

As these discussions clearly demonstrate, Morgenthau, Waltz and

Their use of this emotion as a political tool to implement policies of their

actors would have no incentives to defend themselves against the perceived

METHOD AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

scholars themselves use synonymously or interchangeably with fear. The

At the theoretical level, the investigation will initially consider

detrimental and/or unnecessary in bringing about the realist worlds as

OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

9. Moravcsik 1997, 541.

38. Donnelly 2000; Lebow 2003; Wohlforth 2008, 132.

103. Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009, 4.

132. Weber 1990, 21.

Fear in the Works of Morgenthau,

The Author(s) 2017 23

particular his major statement of offensive realism, The Tragedy of Great

MORGENTHAUS WORKS IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES

all focus on international law rather than international politics, as we have

MORGENTHAUS WORKS IN ENGLISH ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

much pressure on the Israeli state. Morgenthau even invoked liberal

THE ANALYSIS OF MORGENTHAUS WORKS

In these publications that are scrutinized here, fear is mentioned 49

general position on this issue, as we have already seen.72 Second, he posits

THE ANALYSIS OF WALTZS WORKS

Moscow could have clashed on numerous occasions. In this regard, he

same fear of Germany. These dynamics would likely lead to a serious

They do so despite the fact that it seriously undermines American interests in

THE ANALYSIS OF MEARSHEIMERS WORKS

In contrast to Morgenthau, all of Waltzs writings have been in English

14. See, for example, Morgenthau 1946a; Morgenthau 1948b; Morgenthau

40. Morgenthau 1973b, 5.

70. Waltz 1986; Waltz 2004a.

88. Mearsheimer 1990b; Mearsheimer 1990a; Hoffmann, Keohane, and

Morgenthau and Fear

MORGENTHAUS CONCEPTION OF FEAR

The Author(s) 2017 45

nationalism where he contends that National Socialism focused existing

As these passages reveal, Morgenthau also regards fear as an emotion that