Resisting Imagination and Confabulation - Effects of Metacognitive Training

Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 126 (2014) 339356
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Experimental Child

Psychology
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jecp
Resisting imagination and confabulation: Effects

of metacognitive training
Paola Castelli , Simona Ghetti
Department of Psychology and Center for Mind and Brain, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA 95616, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history: False memory rejection is enhanced when individuals rely on

Received 29 December 2012 memorability-based inferences (e.g., I should remember this
Revised 22 April 2014 event well; if I dont, it must not have happened). The present
Available online 4 July 2014
study investigated whether 8- and 9-year-olds and adults could
be trained to engage in memorability-based inferences to reject
Keywords:
false, but highly familiar (increased through imagination and con-
False memory
False memory rejection
fabulation), events. Across two experiments, participants enacted,
Metacognition imagined, or confabulated a series of actions differing in expected
Metacognitive inferences memorability. Two weeks later, half of the participants received
Imagination memorability-based training before being administered an old/
Confabulation new recognition test in which they were asked to endorse only
enacted actions. Thus, imagined and confabulated actions were to
be rejected in the face of their high familiarity. Results indicated
that adults, but not children, exhibited increased rejection of these
false events if they were of high memorability following a training
procedure that explained the functioning of memorability-based
inferences (Experiment 1, N = 100). Childrens rejection of familiar
events improved only when the training procedure closely mim-
icked the demands of the retrieval test (Experiment 2, N = 125).
Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Corresponding author. Current address: Department of Economics and Social Sciences, John Cabot University, 00165 Rome,
Italy. Fax: +39 06 589 7429.
E-mail address: pcastelli@johncabot.edu (P. Castelli).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2014.04.005
0022-0965/ 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
340 P. Castelli, S. Ghetti / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 126 (2014) 339356
Introduction
Over the past decades, a large body of research has addressed childrens ability to discriminate
between accurate and potentially inaccurate (or false) memories (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, Wright, &
Mojardin, 2003; Ghetti, 2003; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Mulder & Vrij, 1996; Thierry & Spence,
2002). This ability is especially valued in forensic settings, where the capacity to produce accurate
reports of witnessed or personally experienced events and avoid acquiescing to the occurrence of inac-
curate or false events is key to prevent miscarriages of justice (Bruck & Ceci, 1995; Goodman, 2006).
The ability to evaluate the accuracy of retrieved information (as indicated by higher condence
judgments for correct vs. incorrect responses) is robust in middle childhood (i.e., 8-year-olds;
Roebers, 2002; Roebers & Howie, 2003) and is observed even earlier in development (i.e., 5-year-olds;
Ghetti & Castelli, 2006; Ghetti, Qin, & Goodman, 2002). Still, the capacity to monitor certain memory
characteristics (e.g., memory strength, evoked feelings of familiarity, distinctiveness) and rely on the
output of these monitoring processes to screen out false memories undergoes substantial develop-
ment (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998; Gee, Gregory, & Pipe, 1999; Koriat, Goldsmith, Schneider, & Nakash-
Dura, 2001; Roebers & Fernandez, 2002), with the ability to monitor some factors (e.g., strong differ-
ences in the familiarity of enacted events) emerging earlier in development than the ability to monitor
other factors (e.g., subtle familiarity differences) (see Ghetti, Lyons, Lazzarin, & Cornoldi, 2008). There-
fore, it is important, for both practical and theoretical reasons, to explore procedures that may
improve the effectiveness of monitoring operations that support rejection of inaccurate memories.
Diagnostic monitoring and training procedures
Diagnostic monitoring refers to a class of false-event rejection processes in which the characteris-
tics of true memories are used as a standard against which to compare memories whose veracity has
yet to be determined (Gallo, 2004; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). In other words, when one
evaluates the veracity of memory of an event, if the available memorial evidence is not as compelling
as that expected for true events, the occurrence of the event is rejected (see Ghetti, 2003; Israel &
Schacter, 1997; Strack & Bless, 1994).
In source monitoring tasks, for example, memory expectations help determine whether poorly
remembered events derive from a source other than personal experience (i.e., it-had-to-be-you bias;
Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983) and should thus be rejected as personal memories. Similarly, memora-
bility-based inferences (Ghetti, 2003; Strack & Bless, 1994) are based on expectations about how
memorable an event should be to determine whether the current memory state is good enough to
be endorsed as a true memory.
The ability to correctly monitor the origin of ones memory has been found to develop considerably
during the course of childhood (Ackil & Zaragoza, 1995; Johnson et al., 1993; Markham, Howie, &
Hlavacek, 1999). Children seem to be at a disadvantage especially when they attempt to discriminate
between internally generated sources (e.g., distinguishing memories of enacted actions from memo-
ries of imagined actions; Foley & Johnson, 1985; Foley & Ratner, 1998; Johnson et al., 1993; Parker,
1995). This likely occurs because children lack the necessary cognitive exibility to rely on different
cues and expectations to make correct source attributions when the candidate sources produce highly
similar memory representations (Foley et al., 1983; Roberts, 2002). Indeed, one of the reasons why
imagination (i.e., thinking about a non-experienced event; Thomas & Loftus, 2002) and confabulation
(i.e., thinking and describing the occurrence of a non-experienced event; Ackil & Zaragoza, 1998)
greatly contribute to false-memory formation in children is that the source attribution process is made
particularly difcult by the increased similarity of these memories to memories generated by direct
enactment (Day, Howie, & Markham, 1998; Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991; Roberts & Blades,
1998, 2000).
A similar developmental trajectory has been documented in the ability to use memorability-based
inferences (Ghetti & Alexander, 2004; Ghetti & Castelli, 2006; Ghetti, Castelli, & Lyons, 2010). Specif-
ically, whereas children between 8 and 9 years of age have been found to use these inferences spon-
taneously (Ghetti, 2003; Ghetti & Alexander, 2004; Ghetti & Castelli, 2006; Ghetti et al., 2010),
P. Castelli, S. Ghetti / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 126 (2014) 339356 341
younger children (i.e., 7 years and under) have demonstrated greater difculty doing so (Ghetti &
Alexander, 2004; Ghetti & Castelli, 2006).
Given younger childrens difculties, research has begun to explore whether training procedures,
or test instructions, could improve the effectiveness of childrens diagnostic monitoring. Poole and
Lindsay (2002), for example, reported that encouragement to attend to the origin of their memories,
without providing direct indication on the contaminating source to be discarded, weakened misinfor-
mation effects in 7- and 8-year-olds. However, this procedure was not helpful with preschoolers. Even
though promoting source monitoring proved to be useful for discriminating accurate memories from
inaccurate memories, Poole and Lindsays training focused on the nal outcome (i.e., reporting truly
experienced events) and did not provide any explicit direction on how to achieve that outcome
(e.g., what features to attend to).
One way to provide explicit directions on how to identify the source of ones memory could be to
remind individuals (or to instruct them) that expectations about event memorability may be used to
determine whether a retrieved memory reaches the criterion appropriate for memories coming from a
specic source (i.e., personal enactment). If the criterion is not met, individuals may interpret the
result of this evaluation as diagnostic of event non-occurrence (i.e., the event must come from an irrel-
evant source). Ghetti, Papini, and Angelini (2006) addressed this possibility. Specically, these authors
investigated whether children could be trained to use memorability inferences to counter the effects
of misinformation. Results indicated that metacognitive training led to a reduction of misinformation
in 9- and 10-year-olds but not in 6- and 7-year-olds. This suggests that only children who are old
enough to spontaneously rely on memorability-based inferences can be encouraged to apply them
to discriminate memories for enacted events from memories generated by an external source (i.e.,
misinformation).
It is an open question whether memorability-based inferences can also be promoted to discrimi-
nate memories for enacted events from memories for events that are internally generated (e.g.,
through imagination or confabulation). Indeed, research indicates that when the experienced familiar-
ity of non-enacted events is increased through imagery, memorability-based inferences are more chal-
lenging even for children who are typically able to use them (i.e., 8- and 9-year-olds), likely because
childrens monitoring of expected memorability is rendered more difcult under this condition (Ghetti
et al., 2010). When confabulation is induced, it not only compromises childrens monitoring abilities,
thereby preventing children from successfully using memorability-based inferences, but also compro-
mises adults ability to do so (Ghetti et al., 2010). It is possible that the memories resulting from imag-
ery or confabulation are strong enough for individuals to fail to realize that considerations of expected
memorability may still be helpful.
Given that both imagery and confabulation greatly contribute to false memory formation (Ackil &
Zaragoza, 1998; Thomas & Loftus, 2002), instructions promoting childrens reliance on memorability
assessments when discriminating between enacted and imagined or confabulated events would be of
particular relevance for forensic interviews, where contamination deriving from internal sources could
be incidentally introduced (see Ackil & Zaragoza, 1998).
Exploring whether memorability-based training promotes rejection of imagined and confabulated
events also has clear theoretical implications. Specically, results from this investigation would help
characterize boundary conditions of successful memorability-based rejections. If training increases
rejection of bizarre compared to common imagined or confabulated distracters, we could conclude
that children can actually assess expectations of memorability even when evaluating events that elicit
a strong sense of familiarity.
Experiment 1
The goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether metacognitive training improved discrimina-
tion between enacted and imagined or confabulated events by encouraging children and adults to rely
on memorability-based inferences. Imagined and confabulated events were included because previous
research indicates different developmental trends for these two classes of distracters (Ghetti et al.,
2010). We involved only children who typically use these inferences spontaneously (Ghetti &
Castelli, 2006; Ghetti et al., 2010) because we sought to investigate the boundary conditions of mem-
orability-based rejection. Therefore, 8- and 9-year-old children were selected to participate in this
research (Ghetti & Castelli, 2006). A comparison group of adults was also included.
To pursue the goal of Experiment 1, participants enacted, imagined, or confabulated about a series
of bizarre and common actions. Bizarre and common actions have been reliably associated with high
and low expected-memorability ratings, respectively, by children as young as 6 years (Ghetti et al.,
2006). In a second session, participants were asked to discriminate between enacted and non-enacted
actions in a classic recognition test. Thus, imagined and confabulated actions were to be rejected. Half
of the participants received a general recommendation to be accurate, whereas the other half were
trained with a procedure modeled after the one employed by Ghetti and colleagues (2006).
We expected training to support memorability-based rejection in children and adults. That is, com-
pared to the no-training condition, participants in the training condition were expected to reject imag-
ined and confabulated bizarre events to a greater extent than their common counterparts. The critical
question concerned whether children would benet from training. Specically, previous research indi-
cated that children may default to monitoring dimensions other than expected memorability with
highly familiar distracters (i.e., current memory strength; Ghetti et al., 2010). Thus, it was of interest
to examine whether this tendency could be reduced and memorability-based inferences could be rein-
stated through training. Given that memorability-based inferences only affect rejection of false events
(Ghetti, 2003; Ghetti & Alexander, 2004; Ghetti & Castelli, 2006; Strack & Bless, 1994), training was
not expected to decrease endorsement of enacted events.
Strategy implementation is typically effortful (Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1990) and may be
affected by limits in cognitive resources as reected in working memory capacity (see Gaultney,
Kipp, & Kirk, 2005). Therefore, in the current experiment, we examined training effects controlling
for individual differences in working memory capacity.
Method
Participants
In total, 50 children (54% females, M = 9 years 3 months, range = 8 years 6 months to 9 years
11 months) and 50 undergraduate students (50% females, M = 20 years 9 months, range = 17 years
9 months to 28 years 1 month) participated in the current experiment. Approximately 62.2% of the
participants were European American, 17.3% were Asian, 9.2% were Hispanic, 2.1% were African Amer-
ican, and 9.2% were of mixed ethnicity. Children were recruited through newspaper advertisements
inviting families to be involved in research and community events; undergraduate students were
recruited through introductory psychology courses.
Materials
Except for the individual difference measure, the materials used in the current research were those
employed in a previous study and were described in detail elsewhere (see Ghetti et al., 2010).
Stimuli. A list of 90 action statements, divided into nine blocks of 10 actions each, was adopted. Half of
the actions in each block were bizarre (e.g., smell the wall) and half were common (e.g., jump
rope). Actions from seven blocks were enacted (three blocks), imagined (two blocks), or confabulated
(two blocks). Actions from the remaining two blocks were used as novel distracters in the nal mem-
ory test. Block use (as enacted, imagined, confabulated, or new) was counterbalanced across
participants.
Bizarreness rating board. Participants used the bizarreness rating board (BRB) to evaluate the bizarre-
ness of the actions during the play session. Bizarreness ratings (ranging from 1 = very common to
4 = very weird) were collected to verify whether the materials were perceived similarly across ages.
Imaginability rating board. The imaginability rating board (IRB) was used to help children evaluate the
quality of the images they could form when asked to imagine or confabulate an action. Imaginability
ratings ranged from 1 (I could not picture the action at all) to 4 (I could picture the action very well).
Memory test. The memory test consisted of 90 questions describing the actions included in each of the
nine blocks (e.g., Did you smell the wall?). Therefore, the nal test contained questions about (a) 30
enacted actions, (b) 20 imagined actions, (c) 20 confabulated actions, and (d) 20 novel distracters. Each
question asked whether or not an action was enacted during the play session. The questions followed
a randomized sequence and were presented in the same order to each participant.
Numbers Reversed Test. The Numbers Reversed Test (Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001) assesses
working memory by asking participants to utter increasingly longer digit spans in reversed order. It
is part of the WoodcockJohnson III Test of Cognitive Abilities (WJ-III; Woodcock et al., 2001).
Procedure
The experiment included a play session and a memory interview session. The sessions occurred
2 weeks apart, and participants were tested individually on each occasion.
Play session. The rst session lasted approximately 45 minutes. At this time, participants were rst
administered the working memory test and then took part in a play session allegedly aimed at eval-
uating a series of actions on different dimensions. Specically, upon presentation of the relevant
objects, participants were asked to enact, imagine enacting, or confabulate a series of actions, and then
provide a judgment (i.e., bizarreness or ease of imagination) about it (see Ghetti et al., 2010, for a
detailed description).
When enacting, participants had to use the object(s) presented to them to actually enact a specic
action (e.g., Rub the lotion on the chair). After each enactment, participants were asked to describe
what they did (e.g., I rubbed the lotion on the chair) and to rate the action bizarreness.
When imagining, participants merely had to imagine enacting a specic action (e.g., Imagine rub-
bing the lotion on the chair) without touching the object(s) presented. After each imagination, par-
ticipants were asked to rate how well they could picture enacting the action.
When confabulating, participants not only had to imagine enacting a specic action (i.e., Imagine
rubbing the lotion on the chair) without touching the presented object(s) but also had to describe
what they just did in their head (e.g., by stating I rubbed the lotion on the chair). This latter state-
ment was identical to that elicited from participants when they actually enacted an action. Thus,
enacted and confabulated actions could not be distinguished on the basis of memory for the descrip-
tion, further enhancing their similarity. After each confabulation, participants were asked to rate how
well they could picture enacting the action.
The collection of bizarreness or imaginability ratings after each action not only allowed us to verify
how participants had experienced each action, but also guaranteed experimental control of incidental
encoding. Specically, we ensured that participants engaged in a controlled procedure when they rst
processed each action. Moreover, the ratings provided an effective cover story for the real goals of the
experiment, thereby reducing the risk that age differences may be due to rehearsal or other strategies
used in anticipation of a future memory test.
Memory interview session. Approximately 14 days after the play session (M = 14.4 days, SD = 1.15,
range = 1020, with 82% of participants returning after exactly 14 days), participants returned to
the laboratory, ostensibly to participate in a second play session. At this time, the recognition memory
test was administered. Participants were told that they would be asked questions about the play ses-
sion and that their job was to identify the actions they had actually enacted at that time.
Before the memory test, participants received a set of different instructions depending on their
training condition. Participants in the no-training condition were rst encouraged to be as accurate
as possible. They were then instructed to endorse only the actions they remembered actually enacting
and to reject the actions they did not remember actually enacting. Participants in the training condi-
tion were trained to take expected memorability into account when determining an event occurrence.
The detailed training procedure is described next.
Training procedure. Before beginning the memory test, participants in the training condition were
involved in three preparatory activities. Each activity required participants to enact an action (i.e.,
wipe off the tape recorder) and required the experimenter to simply describe another action
(i.e., Sometimes I also ask children to put a tape in the tape recorder, but its not necessary today
because I already have a tape in it) (see Ghetti et al., 2006). After the preparatory activities, partici-
pants were informed that the memory test would soon begin, and that they needed to use two rules to
answer the test questions.1 The rules were designed to encourage participants to consider expected
memorability when determining whether an action had been truly enacted or not. Specically, partici-
pants were instructed to endorse an action only when they remembered actually enacting that action
(yes rule). They were instructed to reject an action if (a) they did not remember actually enacting it
and (b) they thought they would have remembered it if they had actually enacted it (no rule).
To ensure understanding of the rules and encourage their implementation even with familiar
distracters, participants were instructed to use them in a practice retrieval test that included (a) the
three actions enacted during the preparatory activities, (b) the three actions described during the pre-
paratory activities (i.e., familiar distracters), and (c) two novel actions (i.e., actions that were not
enacted or described before and, thus, were unfamiliar distracters).
During the practice test, participants were rst asked whether they remembered enacting an action
(e.g., Do you remember wiping off the tape recorder?). If they assented, they were prompted to
choose the applicable rule (i.e., yes rule, e.g., So, if I asked you Did you wipe off the tape recorder,
what would you answer?) and were given positive feedback for correct choices. For incorrect choices,
participants were reminded of the conditions in which each rule applied (e.g., Actually, when you
remember doing something, you should answer with a yes. You should answer with a no only when
you dont remember doing something and you think you would have remembered it if you had actu-
ally done it).
If participants did not remember enacting an action, they were asked whether they would have
remembered it if they had actually enacted it. For positive responses, participants were again
prompted to choose the applicable rule (i.e., no rule) and were provided with positive or negative
feedback depending on their choice. After the practice retrieval test, participants were required to
show their understanding of the task by reproducing the rules to be used. Specically, they were
asked, When will you answer with a yes? and When will you answer with a no? Once the rules
were successfully reproduced, the actual memory test began.
Memory test. The memory test contained 90 questions about enacted and non-enacted actions. For
each question, participants were asked to provide a yes/no recognition judgment. Halfway through
the memory test (i.e., after 45 questions), participants were reminded of the instructions/rules to fol-
low according to the condition to which they were assigned. The memory interview lasted approxi-
mately 50 minutes. After nishing the interview, participants were debriefed and thanked for their
participation.
Results
The following sections rst present the results of preliminary analyses. Then, results about memory
performance are reported separately for hits and false alarms.
Preliminary analyses
To conrm that participants across age groups and conditions engaged in a similar encoding expe-
rience, preliminary analyses examined the ratings provided at encoding. First, bizarreness ratings
were entered into a 2 (Age Group: children vs. adults) 2 (Training Condition: no-training vs. train-
ing) 2 (Expected Memorability: bizarre vs. common) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Across age
groups and training conditions, bizarre actions obtained signicantly higher bizarreness ratings com-
pared to common actions (M = 3.36, SD = .37, and M = 1.42, SD = .31, respectively), conrming that par-
1
Ghetti and colleagues (2006) training procedure was originally developed in Italian, and a direct translation of the instructions
would have made them overly complicated in English. Therefore, participants in the current study were simply provided with two
rules to follow during the practice test, namely a rule for endorsement and a rule for rejection of presented events. The rules were
designed to exemplify the inferential process underlying the implementation of the memorability-based strategy and, thus, were
expected to promote memorability-based inferences.
ticipants ratings were consistent with our own classication, F(1, 96) = 2032.31, p < .001, g2p = .96, and
that this classication held for both children and adults.
A signicant three-way interaction between age, expected memorability, and condition also
emerged, F(1, 96) = 4.39, p < .05, g2p = .04. Simple effects analyses indicated that in the no-training con-
dition children gave higher bizarreness ratings to common actions than adults, F(1, 48) = 4.18, p < .05,
g2p = .08, (M = 1.54, SD = .39, and M = 1.36, SD = .23, respectively); nevertheless, for both age groups
these actions were consistently rated as less common than bizarre actions (children: M = 3.33,
SD = .42; adults: M = 3.44, SD = .28).
Imaginability ratings were then entered into the 2 (Age Group: children vs. adults) 2 (Training
Condition: no-training vs. training) 2 (Expected Memorability: bizarre vs. common) 2 (Familiar-
ity: imagined vs. confabulated) ANOVA. This analysis revealed a signicant main effect of age, F(1,
96) = 15.72, p < .001, g2p = .14, with adults reporting higher ease than children at picturing actions in
their mind (M = 3.46, SD = .36, and M = 3.14, SD = .48, respectively). An interaction between age and
training condition, F(1, 96) = 8.76, p < .001, g2p = .08, further claried that children in the no-training
condition reported lower ease at imagining; this was not the case in adults (children: no-training,
M = 2.97, SD = .43; training, M = 3.31, SD = .48; adults: no-training, M = 3.53, SD = 0.37; training,
M = 3.39, SD = .34). Imaginability scores were given during encoding and, thus, cannot be the result
of the training procedures provided during the retrieval session; therefore, the effect of training
was due to unexpected sample differences. Nevertheless, imaginability ratings were entered as covar-
iates in the analysis involving imagined and confabulated actions.
A signicant main effect of expected memorability also emerged, F(1, 96) = 125.75, p < .001,
g2p = .57, indicating that across age groups common actions were easier to imagine compared to bizarre
actions (M = 3.58, SD = .47, and M = 3.05, SD = .56, respectively). Of importance, no signicant age or
training by expected memorability interaction emerged, indicating that actions were assessed simi-
larly across ages and training condition, at least with respect to their bizarreness.
Memory performance: Hit rates

Mean hit rates were entered into a 2 (Age Group: children vs. adults) 2 (Training Condition: no-
training vs. training) 2 (Expected Memorability: bizarre vs. common) ANOVA. Hit rates did not vary
by age group or training condition, Fs(1, 96) 6 3.11, ps P .08, g2ps 6 .03 (see Table 1 for means). How-
ever, a signicant effect of expected memorability was observed, F(1, 96) = 49.18, p < .001, g2p = .34:
Enacted bizarre actions were recognized at a higher rate than common actions (M = .85, SD = .14,
and M = .73, SD = .19, respectively). No interaction effects were observed.
Table 1
Experiment 1: Hits and mean false alarm rates by age, training condition, familiarity, and expected memorability.
Children Adults
No-training Training No-training Training
Hits
Bizarre .87 (.09) .83 (.18) .91 (.09) .81 (.13)
Common .78 (.12) .72 (.25) .74 (.20) .70 (.19)
Novel distracters
Bizarre .02 (.05) .00 (.02) .04 (.11) .04 (.11)
Common .13 (.17) .06 (.06) .08 (.13) .07 (.09)
Imagined distracters
Bizarre .26 (.19) .24 (.22) .23 (.20) .16 (.15)
Common .32 (.17) .25 (.19) .22 (.21) .22 (.17)
Confabulated distracters
Bizarre .33 (.17) .28 (.22) .29 (.23) .16 (.16)
Common .38 (.18) .29 (.17) .24 (.20) .17 (.16)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Fig. 1. Mean false alarm rates for the signicant Age Expected Memorability Training Condition interaction (Experiment 1).
Memory performance: False alarm rates

To examine the effect of metacognitive training on childrens and adults ability to correctly reject
non-enacted actions, mean false-alarm rates were then entered into a 2 (Age Group: children vs.
adults) 2 (Training Condition: no-training vs. training) 2 (Expected Memorability: bizarre vs. com-
mon) 3 (Familiarity: novel vs. imagined vs. confabulated) mixed analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
with participants working memory scores as a covariate (see Table 1 for means). Given the differences
in ease of imagination across ages and conditions identied in preliminary analyses, imaginability rat-
ings were also entered into the model as a covariate.
A main effect of training condition emerged, F(1, 91) = 5.68, p < .01, g2p = .06, such that metacogni-
tive training reduced false-alarm rates (training: M = .16, SD = .10; no training: M = .21, SD = .13). This
effect was qualied by a signicant interaction with familiarity, F(2, 91) = 3.26, p < .05, g2p = .04. Bon-
ferroni planned comparisons indicated that training signicantly decreased false alarm rates to con-
fabulated distracters, F(1, 98) = 6.69, p < .05, g2p = .06 (no-training: M = .32, SD = .17; training:
M = .22, SD = .16), whereas it did not affect false alarm rates to imagined and novel ones (imagined:
no-training, M = .26, SD = .17; training, M = .22, SD = .16; novel: no-training, M = .07, SD = .11; training,
M = .04, SD = .07).
A signicant three-way interaction between age, expected memorability, and training condition
was also observed, F(1, 91) = 4.96, p < .05, g2p = .05 (see Fig. 1). Simple effects analyses revealed that
for children training did not signicantly decrease false-alarm rates, even though a non-signicant
trend was detected for common distracters, F(1, 44) = 3.01, p = .09, g2p = .06. For adults, metacognitive
training effectively reduced false-alarm rates to bizarre distracters, F(1, 48) = 4.12, p < .05, g2p = .08,
whereas the effect of training was not present for common distracters, F(1, 48) = .52, p = .47,
g2p = .01. In addition to these ndings, there was a non-signicant trend for working memory, F(1,
91) = 2.98, p = .09, g2p = .03, suggesting a tendency for higher working memory scores to be associated
with lower overall false-alarm rates; however, no interaction was found between working memory
and age, expected memorability, familiarity, or training conditions, Fs(2, 91) 6 1.20, ps P .30,
g2p s 6 .01.
Discussion
The aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether metacognitive training would promote rejec-
tion of non-enacted actions that participants imagined or confabulated by encouraging reliance on
assessments of expected memorability. The typical detrimental effect of imagination and confabula-
tion on memory accuracy was documented in this experiment; higher false-alarm rates were observed
for actions that had been imagined or confabulated compared to novel actions, conrming the pow-
erful effects of these manipulations (Foley & Johnson, 1985; Thomas & Loftus, 2002). Receiving meta-
cognitive training signicantly decreased false-alarm rates without affecting hit rates, thereby indicat-
ing that encouraging participants to consider the expected memorability of the experienced actions
induced greater discrimination between true and false events and did not induce overall conservative
responding.
Two other results are worth of consideration. First, the effect of training was mainly driven by
reduced false-alarm rates to confabulated distracters. Previous research indicated that the ability to
monitor event expected memorability and to use it to determine event occurrence is especially
affected by confabulation (Ghetti et al., 2010). Indeed, when determining the actual occurrence of a
familiar event, individuals ought to engage in ne-grained assessments of the quality of their memo-
ries to establish whether it matches the expected memory quality for truly enacted actions. This
assessment may be particularly difcult with memories resulting from confabulated events because
their differences from truly enacted events may be relatively subtle, and memorability-based infer-
ences might not be invoked. Thus, metacognitive training may be particularly effective on this class
of distracters.
Second, developmental differences emerged in the effect of training on memorability-based rejec-
tion. Specically, adults showed reduced false alarms to bizarre distracters compared to common
distracters, suggesting that metacognitive instructions encouraged them to use memorability-based
inferences to control their memory output. In contrast, children did not appear to signicantly benet
from the training. Even though a trend was detected on rejection of common actions, successful imple-
mentation of memorability-based inferences should produce reduced endorsement of bizarre actions
because they are expected to be more memorable. Thus, it is safe to assume that metacognitive train-
ing did not promote childrens consideration of expected memorability in this experiment.
Memory monitoring and strategy use are typically effortful and resource-consuming (Guttentag,
1984; Kee, 1994). In this specic case, monitoring expected memorability, when the relative familiar-
ity of distracters is a dominant task dimension for childrens monitoring (Ghetti et al., 2010), arguably
engaged considerable resources. Under these circumstances, keeping the metacognitive training
instructions in mind and following them to reject false events might have posed additional demands
during a difcult memory task, thereby precluding effective use of metacognitive inferences in chil-
dren (see DeMarie & Ferron, 2003; Guttentag, 1989; Miller, Seier, Probert, & Aloise, 1991).
It is important to note that the effects of training were observed while controlling for individual
differences in working memory capacity. Thus, we can exclude that age differences in working mem-
ory account for the results observed in this study. However, implementing the training instructions
may have been overall too taxing even for individuals with high working memory capacity, resulting
in overall small effects.
Although these results apparently lead to the conclusion that childrens inability to benet from
training may reect a boundary condition of successful memorability-based rejection, additional
explanations should be considered. First, during training children practiced using memorability-based
inferences to discriminate between actions that had been enacted and heard immediately prior to
receiving instructions and being tested. Thus, all of these actions were remembered perfectly. It is pos-
sible that this characteristic limited childrens appreciation that responses in the actual recognition
test would require them to make assessments under conditions of high uncertainty. Memorability-
based inferences should be especially useful under conditions of high uncertainty (e.g., when true
and false memories may resemble each other; Ghetti et al., 2010). Thus, children may be better posi-
tioned to benet from metacognitive training under conditions that require effortful memory searches
with an uncertain outcome.
Second, the practice task in Ghetti and colleagues (2006) study required children to discriminate
between actions they had enacted and actions that had been suggested to them from an external
source. Thus, the practice task mimicked the actual recognition task more than in the current study,
possibly facilitating skill transfer. It is possible that the training would be more effective if it required
discrimination among internally generated memories. In addition, given that memorability monitor-
ing proves to be particularly challenging with imagined and confabulated distracters (Ghetti et al.,
2010), it may be necessary for the practice test to include actions associated with different levels of
expected memorability, even though 9-year olds performance in Ghetti and colleagues (2006)
research improved with training that did not include bizarre actions. This latter approach, adequate to
reduce misinformation, may indeed be insufcient for imagined and confabulated actions. These
hypotheses were investigated in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
The goal of Experiment 2 was to further clarify whether imagery and confabulation irremediably
compromise childrens ability to use memorability-based rejection or whether other viable explana-
tions for training ineffectiveness exist. In particular, one of the hypotheses we wished to test was
whether experiencing memory uncertainty during the practice test would help children benet from
metacognitive training and engage in memorability-based rejection of familiar distracters. To this end,
we experimentally manipulated the level of uncertainty.
Specically, low uncertainty was accomplished by having participants practice with actions expe-
rienced immediately before the training procedure began, just like in Experiment 1 (trainingpresent
condition). High uncertainty was achieved by having participants practice on actions experienced at
the time of encoding (trainingpast condition). Thus, in the latter condition, the interval between
the experience of the practice actions and the practice test matched that between the play session
and memory test. If the experience of uncertainty is crucial to appreciate the benets of memorabil-
ity-based inferences with imagined and confabulated actions, the trainingpast condition should be
more effective than the trainingpresent condition and should result in improvements in childrens
memorability-based rejection of familiar false events.
Alternatively, it is possible that the experience of uncertainty in itself is not critical. Instead, the
training procedure in Experiment 1 might have fallen short because the actions used for practice
had not been imagined or confabulated and were only common, thereby making it difcult for chil-
dren to see the relevance of the training rules to the actual memory task. If this is the case, children
should benet equally in each training condition compared to the control condition.
To address these possibilities, a new training procedure was designed for Experiment 2. The new
procedure, across both trainingpast and trainingpresent conditions, included two main modica-
tions. First, to facilitate transfer from the practice test to the actual recognition test, participants were
trained to rely on memorability-based inferences with actions that were either novel or had been pre-
viously enacted, imagined, or confabulated. Second, practice actions were also associated with differ-
ent levels of expected memorability. That is, for every class of practice actions (i.e., enacted, imagined,
confabulated, or new), one bizarre (high expected memorability) action and one common (low
expected memorability) action were used. To provide optimal conditions for inference use, we also
created a pictorial representation of the memorability-based rules (Fig. 2). This representation was
available for consultation throughout the memory test.
Method
Participants
In total, 62 children (50% female, M = 9 years 1 month, range = 8 years 6 months to 9 years
11 months) and 63 undergraduate students (49% female, M = 20 years 8 months, range = 18 years
0 months to 28 years 9 months) participated in Experiment 2. Approximately 41.4% of the participants
were European American, 9.4% were Asian, 6.3% were Hispanic, 3.9% were African American, 10.9%
were of mixed ethnicity, and 28.1% did not disclose their ethnic background. Participants were
recruited by means of the same procedures as described in Experiment 1.
Materials
The same experimental materials and working memory task from Experiment 1 were adopted in
the current experiment, with the addition of 14 practice actions and a training board.
Practice actions. Two blocks of six practice actions (three bizarre and three common) were used in the
current study. One block of actions was employed as practice at encoding, and the other block was
adopted as practice at retrieval in the trainingpresent condition. Block use at encoding or retrieval
was counterbalanced. The two extra actions (one bizarre and one common) were included as novel
distracters in the practice test in both training conditions.
Training board. This board provided a pictorial depiction of the inferential processes involved in deter-
mining event occurrence (see Fig. 2). The pictorial description was meant to facilitate childrens under-
standing of the rules and also provide a visual reminder of the rules throughout the memory
interview. Details on how the board was employed are explained in the next section.
Procedure
Similar to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 included a play session and a memory interview session that
occurred 2 weeks apart. Participants were tested individually on each occasion.
Play session. During the 45-minutes play session, participants rst completed the working memory
test and then were asked to enact, imagine, or confabulate a series of actions and provide a judgment
about them (i.e., bizarreness or ease of imagination), just as in Experiment 1. In the current experi-
ment, however, an explanation of how to perform each of the activities was also provided. Specically,
participants practiced enacting, imagining, and confabulating one common action and one bizarre
action for each category.
Memory interview session. The memory interview occurred approximately 14 days after the play ses-
sion (M = 14.15 days, SD = .58, range = 1316, with 81% of participants returning after exactly 14 days).
Participants received a set of different instructions to follow during the memory interview, depending
on their training condition.
Instructions for the no-training condition mimicked those of Experiment 1. Participants in the two
training conditions were instructed to take expected memorability into account when determining
whether an action had been truly enacted or not. Unlike Experiment 1, participants in the training
conditions were presented with the training board along with the verbal instructions. The detailed
training procedures are described next.
Training procedures. In the trainingpresent (i.e., low uncertainty) condition, participants were rst
asked to enact, imagine, and confabulate a total of six actions (i.e., one bizarre and one common action
for each activity) and to supply the same kind of ratings provided during the encoding phase. After
completing the six preparatory actions, participants were instructed on how to use the training board
and then were engaged in a practice recognition test that included the six preparatory actions and two
novel ones. Thus, the low level of uncertainty participants experienced in the trainingpresent condi-
tion matched that of Experiment 1. However, in the current experiment, the practice actions matched
the characteristics of the distracters included at retrieval (i.e., they varied in expected memorability
and level of familiarity).
In the trainingpast (i.e., high uncertainty) condition, participants were immediately instructed on
how to use the training board and were then asked to use it in a practice recognition test. The practice
test included the six actions used as practice at encoding (two enacted, two imagined, and two con-
fabulated) plus two novel actions.
In both training conditions, we instructed children to use the training board as follows. When asked
whether an action was truly enacted, participants were told (by pointing at the rst smiley in Fig. 2) to
search their memory for the actual experience of the event. If the memory search was positive (i.e., if
they remembered the event [second smiley]), participants were instructed to endorse the occurrence
of the event.
If the memory search was negative (i.e., if they failed to remember enacting the event [third smiley
in Fig. 2]), participants were instructed to further consider whether they would have remembered the
action had it actually been enacted (fourth smiley). For actions evaluated as being of high expected
memorability (fth smiley), participants were encouraged to interpret their retrieval failure as diag-
nostic of non-occurrence. For actions not deemed to be highly memorable (sixth smiley), participants
were told that lack of memory may indicate either non-occurrence or forgetting (seventh smiley);
thus, they would need to guess.
Fig. 2. Training board adopted in Experiment 2.
For the practice recognition test, participants in both training conditions were instructed to
endorse only actions that had actually been enacted and to use the training board to help them dis-
criminate enacted and non-enacted actions. When participants failed to remember an enacted event,
they were warned of its actual occurrence and were encouraged to be as accurate as possible. Simi-
larly, when participants claimed to remember a non-enacted action, they were informed of the actual
nature of the action (i.e., imagined, confabulated, or novel) and were reminded that only enacted
actions should be endorsed.
In both training conditions, after the practice test, the actual recognition test began. Participants
were encouraged to refer to the training board to help determine event occurrence (i.e., enactment),
just like they did during the practice test. Similar to Experiment 1, participants were reminded of how
to use the training board halfway through the memory test (participants in the no-training condition
were simply reminded to be as accurate as possible).
Results
The following sections rst present the results of preliminary analyses. Then results about memory
performance are reported separately for hits and false alarms.
Preliminary analyses
To verify whether participants across age groups engaged in similar encoding experiences, ratings
of action bizarreness were entered into a 2 (Age Group: children vs. adults) 3 (Training Condition:
no-training vs. trainingpast vs. trainingpresent) 2 (Expected Memorability: bizarre vs. common)
ANOVA. Results highlighted signicant main effects of expected memorability, F(1, 119) = 3122.00,
p < .001, g2p = .96, and age, F(1, 119) = 12.17, p < .001, g2p = .09. These main effects were qualied by a
signicant interaction between expected memorability and age, F(1, 119) = 11.90, p < .001, g2p = .09.
Simple effects analyses indicated that (a) both children and adults rated bizarre actions as being sig-
nicantly more bizarre than common actions, Fs(1, 61) P 1007.44, p 6 .001 (children: bizarre,
M = 3.40, SD = .32; common, M = 1.55, SD = .37; adults: bizarre, M = 3.38, SD = .27; common,
M = 1.29, SD = .20), and (b) compared to adults, children provided higher bizarreness ratings to com-
mon actions (but still in the common range), F(1, 119) = 23.96, p < .001, g2p = .16. The results con-
rmed that, across age groups and training conditions, common actions were considered to be
common and bizarre actions were indeed considered to be bizarre, thereby ensuring that participants
mostly engaged in comparable encoding experiences.
In addition, imaginability ratings were entered into a 2 (Age Group: children vs. adults) 3 (Train-
ing Condition: no-training vs. trainingpast vs. trainingpresent) 2 (Expected Memorability: bizarre
vs. common) 2 (Familiarity: imagined vs. confabulated) ANOVA. As in Experiment 1, a signicant
main effect of expected memorability emerged, F(1, 119) = 151.06, p < .001, g2p = .56, indicating that
common actions were more easily imagined compared to bizarre actions (M = 3.68, SD = .37, and
M = 3.13, SD = .56, respectively). A signicant main effect of age also emerged, F(1, 19) = 36.78,
p < .001, g2p = .24, with adults being better than children at picturing an action in their mind
(M = 3.60, SD = .28, and M = 3.21, SD = .42, respectively). These results conrm that imagination expe-
riences, with respect to the difference between bizarre and common actions, were mostly similar
across age groups.
Memory performance: Hit rates

Mean hit rates were entered into a 2 (Age Group: children vs. adults) 3 (Training Condition: no-
training vs. trainingpast vs. trainingpresent) 2 (Expected Memorability: bizarre vs. common)
ANOVA. Hit rates were comparable across age groups and training conditions, Fs(2, 119) 6 1.08,
ps P .16, g2ps 6 .03 (see Table 2 for means). Conrming that individuals expectations of event mem-
orability matched the likelihood of the event being retrieved, a signicant effect of expected memo-
rability was observed, F(1, 119) = 109.42, p < .001, g2p = .48, indicating that bizarre enacted actions
were recognized at a higher rate (M = .86, SD = .10) than common actions (M = .72, SD = .14). No signif-
icant interaction effects were observed.
Memory performance: False alarm rates

To examine whether the new training procedures were effective in promoting memorability-based
rejection of non-enacted actions, mean false-alarm rates were entered into a 2 (Age Group: children
vs. adults) 3 (Training Condition: no-training vs. trainingpast vs. trainingpresent) 2 (Expected
Memorability: bizarre vs. common) 3 (Familiarity: novel vs. imagined vs. confabulated) mixed
ANCOVA with working memory scores entered as a covariate. This analysis revealed signicant main
effects of three variables of interest and several signicant interactions (see Table 2 for means).
First, the main effects of familiarity, F(2, 116) = 14.93, p < .001, g2p = .11, and age, F(1, 116) = 18.13,
p < .001, g2p = .14, were qualied by a signicant interaction between the two, F(2, 116) = 3.61, p < .05,
g2p = .03. Simple effects analyses indicated that adults had lower false-alarm rates compared to chil-
dren across all levels of distracters familiarity; however, whereas children produced signicantly
lower false alarms to novel distracters (M = .07, SD = .07) compared to imagined (M = .27, SD = .17)
and confabulated ones (M = .30, SD = .16), adults false-alarm rates were all signicantly different from
each other (novel: M = .03, SD = .04; imagined: M = .13, SD = .09; confabulated: M = .18, SD = .10).
Table 2
Experiment 2: Hits and mean false alarm rates by age, training condition, familiarity, and expected memorability.
Children Adults
No-T T-past T-present No-T T-past T-present
Hits
Bizarre .88 (.12) .86 (.10) .86 (.12) .88 (.10) .84 (.11) .86 (.10)
Common .76 (.14) .70 (.12) .75 (.15) .72 (.16) .68 (.13) .73 (.15)
Novel distracters
Bizarre .04 (.01) .03 (.02) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01)
Common .12 (.02) .12 (.01) .10 (.02) .06 (.02) .01 (.02) .06 (.02)
Imagined distracters
Bizarre .28 (.04) .22 (.04) .20 (.04) .15 (.04) .12 (.04) .12 (.04)
Common .36 (.04) .32 (.04) .23 (.04) .19 (.04) .08 (.04) .13 (.04)
Confabulated distracters
Bizarre .40 (.04) .25 (.03) .20 (.04) .23 (.04) .13 (.04) .19 (.04)
Common .35 (.03) .33 (.04) .29 (.03) .19 (.03) .16 (.03) .15 (.03)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. No-T, no training; T-past, trainingpast; T-present, trainingpresent.
Fig. 3. Mean false alarm rates for the signicant Familiarity Expected Memorability Training Condition interaction
(Experiment 2).
Age also interacted with expected memorability, F(1, 116) = 4.87, p < .05, g2p = .04, indicating that
although children endorsed both bizarre and common distracters to a greater extent than adults,
the effect of event expected memorability was detectable in children (bizarre: M = .18, SD = .13; com-
mon: M = .24, SD = .12) but not in adults (bizarre: M = .11, SD = .08; common: M = .11, SD = .09).
Across age groups, the training manipulation was effective in reducing false-alarm rates, as high-
lighted by a signicant main effect of training condition, F(2, 116) = 5.04, p < .01, g2p = .08. Bonferroni
post-hoc comparisons further indicated that false-alarm rates were signicantly lower in the training
present condition compared to the no-training condition, whereas the trainingpast condition was not
signicantly different from the other two conditions (no-training: M = .20, SD = .11; trainingpast:
M = .15, SD = .10; trainingpresent: M = .14, SD = .09).
The effect of training condition was further qualied by a signicant three-way interaction with
familiarity and expected memorability, F(4, 116) = 3.03, p < .05, g2p = .05 (see Fig. 3). Simple effects
analyses revealed that training effects were restricted to confabulated bizarre actions, F(2,
119) = 6.18, p < .01, g2p = .09. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons indicated that both trainingpast and
trainingpresent signicantly reduced false-alarm rates compared to the no-training condition,
whereas no signicant difference emerged between the two training conditions (no-training:
M = .32, SD = .23; trainingpast: M = .19, SD = .17; trainingpresent: M = .19, SD = .14). These effects
were not evident on confabulated common actions, F(2, 119) = 0.75, p = .47, g2p = .01, or on novel
and imagined actions, Fs(2, 119) 6 2.50, ps P .09, g2p s 6 .04. No signicant main or interaction effects
of working memory were found, Fs(2, 116) 6 1.21, ps P .30, g2p s 6 .01.
Discussion
Experiment 2 claried the results of Experiment 1 by exploring whether memorability-based rejec-

tion in children is irremediably impaired when children ought to discriminate memories for events
that are internally generated or it is still possible to promote the use of memorability-based inferences
to reject imagined and confabulated actions. Contrary to expectations, the experience of uncertainty
was not necessary to encourage memorability-based rejection of imagined and confabulated distract-
ers in children. Indeed, childrens rejection of bizarre confabulated events was evident in both training
conditions. This opens the possibility that childrens limited improvement in Experiment 1 was not
due to difculties in understanding how to detect false events based on evaluations of expected mem-
orability. Instead, it is reasonable to conclude, consistent with the alternative hypothesis, that children
may have found it difcult to see the connection between the actions used in the training task and
those used in the actual memory task due to the lack of similarity between the two.
In the current experiment, we ensured correspondence between the characteristics of practice
events and events participants were later asked to discriminate. Older children can spontaneously
use memorability-based inferences when inferring the occurrence of false events that are not highly
familiar (Ghetti, 2003; Ghetti & Castelli, 2006) or whose familiarity is increased through misinforma-
tion (Ghetti et al., 2006); therefore, it is possible that practicing how to apply memorability-based
inferences to events that elicited a strong sense of familiarity was sufcient to ensure that even chil-
dren used these inferences during the actual test. Moreover, the availability of visual aids may have
ensured optimal conditions for inference use in children.
From an applied perspective, the effectiveness of the trainingpresent procedure is a positive out-
come. Because it might not always be possible in the forensic context to induce the same level of
uncertainty experienced for events about which one is interviewed, the fact that training performed
on actions experienced at the time of interview promotes memorability-based rejection of false events
indicates that this training procedure could be successfully integrated into forensic interviews to help
children report the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
In addition, we note the decreased endorsement of confabulated distracters following metacogni-
tive training. Alleged child victims/witnesses may often be pressured by parents or investigators to
answer questions about experienced events. It is not unlikely that under these circumstances, and
in the absence of actual memories, children may confabulate answers. By the time the actual forensic
interview takes place, children may nd it difcult to discern confabulated events from experienced
ones. Thus, a procedure that effectively helps them make this discrimination should be especially
useful.
The effect of training on confabulated distracters is also particularly interesting from a theoretical
perspective. Previous research indicated that even 9-year-olds failed to monitor expected memorabil-
ity when evaluating the actual occurrence of events they confabulated (Ghetti et al., 2010). Whether or
not this inability reected a true developmental constraint was one of the aspects we aimed to clarify.
The nding that training effectively promotes memorability-based inferences to reject bizarre confab-
ulated distracters indicates that children might not spontaneously elect to use memorability assess-
ments when discriminating between highly familiar events, but can successfully do so when
reminded, suggesting that no intrinsic developmental constraint exists in their ability to monitor
expected memorability.
Before concluding, it is important to comment on the lack of training effects on imagined actions.
Previous research suggests that older children can still spontaneously use memorability-based infer-
ences to reject imagined distracters because their monitoring abilities are not thoroughly compro-
mised in that task (Ghetti et al., 2010). Thus, it is viable to assume that participants may have
already been using memorability-based inferences with imagined distracters. Indeed, as visible in
Table 2, false-alarm rates to imagined distracters in the no-training condition are similar to those seen
for confabulated distracters in the two training conditions. These false-alarm rates likely represent the
higher limit of possible improvement over which no additional benet of training will be detected.
Conclusions
In recent years, the study of mechanisms that support false memory rejection has received growing
attention (Brainerd et al., 2003; Ghetti, 2003; Ghetti & Castelli, 2006). Specically, research has inves-
tigated whether training procedures could be devised to promote the use of these mechanisms and
enhance the ability to discriminate memories for truly experienced events from memories arising
from other potentially confounding sources (misinformation, imagination, or confabulation).
Previous research showed that instructing 9-year-old children to monitor expected memorability
could be helpful to reduce suggestibility effects (Ghetti et al., 2006), but experimental conditions that
induced mild misinformation effects did not completely compromise childrens ability to engage in
memorability-based inferences. Instead, childrens use of these inferences to screen out information
they imagined or confabulated seemed to be compromised (Ghetti et al., 2010). Thus, it was not clear
whether training would be helpful. The current work explored whether the ability to do so could be
reinstated by providing metacognitive instructions, an important question in both theoretical and
applied perspectives.
Across two experiments, we reported a set of complementary ndings. Whereas the general train-
ing procedure adopted in Experiment 1 did not effectively promote childrens ability to engage in
memorability-based rejection successfully, the training procedures employed in Experiment 2 were
effective, highlighting that children might require considerable support to use memorability-based
inferences once they engaged in imagery and confabulation.
From an applied perspective, the results highlight that alerting children to the importance of mem-
orability monitoring is in itself effective in increasing rejection of false events without affecting
endorsement rates for true events. In terms of identifying procedures that may help children discrim-
inate between true and false events, it seems feasible to consider incorporating instructions that not
only direct children to monitor the source of their memory but also provide specic indications on the
factors they should monitor to identify memories coming from irrelevant sources. Expected memora-
bility seems to be a particularly useful factor to monitor because it allows for inferences to be made in
both the presence and absence of recollection.
Training procedures promoting memory editing through monitoring of expected memorability
would be of great utility in a forensic context. Interviews occur at times after long delays, when high
rates of forgetting may be expected (Brainerd, Kingma, & Howe, 1985), and interference from external
sources (i.e., misinformation) or from cognitive operations (e.g., imagination and confabulation) have
the potential of contaminating childrens reports.
Forensic interview protocols have already successfully incorporated instructions that promote
accuracy. For example, based on the empirical nding that children provide a higher rate of accurate
responses when they are given the possibility of providing I dont know/remember answers (see
Koriat et al., 2001), an encouragement to withhold uncertain responses has been integrated into for-
mal interviewing protocols (e.g., Cognitive Interview and National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development [NICHD] protocols) to improve the overall accuracy of childrens reports and
reduce the risk of reporting non-experienced events (Lamb, Hershkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin, 2008;
Lamb, Sternberg, & Esplin, 1998; McCauley & Fisher, 1995; Orbach, Hershkowitz, Lamb, Esplin, &
Horowitz, 2000; Poole & Lamb, 1998). The metacognitive training procedures devised are not time-
consuming and are effective in promoting false-memory editing. Thus, they hold the potential of
greatly beneting childrens accuracy.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation Grant (SES 0648564).
Any opinions, ndings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reect the views of the National Science Foundation
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Resisting Imagination and Confabulation - Effects of Metacognitive Training

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Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 126 (2014) 339356

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Journal of Experimental Child

Resisting imagination and confabulation: Effects

Article history: False memory rejection is enhanced when individuals rely on

Diagnostic monitoring and training procedures

Memory performance: Hit rates

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Memory performance: False alarm rates

Fig. 2. Training board adopted in Experiment 2.

Memory performance: Hit rates

Memory performance: False alarm rates

Experiment 2 claried the results of Experiment 1 by exploring whether memorability-based rejec-

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