Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 5


Hydrotreating Unit
Brian Jack(ConocoPhillips) reported a failure in dissimilar welding between Alloy 625
and carbon steel in H2S stripper unit. They replaced the top of the tower due high
corrosion rate. After the repair an intensive crack was found in the fusion line. The cause
of the cracking was H2S SCC. The temperature in the top was 400 F, not PWHT was
required, the thickness was too low to required PWHT.
Gerald Wilks (CITGO) reported a failure in the 4 in pipe (Sch 80) between Feed/Effluent
Hx and REAC (fin fans cooler). The failure was in the top of the pipe, a localized
thinning was detected. The material of the pipe is carbon steel, operating condition is 350
Psig @ 300 F, the calculate corrosion rate was 40 mpy. The analysis of the deposit in the
tube, shown sulfide and oxide in the external of deposit and chloride in the area close to
the surface. The pipe was plugged. This unit has a history of failure in the same circuit.
However the wash water was not as design. There was not injection quill before of the
After the failure they recommend wash water rate injection that allow at least 20% of free
water after injection (Baker Petrolite guideline)
After the investigation due the ammonium chloride corrosion, they also replace the
existing SS304 ring joint for a chloride resistant alloy.
Also they set 5 mpy as a operational envelop in this circuit.
They were no clear if the chloride was organic or inorganic.

Salt point: 390 -405 F
Velocity: 20 fps,
turbulent flow

CR: 40 mpy

Figure 1. Sketch of carbon steel circuit in Hydrotreating unit.

RP 0170
Hiroyuki Anada (Sumitomo)

NACE CTW 2006, Orlando Fl. M. Caceress notes from meetings

Show a presentation about Japanese experience with SS347LN (TP 347 AP). They h as
been using this material in different refineries process with success for about 10 years.
This material has a high resistance to Polythionic Attack (PTA and do not required
The lab test shown no sensitization in this material at 550 C for 300 hours, however the
SS321 shown in the same condition a severe sensitization and SS 347 shown less. The
carbon content in those three alloys was low, about 0.005%.
The weldability was good for this material, they uses in heat exchanger also in heater.
Chairman session (Shell Global Solution) inform that the RP0170 is inactive right now,
however they can ask to reopen to review this practice for the next Corrosion Meeting
Spring 2007.
Hydrogen Unit
Carol-Ann (Chevron) Present a case of Deareator failure in one on the Hydrogen unit
locate in California. This vessel has a carbon steel storage tank and a SS304 Stripping
vessel on the top of the storage tank. The manway locate in this SS304 catastrophic
failed, fortunately nobody was around. The initial inspection revealed an extensive SCC,
the crack can be observed in the pictures. The pressure is this vessel is 50 Psi and use
steam to strip remaining O2 and CO2; the reason of SS304 is for CO2 content in the
stream. After insulation removal they observed that a steam leak occurred prior to failure,
but was not observed due the insulation. This failure occurred in January 2006 and in
under investigation, the picture and report will be release after the official investigation
concluded. (Suncor: need to review the Deareator in their Hydrogen unit).
Carol Ann ask about other similar experience, Andy (Imperial Oil) mentioned that they
used carbon steel stripping tower with SS304 clad. Also mentioned that this vessel is
typical under fatigue, which can accelerated the SCC, and also minimum amount the
chloride can cause failure in solid SS304 for this application.
Gerald Wilks(Citgo) shown heater tube failure occurred in June 2006. The material of the
tube is 35%Ni-25%Cr-0.75% Nb, diameter 4.6 and 0.52thk. The leak occurred after
restart hydrogen unit due a Compressor failure. They reported 8 shutdowns per year in
this unit, and ask to the audience about other reference (no response). He also asks about
how many time typically the use steam stripping in the heater to eliminate high pressure
drop (no response).
The analysis of failed tube shown a severe internal carburization in the tube and also
confirms that these tubes were not proper bore before to put in service (1995). The depth
of the carburization was 25% in the ID of the tube and al a thick carbon layer was found
inside the tube.
Brian Jack (ConocoPhillips) presented a failure in butane piping attribute to high velocity
(150 fps), they know this issue prior to put in service, however recommend to inspect
every 3 or 4 month to detect thinning, it was not enough and most of the people was
agree that this is safe mitigation action for this particular case. (Suncor review the pipe
that carries the acid gas from U53 to 52K-401 that is going to put in service at the end of
Moraima Caceres (Suncor) give to the audience a brief description of the failure happen
in the Waste Boiler in the Sulphur Recovery Unit in Oil sand. I ask about the practice or
guideline about suitable material for this application. Marten Dennis (?) indicated that

NACE CTW 2006, Orlando Fl. M. Caceress notes from meetings

carbon steel is the only suitable material even without alonized, he explained that ferrule
should be enough to protect the material and also indicated that high nickel alloy is not
suitable neither austenitic due risk of sensitization and PTA for this application.
Carol-Ann (Chevron) presented the case of internal explosion in the slug tank. The cause
was the severe corrosion in the impeller mixer, this piece was corrode therefore the
required missing in the tank was not proper, it cause internal explosion but was detected
immediately by operator and mitigated. She ask about any instrumentation that can allow
to know if the impeller is still working or similar experience. No response
Moraima Caceres (Suncor) ask about material for the burner in SRU different that SS310
or SS416, Marten Dennis(Black & Veatch) explain that the only suitable material is
SS310, high Nickel alloy is not suitable.
Walter Giesbrecht(Flint Hills Resources) explains a failure occurred in the fist overhead
condenser in his Vacuum unit. The hypothesis of the failure is CO2, Cathy Shargay ask if
they analyzed the water in the accumulator and if the used neutralized amine, he said yes.
ExxonMobil ask which evidence they have to concluded that the cause of the failure was
CO2, he said none, also mentioned that is so difficult to measure CO2 in the ejector to
confirm this theory. The analysis in not conclude yet.
JCG presented a case of 1Cr- Mo failure (heavy wall), the cause was the welding
procedure used. He explains that they use FCAW (Rutile/Grade H8)) and because of the
base material has a high strength it cause failure during welding process or in service.
Imperial Oil mentioned that they used FCAW bit grade H4 to minimize this risk(offshore
Gerald Wilks (Citgo) presenta case where they use Omega to estimated the remaining life
of the tube better that API 530.

1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1500

1996 Consumed life: 0%

1997 Consumed life: 7.46%
2006 consumed life 13.5%

Graph presented (No as was presented, it is used only for reference and tendency)
They feel confident to use Omega life to estimate the remaining life of the heater tubes.
ConocoPhillips present a failure in the coker heater, according with the failure analysis
the cause was carbonate corrosion, they do not include the degradation mechanism
before, but now they incorporate to Reliability Program in their facilities (there is a

NACE CTW 2006, Orlando Fl. M. Caceress notes from meetings

specific STG that discuss and review this case, see detail to determine if Suncor need also
review this mechanism and include it in the RBI)

Mike Fahrion (Chevron) ask about design to mitigate erosion corrosion in the returnd
bend. He explains that they had failure after online spalling. Fluor and ExxonMobil
mentioned that they use 9Cr tube with Stellite internal hard facing.
Pre-question: Wash Water. Motiva explain that they used thermography to determine if
there is an adequate water distribution in the REAC in order to prevent failure.

Russel Kane (Honeywell) presents the status of the JIP in the New Technology session.
They mentioned that the exiting API 581 has a limitation due its ava:
NH2HS Already released
Rich Amine:
Definition of iso-corrosion curves
Parametric relation for: Temperature, H2S load, CO/H2S ratio/amine Impurities
Lean Amine:
Lean amine is more severe where gas de-absorbed from rich amine solution, heat transfer
area (High delta T) and high velocity, Wall Shear Stress (WSS).
Overtripping amine also cause severe corrosion
Effects of H2S (0 to 1000 ppm)
Bulk Temperature (< 350 F)
Heat Transfer (Three T 0 to 50F)
HSAS level
Will be release by end 2007
Napthpenic Corrosion: October 2006.
They found that wall shear stress has a huge influence in the corrosion mechanism.
Pat McKenzie (OLI System INC)
This company presented software to simulated overhead condition that will allow
evaluating amines and inhibitors. They mentioned that there are some simulation and
model to estimated corrosion rate for amine, water, CO2, H2S and HCs but not to
chloride, their model can do that.
There were four proposed modifications:
Ballot Item #2006-01 - Copper alloys / aluminum alloys (TG 231)
Ballot Item #2006-02 H2S/total sulfides (re-wording of 1.3.5) (TG 231)
Ballot Item #2006-03 Standard Duplex Quenching Methods (TG 231)
Ballot Item #2006-04 New paragraph for superduplex stainless steels with increased
hardness limit (Ulf Kiviskk Sandvik)
According with the present the most important modification will be relate with the # 2
and # 4. However four of them will be review by the technical committee to evaluate d if
these modifications will be incorporated in the document. The limit proposed for
superduplex is 28 HRC

NACE CTW 2006, Orlando Fl. M. Caceress notes from meetings

During this session the applicability of the NACE TM0284 was discussed, the proposed
wording is as follow:
TM0284 may not apply to SOHIC testing because it was develop for non-stressed test
specimen. Therefore TM0103was specifically for SOHIC test using stressed specimen.
However to date TM0103 has not been adopted as a production test for carbon steel plate
acceptance by any company surveyed, including an adhoc survey conducted of those
attending the TEG 205Xinformation exchanger meeting during CTW 2006. Some have
used TM0103 test method as a tool n comparing relative steel and condition in
developing CS plate for new construction and for understanding problem with SOHIC.
Some specify CS plate with series 300 clad for new pressure vessel constructed for severe
wet sour service, a few specify HIC resistance CS plate tested to T<0284 with PWHT
to reset SOHIC cracking for new pressure vessel constructed for wet H2S service.
Also the category definitions were reviewed as per attachment, because there are some
Basically these groups discuss the revision of:
Discussion related to additional welding technical information
Inclusion of Weld Procedure ControlsAndy Gysbers
Additional information for casting weld repairsDon Bush
There were three proposals to be review for the technical committee:
1. Specify the use of ASTM E92 HV10 for HAZ hardness testing regardless of the
option taken.
2. Expand/cleanup hardness profile testing (EN 1043: Destructive Tests on Welds in
Metallic Materials Hardness Testing Part 1: Hardness Test on Arc Welded Joints).
Basically change to 1.5+/- 0.5 mm for spacing from surface and <= 0.5 mm
distance from fusion line.
3. Define the three option for heat treatment
Propose for HAZ: Required weld procedure pre-production hardness testing regardless
the option used
Clearly identify the HV10 (ASTM E92) based test (Vs microhardness) < 248 HV10
And finally the t5/8 cooling time was discussed in regard of:
Heat input (Use EN BS 1011 Part 2: Welding - Recommendations for Welding of
Metallic Materials - Part 2: Arc Welding of Ferritic Steels-Together with BS EN
1011-1:1998 Supersedes BS 5135:1984)
Thickness (2D vs 3D heat flow)
Weldment geometry (weld shape factor) rather than put limits
All of these modifications are going to be review and response for the committee, and
because most of the modifications are coming for BS EN1011/1043, it is required
permission to incorporate these changes in this NACE document.

NACE CTW 2006, Orlando Fl. M. Caceress notes from meetings