Emergency Planning College

Occasional Papers
New Series

Number 21
May 2017

Disaster Risk Reduction and the

Sendai Framework
What does it mean for UK resilience
practitioners?

Dr Hugh Deeming
HD Research and Senior Research Fellow
Emergency Planning College
Please Note:

This Occasional Paper is a discussion article, written and published in order to

stimulate debate and reflection on key themes of interest to the resilience
community. It is part of a series of papers published by the Emergency Planning
College on the Knowledge Centre of its website and available freely to practitioners
and researchers. The opinions and views it expresses are those of the author
alone. This paper does not constitute formal guidance or doctrine of any sort,
statutory or otherwise, and its contents are not to be regarded as the expression of
government policy or intent.

For further information, including a submissions guide for those who wish to submit a
paper for publication, please contact:

Mark Leigh
Emergency Planning College

T: 01347 825036
E: mark.leigh@emergencyplanningcollege.com
 Disaster Risk Reduction and the Sendai Framework:
What does it mean for UK resilience practitioners?
Introduction
For many people the international discussions and processes associated with attempts to
reduce disaster risk and to increase resilience are somewhat esoteric. This is because
disaster risk reduction can be regarded by some as a necessity only for developing
countries. From this perspective, the only issue relevant to the G20 nations becomes how
much international aid should be allocated to enable this stream of activity to be undertaken
by others.
This understanding does, however, fail to acknowledge two important factors: Firstly, the fact
that since 2005 the United Nations frameworks for disaster-risk reduction (DRR) have been
applicable to all nations and at all scales, from local, to national, regional, and global. Thus,
in addition to guiding the activities of others, such context underlines a clear relationship
between these internationally agreed frameworks and the risk reduction and risk
management aspirations of all national civil-protection practitioners, including the whole UK
Civil Protection sector. Secondly, that recent decades have seen disasters occurring in
nations spanning the gamut of development, suffice that the UN suggests that despite
concerted mitigation activity disaster losses resulting from natural and manmade causes
remain a significant challenge for all nations:
Disasters, many of which are exacerbated by climate change and which are
increasing in frequency and intensity, significantly impede progress towards
sustainable development. Evidence indicates that exposure of persons and
assets in all countries has increased faster than vulnerability has decreased, thus
generating new risks and a steady rise in disaster-related losses, with a
significant economic, social, health, cultural and environmental impact in the
short, medium and long term, especially at the local and community levels.
UN/ISDR (2015: p.10)
In light of these factors, this paper will investigate where the principal model through which
UK civil protection is delivered Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) aligns with and
supports the meeting of the targets and priorities that have been set out in the current UN
framework, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) (UNISDR, 2015b).
In doing so, this paper will enable those working with IEM concepts to understand
where IEM and the Sendai framework need to be meshed in order to reinforce the DRR
aspects of their practice. It will also identify where gaps may exist between the
capabilities, capacities and competences inhered within UK IEM doctrine and practice
(MacFarlane, 2017) and those of any other sectors, whose engagement with disaster risk
reducing activities will undoubtedly be necessary to meet SFDRR targets at the local and
national scales.
This secondary aim is important because, whilst the SFDRR is focussed on attaining
disaster-risk reduction and building disaster resilience, the framework clearly associates
such activities as bearing a renewed sense of urgency within the context of sustainable
development and poverty reduction (Ibid., p.9), i.e. the need to reduce systemic
vulnerabilities (e.g. poverty) something which has not necessarily been a traditional civil-
protection function make achieving the SFDRR targets and priorities a truly integrated
undertaking. Whilst these issues will be expanded on later, a key illustration of this broader

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 conceptualisation of DRR is encompassed within SFDRRs Priority 4 and its focus on
Building Back Better; something that has only recently become clearly accepted as a key
component of risk mitigation in the UK (e.g. Bonfield, 2016).
Following a short definition of concepts, this paper will commence with a description of how
the SFDRR came into being. The framework itself will then be described relative to parallels
with the Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) model. This will be followed by a
discussion of those current workstreams and measures in place within the UK civil protection
sector that correlate with SFDRR targets and priorities and which act as illustration to the
sectors implicit and explicit capability to deliver on these agreed ambitions. Finally, some
conclusions will be drawn and tentative recommendations made, which illustrate
opportunities where changes to policies and practices may assist the sector in contributing
effectively to achieving SFDRR targets.

Definitions
This paper discusses concepts that have numerous definitions across a range of academic,
policy and practice applications. Accordingly, it is important to frame the discussion in a way
that encourages a consistent understanding of the concept being discussed. This does not
mean that other interpretations are invalid. Rather, it simply ensures that all readers are
considering the same interpretation and building their understandings, and their challenges
to that interpretation, from that position.
This approach is slightly at odds with straightforward analysis, because the subject matter
means that it is possible to use either of two lexicons from which to adopt concept
definitions. The UNISDR glossary of terms1 contains definitions for several of the relevant
concepts, which have been deliberated and agreed between member nations. Accordingly, it
is important not to ignore these interpretations. However, as this paper discusses SFDRR in
the context of UK IEM, it is also important to acknowledge the terminology within the UK
Emergency Responder Interoperability Lexicon2.
Table 1 lists the interpretations of the key concepts discussed in this paper side by side, as
they are defined in the respective glossaries. This comparison allows the reader to
understand key similarities and differences between these definitions, and from there to
make an individual judgement on their respective applicability in this context.

Table 1: Comparison of key concepts between two relevant glossaries

Concept UNISDR Glossary of Terms
Disaster A serious disruption of the functioning of a
community or a society at any scale due
to hazardous events interacting with
conditions of exposure, vulnerability and
capacity, leading to one or more of the
following: human, material, economic and
environmental losses and impacts.
UK Emergency Responder
Interoperability Lexicon
Although Disaster was a
recognised concept in UK
doctrine prior to the Civil
Contingencies Act (e.g. the
guidance document Dealing with
Disaster: Cabinet Office, 2004),
since the Act its use has been
succeeded by the somewhat less
emotive concept of Emergency

1
https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology
2
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-responder-interoperability-lexicon

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Emergency Emergency is sometimes used
interchangeably with the term disaster, as, An event or situation which
for example, in the context of biological threatens serious damage to
and technological hazards or health human welfare in a place in the
emergencies, which, however, can also UK, the environment of a place in
relate to hazardous events that do not the UK, or the security of the UK
result in the serious disruption of the or of a place in the UK.
functioning of a community or society
Integrated Multi-agency approach to
Emergency emergency management entailing
Management six key activities
See: Disaster Risk Reduction (below)
(IEM) anticipation, assessment,
prevention, preparation, response
and recovery
Risk All activities and structures
Management directed towards the effective
See: Disaster Risk Management (below),
assessment and management of
but comparison is not exact
risks and their potential adverse
impacts.
Disaster Risk Disaster risk management is the
Management application of disaster risk reduction
policies and strategies to prevent new
See: Risk Management (above),
disaster risk, reduce existing disaster risk
but comparison is not exact
and manage residual risk, contributing to
the strengthening of resilience and
reduction of disaster losses.
Disaster Risk Disaster risk reduction is aimed at
Reduction preventing new and reducing existing
disaster risk and managing residual risk, Not explicitly defined. However,
all of which contribute to strengthening Disaster Risk Reduction can be
resilience and therefore to the understood as a key function of
achievement of sustainable development. UK Civil Protection Doctrine,
Annotation: Disaster risk reduction is the which is ingrained within the
policy objective of disaster risk concept of Integrated Emergency
management, and its goals and objectives Management (IEM).
are defined in disaster risk reduction
strategies and plans
Resilience The ability of a system, community or
society exposed to hazards to resist,
Ability of the community, services,
absorb, accommodate, adapt to,
area or infrastructure to detect,
transform and recover from the effects of
prevent, and, if necessary to
a hazard in a timely and efficient manner,
withstand, handle and recover
including through the preservation and
from disruptive challenges
restoration of its essential basic structures
and functions through risk management
Vulnerability The conditions determined by physical,
Susceptibility of individuals or
social, economic and environmental
community, services or
factors or processes which increase the
infrastructure to damage or harm
susceptibility of an individual, a
arising from an emergency or
community, assets or systems to the
other incident
impacts of hazards.

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As Table 1 illustrates, some of the differences between definitions are effectively semantic
(e.g. vulnerability). However, in other cases it would be remiss to adopt one definition without
acknowledging either the conceptual limitations of or, correspondingly, the greater
comprehensiveness of the other. The key example in this regard is that of resilience. For
this, the UK lexicon offers an understanding of this now familiar term as a relatively stable
system attribute that underpins an ability to bounce back after adversity. The UN definition,
by contrast, is much more open to a broader interpretation, which acknowledges that
bouncing back risks the reproduction of vulnerabilities which may feed future disasters
(Manyena, 2011). Accordingly, the UN definition foregrounds adaptation and transformation
as potential resilience pathways to recovery. Again, this interpretation of resilience as a
dynamic attribute, which is encompassed in an ability to change, is a fundamental
component of the SFDRRs priority 4: Building Back Better.
It should also be noted that disaster risk reduction (DRR) is recognised by the UNISDR as
the desired outcome of effective disaster risk management (DRM). In other words, success
in DRR will inevitably be predicated on the effective delivery of DRM, through the
implementation of strategies, integrated into all relevant plans, policies and programs,
developed to meet specific risk-reduction objectives and goals.

The History of UN Disaster Risk Reduction Frameworks

The international aspiration to achieve disaster risk reduction (DRR) at all levels, from local,
national, regional to global, was initially institutionalised within the Hyogo Framework for
Action 2005-2015 (HFA) (UNISDR, 2005). HFA introduced the requirement for signatory
nations to self-assess and report disaster risk reduction outcomes based on five priority
areas:
1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority with a strong
institutional basis for implementation.
2. Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning.
3. Use knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilience
at all levels.
4. Reduce the underlying risk factors.
5. Strengthen the disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.
Over the course of the HFAs 10-year life, relative success was met in terms of Priorities 2
(Identifying risks, etc.) and 3 (Use knowledge, etc.). These included undoubted progress in
developing early-warning systems, for diverse hazards, which have already saved
thousands of lives around the world. However, considerable impasse occurred in relation to
the other priorities, where deeper systemic changes were required to go beyond
straightforward hazard management, i.e. in order to reduce vulnerability as a root driver of
risk and to institutionalise DRR as a social and political objective (Pearson and Pelling,
2015). Box 1 provides an example of how this shift could be said to have occurred in relation
to English flood risk management.

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 Box 1: English flooding as an example of a slow shift from hazard management to
flood risk management (FRM)
In a UK, and specifically English, flood-risk management (FRM) context, attempts to
generate new processes through which to share governance and responsibility for FRM,
were encompassed within the Department for the Environment and Rural Affairs (Defra)
strategic objective of Making Space for Water (Defra, 2005). This strategy represented a
policy response to a series of high-magnitude floods, which had defeated structural flood
defence measures around the nation since 1998.
Accordingly, the implementation of multi-objective approaches to deliver whole catchment
management, which relied less on concrete and other structures and more on resilience
and adaptation to hazards, was the primary objective of this shift. However, flood
emergencies, which continued to occur from 2005 to 2013/14 resulted in the
perseverance of a political preference for structural defences, with the development of
whole catchment FRM approaches remaining a considerable challenge. This position
changed during the winter storms of 2015/16. The floods precipitated by Storms
Desmond, Eva and Frank, completely overwhelmed even newly installed, high-
specification, structural defences across the northern UK.
This led directly to much more strident calls from the public and policy communities to
implement integrated catchment flood-risk management strategies, which expressly
included the adoption of tested, but still relatively experimental, measures such as Natural
Flood Management (NFM) (Deeming, 2017, Environment Agency, 2016c)

One issue with the self-reporting structure within the HFA approach was that compliance did
lead governments to develop national policies. Unfortunately, however, when viewed
objectively these policies achieved very few DRR outcomes at the local scale: where
disaster impacts are most keenly felt.
So, HFAs success was in achieving limited DRR outcomes focussed on multi-hazard
management, rather than through success in confronting the factors that underpin risk
accumulation and risk persistence (e.g. inappropriate land use; failing to reduce
vulnerability). This limited success, therefore, fed deliberation over what would succeed
HFA. The consensus became that there was a clear need to actively tackle these ingrained
constraints as part of the global DRR strategy:
As a result, if the expected outcome of the HFA, the substantial reduction in
disaster losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of
countries and communities, is ever to be achieved, there is a growing consensus
that the development drivers of risk, for example climate change, the
overconsumption of natural capital, poverty and inequality will have to be
addressed.
In order to do so, it is essential to manage disaster risks more effectively.
However, this in turn implies reinterpreting the way disaster risk reduction has
been approached and practised to date. Managing risk, and not just the disasters
that arise from unmanaged risk, has to become the new normal in development
practice. Otherwise, sustainable development will not be sustainable. (UNISDR,
2015a: p.248)

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Accordingly, delegates at the 3rd UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction:
reiterated their commitment to address disaster risk reduction and the building
of resilience to disasters with a renewed sense of urgency within the context of
sustainable development and poverty eradication, and to integrate, as
appropriate, both disaster risk reduction and the building of resilience into
policies, plans, programmes and budgets at all levels and to consider both within
relevant frameworks. UNISDR (2015b: p.9)
Following extensive deliberation (i.e. political, academic, contextual) the World Conference
agreed the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) on 18th March 2015
(Appendix 1).
As appendix 1 illustrates, SFDRR is laid out as a table of the key components required to
deliver the frameworks expected output and goal, as predicated on its central scope and
purpose:
The present framework will apply to the risk of small-scale and large-scale,
frequent and infrequent, sudden and slow-onset disasters, caused by natural or
manmade hazards as well as related environmental, technological and biological
hazards and risks. It aims to guide the multi-hazard management of disaster risk
in development at all levels as well as within and across all sectors
From a UK civil protection perspective, the wording of this scope is interesting in at least
two ways. Firstly, applying this wording in a UK context it is clear that, as with the HFA, the
SFDRR is effectively focussed on reducing disaster risks related to hazards and major
accidents (i.e. manmade hazards). Threats (i.e. terrorist and other malicious attacks),
which are differentiated from hazards and accidents in the National Risk Register (Cabinet
Office, 2015b) do not fall within the frameworks purview.
Secondly, answering the criticism of HFA and its poor record of achieving outcomes at the
all-important local level, the diversity of hazards and accidents that this framework relates to
is substantive. It is clear that the intent is to reduce risks related to all scales of disaster.
Therefore, the corollary of this is that local risk managers need to be as fully engaged
with applying this framework as national actors. SFDRR effectively recognises that
disaster is not scale dependent, i.e. a small village exposed to a spatially-confined extreme
hazard faces disaster (e.g. Boscastle: Jennings, 2009), but it is clearly on a different scale to
the disaster potential of a county or region exposed to a wide-area emergency (e.g. Winter
storms 2015/16).
Accordingly, it is important to accept that compliance with the SFDRR means that its targets
and priorities need to be considered whatever the geographical spread of a disaster is
projected to be. In other words, considering incident escalation, as it is illustrated in matrix
form in the UK Government Concept of Operations (Cabinet Office, 2013) (Figure 1),
SFDRR effectively encourages the development of coherent DRR strategies for all
hazards, from those requiring Local response only right through to those that
threaten catastrophic impacts and require direction from COBR.

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 Figure 1: Likely form of Central Government engagement based on impact and
geographic spread of an emergency in England (Cabinet Office, 2013: p.68)

NB. At time of writing CONOPS has not been updated to reflect the change in regional
coordination structure; from Government Offices (GO) to the DCLG Resilience and
Emergencies Division (DCLG-RED)

SFDRR: Targets
Whereas HFA had no formalised targets for signatory nations to meet, SFDRR presents
seven global targets. Whilst an improvement, these targets are not legally binding and there
remains no sanction for failing to meet them. As Pearson and Pelling (2015: p.4) state,
however, they do provide a starting point for measuring success.
The seven targets (see Appendix 1) are, in effect, high-level aspirations for globally
significant disaster risk reduction (e.g. reduce global disaster mortality by 2030). However,
all these targets bear relevance for those orchestrating DRR efforts at the national scale
(e.g. reducing the number of people affected by flooding in the UK has already been a
strategic UK government objective for many years (MAFF, 2000, Defra, 2005, Environment
Agency, 2009).
It could also be said that the UK has already developed effective DRR strategies at national
and local levels, in the sense that the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) enacts statutory duties
for designated responders to carry out risk assessment and other activities at national and
local (i.e. Local Resilience Forum: LRF) scales. Closer reflection on this particular aspect
does, however, highlight that risk treatment3 (i.e. proactive intervention to reduce risks)

3
Risk treatment involves deciding which risks are unacceptably high, developing plans and
strategies to mitigate these risks, and then testing the plans and any associated capabilities. [] It is
important to note that the Act does not require Category 1 responders to take action to reduce the

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does not form a statutory duty for responders under the Act, even though it is
discussed for completeness in guidance (HM Government, 2013a: chpt 4, p.15), and is
increasingly being carried out as a key component of UK risk management.
It could also be said that risk treatment activities fall more clearly into the Prevent stream of
the doctrine-based IEM model. Therefore, opportunities likely already exist to identify and/or
to develop and integrate quantifiable DRR objectives/outcomes into local to national
resilience plans relatively easily (e.g. consider for example Box 1 above, and the work
carried out to move toward the integrated catchment flood risk management process that
has been decided on in response to the winter storms of 2015/16: Environment Agency,
2016c, Environment Agency, 2016b).
Only one target (i.e. enhancing cooperation with developing countries to support their
national DRR actions) falls completely outside the remit of UK civil protection doctrine and
into that of the Department for International Development (DfID). However, it is clear that UK
expertise across DRR/IEM is of direct relevance to DfIDs investments and development
spending around the world. In a speech on the UKs development priorities from 2015, then-
Secretary of State for International Development Justine Greening MP noted, In Britain we
have a wealth of expertise to share And Im determined to draft in the best of British
expertise.4 One of DfIDs four priorities in its Single Departmental Plan, which informs all of
DfIDs programmes, is Strengthening resilience and response to crisis5. Therefore, there is
a strong and tangible link between domestic implementation of the Sendai Framework, and
the UKs role as the second largest national aid donor in the world, ensuring communities
most at risk from disasters are able to reduce their risk exposure.

SFDRR: Priorities
In order to make progress in achieving the SFDRR targets during the period, the framework
also lays out four Priorities for Action:
1. Understanding disaster risk.
2. Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk.
3. Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience.
4. Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response, and to Build Back Better
in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.
Within the text of the framework document these priorities are expanded upon, with
suggested measures to achieve each one outlined separately for national/local and
global/regional regimes.
As this paper is focussed on the SFDRRs relevance to UK civil protection practice, the
following section will discuss where the SFDRRs local/national priorities mesh with current
UK civil protection doctrine and practice. It will also suggest gaps where this doctrine and
practice could be adapted or transformed to better align with the internationally agreed goal
of the SFDRR, that all nations should prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk.

likelihood of threats and hazards. Category 1 responders may decide to do this as part of their
treatment of assessed risks but the Act only requires that emergency plans be developed: prevention
and pre-emption lie outside its scope. (HM Government, 2013: Chpt 4, p.15)
4
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/justine-greening-beyond-aid-development-priorities-from-
2015
5
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfid-single-departmental-plan-2015-to-2020/single-
departmental-plan-2015-to-2020#strengthening-resilience-and-response-to-crisis

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It should be acknowledged, however, that whilst SFDRR relates to all disaster risks
associated with hazards and major accidents (as described above), this papers author has
expert knowledge relating to flood risk management (FRM). Therefore, FRM will be used as
a central lens for analysis of the priorities but, where possible, points related to other risks
will be made, as knowledge allows. Whilst this approach is obviously limited and will need
future elaboration for other risk-management sectors, inland and coastal flood risks have
always been assessed as bearing relatively high probability and impact scores in the
National Risk Register (Cabinet Office, 2015a). It also cannot be denied that contemporary
and projected trends in flood-generating hydrological conditions (e.g. winter rainfall) are
causing increasing concern (The Committee on Climate Change, 2017, Marsh et al., 2016).
Accordingly, this focus on the UKs recent experience of severe flood effects and impacts
does offer an opportunity for learning that may make for clearer illustrations than would
suppositions related for other risks whose effects are undoubtedly planned for, but which
have not been so recently manifest.

Priority 1: Understanding Disaster Risk

Disaster risk management needs to be based on an understanding of disaster
risk in all its dimensions of vulnerability, capacity, exposure of persons and
assets, hazard characteristics and the environment.
Understanding the risk potential of UK emergencies (and disasters if the more emotive term
is to be used) is a fundamental component of the duties given effect by the Civil
Contingencies Act (2004). The Act formalised the requirement for Act-defined Category One
Responder organisations to carry out risk assessments as part of an IEM process. These
risk assessments are intended to be carried out in a uniform manner by all Local Resilience
Forums (LRF) and accordingly, these processes are informed by guidance included in the
statutory publication Emergency Preparedness (HM Government, 2012). In order to assist in
developing a uniformity of approach, LRFs are also provided with a set of plausible risk
scenarios, against which to assess their own IEM capabilities and capacities and through
doing so, develop a Community Risk Register (CRR). This CRR then provides an agreed
position on the risks affecting a local area and on the planning and resourcing priorities
required to prepare for those risks (Cabinet Office, 2012: p.7).
Whilst in theory this approach to understanding local risks provides an important baseline of
understanding, three issues are important to acknowledge:
Firstly, it has been found that although the CCA-defined risk-assessment methodology
appears straightforward, some LRFs were, at least until recently, making errors in their
interpretation of the guidance (Leigh, 2013). Thus, what appeared to be a nationally
consistent picture of local risks was in fact less so.
Secondly, the concept of local that is defined in the guidance and in the CRR relates not to
community risks in a town-by-town, or an urban/rural context, but in terms of a
geographically and politically defined Police Area (for example Devon & Cornwall and the
Isles of Scilly LRFs risk register defines community risks in a geographical area comprising
3,961 square miles). Accordingly, whilst the CRR undoubtedly provides a valuable strategic
tool with which to inform and prioritise the delivery of IEM at that scale, it is reasonably clear
that community in this sense should not be equated with community or local as they are
discussed in the SFDRR.
Thirdly, the CRR ostensibly provides LRFs with a framework through which to prioritise the
investment of resources, time and planning effort in appropriate IEM based on their risk

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profile. However, for those LRFs who host major accident and/or radiation hazard sites in
their area, the additional challenge of regulatory compliance, under COMAH and REPPIR
legislation, can test responders capacity to invest resources into managing hazards which
may appear much higher, or more top-right, in their areas CRR assessment matrix (see
Leigh, 2013: p.5 for illustration of the matrix). This is not to say that regulatory compliance is
in any way wrong. Far from it. These regulations have been developed expressly to mitigate
up-to catastrophic level, major-accident risks, albeit that they have low-probability. However,
the point is that public sector resources are becoming increasingly stretched and without
innovation on the part of LRFs the resources available for managing all risks, as hazard-
exposed communities might expect, may actually diminish (Leigh, 2016).
That, however, is a rather pessimistic outlook if some of the risk assessment and
management activity currently on-going in the UK is to be considered. In relation to flooding
specifically, the efforts on-going in improving the science of flood forecasting have already
realised considerable benefits.
Prompted by Sir Michael Pitts review of the 2007 floods (Pitt, 2008), and before that Bye
and Horners (1998) inquiry into the 1998 floods, considerable effort had been expended in
improving risk assessment tools such as the Environment Agencys Flood Map (Porter and
Demeritt, 2012). Following the Winter storms of 2015 these methodologies were further
revised as part of the National Flood Resilience Review (HM Government, 2016). The review
team tested planning assumptions related to the probability of Storm Desmond + 20%
floods. Whilst this modelling exercise only investigated fluvial and coastal flood probabilities
(i.e. surface and groundwater probabilities were not explored), the findings were significant
in risk assessment terms:
Crucially, our models suggest that even this plausible extreme flooding
remains overwhelmingly within the areas and depths defined by the current
Environment Agency Extreme Flood Outlines (Ibid.: p.3).
This finding should prompt renewed confidence within the civil protection community that the
Agencys flood map provides one of the best flood planning tools in the world. This is not to
diminish the difficulty of developing contingencies and adaptation strategies to reduce
floodplain risks. On the contrary, it reaffirms that we can assess where the greatest
floodplain risks are located at high resolution: regardless of both a persistent public
propensity to deny such risks, and the fact that managing them remains neither
straightforward nor cheap.
The fact that flood maps are available to specifically inform spatial planning and land-use
decisions will be further discussed under Priority 4.
The sectors history of analysing the manifest effects and impacts of hazards and major
accidents should also be considered favourably and highly relevant under this Priority. Flood
reviews already mentioned and others (e.g. the East Coast storm-surge of 2013: LLRF,
2014), as well as the investigations convened following major accidents, e.g. Buncefield
(BMIIB, 2008) and Shoreham (AAIB, 2017), suggest an institutionalised desire to learn
lessons from such events.
Capacities and capabilities in relation to delivering civil protection are also assessed in
several ways. In relation to CCA compliance, the National Resilience Capabilities
Programme (NRCP) has provided a structure through which LRFs can evolve their
readiness for all hazards and threats through learning from the experience of others. In the
health sector, IEM contingencies are directly assessed through the Emergency
Preparedness, Resilience and Response (EPRR) framework. Accordingly, these frameworks

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offer important gauges under which the core effectiveness and resilience of local-to-national
emergency contingencies can be developed. Such assessment is also occurring in (and in
some respects is driving) a practice environment where interoperability and inter-LRF
mutuality of arrangements are becoming increasingly vital, as the potential impacts of major
cross-boundary emergencies, and the importance of dealing with them in a coordinated
manner, are understood (JESIP 2016).
As Pollock (2013) suggests, however, until relatively recently reviews, investigations and
inquiries have often identified lessons from events, but these lessons have tended to go
unlearned. From this perspective, it is reassuring that structures have been put in place to
encourage the civil protection sector to both share notable practice and to improve their
practice through joint organisational learning (JESIP, 2016). Such learning offers obvious
opportunities to the sector in terms of improving responders abilities to interpret risks and to
plan for emergencies using ground-truthed understandings of available capabilities,
capacities and procedures.
Looking outside the practitioner community, Community Preparedness has been another
concept that has been developed out of a Pitt Review (2008) recommendation.
Encouragement for practitioners to enable diverse communities to develop their own
contingency arrangements, that complement the response of the emergency services
(Cabinet Office, 2011: p.11), has now been ongoing for several years and has recently been
refreshed in new practitioner guidance (Cabinet Office, 2016).
From an SFDRR perspective, what such participatory approaches and toolkits should be
seen as providing are opportunities for practitioners to work directly with at-risk communities
to carry out location and community specific risk assessments and risk management
interventions at truly-local spatial and social resolutions. Whilst such initiatives are intended
(correctly) to be all-hazards focussed, the fact that it is the flooding of recent years that has
acted as a stimulus for flood-risk exposed communities to engage in planning activity should
always be acknowledged. As with risk-perception generally, the recent and easy availability
of flood experience and flood-risk evidence has sensitised the population to the importance
of planning for flooding. Accordingly, it is vital to enable more encompassing community risk
assessments to be carried out, by encouraging and enabling practitioners to actively lead
communities through this process.

Priority 2: Strengthening Disaster Risk Governance to Manage Disaster

Risk
Disaster risk governance at the national, regional and global levels is vital to the
management of disaster risk reduction in all sectors and ensuring the coherence
of national and local frameworks of laws, regulations and public policies that, by
defining roles and responsibilities, guide, encourage and incentivize the public
and private sectors to take action and address disaster risk
The duties and institutions introduced to the UK civil protection sector by the Civil
Contingencies Act (2004) undoubtedly go a long way in satisfying this SFDRR priority. Civil
Protection in the UK does indeed take a stepped approach (Figure 1) and the principle of
subsidiarity dictates that decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with co-
ordination at the highest necessary level (HM Government, 2013b) (see Figure 1).

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At the national level, the UK has a highly developed national policy and framework for risk
management6. The National Risk Assessment (NRA) drives an all-threats and all-hazards
approach to risk management, which incorporates all relevant government departments,
agencies and other actors. Flowing from the NRA, the National Resilience Planning
Assumptions and National Capabilities Programme further develop practical risk reduction
measures, by identifying common consequences of risks/hazards and driving work to
address them. The strong UK Lead Government Department (LGD) model encourages all
aspects of risk management to be addressed in partnership between Government, industry
and regulators7.
Importantly, however, in recent years the UK civil protection arrangements have been further
improved with the introduction of the Ministerial Recovery Group (MRG) concept. The
activation of the MRG for the Winter storms of 2015/16 only represented its fourth activation.
However, the continuity of ministerial oversight now provided for major emergencies, from
COBR during preparedness/response to MRG for recovery, indicates a clear aspiration for
emergency management to be more effectively integrated and to reduce consequences from
not only the hazard/accident effects, but also from emergencies secondary effects (e.g. The
MRG has enabled high-level coordination with insurers to ensure efficient and equitable
restoration for affected populations).
As well as the undoubted relevance of the community preparedness work mentioned above
to this priority, is the duty placed on Local Authorities, to provide advice and assistance to
those undertaking commercial activities and to voluntary organisations in relation to business
continuity management (BCM) in the event of emergencies (HM Government 2012). This is
exemplified by the experience that businesses can be and have been seriously affected by
emergencies. For example, the best estimate of business damages during the Winter
2013/14 storms was 270m (Environment Agency, 2016a), with between 3,100 and 4,900
businesses directly affected. Also in a provisional impact assessment following Storm
Desmond in Cumbria in 2015, it was estimated that 1,029 out of 2,923 businesses situated
on the floodplain (10% of all businesses in the County) were directing affected by flooding
(Cumbria County Council, 2016). These are significant numbers.
To support increasing BCM planning across the private sector the British Standards Institute
has adopted a core international standard for businesses to meet (i.e. ISO 22301). However,
whilst uptake of BCM practice by large businesses appears relatively healthy, adoption by
small and medium size enterprises (SME) is still slow. Looking into the reasons for this,
again particularly in relation to flood risk, the SESAME project identified several business
perceptions, which may present challenges for local authority staff trying to exercise their
duties effectively. These included the finding that business owners generally listen more
attentively to the opinions and advice of other businesses than they do to people with
formalised expertise in risk management. Also, risk-mitigation actions tended to result from
the experience of flooding, rather than as a result of developing formal knowledge, through
reading books, leaflets or web-pages (Harries et al., 2016). The obvious lesson to take from
these findings is the importance of civil-protection practitioners working collaboratively with
engaged business owners to share learning across appropriate business forums.

6
2013 United Kingdom Peer Review - Building resilience to disasters: Implementation of the Hyogo
Framework for Action (2005-2015), UNISDR, EC, OECD
http://www.unisdr.org/files/32996_32996hfaukpeerreview20131.pdf
7
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/list-of-lead-government-departments-responsibilities-
for-planning-response-and-recovery-from-emergencies

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It should also be noted, that in terms of the challenges in increasing BCM amongst hazard
and major-accident risk exposed businesses, a recent Horizon-scan survey by the Business
Continuity Institute revealed that adverse weather events were regarded as only the 8th
highest threat by business BCM professionals, with cyber and terrorism registering higher,
along with utility disruption and data issues (BCI, 2016). These latter two concerns obviously
represent potential common consequences of hazards and major accidents and therefore,
may well represent hooks with which to attract businesses into BCM thinking.

Priority 3: Investing in Disaster Risk Reduction for Resilience

Public and private investment in disaster risk prevention and reduction through
structural and non-structural measures are essential to enhance the economic,
social, health and cultural resilience of persons, communities, countries and their
assets, as well as the environment. These can be drivers of innovation, growth
and job creation. Such measures are cost-effective and instrumental to save
lives, prevent and reduce losses and ensure effective recovery and rehabilitation
In relation to investment in structural and non-structural measures to reduce the impact of
emergencies, no apology is made here in again focussing on specific aspects of evolving
flood risk management policy and practice. Whereas risk reduction in terms of major
accidents tends to be covered by regulatory instruments, legislation, and compliance, flood
risk reduction has in the last decade become much more of a societal endeavour. Whether
this has been an acceptable shift from the publics perspective is, of course, another matter
(Begg et al., 2015).
However, in real terms, current expenditure on flood defence is at record levels (House of
Commons Library, 2016). But, whereas in previous decades such expenditure would have
come almost completely from the public purse, since 2011 a partnership funding model has
been adopted by the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra, 2011).
This model was designed to attract funding from non-government sources in order to share
costs and potentially increase the opportunities for developing schemes where they would
not have previously met state funding criteria. The development of such a model represents
important evidence of attempts to garner public and private-sector engagement with risk
reduction. However, a Parliamentary inquiry found that the majority of the partnership
funding that had been secured under this model had actually come from local authorities,
rather than from other sources, i.e. the implication being that additional opportunity costs
were being incurred by already financially-stretched local authorities, when that had not been
the schemes intention (EFRA, 2013). The corollary of this finding being that although
national government is attempting to engage and to push responsibility for FRM across a
wider stakeholder group, inherent barriers still exist against this at more local levels.
In relation to non-structural FRM measures, there has recently been clear evidence in
England of a related aspiration to support resilience building in flood affected communities.
Post-flood grant schemes have been a feature of national governments response to
extreme floods for several years. Most significantly, following the winter storms of 2015/16
the Government offered Property-Level Resilience (PLR) grants to all affected households
as well as match-funding charitable donations and providing other financial relief via
instruments such as council tax and business-rate relief and a farming recovery fund.
Whether there is, or should be, a political appetite to continue such financial interventions in
the future should be regarded as a currently open question. However, it will be important to
better understand the implications of either continuance or cessation relatively soon; if for no
other reason than to foster realistic expectations in at-risk communities. A key question that

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presents itself here is, for example, how many times should a property benefit from a PLR
grant if it is subjected to repeat inundations?
In relation to understanding property-level resilience and other risk-influencing factors, a
review was also commissioned in 2015 to explore opportunities: through which to enable the
uptake of effective PLR measures by at-risk households and businesses; to assess any
requirement to change building regulations and to enhance sector skills to deliver resilient
reinstatement; to better understand effective risk communication and behaviour-change
needs; to investigate how insurers could act to increase resilience and; to share all lessons
publicly via a one-stop-shop (Bonfield, 2016).
The parallel National Flood Resilience Review (HM Government, 2016) investigated the
flood modelling, mentioned above, as well as exploring key opportunities and challenges in
improving the resilience of key critical infrastructure against flooding.
Both these reviews undertook broad consultations before reporting and, if their
recommendations are followed, both should be seen as representing significant actions to
better understand risks and to enable a broader and inclusive constituency of publics and
professionals to improve their own and others practices in attaining greater flood resilience.
A further development in terms of governmental support for more innovative methods to
reduce flood risks has been the catalytic effect of the winter 2015/16 storms in shifting
political and public perceptions of Natural Flood Management (NFM) measures and the
concept of integrated catchment management, from broad-based ambivalence to
unequivocal support (Deeming, 2017, EFRA, 2017).

Priority 4: Enhancing Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response,

and to Build Back Better In Recovery, Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction
Experience indicates that disaster preparedness needs to be strengthened for
more effective response and ensure capacities are in place for effective recovery.
Disasters have also demonstrated that the recovery, rehabilitation and
reconstruction phase, which needs to be prepared ahead of the disaster, is an
opportunity to Build Back Better through integrating disaster risk reduction
measures. Women and persons with disabilities should publicly lead and promote
gender-equitable and universally accessible approaches during the response and
reconstruction phases
Preparedness issues have undoubtedly been confronted in recent years, both within civil-
protection practice and the public spheres. As discussed above, concerted efforts have been
made to develop community preparedness. This has been done through the facilitation of an
emergency planning process within at-risk communities, via the provision of frameworks,
toolkits and resources with which people can plan responses and protect themselves
(Cabinet Office 2016). These initiatives are important. However, it should always be
remembered that such groups may see themselves as occupying two clearly differentiated
roles, one focussed on actively reducing risks faced by their communities and another that
concentrates on activism to ensure the relevant authorities do not step away from their
statutory, as well as perceived, risk management obligations.
In terms of understanding how people respond to warnings, numerous projects have
investigated these challenges, with findings directly influencing the way an increasingly

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sophisticated range of warning systems are developed (Cabinet Office, 2014, Cave et al.,
2009, Environment Agency, 2015).
Another specific capability that must be mentioned in relation to response has been the
development by Defra and other key stakeholders, of a Flood Emergency Concept of
Operations (Defra, 2014). This CONOPS has effectively moved the sector from the effective
but presentationally deficient response to the 1998/2000 floods characterised by the image
of rescuers pulling householders into hastily appropriated dinghies to the incredibly
professional, nationally-coordinated swift-water rescue capability that was deployed across
the north of the UK during the winter 2015/16 storms.
A further element of progress has been the change in relationship between the military and
the civil authorities, which has culminated in a much more forward-leaning (but still
contingent) approach by the military in terms of its willingness to provide Military Aid to the
Civil Authorities (MACA). This coming in the shape of access, at relatively low cost, to a
formidable array of capability, capacity and niche assets (Ministry of Defence, 2016).
In relation to recovery, progress in planning for this phase of emergencies has improved,
particularly following the evolution of National Recovery Guidance and the Recovery Plan
Guidance Template (HM Government, 2007). However, recovery is still an incredibly
challenging task and one which involves the inclusion of a far larger stakeholder group than
is normally associated with response. Such complexity is also inevitable, given that recovery
is not solely associated with dealing with emergency-related effects, but incorporates a
mosaic of inter-related challenges and the potential retraumatisation of impacted publics,
due to the presence of the additional actors and bureaucracies required to manage this long-
term process (Whittle et al., 2010).
That being said, the apparent ambivalence with which some responders view recovery as a
key element of IEM has not been assisted in recent years by an apparently institutionalised
resistance against incorporating recovery, in any meaningful way, into otherwise
comprehensive and successful major exercises. Illustrations of this are the national flood-
exercise Watermark, as well as the simulated underground-rail emergency Exercise Unified
Response: both of which were concluded a notional few hours after the response-phase
ended.
It is clearly understood that there would be cost implications for extending such exercises to
include recovery challenges. However, there exclusion from these invaluable learning
experiences means that during and after live emergencies many actors continue to find
themselves drawn into recovery delivery with little or no preparation for these roles.
The SFDRRs identification of Building Back Better as a crucial element of DRR also
challenges any emergency-services focused ideas of risk reduction as being a job for the
civil-protection sector alone. Resilient reinstatement was discussed above under priority 3.
However, the need for the sector to collaborate and work alongside the spatial and land-use
planning, building and damage-restoration communities to identify risks and to mitigate
them, or to prevent them entirely through the judicious use of regulations, represents a key
element of SFDRR compliance. It is hoped that the outcome of the Bonfield (2016) and other
reviews into the efficacy of recovery and restoration practices will provide additional
opportunities for the sector to further influence critical decision-making where poor choices
can result in the persistence or creation of unnecessary vulnerabilities.
In speaking about vulnerability, it is also worthwhile noting the final clause in the SFDRR
Priority 4. This relates to the inclusion of women and those with disabilities into the
deliberation of DRR inputs and aspired outcomes. This raises an interesting issue, in that in

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most UK civil protection doctrine, gender, young and old age, minority ethnicities, faiths or
beliefs, and disability are more generally regarded as vulnerabilities to be managed by
others. What the SFDRR reminds us is that far from passive potential victims, these
individuals and groups possess key attributes and knowledges, which if facilitated, can
represent usefully nuanced perspectives to be integrated into the equity- and practicality-
based decisions that form the basis of planned contingencies.

Conclusions
This paper has sought to identify parallels between the aspirations of the internationally
agreed Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) and the current UK civil
protection practice of Integrated Emergency Management (IEM). The non-legally binding
targets and priorities of the SFDRR have been examined, predominantly against the context
of flood-emergency management in England, but also in respect to a broader range of
contingency planning for floods and other hazards and major accidents in the UK. In
comparing the SFDRR priorities against the partially statutory and partially doctrine-based
delivery of IEM, it can be seen that in many respects the UK is on track to deliver the
SFDRR goal of disaster risk reduction at a national level. It was found that learning that has
emerged, particularly as a result of extreme flood emergencies, has resulted in many
improvements to the way civil protection is both, perceived by the public, and delivered by an
expanding network of practitioners, businesses, voluntary-sector and community groups.
The UK civil-protection sector and those responsible for its resourcing should not, however,
be complacent. Maintaining the current trend toward including the wider population in
resilience building is an admirable aspiration, but it is not a one-shot undertaking. This will
require on-going and honest engagement by practitioners with appropriate negotiating skills
and resources, and who are able to foster relationships. If facilitated effectively there is no
reason why such networks should not be able to continue to develop increasingly ambitious
plans and programmes and to deliver clear and quantifiable risk reduction outcomes across
a continuum of local to national scales.

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Appendix 1: The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR 2015)

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