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Risk-based maintenance model for offshore oil


and gas pipelines: A case study

Article in Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering September 2004


DOI: 10.1108/13552510410553226

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Prasanta Kumar Dey Stephen O. Ogunlana


Aston University Heriot-Watt University
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1. Introduction
Risk-based maintenance
Pipelines are the most effective way to transport
model for offshore oil, gas, water, chemicals and slurry. Offshore
pipelines ship hydrocarbon from an oil well/oil
oil and gas pipelines: terminal in the sea to the plant on land. Todays
a case study offshore pipeline system is highly efficient, safe,
and environmental friendly as likelihood and
impact of a pipeline failure is exceedingly small.
Prasanta Kumar Dey However, if failure occurs, it can have high impact
Stephen O. Ogunlana and on both environment and habitat.
In the unlikely event of a failure, a large volume
Sittichai Naksuksakul of gas and oil would initially be discharged into the
sea, and it would rise from the sea floor to the
The authors water surface. The natural gas would rapidly be
Prasanta Kumar Dey is based at the Aston Business School, diluted and dispersed by the winds, virtually
Birmingham, UK. eliminating environmental impacts. The light
Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul are based at liquid hydrocarbons would likewise quickly
the School of Civil Engineering, Asian Institute of Technology, evaporate in the atmosphere, resulting in neither
Klong Luang, Thailand. any significant danger to marine lives nor explosive
risk. Natural gas consists predominately of
Keywords
methane, the lightest hydrocarbon, which being
Pipelines, Risk analysis, Inspection, Maintenance, lighter than air will rise and disperse into the
Analytical hierarchy process atmosphere if released. As soon as a failure occurs,
monitoring systems on the pipeline would
Abstract immediately sense a pressure change and shut off
Offshore oil and gas pipelines are vulnerable to environment as any the flow of gas and oil to the damaged area, thus
leak and burst in pipelines cause oil/gas spill resulting in huge minimizing the volume of hydrocarbon lost from
negative impacts on marine lives. Breakdown maintenance of these
the pipeline. The environmental impacts of
pipelines is also cost-intensive and time-consuming resulting in huge
tangible and intangible loss to the pipeline operators. Pipelines health pipelines are relatively small compared with other
monitoring and integrity analysis have been researched a lot for modes of energy transportation as environmental
successful pipeline operations and risk-based maintenance model is issues are addressed during planning and
one of the outcomes of those researches. This study develops a risk- construction of pipeline facilities. The
based maintenance model using a combined multiple-criteria construction of pipelines may cause short-term
decision-making and weight method for offshore oil and gas pipelines
disruption due to movement of heavy equipment,
in Thailand with the active participation of experienced executives.
The models effectiveness has been demonstrated through real life materials, and machineries. However, there is very
application on oil and gas pipelines in the Gulf of Thailand. Practical little effect on environment during normal
implications. Risk-based inspection and maintenance methodology is operations.
particularly important for oil pipelines system, as any failure in the While pipelines are one of the safest modes of
system will not only affect productivity negatively but also has transporting bulk energy, and have failure rates
tremendous negative environmental impact. The proposed model
much lower than the railroads or highway
helps the pipelines operators to analyze the health of pipelines
dynamically, to select specific inspection and maintenance method for transportation, failures do occur, and sometimes
specific section in line with its probability and severity of failure. with catastrophic consequences.
Traditionally, most pipeline operators ensure
that during the design stage, safety provisions are
Electronic access created to provide a theoretical minimum failure
The Emerald Research Register for this journal is rate for the life of the pipeline. Safety provisions
available at are considered when selecting pipes and other
www.emeraldinsight.com/researchregister fittings. To prevent corrosion, a pipeline is
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is electrically isolated by providing a high resistance
available at external coating material. As a secondary
www.emeraldinsight.com/1355-2511.htm protective measure, a low-voltage direct current is
impressed in the pipe at pre-calculated distance to
transfer any corrosion that occurs due to breaks in
the coating caused by a heap of buried iron junk,
Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering
Volume 10 Number 3 2004 pp. 169183 rails, etc. This is called impressed current cathodic
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited ISSN 1355-2511 protection (CP). The quality of the commodity
DOI 10.1108/13552510410553226 that is being transported through the line is also
169
Risk-based maintenance model Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering
Prasanta Kumar Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul Volume 10 Number 3 2004 169183

ensured, and sometimes corrosion-preventing elaborates specific inspection and maintenance


chemicals (corrosion inhibitors) are mixed with requirements of the operating pipelines in line with
the commodity. To avoid deliberate damage of the the risk analysis results. Section 6 concludes the
pipeline in isolated locations, regular patrolling of study with the recommendations of various
the right-of-way from the air as well as on foot is inspection and maintenance strategies for offshore
carried out, and all third party activities near the oil and gas pipelines.
route are monitored.
Various techniques are routinely used to
monitor the status of a pipeline. Any deterioration 2. Methodology
in the line may cause a leak or rupture. Modern
methodologies can ensure the structural integrity The above objectives are achieved using pipelines
of an operating pipeline without taking it out of data, collective experiences of the pipelines
service (Jamieson, 1986). operators, and existing knowledge base. The above
The existing inspection and maintenance information is processed using analytic hierarchy
practices commonly followed by most pipeline process (AHP), a multiple criteria decision-
operators are formulated mainly on the basis of making technique and weight methods.
experience. However, operators are developing an
organized maintenance policy based on data
analysis and other in-house studies to replace rule-
3. Risk identification
of-thumb based policies. The primary reasons for
this are stringent environmental protection laws Mckim (1992) stated that risk is the uncertainty
(US Department of Transportation, 1995), scarce associated with any outcome. Uncertainty can be
resources, and excessive inspection costs. Existing in the form of probability of the possible event and/
policies are not sharply focused from the point of or consequence of the possible event (Chapman,
view of the greatest damage/defect risk to a 1997). Normally, risk management is often
pipeline. The basis for selecting health monitoring preceded in terms of cost or monitory assessment.
and inspection techniques is not very clear to many In this study, for the offshore pipeline system
operators. In many cases, a survey is conducted risks are identified in to two trials, namely
over an entire pipeline or on a particular segment, likelihood loop and consequence loop.
when another segment needs it more. Avoidable
expenditures are thus incurred (Dey, 2004).
A strong reason exists; therefore, to derive a 3.1 Likelihood loop
technique that will help pipeline operators select A likelihood loop identifies the probability of
the right type of inspection/monitoring technique causes of the pipeline failure. In the likelihood
for segments and/or different types of pipelines loop, the risk factors that can cause failures as
that need it. A more clearly focused inspection and identified by the pipeline operators of the
maintenance policy that has a low investment-to- organization under study are the following.
benefit ratio should be formulated. .
Corrosion: internal and external corrosions.
This study introduces a tool for predicting the .
External influence: third party activity and
risk factor for pipeline failures, analyze their effect, free span.
and develop responses through effective inspection .
Construction and material defect: poor
and maintenance methods. construction and low-grade material.
This study reveals the effect of certain risk .
Error: human and operation errors.
factors on the failure of pipelines/pipeline sections, .
Others: natural hazards.
and derives risk management strategies.
Internal corrosion is normally caused by the
Accordingly, the objectives of this study are:
chemical reaction between the pipeline material
.
to identify the factors affecting failure of
and the fluid or gas, such as CO2, H2S, and O2.
offshore pipelines;
Corrosion can take the form of general or localized
.
to analyze risk; and
metal loss from pipe and it may also give rise to
. to suggest the guideline for an effective
cracks in the pipeline material. The rate of
inspection and maintenance of offshore oil
corrosion depends on pipe materials, type of
and gas pipelines.
products being transported through pipelines, and
Section 2 describes the methodology to achieve corrosion inhibitor.
these objectives. Section 3 discusses the risks of The chemical reaction between the pipe metal
operating oil and gas pipelines and identification and the seawater causes an external corrosion. The
processes. Section 4 demonstrates risk analysis rate of external corrosion depends on the
method to determine the probability and severity of condition of coating and CP. The external
oil and gas pipelines under study. Section 5 corrosion also includes external erosion, which is
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Risk-based maintenance model Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering
Prasanta Kumar Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul Volume 10 Number 3 2004 169183

caused by solid substances in the seawater when The total amount of reserve is the quantity of
they come in contact with pipelines. petroleum products in petroleum trap. The larger
One possible reason for the failure of offshore the reserve is more is the chance of impact.
pipeline is third party activities such as dropping of An operation rate relates to how much the
anchor and heavy materials from ship/boat. This system can be affected when the pipeline fails.
may damage the pipeline as well as dislocate from Pipelines with high flow rate will have more impact
its original position. Offshore pipelines are liable to than pipelines with less flow rate.
damage also by fishing activities. Unlike the The amount of product loss depends on the
onshore pipeline, offshore pipelines never fail due diameter and length of the pipeline when the
to malicious reason. pipeline is not in operations. Hence, the impact of
A free span is another criteria that can cause pipeline failure will be more intense for large and
pipeline failure. A free span is an area where the long pipelines.
pipe does not have support in the seabed because Consequences from the pipeline failure also
of subsidence. If the free span is long, ocean depend on the type of products being transported
currents might damage the pipelines. through the affected pipeline, its geographical
Construction methods and pipeline materials terrain, and physical layout in terms of closeness of
play an important role in improving the reliability other pipelines and facilities.
of pipelines. If the construction methods and Pipeline failures affect the industries, which are
materials of the pipelines are below standard, the the consumers of the gas and oil being transported
probability of pipeline failure increases. These are through the affected pipelines.
not significant criteria for pipeline failure as Severity to ecology can be measured by severity
pipelines are designed and constructed using of pipeline failure, which depends on the type of
standard codes. However, design criteria, selection products being transported and the time it takes to
of technology, and construction methodology vary respond to address the failure event.
across organizations depending on the physical Severity to people can be measured by severity
and economic environments. and duration that may affect the people in that
Although todays pipeline system requires area, including industry workers. Type of product
minimum human intervention during operations, is the main consideration for judging differences in
still failure is not uncommon due to human error, as severity.
pipeline operators require making many decisions The quantity of leak from pipeline depends on
during both normal and abnormal operations of the the flow rate, size of pipe, and length of pipeline in
pipelines. An operation error is the error generated the event of pipeline failure.
by the machine or by the procedure of the pipeline The area that may be affected by the leaked
operations. This sub-factor may not be significant products depends on factors like type of
because the whole pipeline network is normally product, wind, and sea-current. These factors
operated under the same standard. Therefore, all may be measured not only in terms of the area
pipelines will have equal probability of failure that may be affected by the leaked products but
caused by the operation error. also by the degree of significance to the
Natural hazard includes earthquake, heavy environment.
storm, and anything else that cannot be predicted, The sub-factors in the consequence loop being
which are caused by natural disaster, not by subjective in nature are difficult to evaluate.
people. It is not often a problem in the Gulf of Therefore, in this study, the evaluation of sub-
Thailand. factors is based on the experiences and opinions of
The hierarchical diagram in Figure 1 shows the the selected experts. The hierarchical diagram in
relationship of these factors and sub-factors. Figure 2 shows the relationship of these factors and
sub-factors.
3.2 Consequence loop
A consequence loop identifies the effect of pipeline
failure. The impacts of pipeline failure are
determined by the factors like: 4. Risk analysis
.
economic loss total amount of reserve,
Six experienced (more than 15 years) persons of
operation/flow rate, possible product loss,
the organization under study evaluated the risk
function of pipeline, etc.; and
factors through pairwise comparison in AHP
.
environmental and social effects severity to
framework (Saaty, 1980, 1982, 1983; Vargas,
ecology, severity to people, quantity of leak,
1990). The results are shown in Tables I and II for
and affected area.
likelihood and consequence, respectively.
The following paragraphs describe the impact of Table III shows the total relative importance
risk factors. score (TRS) for the sub-factors.
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Risk-based maintenance model Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering
Prasanta Kumar Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul Volume 10 Number 3 2004 169183

Figure 1 Likelihood loop diagram

Figure 2 Consequence loop diagram

Table I Likelihood of the risk factors


Experts
Likelihood 1 2 3 4 5 6 Average SD % CV
Corrosion 0.508 0.443 0.572 0.524 0.558 0.441 0.508 0.056 10.957
Internal corrosion 0.875 0.857 0.900 0.875 0.900 0.857 0.877 0.019 2.195
External corrosion 0.125 0.143 0.100 0.125 0.100 0.143 0.123 0.019 15.703
External influence 0.131 0.106 0.069 0.277 0.273 0.141 0.166 0.088 52.825
Third party activity 0.667 0.500 0.500 0.750 0.875 0.800 0.682 0.156 22.932
Free span 0.333 0.500 0.500 0.250 0.125 0.200 0.318 0.156 49.169
Construction and material defect 0.115 0.337 0.050 0.060 0.070 0.089 0.120 0.109 90.255
Poor construction 0.333 0.889 0.750 0.667 0.833 0.250 0.620 0.267 43.010
Low-grade material 0.667 0.111 0.250 0.333 0.167 0.750 0.380 0.267 70.285
Error 0.196 0.072 0.193 0.095 0.061 0.288 0.151 0.089 59.263
Human error 0.500 0.875 0.667 0.750 0.875 0.833 0.750 0.147 19.563
Operation error 0.500 0.125 0.333 0.250 0.125 0.167 0.250 0.147 58.689
Other (natural hazard) 0.049 0.043 0.116 0.044 0.037 0.041 0.055 0.030 55.181

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Prasanta Kumar Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul Volume 10 Number 3 2004 169183

Table II Impact of the risk factors


Experts
Consequence 1 2 3 4 5 6 Average SDa %CVb
Economic loss 0.500 0.100 0.167 0.875 0.125 0.800 0.428 0.350 81.722
Total amount of reserve 0.093 0.052 0.066 0.040 0.068 0.076 0.066 0.019 28.389
Operation/flow rate 0.518 0.477 0.363 0.516 0.157 0.105 0.356 0.184 51.669
Possible product loss 0.229 0.288 0.106 0.100 0.297 0.214 0.206 0.086 41.614
Function 0.067 0.151 0.389 0.295 0.434 0.561 0.316 0.184 58.138
Other 0.093 0.032 0.075 0.048 0.043 0.044 0.056 0.023 41.414
Environmental and social effects 0.500 0.900 0.833 0.125 0.875 0.200
0.572 0.350 61.093
Severity to ecology 0.052 0.295 0.284 0.178 0.270 0.179
0.210 0.093 44.354
Severity to people 0.054 0.534 0.071 0.049 0.430 0.638
0.296 0.269 90.764
Quantity of leak 0.247 0.040 0.165 0.677 0.082 0.143
0.226 0.232 102.948
Affected area 0.647 0.131 0.480 0.095 0.218 0.040
0.268 0.241 89.994
q
P
n
Notes: aStandard division (SD) is used to measure the distribution of data. SD is calculated by SD  2
i1 xi 2 X =n 2 1.
b
Percent of coefficient of variation (%CV) is used to measure the distribution of data. Normally, it compares at least two sets of data.
%CV is calculated by %CV SD=X  100

Table III Total relative importance score In most of the cases, pipeline replacement is the
RS TRS Rank only solution when inspection suggests
maintenance.
Likelihood
The second important causes of pipeline failures
Corrosion 0.508
are the third party activities and the human error.
Internal corrosion 0.877 0.446 1
Managing the activities of the outsiders in the same
External corrosion 0.123 0.062 5
External influence 0.166
corridor of oil and gas pipelines is not only difficult
Third party activity 0.682 0.113 2 but also sometimes impossible if some legislation is
Free span 0.318 0.053 7 not in place. Human error is also an important
Construction and material defect 0.120 factor to address because operator has to make lots
Poor construction 0.620 0.074 4 of decisions in various situations.
Low-grade material 0.380 0.046 8 Poor construction is the fourth ranked factor,
Error 0.151 although there is no report stating poor
Human error 0.750 0.113 2 construction of pipelines under study. The
Operation error 0.250 0.038 9 personnel interviewed believe that there might be
Others 0.055 certain problem during construction of pipelines,
Act of God 1.000 0.055 6 which has not been reported.
Like internal corrosion, external corrosion is
Consequence
Economic loss 0.428
also an important factor for pipeline failure.
Total amount of reserve 0.066 0.028 8 However, the external corrosion can be detected
Operation/flow rate 0.356 0.153 3 more easily than internal corrosion. Natural
Possible product loss 0.206 0.088 7 hazard is not a vulnerable cause of pipeline failure
Function 0.316 0.135 4 in the Gulf of Thailand. Free span, low-grade
Others 0.056 0.024 9 material and operational error have also low
Environmental and social effects 0.572 likelihood of failure.
Severity to ecology 0.210 0.120 6 In consequence analysis, the experts gave more
Severity to people 0.296 0.169 1 importance to environmental and social effects
Quantity of leak 0.226 0.129 5 than economic loss. All sub-factors under
Affected area 0.268 0.154 2 environmental and social effects have almost equal
relative importance. However, operation/flow rate
has been given more priority under economic loss.
In the likelihood loop, the result shows that
corrosion is the most important cause of pipeline 4.1 Analyzing pipelines condition
failure. All experts agree that pipeline failure is The above results are used to determine the
normally caused by the internal corrosion and it is condition of the pipelines of the organization
difficult to detect. Hence, internal corrosion under study. The organization has 96 pipelines
problem should be addressed through effective connecting 15 oil fields together as a network.
inspection and/or maintenance method. Internal For this analysis, pipeline information was
inspection of pipelines is difficult and expensive. collected as shown in Figure 3.
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Risk-based maintenance model Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering
Prasanta Kumar Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul Volume 10 Number 3 2004 169183

Figure 3 Information input for pipelines under study For the subjective judgment, the experts are
responsible for giving the score for all pipelines
under each sub-factor. For the objective
judgment, the scores for all pipelines are
calculated by comparing the pipeline value with
the range of scores in Table V. The weight for
pipeline is then determined using the following
formulas:
Example for pipeline-600 PL4:
 
S 111600 PL4
W 111600 PL4 P TRS111 1
S 111for all pipelines
XXX
W ERCLE W abc600 PL4  2
a b c

where 111 is for internal corrosion; abc is a code


used for loop, factor and sub-factor (Figures 1
The conditions of the pipelines were determined and 2); and S is the Score given by expert or
using both objective and subjective judgment. objective judgment.The results are shown in
Subjective judgment. Since the number of Tables VI and VII under each sub-factor and the
pipelines is too large, to use the AHP method, the total weight (W) for first ten ranked pipelines with
experts evaluated the pipeline by direct weighting. respect to likelihood and consequence of failure.
The direct weighting is based on the ten-point The analysis shows that the three-phase lines are
scale as explained in Table IV. Sub-factors, which the most vulnerable with respect to likelihood of
are used for subjective judgment are internal and failure as they contain water along with petroleum
external corrosions, third party activity, free span, products. The dissolved oxygen, and hydrogen
poor construction, low-grade material, human and sulphide react with metal and lead to internal
operation errors, natural hazards, function of corrosion. The large gas lines are the most
pipeline, side effect, severity to ecology and people, vulnerable for consequence as on failure event
and affected area. large volume of oil and gas comes out. However,
Objective judgment. Sub-factors, which are used the intensity of leak and burst depends on the
for objective judgment are total amount of reserve, quantity of reserve and operation/flow rate. The
operation rate, possible product loss, and quantity three-phase and condensate product pipelines are
of loss. These sub-factors can be evaluated by vulnerable from the social and environmental
using the existing pipeline information. Like point of view.
subjective judgment, objective judgment is based As shown in Tables VI and VII, pipelines,
on the ten-point scale by giving the score which have high priority in terms of likelihood,
depending on the portion between the pipelines may not have high priority in terms of
value and the maximum value. However, consequence of failure. Therefore, the likelihood
maximum value is mostly out of lining, so if or consequence alone cannot identify which
maximum value is used as the base for giving the pipeline should be maintained with high priority.
score, the score may not be well distributed. To Since the likelihood loop and the consequence
solve this problem, the 95th percentile is used to be loop cannot be considered separately, the next
the base. The range of scores for each sub-factor, step is to integrate them together. The new score
which is used for objective judgment, is shown in of each pipeline will be set based on its priority
Table V. (Table VIII).

Table IV Ten-point scale for direct weighting


Scale Likelihood Consequence
10 The event will occur Strongly recommended (strongly important) Maximum value
1 There is a strong possibility that the event will occur Recommended (important)
6 There is a possibility that the event will occur Considerable (moderate important)
4 There is a slight possibility that the event will occur Acceptable (slightly important)
2 It is highly unlikely that the risk event will occur Negligible (low important)
1 This sub-factor is not a cause of pipeline failure Not important Minimum value
Note: Intermediate and two decimal numbers can be used

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Risk-based maintenance model Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering
Prasanta Kumar Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul Volume 10 Number 3 2004 169183

Table V Range of score


Total amount Flow rate Possible Quantity of
Percent of 95th (gas) (gas) loss leak
Score percentile (BCF) (MMscfd) (ft3) (ft3)
Maximum value
660.20 273.79 1,486,428.66 1,486,428.66
95th percentile
146.10 132.73 364,265.42 364,265.42
Range of value
10 .90 .131.49 .119.46 .327,838.88 .327,838.88
9 80-90 116.88-131.49 106.18-119.46
8 70-80 102.27-116.88 92.91-106.18
7 60-70 87.66-102.27 79.64-92.91
6 50-60 73.05-87.66 66.36-79.64
5 40-50 58.44-73.05 53.09-66.36
4 30-40 43.83-58.44 39.82-53.09
3 20-30 29.22-43.83 26.55-39.82
2 10-20 14.61-29.22 13.27-26.55
1 ,10 ,14.61 ,13.27 ,36,426.54 ,36,426.54

The principle is calculating risk by multiplying the maintenance decision-making. Perdomo and
two values: risk score of likelihood and risk score of Medina (2000) have shown that risk-based
consequence. The risk category of each pipeline analysis help in expanding maintenance interval.
can be categorized by and risk matrix (Figure 4). Taylor (1994) has demonstrated risk analysis of
The risk score of both likelihood and entire process plant for effective maintenance.
consequence of all pipelines is shown in Table IX. The above analysis helps to develop a
The risk category is defined as the result of maintenance program for the entire offshore
multiplying two risk scores and it is shown in pipelines network of the organization under study.
Table IX and the risk matrix (Figure 4). The Pipeline inspections are expensive engineering
numbers in the risk matrix are the number of exercises. Visual examinations comprise the major
pipelines falling into each category. part of any inspection program. The key areas that
Table IX shows that the pipelines, which fall require visual inspection include marine growth,
into medium to high risk, high risk, and critical welds, missing items, condition of protective
risk, are three-phase pipelines. That is because coatings, corrosion protection systems, debris, and
three-phase contains water, the basic element for movement of the seabed (scour). The following
pipeline internal corrosion and internal corrosion visual inspection techniques are commonly used:
is the main factor that causes the pipeline failure. .
divers visual inspection;
Gas pipelines normally have high consequence,
.
photography; and
but they have low possibility to fail, so they fall into
.
closed-circuit television (CCTV or video).
only low risk and low to medium risk. The following inspection methods are commonly
Table AI shows the risk category of all the 96 used by offshore pipeline operators.
pipelines.

5.1. Diving
Diving is surface-orientated. The diver normally
5. Inspection and maintenance plans communicates with the surface by the umbilical
connection. Diving consists of diving at ambient
Shen et al. (1998) pointed out prioritizing practices pressure, atmosphere diving suits (ADSs), and
in maintenance planning for effective use of manned submersible.
resources. Dey (2001) introduced risk-based
inspection and maintenance for cross-country 5.1.1. Diving at ambient pressure
petroleum pipeline in India. They argued that At shallow depths, the divers breathing gas is
environmental concern and laws, scare resources, supplied directly from the surface through a hose
and excessive inspection cost provide rational for in the umbilical connection which permanently
using risk-based method. Reynolds (1997) has links the diver with his surface equipment and
shown that risk-based inspection and maintenance personnel. The umbilical also allows
is a systematic way to integrate both probability communications between the diver and the
and consequence of risk in inspection and surface. At greater depths, it is necessary to use
175
Table VI Total relative importance score (TRS) of likelihood loop
Poor Low-grade
Risk-based maintenance model

Internal External Third party Free span construction material Human error Operation Act of god Total score
Item Name (3102 2) (3102 2) activity (3102 2) (3102 2) (3102 2) (310-2) (3102 2) error (3102 2) (3102 2) (3102 2) Rank
00
18 10 PL8 0.598 0.065 0.147 0.069 0.076 0.047 0.115 0.042 0.057 1.216 3
19 1000 PL9 0.598 0.065 0.126 0.059 0.076 0.047 0.115 0.042 0.057 1.185 4
21 1000 PL11 0.598 0.065 0.126 0.059 0.076 0.047 0.115 0.042 0.057 1.185 4
Prasanta Kumar Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul

22 1000 PL12 0.523 0.065 0.147 0.069 0.076 0.047 0.115 0.042 0.057 1.141 9
24 1000 PL14 0.598 0.065 0.126 0.059 0.076 0.047 0.115 0.042 0.057 1.185 4

176
32 1000 PL22 0.523 0.065 0.147 0.069 0.076 0.047 0.115 0.042 0.057 1.141 9
47 1000 PL37 0.523 0.065 0.147 0.069 0.076 0.047 0.115 0.042 0.057 1.141 9
48 1000 PL38 0.523 0.065 0.147 0.069 0.076 0.047 0.115 0.042 0.057 1.141 9
55 1000 PL45 0.672 0.065 0.105 0.049 0.076 0.047 0.115 0.035 0.057 1.222 2
64 1000 PL54 0.598 0.065 0.105 0.049 0.082 0.051 0.115 0.042 0.057 1.164 8
88 1600 PL24 0.672 0.065 0.105 0.049 0.076 0.047 0.115 0.037 0.057 1.225 1
87 1600 PL23 0.523 0.065 0.168 0.079 0.076 0.047 0.115 0.035 0.057 1.166 7
Volume 10 Number 3 2004 169183
Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering
Table VII Total relative importance score (TRS) of consequence loop
Risk-based maintenance model

Operation Possible Severity to Severity to Affected Total


Total amount of rate product loss Function Other ecology people Quantity of area score
Item Name reserve (3102 2) (3102 2) (3102 2) (3102 2) (3102 2) (3102 2) (3102 2) leak (3102 2) (3102 2) (3102 2) Rank
10 800 PL3 0.088 0.055 0.226 0.216 0.029 0.158 0.265 0.331 0.246 1.613 6
33 1000 PL23 0.088 0.055 0.226 0.220 0.030 0.161 0.264 0.331 0.245 1.619 5
Prasanta Kumar Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul

65 1600 PL1 0.009 0.111 0.322 0.149 0.027 0.133 0.155 0.473 0.157 1.534 9

177
70 1600 PL6 0.053 0.443 0.193 0.142 0.026 0.127 0.155 0.284 0.166 1.589 8
80 1600 PL16 0.053 0.443 0.193 0.128 0.027 0.127 0.172 0.284 0.166 1.593 7
84 1600 PL20 0.088 0.554 0.322 0.177 0.025 0.096 0.187 0.473 0.116 2.038 2
92 1800 PL1 0.035 0.388 0.322 0.157 0.027 0.133 0.149 0.473 0.147 1.832 4
93 1800 PL2 0.044 0.499 0.322 0.149 0.027 0.130 0.163 0.473 0.144 1.952 3
96 2400 PL3 0.088 0.554 0.322 0.186 0.027 0.113 0.181 0.473 0.111 2.055 1
87 1600 PL23 0.009 0.333 0.226 0.149 0.027 0.133 0.155 0.331 0.147 1.509 10
Volume 10 Number 3 2004 169183
Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering
Risk-based maintenance model Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering
Prasanta Kumar Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul Volume 10 Number 3 2004 169183

Table VIII Risk score pressure. Decompression is carried out in a deck


Percentile of priority (percent) Priority number Risk score decompression chamber (DDC) on the surface.

1st-10th (first 10 percentile) 1-9 10 5.1.2. Atmospheric diving suits


11st-20th 10-19 9 ADSs is a pressure vessel where the operator
21st-30th 20-28 8 inserts his arms inside articulated extensions to the
31st-40th 29-38 7 vessel. The operator is able to actuate grab and
41st-50th 39-48 6 rotary type grippers from inside the arm. ADSs can
51st-60th 49-57 5 work down to depths of 700 m, with
61st-70th 58-67 4 communications (and sometimes power) supplied
71st-80th 68-77 3 via an umbilical connected to the surface. A
81st-90th 78-86 2 fundamental feature of all ADSs is that the
91st-100th (last 10 percents) 87-96 1
operator works at a pressure of one atmosphere, so
there is no need for decompression after working.

5.1.3. Manned submersibles


Figure 4 Risk matrix Manned submersibles and ADSs are similar in
many of their characteristics and limitations. The
main differences are that submersibles are not
anthropomorphic and are usually designed for a
crew of two or more men.

5.2. Remotely operated vehicles


Safety considerations and the high cost of putting
divers into water, have led to the development of
unmanned submersibles, which are commonly
known as Remotely operated vehicles (ROVs). By
design, some ROVs can be manned if required,
thus offering the user both options.
Most ROVs currently in use are tethered
vehicles controlled by a pilot at the surface. The
vehicles carry the equipment necessary for their
work, such as lights, navigation aids, still and/or
video cameras, and possibly one or more
manipulators.
Some ROVs are untethered, i.e. self-powered
and operate without any physical connection to the
surface. Maneuverability is generally three-
a pressure vessel (a diving bell) to transport the dimensional and the collected data are stored
diver from the surface to the work site. After, aboard the vehicle.
pressuring, the diver leaves the bell to work in
water but he always remains attached to the bell via 5.3. Acoustic surrey
umbilical connections. After inspection, the diver The basis of this method is to use sound waves.
returns to the surface of the, bell but is still under The boat pulls the sound generator in the direction

Table IX Summary of risk category


Risk category
Dia. Low Low-medium Medium Medium-high High Critical Sum
00
Three-phase 10 13 23 14 50
1600 2 9 9 2 1 23
1800 1 1 2
Condensate 600 6 1 7
800 3 3
1000 2 2
Gas 1000 2 2
1600 3 1 4
2400 2 1 3
20 38 25 9 3 1 96

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Risk-based maintenance model Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering
Prasanta Kumar Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul Volume 10 Number 3 2004 169183

of pipeline. The sound generator sends and .


photogrammetry for measuring distances
receives the sound waves. In doing so, line, free between object points;
span, crack, and transformation of pipeline can be . holography for reproducing a stereoscopic
known. image without cameras or lenses;
.
radiographic tomography for mapping pipe
internal surface;
5.4. Pipeline inspection gauge (PIG) .
neutron backscatter for detecting flooding in
PIG is a direct internal inspection. It has a shape hollow members; and
like a shuttle. It is inserted into the pipeline and .
thermography for mapping temperature
moves through the pipeline. It collects and records differences due to wall thickness change.
all necessary data inside the pipeline. PIGs can
Table X shows the advantages and disadvantages
specify the position of the pipeline that may
damage and require maintenance. of various inspection methods.
Table XI shows the inspection methods for a few
critical, high, and medium to high-risk pipelines.
Table XI shows the top three categories of risk
5.5. Sampling
that should be of major concern. All pipelines
Sampling is an indirect internal inspection.
The sample is used to measure the corrosion rate falling into these three categories are the three-
of the whole pipeline, but it cannot specify the phase lines and long and large diameter pipelines.
remaining pipes thickness. The samples at the These pipelines have high risk of failure due to the
starting and ending point of pipeline are kept and following reasons:
tested in the laboratory. The difference in
.
Three-phase product contains water. Water is
the amount of dissolved metal in the product is the the main factor that makes pipes corrode. No
indicator of corrosion rate of the whole pipeline. corrosion will occur if water is absent.
The other methods of inspection of offshore Additionally, three-phase product has high
pipelines as demonstrated by Levy (1991), are as impact on environment and society.
follows:
. The size of pipeline presents the potential for
.
magnetic particle inspection (MPI); possible product loss and quantity of product
.
ultrasonic testing; leak. Therefore, large pipelines always have
.
radiography; higher score on these factors than small
.
eddy current testing; pipelines. Furthermore, large pipelines are
.
alternating current drop method for always used to transport products received
measuring crack depth; from several small pipelines. Consequently,

Table X Advantages and disadvantages of various inspection methods


Inspection methods Received information Advantages Disadvantages

Diving Visual inspection information Diver can make decision Expensive (more than ROVs)
Condition of pipeline is well Only external condition of the pipeline can
perceived by visual inspection be determined
High risk activity
Time limitation
Depend on weather condition
Remotely operated Leakage of pipeline Picture clarity is better than acoustic scan Expensive compared to acoustic
vehicle (ROV) Condition of free span CP performance can be determined Difficulty in interpreting results
Current condition of coating and CP More safe operations Depend on weather condition
Acoustic Leakage of pipeline Less expensive Picture clarity problem
Condition of free span Cheaper inspection CP performance cannot be measured
It cannot detect pipe crack
Pipeline inspection Thickness of pipe Pipeline operations can continue during inspection Instrumented PIG survey is expensive
gauge Crush of pipe PIG can determine pipeline condition very effectively It is time-consuming
Movement of pipeline PIG may stick inside the pipeline
Position
Strength of pipe
External and internal corrosion
Sampling Internal corrosion rate It is not expensive Very difficult to determine the entire
It can be taken up dynamically without affecting pipeline integrity
pipeline operations

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Risk-based maintenance model Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering
Prasanta Kumar Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul Volume 10 Number 3 2004 169183

Table XI Inspection tools for critical, high, and medium to high risks pipelines
Name Risk category Explanation Inspection tools

1600 Critical 1600 PL23 is a big three-phase pipeline and a very long line. This pipeline requires both internal and external
PL23 Hence its consequence is quite high in point of operation inspections. PIGs may be used for this pipeline for
rate, possible product loss, and quantity of leak. inspecting internal condition and ROVs are reasonable to
Additionally, since it is a three-phase line, which contains be used for external corrosion, especially for free span
water inside, and corrosion has been found up to 24 length because this pipeline has never been performed the
percent deep in 1996, its likelihood of failure is also quite external inspection. Additionally, routine inspection,
high due to internal corrosion and third party interference sampling for internal corrosion control and frequent
patrolling for controlling the third party interference must
be done to this pipeline
1600 High risk 1600 PL16 has high impact on failure event due to its flow This pipeline is prone to internal corrosion. Inspection using
PL16 rate, size and length. However, failure chance of this PIG would be ideal one to take up. Acoustic scan is to be
pipeline is low employed for monitoring pipeline condition because of
poor construction and use of low-grade materials for this
pipeline
1600 High risk 1600 PL21 is the same as 1600 PL23. It has high score in 1600 PL21 is also prone to internal corrosion and it is in the
PL21 possible product loss and quantity of leak. Its likelihood of near area as 1600 PL23, so the similar actions as 1600 PL23
failure due to third party activities is very high. Severe may be suitable for this pipeline. The internal corrosion
internal corrosion was observed (up to 79 percent deep in a must be specially bewared
few locations) in the year 1995
1800 High risk 1800 PL2 is a big three-phase pipeline and a very long line. This newly laid pipeline has no external coating, so the
PL2 Hence its consequence is quite high in terms of operation acoustic scan is needed to monitor pipeline health
rate, possible product loss, and quantity of leak. periodically. ROVs may be needed in the near future. PIGs
Additionally, since it is a three-phase line, which contains are also required for the internal inspection after suitable
water inside, its likelihood of failure is also quite high due interval and frequent patrolling should be applied to
to internal corrosion prevent the third party interference
1600 Medium to high Most pipelines, which are medium to high risk, are big Most of these pipelines require the internal inspection,
PL5 risk three-phase pipelines. This reason makes them have high sampling and/or PIGs. For 1600 PL24, PIGs are highly
risk of failure due to internal corrosion and high required because it has high rank in likelihood of failure
consequence in operation rate, possible product loss, and
quantity of leak
1600 Medium to high
PL6 risk
1600 Medium to high
PL8 risk
1600 Medium to high
PL15 risk
1600 Medium to high
PL17 risk
1600 Medium to high
PL18 risk
1600 Medium to high
PL19 risk
1600 Medium to high
PL22 risk
1600 Medium to high
PL24 risk

in terms of total amount reserve, operation consider only the likelihood of failure, many small
rate, and function, they are more important pipelines tend to have high risks. Therefore,
than the small pipelines. although the consequence of a small pipeline is not
.
The length of pipeline presents the potential high, it should not be ignored. It should be taken
for possible product loss and quantity of care of and specially inspected periodically to
product leak. Long pipelines have a higher prevent any failure.
chance to be interfered with by third party Diving will be needed whenever more specific
than the short lines. detail of pipeline is required or the information
Depending on the above reasons, large pipelines from other methods is not clear and the pipeline
have higher risks than small pipelines. If we can fail.
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Risk-based maintenance model Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering
Prasanta Kumar Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul Volume 10 Number 3 2004 169183

6. Conclusion .
High likelihood but low consequence. For this
kind of pipeline, PIGs and sampling are also
This paper attempts to develop a risk-based required to monitor and control the corrosion
inspection and maintenance model for offshore rate.
pipelines in the Gulf of Thailand. The identified .
Low likelihood but high consequence. Acoustic
risk factors, which correspond to the likelihood of scan may be sufficient for this pipeline and
failure are corrosion: internal and external sampling and patrolling should be more
corrosions, external influence: third party activity frequent than regular schedule. However,
and free span, construction and material defect: some pipelines in this type may not be allowed
poor construction and low-grade material, error: to stop working, so PIGs and ROVs are still
human and operations, and natural hazards.
needed too.
Additionally, impact of pipeline failure has .
Low likelihood and low consequence. This kind
been derived by the factors like economic loss:
of pipeline may use only routine
total amount of reserve, operation/flow rate,
inspection for regular schedule and/or
possible product loss, function of pipeline,
others and environmental and social effects: acoustic scan.
severity to ecology and people, quantity of leak,
affected area.
This study uses AHP in an interactive way References
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that internal corrosion is the major cause for
Project Management, Vol. 15 No. 5, pp. 273-81.
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social factors have more impact on failure. maintenance of cross-country petroleum pipelines,
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weights method with the consideration of No. 1, pp. 25-41.
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reveals that three-phase lines are vulnerable for Energy Encyclopaedia, Academic Press, Elsevier Science,
failure as they are highly affected by internal New York, NY.
Jamieson, R.M. (1986), Pipeline integrity monitoring, paper
corrosion due to the presence of water, three-phase
presented at the pipeline integrity conference, Aberdeen,
pipeline has higher severity of failure than a gas line, 29-30 October.
gas pipeline has high consequence because gas is Levy, D. (1991), An Introduction to Offshore Maintenance,
the main product of the organization under study Oilfield Publication Limited, Ledbury.
to serve customers. Additionally, large diameter Mckim, R.A. (1992), Risk management-back to basics, Cost
and long pipelines have higher impact on failure Engineering, Vol. 34 No. 12, pp. 7-12.
event. Perdomo, J.J. and Medina, R.J. (2000), Risk-based analysis
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reveals that the large and long three-phase lines are
Reynolds, J.T. (1997), The application of risk-based inspection
the most vulnerable for failure. They require methodology in the petroleum and petrochemical
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lines normally have high consequence, but they Saaty, T.L. (1980), The Analytic Hierarchy Process, McGraw-Hill,
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frequent patrolling. The gas lines, which are very Learning, New York, NY.
Saaty, T.L. (1983), Priority setting in complex problems, IEEE
much business sensitive can have more tight
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below. Taylor, J.R. (1994), Risk Analysis for Process Plant, Pipelines and
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181
Risk-based maintenance model Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering
Prasanta Kumar Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul Volume 10 Number 3 2004 169183

Appendix

Table AI Risk category of pipelines


Likelihood Consequence
Item Name Weight (3102 2) Rank Risk score Weight (3102 2) Rank Risk score Risk value Risk category
1 600 PL1 1.056 74 3 1.044 42 6 18 Low to medium risk
2 600 PL2 1.046 77 2 0.975 51 5 10 Low to medium risk
3 600 PL3 1.077 64 4 1.016 45 6 24 Low to medium risk
4 600 PL4 1.115 13 9 1.060 40 6 54 Medium risk
5 600 PL5 0.795 86 2 0.998 46 6 12 Low to medium risk
6 600 PL6 0.942 80 2 1.349 18 9 18 Low to medium risk
7 600 PL7 0.902 84 2 1.302 19 9 18 Low to medium risk
8 800 PL1 0.926 82 2 0.991 47 6 12 Low to medium risk
9 800 PL2 0.926 82 2 1.100 36 7 14 Low to medium risk
10 800 PL3 0.941 81 2 1.613 6 10 20 Low to medium risk
11 1000 PL1 1.067 70 3 0.789 72 3 9 Low risk
12 1000 PL2 1.036 78 2 0.804 67 4 8 Low risk
13 1000 PL3 0.966 79 2 1.231 24 8 16 Low to medium risk
14 1000 PL4 0.662 96 1 1.269 21 8 8 Low risk
15 1000 PL5 0.755 91 1 1.100 35 7 7 Low risk
16 1000 PL6 0.730 92 1 0.725 81 2 2 Low risk
17 1000 PL7 1.111 14 9 1.031 44 6 54 Medium risk
18 1000 PL8 1.216 3 10 0.969 52 5 50 Medium risk
19 1000 PL9 1.185 4 10 0.642 95 1 10 Low to medium risk
20 1000 PL10 1.111 14 9 0.903 56 5 45 Medium risk
21 1000 PL11 1.185 4 10 0.760 76 3 30 Medium risk
22 1000 PL12 1.141 9 10 0.912 55 5 50 Medium risk
23 1000 PL13 1.111 14 9 0.847 61 4 36 Medium risk
24 1000 PL14 1.185 4 10 0.839 62 4 40 Medium risk
25 1000 PL15 1.080 30 7 1.084 37 7 49 Medium risk
26 1000 PL16 1.073 67 4 1.084 37 7 28 Low to medium risk
27 1000 PL17 1.080 30 7 0.828 63 4 28 Low to medium risk
28 1000 PL18 1.080 30 7 0.763 75 3 21 Low to medium risk
29 1000 PL19 1.049 75 3 0.903 57 5 15 Low to medium risk
30 1000 PL20 1.080 30 7 0.873 60 4 28 Low to medium risk
31 1000 PL21 1.080 30 7 0.897 58 4 28 Low to medium risk
32 1000 PL22 1.141 9 10 0.962 53 5 50 Medium risk
33 1000 PL23 0.849 85 2 1.619 5 10 20 Low to medium risk
34 1000 PL24 1.073 67 4 0.698 84 2 8 Low risk
35 1000 PL25 1.080 30 7 0.978 50 5 35 Medium risk
36 1000 PL26 1.080 30 7 0.750 78 2 14 Low to medium risk
37 1000 PL27 1.080 30 7 0.645 93 1 7 Low risk
38 1000 PL28 1.057 72 3 0.744 80 2 6 Low risk
39 1000 PL29 1.057 72 3 0.930 54 5 15 Low to medium risk
40 1000 PL30 1.078 61 4 0.824 64 4 16 Low to medium risk
41 1000 PL31 1.080 30 7 0.663 88 1 7 Low risk
42 1000 PL32 1.049 75 3 0.660 89 1 3 Low risk
43 1000 PL33 1.080 30 7 0.643 94 1 7 Low risk
44 1000 PL34 1.088 25 8 0.879 59 4 32 Medium risk
45 1000 PL35 1.080 30 7 0.812 66 4 28 Low to medium risk
46 1000 PL36 1.088 25 8 1.038 43 6 48 Medium risk
47 1000 PL37 1.141 9 10 0.795 70 3 30 Medium risk
48 1000 PL38 1.141 9 10 0.751 77 2 20 Low to medium risk
49 1000 PL39 1.111 14 9 0.685 86 2 18 Low to medium risk
50 1000 PL40 1.080 30 7 0.712 83 2 14 Low to medium risk
51 1000 PL41 1.080 30 7 0.748 79 2 14 Low to medium risk
52 1000 PL42 1.080 30 7 0.655 91 1 7 Low risk
53 1000 PL43 1.080 30 7 0.692 85 2 14 Low to medium risk
(continued)

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Prasanta Kumar Dey, Stephen O. Ogunlana and Sittichai Naksuksakul Volume 10 Number 3 2004 169183

Table AI
Likelihood Consequence
Item Name Weight (3102 2) Rank Risk score Weight (3102 2) Rank Risk score Risk value Risk category
00
54 10 PL44 1.080 30 7 0.776 73 3 21 Low to medium risk
55 1000 PL45 1.222 2 10 0.815 65 4 40 Medium risk
56 1000 PL46 1.080 30 7 0.776 73 3 21 Low to medium risk
57 1000 PL47 1.080 30 7 0.721 82 2 14 Low to medium risk
58 1000 PL48 1.078 62 4 0.985 49 5 20 Low to medium risk
59 1000 PL49 1.078 62 4 0.796 69 3 12 Low to medium risk
60 1000 PL50 1.080 30 7 0.649 92 1 7 Low risk
61 1000 PL51 1.080 30 7 0.660 90 1 7 Low risk
62 1000 PL52 1.080 30 7 0.636 96 1 7 Low risk
63 1000 PL53 1.089 19 9 0.790 71 3 27 Low to medium risk
64 1000 PL54 1.164 8 10 0.673 87 1 10 Low to medium risk
65 1600 PL1 1.064 71 3 1.534 9 10 30 Medium risk
66 1600 PL2 0.792 87 1 1.433 12 9 9 Low risk
67 1600 PL3 0.761 90 1 1.240 22 8 8 Low risk
68 1600 PL4 0.792 87 1 1.240 23 8 8 Low risk
69 1600 PL5 1.089 19 9 1.205 25 8 72 Medium to high risk
70 1600 PL6 1.080 30 7 1.589 8 10 70 Medium to high risk
71 1600 PL7 1.080 30 7 1.067 39 6 42 Medium risk
72 1600 PL8 1.080 30 7 1.358 17 9 63 Medium to high risk
73 1600 PL9 1.080 30 7 1.147 30 7 49 Medium risk
74 1600 PL10 1.080 30 7 0.803 68 3 21 Low to medium risk
75 1600 PL11 1.080 30 7 1.053 41 6 42 Medium risk
76 1600 PL12 1.080 30 7 1.179 26 8 56 Medium risk
77 1600 PL13 1.080 30 7 1.294 20 8 56 Medium risk
78 1600 PL14 1.089 19 9 0.987 48 6 54 Medium risk
79 1600 PL15 1.089 19 9 1.107 34 7 63 Medium to high risk
80 1600 PL16 1.083 28 8 1.593 7 10 80 High risk
81 1600 PL17 1.083 28 8 1.166 28 8 64 Medium to high risk
82 1600 PL18 1.089 19 9 1.170 27 8 72 Medium to high risk
83 1600 PL19 1.089 19 9 1.129 32 7 63 Medium to high risk
84 1600 PL20 0.792 87 1 2.038 2 10 10 Low to medium risk
85 1600 PL21 1.101 18 9 1.499 11 9 81 High risk
86 1600 PL22 1.080 30 7 1.361 16 9 63 Medium to high risk
87 1600 PL23 1.166 7 10 1.509 10 9 90 Critical
88 1600 PL24 1.225 1 10 1.129 33 7 70 Medium to high risk
89 1600 PL25 1.075 65 4 1.154 29 7 28 Low to medium risk
90 1600 PL26 1.080 30 7 1.144 31 7 49 Medium risk
91 1600 PL27 1.073 67 4 1.369 15 9 36 Medium risk
92 1800 PL1 1.075 65 4 1.832 4 10 40 Medium risk
93 1800 PL2 1.085 27 8 1.952 3 10 80 High risk
94 2400 PL1 0.702 93 1 1.401 13 9 9 Low risk
95 2400 PL2 0.700 94 1 1.401 13 9 9 Low risk
96 2400 PL3 0.700 94 1 2.055 1 10 10 Low to medium risk

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