In this paper I will defend the claim that God is a being that exists in atemporal eternity.

Since

atemporality is difficult for us to grasp within our temporal reality, I will partly explain it through logical

reasoning, but mostly by defending against the objections of its counterpart, the concept of temporal

eternity, in order to try and define atemporal eternity by negation. God’s relation to time has a lot of

bearing on his relation to creation (namely, us), and his role as a Creator and personal God, so it is an

important topic for us to consider.

To begin, we will look at the definition of eternity as laid out by Boethius, a medieval

philosopher who, although not the first to define eternity, created one of the soundest definitions we

have for it. Boethius defines eternity as the complete possession all at once of illimitable life. From this

we can draw four main ingredients of his definition:

1. Anything that is eternal has life.

2. Illimitability: the life of an eternal being cannot be limited, and cannot have a beginning or an
end. The life of an eternal entity is characterized by beginningless, endless, infinite duration.
3. Duration: it must be pointed out that anything that has life must have duration, but illimitable
life entails a special sort of duration.
4. “The complete possession all at once”: all beings possess life, but it is impossible for a temporal
being to possess all its life at once. Whatever has complete possession of all its life cannot be
temporal.

From this definition, we can infer two separate modes of real existence: temporal reality and atemporal

reality.1

The conception of God as atemporal, or timelessly eternal, means that He exists in this other

mode of reality called eternity which is atemporal. “On this view, God, unlike you and I, is not located

within time, and tense and related temporal conceptions have no application to him whatever.” 2 God

exists timelessly, and his life experience of our temporal reality is timeless and unchanging. It is true to

say that God knows timelessly that I am writing this paper far too late at night. “God knows this, and

everything else as well, in a single, timeless act of awareness that encompasses all of heaven and earth,

1
Stump, Eleanore and Norman Kretzmann. “Eternity.” From Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions. Ed.
by Stump, Eleanore and Michael J. Murray. Blackwell Publishing: Malden, MA, 1999, p. 43-44.
2
McCann, Hugh J. “The God Beyond Time.” Class handout of a revised version excerpted from his anthology, p. 231.

1
in its complete history.”3 One of the characteristics of divine timelessness is that the whole of eternity is

simultaneous with every single moment in time, from beginning to end. Every moment in our history

and future, for God, is lived in his present. This eternal present is not just instantaneous, but it must be

of some duration, since eternity necessarily entails duration. “The eternal present…is by definition an

infinitely extended, pastless, futureless duration.” 4

For this view to make sense, we must hold to a B-series conception of time: time, rather than

flowing like a river from past to present to future and being governed by those tenses (this is the A-

series conception of time), is rather laid out like points on a map. There are no tenses, but only “before”

and “after,” or “earlier than” and “later than.” Point A, 11:35pm on Wednesday, March 10, 2010, occurs

before Point B, 11:36pm on Wednesday, March 10, 2010, but the way God views them is simultaneous. 5

One of the easiest and most common objections to this view of time and the simultaneity of eternity

with time is one as stated, for example, by Anthony Kenny: “On St. Thomas’ view [of timelessness], my

typing of this paper is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Again on this view, the great fire of

Rome is simultaneous with the whole of eternity. Therefore, while I type these words, Nero fiddles

heartlessly on.”6 With this objection, divine timelessness seems incoherent. McCann responds to this

objection thusly: “God creates and is aware of all of history neither simultaneously nor at different

times, but eternally. His activity as Creator and Knower is unified and unchanging, but it does not occur

at any present moment, not even a supposed eternal one. It simply is.” 7

Another way to rebut this objection is to look at the principle of GWK (God’s Way of Knowing).

This is a line of reasoning that states that if God knows something non-temporally, then what he knows

3
Ibid.
4
Stump, Eleanore and Norman Kretzmann. “Eternity.” From Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions. Ed.
by Stump, Eleanore and Michael J. Murray. Blackwell Publishing: Malden, MA, 1999, p. 45.
5
Class notes, February 19, 2010
6
Quote from Hasker, William. Excerpt from God, Time, and Knowledge. From Philosophy of Religion: The
Big Questions. Ed. by Stump, Eleanore and Michael J. Murray. Blackwell Publishing: Malden, MA, 1999.
7
McCann, Hugh J. “The God Beyond Time.” Class handout of a revised version excerpted from his
anthology, p. 235.

2
is non-temporal. Thus, if God knows all true-p non-temporally, then it must be the case that all true-p is

non-temporal. This can be reduced to the formula “if God knows p in way W, then p is W.” 8 Obviously,

this assertion is false. We could make it say that, if God knows something non-spatially, then that which

he knows is non-spatial. Or, God knows me sinlessly, therefore I am sinless. What GWK does is moves,

fallaciously, from a characterization of God’s way of knowing to a characterization of what God knows. 9

Kenny’s objection falls under this fallacy. He assumes that, because God knows the events of history

simultaneously, then the separate events of history are in fact simultaneous. This is false, and should not

be considered seriously as an objection to the atemporal nature of God.

If God is atemporal, we must also look at his relation to our world as Causer of change. The

question here is if it is possible for a timeless unchanging entity to be the cause of temporal change.

Davis for example, doesn’t think that the concept of atemporal causation makes any sense. He says that

“no temporal term like ‘at T’ can meaningfully be applied to a being or to the actions of a being that

lacks temporal location and temporal extension.” 10 Davis argues that timelessness is incompatible with

the claim that God is the creator of the universe. His argument is as follows:

1. God creates x
2. X first exists at T
3. Therefore, God creates x at T

Davis says that (3) cannot be true if God lacks temporal location. But we must notice the ambiguity

within premise (3) and break it down into two readings:

3a. At T (God creates x)

3b. God creates (x at T)

3a is governed, in a sense, by “at T.” So “God creates x” is a feature of “at T,” and God’s act of creating is

governed by, and within, time. 3b is the opposite, the premise being governed by “God creates,” and

thus the premise becomes a feature of God’s creation, and the whole action is governed by God’s act of

8
Class notes, February 19, 2010
9
Ibid.
10
Davis, Stephen T. “Temporal Eternity.” Class handout from Logic and the Nature of God, p. 225.

3
creation. 3a commits us to the view of temporal causation, while 3b commits us to atemporal causation,

which leaves us with the same unanswered question of which one works or doesn’t work. McCann’s

response to this is that causation, in itself, is neither a temporal nor an atemporal phenomenon. Some

instances of causation are temporal and some are not. McCann argues that causation is a species of

explanation, and explanation is neither temporal nor atemporal. He shows that there are non-causal

explanations, such as the number 3 being greater than the number 2. This explains 3’s position on the

number line, but it’s not a causal explanation. McCann also asserts that laws of nature that explain

things in temporal reality are, plausibly, atemporal. Hence, it’s plausible to suppose that an atemporal

being explains features of temporal reality, thus refuting Davis’ claim that atemporal causation is

impossible.11

Davis also argues against divine timelessness on the claim that timelessness is incompatible with

the concept of God as a personal being. His argument reads like this:

1. If God is a personal being, then he must plan or anticipate or remember or respond or

punish or forgive or warn.
2. If a being plans or anticipates, or remembers or responds or punishes or forgives or
warns, then that being is in time.
3. Hence, if God is a personal being, then God is in time.

What Davis is arguing here is that, in order to interact with his creation on a personal level, God cannot

be outside of time. McCann doesn’t buy this argument. He asserts that, with the atemporalist view, all

of reality owes its existence to God, who upholds and sustains all things. God’s involvement in our lives

is the same at all times during our lives and the history of the world. In a sense, McCann denies premises

1 and 2, because within those premises, the terms such as plan or anticipate, etc., are applied to God in

the exact same way in which they are applied to us. We must be careful when using our human terms to

attribute features to God. Because His nature is so radically different than our own, his intelligence and

love and plans, etc., will also be radically different. 12

11
Class notes, February 19, 2010
12
Ibid.

4
 Scripture itself seems to lean toward the personal God as acting within time, creating the world

in six days, reacting to human behavior, adjusting his plans according to human intercessions, and in

general having deep involvement in this world. McCann defends against this argument by asserting that

the passages that portray God as temporal be taken metaphorically, 13 and by quoting other Scripture

that shows a God beyond time. For example, John 8:58, where Jesus says, “I say to you, before Abraham

was born, I am,” seems to imply Jesus (here claiming divinity) to be beyond time and creation. This

antimony we find in Scripture is not uncommon and has left philosophers and theologians struggling for

centuries on these issues.14

The question of God’s relation to time necessarily raises questions about his sovereignty as

Creator. All throughout Scripture, as well as in cosmological proofs for God’s existence, he is portrayed

as the Creator of everything and having complete power and authority over everything. “But if God is in

time, his sovereignty is restricted. There is something other than himself that he did not create—

namely, time itself—and his experience and action are made subject to the limitations of opportunity.” 15

So if God is to be completely sovereign, then he must be the Creator of time. I believe that modern

science, especially within the theory of relativity, helps show God as Creator of time as well. If, as many

modern theories are pointing to, time is somehow intimately connected with space, then time, along

with space and other matter, must be a created thing.

Although for lack of space not every argument was considered here, I believe that the case for

the atemporality of God’s eternity is clear. I believe that the concept of divine timelessness stands

against the arguments that come against it and is more logical to accept than the alternative. We have

explored the nature of eternity, the nature of time, and the nature of God as Creator and Lord;

atemporality supports all of these assertions. It stands that God, in his eternity outside time, is Creator

13
In my opinion, a weak defense.
14
McCann, Hugh J. “The God Beyond Time.” Class handout of a revised version excerpted from his anthology, p. 232
15
Ibid.

5
and Lord over time and all creation. It may remain a mystery to us how exactly the eternal and temporal

planes of reality interact, but I don’t believe we should always expect the workings of a different mode

of reality to be submitted to our rational thought process. Even with God’s help in revelation to us, often

we still remain in the dark. As Ecclesiastes 3:11 says of God: “He has made everything beautiful in its

time. He has also set eternity in the hearts of men; yet they cannot fathom what God has done from

beginning to end.”16 May this knowledge assist us in worshipping the God who is Sovereign Master over

all things.

16
NIV

6
 Ben Wulpi

Philosophy of Religion

March 12, 2010