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Neoclassical Natural Capital Theory and "Weak"
Indicators for Sustainability
the old of each period to consume opti- III. A SIMPLE OLG MODEL WITH
mally), the typical result is monotonically NATURALCAPITAL
declining utility levels beyond some period
into the future.5 Presentation
of theModel
Second and conversely, achieving an
equilibrium with nondecreasing consump- We now specify a multi-periodoverlap-
tion levels requires that, one way or an- ping generations (OLG) model which has
other, present generations "care enough" the same productionfunctionas in Stiglitz's
about future generations. This "caringfor (1974) originalproblem:three inputs-man-
the future"can be expressedthrougha vari- ufacturedcapital M, human capital L, and
ety of mechanisms,notably: nonrenewable natural capital R-to a
Cobb-Douglas production function which
* the impositionof a maximinsocial wel- produces manufacturedcapital as its sole
fare function;or impositionof a crite- output. The manufacturedcapital can be
rion of intertemporal social-welfare used in consumptionC or saved for invest-
maximization subject to nonnegative ment S.
The model problem is to maximize an
change in representative individuals' intertemporalsocial welfare function, or in
welfare from one period to next; other words an intertemporaldistribution
* the assumption of a sufficiently high
rule, subjectto a numberof constraints.As
level of individualaltruismof each gen- in the earlier Howarth-Norgaardmodels,
eration towardsthe generationimmedi- each generation lives two periods. The nth
ately following; generationis young in period n, and old in
* the assumption of an "obligation"on period n + 1, and obtains utility from con-
the part of each generation to provide sumption specified by the Cobb-Douglas
for a utility level of the generationim- function of the form Un = ln(Cn,) +
mediately following at least as high as ln(Cn+1,o).
its own, resultingin a "chainof obliga- We have set N = 20 periods, which is
tion" indefinitelyinto the future; sufficiently"long"to show the range of so-
* the explicit award of property rights lution properties in question.' There are
over naturalcapital or the benefits ob-
tainable from it as initial endowments 5Thus, Pareto-efficiencyand sustainability(and eq-
distributed "equitably"to all genera- uity considerationsmoregenerally)mustbe considered
tions. as distinct,and complementary, criteriafor characteriz-
ing model solutions and policy possibilities(see also
Dasguptaand Mitra 1983;Dubourgand Pearce 1996;
Third,the possible model equilibriafor a Toman,Pezzey,and Krautkraemer 1995;Baranziniand
given model are each characterizedby dis- Bourguignon1995).
tinctive trajectories, not just for capital 6This result also appliesto the "correct"valuation
stocks and consumption,but also for rela- of environmentalamenityand to the size of a "correc-
tive tax" for internalizingan externaleffect relatedto
tive prices includingthe time discount rate. economic productionor natural capital exploitation.
It is often said that, for intertemporaleffi- HowarthandNorgaard(1992)showthat,for a situation
ciency, the price of natural capital such as of cumulativepollution,both the "efficient"tax level
mineralsor energy resources or fish or for- and the interestrate are functionsof the incomedistri-
bution between generations (as determinedin their
est products,should "correctly"reflect the model by the choice of social welfare function).For
intertemporal opportunity cost (viz., the furthertheoreticaldiscussionof "endowmenteffects"
"user cost").If sustainabilityis an objective, on valuation,see Martinez-Alierand O'Connor(1996),
we must add the condition that this has to O'Connorand Muir(1995),and Muir(1996).
be the opportunitycosts as evaluatedalong The number of periods can be varied between
N = 3 and N = any large (finite) number, limited only
an intertemporalefficientpath that also sat- by computationalcapacityof the software and hard-
isfies the sustainabilitycriterion.6 ware.
534 LandEconomics November1997
N - 1 = 19 generations who each live two the natural resource constraint condition
periods. Also we add an "old" generation stating that the entire stock of nonrenew-
who consumes in the first period only; but able natural capital is used up by the Nth
no new "young"generation is born in the period; [9] is the nth generation's utility.
final Nth period. For our exposition, two The symbolsare as follows:
social welfare distributionrules will be ap-
plied. Rn is the amount of natural resources
The first rule is to maximizethe present used in period n,
value of utility (henceforth PVU-max),dis-
RToris the total amount of natural re-
countingeach generation'sutility by a con- sources,
stant factor 8, where 0 < 8 < 1, relative to the amountconsumedby the young
the previousgeneration.The problemto be Cn, yis
generationin period n,
solved is:
C, o is the amount consumed by the
old-the (n - 1)th generation-in
Maximize:Y61U,
period n,
U = ln(C + ln(C + 1, is the Cobb-
where the sum is over n = 1 to n = N, [1] y) o)
Douglas utility function of the nth
subjectto: generation,
8 is the utilitydiscountfactor,
M + MLa2Rn--l-a2=S2 + Cn,y Cn,o Mn is the economic capital of the nth
L generation,
Vn = 1... (N- 1) [2] Ln is the labor endowment of the nth
generationof young,
Mn+, = Sn Vn = 1... (N - 1) [31 S, is the savings of the nth generation
of young,
M1 = Mini,
[4] Minit is the initial level of economic capital
in the firstperiod.
L, = 1 Vn = 1... N [5]
From [9], each generation gives equal
SN =0 [6]
weight to its own consumptionas "young"
=0 [7] as it does to its own consumptionas "old."
CN,y There is thus no "subjective"discounting
IR, = RTOT within a generation's life. The social dis-
count parameter8 dictates the strength of
where the sum is over n = 1 to n = N. [8] time-preference(impatience)for the econ-
= + ln(Cn+1,o). omy overall. If 8 = 1 all generationscount
Un ln(Cn,,) [9]
equally;if 8 < 1 the successivegenerations
count progressivelyless. Conventionally,the
The constraints have the following mean- social discountrate between generations is
ings: [2] representsthe marketclearingcon- given by p definedby 1/(1 + p) - * p-
dition combinedwith the productionfunc- (1 - 8)/B; note that this is not the interest
tion; [3] is a device to propagate savings, rate.
analyticallyconvenientbut not strictlynec- The second social distributionrule con-
essary;[4] sets the initial level of manufac- sists of a "sustainability"requirementover-
tured capital in the first period, owned by laid on the PVU-maximizationobjective,
the first generation;[5] specifies a constant representingthe intergenerational equityre-
endowmentof labor for each generationin quirement that each generation at least
be
their "young"period; [6] specifies that the as well off as the immediately preceding
Nth generation young do not save anything one:
because they are not born; [7] specifies that
the Nth generation young do not consume
anything because they are not born; [8] is > U,, for n = 1 to n = N- 1. [10]
Un+1
73(4) Faucheuxet al.:NaturalCapitalTheory 535
TABLE 1
PARAMETERSAND PROPERTIESFOR MODEL EQUILIBRIUMSCENARIOS
-(1-otz - o2) =
0.15 (A) sustainedgrowth (B) single-peakgrowthand decline
0.55 (C) single-peakgrowthanddecline (D) monotonicdecline
2,5 0,6
0,s
1.5 --+Young Consumption
03
-... OldConsumption
YoungConsumpoon
'
Old Consumption
0,2
1 3 5 7 9 1113151719
0
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 FIGURE 1(C)
CONSUMPTION
LEVELSOVERTIME:
FIGURE 1(A) PVU-MAX(SCENARIO
C)
CONSUMPTION
LEVELSOVERTIME: (nat capital p = 0.55; econ capital al = 0.15; labor a2 =
PVU-MAX(SCENARIO
A) 0.30; PVU-max with intergenerationalutility discount fac-
(nat capital 0 = 0.15; econ capital al = 0.55; labor a2 = tor 8 = 0.90)
0.30; PVU-max with intergenerationalutility discount fac-
tor 8 = 0.90)
This gives us four "scenarios,"for whichwe
comparethe timepathsfor consumption,see
Table 1 and Figure 1. The graphsshow the
Consumption Levels consumption levels of the "old" and the
0,7
"young"in each period. The utility of each
generation, Un ln(C, y) nC
+ 1), fol-
06 lows the same-=trend as the consumption
curves.9Solution [11-A]is sustainedgrowth;
0,5 K.. the output elasticity of economic capital is
- 0-iYoung Consumption
high and the society is sufficientlypatient to
...OlOdConsumption allow future generationsto enjoy a progres-
sively greater utility level. Solutions [11-B]
02
and [11-C] are nonsustainable growth paths
r
with a boom-and-declineform. In case (B)
oo
the culprit is the high social discount rate
01 3 5 7 9 1113151719
9Extension of the model to a larger number of
FIGURE 1(B) periods (say N = 50) does not alter the qualitative
CONSUMPTION LEVELSOVERTIME: features of the four cases chosen. Note in particular
PVU-MAX (SCENARIOB) that cases (A) and (B) have the substitution elasticity
(nat capital (p = 0.15; econ capital al = 0.55; labor a2 = and output elasticity properties identified by Stiglitz,
0.30; PVU-max with intergenerationalutility discount fac- Solow, Hartwick, and others as capable of supporting a
tor 8 = 0.70) finite nondecreasing consumption indefinitely.
73(4) Faucheuxet al.:NaturalCapitalTheory 537
ConsumptionLevels ConsumptionLeves
1,2 2,5
0,8
1,5
-4-Young Consumpton
Old Conuumpdion
0,4
0,5
0.2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
PathswithNon-decreasing
Utility 02
acrossGenerations -- Con•u•npoon
01 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 20
-the SNI(i)-so that the manufactured consumptionplus net changein the value of
capital stock is built up. This is, indeed, the capital stocks. If natural capital stocks are
presumption behind traditional macroeco- included,we call it a "greenNNP," defined
nomic modeling that discusses the "trade- as: gNNP = p1C + (' - dX/dt) where, as
off' between current consumption and before, C is the physical quantity of con-
growth rate-the so-called "golden-rule" sumption,p, is the currentprice of manu-
literature; and as Pezzey (1994, 1997) dis- facturedcapital(whichcan be saved or con-
cusses, the concept of SNI(ii) seems very sumed) and 7r-dX/dt is the Hartwick"net
pertinentwhere naturalcapitalscarcitycon- savings"measuredin currentprices (Solow
strainslong-runmanufacturedcapital accu- 1986;Miiler 1991).
mulation.11 Because Hartwick'srule does not include
Hicksianincome.The Hicksiandefinitionof the "capital gains" term, the respect of
a person's(or nation's)incomeis the amount Hartwick'srule at any moment in time does
he/she (or it) can consume duringa speci- not necessarilyimplynonnegativechange in
fied period, while ensuring that his/her the value of total capital stocks. So the
wealth at the end of the period is no less Hicksian national income and the net na-
than his/her wealth at the outset (Hicks tional product (gNNP) are not the same
1946).Assume that the value of total capital thing.12 Furthermore,the gNNP and the
stocks is K, measuredin moneyunits, so let SNI(i) are not the same thing.As the recent
us write: workby Asheim (1994) and by Pezzey(1994,
1997) has made plain, the gNNP and SNI(i)
K - X, will coincide only if highly restrictivetheo-
retical conditionsare fulfilled.
where
TheReasoningfor the "Weak"Indicators
X = (M, L, R) is the vector of stocks in for Sustainability
physicalunits, and The early work by Solow, Hartwick,and
7r = (Pi, P2, P3) is the vector of relative
prices. others showed that, for a closed economy
obeying the PVU-max criterion,a property
Then the Hicksiannationalincome will be of the SNI(i) "maximin"consumptionpath
associated with the rule: dK/dt = 0. The is that Hartwick'srule is satisfied at all
times. Howeverit was not initiallyremarked
change in value of capital stock may, gener-
that respect of Hartwick'srule in this con-
ally, be written: dK/dt = d/dt(7r -X), and
this can be split into two parts: text was a necessary but not a sufficient
condition. In effect, the problems of (1)
the currentvalue of savings: -rrdX/dt changes in relativeprices along a PVU-max
and the "capitalgains"term: X- drr/dt. path through time-showing up in, among
other places, the "capitalgains"term-and
Hartwick'ssavingsrule.Using the above no- of (2) different relative prices associated
tation, Hartwick'srule is written:-7r dX/dt with each distinct PVU-max solution, were
? 0. For a model with constant population
we have dL/dt = 0, so this becomes
p, dM/dt + P3 dR/dt ? 0. The first term
refers to the value, in currentprices, of the "Apart from Pezzey'swork and our own results
reported here, relatively little neoclassical modeling
change in manufacturedcapital stock; the work along these lines seems to have been done. This
second term refers to the value, in current reflects past computationalobstacles (which are no
prices,of the change in naturalcapitalstock. longeras severe),and perhapsalso modelers'addiction
Green net national product. Suppose the to PVU-maxcriteria?
12See also Johanssonand L6fgren(1996),who look
economy maximizespresent value of con- at the way that price changes make welfare compar-
sumption. Then the net national product isons for alternative investment/consumptiontime-
(henceforth NNP) is defined as value of paths a hazardousbusiness.
540 LandEconomics November1997
nondecreasingHicksianincome.
We do not prove this second result math-
ematically. The reason can be seen intu-
itivelyfrom our model results as follows. On
a "single-peak" PVU-max timepath, the P-TV rod Cap
-ATV
TV Nat Cap
Labour
There is a portion of the timepath where X TV Resources
timepath.
sustained-utilityconstraint is imposed.
The rapid exploitation of the de- FIGURE3(C)
pletable natural capital combinedwith VALUE OF CAPITALSTOCKS:PVU-MAX
"BOOM AND BUST" (SCENARIOC)
inadequate savings of manufactured (nat capital cp= 0.55; econ capital al = 0.15; labor a2 =
capital compromises future genera- 0.30; PVU-max with intergenerationalutility discount fac-
tions' economicchances.We observein tor 8 = 0.90)
cator AK > 0 tells us, with one period's The measurementproblemsin theoryand in
delay, that the consumptionhas tres- practice.Figures that have, in recent years,
passedbeyondthe level compatiblewith been actually produced as putative esti-
the sustainabilitycriterion of nonde- mates for a "green GNP" in this perspec-
tive, are generally admitted to involve "in-
creasingutility.
complete" adjustments(e.g., Repetto 1989;
El Serafy 1989; Peskin 1991; Pearce and
The Hicksian Rule dK/dt > 0 is "too Atkinson 1993; Pearce and Warford 1993;
weak" as a sustainabilityindicator.Along a and others since). Yet, there has been a
single-peakpath, by the time that the sign tendency to let it be presumed that these
of the indicatorAKn changes from positive
"preliminary"calculations can somehow
to negative, significant (and possibly irre- function as "first approximations,"serving
versible) damage has alreadybeen done to the same policy relevance as the theoretically
sustainabilityprospects. specified measures.14 This presumption is
The Hartwick rule. Now consider the difficult to defend, partly because of the
propositionthat a nondecreasingconsump- restrictedvalidity in theory, and partly be-
tion is assured by respect of the Hartwick cause of problemsof indeterminacy,incom-
rule, WT.dX/dt = 0. The reasoning is that a pleteness, and systematicmeasurementbi-
positive sign of the Hartwickian"net sav- ases at the empiricallevel.
ings"(t.- dX/dt) > 0 for a PVU-maxecon- The monetizationof environmentaldete-
omy means that pC < gNNP. If it is as- rioration,in neoclassical perspective,relies
sumed that gNNP = SNI(i), then the cur- on the ability to estimate opportunitycosts
rent consumptionwould be lower than the associatedwith resource use alternativesin
maximinincome and hence the economy is economic production, pollution treatment,
not violating requirementsfor sustainable waste disposal, and environmentalmanage-
consumption. But as Asheim (1994) and ment. Strictly speaking, these opportunity
Pezzey (1994, 1997)have demonstrated: costs are definableonly within the theoreti-
cal frameworkof an intertemporalgeneral
* the "Hartwickincome" defined by the equilibriummodel. For valid indicatorspec-
- ification estimation, three related theoreti-
gNNP when w dX/dt = 0, is not (gen-
erally)the SNI(i); cal points thus arise. First, the role of capi-
* the equalitybetween gNNP and SNI(i)
holds only for a PVU-max path where
'4In workreportingestimationsof performanceac-
the Hartwickrule is respected at every cordingto the "weak sustainability"criterion,Pearce
point in time; and Atkinson (1993, 104) stated: "We begin with an
* the gNNP for a PVU-max timepath intuitiverule for determiningwhethera countryis on
or off a sustainabledevelopmentpath. To do this, we
therefore will not, in general, coincide
adopt a neoclassicalstance and assume the possibility
with SNI(i), nor for that matter with of substitutionbetween'natural'and 'man-made'capi-
SNI(ii). This statement holds even if, tal...." They presentedempiricalcalculationssuppos-
edly as estimatesof the value of the "weaksustainabil-
for a particular moment in time, it hap- ity indicator"for 22 countries,of which only 8 do not
pens that C = gNNP is the PVU-max fulfillthe nonnegativitycondition.Proopsand Atkinson
consumption; (1997) present similar sets of results, making adjust-
ments for internationaltrade such that naturalcapital
* therefore a positive sign of the Hart-
depreciationis attributedto the countryof final goods
wickian"net savings"(7-r dX/dt) for a consumptionratherthan production.Some changesin
PVU-max economy is not a reliable magnitudesare observable,but the basic pattern re-
mainsthe same, and the underlyingassumptionsof the
indicatorthat the currentconsumption approachare the same whetheror not the figuresare
pC is lower than the SNI(i), and hence "corrected"for internationaltrade.The evidentdefect
that the economy is not violating re- of this workis that the depreciationcoversonly a very
small number of categories of marketed natural re-
quirements for sustainable consump- sources and environmentaldegradation,using current
tion. pricesor inferencesfrom currentprices.
73(4) et al.:NaturalCapitalTheory
Faucheux 543
2,5
-4-Produced Capital
1,5 - - NaturalCapita
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
FIGURE 4(C)
FLOWSOF CAPITALSINTOPRODUCTION:PVU-MAX "BOOM AND BUST"
(SCENARIOC)
(nat capital p= 0.55; econ capital o I = 0.15; labor ot2 = 0.30; PVU-maxwith
intergenerationalutilitydiscount factor 8 = 0.90)
3
2.5
2- zz~???~ss~:?..f?
-n-:::~::::::u:~:-ae~:~
IE:~:::s:::::~::
Xf.... .............
"M
IXi?:~::'~~:::::
....
.::*:.:.:
s-iK R?::-:ji ks0
'RIM, ---rdce
af
~~i: tz
:.:~~.
k::~
:~::~j::~:~;?:~:::
~ii~% ............
.
?.~s~i
'~'f'5:~:~:~i::i
.....
,, ~~~"~K""
Xx ?M M M. Ag -gk
,?..:::~:~:~:i:
~KOX ::%ffi *f--
::~::~:5~':":
%;:
?~Ii~:?:~-:;~;?:;?55S~??-
N,: ::"':..:.:::::i~j~:~"i
*X.I:~,,,
::::::;;:g:;;:g .
-*gM.m
................-??::~:"~:::ii~j:,~i:
~
0,5? ....... *%
,-,3X
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011121314151617181920
FIGURE 4(C/S)
FLOWSOF CAPITALSINTOPRODUCTION:OP-SUS WITHNONDECREASING
UTILITY
C / S)
(SCENARIO
(nat cap p= 0.55; econ cap alt = 0.15; labor a 2 = 0.30; "Op-Sus"with intergenerational
utility discount factor 8 = 0.90)
of resource utilization conform to a PVU- itous and cynical disposal of toxic wastes,
max path, and a lot of reasons exist to state interventions to furnish low-cost ac-
believe the contrary, notably the prevalence cess by commercial interests to forest, wa-
of market power, force majeure, and other ter, fisheries, and agricultural resources, and
forms of non-Pareto-efficient competition so on). Many environmental services (in-
(e.g., oligopoly market power, high commer- cluding waste disposal) and scarce natural
cial discount rates, strategic behavior, gratu- resources (including fish, water, forests) are
73(4) Faucheuxet al.:NaturalCapitalTheory 547
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