G.R. No.

L-23875 May 27, 1977

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA: MARIA VENTURA, executrix-appellant, MIGUEL VENTURA
and JUANA CARDOVA, Heirs,
vs.
MERCEDES VENTURA, and her husband PEDRO D. CORPUZ, and GREGORIA VENTURA and her husband
EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, oppositors-appellees.

Facts:

Appeal from the orders entered by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (Guimba Branch) in Special
Proceedings No. 812, Testate Estate of the Late Gregorio Ventura, on February 26, 1964 and June 11, 1964
granting the motion of appellee Mercedes Ventura to annul the institution of heirs made in the will of the
deceased, which was probated during his lifetime, upon the ground that said appellee and her sister Gregoria
Ventura who have been found in the decision of another court in a corresponding case, already final, to be
legitimate children and compulsory heirs of said deceased, were preterited and deprived of their share in the
inheritance. Appellant denies that the decision referred to has already become final and executory.

On December 14, 1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will, said will was admitted to
probate on January 14, 1954. This admission became final.

Gregorio died on September 26, 1955, and on October 17, 1955, pursuant to his will, Maria Ventura was
appointed executrix, in which capacity, she is appellant in this case.

Gregoria and Mercedes claimed that they are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife Paulina
Simpliciano, who died in 1943, and asked that one-half of the properties described in the complaint be declared
as the share of their mother in the conjugal partnership, with them as the only forced heirs of their mother
Paulina.

Later on the same properties were subject to another civil case file by Alipio, Eufracia and Juliana, all surnamed
Simpliciano, against Gregorio Ventura and the two sisters, Mercedes and Gregoria. They alleged that as the only
children of Modesto Simpliciano, sole brother of Paulina, they, instead of Mercedes and Gregoria, whom they
claimed are adulterous children of Paulina with another man, Teodoro Ventura, and as such are not entitled to
inherit from her under the Old Civil Code, are the ones who should be declared as inheritors of the share of
Paulina in the conjugal partnership with Gregorio.

The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered a decision declaring Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura to be
the legitimate daughters of Paulina and Gregorio Ventura declaring that as such legitimate daughters of Paulina
Simpliciano they are entitled to 1/2 of the subject properties. Upon motion for reconsideration, this decision
was amended by reducing the amount of the monetary judgment against Mercedes and her husband to
P97,000.

Maria Ventura as executrix of the estate of Gregorio, was substituted for him appealed from the above decision
but said appeal was dismissed due to late payment of docket fees and the estimated cost of printing.
Earlier, or, on July 14, 1962, Mercedes filed, thru counsel, Atty. Arturo M. Tolentino, the "Motion to Annul
Provisions of Will" that spawned the present controversy. In the decision it was rendered that Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura were omitted from the will, this preterition takes place making the provisions of the will null
and void and the former are entitled to the estate by rules of intestacy. The decision was opposed by Miguel
Ventura and Juana Cordova, who were given shares in the will of Gregorio, and later by appellant Maria. The
main ground of this latter opposition was that the decision in Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476 was not yet final,
notwithstanding the dismissal of her appeal. She contended that since the action filed by Mercedes and
Gregoria was for partition, the decision of the court of November 4, 1959, which merely "urged" the parties "to
arrive at an amicable settlement of the properties herein adjudicated within twenty days from receipt of this
decision," and "upon their failure to do so, the Court shall appoint commissioners to divide the properties in
accordance with the terms of this decision" left something else to be done and was, therefore, interlocutory and
not final, citing 1 Moran, Rules of Court, 1950 ed. 810 and the cases therein cited.

A motion to dismiss the present appeal on the ground that it has become moot and academic, was filed by Atty.
Tolentino, as counsel for appellees Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz. However, appellant Maria Ventura
filed an opposition contending that there is no basis in alleging that the appeal has become moot and academic
just because the partition in Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476 has already been done with approval of the court
which has not been appealed.

Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Court in Civil cases nos. 1064 and 1476 dated November 4, 1959 as
amended, the dispositive portion of which is quoted above, already final and executory?

Held:

Yes, acting on appellees' motion to dismiss appeal, it is Our considered opinion that the decision in Civil Cases
Nos. 1064 and 1476 declaring that appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of the
deceased Gregorio Ventura and his wife, Paulina Simpliciano, and as such are entitled to the annulment of the
institution of heirs made in the probated will of said deceased became final and executory upon the finality of
the order approving the partition directed in the decision in question. We need not indulge in any discussion as
to whether or not, as of the time the orders here in question were issued by the trial court said decision had the
nature of an interlocutory order only. To be sure, in the ease of Miranda, aforementioned, the opinion of the
majority of the Court may well be invoked against appellant's pose. In any event, even if the Court were minded
to modify again Miranda and go back to Fuentebella and Zaldariaga, - and it is not, as of now - there can be no
question that the approval by the trial court in Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476 of the partition report of the
commissioners appointed for the purpose, one of whom, Emmanuel Mariano, is the husband of appellant, put a
definite end to those cases, leaving nothing else to be done in the trial court. That order of approval is an
appealable one, and inasmuch as no appeal has been taken from the same, it is beyond dispute that the decision
in controversy has already become final and executory in all respects. Hence, the case at bar has become moot
and academic.
G.R. No. L-41508 June 27, 1988

CANDELARIO VILLAMOR, PILAR DE LA SERNA, BARTOLOME VILLAMOR, RAFAELA RETUYA, SOFRONIO

VILLAMOR, PILAR SEMBLANTE, ELEUTERIO VILLAMOR, CARIDAD GORECHO, MARCOS OR and GUADALUPE
CEDEO petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DANIELA CENIZA UROT, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Fr.
Nicanor Cortes, under Sp. Proc. No. 3062-R, respondents.

Facts:

Luis L. Co vs Hon. Ricardo Rosario

Facts:
On March 4, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) OF Makati City, Branch 66, in Sp. Proc. No. M-4615, appointed
petitioner and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special administrators of the estate of the petitioners father, Co Bun
Chun. However, on motion of the other heirs, the trial court set aside petitioners appointment as special co-
administrator. Petitioner consequently, nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co (Alvin, for brevity), for appointment
as co-administrator of the estate. On August 31, 1998, the RTC appointed Alvin as special co-administrator.

Almost four years therafter, the RTC revoked the appointment of Alvin as special co-administrator for the reason
that he had become unsuitable to discharge the trust given to him ecause his capacity, ability or competence to
perform the functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by the filing of several criminal cases against him,
which, even if there was no conviction yet, had provided the heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle
the subject estate with utmost fidelity, trust and confidence.

Aggrieved petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the
revocation and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment of petitioner as
special co-administrator

Held:

No, We affirm the appellate courts ruling that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
revoking Alvins appointment as special co-administrator. Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of
special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators.
[10] Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the
Rules, at their discretion.[11] As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will
not interfere with it. [12] This, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal
likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be
based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles.[13]

Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court finds the appointee no longer
entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.[14]
The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is
expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration
and earliest settlement. [15]

In this case, we find that the trial courts judgment on the issue of Alvins removal as special co-administrator is
grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. It is not characterized by patent and gross
capriciousness, pure whim and abuse, arbitrariness or despotism, as to be correctible by the writ of certiorari.

Vilma C. Tan vs Hon. Francisco Gedorio Jr.

Facts:

Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31 October 2001, private respondents, who
are claiming to be the children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration. The Petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4014-0 and was raffled to Branch 12.
Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.

Private respondents moved for the appointment of a special administrator. They prayed that their attorney-in-
fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners filed an Opposition to
private respondents Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the private respondents can be appointed as
the special administrator since they are not residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo
does not have the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma)
who was already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his death.

Atty. Clinton Nuevo, as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto
administratix. However, the latter has failed to comply. Consequently, RTC Judge Menchavez issued an order
appointing Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardos Estate. Petitioners filed an opposition claiming that
petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administrator as she was allegedly next of kin of the
deceased.

Respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the CA issued a decision
denying petitioners petition. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that they should be given priority in the
administration of the estate since they are allegedly the legitimate heirs of Gerardo, as opposed to private
respondents, who are purportedly Gerardos illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the doctrine that generally,
it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator of
the decedents estate.

Issue:

Held:

The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.If no executor is named in the will, or the executor
or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or
to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death
of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.

However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special
administrator.[13] The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies
entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. which was what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari, however,
requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.[15]

We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge
Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavezs appointment of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge Menchavez
clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special administratrix of Gerardos estate, but decided
against her appointment for the latters failure to comply with the directives of Atty. Nuevo. Both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals found that the documented failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the reportorial
requirements after the lapse of a considerable length of time certainly militates against her appointment.

G.R. No. 18140 September 1, 1922

MARIA BABAO, applicant-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIA G. VILLAVICENCIO, administratrix-appellant.

Facts:

In the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of Ignacio Trillanes, Maria Babao, the herein
appellee, petitioned the court below that an additional inventory be made of certain properties of the deceased
and an allowance be made to her minor children for their support, pending the distribution of the estate. These
minors are children of Jose Trillanes, son of the deceased Ignacio Trillanes.
This petition was opposed by the administratrix of the estate on the ground that said minors are not entitled to
the support applied for, because section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides only for the support of the
children of the deceased and not of his grandchildren. The lower court, however, held otherwise and allowed
P15 monthly pension to each of the minors to be charged against the estate.

Issue:

Whether or not the right to the provisional support granted by section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure
extends to the grandchildren of the deceased

Held:

In this section the law uses the phrase "minor children of a deceased." Child, in its common acceptation, is the
"persona o animal, respecto de su padre o de sumadre." (Dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy.)

And "child" is "a male or female descendant in the first degree." (The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia.)

The ordinary acceptation, therefore, of the word "hijo" or child does not include "nieto" or "grandchild."

In applying in this proceeding for the aforesaid provisional allowances, the appellee does not, and cannot,
invoke but section 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure in support of her petition, whose provisions on this point
do not, in the opinion of the court, extend to the grandchildren of the deceased. She cannot invoke the Civil
Code because the grandfather against whose estate the allowance claimed is to be charged is now dead, and
therefore the obligation of such a grandfather to give support was already extinguished. (Art. 150, Civ. Code.)

G.R. No. L-21917 November 29, 1966

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO. MARCELO PIJUAN, special
administrator-appellee,
vs.
MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA, movant-appellant.

Facts:

Appellant Manuela Ruiz and Carlos Gurrea were married in Spain. Carlos abandoned her and came with their
son Teodoro in the Philippines. Here he lived with Rizalina Perez where they have 2 children. Years later having
informed by Teodoro their son that his father was residing in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, Maria came to the
Philippines.

Manuela Ruiz instituted against Carlos Gurrea for support and the annulment of some alleged donations of
conjugal property, in favor of his common-law wife Rizalina. The said court issued an order granting Mrs.Gurreaa
monthly alimony pendent lite of P2,000 which was reduced to P1,000 by Court of Appeals.

Carlos died leaving a will in which he named Marcelo Pujian as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea
and their son Teodoro. Thereafter, Pijuan instituted a special proceeding for probate of the said will. Pijuan was,
upon his ex parte motion, appointed special administrator of the estate, without bond. Oppositions to the
probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son Teodoro and one Pilar Gurrea, as an alleged illegitimate
daughter of the deceased.

Mrs, Gurrea filed in said special proceedings a motion alleging that the aforementioned alimony, pendent lite of
P1,000 a month had been suspended upon the death of Carlos Gurrea and praying that the Special
Administrator be ordered to continue paying it pending the final determination of the case. This motion having
been denied moved for reconsideration thereof and also moved for her appointment as administratix of the
estate of the deceased. However, the trial court denied both motions.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in denying her motion regarding the suspension of her alimony, pendente
lite and an administratix of the estate of the deceased

Held:

Yes, the court ruled that the denial of the trial court of the support to MrsGurrea because of the absence of
proof as regards the status, nature or character of the property now under the custody of the special
administrator. On account of such lack of proof thereon, it is presumed under the law that the estate of the
deceased consists of property belonging to the conjugal partnership, one-half of which belongs presumptively
to Mrs. Gurrea, aside from such part of the share of the deceased in said partnership as may belong to her as
one of the compulsory heirs,4 if his alleged will were not allowed to probate, or, even if probated, if the
provision therein disinheriting her were nullified. Inasmuch as the aforementioned estate is worth P205,397.64,
according to the inventory submitted by the special administrator, it is clear to us that the continuation of the
monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000, authorized in said Civil Case No. 5820, is fairly justified.

However, the contention of MrsGurrea that the trial court erred in denying her petition for appointment as
administratix for, as widow of the deceased, she claims a right of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the
Revised Rules of Court is without merit. In the language of this provision, said preference exists "if no executor is
named in the will or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate." None of these conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar.The deceased Carlos
Gurrea has left a document purporting to be his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as
yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not
claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also,
expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment as executor, and, upon his appointment as special
administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It may not be amiss to note that the preference accorded by the
aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving spouse refers to the appoint of a regular
administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and that the order appointing the latter
lies within the discretion of the probate court, and is not appealable.
G.R. No. 14904 September 19, 1921

FRANCISCO D. LUNSOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
SINFOROSO ORTEGA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Facts:

Rufina Medel, widow sold to Francisco Lunsod, husband of GabinaPeyamonte, for the sum of P2,000 and with
the right to repurchase for two years, three parcel of land planted with coconut trees. It being a condition of the
sale that the vendor could not exercise the right of repurchase until after the expiration of said two years from
the date of the document and that two thirds of the fruits produced by said land would belong to the purchaser
and one-third to the vendor, as compensation for the work of clearing and taking care of the parcels of land
during said period.

On September 19, 1916, FrancicoLunsod filed a complaint against Sinforoso Ortega and Candido Cariaga alleging
that he was the owner of the three parcels of land and that he was illegally and by means of of strategy and
stealth turned out of the possession of the said parcels of land by the defendants. He prayed for the recovery of
possession of the said land and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P150 for the value of the coconuts taken and the
damages occasioned to the latter.

In answer to said complaint, the defendant Ortega denied generally and specifically each and every allegation
thereof, and alleged, as a special defense, that he was in possession of said parcels because he was, together
with his sister Francisca Ortega, a pro indiviso owner thereof, and that his possession was not obtained illegally,
nor by the means mentioned in the complaint. The defendant, therefore, prayed that he be absolved from the
complaint and the injunction denied.

An intestate proceeding was instituted upon the death of Rufina Medel by her brother Cipriano Medal and
moved for this appointment as administrator of the property left by the deceased. An inventory of the property
having been submitted in which the three parcels of land in question were included, with the statement that
they had been sold to Francisco Lunsod with the right of repurchase for the sum of P2,000. Respondents
appeared in the said proceeding and filed a motion asking that the said parcels be excluded from the inventory
on the ground that said parcels were their exclusive property and were then in their exclusive possession, having
inherited the same from their first cousin, Anacleta Ortega. The probate court denied the motion on the ground
that the question of ownership of those parcels could not be raised in said proceedings.

An appeal was taken by Ortega. Lunsod claimed that the parcels of land were his exclusive property, having
acquired them by purchase from Rufina Medel, deceased, the sole and absolute owner thereof.

Upon the death of Rufina Medel, intestate proceedings were instituted. An inventory of the property was
submitted where the parcels of land in question were included. Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega filed a motion
asking that the parcels of land be excluded from the inventory on the ground that said parcels were their exclusive
property and were then in their exclusive possession, having inherited the same from their first cousin, Anacleta
Ortega.

Issue:
Whether or not the property is a reservable property?

Held:

Yes.

The court held ratiocinated:

ESTATE DUTY OF ASCENDANT, WHO INHERITS THROUGH A DESCENDANT, TO RESERVE THE

PROPERTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW ARTICLE 811, CIVIL CODE. Property which an ascendant
inherits by operation of law from his descendant and which was inherited by the latter from another ascendant of
his, must be reserved by the ascendant heir in favor of uncles of the descendant from whom the inheritance
proceeded, who are his father's brother, because they are relatives within the third degree, if they belong to the
line whence the property proceeded according to the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.

In the case at bar, Rufina Medel inherited by operation of law from her daughter Anacleta Ortega, who died at the
age of six years, the three parcels of land in question situated in the barrio of Sta. Catalina in the municipality of
San Pablo Province of Laguna, which parcels had been acquired by said AnacletaOrtega gratuitously, that is to
say, also by inheritance from an ascendant, who was her father Estanislao Ortega, and said three parcels having
come from Mariano Ortega, father of the deceased Estanislao Ortega and the appellees Sinforoso and Francisco
Ortega, who are therefore relatives within the third degree of the child Anacleta Ortega, daughter of
EstanislaoOrtega, then according to the provisions of said article 811, these pieces of land constitute reservable
property in favor of said Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, uncle and aunt of the descendant's predecessor in
interest with respect to the property.

The ascendant who inherits from a descendant, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law, acquires the
inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership
belong to him exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal, and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent
in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence
the property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the
property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property
proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must
be determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which
makes this limitation consists in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition of a mere usufructuary, depriving
him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have,
according to the opinion that has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the father or mother who has
married again. There is a marked difference between the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his
heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or
of the father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary
property resides in the hereditary owner and only he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in
no way perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct
in accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the limited
one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the
ascendant who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father or mother required by
article 968 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they inherit itself, the former from his descendant and
the latter from his or her child in first marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the
persons in whose favor the right if required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of
disposal or of recovery.

Rufina Medel not having acquired said parcels before her death in fee simple and without the limitation which
characterizes them as reservable property, for the reason that Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, who were
entitledto have such parcels reserved, survived her, it is obvious that the brother and sister of the former, Cipriano
andJacobaMedel did not, as they claim acquire said parcels by inheritance from said deceased, and,
consequently, they have no right to have said property registered in the registry of deeds in their name and the
opposition to said registration presented by Francisco Lunsod in said case No. 219 is, therefore, groundless.
The three parcels referred to not being, therefore property of the conjugal partnership of the deceased
EstanislaoOrtega and Rufina Medel, but the separate and exclusive property of the former, since he acquired
them gratuitously from his father Mariano Ortega, the title thereof passing afterwards to their daughter Anacleta
Ortega, and, upon the latter's death, to Rufina Medel by inheritance from Anacleta, with the character of
reservableproperty in favor of Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, who acquired the absolute title thereto by virtue of
said character, the exclusion, ordered by the court, of said property from the inventory presented by the
administrator CiprianoMedel in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rufina Medel, case
No. 2218, was proper.

With respect to the possession of said parcels claimed by Francisco Lunsod of which, he alleges, he was
deprived by Sinforoso Ortega in June or July, 1916, these facts were nor proved at the trial, as already stated,
but, on the contrary, it was proven that Rufina Medel continued in said possession in which, in some way or
another, her brother and sisterinlaw, Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega, the persons entitled to have the property
reserved in their favor, participated, although Rufina Medel, according to the document of June 3, 1915, had
already sold said parcels to Lunsod with the right to repurchase, and therefore the remedy prayed for by the latter
in his complaintin the Court of First Instance, which is a reproduction of the one previously filed in the court of the
justice of the peace of San Pablo, and docketed there as case No. 2322, is improper and groundless.

What has been said knows that the trial court did not commit errors Nos. 6, 8, and 9 assigned by the appellants in
their brief neither did the court below commit the 7th error, for the judgment appealed from, there are set forth the
conclusions arrived at by the trial judge with respect to the points in issue and which his Honor considered
proved, it being there stated, at the same time, that the preponderance of the evidence is notably in favor of the
theory maintained by the appellees Sinforoso and Francisca Ortega.

G.R. No. L-46847 June 29, 1940

Testamentaria de la finada Arcadia Santos (alias Leocadia).

MAXIMINA MARCELINO, solicitante y apelada,
vs.
ROSARIO ANTONIO Y OTROS, solicitantes y apelantes.

Facts:

After the will of late Arcadia Santos has been probated in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, his heirs
Felisa Antonio and other s filed two motions asking of the following

a. inventory of the property of the estate of Leocadia; to separate from the property inventory, pertaining
to the conjugal partnership of Leocadia and Modesto Marcelino; to render an account of said conjugal
partnership from 1905 death of Marcelino and liquidate the same; to designate a day in court for the
presentation of evidence regarding the conjugal partnership the properties which have been illegally
included and disposed in the will of Leocadia Santos.
b. That the deceaseds will be declared void in respect to any legacy or interest given in the will to Calixta
Peralta, daughter of Casimiro Peralta, one of the witnesses of the will.

Further, they also asked for the partition of the estate left by the deceased Leocadia excluding certain properties
that did not belong to him. The trial court holding on the oppositions of the movers appellees on the ground
that they raised questions that should be addressed in separate action. Hence, this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in denying the motions of the petitioners

Held:

The Court is of opinion that once a will is probated it is the duty of the executor or administrator, unless it is a
legatee to submit to the Court, within 3 months his appointment, an inventory of all assets, rights and credits
that have come into his hands (Art. 668, Code of Civil Procedure.) In the inventory must be included half of the
property that corresponds to the deceased. (Art. 685, id., Amended by Law No. 3176.) And in order to find that
half of the profits, it must proceed before the liquidation of the assets, rendering of accounts of the partnership,
payment of debts, etc. Therefore, what was requested by the movants in this case is in accordance with the law
and must be substantiated in the same proceedings in which the will of the late Leocadia is probated.

As to the other motion, in which the will is declared invalid in relation to the legacy made in favor of Calixta
Peralta, and as to the memorandum of the movers with respect to the exclusion of certain properties of the
inventory of the testamentary, the Order can not be upheld either. After paying all the debts of a testamentary
or intestate, the court has jurisdiction to proceed with the partition and distribution of the inheritance between
the interested parties. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, the court may or may not respect the distribution
made in the will, according to whether or not this distribution is in accordance with the provisions of the law.
The power, therefore, to determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary dispositions, is inherent in the
jurisdiction of the court when proceeding to a fair and legal distribution of the inheritance. On the other hand,
to declare that an independent and separate action is necessary for that purpose, is to go against the general
tendency of jurisprudence to avoid multiplicity of lawsuits, and is, moreover, costly, dilatory and impractical.

As to the exclusion of the inventory of certain properties, although it is true, as a general rule, that the court, in
these proceedings, does not have the power to decide matters of title to property, we have already stated,
however, that it can do so, On an interim basis, when the purpose is only to determine whether particular
properties should be excluded from the inventory.

G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987

PRINCESITA SANTERO, FEDERICO SANTERO and WILLIE SANTERO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, ANSELMA DIAZ, VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA, MIGUEL, all
surnamed SANTERO, and REYNALDO EVARISTO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
PABLO SANTERO, respondents.

Facts:

This is a Petition for certiorari which questions the order of the respondent court granting the Motion for
Allowance filed by private respondents.
A motion for allowance was filed by Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all surnamed Santerno, thru their
guardian, Anselma Diaz on the ground cited was support which included educational expenses, clothing and
medical necessities, which was granted and said minors were given an allowance prayed for in their motion.

In their opposition the oppositors contend that the wards for whom allowance is sought is no longer schooling
and have attained majority age and they are no longer under guardianship.

It appears from the records that petitioners PrincesitaSantero-Morales, Federico Santero and Winy Santero are
the children begotten by the late Pablo Santero with FelixbertaPacursa while private respondents Victor,
Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are four of the seven children begotten by the same Pablo
Santero with Anselma Diaz.

Further, private respondent filed another Motion for Allowance to include Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito all
surnamed Santero alleging that in previous motion only the last four children were included and her first three
children who are then of age should have been included since all her children have the right to receive
allowance as advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of Pablo Santero. The trial court granted the
motion of allowance to the other three children.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondents should be entitled to allowance nothwithstanding that they have attained
the age of majority.

Held:

The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the New Rules of Court but Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil
Code reading as follows:

Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance,
according tothe social position of the family.

Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or
training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.

Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the
children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from
this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.

The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be
regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit
allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the
surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the
inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the
surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the
deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it
noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law
spouses who are the mothers of the children here).