F AR E ASTERN U N I V E RSI TY

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1

CASE DIGESTS No. 7.1

Erzena P. Abibas
13 JANUARY 2015

Atty. Christian Villasis

 G.R. NO. 170026 JUNE 20, 2012
SHIMIZU PHILIPPINES CONTRACTORS, INC., Petitioner vs. LETICIA MAGSALIN et.al., Respondents.

Carpio, J.:

FACTS:
Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. claims that one Leticia Magsalin, doing business under the trade
name "Karens Trading," had breached their subcontract agreement for the supply, delivery, installation, and
finishing of parquet tiles for certain floors in the petitioners Makati City condominium project called "The Regency
at Salcedo." The breach triggered the agreements termination. When Magsalin also refused to return the
Shimizu's unliquidated advance payment and to account for other monetary liabilities despite demand, the
petitioner sent a notice to respondent FGU Insurance Corporation demanding damages pursuant to the surety and
performance bonds the former had issued for the subcontract. Shimizu filed a complaint against Magsalin and
FGU. However, it was only FGU who was able to served with summons. FGU then filed a motion for leave of court
to file a third-party complaint. The RTC granted the motion. In May 2003, the RTC issued a notice setting the case
for hearing on June 20, 2003. FGU Insurance filed a motion to cancel the hearing on the ground that the third-
party defendants had not yet filed their answer. The motion was granted. With the foregoing procedural events,
RTC gave an order dismissing the complaint of Shimzu for failure to prosecute. After the dismissal, Shimizu sought
relief with the CA when it filed an appeal under Rule 41. However, FGU filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that it did not dispute the proceedings before the RTC and only raised a pure question of law. The
appellate court then granted the motion of FGU. Aggrieved, Shimizu now filed a review on certiorari. Shimizu
claimed that the order of dismissal done by the RTC is improper. Now FGU assails the present petition of Shimizu,
claiming that the petition is fatally defective. It also reiterated that the appeal made in the CA and filed under Rule
41 was improper and should have been filed directly with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the petition for review was proper and in accord under Rule 41
2. Whether or not the order of dismissal due to failure to prosecute was proper

HELD:
1. Yes. It is noteworthy that the CA dismissed the appeal of Shimizu based on the ruling laid in Joaquin
vs. Navarro: "Where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated
in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is
one of law which is properly subject to the review of this Court." However what was being
questioned by Shimizu was that the facts supposedly supporting the trial courts conclusion of non
prosequitur were not stated in the judgment. Thus, this defeats the application of Joaquin. At any
rate, the filing of the appeal in CA under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court was proper as it necessarily
involved questions of fact.

2. No. Based on available records and on the averments of the parties, the following events were
chronologically proximate to the dismissal of the case: (a) on March 24, 2003, the court admitted FGU
Insurances third-party complaint; (b) the trial court cancelled the June 20, 2003 hearing upon FGU
Insurances motion; and (c) on June 16, 2003, Baetiong filed his Answer to the third-party complaint
but did not serve it upon the petitioner. None of these events square with the grounds specified by
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for the motu proprio dismissal of a case for failure to
prosecute. These grounds are as follows: (a) Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to

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 appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief; (b) Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time; (c) Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the Rules of
Court; or (d) Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.

G.R. NO. 203947 FEBRUARY 26, 2014

RUFA RUBIO et.al., Petitioners vs. LOURDES ALABATA, Respondent.

Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners Rufa A. Rubio, Bartolome Bantoto, Leon Alagadmo, Rodrigo Delicta, and Adriano Alabata and
respondent Lourdes Alabata were protagonists in an earlier case for annulment of declaration of heirship and sale,
reconveyance and damages before the RTC of Dumaguete The case was decided in favor of petitioner. Initially
Lourdes appealed the decision of the RTC, however, she later withdrew the appeal, which in turn turned the
decision final and executory. It was on August 20, 1997, the Entry of Judgment was issued and recorded in the CA
Book of Entries of Judgments. However despite the finality of the decision it was never executed. Petitioners claim
that their counsel at the Public Attorneys Office, Dumaguete City, was never informed that the entry of judgment
had already been issued. They explained that although a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to Atty. Ma.
Lourdes Naz, the SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, she failed to inform petitioners of the issued entry of
judgment before she resigned from PAO sometime in November 1997. She also failed to inform PAO-Dumaguete
of the said development. When petitioners followed up with PAO-Dumaguete, it was of the belief that the appeal
of respondent was still pending. In November 2007, or more than ten (10) years from the date when the RTC-43
decision was entered in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments, petitioners found out that the said decision had
become final and executory when their nephew secured a copy of the Entry of Judgment. On December 5, 2007,
petitioners, through PAO-Dumaguete, filed an action for revival of judgment which was raffled to RTC-42. On
February 28, 2008, after respondent filed her Answer with Affirmative Defenses, RTC-42 granted her Motion to
Dismiss and ordered petitioners case for revival of judgment dismissed on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision can be subject of revival under the rules of court

HELD:
Yes. While generally, as provided by Rule 39 Section 6, once a judgment becomes final and executory, the
prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5) years from the date of
entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five (5)
years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in
a regular court within ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final. However, due to the events that
transpired, the Court find it proper to relax the rules and allow the revival of judgment. To allow a strict application
of the rules, however, would result in an injustice to petitioners considering (1) that respondent decided not to
contest the RTC-43 decision and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed to petitioners.

G.R. NO. 161909 APRIL 25, 2012

PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner vs. FELIX PARAS AND INLAND TRAILWAYS, INC.,
Respondents.

Bersamin, J.:

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FACTS:

Respondent Felix Paras is one of the passengers injured from an accident met by the bus operated by
Inland Trailways and a bus operated by petitioner Philtranco Service. Felix went through number operations and
was unable to obtain sufficient financial assistance from Inland for the costs of his operations, hospitalization,
doctors fees and other miscellaneous expenses, thus, on 31 July 1989, Paras filed a complaint for damages based
on breach of contract of carriage against Inland. On 02 March 1990, upon leave of court, Inland filed a third-party
complaint against Philtranco and Apolinar Miralles. In this third-party complaint, Inland, sought for exoneration of
its liabilities to Paras, asserting that the latters cause of action should be directed against Philtranco considering
that the accident was caused by Miralles lack of care, negligence and reckless imprudence. The RTC then rendered
a decision declaring Philtranco and Apolinar liable for moral and actual damages. The said award of damages was
also affirmed by the CA. Ultimately, Philtranco questions the validity of awarding moral damages on the ground
that the basis of such award is based on a breach of contract of carriage, which is not one of the enumeration
provided by the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of damages is proper

HELD:
Yes. Section 16, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court defines a third party complaint as a "claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the thirdparty
defendant, for contribution, indemnification, subrogation, or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim."
Under this Rule, a person not a party to an action may be impleaded by the defendant either (a) on an allegation of
liability to the latter; (b) on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff-; or, (c) both (a) and (b). The situation in (a)
is covered by the phrase "for contribution, indemnity or subrogation;" while (b) and (c) are subsumed under the
catch all "or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim." The case at bar is one in which the third party
defendants are brought into the action as directly liable to the plaintiffs upon the allegation that "the primary and
immediate cause as shown by the police investigation of said vehicular collision between the above-mentioned
three vehicles was the recklessness and negligence and lack of imprudence of the third-party defendant Virgilio
Esguerra y Ledesma then driver of the passenger bus." The effects are that "plaintiff and third party are at issue as
to their rights respecting the claim" and "the third party is bound by the adjudication as between him and
plaintiff." It is not indispensable in the premises that the defendant be first adjudged liable to plaintiff before the
third-party defendant may be held liable to the plaintiff, as precisely, the theory of defendant is that it is the third
party defendant, and not he, who isdirectly liable to plaintiff. The situation contemplated by appellants would
properly pertain to situation (a) above wherein the third party defendant is being sued for contribution, indemnity
or subrogation, or simply stated, for a defendant's "remedy over".

G.R. NO. 171496 MARCH 3, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Respondents.

Leonen, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent, Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, is the owner of a parcel of land known in Pasig City. Upon
the request of the Department of Public Works and Highways, respondent Ortigas caused the segregation of its

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property into five lots and reserved one portion for road widening for the C-5 flyover project. The C-5-Ortigas
Avenue flyover was completed in 1999, utilizing only 396 square meters of the allotted lot. Consequently,
respondent Ortigas further subdivided the subject Lot into two lots: Lot 5-B-2-A-1, which was the portion actually
used for road widening, and Lot 5-B-2-A-2, which was the unutilized portion of Lot 5B-2-A.
On February 14, 2001, respondent Ortigas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for authority to sell
to the government Lot 5-B-2-A-1. It then set the case for hearing with no one making any opposition. There being
no opposition, the RTC issued an order authorizing the sale of Lot 5-B-2-A-1 to the Republic of the Philippines.
After the issuance of such decision, the Republic filed its opposition on the ground that Ortigas' property can only
be conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known
as the Property Registration Decree. However despite the opposition of the Republic, the RTC maintained its
decision.
On appeal to the CA, the appeal was dismissed by the appellate court declaring that an order denying the
motion for reconsideration is unappealable. In a motion for reconsideration filed by the Republic, the appellate
dismissed the same on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to try over the case for raising only a question of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA is correct in ordering the dismissal of the Complaint

HELD:
Yes. Appeals from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 must raise both
questions of fact and law. Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals taken from the Regional
Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only pure questions of law are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. In
which case, the appeal shall not be transferred to the appropriate court. Instead, it shall be dismissed outright.
Appeals from the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely questions of law must, in all cases, be taken
to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. The sole issue raised by
petitioner Republic of the Philippines to the Court of Appeals is whether respondent Ortigas property should be
conveyed to it only by donation, in accordance with Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. This question
involves the interpretation and application of the provision. It does not require the Court of Appeals to examine
the truth or falsity of the facts presented. Neither does it invite a review of the evidence. The issue raised before
the Court of Appeals was, therefore, a question purely of law. The proper mode of appeal is through a petition for
review under Rule 45. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal on this ground.

G.R. NO. 196894 MARCH 3, 2014

JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO, Petitioners vs. JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,
Respondent.

Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:

This controversy stemmed from various cases of collection for sum of money filed against So Keng Kok,
the owner of various properties including two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 292597 and 292600 (subject
properties), which were attached by various creditors including the petitioners in this case. As a result, the levies
were annotated on the back of the said titles. Petitioners Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo were the
plaintiffs in two (2) collection cases against Robert Limso, So Keng Koc, et al. Respondent JEWM Agro-Industrial

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Corporation was the successor-in-interest of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another collection cases against the
same defendant. On October 19, 1998, RTC-Br. 8 rendered its decision based on a compromise agreement, dated
October 15, 1998, between the parties wherein the defendants in said case were directed to transfer the subject
properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben. The latter subsequently sold the subject properties to one Nilda Lam who, in
turn, sold the same to JEWM on June 1, 2000. Thereafter, TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676 were eventually issued in
the name of JEWM, both of which still bearing the same annotations as well as the notice of lis pendens in
connection with the other pending cases filed against So Keng Kok. A year thereafter, Spouses Crisologo prevailed
in the separate collection case filed before RTC-Br. 15 against Robert Lim So and So Keng Koc. Thus, on July 1,
1999, the said defendants were ordered to solidarily pay the Spouses Crisologo. When this decision attained
finality, they moved for execution. On June 15, 2010, a writ was eventually issued. Acting on the same, the Branch
Sheriff issued a notice of sale scheduling an auction on August 26, 2010. The notice of sale included, among others,
the subject properties now, in the name of JEWM.

In the same proceedings, JEWM immediately filed its Affidavit of Third Party Claim and the Urgent Motion
Ad Cautelam. It prayed for the exclusion of the subject properties from the notice of sale. In an order, dated
August 26, 2010, however, the motion was denied. In turn, the Spouses Crisologo posted a bond in order to
proceed with the execution. To protect its interest, JEWM filed a separate action for cancellation of lien with
prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction before RTC-Br.14. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent the public sale of the subject properties covered in the writ of execution issued
pursuant to the ruling of RTC-Br. 15; the cancellation of all the annotations on the back of the pertinent TCTs; and
the issuance of a permanent injunction order after trial on the merits. "The Register of Deeds of Davao City, Sheriff
Robert Medialdea, John and Jane Does and all persons acting under their direction" were impleaded as
defendants. At the scheduled hearing before RTC-Br. 14 on September 22, 2010, Spouses Crisologos counsel
appeared and filed in open court their Very Urgent Manifestation questioning the authority of the said court to
restrain the execution proceedings in RTC-Br. 15. JEWM opposed it on the ground that Spouses Crisologo were not
parties in the case.

On September 24, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the denial of the
application for writ or preliminary injuction filed by JEWM and asking for their recognition as parties. No motion to
intervene was, however, filed as the Spouses Crisologo believed that it was unnecessary since they were already
the John and Jane Does named in the complaint. Spouses Crisologo submit as error the CA affirmation of the RTC-
Br. 14 ruling that the action for cancellation may proceed without them being impleaded. They allege deprivation
of their right to due process when they were not impleaded in the case before RTC-Br. 14 despite the claim that
they stand, as indispensable parties, to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the action for the cancellation
of annotations covering the subject properties. They cite Gonzales v. Judge Bersamin,11 among others, as
authority. In that case, the Court ruled that pursuant to Section 108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, notice
must be given to all parties in interest before the court may hear and determine the petition for the cancellation of
annotations on the certificates of title.

The Spouses Crisologo also question the statement of the CA that their failure to file the motion to
intervene under Rule 19 before RTC-Br. 14 barred their participation in the cancellation proceedings. They put
emphasis on the courts duty to, at the very least, suspend the proceedings before it and have such indispensable
parties impleaded.

As to the ruling on the denial of their application for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction, Spouses Crisologo claim that their adverse interest, evinced by the annotations at the back of the
certificates of title, warranted the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against JEWMs attempt to

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cancel the said annotations in violation of their fundamental right to due process. JEWM asserts that Spouses
Crisologos failure to file a motion to intervene, pleadings-in-intervention, appeal or annulment of judgment, which
were plain, speedy and adequate remedies then available to them, rendered recourse to Rule 65 as improper; that
Spouses Crisologo lacked the legal standing to file a Rule 65 petition since they were not impleaded in the
proceedings before RTC-Br. 14; and that Spouses Crisologo were not indispensable parties since their rights over
the properties had been rendered ineffective by the final and executory October 19, 1998 Decision of RTC-Br. 8
which disposed unconditionally and absolutely the subject properties in favor of its predecessor-in-interest.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the action for Cancellation of Annotations may proceed
even without notice to and impleading the party/ies who caused the annotations, in clear
contravention of the rule on joinder of parties and basic due process.
2. Whether or not the erred in applying a very constrictive interpretation of the rules in holding that a
motion to intervene is the only way an otherwise real party in interest could participate.

HELD:

1. Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologos liens were indeed annotated at the back of TCT
Nos. 325675 and 325676. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand to be benefited or
injured by any order relative to the cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other words,
they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the final disposition of the case for cancellation, being one
of the many lien holders. As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been joined as
defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The reason
behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is the complete determination of all possible
issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as regards other persons who may be
affected by the judgment.

In this case, RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated pleas by Spouses Crisologo to be recognized as
indispensable parties, failed to implement the mandatory import of the aforecited rule. In fact, in Sps.
Crisologo v. Judge George E. Omelio, a related administrative case, the Court found the trial judge
guilty of gross ignorance of the law when it disregarded the claims of Spouses Crisologo to
participate. In part, the Court stated:

This is not the first time Judge Omelio has rendered a decision affecting third parties interests,
without even notifying the indispensable parties. In the first disputed case, JEWM Agro-Industrial
Corporation v. Register of Deeds, Sheriff Medialdea, John & Jane Does and all persons acting under
their directions, Judge Omelio failed to cause the service of proper summons upon the John and Jane
Does impleaded in the complaint. Even when Sps. Crisologo voluntarily appeared in court to be
recognized as the John and Jane Does, Judge Omelio refused to acknowledge their appearance and
ordered the striking out of Sps. Crisologos' pleadings. For this reason, the Investigating Justice
recommended admonishing Judge Omelio for failing to recognize the Sps.Crisologo as indispensable
parties in that case.

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 To turn a blind eye to the said nullity and, in turn, rule as improper the recourse to Rule 65 by the lack
of legal standing is to prolong the denial of due process to the persons whose interests are
indispensible to the final disposition of the case. It will only result in a protracted litigation as Spouses
Crisologo will be forced to rely on a petition for the annulment of judgment before the CA (as the last
remaining remedy), which may again reach this Court. To prevent multiplicity of suits and to expedite
the swift administration of justice, the CA should have applied liberality by striking down the assailed
orders despite the lack of legal standing on the part of Spouses Crisologo to file the Rule 65 petition
before it. Besides, this lacking requirement, of which Spouses Crisologo were not even at fault, is
precisely the reason why this controversy arose. All told, the CA erred in dismissing the amended
petition filed before it and in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 14. Petition
is granted.

G.R. NO. 178789 NOVEMBER 14, 2012

NATIVIDAD LIM, Petitioner vs. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, SPOUSES ROBERTO ARCINUE AND ARABELA
ARCINUE, Respondents.

Abad, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent National Power Corporation filed an expropriation suit against petitioner Natividad B. Lim
before the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan covering Lots 2373 and 2374 that the NPC needed for its Sual Coal-Fired
Thermal Power Project. Since Lim was residing in the United States, the court caused the service of summons on
her on February 20, 1995 through her tenant, a certain Wilfredo Tabongbong. On March 1, 1995, upon notice to
Lim and the deposit of the provisional value of the property, the RTC ordered the issued writ of possession in NPC's
favor that would enable it to cause the removal of Lim from the land.

Lim, represented by her husband Delfin, filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the action and to suspend the
writ of possession, questioning the RTC's jurisdiction over Lim's person and the nature of the action. She also
assailed the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. The RTC denied the motions. Respondent spouses
Roberto and Arabela Arcinue filed a motion for leave to admit complaint in intervention, alleging that they owned
and were in possession of Lot 2374, one of the two lots subject of the expropriation. On January 7, 1997 the RTC
granted the Arcinues' motion and required both the NPC and Lim to answer the complaint-in-intervention within
10 days from receipt of its order. When Lim and the NPC still did not file their answers to the complaint-in-
intervention after 10 months, on December 7, 1998 they filed a motion for judgment by default. Lim sought to
expunge the motion on the ground that it lacked the requisite explanation why the Arcinues resorted to service by
registered mail rather than to personal service. At the scheduled hearing of the motion, Lim's counsel did not
appear. The NPC for its part manifested that it did not file an answer since its interest lay in determining who was
entitled to just compensation.

On March 1, 1999 the RTC issued an order of default9 against both Lim and the NPC. The RTC pointed out
that the Arcinues' failure to explain their resort to service by registered mail had already been cured by the
manifestation of Lim's counsel that he received a copy of the Arcinues' motion on December 7, 1998 or 10 days
before its scheduled hearing. Lim filed a motion for reconsideration to lift the default order but the Court denied
the motion, prompting Lim to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 52842. On
March 23, 2007 the CA rendered a decision that affirmed the RTC's order of default. Lim filed a motion for

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reconsideration but the CA denied it, prompting her to file the present petition for review. On September 24, 2007
the Court initially denied Lim's petition but on motion for reconsideration, the Court reinstated the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the order of default that the RTC
entered against Lim

HELD:

Lim points out that an answer-in-intervention cannot give rise to default since the filing of such an answer
is only permissive. But Section 4, Rule 1919 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires the original parties to file
an answer to the complaint-in-intervention within 15 days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a
different period is fixed by the court. This changes the procedure under the former rule where such an answer
was regarded as optional. Thus, Lim's failure to file the required answer can give rise to default. The trial court had
been liberal with Lim. It considered her motion for reconsideration as a motion to lift the order of default and
gave her an opportunity to explain her side. The court set her motion for hearing but Lim's counsel did not show
up in court. She remained unable to show that her failure to file the required answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence. And, although she claimed that she had a meritorious defense, she was unable
to specify what constituted such defense. Lim points out that the RTC should have ordered the Arcinues' motion
for judgment by default expunged from the records since it lacked the requisite explanation as to why they
resorted to service by registered mail in place of personal service. There is no question that the Arcinues' motion
failed to comply with the requirement of Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:

SECTION 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of
pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a
resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation, why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.

But the above does not provide for automatic sanction should a party fail to submit the required
explanation. It merely provides for that possibility considering its use of the term "may." The question is whether
or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in not going for the sanction of striking out the erring motion. The
Court finds no such grave abuse of discretion here. As the RTC pointed out, notwithstanding that the Arcinues'
failed to explain their resort to service by registered mail rather than by personal service, the fact is that Lim's
counsel expressly admitted having received a copy of the Arcinues' motion for judgment by default on December
7, 1998 or I0 days before its scheduled hearing. This means that the Arcinues were diligent enough to file their
motion by registered mail long before the scheduled hearing. Personal service is required precisely because it
often happens that hearings do not push through because, while a copy of the motion may have been served by
registered mail before the date of the hearing, such is received by the adverse party already after the hearing.
Thus, the rules prefer personal service. But it does not altogether prohibit service by registered mail when such
service, when adopted, ensures as in this case receipt by the adverse party.

G.R. NO. 195592 SEPTEMBER 15, 2012

MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION et.al., Petitioners vs. THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, substituted by
FIRST SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., Respondent.

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Reyes, J.:

FACTS:

The Manila Banking Corporation filed a complaint for sum of money, against herein petitioners,
Magdiwang Realty Corporation, Renato P. Dragon and Esperanza Tolentino, after said petitioners allegedly
defaulted in the payment of their debts under the five promissory notes they executed in favor of TMBC. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-511 and raffled to Branch 148 of the RTC of Makati City. Instead of filing a
responsive pleading with the trial court, the petitioners filed on October 12, 2000, which was notably beyond the
fifteen (15)-day period allowed for the filing of a responsive pleading, a Motion for Leave to Admit Attached
Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Dismiss, raising therein the issues of novation, lack of cause of action against
individuals Dragon and Tolentino, and the impossibility of the novated contract due to a subsequent act of the
Congress. The motions were opposed by the respondent TMBC, via its Opposition which likewise asked that the
petitioners be declared in default for their failure to file their responsive pleading within the period allowed under
the law. Acting on these incidents, the RTC issued an Order on July 5, 2001 declaring the petitioners in default. The
Court will have to rule that the Motion to Dismiss was nonetheless filed out of time, hence, there is sufficient basis
to declare defendants in default.

The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its Order dated August 2,
2005. The ex parte presentation of evidence by the bank before the trial court's Presiding Judge was
scheduled. Unsatisfied with the RTC orders, the petitioners filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA
affirmed the RTC orders after ruling that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it declared
herein petitioners in default. In the meantime, TMBC's presentation of evidence ex parte proceeded before
Presiding Judge Oscar B. Pimentel of the RTC of Makati City.

On May 20, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of TMBC and against herein petitioners.

The petitioners appealed with the CA, however such was again dismissed. On the issue of prescription, the CA cited
the rule that the prescriptive period is interrupted in any of the following instances: (1) when an action is filed
before the court; (2) when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors; and (3) when there is any
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

The appellate court held:

As shown by the evidence, we arrived at the conclusion that the prescriptive period was legally interrupted on
September 19, 1984 when the defendants-appellants, through several letters, proposed for the restructuring of
their loans until the plaintiff-appellee sent its final demand letter on September 10, 1999. Indeed, the period
during which the defendants-appellants were seeking reconsideration for the non-settlement of their loans and
proposing payment schemes of the same should not be reckoned against it. When prescription is interrupted, all
the benefits acquired so far from the lapse of time cease and, when prescription starts anew, it will be entirely a
new one. This concept should not be equated with suspension where the past period is included in the
computation being added to the period after prescription is resumed. Consequently, when the plaintiff-appellee
sent its final demand letter to the defendants-appellants, thus, foreclosing all possibilities of reaching a settlement
of the loans which could be favorable to both parties, the period of ten years within which to enforce the five
promissory notes under Article 1142 of the New Civil Code began to run again and, therefore, the action filed on
April 18, 2000 to compel the defendants-appellants to pay their obligations under the promissory notes had not
prescribed. The written communications of the defendants-appellants proposing for the restructuring of their
loans and the repayment scheme are, in our view, synonymous to an express acknowledgment of the obligation

9
and had the effect of interrupting the prescription. The defense of novation was also rejected by the CA, citing
the absence of two requirements for a valid novation, namely: (1) the clear and express release of the original
debtor from the obligation upon the assumption by the new debtor of the obligation;

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners were correctly declared in default

HELD:

The petition is dismissed. At the outset, we explain that based on the issues being raised by the
petitioners, together with the arguments and the evidence being invoked in support thereof, we hold that the
petition involves questions of fact that are beyond the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari. Section 1, Rule
45 then categorically states that a petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law, which must be
distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question
to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set
of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is
one of fact.

On the first issue of prescription, the petitioners argue that there was no written extrajudicial demand by
the creditor TMBC that could have validly interrupted the ten (10)-year prescriptive period. Similarly, the issue of
the alleged novation involves a question of fact, as it necessarily requires a factual determination on the existence
of the following requisites of novation: (1) there must be a previous valid obligation; (2) the parties concerned
must agree to a new contract; (3) the old contract must be extinguished; and (4) there must be a valid new
contract. Needless to say, the respondent's entitlement to attorney's fees also depends upon the questioned
factual findings. The settled rule is that conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a
better position to examine real evidence, as well as observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the
case. The fact that the CA adopted the findings of fact of the trial court makes the same binding upon this Court.

At the outset, it behooves this Court to accentuate that the Order of the trial court declaring the
defendants-appellants in default for their failure to file their responsive pleading to the complaint within the
period prescribed under Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court had been declared final and beyond
review already by the Supreme Court through its Resolution dated March 5, 2008 and June 25, 2008. Judicial
decisions of the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy, assume the same authority as
the law itself. Thus, the issue raised by the defendants-appellants questioning the wisdom of the trial court's
decision in declaring them in default is now rendered moot and academic by the aforecited Supreme Court
resolutions.

G.R. NO. 172909 MARCH 5, 2014

SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENE Y. PLAZA, Petitioners vs. GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA
VDA. DE MARTINEZ AND VICKY SAYSON GOLOSENO, Respondents.

Brion, J.:

10
FACTS:

Barbara Plaza was the declared owner of the subject agricultural land in this case by the CA. The subject
land was occupied by herein respondents Lustiva, Martinez and Goloseno. On September 14, 1999, Vidals son and
daughter-in-law, the petitioners, filed a Complaint for Injunction, Damages, Attorneys Fees with Prayer for the
Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against the respondents and
the City Government of Butuan. They prayed that the respondents be enjoined from unlawfully and illegally
threatening to take possession of the subject property. According to the petitioners, they acquired the land from
Virginia Tuazon in 1997; Tuazon was the sole bidder and winner in a tax delinquency sale conducted by the City of
Butuan on December 27, 1996.

Respondents pointed out that they were never delinquent in paying the land taxes and were in fact not
aware that their property had been offered for public auction. Moreover, Tuazon, being a government employee,
5
was disqualified to bid in the public auction, as stated in Section 89 of the Local Government Code of 1991. As
Tuazons participation in the sale was void, she could have not transferred ownership to the petitioners. Equally
important, the petitioners merely falsified the property tax declaration by inserting the name of the petitioners
father, making him appear as a co-owner of the auctioned land. Armed with the falsified tax declaration, the
petitioners, as heirs of their father, fraudulently redeemed the land from Tuazon. Nonetheless, there was nothing
to redeem as the land was not sold. For these irregularities, the petitioners had no right to the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order prayed for against them. Through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioners challenged the RTCs order before the CA. While the petition for review on
certiorari was pending before the CA, the petitioners filed an action for specific performance against the City
Government of Butuan.

The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling, found the petitioners guilty of forum shopping, dismissed the case, and
referred the case to the Court and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and institution of the
appropriate administrative action. The CA, after legal analysis, similarly concluded that for being disqualified to bid
under Section 89 of the Local Government Code of 1991, Tuazon never obtained ownership over the property;
much less transmit any proprietary rights to the petitioners. Clearly, the petitioners failed to establish any clear
and unmistakable right enforceable by the injunctive relief.

On April 6, 2006, the CA rejected the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of forum shopping

HELD:

The petitioners are guilty of forum shopping. We agree with the CA that the petitioners committed forum
shopping when they filed the specific performance case despite the pendency of the present case before the CA. In
the recent case of Heirs of Marcelo Sotto, etc., et al. v. Matilde S. Palicte, the Court laid down the three ways forum
shopping may be committed: 1) through litis pendentia filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet; 2) through res judicata filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved; and
3) splitting of causes of action filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers

11
 the ground to dismiss being either litis pendentia or res judicata. "The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the
identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases
such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other."

Noticeable among these three types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the
different cases filed. Cause of action is "the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another." The
cause of action in the present case (and the main case) is the petitioners claim of ownership of the land when they
bought it, either from the City Government of Butuan or from Tuazon. This ownership is the petitioners basis in
enjoining the respondents from dispossessing them of the property. On the other hand, the specific performance
case prayed that the City Government of Butuan be ordered to issue the petitioners the certificate of sale
grounded on the petitioners ownership of the land when they had bought it, either from the City Government of
Butuan or from Tuazon. While it may appear that the main relief prayed for in the present injunction case is
different from what was prayed for in the specific performance case, the cause of action which serves as the basis
for the reliefs remains the same the petitioners alleged ownership of the property after its purchase in a public
auction.

Thus, the petitioners' subsequent filing of the specific performance action is forum shopping of the third
kind-splitting causes of action or filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different
prayers. As the Court has held in the past, "there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two
cases are different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues." Similarly, the CA correctly found that
the petitioners and their counsel were guilty of forum shopping based on litis pendentia. Not only were the parties
in both cases the same insofar as the City Government of Butuan is concerned, there was also identity of rights
asserted and identity of facts alleged. The cause of action in the specific performance case had already been ruled
upon in the present case, although it was still pending appeal before the CA. Likewise, the prayer sought in the
specific performance case-for the City Government of Butuan to execute a deed of sale in favor of the petitioners -
had been indirectly ruled upon in the present case when the R TC declared that no certificate of sale could be
issued because there had been no valid sale.

G.R. NO. 180134 MARCH 5, 2014

RAFAEL VALES et.al, Petitioners vs. MA. LUZ CHORESCA GALINATO, et.al., Respondents.

Perlas-Bernabe, J.:

FACTS:

Spouses Perfecto and Marietta Vales executed a Deed of Sale conveying five (5) parcels of registered
agricultural land to their three (3) children, herein petitioners. However, the subject sale was not registered,
hence, title to the subject lands remained in the names of Sps. Vales. At the time of the sale, the subject lands
were tenanted.

Several months later Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was passed decreeing the emancipation of tenants.
As required under Letter of Instruction No. (LOI) 41 petitioner Rafael Vales executed a sworn declaration asserting
that he and his sisters are co-owners of the subject lands. This notwithstanding, the subject lands were placed
under the coverage of the governments Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program as properties belonging to Sps.
Vales, not to petitioners. Invoking the landowners retention rights provided under PD 27 petitioners filed a letter-

12
request for the retention of the subject lands with the Office of the Agrarian Reform which, however, was not
acted upon. They then Ministry of Agrarian Reform-Region VI, praying that they be certified as owners of the
subject lands which they have declared in their names for tax purposes.

Meanwhile, petitioners entered into several Agricultural Leasehold Contracts with different tenants.
Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to certain tenants of the subject lands. Petitioners claimed, however, that
such issuances were made "without [their] knowledge and despite their vehement protest and
opposition. Petitioners filed a petition before the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
admitting that the subject sale was not registered and thus, the titles to the subject lands were not transferred to
their names. This was supposedly due to the fact that the lands were tenanted, and that the Minister of Agrarian
Reform refused to issue the required certification for purposes of registration.

The DAR regional director declared that ownership over the subject lands remained with Sps. Vales due to
petitioners failure to effect the registration. The DAR Secretary reversed and set aside the orders of the DAR
Regional Director, and thereby granted the petitions for exemption and retention. The OP held that upon the
demise of Perfecto, his heirs, including herein petitioners, became co-owners of the subject lands by intestate
succession with the inherent right to apply for exemption/retention. However the OP decided on appeal that the
non-registration of the subject sale and the tenants lack of actual knowledge thereof rendered the transfer as
invalid and non-binding on third persons. The subject lands, thus, remained under the ownership of Sps. Vales for
purposes of determining OLT Program coverage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject land is exempted from the OLT program of the government

HELD:

Transfer of ownership of unregistered lands whether registered or not with the Register of Deeds
concerned pursuant to Act No. 3344 may be considered a valid transfer/conveyance as between the parties
subject to verification of the due execution of the conveyance/transfer in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. In order that the foregoing transfers of ownership mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs
may be binding upon the tenants, such tenants should have knowledge of such transfers/conveyance have
recognized the persons of the new owners, and have been paying rentals/amortization to such new owners.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the subject sale was not registered or even annotated on the
certificates of title covering the subject lands. More importantly, the CA, which upheld the final rulings of the DAR
Secretary and the OP, found that the tenants categorically belied having actual knowledge of the said sale, and
that the tenants still recognized Sps. Vales as the landowners. In this regard, petitioners failed to show any
justifiable reason to warrant a contrary finding. Thus, keeping in mind that the factual findings of the CA are
generally accorded with finality absent any sufficient countervailing reason therefor, it may be concluded that
petitioners failed to comply with the requirements stated under the May 7, 1982 DAR Memorandum. As a result,
the subject sale could not be considered as valid, especially as against the tenants and/or their relatives
particularly, herein respondents. The subject lands were therefore correctly placed under the OLT Program of the
government, which thereby warranted the denial of the petition for exemption.

G.R. NO. 176628 MARCH 19, 2012

PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, Petitioner vs. PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC.,
Respondent.

13
Brion, J.:

FACTS:

PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for
the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects. Since AEI was incapable of constructing the golf
course aspect of the project, it entered into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF. The sub-contract agreement
also provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress billings directly to PTA and, in turn, PTA shall directly pay
PHILGOLF. PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA for the construction of the golf course PTA failed to answer
the complaint. Hence the RTC rendered a judgment of default. PTA seasonably appealed the case to the CA. But
before the appeal of PTA could be perfected, PHILGOLF already filed a motion for execution pending appeal with
the RTC to which the court granted. PTA filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC for granting the motion for execution pending appeal. The CA ruled in favor of
PTA and set aside the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal. PTA then filed petition for
annulment of judgment grounded on the negligence of PTAs counsel.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the negligence of PTAs counsel amounted to an extrinsic fraud warranting an annulment
of judgment
2. Whether or not should not be bound by the inactions or negligence of its counsel
3. Whether or not there were no other available remedies left for PTA but a petition for annulment of
judgment.

HELD:

1. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. The records reveal
that the judgment of default was sent via registered mail to PTAs counsel. However, PTA never
availed of the remedy of a motion to lift the order of default. Since the failure of PTA to present its
evidence was not a product of any fraudulent acts committed outside trial, the RTC did not err in
declaring PTA in default.

2. The Rules of Court specifically provides for deadlines in actions before the court to ensure an
orderly disposition of cases. PTA cannot escape these legal technicalities by simply invoking the
negligence of its counsel. This practice, if allowed, would defeat the purpose of the Rules on periods
since every party would merely lay the blame on its counsel to avoid any liability. The rule is that a
client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique[,]and
unless such acts involve gross negligence that the claiming party can prove, the acts of a counsel bind
the client as if it had been the latters acts.

3. PTAs appropriate remedy was only to appeal the RTC decision. Annulment of Judgment under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is recourse equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional cases
where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of petitioner.

14
 In this case, appeal was an available remedy. There was also no extraordinary reason for a
petition for annulment of judgment, nor was there any adequate explanation on why the remedy for
new trial or petition for relief could not be used. The Court is actually at a loss why PTA had
withdrawn a properly filed appeal and substituted it with another petition, when PTA could have
merely raised the same issues through an ordinary appeal.

G.R. NO. 173559 JANUARY 7, 2013

LETICIA DIONA represented by her Attorney-in-fact, MARCELINA DIONA, Petitioner vs. ROMEO BALANGUE et.al.,
Respondents.
Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS:

Respondents obtained a loan from petitioner payable in six months and secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage. When the debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Respondents were
served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue. They filed a Motion to Extend Period to Answer.
Despite the requested extension, however, respondents failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion
of the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed petitioner to present her evidence ex parte.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution. However before it could be resolved respondents
filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment claiming that not all of them were duly served with summons. According to
the other respondents, they had no knowledge of the case because their co-respondent Sonny did not inform
them about it. The RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution. However, since the writ could not be satisfied,
petitioner moved for the public auction of the mortgaged property which the RTC granted. In an auction sale
conducted petitioner was the only bidder, thereafter, a certificate of sale was issued in her favor. Respondents
then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale claiming that the parties did not
agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her
Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest until full payment.

Taking their cue from the Decision of the CA in the special civil action for certiorari, respondents filed with
the same court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale with Damages. They contended that the
portion of the RTC Decision granting petitioner 5% monthly interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule
9 of the Rules of Court and of their right to due process. According to respondents, the loan did not carry any
interest as it was the verbal agreement of the parties that in lieu thereof petitioners family can continue
occupying respondents residential building located in Marulas, Valenzuela for free until said loan is fully paid. The
CA ruled that aside from being unconscionably excessive, the monthly interest rate of 5% was not agreed upon by
the parties and that petitioners Complaint clearly sought only the legal rate of 12% per annum.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the award of 5% monthly interest violated the right of respondent to due process and,
hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment

HELD:

We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due process and,
hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court. A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under

15
exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not
available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the partys own neglect in promptly availing of the
same. Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client.1wphi1 This is based
on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as
an act of his client. A recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to
maintain their clients cause and such amounted to a deprivation of their clients property without due process of
law.

The manifest indifference of respondents former counsel in handling the cause of his client was already
present even from the beginning. It should be recalled that after filing in behalf of his clients a Motion to Extend
Period to Answer, said counsel allowed the requested extension to pass without filing an Answer, which resulted
to respondents being declared in default. His negligence was aggravated by the fact that he did not question the
awarded 5% monthly interest despite receipt of the RTC Decision. In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other remedies through their own fault. It can only be attributed to the
gross negligence of their erstwhile counsel which prevented them from pursuing such remedies. We cannot also
blame respondents for relying too much on their former counsel. Clients have reasonable expectations that their
lawyer would amply protect their interest during the trial of the case.

G.R. NO. 200868 NOVEMBER 21, 2012

ANITA LEDDA, Petitioner vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Carpio, J.:

FACTS:

Ledda was issued a pre-approved BPI credit card by the respondent Bank. The BPI Credit Card Package,
which included the Terms and Conditions governing the use of the credit card, was delivered at Leddas residence.
Thereafter, Ledda used the credit card for various purchases of goods and services and cash advances.Ledda
defaulted in the payment of her credit card obligation, which BPI claimed in their complaint. Consequently, BPI
sent letters to Ledda demanding the payment of such amount, representing the principal obligation. Despite BPIs
repeated demands, Ledda failed to pay her credit card obligation constraining BPI to file an action for collection of
sum of money with the Regional Trial Court. The trial court declared Ledda in default for failing to file Answer
within the prescribed period, despite receipt of the complaint and summons. Upon Leddas motion for
reconsideration, the trial court lifted the default order and admitted Leddas Answer Ad Cautelam. Thereafter the
RTC rendered a decision in favor of BPI. On appeal to the CA, the CA also rendered decision in favor of BPI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the document containing the Terms and Conditions is an actionable document

HELD:

Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written
instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the
original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the

16
pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading. Clearly, the above provision applies when
the action is based on a written instrument or document.

In this case, the complaint is an action for collection of sum of money arising from Leddas default in her
credit card obligation with BPI. BPIs cause of action is primarily based on Leddas (1) acceptance of the BPI credit
card, (2) usage of the BPI credit card to purchase goods, avail services and secure cash advances, and (3) non-
payment of the amount due for such credit card transactions, despite demands.11 In other words, BPIs cause of
action is not based only on the document containing the Terms and Conditions accompanying the issuance of the
BPI credit card in favor of Ledda. Therefore, the document containing the Terms and Conditions governing the use
of the BPI credit card is not an actionable document contemplated in Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. As such, it is not required by the Rules to be set forth in and attached to the complaint. At any rate, BPI
has sufficiently established a cause of action against Ledda, who admits having received the BPI credit card,
subsequently used the credit card, and failed to pay her obligation arising from the use of such credit card.

G.R. NO. 184371 MARCH 5, 2014

SPOUSES MARIO AND JULIA CAMPOS, Petitioners vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Brion, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners applied for the registration of a 6,904 square meter-parcel of land situated in Baccuit, Bauang,
La Union, particularly described as Lot No. 3876, Cad-474-D, Case 17, Bauang Cadastre. The petitioners bought the
subject land from Roberto Laigo, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the parties on July 26, 1990.
Only the Republic filed a formal opposition to the petitioners application, which the MTC later dismissed due to
the Republics failure to present testimonial or documentary evidence to substantiate its grounds for objection. On
December 29, 2004, the MTC rendered a decision granting the petitioners application for registrationThe Republic
appealed to the CA on the ground that the MTC erred in granting the petitioners application for registration
because of discrepancies in the area of the subject land as applied for and indicated in the tax declarations and the
parties deed of sale. Also, discrepancies in the description of the subject land appeared in the tax declarations, as
the land was sometimes described as "swampy" and, in others, "sandy." The CA, in its assailed April 30, 2007
decision, reversed and set aside the MTCs decision and dismissed the petitioners application for registration of
title.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling on non-issues and on established and undisputed facts that were
not raised by the Republic as errors in its appeal

HELD:

NO. Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides:

SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated

17
in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the
brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.

The general rule that an assignment of error is essential to appellate review and only those errors
assigned will be considered applies in the absence of certain exceptional circumstances. As exceptions to the rule,
the Court has considered grounds not raised or assigned as errors in instances where: (1) grounds not assigned as
errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are
evidently plain or clerical errors within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal,
whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the
interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal
but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the
parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are closely
related to the assigned error/s; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal, whose determination is
necessary to rule on the question/s properly assigned as errors. The present case falls into the exceptions. We find
no error by the CA in resolving the issues on the nature and duration of the petitioners possession and on the
alienable character of the subject land. These issues were apparently not raised by the Republic in its appeal
before the CA, but are crucial in determining whether the petitioners have registrable title over the subject land. In
Mendoza v. Bautista, the Court held that the appellate court reserves the right, resting on its public duty, to take
cognizance of palpable error on the face of the record and proceedings, and to notice errors that are obvious upon
inspection and are of a controlling character, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice due to oversight.

G.R. No. 193684 March 5, 2014

ONE NETWORK RURAL BANK, INC., Petitioner, vs. DANILO G. BARIC, Respondent.

Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS:

Jaime Palado was the registered owner of real property with a building containing commercial spaces for
lease. Respondent Danilo G. Baric was a lessee therein, operating a barber shop on one of the commercial spaces.
The lease was governed by a written agreement, or "Kasabutan." In December 2000, Baric received a written
5
notice from Palado demanding the return of the leased commercial space within 40 days from December 15,
2000.Baric took the matter to the office of the barangay Lupong Tagapamayapa (Lupon). Baric failed to attend,
which prompted the Barangay Chairman to issue a Certificate to Bar Action.In the meantime, it appears that the
building was demolished.In February 2001, Baric filed a case for forcible entry with prayer for injunctive relief
against Palado and herein petitioner One Network Rural Bank, Inc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent should be restored in his possession and awarded damages in his favor;
presumably, he implores the Court to grant him continued possession of the premises and damages

HELD:

No. With regard to Baric's argument that he should be reinstated to the premises and awarded damages,
this may not be allowed. He did not question the CA ruling in an appropriate Petition before this Court. "It is well-

18
settled that a party who has not appealed from a decision cannot seek any relief other than what is provided in the
judgment appealed from. An appellee who has himself not appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below."

G.R. NO. 208660 MARCH 5, 2014

PENAFRANCIA SUGAR MILL, INC., Petitioner vs. SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, Respondent.

Perlas-Bernabe, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Penafrancia Sugar Mill is a corporation duly established under the Philippine laws and is
engaged in the business of milling sugar. Respondent Sugar Regulatory Administration is a government entity
tasked to promote the growth and development of the sugar industry. Respondent issued an order declaring that
from September 11, 1995 until August 31, 2005, a lien of P2.00 per LKG-Bag shall be imposed on all raw sugar
quedan-permits, as well as on any other form of sugar, such as Improved Raw, Washed, Blanco Directo, Plantation
White, or Refined, in order to fund the Philippine Sugar Research Institute, Inc (PHILSURIN). It also provided that
the said lien shall be paid by way of Managers Checks in the name of PHILSURIN to be collected by the mill
company concerned upon withdrawal of the physical sugar and remitted to PHILSURIN not later than fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof.

Petitioner herein questions the validity of the orders as they file an injunction against herein respondent
and PHILSURIN. The petition alleged that the order is unconstitutional for it was issued beyond the powers and
authority granted to the Sugar Regulatory Administration and that the amount levied by virtue of the said orders
constitutes public funds, and thus, cannot be legally channeled to a private corporation such as PHILSURIN. In
response, the SRA and PHILSURIN filed their respective motions to dismiss on the ground of forum-shopping.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Penafrancia Sugar Mill committed forum-shopping in filing the case a quo

HELD:
The case at bar should be dismissed for having become moot and academic. A case or issue is considered
moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an
adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there
is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal
of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is
because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of
things, it cannot be enforced.

In this case, the supervening issuance of Sugar Order No. 5, s. 2013-2014 which revoked the effectivity of
the Assailed Sugar Orders has mooted the main issue in the case a quo - that is the validity of the Assailed Sugar
Orders. Thus, in view of this circumstance, resolving the procedural issue on forum-shopping as herein raised
would not afford the parties any substantial relief or have any practical legal effect on the case.

G.R. NO. 151898 MARCH 14, 2012

RICARDO RIZAL, et.al., Petitioners vs. LEONCIA NAREDO, et.al., Respondents.

19
Reyes, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners herein commenced a civil case against respondents involving the accretion of two (2) hectares
of land in Calamba. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the respondents to
vacate the land and pay P500.00 a year from 1943 as reasonable rent for their occupancy. This ruling was upheld
by both the appellate court and Supreme Court. To satisfy the money judgment, the provincial sheriff levied lots
no. 252 and 269 together with a house erected on Lot 252, which is owned by the legal heirs of Gervacia Cantillano
to which several third party claims were filed, including herein respondent. Petitioners acquired the lot and the
respondent now questions the execution for they believe that it must be exempt from execution. Although the CFI
ordered that the petitioners be placed in possession of the subject land, it did not evict Leoncia Naredo. The
parties then entered into a compromise agreement whereby 3/5 belongs to the petitioners and 2/5 to the
defendants. Ten years after, they assailed the validity of the compromise agreement claiming that forgery took
place. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be dismissed on the ground of prescription and failure to pay docket
fees

HELD:
Yes. Failure to observe the requirements under Section 13(a), Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Court and to
pay the correct docket fees is fatal to the appeal. Likewise, the action is dismissible for res judicata and lack of
cause of action. The partition of Lot No. 252 was the result of the approved Compromise Agreement in Civil Case
No. 36-C, which was immediately final and executory. Absent any showing that said Compromise Agreement was
vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, the court cannot set aside a judgment based on compromise. It is axiomatic
that a compromise agreement once approved by the court settles the rights of the parties and has the force of res
judicata. It cannot be disturbed except on the ground of vice of consent or forgery. We thus sustain the
respondents' affirmative defenses of res judicata and lack of cause of action, and uphold the appellate and trial
courts' rejection of the petitioners' ostensible attempt to revive the already stale judgment in Civil Case No. 36-C
through an entirely new action for partition.

G.R. NO. 185374 MARCH 10, 2014

PEDRO LUKANG, Petitioner vs. PAGBILAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ,
Respondents.

Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:
Arsenio Lukang, and Mercedes Dee lived as husband and wife in from 1922 to 1934 and begot
3 children, namely, Domingo, Rosalina and Olympia. In 1935, he started cohabiting with Leoncia Martinez, with
whom he had 10 children, namely, Elpidio, Socorro, Manuel, Pedro, Teresita, Simeon, Eugenio, Hilaria, Concepcion,
and Carlos. During their cohabitation in Lucena, Quezon, they acquired several real properties located in Pagbilao,
Quezon The said properties were then registered in the name of ARSENIO LUKANG, married to Mercedes Dee,
share and Leoncia Martinez, single, share.
Arsenio and Leoncia later acquired four 4 more parcels of land covered by. It was allegedly agreed that
the said properties should be registered in the name of Simeon, one of their children, in trust for the other heirs

20
and should be owned in common by their family. When Arsenio died in 1976, his 13 children and Mercedes,
executed the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, in which they agreed to adjudicate and transfer among themselves
the rights, interest and ownership of the 4 parcels of land. There was, however, no agreement to partition the
properties as they remained common to all the heirs. Years later, after the execution of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate, Mercedes, together with her three 3 children, Rosalina, Domingo, and Olympia, executed
another document, wherein the parties declared that they were the only heirs of Arsenio and partitioned the half
portion of the 4 parcels of land covered among themselves, with Mercedes waiving her supposed share in favor of
her three 3 children. Simeon, alleging that the certificates of title of the properties were lost, filed a petition for the
issuance of the owners duplicate copy before the RTC. As a result, new owners duplicate copies of the allegedly
lost titles were issued in his favor. Thereafter, Simeon, in a deed of donation, transferred the said properties in
favor of his children, Benedict, Heile and Madeleine.

In the meantime, Mercedes, through Rosalinda, filed the Petition for the Issuance of the Owners
Duplicate before the RTC, The RTC, in its Order, dated granted the petition and new titles were issued in favor of
Mercedes. Unknown to Leoncia, Rosalina caused the segregation of the one-half portion of the said properties in
her favor and the division of the remaining half among her and her siblings, Domingo and Olympia. Hence, TCTs
were cancelled and new titles were issued in the names of Rosalina, Domingo and Olympia, while the other
TCTs were registered in the name of Leoncia. Leoncia and her children, claiming that the titles were not lost but in
her possession, filed a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial partition, affidavit of segregation and annulment of
the new certificates of title. The said case was consolidated with Civil Case No. 89-79, a case for recovery of four
(4) owners duplicate copy of TCTs filed by Simeon against his brother Pedro. The cases were raffled to RTC, Branch
53, Lucena City. Subsequently, Leoncia, through Pedro, registered her adverse claim on the TCTs. He further
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the other properties. In 1993, the cases were still pending,
respondent Pagbilao Development Corporation (PDC) purchased from Simeon, Mercedes and Rosalina the 6
properties which were the subject of the two cases. Thus, the TCTs were cancelled and new titles, were issued in
favor of PDC. Accordingly, the annotations were carried over to PDCs titles.

When Pedro and the other heirs learned of the sale of the subject properties to PDC, they filed a motion
to require Simeon and Rosalina to explain why they sold the properties without permission from the RTC. On April
23, 2008, they also filed an application for a writ of preliminary injunction with ex-parte prayer for temporary
restraining order (TRO). They alleged that they were in actual and physical possession of the subject properties;
and that PDC entered into the said premises, destroyed some structures therein and started to construct
improvements on the properties without their consent. After due hearing, the RTC issued the Order granting the
application for writ of preliminary injunction by which it restrained PDC from wresting possession of the subject
properties and ordering the movant, Pedro, to file a bond. PDC filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied.

PDC filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
The CA, in its Decision, dated October 21, 2010, granted the petition and set aside the May 13, 2008 and March 18,
2009 Orders of the RTC. The CA explained that Pedros right over the said properties was not clear as it was
contingent on the outcome or result of the cases pending before the RTC; that it was not a present right but a
contingent or future right which was not covered by injunction; and that there was no paramount necessity
because there would be no great and irreparable injury. Moreover, PDC, as the registered owner of the said
properties, had the right to enjoy the same as provided under Articles 428 and 429 of the Civil Code. Pedro filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the CA Resolution, dated January 19, 2011. Hence, this petition

21
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the Order granting the writ
of preliminary injunction.

HELD:
Yes. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct to a main suit, as well as a
preservative remedy issued to maintain the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between
34
the parties during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim is to
35
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are fully heard. Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, an application for a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted if the following grounds are established:
a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Thus, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued upon the concurrence of the following essential
requisites, to wit: (a) the invasion of right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the
complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. While a clear showing of the right is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established.
Hence, to be entitled to the writ, it is sufficient that the complainant shows that he has an ostensible right to the
final relief prayed for in his complaint.

The well-entrenched rule is that the grant or denial of the writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the
sound discretion of the court. The trial court is given wide latitude in this regard. Thus, in the absence of a manifest
abuse, such discretion must not be interfered with. Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or
to act at all in contemplation of law.

MARCH 13, 2012

RE: IN THE MATTER OF CLARIFICATION OF EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF ALL COURT AND SHERIFF'S FEES OF
COOPERATIVES DULY REGISTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9520 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
PHILIPPINE COOPERATIVE CODE OF 2008,
PERPETUAL HELP COMMUNITY COOPERATIVE (PHCCI)

FACTS:
Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (PHCCI), through counsel, requests for the issuance of a court
order to clarify and implement the exemption of cooperatives from the payment of court and sheriffs fees
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520, otherwise known as the Philippine
Cooperative Act of 2008.

22
 PHCCI contends that as a cooperative it enjoys the exemption provided for under Section 6, Article 61 of
Republic Act No. 9520, which states:
(6) Cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all court and sheriffs fees payable to the Philippine
Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such actions is brought by
the Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.

It claims that this was a reiteration of Section 62, paragraph 6 of Republic Act No. 6938, An Act to Ordain a
Cooperative Code of the Philippines, and was made basis for the Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 03-4-01-0, as well
as of Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 44-2007. It avers that despite the exemptions granted by
the aforesaid laws and issuances, PHCCI had been continuously assessed and required to pay legal and other fees
whenever it files cases in court. PHCCI reports that it filed with the Office of the Executive Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, a Motion to implement the exemption of
cooperatives from the payment of court and sheriffs fees in cases filed before the courts in his jurisdiction, but the
Executive Judge ruled that the matter is of national concern and should be brought to the attention of the
Supreme Court for it to come up with a straight policy and uniform system of collection. In the meantime, the
MTCC has continued the assessment of filing fees against cooperatives. Records reveal that on 21 September 2011,
Executive Judge Antonio, MTCC, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, issued an Order treating the motion filed by
PHCCI as a mere consulta considering that no main action was filed in his court. Executive Judge Estoconing
submits that he had second thoughts in considering the exemption in view of the guidelines laid down in the Rules.
He reported that many cases filed by PHCCI are small claims cases and under Section 8 of the Rule on Small Claims,
the plaintiff is required to pay docket fees and other related costs unless he is allowed to litigate the case as an
indigent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not cooperatives are exempt from the payment of court and sheriffs fees

HELD:
No. The fees referred to are those provided for under Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The
term "all court fees" under Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520 refers to the totality of "legal fees"
imposed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as an incident of instituting an action in court. These fees include
filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriffs fees,
stenographers fees and commissioners fees.

With regard to the term "sheriffs fees," this Court, in an extended minute Resolution dated 1 September
2009, held that the exemptions granted to cooperatives under Section 2, paragraph 6 of Republic Act No. 6938;
Section 6, Article 61 of Republic Act No. 9520; and OCA Circular No. 44-2007 clearly do not cover the amount
required "to defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server or other court-authorized person in the
service of summons, subpoena and other court processes issued relative to the trial of the case," which are neither
considered as court and sheriffs fees nor are amounts payable to the Philippine Government.
In fine, the 1 September 2009 Resolution exempted the cooperatives from court fees but not from sheriffs
fees/expenses. Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As
one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, much less with the Executive.

23
 G.R. NO. 183034 MARCH 12, 2014
SPOUSES FERNANDO and MA. ELENA SANTOS, Petitioners vs. LOLITA ALCAZAR, represented by her Attorney-in-
Fact DELFIN CHUA, Respondent.
Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS:
The rule that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted, unless the
adverse party specifically denies them under oath, applies only to parties to such instrument. In February 2001,
respondent Lolita Alcazar, proprietor of Legazpi Color Center (LCC), instituted through her attorney-in-fact Delfin
4
Chua a Complaint for sum of money against the petitioners, spouses Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos, to collect
the value of paint and construction materials obtained by the latter from LCC amounting to P1,456,000.00, which
remained unpaid despite written demand. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9954 and assigned to Branch 5
of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City. Respondents cause of action is based on a document entitled
"Acknowledgment" apparently executed by hand by petitioner Fernando, In their Answer, petitioners sought the
dismissal of the Complaint, alleging among others that
4. Paragraph 5 is specifically denied as the document which Defendant Fernando T. Santos signed does
not reflect the true contract or intention of the parties, the actionable document is incorrect and has to
be reformed to reflect the real indebtedness of the defendants;
5. Paragraph 6 of the complaint is specifically denied as the same does not reflect the correct amount. The
defendants*+ computation is that the amount of P600,000.00 is the only amount due and the instrument
used as the actionable document does not reflect the correct substance of the transaction and indicates a
reformation of the actionable document;
6. Paragraph 7 is specifically denied as defendants are willing to pay the correct amount, not the amount
in the complaint as the same does not indicate the correct amount owing to the plaintiff;

Pre-trial was conducted, the trial court issued its Pre-trial Order setting forth the matters taken up during
the pre-trial conference and the schedule of hearings. The presentation of respondents evidence was set on
October 10; November 8 and 21; and December 6 and 13, 2005. Petitioners were scheduled to present their case
on January 9 and 23; and February 6, 2006. Respondent then presented her evidence and testified in court as the
lone witness. She then made a formal offer of her evidence and rested her case. Petitioners filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, which respondent opposed. Petitioners argued that the Acknowledgment respondents Exhibit "A"
which was presented in court was not an original copy and thus inadmissible; petitioners receipt of the written
demand was not proved; the alleged deliveries of paint and construction materials were not covered by delivery
receipts; and respondents testimony was merely hearsay and uncorroborated.

The court denied the demurrer for lack of merit. In the same Order, the trial court scheduled the
presentation of petitioners evidence. Petitioners moved to reconsider the trial courts Order. The trial court issued
an Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and scheduled the presentation of evidence for the
petitioners on March 20, 2006. The trial court essentially held that petitioners, in their Answer, admitted that they
entered into transactions with the respondent for the delivery of paint and construction materials, which remained
unpaid; that from the Acknowledgment, Exhibit "A," signed by Fernando and duly presented, authenticated, and
identified by respondent during trial, petitioners admitted that their unpaid obligation including interest
amounted toP1,456,000.00; and that petitioners plea for reformation has no basis.

ISSUE:

24
 Whether or not respondent failed to produce and present the original copy of the acknowledgement
receipt which is a violation of the best evidence rule

HELD:
No. Respondents failure to present the original copy of the Acknowledgment during the taking of her
testimony for the second time, and the presentation of a mere photocopy thereof at said hearing, does not
materially affect the outcome of the case. It was a mere procedural inadvertence that could have been cured and
did not affect petitioners cause in any manner. As conceded by them and as held by the CA, the original exists and
was made part of the records of the case when respondents evidence was first taken. Though respondent now
claims that she had lost the original, the CA proclaimed that the document resides in the record. This would
explain then why respondent cannot find it in her possession; it is with the court as an exhibit. Besides, it evidently
appears that there is no question raised on the authenticity and contents of the photocopy that was presented and
identified in court; petitioners merely insist that the photocopy is inadmissible as a result of respondents failure to
present the original, which they nevertheless admit to exist and is found and included in the record of the case.

While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere photocopy, there is no harm
if in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated, identified and formally offered in
evidence by the party proponent. More to the point is the fact that petitioners failed to deny specifically under
oath the genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment in their Answer. The effect of this is that the
genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment is deemed admitted. "By the admission of the
genuineness and due execution [of such document] is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that
he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in
words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered;
and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it
lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such defenses as that the signature is a forgery x x x; or that it was unauthorized x
x x; or that the party charged signed the instrument in some other capacity than that alleged in the pleading
setting it out x x x; or that it was never delivered x x x, are cut off by the admission of its genuineness and due
execution."

"There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents the genuineness and
due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party." With the consequent admission engendered by
petitioners failure to properly deny the Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled with its proper authentication,
identification and offer by the respondent, not to mention petitioners admissions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of their
Answer that they are indeed indebted to respondent, the Court believes that judgment may be had solely on the
document, and there is no need to present receipts and other documents to prove the claimed indebtedness. The
Acknowledgment, just as an ordinary acknowledgment receipt, is "valid and binding between the parties who
executed it, as a document evidencing the loan agreement they had entered into." The absence of rebutting
evidence occasioned by petitioners waiver of their right to present evidence renders the Acknowledgment as the
best evidence of the transactions between the parties and the consequential indebtedness incurred. Indeed, the
effect of the admission is such that "a prima facie case is made for the plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity
of evidence on his part and entitles him to a judgment on the pleadings unless a special defense of new matter,
such as payment, is interposed by the defendant."

25
 G.R. No. 187188 June 27, 2012
SALVADOR O. MOJAR, EDGAR B. BEGONIA, Heirs of the late JOSE M. CORTEZ, RESTITUTO GADDI, VIRGILIO M.
MONANA, FREDDIE RANCES, and EDSON D. TOMAS, Petitioners, vs. AGRO COMMERCIAL SECURITY SERVICE
AGENCY, INC., et al.,Respondents.

Sereno, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners were employed as security guards by respondent and assigned to the various branches of the
Bank of Commerce in Pangasinan, La Union and Ilocos Sur. Pursuant to an order, petitioners were relieved from
their posts and directed to report to their new assignments in Metro Manila. However, they failed to report for
duty in their new assignments, prompting respondent to send them a letter requiring them to send a written
explanation why no disciplinary action should be taken against them, but the letter was not heeded. Petitioners
filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent and the Bank of Commerce, Dagupan Branch, before the
NLRC. Petitioners claimed that their reassignment was a scheme to sever the employer-employee relationship and
was done in retaliation for their pressing their claim for salary differential, which they had earlier filed against
respondent and the Bank of Commerce before the NLRC. They also contended that the transfer to Manila was
inconvenient and prejudicial, since they would incur additional expenses for board and lodging.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision finding that petitioners were illegally dismissed. NLRC affirmed
the LAs ruling. On 23 January 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Extension to file a Petition for Certiorari before
the CA. The appellate court granted the Motion for Extension, allowing respondent until 10 February 2008 within
which to file its Petition. On 9 February 2008, respondent filed its Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court.
On 30 June 2008, the CA issued a Resolution noting that no comment on the Petition had been filed, and stating
that the case was now deemed submitted for resolution. On 21 July 2008, the CA rendered its Decision. Finding
merit in the Petition, it found the Orders transferring petitioners to Manila to be a valid exercise of management
prerogative. Petitioners refusal to comply with the transfer orders constituted willful disobedience of a lawful
order of an employer and abandonment, which were just causes for termination under the Labor Code. However,
respondent failed to observe the due process requirements in terminating them. On 1 August 2008, petitioner
Mojar filed a Manifestation before the CA, stating that he and the other petitioners had not been served a copy of
the CA Petition. He also said that they were not aware whether their counsel before the NLRC, Atty. Jose C.
Espinas, was served a copy thereof, since the latter had already been bedridden since December 2007 until his
demise on "25 February 2008." Neither could their new counsel, Atty. Mario G. Aglipay, enter his appearance
before the CA, as petitioners failed to "get [the] folder from the office of Atty. Espinas, as the folder can no longer
be found."

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Annul Proceedings before the CA. They moved to annul the
proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that the NLRC Decision had already attained finality,
since the Petition before the CA was belatedly filed, and the signatory to the Certification of non-forum shopping
lacked the proper authority. However, it was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid service of CA Petition

26
 Whether or not the CA can validly take cognizance of the case

HELD:

The appellate court stated that their records revealed that Atty. Espinas, petitioners counsel of record at
the time, was duly served a copy of the following: CA Resolution dated 20 February 2008 granting respondents
Motion for Extension of Time to file the CA Petition; CA Resolution dated 24 April 2008 requiring petitioners to file
their Comment on the CA Petition; and CA Resolution dated 30 June 2008, submitting the case for resolution, as no
comment was filed. Such service to Atty. Espinas, as petitioners counsel of record, was valid despite the fact he
was already deceased at the time. If a party to a case has appeared by counsel, service of pleadings and judgments
shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party is specifically ordered by the court. It
is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a case, whether the law firm or partnership
representing one of the litigants continues to exist lawfully, whether the partners are still alive, or whether its
associates are still connected with the firm. It is the duty of party-litigants to be in contact with their counsel from
time to time in order to be informed of the progress of their case. It is likewise the duty of parties to inform the
court of the fact of their counsels death. Their failure to do so means that they have been negligent in the
protection of their cause. They cannot pass the blame to the court, which is not tasked to monitor the changes in
the circumstances of the parties and their counsel.

Petitioners claim that Atty. Espinas passed away on 8 February 2008. They further claim that he was
already bedridden as early as December 2007, and thus they "failed to get any information whether [he] was
served with a copy of the [CA Petition]." Petitioners were negligent in the conduct of their litigation. Having known
that Atty. Espinas was already bedridden as early as December 2007, they should have already obtained new
counsel who could adequately represent their interests. The excuse that Atty. Aglipay could not enter his
appearance before the CA "because [petitioners] failed to get [their] folder from the office of Atty. Espinas" is
flimsy at best. In this case, petitioners must bear the fruits of their negligence in the handling of their case. They
may not decry the denial of due process, when they were indeed afforded the right to be heard in the first place.

G.R. No. 192100 March 12, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
(DPWH), Petitioner, vs. ASIA PACIFIC INTEGRATED STEEL CORPORATION, Respondent.

Villarama, JR., J.:

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) through the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) instituted
expropriation proceedings against Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation over a portion of their property. The
affected area shall be traversed by the expansion of the San Simon Interchange. Subsequently, petitioner filed an
urgent ex-parte motion for issuance of writ of possession, stating that it deposited with the Land Bank of the
Philippines the amount equal to 100% of the value of the property based on current zonal valuation of the BIR and
hence the court has the ministerial duty to place petitioner in possession. The trial court granted the petitioners
motion and directed the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cause the annotation of the writ of possession.
Respondent questioned the TRBs authority to expropriate the subject property and objected to petitioners
offered compensation which respondent deems unjust because the basis thereof - the BIR zonal valuation - was an
unofficial valuation.

27
 During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on TRBs authority to expropriate the subject property
but disagreed as to the amount of just compensation. The parties eventually agreed to submit the issue of just
compensation to three Commissioners composed of the Municipal Assessor of San Simon as Chairman, and the
RTC Branch Clerk of Court and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Pampanga as Members. The trial court
granted respondents motion to withdraw the P607, 200.00 deposited by petitioner with the LBP as partial
payment for just compensation. Commissioners recommended an amount ranging from P1,000.00 to P1,500.00,
Philippine currency, per square meter, depending on their proximity to the national roads, municipal roads, and
barangay roads, and the improvement/development put in place. However the Republic contended that the
valuation should be P300 per square meter. The trial court finds it very low. It was appealed to the CA and affirmed
the same. Petitioner argues that the evidence for determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation
cases should be on those factors provided in Section 5 of R.A. 8974. Considering such factors and the evidence
submitted by the parties before the trial court, petitioner maintains that just compensation for the subject
property should be no more than the zonal valuation (P300.00 per square meter), and in no case should it amount
to the market value of P1,300.00 per square meter adjudged by the trial and appellate courts. Petitioner claims
that such huge sum for only 2,024-square meter portion of respondents 17,175-square meter property, is
unbelievably 433.4% more than the 1998 BIR zonal value for an underdeveloped industrial land at the time of its
taking.

On the other hand, respondent contends that no reversible error was committed by the CA in affirming
the trial courts decision after considering all the arguments raised by petitioner and the evidence on record. It
asserts that the main issue of just compensation and the findings thereon by the trial court as affirmed by the CA is
a question of fact which should not be disturbed by this Court. Moreover, respondent asserts that the
determination by the trial court is entitled to the highest respect considering that the judge has personal
knowledge of the condition of the subject property, having conducted an ocular inspection on September 23,
2004.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the issue of just compensation is a question of fact

2. Whether or not the trial court is bound by the recommendations submitted by the commissioners

HELD:

1. As a rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law.
Questions of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by this Court in the exercise of its
power to review. The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is established. A
question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of
facts. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. This being so, the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and this Court will
not review them on appeal.

For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. In this case, the only legal issue raised by
petitioner is whether the trial court based its determination of just compensation on the factors
provided under existing laws and jurisprudence.

28
 2. The court find that the trial court did not judiciously determine the fair market value of the subject
property as it failed to consider other relevant factors such as the zonal valuation, tax declarations
and current selling price supported by documentary evidence. Indeed, just compensation must not be
arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation of different factors.

The trial court was not bound by the assessment report of the commissioners and that it had the
discretion to reject the same and substitute its own judgment on its value as gathered from the
record, or it may accept the report/recommendation of the commissioners in toto and base its
judgment thereon. However, the decision of the court must be based on all established rules, upon
correct legal principles and competent evidence. The court is proscribed from basing its judgment on
speculations and surmises.

G.R. NO. 192717 MARCH 12, 2014

MINDA S. GAERLAN, Petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Villarama, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner filed an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land. In her application,
petitioner alleged that she acquired the property from Mamerta Tan by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land. The Republic filed an opposition to petitioners application for registration on the ground,
among others, that the subject land is a portion of the public domain, hence, not registrable. During the hearing,
petitioner presented Mamerta Tan and Honesto Velez, the City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City, to testify as to
petitioners right over the property. The trial court rendered judgment granting petitioners application for
registration of title. The Republic appealed from the aforementioned decision asserting that the trial court erred in
ruling that the subject property is available for private appropriation. The CA found that petitioner failed to
present any proof to establish that the subject land is alienable and disposable, and ruled that she is not entitled to
registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529. Petitioner thus filed the present petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issue raised by petitioner involves a question of fact which cannot be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari

HELD:

The principle is well established that the Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. The distinction between a question of law and a question of
fact is settled. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, and the question does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of
whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, there is a question of law.

29
In the present case, there seems to be no dispute as to the facts, and the question presented before the Court calls
for a review of the CAs conclusion that the documents and evidence presented by petitioner are insufficient to
support her application for registration of title. Hence, the petition is properly filed.

G.R. NO. 195619 SEPTEMBER 5, 2012

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, et. Al., Petitioners vs. JULIE CHANDUMAL, Respondent.

Reyes, J.:

FACTS:

The instant case stemmed from a contract to sell a parcel of land, together with improvements, between
BF Homes, Inc. (BF Homes) and herein respondent Julie Chandumal (Chandumal). Chandumal paid her monthly
amortizations from December 1990 until May 1994 when she began to default in her payments. In a Notice of
Delinquency and Rescission of Contract with Demand to Vacate, PDB gave Chandumal a period of thirty (30) days
from receipt within which to settle her installment arrearages together with all its increments; otherwise, all her
rights under the contract shall be deemed extinguished and terminated and the contract declared as rescinded.
Despite demand, Chandumal still failed to settle her obligation. An action for judicial confirmation of notarial
rescission and delivery of possession was filed by PDB against Chandumal. Consequently, summons was issued and
served by deputy sheriff Roberto T. Galing (Sheriff Galing). According to his return, Sheriff Galing attempted to
personally serve the summons upon Chandumal but it was unavailing as she was always out of the house on said
dates. Hence, the sheriff caused substituted service of summons by serving the same through Chandumals mother
who acknowledged receipt thereof. For her failure to file an answer within the prescribed period, PDB filed an ex
parte motion to declare Chandumal in default. The RTC issued an Order granting the motion of PDB.

Chandumal filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer. She
maintained that she did not receive the summons and/or was not notified of the same. She further alleged that
her failure to file an answer within the reglementary period was due to fraud, mistake or excusable negligence.
The RTC denied Chandumals motion to set aside the order of default. Her motion for reconsideration was also
denied for lack of merit. Conformably, the RTC allowed PDB to present its evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a
Decision in favor of PDB. Chandumal appealed to the CA. Without ruling on the propriety of the judicial
confirmation of the notarial rescission, the CA rendered the assailed decision nullifying the RTC decision due to
invalid and ineffective substituted service of summons.

ISSUES:

1. Whether there was a valid substituted service of summons

2. Whether Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court

HELD:

1. In this case, the sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons due to his failure to serve it personally.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court detailed the requisites for a valid substituted service of
summons, summed up as follows: (1) impossibility of prompt personal service the party relying on
substituted service or the sheriff must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly or there is
impossibility of prompt service; (2) specific details in the return the sheriff must describe in the Return

30
 of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service; (3) a person of
suitable age and discretion the sheriff must determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or
residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipients relationship with the defendant is, and
whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to
immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons, which
matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons; and (4) a competent person
in charge, who must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.

In applying the foregoing requisites in the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the sheriffs return
failed to justify a resort to substituted service of summons. According to the CA, the Return of Summons
does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual exertion of efforts or any positive step taken by
the officer or process server in attempting to serve the summons personally to the defendant. The return
merely states the alleged whereabouts of the defendant without indicating that such information was
verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Indeed, the sheriffs return shows a mere perfunctory
attempt to cause personal service of the summons on Chandumal. There was no indication if he even
asked Chandumals mother as to her specific whereabouts except that she was "out of the house", where
she can be reached or whether he even tried to await her return. The "efforts" exerted by the sheriff
clearly do not suffice to justify substituted service and his failure to comply with the requisites renders
such service ineffective.

2. Despite that there was no valid substituted service of summons, the Court, nevertheless, finds that
Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. When Chandumal filed an Urgent
Motion to Set Aside Order of Default and to Admit Attached Answer, she effectively submitted her person
to the jurisdiction of the trial court as the filing of a pleading where one seeks an affirmative relief is
equivalent to service of summons and vests the trial court with jurisdiction over the defendants person.
Thus, it was ruled that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration is
considered voluntary submission to the trial courts jurisdiction.The Court notes that aside from the
allegation that she did not receive any summons, Chandumals motion to set aside order of default and to
admit attached answer failed to positively assert the trial courts lack of jurisdiction.

Given Chandumals voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the RTC had all authority to
render its Decision dated May 31, 2004. The CA, therefore, erred in nullifying said RTC decision and
dispensing with the resolution of the substantial issue raised herein, i.e., validity of the notarial rescission.

G.R. NO. 193494 MARCH 7, 2014

LUI ENTERPRISES INC., Petitioner. vs. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORP. AND THE PHILIPPINE BANK COMMUNICATIONS,
Respondents.

Leonen, J.:

FACTS:

Lui Enterprises and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered into a 10-year contract of lease over a parcel of
land. Subsequently, Zuellig received a letter from the Philippine Bank of Communications. Claiming to be the new

31
owner of the leased property, the bank asked Zuellig to pay rent directly to it. Zuellig promptly informed Lui
Enterprises of the PBComs claim. Lui enterprises wrote to Zuellig and insisted on its right to collect the leased
property. Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and PBCom over the rental payments, Zuellig filed a
complaint for interpleader with the RTC. PBCom filed its answer to the complaint, while Lui Enterprises filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuelligs alleged representative did not have authority to file the complaint
for interpleader on behalf of the corporation. According to Lui Enterprises, an earlier filed nullification of deed of
dation in payment case pending with the RTC of Davao barred the filing of the interpleader case. Lui Enterprises
filed this case against the PBCom with respect to several properties it dationed to the bank in payment of its
obligations, one of which being the property leased to Zuellig.

In the nullification of deed of dation in payment case, Lui Enterprises raised the issue of which corporation
had the better right over the rental payments, which, as Lui Enterprises argued, was the same issue involved in the
interpleader case. To avoid possible conflicting decisions of the Davao trial court and the Makati trial court on the
same issue, Lui Enterprises argued that the subsequently filed interpleader case be dismissed. Zuellig filed its
opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing that the same should be dismissed for having been filed late.
Considering that Lui Enterprises filed its motion to dismiss beyond the 15-day period to file an answer, Zuelling
moved that Lui Enterprises be declared in default. The RTC of Makati found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its
motion to dismiss within the reglementary period, and denied its motion to dismiss and declared it in default.

It was only one year after the issuance of the order of default that Lui Enterprises filed a motion to set
aside order of default in the RTC of Makati on the ground of excusable negligence. The RTC of Makati subsequently
rendered a decision holding that Lui Enterprises was barred from any claim in respect of the rental payments since
it was declared in default. Thus, according to the RTC, there was no issue as to which corporation had the better
right over the rental payments. The trial court awarded the total consigned amount to the PBCom. Lui Enterprises
appealed to the CA, which found its appellants brief insufficient for non-compliance with Rule 44, Section 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA dismissed Lui Enterprises appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC of
Makati.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Lui Enterprises appeal for non-compliance with the rules on
the contents of the appellants brief

2. Whether or not the RTC of Makati erred in denying Lui Enterprises motion to set aside order of default

3. Whether or not the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the RTC of Davao barred the
subsequent filing of the interpleader case in the RTC of Makati

HELD:

1. Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the CA may on its own
motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the appellants brief lack specific requirements
under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f). Lui Enterprises appellants brief lacked a
subject index, page references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule
50, Section 1, the CA correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises appeal. Except for cases provided in the
Constitution appeal is a purely statutory right. The right to appeal must be exercised in the manner
prescribed by law and requires strict compliance with the Rules of Court on appeals. Otherwise, the
appeal shall be dismissed, and its dismissal shall not be a deprivation of due process of law.

32
 In this case, Lui Enterprises did not substantially comply with the rules on the contents of the appellants
brief. It admitted that its appellants brief lacked the required subject index, page references to the
record, and table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited. However, it did not even correct its admitted
technical omissions by filing an amended appellants brief with the required contents. Thus, this case
does not allow a relaxation of the rules. The CA did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises appeal.

2. A defendant declared in default loses his or her standing in court. However, the defendant declared in
default does not waive all of his or her rights. He or she still has the right to receive notice of subsequent
proceedings. Also, the plaintiff must still present evidence supporting his or her allegations despite the
default of defendant. After a notice of declaration of default but before the court renders the default
judgment, the defendant may file, under oath, a motion to set aside order of default. The defendant must
properly show that his or her failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. The defendant must also have a meritorious defense.

If the defendant discovers his or her default after judgment but prior to the judgment becoming final and
executory, he or she may file a motion for new trial under Rule 37. If he or she discovers his or her default
after the judgment has become final and executory, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 may
be filed. Appeal is also available to the defendant declared in default. He or she may appeal the judgment
for being contrary to the evidence or to the law under Rule 41.

In this case, Lui Enterprises had discovered its default before the RTC of Makati rendered judgment. Thus
it timely filed a motion to set aside order of default, raising the ground of excusable negligence. Excusable
negligence is one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The
circumstances should be properly alleged and proved. In this case, the Court finds that Lui Enterprises
failure to answer within the required period is inexcusable.

Lui Enterprises counsel filed its motion to dismiss four days late. It did not immediately take steps to
remedy its default and took one year from discovery of default to file a motion to set aside order of
default. In its motion to set aside order of default, Lui Enterprises only conveniently blamed its counsel for
the late filing of the answer without offering any excuse for the late filing. This is not excusable negligence
under Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the RTC of Makati did not err in refusing to set
aside the order of default.

3. Under Rule 16, Section 1, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of litis pendentia. The requisites
of litis pendentia are:

a. Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;

b. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and

c. The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

All of the requisites must be present. Absent one requisite, there is no litis pendentia. In this case, there is
no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the nullification of deed of dation in payment case
and the interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is not a party to the nullification case filed in the Davao RTC.

There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui Enterprises filed the first case to
nullify the deed of dation in payment it executed in favor of PBCom. Zuellig subsequently filed the

33
 interpleader case to consign in court the rental payments and extinguish its obligation as lessee. The
interpleader case was necessary and was not instituted to harass either Lui Enterprises or the PBCom.
Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.

G.R. NO. 173336 NOVEMBER 26, 2012

PABLO PUA, Petitioner vs. LOURDES DEYTO, Respondent.

Brion, J.:

FACTS:
Pua is engaged in the business of wholesale rice trading. Among his clients was respondent Jennelita Ang,
allegedly operating under the business and trade name of JD Grains Center. In October 2000, Pua delivered to Ang
truckloads of rice worth P766,800.00. Ang paid Pua through two (2) postdated checks dated November 4, 2000
and November 6, 2000. When the checks fell due, Pua tried to encash them, but they were dishonored because
they were drawn from a closed account. Pua immediately went to Angs residence to complain. Unfortunately, he
was only able to talk to Angs mother and co-respondent, Lourdes Deyto, who told him that Ang had been missing.
Unable to locate Ang, Pua demanded payment from Deyto, but she refused to pay.

On November 24, 2000, Pua filed a complaint with the RTC forcollection of sum of money with
preliminary attachment against Ang and Deyto, as co-owners of JD Grains Center. The complaint alleged that the
respondents were guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation, as they persuaded Pua to conduct business with
them and presented documents regarding their financial capacity to fund the postdated checks. On November 28,
2000, the RTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment upon an attachment bond of
P766,800.00. Since Ang could not be found and had no available properties to satisfy the lien, the properties of
Deyto were levied upon. Summons was duly served on Deyto, but not on Ang who had absconded. On April 16,
2001, Deyto submitted her answer with special and affirmative defenses.6 On May 8, 2001, Deyto filed a Motion
to Set Hearing of Defendants Special and Affirmative Defenses, which was in the nature of a motion to dismiss.7
In an order dated July 12, 2001, the RTC denied Deytos motion to dismiss.

Since service of summons could not be effected on Ang, Pua moved for leave of court to serve summons
by publication on Ang on January 8, 2002. The RTC granted the motion in an order dated January 11, 2002. By
March 2002, Puas counsel manifested that the summons for Ang remained unpublished; the RTC accordingly
cancelled the pre-trial scheduled on March 5, 2002. On May 17, 2002, Pua again filed a manifestation that as early
as April 17, 2002, he had already paid P9,500.00 to Manila Standard for the publication of the summons on Ang,
but it failed to do so. This prompted the RTC to issue an order directing Manila Standard to explain why the
summons was not published despite payment of the corresponding fees. On May 30, 2002, Manila Standard
explained15 to the trial court that when Pua paid the publication fee, he issued a specific order to hold the
publication until he ordered otherwise. Eventually, the summons for Ang was published in the May 31, 2002
edition of the Manila Standard. On January 24, 2003, more than (6) months after the publication of summons for
Ang, the case was archived for inactivity. Since neither party filed any further motions, the RTC dismissed the case
for the plaintiffs lack of interest to prosecute on October 1, 2004.

On November 3, 2004, Pua submitted a motion for reconsideration and a motion to declare Ang in
default. The RTC, however, denied the motion in an order dated January 3, 2005; it added that the dismissal of the
main case amounts to the dismissal of the motion to declare Ang in default.

34
Pua appealed the case to the CA. He argued that the reason for the delay in prosecuting the case was the untimely
death of his counsel Atty. Kamid Abdul. He added that he had shown interest in the case by securing the
properties of Deyto; paying the annual premium of the attachment bond for the years 2002, 2003, and 2004; and
causing the publication of summons on Ang. On February 23, 2006, the CA denied Puas appeal. While the CA
recognized some of Puas actions in prosecuting the case, it still found that the totality of the surrounding
circumstances of the case pointed to gross and immoderate delay in the prosecution of the complaint.18 Pua
moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied in its resolution dated June 23, 2006.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff incurred unreasonable delay in prosecuting the present case

HELD:
NO. Petition is denied. We agree with the finding that Pua committed delay in prosecuting his case against
the respondents. We clarify, however, that Puas delay is limited to his failure to move the case forward after the
summons for Ang had been published in the Manila Standard; he could not be faulted for the delay in the service
of summons for Ang. A 13-month delay occurred between the filing of the complaint and the filing of the motion
to serve summons by publication on Ang. This delay, however, is attributable to the failure of the sheriff to
immediately file a return of service of summons. The complaint was filed on November 24, 2000, but the return of
service of summons was filed only on January 3, 2002, after the RTC ordered its submission and upon Puas
motion.

Under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, service of summons may be effected on a defendant by
publication, with leave of court, when his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Until the summons has been served on Ang, the case cannot proceed since Ang is an indispensable party to the
case; Pua alleged in his complaint that the respondents are co-owners of JD Grains Center. After the summons for
Ang was published on May 31, 2002 and the Affidavit of Service was issued by Manila Standards Advertising
Manager on June 3, 2002, no further action was taken on the case by Pua. Even after the RTC issued its order
dated January 24, 2003 to archive the case, Pua made no move to have the case reopened. More than a year after
the case was sent to the archives (October 1, 2004), the RTC decided to dismiss the case for Puas lack of interest
to prosecute the case. It was only after Pua received the order of dismissal that he filed his motion for
reconsideration and motion to declare Ang in default.

Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the
merits and is understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action unless otherwise provided in the order
of dismissal. In this case, Pua failed to take any action on the case after summons was served by publication on
Ang. It took him more than two years to file a motion to declare Ang in default and only after the RTC has already
dismissed his case for failure to prosecute. That Pua renewed the attachment bond is not an indication of his
intention to prosecute. The payment of an attachment bond is not the appropriate procedure to settle a legal
dispute in court; it could not be considered as a substitute for the submission of necessary pleadings or motions
that would lead to prompt action on the case.

G.R. NO. 201601 MARCH 12, 2014

MARYLOU CABRERA, Petitioner vs. FELIX NG, Respondent.

Reyes, J.:

35
FACTS:
Respondent Felix Ng filed a complaint for sum of money with the RTC against the petitioner and her
husband Marionilo Cabrera, alleging that the latter issued to him three Metrobank checks, which were all
dishonored upon presentation. The spouses Cabrera admitted that they issued two checks to the respondent and
that the same were dishonored when presented for payment. However, they claimed that they paid the
respondent the amount represented by the said checks through the latters son Richard Ng. Further, they deny
having issued a third check to the respondent, alleging that the said check was forcibly taken from them by Richard
Ng. The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent.

On August 8, 2007, the spouses Cabrera received a copy of the RTC Decision dated August 7, 2007. On
August 14, 2007, the spouses Cabrera filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration, which they set for hearing
on August 17, 2007. On even date, the spouses Cabrera sent a copy of their motion for reconsideration to the
respondent thru registered mail; it was actually received by the respondent on August 21, 2007. The said motion
for reconsideration, however, was not heard on August 17, 2007 as the new acting presiding judge of the said
court had just assumed office. On August 28, 2007, the RTC issued a notice, which set the said motion for
8
reconsideration for hearing on September 25, 2007. On September 20, 2007, the respondent filed an opposition
to the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera. The respondent alleged that the said motion for
reconsideration is a mere scrap of paper since it violated the three-day notice requirement. The respondent
pointed out that the spouses Cabrera sent to him a copy of their motion for reconsideration, which was set for
hearing on August 17, 2007, via registered mail on August 14, 2007; that he actually received a copy thereof only
on August 21, 2007 four days after the scheduled hearing thereon.

It appears that the scheduled hearing of the spouses Cabreras motion for reconsideration on September
25, 2007 did not push through. Consequently, on September 26, 2007, the RTC issued another notice, which set
the said motion for reconsideration for hearing on October 26, 2007. On October 26, 2007, the RTC issued an
Order, which directed the parties to file their additional pleadings, after which the motion for reconsideration filed
by the spouses Cabrera would be deemed submitted for resolution. On December 19, 2007, the RTC issued an
Order which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera. The RTC pointed out that the
spouses Cabrera violated Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that every motion required to
be heard should be served by the movant in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three
days before the date of hearing.

The RTC further opined that a motion, which fails to comply with the three-day notice requirement is a
mere scrap of paper; it is not entitled to judicial cognizance and would not toll the running of the reglementary
period for filing the requisite pleadings. Accordingly, the RTC held, its Decision dated August 7, 2007 had already
become final for failure of the spouses Cabrera to comply with the three-day notice requirement. The petitioner
then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying her
motion for reconsideration. On October 21, 2009, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision, denied the petition for
certiorari filed by the petitioner. The CA opined that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera since it merely applied the three-day notice requirement under
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Order dated December 19, 2007, which denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera.

36
HELD:
Yes. The petition is meritorious. The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions
17
under Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. It is an integral component of procedural due process.
"The purpose of the three-day notice requirement, which was established not for the benefit of the movant but
rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the latter and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion
and to enable it to meet the arguments interposed therein."

"A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority
to act upon." "Being a fatal defect, in cases of motions to reconsider a decision, the running of the period to appeal
is not tolled by their filing or pendency. Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule.
When the adverse party had been afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard through the
pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is deemed
realized. In such case, the requirements of procedural due process are substantially complied with. Thus, in
Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corporation, the Court ruled that:

The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where
the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not
deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and
courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice. It is undisputed that the hearing on the motion for reconsideration filed by the
spouses Cabrera was reset by the RTC twice with due notice to the parties; it was only on October 26, 2007 that
the motion was actually heard by the RTC. At that time, more than two months had passed since the respondent
received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration on August 21, 2007. The respondent was thus given
sufficient time to study the motion and to enable him to meet the arguments interposed therein. Indeed, the
respondent was able to file his opposition thereto on September 20, 2007.

Notwithstanding that the respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration four days
after the date set by the spouses Cabrera for the hearing thereof, his right to due process was not impinged as he
was afforded the chance to argue his position. Thus, the RTC erred in denying the spouses Cabrera's motion for
reconsideration based merely on their failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement.

G.R. NO. 171750 JANUARY 25, 2012

UNITED PULP AND PAPER INC., Petitioner vs. ACROPOLIS CENTRAL GUARANTY CORP., Respondent.

Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:
On May 14, 2002, United Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. (UPPC) filed a civil case for collection of the amount of
P42,844,353.14 against Unibox Packaging Corporation (Unibox) and Vicente Ortega (Ortega) before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 148 (RTC). UPPC also prayed for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the
properties of Unibox and Ortega for the reason that the latter were on the verge of insolvency and were
transferring assets in fraud of creditors. On August 29, 2002, the RTC issued the Writ of Attachment after UPPC

37
posted a bond in the same amount of its claim. By virtue of the said writ, several properties and assets of Unibox
and Ortega were attached. On October 10, 2002, Unibox and Ortega filed their Motion for the Discharge of
Attachment, praying that they be allowed to file a counter-bond in the amount of P42,844,353.14 and that the writ
of preliminary attachment be discharged after the filing of such bond. Although this was opposed by UPPC, the
RTC, in its Order dated October 25, 2002, granted the said motion for the discharge of the writ of attachment
subject to the condition that Unibox and Ortega file a counter-bond. Thus, on November 21, 2002, respondent
Acropolis Central Guaranty Corporation (Acropolis) issued the Defendants Bond for Dissolution of Attachment in
the amount of P42,844,353.14 in favor of Unibox.

On September 29, 2003, Unibox, Ortega and UPPC executed a compromise agreement, wherein Unibox
and Ortega acknowledged their obligation to UPPC in the amount of P35,089,544.00 as of August 31, 2003,
inclusive of the principal and the accrued interest, and bound themselves to pay the said amount in accordance
with a schedule of payments agreed upon by the parties. Consequently, the RTC promulgated its Judgment dated
October 2, 2003 approving the compromise agreement. For failure of Unibox and Ortega to pay the required
amounts for the months of May and June 2004 despite demand by UPPC, the latter filed its Motion for Execution
to satisfy the remaining unpaid balance. In the July 30, 2004 Order, the RTC acted favorably on the said motion
and, on August 4, 2004, it issued the requested Writ of Execution. The sheriff then proceeded to enforce the Writ
of Execution. It was discovered, however, that Unibox had already ceased its business operation and all of its
assets had been foreclosed by its creditor bank. Moreover, the responses of the selected banks which were served
with notices of garnishment indicated that Unibox and Ortega no longer had funds available for garnishment. The
sheriff also proceeded to the residence of Ortega to serve the writ but he was denied entry to the premises.

Despite his efforts, the sheriff reported in his November 4, 2008 Partial Return that there was no
satisfaction of the remaining unpaid balance by Unibox and Ortega. On the basis of the said return, UPPC filed its
Motion to Order Surety to Pay Amount of Counter-Bond directed at Acropolis. On November 30, 2004, the RTC
issued its Order granting the motion and ordering Acropolis to comply with the terms of its counter-bond and pay
UPPC the unpaid balance of the judgment in the amount of P27,048,568.78 with interest of 12% per annum from
default. Thereafter, on December 13, 2004, Acropolis filed its Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing that it could not be made to pay the amount of the counter-bond because it did not
receive a demand for payment from UPPC. Furthermore, it reasoned that its obligation had been discharged by
virtue of the novation of its obligation pursuant to the compromise agreement executed by UPPC, Unibox and
Ortega. The motion, which was set for hearing on December 17, 2004, was received by the RTC and UPPC only on
December 20, 2004. In the Order dated February 22, 2005, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit and for having been filed three days after the date set for the hearing on the said motion. Aggrieved,
Acropolis filed a petition for certiorari before the CA with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On November 17, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision granting the
petition, reversing the February 22, 2005 Order of the RTC, and absolving and relieving Acropolis of its liability to
honor and pay the amount of its counter-attachment bond.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not UPPC failed to make the required demand and notice upon Acropolis; and
2. Whether or not the execution of the compromise agreement between UPPC and Unibox and Ortega
was tantamount to a novation which had the effect of releasing Acropolis from its obligation under the
counter-attachment bond.

38
HELD:
Petition is granted.

1. No. UPPC complied with the twin requirements of notice and demand. On the recovery upon the
counter-bond, the Court finds merit in the arguments of the petitioner. UPPC argues that it complied
with the requirement of demanding payment from Acropolis by notifying it, in writing and by
personal service, of the hearing held on UPPCs Motion to Order Respondent-Surety to Pay the Bond.
Moreover, it points out that the terms of the counter-attachment bond are clear in that Acropolis, as
surety, shall jointly and solidarily bind itself with Unibox and Ortega to secure the payment of any
judgment that UPPC may recover in the action.

It is evident that a surety on a counter-bond given to secure the payment of a judgment becomes
liable for the payment of the amount due upon: (1) demand made upon the surety; and (2) notice
and summary hearing on the same action. After a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, the
Court is of the view that UPPC indeed complied with these twin requirements.

This Court has consistently held that the filing of a complaint constitutes a judicial demand.
Accordingly, the filing by UPPC of the Motion to Order Surety to Pay Amount of Counter-Bond was
already a demand upon Acropolis, as surety, for the payment of the amount due, pursuant to the
terms of the bond. In said bond, Acropolis bound itself in the sum of P 42,844,353.14 to secure the
payment of any judgment that UPPC might recover against Unibox and Ortega. Furthermore, an
examination of the records reveals that the motion was filed by UPPC on November 11, 2004 and was
set for hearing on November 19, 2004. Acropolis was duly notified of the hearing and it was
personally served a copy of the motion on November 11, 2004, contrary to its claim that it did not
receive a copy of the motion. Acropolis was given the opportunity to defend itself. That it chose to
ignore its day in court is no longer the fault of the RTC and of UPPC. It cannot now invoke the alleged
lack of notice and hearing when, undeniably, both requirements were met by UPPC.

2. No. There was no novation despite compromise agreement; Acropolis still liable under the terms of
the counter-bond. The terms of the Bond for Dissolution of Attachment issued by Unibox and
Acropolis in favor of UPPC are clear and leave no room for ambiguity. Acropolis voluntarily bound
itself with Unibox to be solidarily liable to answer for ANY judgment which UPPC may recover from
Unibox in its civil case for collection. Its counter-bond was issued in consideration of the dissolution
of the writ of attachment on the properties of Unibox and Ortega. The counter-bond then replaced
the properties to ensure recovery by UPPC from Unibox and Ortega. It would be the height of
injustice to allow Acropolis to evade its obligation to UPPC, especially after the latter has already
secured a favorable judgment. Both questions can be solved by bearing in mind that we are dealing
with a counterbond filed to discharge a levy on attachment. Rule 57, section 12, specifies that an
attachment may be discharged upon the making of a cash deposit or filing a counterbond "in an
amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by the judge"; that upon the filing
of the counterbond "the property attached ... shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or
giving the counterbond, or the person appearing on his behalf, the deposit or counterbond aforesaid
standing in place of the property so released."

Whether the judgment be rendered after trial on the merits or upon compromise, such judgment
undoubtedly may be made effective upon the property released; and since the counterbond merely

39
 stands in the place of such property, there is no reason why the judgment should not be made
effective against the counterbond regardless of the manner how the judgment was obtained.

The argument of Acropolis that its obligation under the counter-bond was novated by the
compromise agreement is, thus, untenable. In order for novation to extinguish its obligation,
Acropolis must be able to show that there is an incompatibility between the compromise agreement
and the terms of the counter-bond, as required by Article 1292 of the Civil Code. Novation by
presumption has never been favored. To be sustained, it need be established that the old and new
contracts are incompatible in all points, or that the will to novate appears by express agreement of
the parties or in acts of similar import. All things considered, Acropolis, as surety under the terms of
the counter-bond it issued, should be held liable for the payment of the unpaid balance due to UPPC.

Three-day notice rule, not a hard and fast rule

Although this issue has been obviated by our disposition of the two main issues, the Court would like
to point out that the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule and substantial
compliance is allowed. Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a manner as to insure its receipt by the other party at least three (3)
days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

The law is clear that it intends for the other party to receive a copy of the written motion at least
three days before the date set for its hearing. The purpose of the three (3)-day notice requirement,
which was established not for the benefit of the movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid
surprises upon the latter and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet
the arguments interposed therein. It is not, however, a hard and fast rule. Where a party has been
given the opportunity to be heard, the time to study the motion and oppose it, there is compliance
with the rule. In the case at bench, the RTC gave UPPC sufficient time to file its comment on the
motion. On January 14, 2005, UPPC filed its Opposition to the motion, discussing the issues raised by
Acropolis in its motion. Thus, UPPCs right to due process was not violated because it was afforded
the chance to argue its position.

G.R. No. 201643 MARCH 12, 2014

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner vs. JOSE T. CAPULONG, Respondent.

Reyes, J.:
FACTS:
The case arose from the Complaint-Affidavit for violation of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713, Perjury under
Article 183 of the RPC, and serious dishonesty and grave misconduct under the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service before the Ombudsman, by Fangon, Acting Director of the General Investigation Bureau
of the Ombudsman, against respondent Capulong, Customs Operation Officer V of the BOC. These charges were
based on two particular acts: first, for failure to file the required SALN for calendar years 1987, 1990-1991, 1993
and 1998; and second, for failure to disclose in his SALNs for calendar years 1999 to 2004 his wifes business
interest in two corporations. Capulong filed a Rejoinder arguing that: (1) the submission of photocopies of his

40
SALNs for calendar years 1991 and 1998 to a responsive pleading is a matter of ordinary procedure; (2) he had filed
his SALNs in accordance with the regular procedure practiced in the MICP of the BOC (3) the complaint against him
is barred by prescription. Capulong received an undated Order issued by the Ombudsman placing him under
preventive suspension without pay which shall continue until the case is terminated but shall not exceed six
months effective from receipt of the Order. Questioning the preventive suspension and wary of the threatening
and coercive nature of the Ombudsmans order, Capulong filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, with urgent
prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a WPI. The CA issued a TRO enjoining and prohibiting the Ombudsman and
any person representing them or acting under their authority from implementing the preventive suspension order
of the Ombudsman until further orders from the court. Ombudsman issued an Order lifting Capulongs preventive
suspension. The CA further held that the Ombudsman has lost its right to prosecute Capulong for non-filing of
SALNs because it had already prescribed in accordance with Act No. 3326. The Ombudsman sought
reconsideration but the same was denied. Aggrieved by the disquisition of the CA, the Ombudsman assails the
same before this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter and can grant reliefs, whether primary or
incidental, after the Ombudsman has lifted the subject order of preventive suspension

HELD:
NO. As a rule, it is the consistent and general policy of the Court not to interfere with the Ombudsmans
exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory
and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. It is within
the context of this well-entrenched policy that the Court proceeds to pass upon the validity of the preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of the preventive
suspension order against Capulong does not render the petition moot and academic. It does not preclude the
courts from passing upon the validity of a preventive suspension order, it being a manifestation of its
constitutionally mandated power and authority to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. The preventive suspension order is interlocutory in character and not a final order on the merits of
the case. The aggrieved party may then seek redress from the courts through a petition for certiorari under Section
1, Rule 65 of ROC. While it is true that the primary relief prayed for by Capulong in his petition has already been
voluntarily corrected by the Ombudsman by the issuance of the order lifting his preventive suspension, we must
not lose sight of the fact that Capulong likewise prayed for other remedies. There being a finding of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as
sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65. It is the allegations in the pleading which determine the nature of the action
and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and proof even if no such relief is prayed for.
Undoubtedly, in this case, the CA aptly ruled that the Ombudsman abused its discretion because it failed to
sufficiently establish any basis to issue the order of preventive suspension. Capulongs non-disclosure of his wifes
business interest does not constitute serious dishonesty or grave misconduct. Nothing in the records reveals that
Capulong deliberately placed "N/A" in his SALN despite knowledge about his wifes business interest. As explained
by Capulong, the SEC already revoked the registration of the corporations where his wife was an incorporator;
hence, he deemed it not necessary to indicate it in his SALN.

41
 G.R. NO. 154390 MARCH 17, 2014
METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC. (MFI) AND ENRIQUE ANG, Petitioners vs. PROSPERITY CREDIT RESOURCES INC.,
DOMINGO ANG AND CALEB ANG, Respondents.
Bersamin, J.:

FACTS:

MFI, a family corporation, owned an industrial compound at Novaliches, QC. Pursuant to a P2 million, 10
year 14% per annum loan agreement with Manphil Investment Corporation (Manphil) the lot was subdivided into
11 lots, with Manphil retaining four lots as mortgage security. The other seven lots were released to MFI. MFI
sought from PCRI a loan in the amount of P3.4M to prevent the repossession of the boiler machine by the seller.
PCRI, also a familyowned corporation licensed to engage in money lending, was represented by Domingo its
president, and his son Caleb, VP. The parties knew each other because they belonged to the same family
association, the LiocKui Tong Fraternity. On the basis only of his interview with Enrique, feedback from the
stockholders and the Chinese community, as well as information given by his own father Domingo, and without
further checking on the background Caleb recommended the approval of the amount with an interest ranging
from 24% to 26% per annum and a term of between five and ten years. The CA gave credence to the
uncorroborated lone testimony of Enriques daughter Vicky that on even before the signing of the mortgage and
loan documents, PCRI released the amout to MFI. It found that the blank loan forms, consisting of the REM
contract, PN, comprehensive surety agreement and disclosure statement, which Domingo himself handed to
Enrique, had no entries specifying the rate of interest and schedules of amortization. That in order to return the
trust of Domingo and Caleb and their gesture of the early release of the loan that Enrique and Vicky entrusted to
them their seven (7) titles with an aggregate value of P11M. PCRIs account statement dated showed that MFIs
total loan obligation amounted to P4.1M. The statement from PCRI, however, showed that all seven (7) titles were
placed as collateral for their P3.5 million loan. Enrique received a Notice of Sheriffs Sale announcing the auction of
the seven lots on due to unpaid indebtedness of P10.5 million. MFI protested the foreclosure, and the auction was
reset thrice and after they assured PCRI that they had found a serious buyer for three of the lots in the person of
Winston Wang. PCRI was the sole bidder. RTC ruled in favor of MFI declaring the REM and foreclosure made on the
plaintiff's properties as null and void. CA reversed and set aside RTC's decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA disregard the factual findings of the RTC with regard to fraud as to warrant the
nullification of the REM

HELD:
NO. It is settled that the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court unless
there is a showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. Indeed, the trial courts findings are always
presumed correct. Nonetheless, the CA is not precluded from making its own determination and appreciation of
facts if it considers the conclusions arrived at by the trial court not borne out by the evidence, or if substantial facts
bearing upon the result of the case were overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied. As an appellate court, the CA is
not necessarily bound by the conclusions of the trial court, but holds the exclusive authority to review the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the weighing of conflicting evidence. The contested deed of REMwas
a public document by virtue of its being acknowledged before notary public Atty. Noemi Ferrer. As a notarized
document, the deed carried the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and had in

42
its favor the presumption of regularity. Hence, it was admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity, and was entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. To rebut its authenticity and genuineness, the
contrary evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the deed should be
upheld. Petitioners undeniably failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence against the genuineness and
authenticity of the deed. Instead, their actuations even demonstrated that their transaction with respondents had
been regular and at armslength, thereby belying the intervention of fraud. The evidence adduced by Vicky Ang,
the lone witness for petitioners, tried to cast doubt on the contents and due execution of the deed of real estate
mortgage by pointing to certain irregularities. But she could not be effective for the purpose because she had not
been among the signatories of the deed. The signatories were her late father Enrique Ang, her mother Natividad
Africa, and her brother Edmundo Ang, none of whom came forward to testify against the deed, or otherwise to
assail the genuineness and due execution of the deed by any other means. They would have been in the better
position than Vicky Ang to substantiate the allegation of fraud if that was the case. Their silence reflected the
inanity of the allegation of fraud by Vicky Ang. Secondly, petitioners freely and voluntarily surrendered to
respondents the seven transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of their lots. Such surrender of the TCTs evinced their
intention to offer the lots as collateral for the performance of their obligations contracted with respondents. They
thereby confirmed the genuineness and due execution of the deed of real estate mortgage. Surely, they would not
have surrendered the TCTs had their intention been otherwise. Thirdly, another circumstance belying the
commission of fraud by respondents was petitioners pleading with respondents for the resetting of foreclosure
sale of the properties after receiving the notice of the impending sale. As a result, the sale was reset thrice. Had
the mortgage and its foreclosure been unreasonable or fraudulent, petitioners should have instead resolutely
contested respondents move to foreclose. Fourthly, even after their properties were eventually sold as the
consequence of the foreclosure, petitioners negotiated with respondents on the partial redemption of three of the
seven lots. They also took the trouble of finding a buyer (Mr. Winston Wang of Asia Cotton) of some of the lots.
Had the mortgage been fraudulent, they could have instead instituted a complaint to nullify the real estate
mortgage and the foreclosure sale. And, lastly, Vicky Angs own letters to respondents had an apologetic tenor,
and was seeking leniency from them. Such tenor and tone of her communications were antithetical to her
allegation of having been the victim of their fraudulent acts.

G.R. NO. 176055 MARCH 17, 2014

SPOUSES EDMUNDO DELA CRUZ AND AMELIA CONCIO-DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES RUFINO R. CAPCO
AND MARTY C. CAPCO, Respondents.
Del Castillo, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the spouses Capco before the MeTC of
Pateros. They alleged that Teodora, mother of petitioner Amelia, acquired ownership over a piece of land by
virtue of a Decision by the RTC of Pasig. It was eventually registered in her name. Teodora, out of neighborliness
and blood relationship, tolerated the spouses Capcos occupation thereof. Tsubject property was conveyed to the
spouses Dela Cruz. Intending to construct a house thereon and utilize the space for their balut and salted eggs
business, the spouses Dela Cruz thus demanded that the spouses Capco vacate the property. Spouses Capco
pointed out that the Complaint is defective for failing to allege the exact metes and bounds of the property. They
asserted that they have all the rights to occupy the subject property since respondent Rufino is an heir of its true
owner. spouses Dela Cruz, included, among others, copies of the (1) the RTC Decision (2) TCT in the name of
Teodora and, (3) Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Teodora T. Concio wherein her heirs agreed to
assign, transfer and convey the property to Amelia.. Spouses Capco presented (1) two 1993 tax declarations

43
covering their house and a camarin which both stand on a lot owned by Juan E. Cruz and (2) several receipts
evidencing their payment of real property taxes. MTC ruled in favor of petititoner. It endeavored to ascertain the
source of the parties claimed rights. Prior to the issuance of in the name of *Amelias+ mother, the subject
property used to form part of one-half of a property owned by one Juan Cruz, which was previously administered
by one Gregorio Reyes, the grandfather of herein defendant RufinoCapco. Notwithstanding the decision of the RTC
and the consequent issuance in favor of Teodora , the spouses Capco remained in possession of the subject
property by reason of the tolerance extended to them by the Concios. Upon the death, however, of Teodora her
heirs including Amelia executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Teodora. In that extrajudicial
settlement all the heirs adjudicated upon themselves the property and thereafter assigned, transferred and
conveyed to plaintiff Amelia. Since the spouses Capcos possession of the subject property was by mere tolerance
of the spouses Dela Cruz, the latter have the better right to possess and thus may recover the same upon demand.
RTC affirmed in toto MTC's decision. CA ruled in favor of responents. It held that while the spouses Dela Cruz
claimed that their property pertains to half of the land previously belonging to Juan that was later adjudicated to
Teodora by virtue of the judgment in aforementioned land registration case, it is not clear whether the portion
occupied by the spouses Capco lies therein or in the other half adjudicated in favor of Hermogenes Reyes. In view
of this, it opined that there is a need to physically determine the exact boundaries of the land which, however,
cannot be done in a mere summary proceeding in an ejectment case but rather in anaccionpubliciana or accion
reindivicatoria before the RTC.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there exists an unlawful detainer to vest the MTC with the jurisdiction?
2. Whether or not spouses Dela Cruz are able to establish by preponderance of evidence that they are
the rightful possessors of the property?

HELD:

1. YES. It must be stated at the outset that this Court is not a trier of facts. However, the conflicting
findings of facts of the MeTC and the RTC on one hand, and the CA on the other, compel us to revisit
the records of this case for proper dispensation of justice. Contrary to the CAs pronouncement, the
Complaint sufficiently makes out a case for unlawful detainer. The timeliness of the filing of the
Complaint for unlawful detainer is not an issue in this case. Hence, the failure of the Complaint to
allege when and how the spouses Capco came into possession of the property does not mean that
the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it. To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of
an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a
remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to
give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. Here, the Complaint alleged that the
spouses Dela Cruz predecessor-in-interest, Teodora, is the registered owner of the property and that
she tolerated the spouses Capcos occupation of the lot. The spouses Dela Cruz subsequently
acquired the property through conveyance and they extended the same tolerance to the spouses
Capco. The spouses Dela Cruz demanded for the spouses Capco to vacate the property but to no
avail; hence, they sent the latter a formal demand letter which, per the attached copy to the
Complaint, is dated September 1, 2003. The Complaint was filed on October 6, 2003 or within one
year from the time the formal demand to vacate was made. Clearly, the Complaint sufficiently
established a case for unlawful detainer as to vest the MeTC jurisdiction over it.

44
 2. Yes. Their allegation that the subject property was adjudicated to Teodora by virtue of a decision in a
land registration case and was later conveyed in their favor, is supported by the copy of the decision,
tile and deed of estra judicial settlement. The spouses Capco, aside from their bare allegation that
respondent Rufino is an heir of the true owners thereof, presented nothing to support their claim.
While they submitted receipts evidencing their payments of the realty taxes of their house and the
camarin standing in the subject property, the same only militates against their claim since the latest
receipts indicate Teodora as the owner of the land. Moreover, the spouses Capcos attempt to attack
the title of Teodora is futile. It has repeatedly been emphasized that when the property is registered
under the Torrens system, the registered owners title to the property is presumed legal and cannot
be collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer. It has even been held that it
does not even matter if the partys title to the property is questionable.

G.R. NO. 201234 MARCH 17, 2014

HEIRS OF AMADA A. ZAULDA, Petitioners vs. ISAAC ZAULDA, Respondent.

Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:

The Petition was not filed in the nick of time inasmuch as the Court could not have pursued action on or
before September 9, 2010 which was supposedly the last day specified on the Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review dated August 23, 2010, postmarked August 24, 2010, and received by this Court on September
13, 2010 for the simple reason that this Division apparently received a copy of the Motion only on September 14,
2010, and the Rollo was forwarded to the Office of the ponente only on January 5, 2011. Certainly, parties and
counsel should not assume that Courts are bound to grant the time they pray for. By parity of reasoning, a motion
that is not acted upon in due time is deemed denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time despite the motion for
extension of time having been timely filed

HELD:

Yes. Petition for review from the RTC to the CA is governed by Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court
of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, x x x.
The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or
of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x. Upon proper motion x x x, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No
further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15)
days.

45
 In this case, the petitioners complied with the requirements laid down in the above quoted provision. The
Court notes that the petition for review before the CA was filed within the additional fifteen (15) day period prayed
for in their motion for extension of time to file it, which was filed on time by registered mail. To repeat, the
petition was filed on September 9, 2010, within the fifteen (15) day period requested in their motion for extension
of time to file the petition. As earlier stated, the Motion For Extension Of Time To File Petition For Review, which
was filed through registered mail on August 24, 2010, was filed on time. It was physically in the appellate courts
possession long before the CA issued its Resolution on February 11, 2011, dismissing the petition for review for
being filed out of time. The record shows that 1] the CA received the motion for extension of time to file petition
for review on September 13, 2010; 2] the CA Division received the motion on September 14, 2010; and 3] the
ponentes office received it on January 5, 2011. Indeed, there was a delay, but it was a delay that cannot be
attributed at all to the petitioners. The almost four (4) months that lapsed before the records reached the
ponentes office was caused by the gross incompetence and inefficiency of the division personnel at the CA. It was
the height of injustice for the CA to dismiss a petition just because the motion for extension reached the ponentes
office beyond the last date prayed for. Clearly, the petitioners were unreasonably deprived of their right to be
heard on the merits because of the CAs unreasonable obsession to reduce its load. In allowing the petitioners to
be fatally prejudiced by the delay in the transmittal attributable to its inept or irresponsible personnel, the CA
committed an unfortunate injustice.

G.R.NO. 185922 JANUARY 15, 2014

HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR., Petitioners vs. JUANA GONZALES et.al., Respondents.

Perez, J.:

FACTS:
Before this Court is a petition for review assailing the 10 April 2008 Decision and 7 January 2009
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86497 dismissing petitioners complaint for annulment of the
Deed of Donation for failure to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise. The decision of the CA was not based
on assigned errors in the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in rendering decision not based on assigned errors in the appeal

HELD:
Yes. The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the complaint. The appellate courts
decision hinged on Article 151 of the Family Code, viz:

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. The
appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides:

46
Section 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

xxxx

(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

The appellate courts reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a motion to dismiss
the complaint. It must be distinguished from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals
with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on
record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the
court shall dismiss the claim.

Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a)
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia ; (c) res judicata ; and (d) prescription of action.
Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin, cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr., the Court held:

x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action
for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of
these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard.
Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the
amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may
motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same
cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x.

The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if the consideration of the issue is kept within the confines of the
language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16 and Section 1 of Rule 9. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not
been complied with, a ground for a motion to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between members from
the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made but had failed, is, as the Rule so words, a ground for a motion to dismiss.
Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer
to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim." The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss
based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section
1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; litis pendentia ; res judicata ; and prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that
earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon such failure, the
defense is deemed waived.

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It was in Heirs of Domingo Valientes v. Ramas cited in P.L. Uy Realty Corporation v. ALS Management and
Development Corporation where we noted that the second sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 does not only supply
exceptions to the rule that defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived, it also allows courts to dismiss cases motu propio on any of the enumerated grounds. The tenor of the
second sentence of the Rule is that the allowance of a motu propio dismissal can proceed only from the exemption
from the rule on waiver; which is but logical because there can be no ruling on a waived ground.

G.R.NO. 158916 MARCH 19, 2014

HEIRS OF CORNELIO MIGUEL, Petitioners vs. HEIRS OF ANGEL MIGUEL, Respondents.

Leonardo-De Castro, J.:

FACTS:
This involves properties that were donated to the respondent from his father Cornelio Miguel.
Respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate of an Original Certificate of Title which was
allegedly eaten and destroyed by white ants. The court granted the petition, which was not contested or appealed
and became final and executory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision has attained conclusiveness of judgment and res judicata

HELD:
Yes. The following are the elements of res judicata:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action.

Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as
enunciated in Section 47(b) of the said Rule and (2) conclusiveness of judgment as explained in Section
47(c) of the same Rule. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the
two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a bar by prior judgment would apply. If as between the two
cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as
conclusiveness of judgment applies.

G.R. NO. 193107 MARCH 24, 2014

SUTHERLAND GLOBAL SERVICES (PHILS.), INC., Petitioner vs. LARRY LABRADOR, Respondent.

Brion, J.:

FACTS:
Sutherland Global Services (Phils.), Inc. hired Larry Labrador as one of its call center agents. In the course
of his employment, Labrador was charged of committing an act of dishonesty or fraud under the companys

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Employee Handbook for having caused two sets of packages to be sent to a customer who had to pay twice for the
same product. An administrative hearing was conducted which led to a recommendation finding Labrador guilty,
leading to him submitting a resignation letter. Later, however, Labrador filed an illegal dismissal case before the
NLRC, which was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack of merit. Labrador filed his Memorandum on Appeal with
the NLRC, to which Sutherland responded with an Answer, noting the presence of formal defects in the
Memorandum which warranted its immediate dismissal: (1) failure to state the date of receipt of the appealed
decision; and (2) failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping in accordance with the NLRC Rules of
Procedure. Notwithstanding these defects, the NLRC reversed the LAs ruling; the NLRC opted for a liberal
interpretation of its Rules in admitting Labradors Memorandum.

Sutherland filed a petition for certiorari with the CA; the petition was dismissed, with the CA ruling that:
(1) technical rules are not binding in labor cases, and therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion when a
liberal interpretation of the NLRC Rules was made; and (2) Labrador had been illegally dismissed. Sutherland filed a
motion for reconsideration, but in vain hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping fatal in labor cases

HELD:
No. Technical rules are not necessarily fatal in labor cases; they can be liberally applied if all things being
equal any doubt or ambiguity would be resolved in favor of labor. These technicalities and limitations can only be
given their fullest effect if the case is substantively unmeritorious; otherwise, and if the defect is similar to the
present one and can be verified from the records (as in this case), we have the discretion not to consider them
fatal. The same reasoning applies to the failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping. [While the 2005
Rules governed the instant case at the time it was filed with the NLRC, it is worth noting that the] 2011 NLRC Rules
of Procedure no longer requires [the attachment of a certificate of non-forum shopping].

[(1) The question of whether the CA correctly determined the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC was answered in the negative due to misappreciation of evidence on the part of the CA; (2) The SC
ruled that Labrador was validly dismissed.]

G.R. NO. 193516 MARCH 24, 2014

VILMA MACEDONIO, Petitioner vs. CATALINA RAMO, et al., Respondents.

Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS:
On January 6, 2004, Vilma Macedonio filed a civil case for rescission with damages against Catalina Ramo
with the Baguio RTC. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5703-R. The contract to be rescinded was in the form
of an agreement for the purchase by Macedonio of a portion of Ramos unregistered lot, assured by the latter to
be free from liens and encumbrances; Macedonio later discovered this assurance to be untrue, which in time led
to the filing of the above-stated case. During the course of the proceedings, the parties mutually agreed to settle.
However, the parties were unable to submit a compromise agreement on the date set by the trial court, which led
to the issuance of an Order dismissing Civil Case No. 5703-R for failure to prosecute. Meanwhile, Remo was able to

49
secure a Sales Patent and later on, a certificate of title over the subject property in her name. The trial court
soon issued an Order considering the case terminated.

Later, Ramo caused the subject property to be subdivided into three lots, which she then transferred to
her co-respondents. No part of the property was transferred to Macedonio, who filed a Motion praying that the
trial court issue an Order directing Ramo to return her advance. Ramo opposed the motion, arguing that the
subject of the motion has become moot and academic for petitioners failure to file a motion for reconsideration
of the trial courts last Order. The trial court issued a new Order allowing the parties to agree orally on how
Macedonio is to be given her downpayment back, which was done by the parties. All seemed to be well at that
point, but due to a disagreement arising as to how much money should be reimbursed, Macedonio prayed that the
case be set for pre-trial in view of failure to settle the issues between the parties. Ramo opposed the same
manifestation and motion, insisting that the case has been terminated. The trial court later issued an Entry of
Judgment certifying that the Order terminating Civil Case No. 5703-R already became final and executory.

In the meantime, Macedonio filed a written Protest with the office of the Regional Executive Director of
the DENR, CAR Branch, seeking an investigation into Ramos acquisition of the subject property. No action has
been taken on the protest. On April 21, 2010, Macedonio filed with the Baguio RTC another civil case this time
for specific performance and annulment of documents and titles with damages docketed as Civil Case No. 7150-
R. Ramo filed her answer with a motion to dismiss, claiming that in filing the case, petitioner violated the rule
against forumshopping since there had already been a prior terminated case (Civil Case No. 5703-R) and a
pending Protest with the DENR. To this, Macedonio filed her comment and opposition, arguing that since Civil Case
No. 5703-R was not decided on the merits and no trial was conducted, Civil Case No. 7150-R is not barred. The trial
court issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. 7150R with prejudice on the grounds of forum-shopping, failure to
inform the court of the existence of Civil Case No. 5703-R, and litis pendentia.

Macedonio moved to reconsider, but the trial court stood its ground thus, this direct recourse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Macedonios failure to inform the trial court of the existence of Civil Case No. 5703-R a
valid ground to dismiss Civil Case No. 7150-R with prejudice

HELD:

No. It is true that while it was incumbent for petitioner to have informed the trial court of Civil Case No.
5703-R and the pending DENR Protest, this Court is inclined to forego petitioners failure to abide by the
requirements of the 1997 Rules regarding certifications against forum-shopping, [in] favor of deciding the case on
the basis of merit, seeing, as the Court does, that a rigid interpretation of the 1997 Rules would result in
substantial injustice to petitioner. The circumstances require that substance must prevail over form, keeping in
mind, as the Court has held countless times, that procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice; their application should be relaxed when they hinder instead of promote substantial justice.
Public policy dictates that court cases should as much as possible be resolved on the merits and not on
technicalities. Besides, the Rules of Civil Procedure on forum shopping are not always applied with inflexibility.

More to the point, the hallowed office and cardinal objective of the Rules *is+ to provide, at each possible
instance, an expeditious and full resolution of issues involving the respective rights and liabilities of the parties
under substantive law. *T+he interests of truth and justice are better served where the court, giving due

50
consideration to technical objections, goes deeper into the basic legal merits of the controversy and concentrates
itself on the fundamental principles of fairness and square dealing which always outweigh technical
considerations.

G.R. NO. 160689 MARCH 26, 2014

RAUL SESBREO, Petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., Respondents.

Bersamin, J.:

FACTS:
Raul Sesbreo filed a case for damages against the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) on the ground of
abuse of right. Sesbreo accused the violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched by the VECO to check
his electric meter with conducting an unreasonable search in his residential premises. However, the RTC dismissed
his claim, and the CA affirmed the dismissal hence, this appeal. The RTC and the CA unanimously found the
testimonies of Sesbreos witnesses implausible because of inconsistencies on material points. Before the SC,
Sesbreo asserts otherwise.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC review and undo the findings of the RTC and the CA as to the credibility of
Sesbreos witnesses and their testimonies

HELD:
No. Considering that such findings [by the RTC and CA now contested by Sesbreo are] related to the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, the Court cannot review and undo them now because it is not a
trier of facts, and is not also tasked to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Verily, a review that may tend to
supplant the findings of the trial court that had the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses themselves should be undertaken by the Court with prudent hesitation. Only when Sesbreo could
make a clear showing of abuse in their appreciation of the evidence and records by the trial and the appellate
courts should the Court do the unusual review of the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts. Alas, that
showing was not made here.

G.R. NO. 162299 MARCH 26, 2014

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC. et.al, Petitioners vs. BABY NELLIE M. OLIAREZ et.al, Respondents

Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:

SLU is an educational institution based in Baguio City. Herein respondents were fourth year graduating
students of SLUs College of Medicine Batch 2002. They filed a complaint for Mandatory Injunction with Damages
and Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against Dean Dacanay and other unidentified
individuals, challenging the implementation of the revised version of the Comprehensive Oral and Written
Examination (COWE), a prerequisite for graduation from SLUs medicine course. According to their complaint, the
COWE was contrary to SLUs Student Handbook and would arbitrarily delay their graduation. The RTC granted the
injunction. Respondents were able to complete the course and were allowed to attend their graduation rites.

51
However, Dean Dacanay refused to issue to them their final grades, clearances and their certificates of graduation.
Respondent sought petitioners in contempt, and a writ of execution was issued against the latter. Petitioner filed
petition for certiorari before the CA challenging the orders of the trial court, the CA dismissed the petition for its
failure to file a prior motion for reconsideration. Unsatisfied, the SLU elevated the disputed CAs resolutions before
the SC via petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari

HELD:

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition
for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed
to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. It is not, however, an ironclad rule.
Under the circumstances, the Court is not convinced that SLUs explanation constitutes sufficient ground for the
application of the exception of the rule. In the same vein, petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the
determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. It should be emphasized that
procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Although the Court in some cases,
permits a relaxation in the application of the rules, this was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity. In this case, a liberality in the application of the rules of procedure, may not be
invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration of justice,
For it is equally settled that, except for the most persuasive of reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to facilitate
the orderly administration of justice.

G.R. NO. 192975 NOVEMBER 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE DENR, REGIONAL
OFFICE NO. 3, Petitioner vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC OF ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, Respondent.

G.R. NO. 192994

SAMAHANG KABUHAYAN NG SAN LORENZO KKK, INC., Petitioner vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC OF ARCHBISHOP OF
MANILA, Respondent.

Perlas-Bernabe, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Republic filed a complaint for cancellation of titles and reversion against respondent RCAM and
several others. The complaint alleged that RCAM appears as a registered owner of 8 parcels of land in Obando,
Bulacan. RCAM sold those 8 parcels of land to the other named defendants. The lands were later on certified by
the Bureau of Forestry as falling within the unclassified lands of the public domain and declared alienable and
disposable. The KKK, occupants of the subject property filed a complaint-in-intervention. During the course of pre-
trial, the RCAM filed a motion to dismiss assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint. The RTC denied
the motion for being premature. The matter was elevated to the CA on certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC. The CA held that while reversion suits are allowed under the law, the same should be

52
instituted before the CA because the RTC cannot nullify a decision rendered by a co-equal land registration court.
The CA further applied equitable estoppels against the State and considered it barred from filing a reversion suit.
Republic petitioned the SC contending that they do not seek annulment of judgment of the RTC acting as Land
Registration Court but the nullification of the subject titles.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the action filed by the Republic

HELD:

In this case, the material averments in the complaint before the RTC, show that their action is one for
cancellation of titles and reversion, not for annulment of judgment of the RTC. The complaint alleged that the
parcels of land which are subject matter of the action, were not subject of the CFIs judgment in the relevant prior
land registration case. Hence, petitioners pray that the certificates of titles of RCAM be cancelled which will not
necessitate the annulment of said judgment. Clearly, Rule 47 of the RC on annulment of judgment finds no
application in the instant case. The RTC may properly take cognizance of the reversion suits which do not call for
an annulment of judgment of the RTC acting as a Land Registration Court. Actions for cancellation of titles and
reversion, like the present case, belong to the class of cases that involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any of interest therein and where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00, fall under the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Consequently, no grave abuse of discretion excess of jurisdiction can be attributed to the
RTC in denying the RCAMs motion to dismiss.

Moreover, it should be stressed that the only incident before the CA for resolution was the propriety of
RCAMs motion to dismiss, thus, it was premature for the CA at this stage to apply the doctrine of equitable
estoppels as the parties have not presented any evidence that would support such finding.

G.R. NO. 195031 MARCH 26, 2014

INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner vs. CELESTE M. CHUA, Repsondent.

Perez, J.:

FACTS:

The 20 feet container van belonging to respondent Chua was placed in the depot belonging to petitioner
for safekeeping pending the customs inspection. Petitioners depot was gutted by fire and respondents container
van, together with 44 others, were burned. Respondent demanded reimbursement for the value of the goods that
were burnt, however her demands fell on deaf ears. Hence, she filed a suit for damages against petitioner.
Petitioner in its Answer denies that there was negligence on its part or that of its employees. It asserts that the fire
gutted the depot was due to a fortuitous event, and that respondent is not entitled to her claim because she has
no cause of action or that respondents cause of action, if any, has already prescribed because the complaint was
not filed within 12 months from the time of damage or loss. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent, ordering petitioner to pay the actual and moral damages. On appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

53
 Whether or not the action was barred by laches

HELD:

Petitioner cannot rely on its Management Contract with the Philippine Ports Authority as basis of its
liability for damages. Contrary to petitioners claim, there is no contractual relationship between it and respondent
since the latter did not avail herself of petitioners services; hence she cannot be bound by the said management
contract. Absence of a contractual relationship is precisely the reason why respondent is not bound be petitioners
Terms of Business which requires a claimant to commence any action for damages against petitioner within 12
months from the occurrence of the cause of the claim. Thus, respondents action cannot be said to have been
barred by prescription or laches.

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