Did Kant Conflate The Necessary and The A Priori

Did Kant Conflate the Necessary and the "A Priori"?
Author(s): Nicholas F. Stang

Source: Nos, Vol. 45, No. 3 (September 2011), pp. 443-471
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NOS 45:3 (2011)443-471
Did Kant Conflate the Necessary and the A Priori?

Nicholas F. Stang
University of Miami
Abstract
It is commonly accepted by Kant scholars that Kant held that all necessary
truths are a priori , and all a priori knowledge is knowledge of necessary
truths. Against the prevailing interpretation, I argue that Kant was agnostic
as to whether necessity and a priority are co-extensive. I focus on three
kinds of modality Kant implicitly distinguishes: formal possibility and ne-
cessity, empirical possibility and necessity, and noumenal possibility and
necessity. Formal possibility is compatibility with the forms of experience;
empirical possibility is compatibility with the causal powers of empirical
objects; noumenal possibility is compatibility with the causal powers of
things in themselves. Because we cannot know the causal powers of things
in themselves, we cannot know what is noumenally necessary and what is
noumenally contingent. Consequently, we cannot know whether noumenal
necessity is co-extensive with a priority. Therefore, for all we know, some a
priori propositions are noumenally contingent, and some a posteriori propo-
sitions are noumenally necessary. Thus, contrary to the received interpreta-
tion, Kant distinguishes epistemologica! from metaphysical modality.
1. Introduction
Some propositions are necessarily true. Others are contingently true. Asso-
ciated with this traditional philosophical distinction is an important philo-
sophical problem: how do we know necessary truths? how do we know that
some proposition is not merely contingently true, but is necessarily true? Ac-
cording to a once influential picture, we have epistemic access to necessary
truths through a priori knowledge and only through a priori knowledge. The
traditional picture appeals to the following principle:
(1) Necessarily p just in case it is a priori knowable that p.
201 1 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
443
444 NOS
This principle asserts that necessity and a priority are co-extensive. I

equivalent to the claim that a posteriority and contingency are co-extensive
i.e. that it is contingent that/? just in case it is knowable only a posteriori th
P-
Saul Kripke, who undermined the traditional picture in Naming and Ne-
cessity , succinctly captures the intuitive appeal of this principle:
First, if something not only happens to be true in the actual world, but is also
true in all possible worlds, then, of course, just by running through all the
possible worlds in our heads, we ought to be able with enough effort to see, if a
statement is necessary, that it is necessary, and thus know it a priori . . . Second, I
guess that it's thought that, conversely, if something is known a priori it must be
necessary, because it was known without looking at the world. If it depended on
some contingent feature of the world, how could you know it without looking?1
The intuitive appeal of the traditional picture, and principle (1), comes from
the twin ideas that knowledge independent of experience cannot be knowl-
edge of contingent fact, and that contingent facts cannot be known a priori.
Kripke undermined this picture by arguing that there are contingent a priori
truths and necessary a posteriori truths, and so distinguished the metaphysical
modalities of necessity and contingency from the epistemological modalities
of the a priori and a posteriori.
Unsurprisingly, Kant has been widely interpreted as holding, in the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason (hereafter, CPR), the pre-Kripkean consensus view that
necessity and a priority are co-extensive.2 However, in this paper I argue
that Kant was in fact agnostic as to whether necessity and a priority are co-
extensive, and consequently rejected the traditional picture of our epistemic
access to necessary truth.
The interpretation of Kant as endorsing the co-extensiveness of necessity
and a priority appears to have much to recommend it. First, it has textual
support. In a variety of passages from the CPR and from other writings
from the same period, Kant appears to assert directly that every necessary
proposition is a priori , and every a priori proposition is necessary:
At issue here is a mark by means of which we can securely distinguish a pure

cognition from an empirical one. Experience teaches us, to be sure, that some-
thing is constituted thus and so, but not that it could not be otherwise. First,
then, if a proposition [Satz] is thought along with its necessity, it is an a priori
judgment . . . necessity and strict universality are therefore secure indications of
an a priori cognition, and also belong together indispensably. (B43)
The proposition says only: these truths do not depend upon experience (which
must occur at one time or another), and are therefore not limited by any tem-
poral conditions, i.e. they are cognizable as truths a priori , which is completely
identical with the proposition: they are cognizable as necessary truths. ("On a
discovery," 8:2354)
Did Kant Conflate the Necessary and the A Priori? 445
Secondly, many Kant scholars take these passages, and others like them, to
show that Kant held that necessity and a priority are co-extensive. James Van
Cleve, for example, describes Kant's position as follows:
Although the two distinctions drawn so far [a priori/ a posteriori and necessary/
contingent] differ in intension (one relating to the manner of being known and
the other to the manner of being true), Kant believes that they coincide in
extension - that they divide up the field of true propositions in the same way.
He believes that propositions are necessary iff they are a priori , and contingent
iff they are empirical or a posteriori.5
In spite of the impression given by these passages, Kant did not accept
principle (1). In fact, he was agnostic about whether necessity and a priority
are co-extensive. Kant held that, for all we know, some a priori propositions
are contingent and some a posteriori propositions are necessary.
In the face of the quoted passages, and others like them, I will argue that
Kant accepts several different kinds of modality. In this paper, I focus on
three:
Formal possibility It is formally possible that/? just in case it is compatible

with our forms of experience that p.6
Empirical possibility It is empirically possible that p just in case it is com-
patible with actual events and natural laws that p.
Noumenal possibility It is noumenally possible that p just in case it is com-
patible with the causal powers of things in themselves
that p.1
In all of these definitions, '/?' ranges over synthetic propositions about em-
pirical objects.8,9 Formal possibility is compatibility with our forms of ex-
perience. The forms of experience are representations the subject's mind
imposes on experience and which therefore apply to all objects of experience.
For instance, space and time, for Kant, are forms of perceptual experience
(intuition). Consequently, it is formally impossible that we experience a non-
spatial or non-temporal object.
Empirical possibility is compatibility with the causal powers of empirical
objects. Noumenal possibility, however, is compatibility with the causal pow-
ers of non-empirical objects, things in themselves. That things in themselves -
also called 'noumena' - are non-empirical means that we do not experience
them; things in themselves appear to us in experience, and the objects we
experience are their appearances, empirical objects. Empirical objects are the
objects of ordinary experience and scientific knowledge; they are in space
and time and stand in causal relations.10 Things in themselves are not in
space or time and we can know nothing about them. Consequently, we can-
not know their causal powers, nor what is compatible with those powers. If p
is a synthetic proposition about empirical objects, and p is actual, then things
446 NOS
in themselves cause p to obtain by causing us to experience objects for which

p obtains.11 It is noumenally possible that not-/? just in case it is compatible
with the powers of things in themselves that they cause us to experience ob-
jects for which p does not obtain. Because I do not know the causal power
of things in themselves, I do not know whether not-/? is compatible with
those causal powers; I do not know whether things in themselves have pow
ers to cause us to experience objects in such a way that p does not obtain.
Consequently, I do not know whether it is noumenally possible that not -p
Therefore, if p is actual, I do not know whether it is noumenally possible
that not-/?.12 For instance, I know that the universal gravitational constant
has a certain value, but I do not know whether things in themselves could
have caused me to experience a world of objects in which it had a differen
value; consequently, I do not know whether it is noumenally possible for the
universal gravitational constant to have a different value.
For each kind of possibility, there is an associated kind of necessity13:
Formal necessity It is formally necessary that p just in case it is incom-

patible with our forms of experience that not -p.
Empirical necessity It is empirically necessary that p just in case it is in-
compatible with actual events and natural laws that
not -p.
Noumenal necessity It is noumenally necessary that p just in case it is in-
compatible with the causal powers of things in them-
selves that not -p.
Again, '/?' ranges over synthetic propositions about empirical objects. Con-
tingency is defined in the usual fashion. It is formally contingent that p just
in case (i) actually /?, and (ii) it is formally possible that not-/?. Likewise for
empirical contingency and noumenal contingency.
I will argue that Kant holds the following views about these kinds of
modality:
(i) Where p is a synthetic proposition, it is a priori that p just in case it is for-

mally necessary that p.14 (Hence in the passages quoted above, by 'necessary'
Kant means formally necessary).
(ii) The empirically necessary, the empirically possible, and the actual are co-
extensive (for propositions for which empirical possibility is defined).
(iii) We cannot know what is noumenally necessary and what is noumenally
contingent.
(iv) We cannot know whether all a priori propositions are noumenally necessary,
and we cannot know whether all a posteriori propositions are noumenally
contingent.
This completes my argument that Kant was agnostic about whether necessity
and a priority are co-extensive. For Kant, the question can we know a priori
that p ? and is it necessarily the case that p? not only have different senses,
but may, as far as we know, have different answers. Thus, Kant distinguished
metaphysical and epistemological modality before Kripke did, but for very
different reasons.15
2. Formal Possibility
In the various passages quoted earlier, Kant claims that we can know a
priori necessary truths about objects of experience. In this section I outline
Kant's theory of experience, and explain what kinds of necessary truths about
objects of experience we can know a priori. These truths I call 'formally'
necessary truths. I begin by outlining Kant's theory of experience, and follow
this with an outline of his explanation of the source of these necessary truths.
Experience, for Kant, is the joint product of affection by mind-
independent objects - which Kant calls 'things in themselves' - and cog-
nitive processing by the subject. Things in themselves causally affect the
subject's mind, creating low-level representations called 'sensations.'16 These
sensations will not typically be available to self-conscious introspection by
the subject; in contemporary terms, they are 'sub-personal.' The subject's
cognitive faculties process these sensations by synthesizing them into repre-
sentations of spatiotemporal objects. The product of this process of cognitive
synthesis is experience.
Some of the representations generated by this cognitive process depend
upon the particular sensations had by the subject. For instance, the deter-
minate shape and size of my desk, as represented in my experience, depends
upon the sensations I have. Other representations do not depend in this way
upon the particular sensory content. Regardless of the sensations I have,
these representations will have the same content. For Kant, a representation
is a priori just in case its content does not depend upon the particular sensa-
tions had by the subject.17 An a posteriori representation is a representation
whose content does depend upon particular sensations. For instance, regard-
less of the sensory content I receive, I experience outer objects (i.e. objects
that are not my inner psychological states) as spatial. Similarly, regardless of
the sensory content I receive, I experience space as Euclidean, according to
Kant. While the determinate spatial properties of objects depend upon the
particular sensory content I receive and are therefore a posteriori , the repre-
sentation of space and its Euclidean character are a priori. This concept of
a priority is not defined in terms of our experience-independent justification
forjudging that objects fall under the representation.
Any particular experience combines determinable a priori representations
and more determinate a posteriori representations. For instance, I experience
an outer object as spatial (a priori) and as having a determinate size, shape
and location {a posteriori ). Thus, a priori representations are what Kant
calls 'forms of experience,' determinable structures of which any particular
448 NOS
experience is a determinate filling-out. There are two kinds of forms of

experience for Kant, forms of intuition and forms of understanding.18 That
space and time are forms of intuition means that they are determinable
structures of perception. The Euclidean structure of space is a priori ; it is
shared by all experiences of outer objects, and it does not depend upon
the particular course of my experience. However, any particular perceptual
experience is a determinate Tilling-ou of the formal structure of space; I
experience outer objects with determinate spatial and temporal properties.
Whereas space and time are determinable perceptual structures, the sec-
ond class of forms of experience, the categories, are determinable conceptual
structures. Experiencing an object, for Kant, requires thinking of it as falling
under the categories. They are a priori concepts, because they provide a de-
terminable conceptual structure that applies to all objects we experience. For
instance, Kant argues that the category 'substance-accident' requires that
we experience each object as either a substance or a modification of a sub-
stance, and the category 'cause-effect' requires that we experience objects as
governed by deterministic causal laws. This again is a determinable struc-
ture, a form of experience. Each particular experience is an experience of
determinate substances and their modifications, and of objects falling under
determinate causal laws. The conceptual forms of experience (categories) do
not dictate which objects we experience as substances, and which as modi-
fications, nor which causal laws govern objects, just as the perceptual forms
(space, time) do not dictate the determinate sizes, shapes, locations and dura-
tions of objects. Thus, experience has both perceptual and conceptual form.
Each particular experience is a combination of determinable a priori percep-
tual and conceptual form (space, time, the categories) and more determinate
a posteriori content or 'matter' (size, shape, location, particular causal laws).
Any object of experience conforms to the forms of experience: it is tem-
poral and spatial (if it is an outer object), and stands in causal relations with
other objects. The determinable forms of experience naturally give rise to a
concept of possibility:
Formal possibility It is formally possible that p just in case it is compatible

with our forms of experience that p}9
For instance, experiencing a tail-less kangaroo is formally possible because

experience of a tail-less kangaroo does not violate the perceptual and con-
ceptual forms of our experience. The parallel concept of necessity is,
Formal necessity It is formally necessary that p just in case it is incompatible

with our forms of experience that not -p.
For instance, it is formally necessary that we experience outer objects as

spatial, that space is Euclidean, and that experienced events are governed
by deterministic causal laws. However, it is formally contingent that objects

have the determinate size, shape and location that they do, and it is formally
contingent which natural laws obtain. The forms of experience dictate that
outer objects are spatial and Euclidean, and that they obey causal laws, but
they leave undetermined the size, shape and location of outer objects, and
which particular causal laws they obey.20
Kant's conclusion is stronger than the claim that it is formally necessary
that we experience outer objects as Euclidean; Kant wants to establish that it
is formally necessary that outer objects are Euclidean. Otherwise, there would
be room for skepticism about whether a priori representations accurately
represent objects, and Kant wants to answer such skepticism. In particular,
Kant wants to justify the application of a priori principles, e.g. the principle
of causation, in natural science. On Kant's transcendental idealist view, the
objects we experience are appearances rather than things in themselves. The
correct interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism is controversial.21
However, it is uncontroversial that Kant's transcendental idealism entails that
the necessary conditions on experience of objects are necessary conditions on
objects of experience: if I necessarily experience objects as being a particular
way, then necessarily objects are that way.22 In my terminology, this is the
claim that if it is formally necessary that I experience objects as falling under
a particular representation, then it is formally necessary that they do fall
under that representation. The a priori representations are introduced into
the content of experience, regardless of the particular course of experience. By
introducing that content into experience the subject introduces that content
into the objects themselves.
Kant's strategy for deriving necessary truths about objects of experience
begins by deriving necessary truths about experience of objects. For a par-
ticular representation R (e.g. the concept 'cause-effect') he will argue first
that:
(i) It is formally necessary that: we experience objects as falling under R (e.g. as

standing in cause-effect relations).
However, the objects of experience are appearances, so:
(ii) If it is formally necessary that we experience objects as falling under R , then

it is formally necessary that objects of experience do fall under R.
In other words, objects of experience are necessarily the way we experience

them to be. It cannot be that we universally misrepresent objects as being, for
example, causally related; since these objects are appearances, from the fact
that we necessarily experience them as standing in casual relations it follows
that they do stand in causal relations. From (i) and (ii) it follows that:
(iii) It is formally necessary that objects of experience fall under R.
450 NOS
Thus, the formally necessary conditions on experience are formally necessary

conditions on objects of experience. The forms of experience are also forms
of objects.
This argument strategy is what Kant has in mind when he writes:
The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time
conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience. Now I assert that the
categories that have just been adduced are nothing other than the conditions of
thinking in a possible experience, just as space and time contain the conditions of
the intuition for the very same thing. They are therefore fundamental concepts
for thinking objects in general for the appearances, and they therefore have a
priori objective validity, which was just what we really wanted to know. (Al 11,
Kant's emphasis)
What Kant calls the "a priori conditions of a possible experience" are the
forms of experience. In this passage Kant is claiming that the categories,
the a priori concepts of metaphysics, are formally necessary conditions on
experiencing objects and concluding, via the argumentative strategy already
sketched, that they are formally necessary conditions on objects. Kant's ide-
alism allows him to conclude, not only that it is formally necessary that
we experience objects as falling under the forms of experience, but that it
is formally necessary that objects of experience do fall under the forms of
experience. Thus the subject's mind imposes the forms of experience upon
objects.
We are now in a position to understand the relation between formal
and epistemic modalities for Kant. The forms of experience ground a priori
knowledge. Regardless of my sensations, outer objects are spatial and space is
Euclidean. Thus, I am justified in believing that outer objects are spatial and
space is Euclidean, independently of the particular course of my experience.
Therefore, I can know a priori that outer objects are spatial and space is
Euclidean. Forms of experience ground a priori knowledge for Kant.
Formally contingent representations depend upon the particular sensory
content I receive. I experience outer objects as having determinate spatial
properties - size, shape, location - and obeying determinate natural laws
partly in virtue of the particular sensory content I receive. Representations
of determinate properties like these are formally contingent. My justifica-
tion for believing that they have these determinate properties is based on
experience. Therefore, I can know the determinate spatial properties of outer
objects - their size, shape and location - and the natural laws they obey only
a posteriori. 23,24
It follows that:
(If) It is formally necessary that p just in case it is a priori knowable that p.25
This follows directly from the definition of formal necessity and the link
between forms of experience and a priori justification. If formal possibility
and necessity is the only kind of modality in Kant's modal theory, then
he accepts the co-extensiveness of a priority and necessity. If we restrict
our attention to formal necessity, then Kant accepts principle (1) from the
Introduction and the traditional picture of the relation between necessity
and a priority.
Commentators who have claimed that Kant extensionally identifies neces-
sity and a priority have restricted their attention to formal necessity.26 It is
abundantly clear from a number of passages in the CPR and other writings,
that formal possibility is part of Kant's modal theory. For instance,
All appearances as possible experiences, therefore, lie a priori in the understand-

ing, and receive their formal possibility from it, just as they lie in the sensibility
as mere intuitions, and are only possible through the latter as far as their form
is concerned. (A 127)
'Appearances' are objects of experience. When Kant writes that they "lie
a priori in the understanding, and receive their formal possibility from it"
he means that the forms of the understanding, the categories, are a priori
representations and are part of the formal conditions on objects.
Part of the reason that Kant scholars have focused on formal possibility
and claimed that Kant extensionally identifies necessity and a priority is
Kant's tendency not to distinguish explicitly formal possibility from other
kinds of possibility. For instance, in the passages quoted in the Introduction
(B4, 8:235), by 'possibility' Kant means formal possibility. In "The Postulates
of Empirical Thinking in General," the section of the CPR devoted to the
modal categories (possibility, existence, necessity), Kant defines possibility
as follows:
Whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in accordance with
intuition and concepts) is possible. (A218/B266)
This is clearly a definition of formal possibility. Whatever is compatible

with the forms of space and time (intuition) and the categories (concepts) is
formally possible. But Kant offers this simply as a definition of 'possibility,'
giving the inaccurate impression that this is the only kind of possibility in his
modal theory.
That Kant has a concept of formal necessity, and that he takes it to be
co-extensive with a priority , is relatively uncontroversial. In the next two
sections, I argue for the controversial parts of my thesis: that Kant accepts
kinds of modality other than formal possibility and necessity, and that he
does not, in general, extensionally identify a priority with necessity.
452 NOS
3. Empirical Possibility
We have already seen that the "Postulates of Empirical Thinking in Gen-

eral", the section of the CPR devoted to the modal categories (possibility,
existence and necessity), contains a definition of formal possibility. Were this
Kant's only conception of possibility, it would indeed be true that he exten-
sionally identifies necessity and a priority. However, the Postulates section
also contains the following discussion of necessity:
From this it follows that the criterion of necessity lies solely in the law of possible
experience that everything that happens is determined a priori through its cause
in appearance. Hence we cognize only the necessity of effects in nature, the
causes of which are given to us, and the mark of necessity in existence does not
reach beyond the field of possible experience, and even in this it does not hold
of the existence of things, as substances, since these can never be regarded as
empirical effects, or as something that happens and arises. Necessity therefore
concerns only the relations of appearances in accordance with the dynamical
law of causality, and the possibility grounded upon it of inferring a priori from
some given existence (a cause) to another existence (the effect). Everything that
happens is hypothetically necessary; that is a principle that subjects alteration
in the world to a law, i.e. a rule of necessary existence, without which not even
nature itself would obtain. (A227-8/B280, Kant's emphasis)
That Kant here writes that we "cognize the necessity of effects in nature"
shows that he does not have formal necessity in mind, for particular events
are not formally necessary for Kant. In this section I develop an alternate
conception of necessity, empirical necessity, and argue that, in this passage
and in others, Kant refers to empirical necessity. However, he does not explic-
itly distinguish this conception of empirical necessity from formal necessity.
The distinctions I am drawing between kinds of modality are made implicitly,
not explicitly, by Kant.
Empirical objects are in time. Thus, the empirical world includes events,
alterations of empirical objects. In the Second Analogy of Experience, Kant
argues that the form of time and the category of cause-effect dictate that
every empirical event has a sufficient cause.27 This means that it is formally
necessary that every empirical event has a sufficient cause. In other words, the
principle of causation is formally necessary, but which causal laws govern the
actual world, and which empirical events occur, are formally contingent. The
principle of causation is a priori , but particular causal laws are a posteriori ,28
To use one of Kant's examples, the warmth of the sun causes wax to melt.
Although it is formally necessary that the event of the wax melting has a
sufficient cause, the following are formally contingent: the event of the wax
melting, the event of the sun shining on the wax, and the law that sunshine
melts wax. None of these are dictated by the principle of causation itself.
They are a posteriori .29
Let p be the proposition that empirical event E occurs at time t. Consider

the following definition:
Empirical possibility It is empirically possible that p just in case it is compati-

ble with actual natural laws, and the past history of the
empirical world up until time /, that p.30
This is a more precise form of the definition given earlier for empirical
possibility. For instance, it is empirically possible that I go grocery shopping
now just in case it is compatible with the entire history of the empirical
world up to this moment, and the natural laws, that I go grocery-shopping
now. As a merely heuristic device, we might introduce the notion of 'possible
worlds' and say: it is empirically possible that E occur at t just in case there
is a possible world that is qualitatively indistinguishable from the actual
world up to time /, and has the same natural laws, in which E occurs at /.31
According to Kant, it is formally necessary that every event has a sufficient
cause. That causes are sufficient, for Kant, means that the laws that govern
the operation of these causes are deterministic. This means that if is the
cause of E , and occurs, it is incompatible with the natural laws that E
not occur. To invoke the heuristic of possible worlds once again, we might
define a 'divergent world' as one that is qualitatively indistinguishable from
the actual world up to time /, and has the same natural laws as the actual
world, but is qualitatively different from the actual world after time t. The
natural laws governing the actual world are deterministic if and only if there
are no divergent possible worlds. The history of the empirical world up to a
moment, plus the natural laws, determine a unique future history. Recall the
definition of empirical necessity given earlier, where p is a proposition that
event E occurs at time t :
Empirical necessity It is empirically necessary that p just in case it is in-

compatible with actual empirical events up to t and the
natural laws that not-/?.
That natural laws are deterministic entails that every empirical event is em-
pirically necessary.32 No non-actual event is empirically possible, because the
prior history of the empirical world and the natural laws entail that it does not
occur. Consequently, for propositions about empirical alterations, the actual,
the empirically possible, and the empirically necessary are co-extensive.33
I now return to the passage from "The Postulates of Empirical Thinking
in General" quoted earlier and apply this conception of empirical necessity:
From this it follows that the criterion of necessity lies solely in the law of possible
experience that everything that happens is determined a priori through its cause
in appearance. Hence we cognize only the necessity of effects in nature, the
causes of which are given to us, and the mark of necessity in existence does not
454 NOS
reach beyond the field of possible experience, and even in this it does not hold
of the existence of things, as substances, since these can never be regarded as
empirical effects, or as something that happens and arises. Necessity therefore
concerns only the relations of appearances in accordance with the dynamical
law of causality, and the possibility grounded upon it of inferring a priori from
some given existence (a cause) to another existence (the effect). Everything that
happens is hypothetically necessary; that is a principle that subjects alteration
in the world to a law, i.e. a rule of necessary existence, without which not even
nature itself would obtain. (A227-8/B280, Kant's emphasis)
I noted earlier that 'necessity' here cannot mean 'formal necessity' because
particular effects, events, are not formally necessary. When Kant writes that
"it follows that the criterion of necessity lies solely in the law of possible
experience that everything that happens is determined a priori through its
cause in appearance" he means that it follows from the principle that every
event has a sufficient cause that every event is empirically necessary. He writes
that "everything that happens is hypothetically necessary" because empirical
necessity is a form of hypothetical necessity. Events are necessary given the
hypothesis of the prior history of the empirical world and the natural laws.
He contrasts substances with effects because, on Kant's view, substances are
permanent; they do not arise or perish. Events are alterations of substances,
and such alterations do come and go. Thus, strictly speaking, substances are
not caused; their alterations (events) are caused.34
It is important to clearly distinguish between formal modality, on the
one hand, and empirical modality on the other. Since empirical possibility is
only defined for propositions about empirical events, we should focus on the
modal statuses of those propositions and those events.35 Within that class, the
empirically necessary, the empirically possible and the actual are co-extensive.
However, many non-actual empirical events are formally possible (e.g. the
non-actual event of my omitting some action I actually commit), and all
actual empirical events are formally contingent. The empirically necessary
is a posteriori ; to know that some event occurs requires experience. The
formally necessary, on the other hand, is always a priori knowable.36
It can, however, be known a priori that every actual event is empirically
necessary, for this follows from the principle that every event has a sufficient
cause, which is a formally necessary principle, and the definition of empirical
necessity. But while it can be known a priori that every actual event is
empirically necessary, it can only be known a posteriori which events are
actual. Thus Kant denies the co-extensiveness of a priority and empirical
necessity; principle (1), from the Introduction, fails for empirical necessity.
4. Noumenal Possibility
We have already seen that the Postulates of Empirical Thought, the sec-
tion of the CPR devoted to the modal categories (possibility, existence, and
Did Kant Conate the Necessary and the A Priori? 455
necessity), contains discussions of formal possibility and of empirical possi-

bility, although they are not explicitly distinguished. The conclusion of the
Postulates, however, is harder to characterize. Kant raises a pair of questions:
"whether the field of possibility is greater than the field that contains every-
thing actual, and whether the latter is in turn greater than the set of that
which is necessary" (A230/B282). These are really the same question: are
there non-actual possibilities? i.e. are there propositions p , such that actually
not-p, but possibly pi31
The first kind of non-actual possibility Kant has in mind are forms of
intuition other than space and time. He writes:
Even were they possible, we could still not conceive of and make comprehen-
sible other forms of intuition (than space and time) . . . whether other percep-
tions than those which in general belong to our entire possible experience and
therefore an entirely different field of matter can obtain cannot be decided by
the understanding, which has only to do with the synthesis of what is given.
(A230/B283)
The understanding, for Kant, is the faculty that generates knowledge; by

claiming that whether "an entirely different field of matter can obtain can-
not be decided by the understanding," he is claiming that we cannot know
whether or not this is possible. Because it follows his discussion of "other
forms of intuition (than space and time)" I take it that "an entirely different
field of matter" refers to non-spatial and non-temporal objects. By claiming
that we cannot know whether "an entirely different field of matter" is pos-
sible, Kant expresses agnosticism about whether it is possible for us to have
forms of intuition other than space and time. 38
This is an initially puzzling claim. If by 'possible' Kant means 'formally
possible,' then it is unclear why he expresses agnosticism. For, since our forms
of intuition are spatial and temporal, it follows trivially that non-spatial and
non-temporal intuition is formally impossible. Furthermore, we can know
that non-spatial and non-temporal intuition is formally impossible because
we can know that space and time are our actual forms of intuition. If, how-
ever, he means 'empirically possible' by 'possible,' it is equally unclear why he
expresses agnosticism. For nothing non-actual is empirically possible; non-
actual empirical events are empirically impossible, and empirical possibility
and necessity is not defined for anything other than events. Consequently,
it not empirically possible that we experience non-spatial and non-temporal
objects. Furthermore, we can know that it is not empirically possible that
we experience non-spatial and non-temporal objects because we know the
definition of empirical possibility. If the kind of possibility Kant has in
mind in this passage is either formal possibility or empirical possibility, it
remains unclear why Kant expresses agnosticism as to whether non-spatial
and non-temporal intuition is possible for us.
456 NOS
Kant expresses further agnosticism about non-actual possibilities:
All that can be added to my understanding is something beyond agreement with

the formal conditions of experience, namely connection with some perception
or other; but whatever is connected with this in accordance with empirical laws
is actual, even if it is not immediately perceived. However, that another series
of appearances in thoroughgoing connection with that which is given to me
in perception, thus more than a single all-encompassing experience, is possible,
cannot be inferred from that which is given, and even less without anything
being given at all. (A231/B284)
In the first sentence, Kant asserts that "all that can be added" to the forms
of experience is "connection with some perception or other." I take this t
mean that what is left undetermined by the forms of experience is the partic
ular objects we experience. In other words, particular perceived objects are
formally contingent; they are not determined solely by the forms of experi-
ence. However, he reminds us that "whatever is connected with" particula
perceived objects agrees with empirical laws. In other words, whatever for
mally contingent empirical objects we experience, these objects are governed
by causal laws. Consequently, they are empirically necessary, because the
follow from previous events by the natural laws. Thus, in the first sentence,
Kant points out that certain features of experience are formally contingent,
but nonetheless empirically necessary. In the second sentence Kant expresses
agnosticism about the possibility of "another series of appearances in thor
oughgoing connection with that which is given to me in perception, thus mor
than a single all-encompassing experience." By this, I take Kant to mean a
non-actual series of empirical events, i.e. an alternate empirical history ("
single all-encompassing experience"). By describing this non-actual series a
"in thoroughgoing connection" I take Kant to mean that it is governed by
causal laws, perhaps even by the causal laws that operate in the actual world.
The question is whether some series of non-actual events, governed by causal
laws, is possible. I will refer to these series of causally linked empirical events
as 'empirical worlds' from now on.39 Some empirical worlds will have the
same natural laws the actual world does; some will not.40
By 'possible,' Kant might mean 'formally possible.' However, it is clear
that a non-actual empirical world is formally possible, as long as it is gov-
erned by causal laws. The forms of experience alone do not determine which
particular series of events we experience. Furthermore, we can know tha
non-actual empirical worlds are formally possible by knowing that the ac-
tual empirical world is formally contingent. Thus, if by 'possible' Kant means
'formally possible,' it is unclear why he expresses agnosticism. On the other
hand, by 'possible' Kant might mean 'empirically possible.' However, no
non-actual series of events is empirically possible. Since a non-actual empir
ical world involves at least some non-actual empirical events, no non-actua
empirical world is empirically possible. Furthermore, we can know that no

non-actual empirical world is empirically possible by knowing what empir-
ical necessity is, and knowing that the causal laws are deterministic. Thus,
if by 'possible' Kant means 'empirically possible,' it is again unclear why he
expresses agnosticism.
Kant expresses agnosticism about the possibility of non-spatial and non-
temporal intuition, and about non-actual empirical worlds. However, neither
formal nor empirical possibility support agnosticism; each of them delivers
a definite answer as to the possibility of non-spatial and non-temporal in-
tuition, and non-actual empirical worlds. Thus, Kant must have a distinct
kind of modality in mind in these passages. Both formal possibility and
empirical possibility are defined in terms of experience. Formal possibility is
compatibility with the forms of experience, the determinable representational
structures that make experience possible. Empirical possibility is compatibil-
ity with empirical laws and the past history of empirical events. However,
the empirical is not the only domain in Kant's metaphysics. Kant also ac-
cepts a domain of non-empirical objects, the things in themselves. Things in
themselves are non-spatial and non-temporal mind-independent objects that
causally affect our minds, giving rise to experience. The objects of experience,
of which we do have knowledge, are appearances of things in themselves.41
In this paper I do not have space to develop a detailed interpretation of
Kant's views on things in themselves and their relation to appearances. For
my purposes it is sufficient to point out that things in themselves provide
an answer to the question we faced earlier: if Kant is not talking about
formal possibility or empirical possibility, what kind of possibility does he
have in mind? When Kant expresses agnosticism about whether non-spatial
and non-temporal intuition and non-actual empirical series are possible, he
is expressing agnosticism about whether things in themselves could cause us
to have different forms of intuition or to experience a different empirical
world. Recall the definition given earlier,
Noumenal possibility It is noumenally possible that p just in case it is com-

patible with the causal powers of things in themselves
that p.
Noumenal possibility, like empirical possibility, is grounded in the causal

powers of actual things. Unlike empirical possibility, it is grounded in the
causal powers of things in themselves. In this paper, I am applying these con-
ceptions of possibility - formal possibility, empirical possibility, and noume-
nal possibility - to propositions about empirical objects, e.g. the proposition
that some actual event occurs, or the proposition that outer objects are spa-
tial. If p is a proposition about empirical objects, it is compatible with the
causal powers of things in themselves that p just in case it is compatible with
the causal powers of things in themselves that they cause p to obtain. Things
458 NOS
in themselves cause propositions about empirical objects to obtain by caus-

ing us to experience objects for which those propositions obtain. Therefore,
if p is a proposition about empirical objects, it is noumenally possible that p
just in case it is compatible with the causal powers of things in themselves
that they cause us to experience objects for which p obtains.42
This is the kind of possibility Kant has in mind when he expresses agnosti-
cism about the possibility of non-spatial and non-temporal intuition and the
possibility of non-actual empirical worlds. We cannot know the causal pow-
ers of things in themselves. Therefore, we cannot know whether it is possible
for things in themselves to cause us to have forms of intuition other than
the forms of intuition we actually have, space and time. Likewise, we cannot
know whether it is possible for things in themselves to cause us to experience
a different empirical world. This conception of noumenal necessity allows us
to define a companion conception of noumenal necessity,
Noumenal necessity It is noumenally necessary that p just in case it is in-

compatible with the causal powers of things in them-
selves that not -p.
Noumenal contingency is defined in the usual fashion: it is noumenally con-

tingent that p just in case (i) actually p , and (ii) it is not noumenally necessary
that p . To know what is noumenally contingent, we would need to know
whether some non-actual proposition (e.g. the proposition that our forms
of intuition are non-spatiotemporal) is compatible with the causal powers
of things in themselves. The only propositions we know to be compatible
with the powers of things in themselves are propositions that are actual;
knowing that some non-actual proposition is noumenally possible would re-
quire knowing the causal powers of things in themselves. Since we cannot
know this, we cannot know what is noumenally contingent. Consequently,
we cannot know what is noumenally necessary.
Some readers might object that my definitions of noumenal possibility and
noumenal necessity attribute causal and modal properties to things in them-
selves. This might be taken to violate Kant's doctrine that categories like
'cause-effect,' 'possibility' and 'necessity' do not apply to things in them-
selves. My response is that I am not directly attributing modal properties
to things in themselves.43 I am attributing modal properties to propositions
about empirical objects on the basis of the causal powers of things in them-
selves. Thus, the only categorial properties I am directly attributing to things
in themselves are causal powers.44 Kant's doctrine is not that categorial prop-
erties cannot be attributed to things in themselves but that we cannot know
the categorial properties of things in themselves. Thus, Kant draws a dis-
tinction between thinking and knowing (or cognizing - Erkennen). All that
is required for thinking of an object falling under a concept is that there
be no logical inconsistency in the object falling under the concept. Since
there is nothing logically contradictory about things in themselves falling

under categories, we can think of things in themselves as having causal pow-
ers.45 Since Kant expresses agnosticism about the noumenal possibility of
non-spatial and non-temporal intuition and non-actual causal laws, it is suf-
ficient that we can think of things in themselves having causal powers.46 We
can think about whether non-spatial and non-temporal intuition and non-
actual causal laws are noumenally possible, but we cannot know. This is why
Kant expresses agnosticism about the noumenal possibility of non-spatial
and non-temporal intuition and empirical worlds other than the actual one.
The notion of noumenal possibility is not confined to the Postulates of
Empirical Thought, however. The noumenal possibility of non-actual events
plays a crucial role in one of the foundations of Kant's whole Critical system:
his theory of freedom. According to Kant, ought implies can, so if I ought
not to perform a given act, then I can omit that act. But every act I commit
is an empirical event and is therefore a necessary consequence of prior events
and natural laws. How can Kant reconcile the empirical necessity of any act
I actually commit with the possibility that I omit it?47
Kant thinks that if we restrict our attention to the empirical world, free-
dom, and therefore the applicability of the moral law, is impossible:
For if appearances are things in themselves, then freedom cannot be saved.

Then nature is the completely determining cause, sufficient in itself, of every
occurrence, and the condition for an occurrence is always contained only in the
series of appearances that, along with their effect, are necessary under the law
of nature. (A536/B564)
If appearances were things in themselves, i.e., if we could not appeal to

things in themselves as a distinct domain of objects, then freedom would be
destroyed.48 Freedom would be destroyed because each of my actions would
be empirically necessary, and there would be no possibility of my omitting
any of my acts.49
Kant resolves the conflict between our freedom and the empirical necessity
of our actions by appeal to a non-empirical domain: things in themselves, and
their causal powers. Self-conscious rational subjects, for Kant, are things in
themselves that appear to themselves and other subjects as empirical objects
in space and time and subject to causal laws. Therefore, as a rational subject,
I can be considered both as a thing in itself (outside of space and time)
and as the appearance of that thing in itself (in space and time, subject to
causal determination).50 In a discussion of the conflict between freedom and
necessity Kant writes:
Every action [of a subject] ... is to be regarded in the consciousness of his intel-
ligible existence as nothing but the consequence and never as the determining
ground of his causality as a noumenon. So considered, a rational being can now
460 NOS
rightly say of every unlawful action he performed that he could have omitted
it even though as appearance it is sufficiently determined in the past, and so
far, is inevitably necessary; for this action, with all the past which determines it,
belongs to a single phenomenon of his character, which he gives to himself and
in accordance with which he imputes to himself, as a cause independent of all
sensibility, the causality of those appearances. (5:97-9851)
Kant resolves the conflict between freedom and necessity by appealing to

the causal powers of the subject, considered as a thing in itself ( noumenon ),
" a cause independent of all sensibility."52 When Kant writes that "a rational
being can now rightly say of every unlawful action he performed that he
could have omitted it" I take him to be claiming that for any unlawful
action an agent performs, the omission of that action is noumenally possible
because the agent, considered as a thing in itself, has the causal power to
choose in such a way that the empirical world does not include that action
The empirical necessity of my actions is compatible with their noumenal
contingency.53
5. Conclusion
Kant accepts the following principles about modality:
( i ) Where p is a synthetic proposition, it is formally necessary that p just in case

it is a priori that p.
Formal possibility is compatibility with the forms of experience (space, time,

the categories). Thus, it is formally necessary that p just in case not -p is
incompatible with the forms of experience. A priori knowledge is knowledge
justified solely by the forms of experience, not by particular determinate
experiences. We can know that p a priori , independently of experience, just in
case the forms of experience guarantee that p. For instance, since non-spatial
outer objects are incompatible with the forms of experience, we can know
a priori that outer objects are spatial. Likewise, since the non-obtaining of
the Newton's inverse-square law of gravitation is compatible with the forms
of experience, our justification for accepting this law must depend at least in
part on particular experiences. Therefore, Newton's law is a posteriori ,54
( ii) For propositions about empirical events, the actual, the empirically possible,
and the empirically necessary are co-extensive.
Empirical possibility is compatibility with actual empirical events and em-

pirical laws. Since the empirical laws are deterministic, the history of the
empirical world up to a given point in time determines a unique future his-
tory. Any event that is not part of that history is incompatible with the past
events and the laws. Therefore, no non-actual empirical events are empirically
possible. Equivalently, all empirical events are empirically necessary.
( iii ) We cannot know what is noumenally necessary, and what is noumenally con-
tingent.
Noumenal possibility is compatibility with the causal powers of things in

themselves. Since we cannot know the causal powers of things in themselves,
for any non-actual proposition p we cannot know whether p is compatible or
incompatible with the powers of things in themselves. Therefore, we cannot
know whether a proposition (e.g. not-/?) that actually obtains is noumenally
necessary or noumenally contingent.
(iv) For all we know, some formally contingent propositions are noumenally nec-
essary, and some formally necessary propositions are noumenally contingent.
Since we cannot know what is noumenally contingent, and what is noume-

nally necessary, we cannot know whether it is noumenally necessary that
outer objects are spatial, and we cannot know whether it is noumenally
contingent that Newton's law obtains.
(v) For all we know, some of our a priori knowledge may be knowledge of noume-
nally contingent truths, and some of our posteriori knowledge may be knowl-
edge of noumenally necessary truths.
For instance, it is formally contingent that Newton's law obtains. Conse-

quently, we know Newton's law only a posteriori. However, we do not know
whether things in themselves could cause us to experience a world in which
Newton's law does not obtain. Therefore, for all we know, Newton's law
is noumenally necessary. Likewise, it is formally necessary that outer ob-
jects are spatial and space is Euclidean; consequently, we know a priori
that outer objects are spatial and space is Euclidean. However, we do not
know whether things in themselves could cause us to have a form of intu-
ition that is non-spatial or non-Euclidean. Therefore, for all we know, it is
noumenally contingent that we experience outer objects as spatial and space
as Euclidean. Therefore, Kant sharply distinguishes metaphysical modality
from epistemological modality.
I began this paper by discussing Kripke 's distinction between metaphysical
and epistemological modality. Kripke begins by pointing out that the a priori
and the necessary are different intensionally' to say that a proposition is
knowable a priori means something different than to say that it is necessarily
true. Kripke then gives examples of propositions where our intuitions lead
us to believe that necessity and a priority come apart, e.g. 'Water is H2O'
and 'this stick is one meter long now.'
462 NOS
Kant also distinguishes between necessity and a priority , but is led to

make this distinction for very different reasons. The central problem raised
in the Critique of Pure Reason is: how can we have a priori knowledge of non-
analytic necessary truths? For reasons I did not discuss in this paper, Kant
held that we could not have a priori knowledge of non-analytic necessary
truths about things in themselves. This threatens to undermine metaphysics.
One of Kant's strategies in the CPR is to take formal possibility as a sui
generis kind of modality. If we take 'compatibility with the forms of experi-
ence' to be a basic, unanalyzable kind of modality, then we have an a priori
metaphysics that gives us insight into necessary truths: formally necessary
truths. Furthermore, these formally necessary truths are truths that neces-
sarily apply to empirical objects, given the premise that these objects are
appearances. It is crucial that we take formal possibility to be primitive. If
we analyze compatibility with the forms of experience in terms of noumenal
possibility given the forms of experience then our knowledge of formal possi-
bility depends our knowledge of noumenal possibility, which we in principle
cannot obtain. On this supposition, we could not know, for instance, that
some non-actual empirical object is formally possible unless we knew that it
is noumenally possible. If we analyze compatibility with the forms of experi-
ence in terms of logical compatibility with the forms of experience, then our
knowledge of what is formally possible, given the forms of experience, would
be analytic, rather than synthetic. On this supposition, we would be able to
derive the theorems of geometry from the axioms by non-synthetic deduc-
tive methods, but Kant thinks this is impossible, because we must employ
the irreducibly synthetic method of construction in pure intuition.
Translated into contemporary language, Kant became skeptical about
our ability to know what is metaphysically possible. In order not to aban-
don metaphysics entirely, he transformed it into a study of formal possi-
bility. Rather than a study of the metaphysically necessary principles that
govern mind-independent objects, metaphysics for Kant becomes a study
of the formally necessary principles that govern mind-dependent empirical
objects.55
Appendix: Analysis of the Secondary Literature
Kant has been widely interpreted as holding the pre-Kripkean consensus view
that necessity and a priority are co-extensive, claim (1) from the Introduction.
In the passage quoted in the Introduction, James Van Cleve describes Kant's
position as follows:
Although the two distinctions drawn so far [a priori/a posteriori and neces-
sary/contingent] differ in intension (one relating to the manner of being known
and the other to the manner of being true), Kant believes that they coincide in
extension - that they divide up the field of true propositions in the same way.
He believes that propositions are necessary iff they are a priori , and contingent
iff they are empirical or a posteriori.56
This interpretation has been defended by Philip Kitcher, Norman Kemp

Smith, and Hans Vaihingen57
However, some interpreters do not attribute (1) to Kant, but the closely
related claim that:
(2a) If it is knowable that it is necessary that /?, then it is a priori that p.5S
Where '/?' ranges over knowable synthetic propositions about empirical ob-
jects. This is the claim that if we know not merely that a proposition is true,
but that it is necessarily true, then that proposition is knowable a priori. It
is equivalent to the claim that a posteriori knowledge is merely knowledge
that something is the case, never that it is necessarily the case. Both Henry
Allison and Paul Guyer interpret Kant as accepting this principle, i.e. as
holding that, for Kant, only a priori propositions can be known to be nec-
essary.59 There is textual evidence for attributing claim (2a) to Kant. In a
passage quoted in the Introduction, which is often read as supporting (1),
Kant writes: "Experience teaches us, to be sure, that something is constituted
thus and so, but not that it could not be otherwise" (B4). In fact, this passage
is most naturally read as making claim (2a).
Note, however, that claim (2a) is only one half of a bi-conditional:
(2) It is knowable that it is necessary that p just in case it is a priori that p.
Principle (2) does not claim that a priority is co-extensive with necessity, but
with 'knowable necessity,' the property a necessarily true proposition has
just in case the proposition can be known to be necessarily true. Principle (2)
is the intuitively plausible claim that all a priori knowable propositions can
be known to be necessary, and that all propositions known to be necessary
are knowable a priori. It is equivalent to the claim that a proposition is a
posteriori just in case it is knowable, but cannot be known to be necessary.
There is also textual evidence for attributing claim (2) to Kant. In a pas-
sage quoted in the Introduction, Kant writes that some truths "are cognizable
as truths a priori , which is completely identical with the proposition: they
are cognizable as necessary truths" (8:235). This is most naturally read as
making claim (2).
I have distinguished two claims one might attribute to Kant:
(1) Necessarily p just in case it is a priori that p.

(2) It is knowable that it is necessary that p just in case it is a priori that p.
464 NOS
Whether Kant accepts these claims depends upon what kind of necessity
they involve. If we restrict claim (1) to formal necessity, it becomes
(1F) It is formally necessary that p just in case it is a priori that p.
I have argued that Kant accepts this claim.60 However, if we restrict claim
(1) to empirical necessity or to noumenal necessity it becomes:
(1E) It is empirically necessary that p just in case it is a priori that p.

(1N) It is noumenally necessary that p just in case it is a priori that p.
I have argued that Kant thinks that (Ie) is false, and is agnostic about the
truth of (In). Therefore, we should expect that whether Kant accepts (2), or
it's left-to-right half, (2a), depends upon what kind of necessity it involves.
If we restrict claim (2) to formal necessity, it becomes:
(2F) It is knowable that it is formally necessary that p just in case it is a priori

that p.
This is a claim Kant accepts61. If, as I suspect they do, Guyer and Allison
understand 'necessary' in (2a) to mean 'formally necessary,' then they are
correct in attributing it to Kant. However, their attribution is incomplete,
for Kant also accepts the bi-conditional of which (2a) is only one half; Kant
accepts claim (2p).62
However, if we restrict claim (2) to empirical necessity we get
(2E) It is knowable that it is empirically necessary that p just in case it is a

priori that p.
Kant does not accept (2E). He does not accept the left-to-right half of (2E)
because the empirically necessary truths are propositions about particular
empirical alterations, and none of them are a priori. For the same reasons,
neither does he accept the right-to-left half. Therefore, if Guyer and Allison
understand by 'necessary' in (2a) 'empirically necessary,' they are wrong in
attributing it to Kant.63
Finally, if we restrict claim (2) to noumenal necessity we get:
(2N) It is knowable that it is noumenally necessary that p just in case it is a

priori that p.
Kant does not accept this principle. He does not accept the right-to-left half,
because he thinks the consequent of that conditional is never satisfied: for
no synthetic proposition p do we know that it is noumenally necessary that
p. However, it follows from Kant's view that the left-to-right half of (2N)
is vacuously true. Since the antecedent 'it is knowable that it is noumenally

necessary that /?' is false for every synthetic proposition p, the left-to-right
half of (2n) is true, but vacuously so. If Guyer and Allison understand
'necessary' in (2a) to mean 'noumenally necessary' then they are attributing
the left-to-right half of (2N) to him. While this is not a claim he rejects, it
is not a substantive principle about a priori knowledge and knowledge of
necessary truth, on Kant's view. However, I think Guyer and Allison have
formal necessity in mind when they attribute (2a) to Kant. Consequently, I
think they are attributing the left-to-right half of (2p), rather than of (2N),
to Kant. As I argued earlier, this attribution is correct, but incomplete.
My stalking-horse in the paper was claim (1). However, more careful
consideration of the texts and the writings of other commentators, have
shown that many of the texts cited to support the attribution of (1) to Kant
actually support the attribution of (2a), or even (2), to Kant, a pointed noted
by Allison and Guyer. So it may seem that I should have focused on (2) from
the beginning. However, my investigation of the much simpler claim, (1), has
also led to an answer as to whether Kant holds the more complicated claim,
(2). If (2) is restricted to formal possibility, Kant holds it; otherwise, not.
Notes
1 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1980), 38.
2 See the Appendix.
3 All citations to the Critique of Pure Reason use the customary format of giving the
page in the 1st -edition of 1781 (A), followed by the page in the 2nd -edition of 1787 (B) (e.g.
A327/B384). Citations to other works of Kant give the volume and page number in the Academy
edition, Kants gesammelte Schriften , edited by the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1900 - ). When followed by a four-digit number, 'R' refers to Kant's
unpublished Reflections in vol. 17 & 18 of the Academy edition. Unless otherwise noted,
translations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Complete Works of Immanuel Kant , eds. Paul
Guyer and Allen Wood (New York: Cambridge UP, 1998 - ).
4 These claims are echoed in passages throughout Kant's work, including the Prolegomena
(4:268, 277, 294, 315, 335n), the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (4:455), the Critique
of Practical Reason (5:53), throughout the unpublished Reflections (e.g. 5607, 5414, 5668, 6324,
6346, 6361) and elsewhere in the CPR (B5, Al 14, A353, A721/B749, A765/B793). See the
Appendix for a breakdown of the textual evidence.
5 James Van Cleve, Problems from Kant (New York: Oxford UP, 1999), 17. See the Appendix
for a more thorough discussion of the secondary literature on this topic.
6 I am departing from Kant's terminology here. Kant typically defines possibility in terms
of the possibility of an object - see his metaphysics lectures (28:410, 543 and 29:811, 960). For
ease of exposition, I have defined possibility in terms of the possibility of a proposition. These
are inter-convertible definitions: an object a is possible just in case the proposition that a exists
is possible.
7 Since the definition of noumenal possibility depends upon the causal powers of things in
themselves, what counts as noumenally necessary will depend upon which things in themselves
the definition refers to. Specifically, if God, who exists necessarily and is, presumably, omnipotent
with respect to all finite beings, is included, no finite being is noumenally necessary. However,
466 N0 S
Kant holds that God does not (directly) create empirical objects. Cf. his discussion of Spinozism
in the Critique of Practical Reason (5:102).
8 Readers who balk at the concept of an analytic or synthetic proposition (rather than,
e.g., a sentence or judgment) should note that by 'proposition' I mean what Kant would call
the content of a judgment, and that the contents of judgments are composed of concepts for
Kant. In this paper, '/?' ranges only over synthetic propositions. Consequently, I will be ignoring
Kant's conception of logical possibility/necessity.
9 Some readers might object to characterizing propositions about empirical objects as
'noumenally possible.' How can a noumenal characterization apply to an empirical object?
However, I have defined noumenal possibility so that it can apply both to noumenal ob-
jects (noumena, or things in themselves) and to empirical objects. The noumenal possibility
of an empirical object having some feature consists in a relation of that empirical object
and that feature to the non-empirical objects (things in themselves) that ground empirical
objects. It is noumenally possible for an empirical object to have that feature just in case
it is compatible with the powers of things in themselves that the empirical object have that
feature.
10 Determining the precise extension of 'objects of experience' for Kant is difficult, because
it is difficult to determine precisely how broad his conception of experience is. However, it is
clear that objects of experience include not only objects we directly perceive (what I call 'objects
of ordinary experience' in this essay) but also objects we perceive only directly, such as entities
whose existence we posit to explain observable phenomena (see Kant's discussion of 'a magnetic
matter' at A225-6/B273- 4). For more on Kant's conception of the limits of experience, see
my "Indeterminacy and Transcendental Idealism" ( British Journal of the History of Philosophy,
forthcoming).
1 1 All of these claims can be made compatible with a 'one object' reading of Kant's idealism.
See notes 21 and 42.
12 Readers who object to the ascription of causal powers to things in themselves should
look at section four and note 44, where I defend this interpretation.
13 These definitions of necessity are derived using the principle: necessarily p if and only if
not possibly not -p. Kant consistently reiterates the inter-definability of possibility and necessity
in his lectures on metaphysics (28:418, 498, 556, 557, and 633). Cf. Al, .
14 When I describe a proposition as ' a priori' I mean this as a short-hand for 'knowable a
priori by us.' Likewise, by ' posteriori ' I mean 'knowable only a posteriori by us' or, equivalently,
'knowable by us, but not a priori .' According to this usage, the a priori and the a posteriori
exhaustively divide the domain of propositions we can know. This does not exclude a posteriori
knowledge of a priori propositions, such as knowledge by testimony that some mathematical
theorem holds. It is not clear whether Kant held that we can know mathematical truths a
posterior i; in the Vienna lecture transcripts on logic Kant says that we cannot know mathematics
by testimony (24:895), but in the Blomberg and Jsche transcripts (24:52-3, 9:22) he suggests
that we can. Furthermore, in this paper I am concerned only with Kant's views on what we can
know on theoretical grounds; Kant's theory of knowledge on practical grounds, developed in the
Critique of Practical Reason , is outside the scope of this paper.
15 In this paper I am not arguing that Kant extensionally distinguished the a priori from the
necessary by pointing out that, for Kant, there are necessarily true propositions that we cannot
know. As Des Hogan has pointed out to me, Kant holds that if God exists, he exists necessarily,
but Kant also holds that we cannot know on theoretical grounds whether God exists. This pro-
vides Kant with a proposition that, if true, is necessarily true, but which is not a priori. Similarly,
Albert Casullo has pointed out that Kant is not committed to claiming that all necessary truths
are knowable - see his "A Priori Knowledge" in Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, ed. Paul
Moser (New York: Oxford UP, 2002), 95-143 at 96. See the Appendix for more discussion of
Casullo's interpretation. As I show below, Kant also extensionally distinguishes between the a
priori and the necessary within the domain of truths knowable by us.
16 Some readers may balk at my attributing to Kant the doctrine of 'noumenal affec-
tion,' that things in themselves (noumena) causally affect us. However, the textual evidence
overwhelmingly supports this attribution. See especially A190/B235, A387, A494/B522, 4:289,
4:314, 4:318, 4:451 and 8:215. The classic defense of noumenal affection is chapter three of
Erich Adickes, Kant und das Ding an Sich (Berlin: Pan Verlag Rolf Heisse, 1924); Des Hogan
convincingly responds to the standard objections to noumenal affection in the first section of
"Noumenal Affection" Philosophical Review 118 (4): 501-532 at 501-5. The rest of Hogan's
paper, in which he tries to show how noumenal affection is compatible with Kant's doctrine that
we are ignorant of things in themselves, I find highly problematic. See my "Freedom, Knowledge
and Affection: Reply to Hogan" (ms).
17 This conception of the a priori is equivalent to what Patricia Kitcher calls 'a priorio' -
see Patricia Kitcher, Kant's Transcendental Psychology (New York: Oxford UP), 15-16.
18 See A50-51/B75: "Thus pure intuition contains merely the form under which something
is intuited, and pure concept only the form of thinking in general. Only pure intuitions or
concepts alone are possible a priori , empirical ones only a posteriori ."
19 What I call 'formal possibility' corresponds to Norman Kemp Smith calls "empirical
possibility in the wider sense, equivalent to agreement with the formal conditions of experience"
in his Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press,
1992), 401.
20 Regarding the contingency of particular causal laws, Kant writes: "Particular laws, be-
cause they concern empirically determined appearances, cannot be completely derived from the
categories, although they all stand under them. Experience must be added in order to come
to know particular laws at all; but about objects of experience in general, and about what can
be cognized as an object of experience, only those a priori laws offer instruction" (B164). Cf.
Kant's discussion in section V of the published Introduction to the Critique of Judgment where
he claims that particular laws are contingent "from the point of view of the understanding"
(5:183^t). See note 24 for more discussion of the modal status of natural laws for Kant.
21 The controversy concerns whether the appearance/thing in itself distinction is a distinc-
tion between two objects (the 'two object' reading), or between two different ways of considering
one object (the 'one object' reading). For a helpful overview of the literature on the subject,
see Karl Ameriks, "Recent Work on Kant's Theoretical Philosophy" in Interpreting Kant 's Cri-
tiques (New York: Oxford UP, 2003), 67-97 . Although I accept the 'two object' reading, I don't
argue for it in this paper; throughout this discussion, I formulate my argument in a way that is
compatible with both a 'two object' and a 'one object' reading.
22 Both Henry Allison, the classic defender of a 'one object' reading of Kant's idealism,
and James Van Cleve, one of the most outspoken critics of Allison's reading, both attribute
this claim to Kant, but interpret it differently in light of their differing interpretations of Kant's
idealism. See Henry Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale UP, 2004), 37;
and Van Cleve, Problems , 90-95.
23 However, both directions of the bi-conditional it is formally necessary that p just in case it
is a priori knowable that p are problematic. To prove the left to right side, Kant needs to exclude
the following possibility: the forms of experience introduce certain contents into experience, but
I can only know through experience what these contents are. To prove the right to left hand side,
Kant needs to exclude the following possibility: I have a priori knowledge of some mathematical
proposition, although that mathematical proposition is not made true by the forms of experience
because it concerns a mathematical structures that can never be instantiated in experience. For
an interesting presentation of these problems, see Paul Kitcher, "A Priori" in Paul Guyer, ed.
Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2006), 28-60.
24 The topic of the modal and epistemic status of natural laws in Kant's system is com-
plicated and controversial. By 'natural laws' I mean law-like generalizations about empirical
objects that do not obtain solely in virtue of the forms of experience; thus, the analogies of
468 NO S
experience are not natural laws. In the passages quoted in note 20, and in others, Kant claims
that all natural laws are (a) formally contingent (not determined by the forms of experience
alone) and (b ) a posteriori (see note 20). In these and other passages, Kant claims that (c) laws
as such must be necessary (e.g. 5:1789-80), and (d) that certain laws (the metaphysical principles
of matter) are a priori (Preface to MFNS). I attempt to resolve these tensions, and provide a
unified account of modality in the empirical world, in my "Kant on the Modal Status of Laws
of Nature" (ms); in this paper, I can only indicate the outlines of that view. I argue that Kant
held that (i) none of the natural laws are formally necessary, because even the 'most' necessary
of them, the metaphysical principles of matter, rest on the empirical concept of matter (which
is not determined by the forms of experience alone); (ii) some of the natural laws, namely, the
metaphysical principles of matter adumbrated in Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
are a priori (see note 25); (iii) the metaphysical principles of matter are necessary in the following
sense: they are formally necessary on the condition that objects of outer sense are material (and
this condition is only formally contingent); (iv) no other laws are strictly speaking a priori, (v)
all laws as such are necessary, but the necessity of laws as such is a distinct kind of modality,
not identical any of the three kinds of modality distinguished in this paper. In this paper, when
I talk about 'particular causal laws,' I am referring to the formally contingent a posteriori laws,
not to the a priori metaphysical principles of matter. Cf. Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact
Sciences (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1992), ch. 3-4.
25 Although Kant does repeatedly endorse both halves of this biconditional (see the Ap-
pendix), there is a putative counter-example within his own system: the metaphysical principles
of matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Kant claims these principles are
both a priori and formally contingent (because they are not determined by the forms of expe-
rience alone), but depend upon the empirical concept of matter; see 4:470, 482. Fully dealing
with these cases requires explaining Kant's idea of a metaphysics of matter, and thus lies far
outside the scope of this paper. In my "Kant on the Modal Status of Laws of Nature" (ms) I
develop a view of Kant's modal theory that covers the metaphysical principles of matter. See
note 24 for more on these issues.
26 See the Appendix.
27 For instance, Kant says of the rules that connect like-causes to like-events (i.e. causal
laws) "in accordance with such a rule there must therefore lie in that which in general precedes
an occurrence the condition for a rule, in accordance with which this occurrence always and
necessarily follows" (A193/B238).
28 See notes 20, 24 and 25 for more on the a posteriori character of particular laws.
29 See A766/B795: "Thus if wax that was previously firm melts, I can cognize a priori
that something must have preceded (e.g. the warmth of the sun) on which this has followed in
accordance with a constant law, though without experience, to be sure, I could determinately
cognize neither the cause from the effect nor the effect from the cause a priori and without
instruction from experience."
30 What I call 'empirical' possibility corresponds roughly to what Norman Kemp Smith
calls 'empirical possibility in the narrower sense' ( Commentary , 401).
31 By introducing this heuristic device, I am not suggesting that Kant accepts a 'possible
worlds' analysis of modality. Kant's theory of modality does not appeal to possible worlds,
except as a heuristic (e.g. 2:72). On the possible worlds analysis of determinism, see David
Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals" in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology
(New York: Oxford UP), 8-55.
32 As I have set up the definitions, it would be more precise to say: for any event E, the
proposition that E occurs is empirically necessary. However, I am treating the two formulations
as identical, for ease of exposition. See note 6.
I have been discussing Kant's model of causation in terms of 'event-event' causation.
In Ch. 4 of his Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality (New York: Cambridge UP, 2005), Eric
Watkins argues that Kant does not have an 'event-event' model of causation, but has instead a
model in which the power of a substance changes the state of another substance. I am assuming
an 'event-event' model in this paper because it makes formulating determinism easier. Everything
I say can be translated into Watkins' model.
34 This is not the only passage in which Kant deploys this conception of empirical necessity.
See Kant's lectures on metaphysics (28:417, 29:814) and R 4298 and 5177.
35 1 take this to be Kant's point when he writes: "Thus it is not the existence of things (sub-
stances) but of their state of alone we can cognize the necessity, and moreover only from other
states, which are given in perception, in accordance with empirical laws of causality . . . hence we
cognize only the necessity of effects in nature, the causes of which are given to us, and the mark
of necessity in existence does not reach beyond the field of possible experience, and even in this
it does not hold of the existence of things, as substances, since these can never be regarded as
empirical effects, or as something that happens and arises (A227/B280)." Empirical modality
is defined only for propositions about empirical events; it is not defined for propositions about
which empirical substances exist, or what laws govern the operation of their powers, since neither
substances nor laws "happen and arise."
36 Therefore, I disagree with Norman Kemp Smith's claim that "only the empirically actual
is genuinely possible. Such is also the meaning that usually attaches to the term possible in
the other sections of the Critique " ( Commentary , p. 392). It is true that only the actual is
empirically possible, but empirical possibility is not the only 'genuine' kind of possibility. In
fact, as I argued in section two, by 'possible' Kant typically means 'formally possible,' contra
Kemp Smith's claim.
37 If necessarily p if and only if not possibly not -p, the questions is the field of possibility
greater than the field of the actuall and is the field of the actual greater than that of the necessary ?
receive the same answer. See note 13.
38 In a variety of other texts, Kant expresses agnosticism about the possibility of a non-
spatiotemporal form of intuition. See A42/B59, B72, A231/B283 and Prolegomena 57 (4:351).
39 By 'empirical worlds' I do not mean empirically possible worlds. There is only one
empirically possible world, the actual one.
40 It is possible to read this passage as concerning the possibility of non-actual empirical
laws. However, the same questions arise: non-actual empirical laws are clearly formally possible,
and empirically impossible, so why does Kant express agnosticism? Cf. Paul Guyer, "The Pos-
tulates of Empirical Thought in General and the Refutation of Idealism," in Immanuel Kant:
Kritik der reinen Vernunft , eds. Georg Mohr and Marcus Willaschek (Berlin: Akadamie Verlag,
1998), 297-324 at 304-308.
41 On a 'one object' reading, these claims should be understood to mean: considering
objects as they appear to us is not the only standpoint we can take on objects. We can also
consider them as they are in themselves. We know only how objects appear to us, not how they
are in themselves. I am remaining neutral on the one object/ two object debate. See note 2 1 for
more on this debate.
42 The doctrine of noumenal affection - that things in themselves cause us to experience
objects - is compatible with the metaphysical version of the 'one object' reading. See, for
instance, Westphal, "In Defense of the Thing in Itself," Kant-Studien 59 (1968), 118-141 at
132-4; and Erich Adickes, Kant und das Ding an Sich (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1977), 28-37.
Furthermore, as I understand their views, the doctrine of noumenal affection is also compatible
with the 'one object' reading of Kant's idealism adopted by Gerold Prauss and Henry Allison.
Allison reinterprets the doctrine as a 'meta-level' claim in Transcendental Idealism , 64-73. As
I understand Allison's current view, noumenal affection and empirical affection are not two
distinct causal processes, but one process described at two different levels: the empirical level,
and an abstract 'transcendental' level where the specific spatiotemporal nature of the affection is
abstracted from ( Transcendental Idealism , 72). Therefore, my interpretation remains compatible
with both 'two object' and 'one object' readings.
470 NOS
43 However, Kant does attribute modal properties to things in themselves, and distinguishes,
for instance, the possibility of a thing in itself from the possibility of an object of experience.
See R 5184, 5723 and 5177.
44 In a variety of passages from the Critical period, Kant describes things in themselves in
causal terms. See especially his discussion of the forces of things in themselves in his response
to Mendelssohn's Morgenstunden at 8:153-4. See note 16 for more on this issue.
45 For the distinction between thinking and cognizing, see the footnote at Bxxvi,
A239/B298, B307-315, and the Critique of Practical Reason (5:43, 55).
46 In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant considers his warrant for applying the category
of causality to the supersensible world - see especially 5:54. In that passage, Kant claims that
we can think supersensible objects under categories, but we cannot cognize or know them to fall
under the categories.
47 Kant confronts precisely this question in the Critique of Practical Reason at 5:95-96.
Kant is trying to reconcile the empirical necessity of all of my acts with the possibility of my
omitting any one of them. He thinks that my acts are normatively subject to the moral law only
if they are free, and freedom requires that it is possible for me to act otherwise.
48 Again, this can be construed on 'one object' lights as well: since objects appear de-
termined, if objects appear to us as they are in themselves, freedom would be destroyed. See
Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (New York: Cambridge UP, 199), 43^t5 and Derk
Pereboom, "Kant on Transcendental Freedom" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73
(2007), 537-567 at 550-559 for 'one object' accounts of Kant's theory of freedom. Pereboom
also has an informative discussion of how Kant's theory of freedom can be understood on both
'two object' and 'one object' readings.
49 Kant assumes throughout that the mere formal possibility of my omitting some act is
not sufficient for its being free. He assumes that freedom requires that I have the causal power
to act other than I do. The mere compatibility of acting otherwise with the forms of experience
entails nothing about my having the power to act otherwise.
50 In the case of the self, the difference between 'one object' and 'two object' readings is
slight. 'Two object' readers typically claim that in the case of the self, there is only one object,
considered two ways: as I am in myself, and as I appear. I appear determined, but, considered as
I am in myself, I am free. Ameriks ("Theoretical Philosophy," 76) and Robert Adams ("Things
in Themselves," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997), 801-825 at 822) each
allow that, in the case of the self, there is one object, considered from two standpoints. Richard
Aquila is a staunch 'two object-er' even in the case of the self - see "Things in Themselves and
Appearances," Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie 61 (1979), 293-307 at 305.
51 See also A537/B565.
52 Kant also writes of the subject as an "intelligible cause" (A537/B565) whose effects
are encountered in experience, and as having an "intelligible character" that appears as its
empirical character (A541/B569). At A544/B572 he describes "empirical causality" as an effect
of "intelligible causality."
53 Exactly how the very same event can be both empirically necessary and noumenally
contingent involves Kant's notions of 'empirical character' and 'noumenal character' and lies
outside the scope of this paper. For more on this issue, see Allen Wood, "Kant's Compatibilism"
in ed. Allen Wood, Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1984), 102-12;
Watkins, Causality , 325-339; and Pereboom, "Transcendental Freedom," 550-559.
54 In two passages, Kant appears to claim that Newton's inverse square law of gravitation is
knowable a priori (Prolegomena 38, MFNS 4:518-521). However, I follow Michael Friedman
in reading these passages differently. I think that, for Kant, the inverse square law is a posteriori.
See Friedman, Exact Sciences , ch. 4. See notes 20, 24 and 25.
55 Many people, over many years, have read and commented on this paper. I would like to
thank in particular Derek Baker, Paul Benacceraf, Dan Garber, Zena Hitz, Des Hogan, Batrice
Longuenesse, and Tristram McPherson.
56 Van Cleve, Problems , 17.

57 Kitcher writes: "Kant believes that the epistemological notion of apriority is coextensive
with the metaphysical concept of necessity" ("Kant and the Foundations of Mathematics," The
Philosophical Review 84 (1975), 23-50, at 25); however, see his "A Priori," 38-9 for his more
recent and more nuanced interpretation. Kemp Smith writes of "Kant's view of the empirical
as synonymous with the contingent" ( Commentary , 56). Vaihinger writes: "'Empirical' and
'contingent' are identical for Kant" ( Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Stuttgart:
Spemann, 1881), vol. 1, 198).
58 This claim is one half of a bi-conditional, claim (2), introduced below. Hence I call it
42a).'
59 In Kant (New York: Routledge, 2006), Paul Guyer writes: "By contrast, if we are ever in
a position to claim that all objects of some kind must be some particular way, that is, to make
judgments that claim 'necessity' and 'true or strict . . . universality,' then our knowledge cannot
be a posteriori , but must be a priori " (46). Guyer makes similar claims in Kant and the Claims of
Knowledge (New York: Cambridge UP, 1987), where he writes of Kant's "unquestioned assump-
tion that no amount of purely empirical evidence ever justifies a genuine claim of universality
and necessity" (94). Similarly, Henry Allison writes: "Following Leibniz, Kant regards necessity
and universality as the criteria of the a priori. Thus, he shares with this predecessor, as well
as many other philosophers, the assumption that the truth value of judgments laying claim
to universality and necessity cannot be grounded empirically" ( Transcendental Idealism , p. 94).
Albert Casullo also interprets Kant as holding (2a) - see his "A Priori Knowledge," 96.
60 See note 25 for a qualification of this claim.
61 See previous note.
62 There are texts in which Kant makes claim (1) (e.g. R5607, R5668), the left-to-right half
of claim (1) (A765/B793, A721/B749, R5414), claim (2) (8:235), claim (2a) (B3, A353, 4:268,
4:294, 4:315, R6346) and the right-to-left half of claim (2) (Al 14) - as well as passages where it
is simply indeterminate what relation he is asserting (B5). Kant has formal necessity in mind in
these passages. He does not carefully distinguish between these claims because he accepts all of
them.
63 As I made clear in the previous paragraph, I suspect that by 'necessary' they mean
'formally necessary.' So I do not take myself to be objecting to Guyer and Allison in my
discussion of empirical necessity

Did Kant Conflate The Necessary and The A Priori

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Did Kant Conflate The Necessary and The A Priori

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Did Kant Conflate the Necessary and the "A Priori"?

Author(s): Nicholas F. Stang

Did Kant Conflate the Necessary and the A Priori?

(1) Necessarily p just in case it is a priori knowable that p.

201 1 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

This principle asserts that necessity and a priority are co-extensive. I

At issue here is a mark by means of which we can securely distinguish a pure

Formal possibility It is formally possible that/? just in case it is compatible

in themselves cause p to obtain by causing us to experience objects for which

Formal necessity It is formally necessary that p just in case it is incom-

(i) Where p is a synthetic proposition, it is a priori that p just in case it is for-

experience is a determinate filling-out. There are two kinds of forms of

Formal possibility It is formally possible that p just in case it is compatible

For instance, experiencing a tail-less kangaroo is formally possible because

Formal necessity It is formally necessary that p just in case it is incompatible

For instance, it is formally necessary that we experience outer objects as

by deterministic causal laws. However, it is formally contingent that objects

(i) It is formally necessary that: we experience objects as falling under R (e.g. as

However, the objects of experience are appearances, so:

(ii) If it is formally necessary that we experience objects as falling under R , then

In other words, objects of experience are necessarily the way we experience

(iii) It is formally necessary that objects of experience fall under R.

Thus, the formally necessary conditions on experience are formally necessary

All appearances as possible experiences, therefore, lie a priori in the understand-

This is clearly a definition of formal possibility. Whatever is compatible

We have already seen that the "Postulates of Empirical Thinking in Gen-

Let p be the proposition that empirical event E occurs at time t. Consider

Empirical possibility It is empirically possible that p just in case it is compati-

Empirical necessity It is empirically necessary that p just in case it is in-

necessity), contains discussions of formal possibility and of empirical possi-

The understanding, for Kant, is the faculty that generates knowledge; by

Kant expresses further agnosticism about non-actual possibilities:

All that can be added to my understanding is something beyond agreement with

empirical world is empirically possible. Furthermore, we can know that no

Noumenal possibility It is noumenally possible that p just in case it is com-

Noumenal possibility, like empirical possibility, is grounded in the causal

in themselves cause propositions about empirical objects to obtain by caus-

Noumenal necessity It is noumenally necessary that p just in case it is in-

Noumenal contingency is defined in the usual fashion: it is noumenally con-

there is nothing logically contradictory about things in themselves falling

For if appearances are things in themselves, then freedom cannot be saved.

If appearances were things in themselves, i.e., if we could not appeal to

Kant resolves the conflict between freedom and necessity by appealing to

Kant accepts the following principles about modality:

( i ) Where p is a synthetic proposition, it is formally necessary that p just in case

Formal possibility is compatibility with the forms of experience (space, time,

Empirical possibility is compatibility with actual empirical events and em-

Noumenal possibility is compatibility with the causal powers of things in

Since we cannot know what is noumenally contingent, and what is noume-

For instance, it is formally contingent that Newton's law obtains. Conse-

Kant also distinguishes between necessity and a priority , but is led to

Appendix: Analysis of the Secondary Literature

This interpretation has been defended by Philip Kitcher, Norman Kemp

(2) It is knowable that it is necessary that p just in case it is a priori that p.

(1) Necessarily p just in case it is a priori that p.

(1F) It is formally necessary that p just in case it is a priori that p.

(1E) It is empirically necessary that p just in case it is a priori that p.

(2F) It is knowable that it is formally necessary that p just in case it is a priori

(2E) It is knowable that it is empirically necessary that p just in case it is a

(2N) It is knowable that it is noumenally necessary that p just in case it is a

is vacuously true. Since the antecedent 'it is knowable that it is noumenally

56 Van Cleve, Problems , 17.

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