Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Plaintiffs, Appellants/Cross-Appellees,
v.
Defendants,
v.
Before
vendor exceeded the value of the seized property. Denault and his
federal and state civil rights claims, including the potential for
I.
- 3 -
inferences supported by that evidence in the light most favorable
254, 259 (1st Cir. 2000). This means, among other things, that
unreasonable to do so.
A.
three children.
Maxima. The officers told Testa that they needed to take the car
and asked her for the keys. Testa responded that she was running
late for a meeting and did not have time to find the keys.
it. Two days after seizing the car, they executed the warrant
- 4 -
with assistance from state forensic scientists. The forensic
contents, which included one booster seat. A few days later, when
the officers determined that the car did not contain evidence
the registered owner of the car, about either the seizure or the
officers did not supply, and Christopher's Towing did not request,
no notice to Denault at the time, and Denault was unaware that CPD
booster seats she claimed she had left in the rear of the car.1
According to Testa, the CPD officers with whom she spoke refused
into Denault. Because Testa "didn't have anything that [she] could
- 5 -
went to the stationhouse and eventually stopped calling CPD. When
several weeks later in November 2013, she reminded the CPD officers
that she still needed her belongings. The officers responded that
they had not returned her property because she had declined to
speak with them about Denault. The officers never returned Testa's
of the car over three months later, when Denault's mother showed
the car in the amount of $4797.82 for towing fees, storage costs,
paid it.
Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, 11I (count II). It further alleges
- 6 -
a common law claim that the defendants converted the plaintiffs'
B.
to the initial seizure of the car because the seizure "was lawful
all claims against Walsh and the Town of Chelmsford, leaving Ahern
- 7 -
only that "[w]e find for" the plaintiffs, in the amounts of $2200
and $25.
- 8 -
These timely appeals followed. During their pendency,
II.
A.
transcripts that may not have been available when the notice of
we should find it clear that the object of that challenge was not
101, 105 (1st Cir. 1998). Therefore, "it has been uniformly held
- 9 -
that a notice of appeal that designates the final judgment
B.
which the district court treated the jury verdict in first entering
claims (count III) and then later amending the judgment to strike
- 10 -
count I. The trouble began when the district court ruled on
the jury to check the names of the parties "[w]e find for," and
then to indicate the amount of any damages if the jury found for
either plaintiff.
that the district court did in fact submit some claim of a federal
motion for directed verdict, the district court stated that the
and the Bill of Rights. The district court expressly covered the
U.S.C. 1983. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 &
n.4 (1970). All of this aligns with the fact that when the district
- 11 -
well as count III. And when, over the plaintiffs' objection, it
the jury, it was only because the district court did, as the
- 12 -
retention and transfer. As we have explained, one point upon which
this record is clear is that any claim based on the initial seizure
review that ruling under the narrow notice of appeal the plaintiffs
seized property, and its transfer to the tow company, violated the
Amendment. Yet the only authority they have cited in their briefs
Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1997). Rather,
are distinct from those relating to the seizure [of the property]."
Id. at 144.
Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 187 (2d Cir.
2004); Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2003);
- 13 -
Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 351 (6th Cir. 1999). They have
retaining property and not the interest in regaining it. Fox, 176
F.3d at 349-52.2 The Seventh Circuit held that applying the Fourth
theory out of hand, writing that "[t]o the extent the Constitution
- 14 -
challenge on federal constitutional grounds the government's
may well obtain when the government seizes a person rather than
recourse where "private property [is] taken for public use, without
the plaintiffs do not even claim, let alone prove, that they first
- 15 -
We therefore find that the evidence did not support a
correct.3
III.
the defendants, and that the district court improperly charged the
damages.
- 16 -
A.
demand was made, keeping in mind that we "examine the evidence and
have reached the conclusion of the jury." White, 221 F.3d at 259.
to Walsh, Testa wanted to retrieve the car and the booster seat.
unable to remove items from the car while he was seeking a warrant
he "advised her that when [the police] were complete with the
company. The next month, when Walsh and Ahern spoke with Testa at
- 17 -
the Middlesex District Attorney's Office, Testa told them that she
still had not retrieved the car because "the tow company told her
the vehicle."
the car and her property inside it. Testa described at least three
During each conversation, she was told that the car was not yet
ready for pickup. As to the booster seats (she claimed there were
two), she testified that a detective told her, "Well, if you come
down here and talk with us, maybe we can work something out."
Denault.4 Per Testa's account, no one ever told her that the car
- 18 -
Christopher's." Instead, they faulted her for failing to cooperate
in their investigation.
they observed her driving Denault's car, they took it from her
driveway, and they communicated with her about its status. The
- 19 -
would be released to Christopher's Towing and communicated with
that both Denault (through Testa) and Testa made clear to the
when the police were entitled to retain the car, and not repeated
until after the police turned the car over to the tow company.
the police that they wanted their property back, and the police
value of the car, and the warrant that the officers secured to
See Restatement (Second) of Torts 238 (Am. Law Inst. 1965) ("One
when the circumstances are such that the demand for immediate
did not surrender the car in accordance with the demand once the
- 20 -
search was completed. Ahern does have a reason for this failure:
towing cost--required him to turn the car over to the tow company,
Testa, however, it could have found that Ahern never told Testa
(or Denault) that the police also had a reason not to return the
car even when the search was completed. And failure to communicate
never refused her demand; instead, they "told her she could
retrieve the car seat if she came into the station." But Testa
return the seats unless she agreed to help with their investigation
their refusal on that basis and require a quid pro quo. The
- 21 -
evidence, viewed in Testa's favor, therefore supports a verdict
B.
the letter for storage fees in February 2014" and "that the
Plaintiffs were offered the car for free and still refused to pick
court erred and then whether this error was harmful." Soto-Lebrn
v. Fed. Express Corp., 538 F.3d 45, 65 (1st Cir. 2008). Ahern
to refer to evidence that (1) the defendants told Testa about the
before the February 2014 notice; and (2) the owner of Christopher's
of the car.
car. The court did not exclude any evidence that the defendants
- 22 -
the key factual dispute as whether the defendants notified Testa
C.
Ahern contends that the district court did not properly instruct
- 23 -
court that its instructions omitted the element of demand and
there was no objection, we review only for plain error. See Fed.
demonstrate '(1) that there was error, (2) that it was plain,
(3) that it likely altered the outcome, and (4) that it was
Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 134 (1st Cir. 2002))).
Corp., 4 F.3d at 95). Yet the district court instructed the jury
- 24 -
instruction was "woefully deficient," but he does not explain why.
- 25 -
the jury specifically about demand and refusal. The district court
responded, "You've argued that but I've said that was too technical
nevertheless find that the omission of demand and refusal from the
the error in the district court's instruction cannot have had any
[the] two different measures." "We assume the jury listens to and
Dooyang Corp., 147 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 1998). In light of that
that the jury discredited Walsh's testimony that Testa knew when
- 26 -
time Testa could have regained possession for a tiny fraction of
the value of the property and of the later bill from Christopher's
Towing. That same testimony by Walsh was the only evidence that
F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1996), but rather is based on what the jury
unmistakably found.
applies. See Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487,
procedures pursuant to which Denault may have owed the tow company.
Ahern says that those lien procedures did not apply in this case.
- 27 -
explanation for how the insertion could have harmed him. We reject
you on this or that aspect of the case that I think anything has
Last but not least, Ahern argues that the district court
IV.
- 28 -