Doha Round

The November 2001 declaration of the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, provides the mandate for
negotiations on a range of subjects, and other work including issues concerning the implementation of the present
agreements.
The negotiations take place in the Trade Negotiations Committee and its subsidiaries. Other work under the work
programme takes place in other WTO councils and committees.
This is an unofficial explanation of what the declaration mandates.

Issues The work programme THE DOHA
> implementation TEXTS
> agriculture The 21 subjects listed in the Doha Declaration (and the > Ministerial
> services paragraphs that refer to them). Most of these involve Declaration
> market access (non- negotiations; other work includes actions under
agriculture) “implementation”, analysis and monitoring: > Declaration on the
> intellectual property TRIPS Agreement and
> investment public health
> competition
> transparency in Implementation-related issues and concerns > Implementation-
government procurement (par 12) > back to top related issues and
> trade facilitation concerns — Decision
> anti-dumping “Implementation” is short-hand for problems raised
> subsidies particularly by developing countries about the > Subsidies —
> regional agreements implementation of the current WTO Agreements, i.e. the procedures for
> dispute settlement agreements arising from the Uruguay Round negotiations. extensions under Article
> environment 27.4 (of the Subsidies
> e-commerce In Doha this important question was handled in two ways. and Countervailing
> small economies First, ministers agreed to adopt around 50 decisions Measures Agreement)
> trade, debt and finance clarifying the obligations of developing country member for certain developing
> trade and technology governments with respect to issues including agriculture, country members
transfer subsidies, textiles and clothing, technical barriers to trade,
> technical cooperation trade-related investment measures and rules of origin. > Decision on waiver for
> least-developed EU-ACP Partnership
countries Agreement on these points required hard bargaining Agreement
> special and differential between negotiators over the course of nearly three years.
treatment > Decision on EU
Many other implementation issues of concern to developing transitional regime for
countries have not been settled, however. For these issues, banana imports
Ministers agreed in Doha on a future work programme for
addressing these matters.
In paragraph 12 of the Ministerial Declaration, ministers See also

underscored that they had taken a decision on the 50 or so > How the negotiations
measures in a separate ministerial document (the are organized
14 November 2001 decision on “Implementation-Related > Implementation
Issues and Concerns”) and pointed out that “negotiations on decision
outstanding implementation issues shall be an integral part
of the Work Programme” in the coming years.
The ministers established a two-track approach. Those

issues for which there was an agreed negotiating mandate in
the declaration would be dealt with under the terms of that
mandate.
Those implementation issues where there is no mandate to

negotiate, would be the taken up as “a matter of priority” by
relevant WTO councils and committees. These bodies are to
report on their progress to the Trade Negotiations
Committee by the end of 2002 for “appropriate action”.
> Implementation decision explained
Agriculture Key dates: agriculture

(par 13, 14) > back to top
Start: early 2000
Negotiations on agriculture began in early 2000, under
Article 20 of the WTO Agriculture Agreement. By “Framework” agreed:
November 2001 and the Doha Ministerial Conference, 1 August 2004.
121 governments had submitted a large number of
negotiating proposals. Formulas and other
“modalities” for
These negotiations will continue, but now with the mandate countries' commitments:
given by the Doha Declaration, which also includes a series originally 31 March
of deadlines. The declaration builds on the work already 2003, now by 6th
undertaken, confirms and elaborates the objectives, and sets Ministerial Conference,
a timetable. Agriculture is now part of the single 2005 (in Hong Kong,
undertaking in which virtually all the linked negotiations China)
are to end by 1 January 2005.
Countries' comprehensive
The declaration reconfirms the long-term objective already draft commitments and
agreed in the present WTO Agreement: to establish a fair stock taking : originally
and market-oriented trading system through a programme by 5th Ministerial
of fundamental reform. The programme encompasses Conference, 2003 (in
strengthened rules, and specific commitments on Mexico)
government support and protection for agriculture. The
purpose is to correct and prevent restrictions and distortions Deadline: originally by 1
in world agricultural markets. January 2005, now
unofficially by end of
Without prejudging the outcome, member governments 2006, part of single
commit themselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed undertaking
at:
• market access: substantial reductions

• exports subsidies: reductions of, with a view to
phasing out, all forms of these
• domestic support: substantial reductions for supports
that distort trade
The declaration makes special and differential treatment for

developing countries integral throughout the negotiations,
both in countries' new commitments and in any relevant
new or revised rules and disciplines. It says the outcome
should be effective in practice and should enable
developing countries meet their needs, in particular in food
security and rural development.
The ministers also take note of the non-trade concerns (such

as environmental protection, food security, rural
development, etc) reflected in the negotiating proposals
already submitted. They confirm that the negotiations will
take these into account, as provided for in the Agriculture
Agreement.
> current negotiations

> more on agriculture
Services Key dates: services

(par 15) > back to top
Start: early 2000
Negotiations on services were already almost two years old
when they were incorporated into the new Doha agenda. Negotiating guidelines
and procedures: March
The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services 2001
(GATS) commits member governments to undertake
negotiations on specific issues and to enter into successive Initial requests for market
rounds of negotiations to progressively liberalize trade in access: by 30 June 2002
services. The first round had to start no later than five years
from 1995. Initial offers of market
access: by 31 March
Accordingly, the services negotiations started officially in 2003
early 2000 under the Council for Trade in Services. In
March 2001, the Services Council fulfilled a key element in Stock taking: originally
the negotiating mandate by establishing the negotiating 5th Ministerial
guidelines and procedures. Conference, 2003 (in
Mexico)
The Doha Declaration endorses the work already done,
reaffirms the negotiating guidelines and procedures, and Revised market-access
establishes some key elements of the timetable including, offers: by 31 May 2005
most importantly, the deadline for concluding the
negotiations as part of a single undertaking. Deadline: originally by 1
January 2005, now
The negotiations take place in “special sessions” of the unofficially end of 2006,
Services Council and regular meetings of its relevant part of single
subsidiary committees or working parties. undertaking

> more on services
Market access for non-agricultural products Key dates: market access

The ministers agreed to launch tariff-cutting negotiations on Start: January 2002
all non-agricultural products. The aim is “to reduce, or as
appropriate eliminate tariffs, including the reduction or Stock taking: 5th
elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation, Ministerial Conference,
as well as non-tariff barriers, in particular on products of 2003 (in Mexico)
export interest to developing countries”. These negotiations
shall take fully into account the special needs and interests Deadline: originally by 1
of developing and least-developed countries, and recognize January 2005, now
that these countries do not need to match or reciprocate in unofficially by end
full tariff-reduction commitments by other participants. 2006, part of single
undertaking
At the start, participants have to reach agreement on how
(“modalities”) to conduct the tariff-cutting exercise (in the
Tokyo Round, the participants used an agreed mathematical
formula to cut tariffs across the board; in the Uruguay
Round, participants negotiated cuts product by product).
The agreed procedures would include studies and capacity-
building measures that would help least-developed
countries participate effectively in the negotiations. Back in
Geneva, negotiators decided that the “modalities” should be
agreed by 31 May 2003. When that date was missed,
members agreed on 1 August 2004 on a new target: the
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 2005.
While average customs duties are now at their lowest levels

after eight GATT Rounds, certain tariffs continue to restrict
trade, especially on exports of developing countries — for
instance “tariff peaks”, which are relatively high tariffs,
usually on “sensitive” products, amidst generally low tariff
levels. For industrialized countries, tariffs of 15% and
above are generally recognized as “tariff peaks”.
Another example is “tariff escalation”, in which higher

import duties are applied on semi-processed products than
on raw materials, and higher still on finished products. This
practice protects domestic processing industries and
discourages the development of processing activity in the
countries where raw materials originate.
The negotiations take place in a Market Access

Negotiating Group.

> more on market access
> GATT and the Goods Council
Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) Key dates: intellectual

(pars 17–19) > back to top property
TRIPS and public health. In the declaration, ministers Report to the General
stress that it is important to implement and interpret the Council — solution on
TRIPS Agreement in a way that supports public health — compulsory licensing and
by promoting both access to existing medicines and the lack of pharmaceutical
creation of new medicines. They refer to their separate production capacity:
declaration on this subject. originally by end of 2002,
decision agreed 30 April
This separate declaration on TRIPS and public health is 2003.
designed to respond to concerns about the possible
implications of the TRIPS Agreement for access to Report to TNC — action
medicines. on outstanding
implementation issues
It emphasizes that the TRIPS Agreement does not and under par 12: by end of
should not prevent member governments from acting to 2002 (missed)
protect public health. It affirms governments’ right to use
the agreement’s flexibilities in order to avoid any reticence Deadline — negotiations
the governments may feel. on geographical
indications registration
The separate declaration clarifies some of the forms of system (wines and
flexibility available, in particular compulsory licensing and spirits): by 5th
parallel importing. (For an explanation of these issues, go to Ministerial Conference,
the main TRIPS pages on the WTO website) 2003 (in Mexico)
(missed)
For the Doha agenda, this separate declaration sets two
specific task. The TRIPS Council has to find a solution to Deadline — negotiations
the problems countries may face in making use of specifically mandated in
compulsory licensing if they have too little or no Doha Declaration:
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, reporting to the originally by 1 January
General Council on this by the end of 2002.(this was 2005, now unofficially by
achieved in August, 2003, see intellectual property section end 2006
of the “Agreements” chapter.) The declaration also extends
the deadline for least-developed countries to apply Least-developed
provisions on pharmaceutical patents until 1 January 2016. countries to apply
pharmaceutical patent
Geographical indications — the registration system. provisions: 2016
Geographical indications are place names (in some
countries also words associated with a place) used to
identify products with particular characteristics because
they come from specific places. The WTO TRIPS Council
has already started work on a multilateral registration
system for geographical indications for wines and spirits.
The Doha Declaration sets a deadline for completing the
negotiations: the Fifth Ministerial Conference in 2003.
These negotiations take place in “special sessions” of the

TRIPS Council.
Geographical indications — extending the “higher level

of protection” to other products. The TRIPS Agreement
provides a higher level of protection to geographical
indications for wines and spirits. This means they should be
protected even if there is no risk of misleading consumers
or unfair competition. A number of countries want to
negotiate extending this higher level to other products.
Others oppose the move, and the debate in the TRIPS
Council has included the question of whether the relevant
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement provide a mandate for
extending coverage beyond wines and spirits.
The Doha Declaration notes that the TRIPS Council will

handle this under the declaration’s paragraph 12 (which
deals with implementation issues). Paragraph 12 offers two
tracks: “(a) where we provide a specific negotiating
mandate in this Declaration, the relevant implementation
issues shall be addressed under that mandate; (b) the other
outstanding implementation issues shall be addressed as a
matter of priority by the relevant WTO bodies, which shall
report to the Trade Negotiations Committee [TNC],
established under paragraph 46 below, by the end of 2002
for appropriate action.”
In papers circulated at the Ministerial Conference, member

governments expressed different interpretations of this
mandate.
Argentina said it understands “there is no agreement to

negotiate the ‘other outstanding implementation issues’
referred to under (b) and that, by the end of 2002, consensus
will be required in order to launch any negotiations on these
issues”.
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, EU, Hungary, India,

Liechtenstein, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, the
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland,
Thailand and Turkey argued that there is a clear mandate to
negotiate immediately.
Reviews of TRIPS provisions. Two reviews have been

taking place in the TRIPS Council, as required by the
TRIPS Agreement: a review of Article 27.3(b) which deals
with patentability or non-patentability of plant and animal
inventions, and the protection of plant varieties; and a
review of the entire TRIPS Agreement (required by Article
71.1).
The Doha Declaration says that work in the TRIPS

Council on these reviews or any other implementation issue
should also look at: the relationship between the TRIPS
Agreement and the UN Convention on Biodiversity; the
protection of traditional knowledge and folklore; and other
relevant new developments that member governments raise
in the review of the TRIPS Agreement. It adds that the
TRIPS Council’s work on these topics is to be guided by
the TRIPS Agreement’s objectives (Article 7) and
principles (Article 8), and must take development fully into
account.
> more on TRIPS
Relationship between trade and investment Key dates: trade and

(pars 20–22) > back to top investment
This is a “Singapore issue” i.e. a working group set up by Continuing work in

the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference has been working group with
studying it. defined agenda: to 5th
Ministerial Conference,
In the period up to the 2003 Ministerial Conference, the 2003 (in Mexico)
declaration instructs the working group to focus on
clarifying the scope and definition of the issues, Negotiations: after 5th
transparency, non-discrimination, ways of preparing Ministerial Conference,
negotiated commitments, development provisions, 2003 (in Mexico) subject
exceptions and balance-of-payments safeguards, to “explicit consensus” on
consultation and dispute settlement. The negotiated modalities with deadline:
commitments would be modelled on those made in services, by 1 January 2005, part
which specify where commitments are being made — of single undertaking. But
“positive lists” — rather than making broad commitments no consensus; dropped
and listing exceptions. from Doha agenda in 1
August 2004 decision
The declaration also spells out a number of principles such
as the need to balance the interests of countries where
foreign investment originates and where it is invested,
countries’ right to regulate investment, development, public
interest and individual countries’ specific circumstances. It
also emphasizes support and technical cooperation for
developing and least-developed countries, and coordination
with other international organizations such as the UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Since the 1 August 2004 decision, this subject has been dropped from
the Doha agenda.
> statement: chairman's understanding of the mandate ...

> more on trade and investment
Interaction between trade and competition policy Key dates: trade and
(pars 23–25) > back to top competition policy
This is another “Singapore issue”, with a working group set Continuing work in
up in 1996 to study the subject. working group with
defined agenda: to 5th
In the period up to the 2003 Ministerial Conference, the Ministerial Conference,
declaration instructs the working group to focus on 2003 (in Mexico)
clarifying:
Negotiations: after 5th
• core principles including transparency, non- Ministerial Conference,
discrimination and procedural fairness, and 2003 (in Mexico) subject
provisions on “hardcore” cartels (i.e. cartels that are to “explicit consensus” on
formally set up) modalities with deadline:
• ways of handling voluntary cooperation on by 1 January 2005, part
competition policy among WTO member of single undertaking. But
governments no consensus; dropped
• support for progressive reinforcement of from Doha agenda in 1
competition institutions in developing countries August 2004 decision
through capacity building
The declaration says the work must take full account of

developmental needs. It includes technical cooperation and
capacity building, on such topics as policy analysis and
development, so that developing countries are better placed
to evaluate the implications of closer multilateral
cooperation for various developmental objectives.
Cooperation with other organizations such as the UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is also
included.
Since the 1 August 2004 decision, this subject has been dropped from
the Doha agenda.

> more on competition policy
Transparency in government procurement Key dates: government

(par 26) > back to top procurement
(transparency)
A third “Singapore issue” that was handled by a working
group set up by the Singapore Ministerial Conference in Continuing work in
1996. working group with
The Doha Declaration says that the “negotiations shall be Ministerial Conference,
limited to the transparency aspects and therefore will not 2003 (in Mexico)
restrict the scope for countries to give preferences to
domestic supplies and suppliers” — it is separate from the Negotiations: after 5th
plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement. Ministerial Conference,
2003 (in Mexico) subject
The declaration also stresses development concerns, to “explicit consensus” on
technical assistance and capacity building. modalities with deadline:
by 1 January 2005, part
Since the 1 August 2004 decision, this subject has been of single undertaking. But
dropped from the Doha agenda. no consensus; dropped
from Doha agenda in 1
> statement: chairman's understanding of the mandate ... August 2004 Decision.
> more on transparency in government procurement
Trade facilitation Key dates: trade

(par 27) > back to top facilitation
A fourth “Singapore issue” kicked off by the 1996 Continuing work in

Ministerial Conference. Goods Council with
The declaration recognizes the case for “further expediting Ministerial Conference,
the movement, release and clearance of goods, including 2003 (in Mexico)
goods in transit, and the need for enhanced technical
assistance and capacity building in this area”. Negotiations: after 5th
Ministerial Conference,
In the period until the Fifth Ministerial Conference in 2003, 2003 (in Mexico) subject
the WTO Goods Council, which had been working on this to “explicit consensus” on
subject since 1997, “shall review and as appropriate, clarify modalities, agreed in 1
and improve relevant aspects of Articles 5 (‘Freedom of August 2004 Decision.
Transit’), 8 (‘Fees and Formalities Connected with
Importation and Exportation’) and 10 (‘Publication and Deadline: originally by 1
Administration of Trade Regulations’) of the General January 2005, now
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) and identify unofficially end of 2006,
the trade facilitation needs and priorities of Members, in part of single undertaking
particular developing and least-developed countries”.
Those issues were cited in the 1 August 2004 decision that

broke the Cancún deadlock. Members agreed to start
negotiations on trade facilitation, but not the three other
Singapore issues.

> more on trade facilitation
WTO rules: anti-dumping and subsidies Key dates: anti-dumping,

(par 28) > back to top subsidies
The ministers agreed to negotiations on the Anti-Dumping Start: January 2002

(GATT Article 6) and Subsidies agreements. The aim is to
clarify and improve disciplines while preserving the basic, Stock taking: 5th
concepts, principles of these agreements, and taking into Ministerial Conference,
account the needs of developing and least-developed 2003 (in Mexico)
participants.
Deadline: originally by 1
In overlapping negotiating phases, participants first January 2005, now
indicated which provisions of these two agreements they unofficially end of
think should be the subject of clarification and 2006, part of single
improvement in the next phase of negotiations. The undertaking
ministers mention specifically fisheries subsidies as one
sector important to developing countries and where
participants should aim to clarify and improve WTO
disciplines.
Negotiations take place in the Rules Negotiating Group.

> more on anti-dumping
> more on subsidies
WTO rules: regional trade agreements Key dates: regional trade

Start: January 2002
WTO rules say regional trade agreements have to meet
certain conditions. But interpreting the wording of these Stock taking: 5th
rules has proved controversial, and has been a central Ministerial Conference,
element in the work of the Regional Trade Agreements 2003 (in Mexico)
Committee. As a result, since 1995 the committee has failed
to complete its assessments of whether individual trade Deadline: originally by 1
agreements conform with WTO provisions. January 2005, now
unofficially end of
This is now an important challenge, particularly when 2006, part of single
nearly all member governments are parties to regional undertaking
agreements, are negotiating them, or are considering
negotiating them. In the Doha Declaration, members agreed
to negotiate a solution, giving due regard to the role that
these agreements can play in fostering development.
The declaration mandates negotiations aimed at “clarifying

and improving disciplines and procedures under the existing
WTO provisions applying to regional trade agreements. The
negotiations shall take into account the developmental
aspects of regional trade agreements.”
These negotiations fell into the general timetable

established for virtually all negotiations under the Doha
Declaration. The original deadline of 1 January 2005 was
missed and the current unofficial aim is to finish the talks
by the end of 2006. The 2003 Fifth Ministerial Conference
in Mexico was intended to take stock of progress, provide
any necessary political guidance, and take decisions as
necessary.
Negotiations take place in the Rules Negotiating Group.

> more on regional trade agreements
Dispute Settlement Understanding Key dates: disputes

(par 30) > back to top understanding
The 1994 Marrakesh Ministerial Conference mandated Start: January 2002

WTO member governments to conduct a review of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU, the WTO Deadline: originally by
agreement on dispute settlement) within four years of the May 2003, currently no
entry into force of the WTO Agreement (i.e. by 1 January deadline, separate from
1999). single undertaking
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) started the review in

late 1997, and held a series of informal discussions on the
basis of proposals and issues that members identified.
Many, if not all, members clearly felt that improvements
should be made to the understanding. However, the DSB
could not reach a consensus on the results of the review.
The Doha Declaration mandates negotiations and states (in

par 47) that these will not be part of the single undertaking
— i.e. that they will not be tied to the overall success or
failure of the other negotiations mandated by the
declaration. Originally set to conclude by May 2003, the
negotiations are continuing without a deadline.
> more on Dispute Settlement Understanding negotiations
Trade and environment Key dates: environment

(pars 31–33) > back to top
Committee reports to
New negotiations ministers: 5th and 6th
Ministerial
Multilateral environmental agreements. Ministers agreed Conferences, 2003 and
to launch negotiations on the relationship between existing 2005 (in Mexico and
WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in Hong Kong, China)
multilateral environmental agreements. The negotiations
will address how WTO rules are to apply to WTO members Negotiations stock
that are parties to environmental agreements, in particular to taking: 5th Ministerial
clarify the relationship between trade measures taken under Conference, 2003 (in
the environmental agreements and WTO rules. Mexico)
So far no measure affecting trade taken under an Negotiations deadline:

environmental agreement has been challenged in the originally by 1 January
GATT-WTO system. 2005, now unofficially
end of 2006, part of
Information exchange. Ministers agreed to negotiate single undertaking
procedures for regular information exchange between
secretariats of multilateral environmental agreements and
the WTO. Currently, the Trade and Environment
Committee holds an information session with different
secretariats of the multilateral environmental agreements
once or twice a year to discuss the trade-related provisions
in these environmental agreements and also their dispute
settlement mechanisms. The new information exchange
procedures may expand the scope of existing cooperation.
Observer status. Overall, the situation concerning the

granting of observer status in the WTO to other
international governmental organizations is currently
blocked for political reasons. The negotiations aim to
develop criteria for observership in WTO.
Trade barriers on environmental goods and services.

Ministers also agreed to negotiations on the reduction or
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental
goods and services. Examples of environmental goods and
services are catalytic converters, air filters or consultancy
services on wastewater management.
Fisheries subsidies. Ministers agreed to clarify and

improve WTO rules that apply to fisheries subsidies. The
issue of fisheries subsidies has been studied in the Trade
and Environment Committee for several years. Some
studies demonstrate these subsidies can be environmentally
damaging if they lead to too many fishermen chasing too
few fish.
Negotiations on these issues, including concepts of what are

the relevant environmental goods and services, take place in
“special sessions” of the Trade and Environment
Committee. Negotiations on market access for
environmental goods and services take place in the Market
Access Negotiating Group and Services Council “special
sessions”.
Work in the committee back to top
Ministers instructed the Trade and Environment

Committee, in pursuing work on all items on its agenda, to
pay particular attention to the following areas:
• The effect of environmental measures on market

access, especially for developing countries.
• “Win-win-win” situations: when eliminating or
reducing trade restrictions and distortions would
benefit trade, the environment and development.
• Intellectual property. Paragraph 19 of the Ministerial
Declaration mandates the TRIPs Council to continue
clarifying the relationship between the TRIPS
Agreement and the Biological Diversity
Convention. Ministers also ask the Trade and
Environment Committee to continue to look at the
relevant provisions of the TRIPS agreement.
• Environmental labelling requirements. The Trade
and Environment Committee is to look at the impact
of eco-labelling on trade and examine whether
existing WTO rules stand in the way of eco-
labelling policies. Parallel discussions are to take
place in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
Committee.
• For all these issues: when working on these (market
access, “win-win-win” situations, intellectual
property and environmental labelling), the Trade
and Environment Committee should identify WTO
rules that would need to be clarified.
• General: ministers recognize the importance of
technical assistance and capacity building
programmes for developing countries in the trade
and environment area. They also encourage
members to share expertise and experience on
national environmental reviews.
> more on trade and environment
Electronic commerce Key date: electronic

(par 34) > back to top commerce
The Doha Declaration endorses the work already done on Report on further
electronic commerce and instructs the General Council to progress: 5th Ministerial
consider the most appropriate institutional arrangements for Conference, 2003 (in
handling the work programme, and to report on further Mexico)
progress to the Fifth Ministerial Conference.
The declaration on electronic commerce from the Second

Ministerial Conference in Geneva, 1998, said that WTO
members will continue their practice of not imposing
customs duties on electronic transmissions. The Doha
Declaration states that members will continue this practice
until the Fifth Ministerial Conference.
> more on electronic commerce
Small economies Key date: small

(par 35) > back to top economies
Small economies face specific challenges in their Recommendations: 5th

participation in world trade, for example lack of economy and 6th Ministerial
of scale or limited natural resources. Conferences, 2003 and
2005 (in Mexico and
The Doha Declaration mandates the General Council to Hong Kong, China)
examine these problems and to make recommendations to
the next Ministerial Conference as to what trade-related
measures could improve the integration of small economies.
> more on Committee on Trade and Development
Trade, debt and finance Key date: debt and

(par 36) > back to top finance
Many developing countries face serious external debt General Council report:
problems and have been through financial crises. WTO 5th and 6th Ministerial
ministers decided in Doha to establish a Working Group Conferences, 2003 and
on Trade, Debt and Finance to look at how trade-related 2005 (in Mexico and
measures can contribute to find a durable solution to these Hong Kong, China)
problems. This working group will report to the General
Council which will in turn report to the next Ministerial
Conference.
Trade and technology transfer Key date: technology

(par 37) > back to top transfer
A number of provisions in the WTO agreements mention General Council report:

the need for a transfer of technology to take place between 5th and 6th Ministerial
developed and developing countries. Conferences, 2003 and
2005 (in Mexico and
However, it is not clear how such a transfer takes place in Hong Kong, China)
practice and if specific measures might be taken within the
WTO to encourage such flows of technology.
WTO ministers decided in Doha to establish a working

group to examine the issue. The working group will report
to the General Council which itself will report to the next
Ministerial Conference.
Technical cooperation and capacity building Key dates: technical

(pars 38–41) > back to top cooperation
Through various paragraphs of the Doha Declaration, WTO Technical assistance

member governments have made new commitments on funding raised 80%;
technical cooperation and capacity building. Development Agenda
Global Trust Fund set up:
For example, the section on the relationship between trade December 2001
and investment includes a call (par 21) for enhanced
support for technical assistance and capacity building in this Director-General reports
area. to General Council:
Within the specific heading “technical cooperation and December 2002
capacity building”, paragraph 41 lists all the references to
commitments on technical cooperation within the Doha Director-General reports
Declaration: paragraphs 16 (market access for non- to ministers: 5th and 6th
agricultural products), 21 (trade and investment), 24 (trade Ministerial
and competition policy), 26 (transparency in government Conferences, 2003 and
procurement), 27 (trade facilitation), 33 (environment), 38- 2005 (in Mexico and
40 (technical cooperation and capacity building), 42 and 43 Hong Kong, China)
(least-developed countries). (Paragraph 2 in the preamble is
also cited.)
Under this heading (i.e. pars 38-41), WTO member

governments reaffirm all technical cooperation and capacity
building commitments made throughout the declaration and
add general commitments:
• The Secretariat, in coordination with other relevant

agencies, is to encourage WTO developing-country
members to consider trade as a main element for
reducing poverty and to include trade measures in
their development strategies.
• The agenda set out in the Doha Declaration gives
priority to small, vulnerable, and transition
economies, as well as to members and observers that
do not have permanent delegations in Geneva.
• Technical assistance must be delivered by the WTO
and other relevant international organizations within
a coherent policy framework.
The Director-General reported to the General Council in

December 2002 and to the Fifth Ministerial Conference
on the implementation and adequacy of these new
commitments.
Following the declaration’s instructions to develop a plan

ensuring long-term funding for WTO technical assistance,
the General Council adopted on 20 December 2001 (one
month after the Doha conference) a new budget that
increased technical assistance funding by 80% and
established a Doha Development Agenda Global Trust
Fund. The fund now has an annual budget of 24 million
Swiss francs.
> more on WTO assistance for developing countries
Least-developed countries Key date: least-developed

(pars 42, 43) > back to top countries
Many developed countries have now significantly Reports to: General

decreased or actually scrapped tariffs on imports from least- Council: July 2002, 5th
developed countries (LDCs). and 6th Ministerial
Conferences, 2003 and
In the Doha declaration, WTO member governments 2005 (in Mexico and
commit themselves to the objective of duty-free, quota-free Hong Kong, China)
market access for LDCs’ products and to consider
additional measures to improve market access for these
exports.
Members also agree to try to ensure that least-developed

countries can negotiate WTO membership faster and more
easily.
Some technical assistance is targeted specifically for least-

developed countries. The Doha Declaration urges WTO
member donors to significantly increase their
contributions.
In addition, the Sub-Committee for LDCs (a subsidiary

body of the WTO Committee on Trade and Development)
designed a work programme un February 2002, as
instructed by the Doha Declaration, taking into account the
parts of the declaration related to trade that was issued at
the UN LDC Conference.
> more on Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries

> more on WTO assistance for developing countries
Special and differential treatment

The WTO agreements contain special provisions which

give developing countries special rights. These special
provisions include, for example, longer time periods for
implementing agreements and commitments or measures to
increase trading opportunities for developing countries.
In the Doha Declaration, member governments agree that

all special and differential treatment provisions should be
reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making
them more precise.
More specifically, the declaration (together with the

Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns)
mandates the Trade and Development Committee to
identify which of those special and differential treatment
provisions are mandatory, and to consider the implications
of making mandatory those which are currently non-
binding.
The Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and

Concerns instructed the committee to make its
recommendations for the General Council before July
2002. But because members needed more time, this was
postponed to the end of July 2005.
DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: NEGOTIATIONS SUMMARY
Doha Development Agenda: Negotiations, implementation and development
The November 2001 declaration of the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, provides the mandate for
negotiations on a range of subjects and other work. The negotiations include those on agriculture and services,
which began in early 2000.
In Doha, Ministers also approved a linked decision on implementation — problems developing countries face in
implementing the current WTO agreements.
Ministerial discussions have taken place in Cancún in 2003, Geneva in 2004, Hong Kong in 2005 and Geneva in
2006 and 2008.
Since Doha back to top
The Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico, in

September 2003, was intended as a stock-taking meeting where
members would agree on how to complete the rest of the
negotiations. But the meeting was soured by discord on
agricultural issues, including cotton, and ended in deadlock on
the “Singapore issues”. Real progress on the Singapore issues
and agriculture was not evident until the early hours of 1 August
2004 with a set of decisions in the General Council (sometimes
called the July 2004 package).
The Sixth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong,

December 2005, recorded the progress made in the year and a
half since then. The final declaration included agreement on a
range of questions, which further narrowed down members’
differences and edged the talks closer to consensus. A new
timetable was agreed for 2006 and members resolved to finish
the negotiations by the end of the year. By then, the original
1 January 2005 deadline had been missed.
June / July 2006 modalities meetings

The General Council, at its meeting on 27-28 July 2006,
supported a recommendation by Director-General Pascal Lamy
to suspend the Doha negotiations.
Director-General's remarks at the informal TNC, 16 November

2006
Informal TNC meeting at the level of Head of Delegation.
July 2008 package

The July 2008 package is a stepping stone on the way to
concluding the Doha Round. The main task before WTO
members was to settle a range of questions that would shape the
final agreement of the Doha Development Agenda. Consultations
took place among a group of ministers representing all interests
in the negotiations. A series of meetings were held in Geneva
from 21 to 30 July 2008.
The Doha Development Round or Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is the current trade-negotiation round of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) which commenced in November 2001. Its objective is to lower trade
barriers around the world, which allows countries to increase trade globally. As of 2008, talks have stalled over a
divide on major issues, such as agriculture, industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers, services, and trade remedies.[1]
The most significant differences are between developed nations led by the European Union (EU), the United
States (USA) and Japan and the major developing countries led and represented mainly by India, Brazil, China
and South Africa. There is also considerable contention against and between the EU and the U.S. over their
maintenance of agricultural subsidies—seen to operate effectively as trade barriers.[2]
The Doha Round began with a ministerial-level meeting in Doha, Qatar in 2001. Subsequent ministerial meetings
took place in Cancún, Mexico (2003), and Hong Kong (2005). Related negotiations took place in Geneva,
Switzerland (2004, 2006, 2008); Paris, France (2005); and Potsdam, Germany (2007).
The most recent round of negotiations, July 23-29 2008, broke down after failing to reach a compromise on
agricultural import rules.[3] After the breakdown, major negotiations were not expected to resume until 2009.[4]
Nevertheless, intense negotiations, mostly between the USA, China and India, were held in the end of 2008 in
order to agree on negotiation modalities. However, these negotiations did not result in any progress.
Contents
[hide]
• 1 Negotiations
o 1.1 Before Doha
o 1.2 Doha, 2001
 1.2.1 Importance of US presidential 'fast-track' authority
o 1.3 Cancún, 2003
 1.3.1 Collapse of negotiations
o 1.4 Geneva, 2004
o 1.5 Paris, 2005
o 1.6 Hong Kong, 2005
o 1.7 Geneva, 2006
o 1.8 Potsdam, 2007
o 1.9 Geneva, 2008
 1.9.1 Collapse of negotiations
• 2 Current progress
• 3 Issues
o 3.1 Agriculture
o 3.2 Access to patented medicines
o 3.3 Special and differential treatment
o 3.4 Implementation issues
• 4 Benefits
• 5 See also
• 6 References
• 7 Literature
• 8 External links
[edit] Negotiations
Doha Round talks are overseen by the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC), whose chair is the WTO’s director-
general, currently Pascal Lamy. The negotiations are being held in five working groups and in other existing
bodies of the WTO. Selected topics under negotiation are discussed below in five groups: market access,
development issues, WTO rules, trade facilitation and other issues.[1].
[edit] Before Doha
Before the Doha ministerial, negotiations had already been under way on trade in agriculture and trade in
services. These ongoing negotiations had been required under the last round of multilateral trade negotiations (the
Uruguay Round, 1986-1994). However, some countries, including the United States, wanted to expand the
agriculture and services talks to allow trade-offs and thus achieve greater trade liberalization.[1]
The first WTO ministerial conference, which was held in Singapore in 1996, established permanent working
groups on four issues: transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation (customs issues), trade and
investment, and trade and competition. These became known as the Singapore issues. These issues were pushed
at successive ministerials by the European Union, Japan and Korea, and opposed by most developing countries.[1]
Since no agreement was reached, the developed nations pushed that any new trade negotiations must include
these issues.[5]
The negotiations were intended to start at the ministerial conference of 1999 in Seattle, USA, and be called the
Millennium Round but, due to several different events including protest activity outside the conference, the
negotiations were never started.[6] Due to the failure of the Millennium Round, it was decided that negotiations
would not start again until the next ministerial conference in 2001 in Doha, Qatar.
According to the so-called "inbuilt agenda", negotiations on agriculture and trade in services started in 2000.
These negotiations were later merged into the overall Doha negotiations.
Just months before the Doha ministerial, the United States had been attacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001.
Some government officials called for greater political cohesion and saw the trade negotiations as a means toward
that end. Some officials thought that a new round of multilateral trade negotiations could help a world economy
weakened by recession and terrorism-related uncertainty. According to the WTO, the year 2001 showed "...the
lowest growth in output in more than two decades,"[7] and world trade contracted that year.[1]
[edit] Doha, 2001
Main article: WTO Ministerial Conference of 2001
The 'Doha Development Agenda' began in November 2001, committing all countries to negotiations opening
agricultural and manufacturing markets, as well as trade-in-services (GATS) negotiations and expanded
intellectual property regulation (TRIPS). The intent of the round, according to its proponents, was to make trade
rules fairer for developing countries.[8] However, by 2008, critics were charging that the round would expand a
system of trade rules that were bad for development and interfered excessively with countries' domestic "policy
space".[9]
[edit] Importance of US presidential 'fast-track' authority
The round had been planned for conclusion in December 2005 — after two more ministerial conferences had
produced a final draft declaration. The WTO pushed back its self-imposed deadline to slightly precede the
expiration of the U.S. President's Congressional Fast Track Trade Promotion Authority. Any declaration of the
WTO must be ratified by the U.S. Congress to take effect in the United States. Trade Promotion Authority
prevents Congress from amending the draft. It expired on June 30, 2007,[10] and congressional leaders decided not
to renew this authority for President George W Bush.[11]
[edit] Cancún, 2003
The 2003 Cancún talks—intended to forge concrete agreement on the Doha round objectives—collapsed after
four days during which the members could not agree on a framework to continue negotiations. Low key talks
continued since the ministerial meeting in Doha but progress was almost non-existent.[12] This meeting was
intended to create a framework for further negotiations.
[edit] Collapse of negotiations
The Cancún ministerial collapsed for several reasons. First, differences over the Singapore issues seemed
incapable of resolution. The EU had retreated on some of its demands, but several developing countries refused
any consideration of these issues at all. Second, it was questioned whether some countries had come to Cancún
with a serious intention to negotiate. In the view of some observers, a few countries showed no flexibility in their
positions and only repeated their demands rather than talk about trade-offs. Third, the wide difference between
developing and developed countries across virtually all topics was a major obstacle. The U.S.-EU agricultural
proposal and that of the Group of 20, for example, show strikingly different approaches to special and differential
treatment. Fourth, there was some criticism of procedure. Some claimed the agenda was too complicated. Also,
Cancún ministerial chairman, Mexico’s Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez, was faulted for ending the meeting
when he did, instead of trying to move the talks into areas where some progress could have been made. [1]
The collapse seemed like a victory for the developing countries.[13] The failure to advance the round resulted in a
serious loss of momentum and brought into question whether the January 1, 2005 deadline would be met.[1] The
North-South divide was most prominent on issues of agriculture. Developed countries’ farm subsidies (both the
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy and the U.S. government agro-subsidies) became a major sticking point. The
developing countries were seen as finally having the confidence to reject a deal that they viewed as unfavorable.
This is reflected by the new trade bloc of developing and industrialized nations: the G20. Since its creation, the
G20 has had fluctuating membership, but is spearheaded by the G4 (the People's Republic of China, India, Brazil,
and South Africa). While the G20 presumes to negotiate on behalf of all of the developing world, many of the
poorest nations continue to have little influence over the emerging WTO proposals.
[edit] Geneva, 2004
The aftermath of Cancún was one of standstill and stocktaking. Negotiations were suspended for the remainder of
2003. Starting in early 2004, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick pushed for the resumption of
negotiations by offering a proposal that would focus on market access, including an elimination of agricultural
export subsidies.[1] He also said that the Singapore issues could progress by negotiating on trade facilitation,
considering further action on government procurement, and possibly dropping investment and competition.[14]
This intervention was credited at the time with reviving interest in the negotiations, and negotiations resumed in
March 2004.[1]
In the months leading up to the talks in Geneva, the EU accepted the elimination of agricultural export subsidies
“by date certain.” The Singapore issues were moved off the Doha agenda. Compromise was also achieved over
the negotiation of the Singapore issues as the EU and others decided. Developing countries too played an active
part in negotiations this year, first by India and Brazil negotiating directly with the developed countries (as the so-
called “non-party of five”) on agriculture, and second by working toward acceptance of trade facilitation as a
subject for negotiation. [15]
With these issues pushed aside, the negotiators in Geneva were able to concentrate on moving forward with the
Doha Round. After intense negotiations in late July 2004, WTO members reached what has become known as the
Framework Agreement(sometimes called the July Package) , which provides broad guidelines for completing the
Doha round negotiations. The agreement contains a 4-page declaration, with four annexes (A-D) covering
agriculture, non-agricultural market access, services, and trade facilitation, respectively. In addition, the
agreement acknowledges the activities of other negotiating groups (such as those on rules, dispute settlement, and
intellectual property) and exhorts them to fulfill their Doha round negotiating objectives. The agreement also
abandoned the January 1, 2005 deadline for the negotiations and set December 2005 as the date for the 6th
ministerial to be held in Hong Kong. [15]
[edit] Paris, 2005
Trade negotiators wanted to make tangible progress before the December 2005 WTO meeting in Hong Kong, and
held a session of negotiations in Paris in May 2005.[16]
Paris talks were hanging over a few issues: France protested moves to cut subsidies to farmers, while the U.S.,
Australia, the EU, Brazil and India failed to agree on issues relating to chicken, beef and rice.[16] Most of the
sticking points were small technical issues, making trade negotiators fear that agreement on large politically risky
issues will be substantially harder.[16]
[edit] Hong Kong, 2005
The Hong Kong Convention Center, which was the site of the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference
The Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference took place in Hong Kong, December 13 to 18, 2005. Although a flurry of
negotiations took place in the fall of 2005, WTO director-general Pascal Lamy announced in November 2005 that
a comprehensive agreement on modalities would not be forthcoming in Hong Kong, and that the talks would
“take stock” of the negotiations and would try to reach agreements in negotiating sectors where convergence was
reported.[1]
Trade ministers representing most of the world's governments reached a deal that sets a deadline for eliminating
subsidies of agricultural exports by 2013. The final declaration from the talks, which resolved several issues that
have stood in the way of a global trade agreement, also requires industrialized countries to open their markets to
goods from the world's poorest nations, a goal of the United Nations for many years. The declaration gave fresh
impetus for negotiators to try to finish a comprehensive set of global free trade rules by the end of 2006. Director-
general Pascal Lamy said, "I now believe it is possible, which I did not a month ago."[17]
The conference pushed back the expected completion of the round until the end of 2006. [1]
[edit] Geneva, 2006
The July 2006 talks in Geneva failed to reach an agreement about reducing farming subsidies and lowering
import taxes, and negotiations took months to resume. A successful outcome of the Doha round became
increasingly unlikely, because the broad trade authority granted under the Trade Act of 2002 to U.S. president
George W. Bush was due to expire in 2007. Any trade pact would then have to be approved by the U.S. Congress
with the possibility of amendments, which would hinder the U.S. negotiators and decrease the willingness of
other countries to participate.[2] Hong Kong offered to mediate the collapsed trade liberalisation talks. Director-
general of Trade and Industry, Raymond Young, says the territory, which hosted the last round of Doha
negotiations, has a "moral high-ground" on free trade that allows it to play the role of "honest broker".[citation needed]
[edit] Potsdam, 2007
In June 2007, negotiations within the Doha round broke down at a conference in Potsdam, as a major impasse
occurred between the USA, the EU, India and Brazil. The main disagreement was over opening up agricultural
and industrial markets in various countries and also how to cut rich nation farm subsidies.[18]
[edit] Geneva, 2008
On July 21, 2008, negotiations started again at the WTO's HQ in Geneva on the Doha round but stalled after nine
days of negotiations over the refusal to compromise over the special safeguard mechanism. "Developing country
Members receive special and differential treatment with respect to other Members' safeguard measures, in the
form of a de minimis import volume exemption. As users of safeguards, developing country Members receive
special and differential treatment with respect to applying their own such measures, with regard to permitted
duration of extensions, and with respect to re-application of measures.— Technical Information on Safeguard
Measures WTO official site
Negotiations had continued since the last conference in June 2007.[19] Director-general Pascal Lamy said before
the start of the conference that the odds of success were over 50%.[20] Around 40 ministers attended the
negotiations, which were only expected to last five days but instead lasted nine days. Kamal Nath, India's
Commerce Minister, was absent from the first few days of the conference due to a vote of confidence being
conducted in India's Parliament.[21] On the second day of the conference, U.S. Trade Representative Susan
Schwab announced that the U.S. would cap its farm subsidies at $15 billion a year[22], from $18.2 billion in 2006.
[23]
The proposal was on the condition that countries such as Brazil and India drop their objections to various
aspects of the round.[22] The U.S. and the EU also offered an increase in the number of temporary work visas for
professional workers.[24] After one week of negotiations, many considered agreement to be 'within reach'.
However, there were disagreements on issues including special protection for Chinese and Indian farmers and
African and Caribbean banana imports to the EU.[25] India and China's hard stance regarding tariffs and subsidies
was severely criticized by the United States.[26] In response, India's Commerce Minister said "I'm not risking the
livelihood of millions of farmers."[27]
[edit] Collapse of negotiations
The negotiations collapsed on July 29 over issues of agricultural trade between the United States, India, and
China.[28] In particular, there was insoluble disagreement between India and the United States over the special
safeguard mechanism (SSM), a measure designed to protect poor farmers by allowing countries to impose a
special tariff on certain agricultural goods in the event of an import surge or price fall.[29]
Pascal Lamy said, "Members have simply not been able to bridge their differences."[3] He also said that out of a
to-do list of 20 topics, 18 had seen positions converge but the gaps could not narrow on the 19th — the special
safeguard mechanism for developing countries. The mechanism allows countries to protect poor farmers by
imposing a tariff on imports of specified goods, if the price of those goods drop or there is a surge in imports.
However, the United States, China and India could not agree on the threshold that would allow the mechanism to
be used, with the United States arguing that the threshold had been set too low. The European Union Trade
Commissioner Peter Mandelson characterized the collapse as a "collective failure".[30] On a more optimistic note,
India's Commerce Minister, Kamal Nath, said "I would only urge the director-general to treat this [failure of
talks] as a pause, not a breakdown, to keep on the table what is there."[29]
Several countries blamed each other for the breakdown of the negotiations.[31] The United States and some
European Union members blamed India for the failure of the talks.[32]India claimed that its position was supported
by over 100 countries.[33] Brazil, one of the founding members of the G-20, broke away from the position held by
India.[34] Then-European Commissioner for Trade Peter Mandelson said that India and China should not be
blamed for the failure of the Doha round.[35] In his view, the agriculture talks had been harmed by the five-year
program of agricultural subsidies recently passed by the U.S. Congress, which he said was "one of the most
reactionary farm bills in the history of the U.S.".[28]
[edit] Current progress

Several countries have called for negotiations to start again. Brazil and Pascal Lamy have led this process. Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva, president of Brazil, called several countries leaders to urge them to renew negotiations.[36]
Lamy visited India to discuss possible solutions to the impasse. [37] The declaration at the end of the G20 summit
of world leaders in London in 2009 included a pledge to complete the Doha round. Although a WTO ministerial
conference scheduled in November 2009 would not be a negotiating session[38], there would be several
opportunities over the year 2009 to discuss the progress[39].
[edit] Issues
Agriculture has become the lynchpin of the agenda for both developing and developed countries. Three other
issues have been important. The first, now resolved, pertained to compulsory licensing of medicines and patent
protection. A second deals with a review of provisions giving special and differential treatment to developing
countries; a third addresses problems that developing countries are having in implementing current trade
obligations.[1]
[edit] Agriculture
Agriculture has become the most important and controversial issue. The first proposal in Qatar, in 2001, called for
the end agreement to commit to substantial improvements in market access; reductions (and ultimate elimination)
of all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting support.”[1][40]
The United States is being asked by the European Union (EU) and the developing countries, led by Brazil and
India, to make a more generous offer for reducing trade-distorting domestic support for agriculture. The United
States is insisting that the EU and the developing countries agree to make more substantial reductions in tariffs
and to limit the number of import-sensitive and special products that would be exempt from cuts. Import-sensitive
products are of most concern to developed countries like the European Union, while developing countries are
concerned with special products — those exempt from both tariff cuts and subsidy reductions because of
development, food security, or livelihood considerations. Brazil has emphasized reductions in trade-distorting
domestic subsidies, especially by the United States (some of which it successfully challenged in the WTO U.S.-
Brazil cotton dispute), while India has insisted on a large number of special products that would not be exposed to
wider market opening.[2]
[edit] Access to patented medicines
A major topic at the Doha ministerial regarded the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS). The issue involves the balance of interests between the pharmaceutical companies in
developed countries that held patents on medicines and the public health needs in developing countries. Before
the Doha meeting, the United States claimed that the current language in TRIPS was flexible enough to address
health emergencies, but other countries insisted on new language.[1]
On August 30, 2003, WTO members reached agreement on the TRIPS and medicines issue. Voting in the General
Council, member governments approved a decision that offered an interim waiver under the TRIPS Agreement
allowing a member country to export pharmaceutical products made under compulsory licenses to least-
developed and certain other members.[1]
[edit] Special and differential treatment
In the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the trade ministers reaffirmed special and differential (S&D) treatment for
developing countries and agreed that all S&D treatment provisions “...be reviewed with a view to strengthening
them and making them more precise, effective and operational.”[1][40]
The negotiations have been split along a developing-country/developed-country divide. Developing countries
wanted to negotiate on changes to S&D provisions, keep proposals together in the Committee on Trade and
Development, and set shorter deadlines. Developed countries wanted to study S&D provisions, send some
proposals to negotiating groups, and leave deadlines open. Developing countries claimed that the developed
countries were not negotiating in good faith, while developed countries argued that the developing countries were
unreasonable in their proposals. At the December 2005 Hong Kong ministerial, members agreed to five S&D
provisions for LDCs, including the tariff-free and quota-free access.[1]
[edit] Implementation issues
Developing countries claim that they have had problems with the implementation of the agreements reached in
the earlier Uruguay Round because of limited capacity or lack of technical assistance. They also claim that they
have not realized certain benefits that they expected from the Round, such as increased access for their textiles
and apparel in developed-country markets. They seek a clarification of language relating to their interests in
existing agreements.[1]
Before the Doha ministerial, WTO Members resolved a small number of these implementation issues. At the
Doha meeting, the Ministerial Declaration directed a two-path approach for the large number of remaining issues:
(a) where a specific negotiating mandate is provided, the relevant implementation issues will be addressed under
that mandate; and (b) the other outstanding implementation issues will be addressed as a matter of priority by the
relevant WTO bodies. Outstanding implementation issues are found in the area of market access, investment
measures, safeguards, rules of origin, and subsidies and countervailing measures, among others.[1]
[edit] Benefits
All countries participating in the negotiations believe that there is some economic benefit in adopting the
agreement; however, there is considerable disagreement of how much benefit the agreement would actually
produce. A study by the University of Michigan found that if all trade barriers in agriculture, services, and
manufactures were reduced by 33% as a result of the Doha Development Agenda, there would be an increase in
global welfare of $574.0 billion.[41] A 2008 study by World Bank Lead Economist Kym Anderson[42] found that
global income could increase by more than $3000 billion per year, $2500 billion of which would go to the
developing world.[43] Others had been predicting more modest outcomes, eg, world net welfare gains ranging from
$84 billion to $287 billion by the year 2015.[1][44] Pascal Lamy has conservatively estimated that the deal with
bring an increase of $130 billion. [45]
The Copenhagen Consensus, which evalutes solutions for global problems regarding the cost-benefit ratio, in
2008 ranked the DDA as the second-best investment for global welfare, after the provision of vitamin
supplements to the world's 140 million malnourished children.[46][47]
Why the WTO Doha Round Talks Have Collapsed – and a Path
Forward
by Lori Wallach and Deborah James
The collapse of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round talks on July 24, 2006, should come as no surprise. A
decade into the WTO experiment, it is clear that the WTO model of corporate globalization has not delivered the promised
benefits of increased economic prosperity, while economic, social, and environmental conditions have worsened in many
rich and poor countries alike. Because of this failed record, opposition has grown worldwide to the WTO model of
globalization which as been driven by a narrow slice of corporate elites to suit their interests. The collapse of the Doha
Round WTO expansion talks offers an extraordinary opportunity for a fundamental re-think of the direction of the global
economy.
To date, most press coverage of the Doha Round collapse has focused on the blame game -- which countries’ failure to
make specific agricultural concessions is to blame. But the under-recognized, but extremely important story is that the
underlying cause of the breakdown is the growing rejection of the WTO, and more broadly of the corporate-led globalization
model, by many people worldwide based on this model’s effects on their lives.
Since the Doha Round’s 2001 launch, every deadline on issues from service sector liberalization to industrial tariffs has
passed. In 2004 half of the original Doha agenda – adding new foreign investor rights and limits on countries’ competition
and procurement policies – was simply jettisoned after the Cancun WTO summit imploded. At issue throughout has been
major differences regarding the WTO’s proper objectives and direction. Effectively, popular opposition is now a significant
counterforce pressuring many WTO member nations to reject the agenda pushed by the world’s largest multinational
corporations, which traditionally have used the WTO Secretariat and negotiators of the world’s most powerful countries to
write the rules of the global economy in favor of expanding their profit margins.
The Doha Round was dubbed a “Development Round.” However, the actual texts reveal an agenda aimed at expanding the
scope of the existing WTO regime. Yet, after a decade of damaging results, many people in the 149 WTO signatory nations
have made clear their opposition to more of the same. This was before the World Bank dramatically revised downward its
projections of Doha Round gains and revealed that a long list of poor countries would be net losers under the likely
outcome. While U.S. and European editorials declared the Doha Round collapse as disaster for the poor, social movements
and NGOs representing the populations of poor countries cheered.
A Decade of WTO Results Has Undermined Support for WTO Expansion
Instead of promised gains, during the WTO decade, economic conditions for the majority have deteriorated. The number
and percentage of people living on less than $1 a day in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East have increased while the
percentage living on less than $2 a day has increased in these regions, as well as in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Growth and the rate of poverty reduction have slowed in most parts of the world since implementation of the WTO’s policy
package – a model imposed a decade earlier on many developing countries by the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank.
In Africa, per capita income – which is an economy’s total output divided by its population– grew around 40 percent from
1960 to 1980 – but actually shrank more than 10 percent from 1980 to 1998.
In Latin America, from 1960 to 1980, average per capita income grew by 82 percent – that’s over 4 percent per year per
person. However, during the era in which governments in the region began implementing policies of corporate globalization,
from 1980 to 2000, income per person grew only 9 percent – less than one half of one percent per person per year. Now its
down to 5%.
There is growing consensus that the clear failure of the model – often called “neoliberalism” – to deliver economic growth or
better standards of living for most is translating into electoral victories for leaders who have made rejection of this agenda a
staple of their platforms. Nowhere is this more evident than in Bolivia, Argentina and Venezuela whose economies all have
been decimated under previous neoliberal governments. After adopting alternative domestic economic policies, Argentina
and Venezuela now boast the highest economic growth and fastest poverty reduction in the region. Likewise, Bolivia’s new
president Evo Morales was elected on a platform of opposition to flawed trade deals after previous neoliberal governments’
policies resulted in a lower per capita GDP today in Bolivia than 27 years ago. Even Costa Rica, Peru, and Mexico,
traditionally neoliberal strongholds, have experienced presidential elections almost entirely dominated by debate over trade
liberalization.
The number of people living in poverty has also increased in South Asia, while growth rates and the rate of reduction in
poverty have slowed in most parts of the world – especially when one excludes China, where huge reductions in poverty
have been accomplished, but not by following WTO-approved policies (China became a WTO member only in 2001).
Indeed, the economic policies that China employed to obtain its dramatic growth and poverty reduction are a veritable
smorgasbord of WTO violations: high tariffs to keep out imports and significant subsidies and government intervention to
promote exports; an absence of intellectual property protection; government-owned, operated and subsidized energy,
transportation and manufacturing sectors; tightly regulated foreign investment with numerous performance requirements
regarding domestic content and technology transfer; government-controlled finance and banking systems subsidizing
billions in non-performing debt; and government-controlled, subsidized and protected agriculture. Many of these same
policies are those employed by the now-wealthy countries during their period of development.
It’s not as if the status quo is working for most people in the rich countries either. During the WTO era, the U.S. trade deficit
has risen to historic levels – from $130 billion (in today’s dollars) in 1994 (the year before the WTO went into effect) to more
than $717 billion in 2005. The U.S. trade deficit is approaching 6 percent of national income – a figure widely agreed to be
unsustainable, putting the United States and global economy at risk. Soaring U.S. imports during the WTO decade have
contributed to the loss of nearly one in six U.S. manufacturing jobs. U.S. real median wages have scarcely risen above their
1970 level, while productivity has soared 82 percent over the same period, resulting in declining or stagnant standards of
living for the nearly 70 percent of the U.S. population that does not have a college degree.
Although trade and the failure of corporate globalization will be important issues in many 2006 U.S. congressional races, the
bottom-up public pressure that has altered trade politics in many nations has not risen to a level in the United States that
translates into significantly altered negotiating positions. Thus, while a majority of the U.S. public is losing under the Bush
administration’s trade agenda, the U.S. WTO position continues to be that of the narrow commercial interests that have
bankrolled the administration’s campaigns and those of the Republican majority in Congress. That’s why efforts of the newly
launched Citizens’ Trade Campaign Political Action Committee (CTC PAC - www.citizenstrade.org/political-action.php) to
hold elected officials accountable for their trade votes on recent bilateral and regional agreements with Oman and Central
America are crucial to changing the future of U.S. trade policy, and hence the future prosperity and well-being of workers
and farmers in the United States and globally.
Meager Projected Doha Round Gains for a Few and Net Losses for Many
The Doha Round was dubbed a “Development Round.” However, the actual texts reveal an agenda aimed at expanding the
scope of the existing WTO regime. Given the record of the WTO decade, proponents of the Doha Round agenda sought to
change the debate away from the WTO’s performance and onto prospective future gains. While initial projections by the
World Bank were $832 billion, more recent World Bank studies based on revised analysis found extremely limited possible
gains from a “Doha Round” overall. The most likely Doha scenario the World Bank reviewed would yield benefits of only $54
billion to the world by 2015, with developing countries receiving a meager 16 percent of those gains. These projections
amount to a miniscule 0.14 percent of projected developing country GDP by that year, or about 0.23 percent of world GDP.
Put another way, it is a little less than one cent per person per day to the developing world, or about four cents per person
per day to the world as a whole.
Worse, the new research revealed that under the “likely” Doha scenario, the Middle East, Bangladesh, much of Africa and
(notably) Mexico would actually face net losses. These studies also showed that the alleged gains that are projected to
accrue to Brazil and India would be largely concentrated in those countries’ agribusiness and manufacturing industries
respectively, while subsistence farmers – a much, much larger percentage of those populations – would see tiny gains or
net losses.
There are several key problems with the studies, however, in that they project gains from agriculture and goods
liberalization without taking into account many costs of Doha implementation. First of all, the economic models used in the
studies “assume full employment.” That means they capture alleged savings on consumer food prices as gains, but fail to
show a loss if millions of subsistence farmers, who represent nearly half of the developing world, lose their livelihoods. In
addition, they fail to include the increased costs that consumers worldwide pay for medicines due to pharmaceutical
monopolies, which some economists estimate outweigh the projected gains, even for the few developing country “winners.”
And finally, the models fail to adequately take into account the loss in tariff revenue for developing countries, which the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development estimated would be 2 to 4 times the projected gains for developing
countries from the Doha WTO expansion. These flaws have rarely been mentioned in media reports touting alleged “gains”
for the poor.
The World Bank findings are key to understanding the current political dynamic because many countries only reluctantly
entered into WTO expansion talks at Doha in 2001 after being promised a “development” round aimed at rectifying
imbalances left over from the original ‘Uruguay Round” multilateral negotiations that hatched the WTO. Indeed, at the 2001
Doha WTO Ministerial, where the talks that have just collapsed were started, a group of 100 developing nations had tabled
an alternative agenda for negotiations, called the Implementation Agenda, which consisted of specific fixes needed to
existing WTO terms. The Implementation Agenda was the developing countries’ counter-initiative after they had rejected the
“Millennium Round” WTO expansion agenda at the 1999 Seattle WTO summit. So while the media still refers, without
attribution, to the negotiations as a mechanism to help the poor, in fact those pushing WTO expansion merely used the false
promise of poverty reduction to get the talks launched, while pursuing policies geared to fatten corporate profit margins.
The Failed Model of Corporate Globalization and its Alternatives
Underlying the continuing faltering of the WTO negotiations and those of other agreements based on the same model of
corporate globalization is not a battle between “protectionism” and “free trade.” Rather, the current globalization model
implemented by the WTO is being challenged increasingly by large numbers of elected officials, economists and civil society
analysts, joining workers, farmers, and environmentalists worldwide, because the set of policies embodied in the model
have proved to be harmful across the globe to all but a corporate elite representing the management of the largest of grain
trading, pharmaceutical, banking and other multinationals. As we live in a world where 24,000 people die every day of
hunger and poverty-related diseases, wages are stagnant yet corporate profits soar, we need to identify the causes of all of
this damage – and how to fix the situation.
Historically, trade agreements have dealt with lowering tariffs on goods. The United States and European nations relied
heavily on tariffs to protect infant industries from foreign competition. But trade agreements no longer just deal with trade in
goods. A cornerstone of the expansion of the corporate globalization agenda also encompasses services. The liberalization
of services involves allowing foreign investors the right to own and operate services within other WTO signatory countries’
territories – including essential services like education, health care, electricity provision and water distribution – for profit. It
also involves de-regulating service industries such as telecommunications, insurance, transportation – even banking, such
as Argentina did before its IMF-induced economic collapse in 2001.
Little-known negotiations in the current Doha Round would also strictly limit national, state and local authority to set service
sector professional licensing, technical standards and qualification requirements. The United States has even offered to
commit higher education to WTO disciplines. But privatization and de-regulation of essential services worldwide have
decreased access for the poor and have eroded hard-won democratic consumer protections.
Meanwhile, the WTO’s agriculture trade rules have been a disaster all around. According to the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization, “progress [toward reducing hunger] has slowed significantly in Asia and stalled completely worldwide” in the
last 15 years. It was the goal of the world’s handful of multinational grain trading giants, including a former Cargill executive
who as a U.S. trade official drafted the WTO farm rules which forced the world to treat food like any other commodity. This
system has failed with horrific results and must be replaced.
The livelihoods of billions of subsistence farmers have been pitted against the profits of corporate agribusiness and grain
trading companies with success measured as greater volume of food moving around in trade, not in decreasing hunger. The
Indian government has confirmed that at least 100,000 farmers who have lost their livelihoods to this scandalous system
have committed suicide in the WTO decade. Meanwhile, for the first time in generations the United States is headed for net
food-importer status (imports outpaced exports in April 2006) even as we are the world’s largest agriculture exporter (often
of the same foods we import) U.S. farmers’ incomes have tanked, while profits of corporate agribusiness giants have
soared.
Another pillar of the WTO model is the massive expansion of corporate patent monopolies. The WTO’s Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS), which sets 20-year worldwide monopoly marketing rights on
drugs and seed varieties, is the single greatest protectionism agreement in the world. Forcing governments worldwide to
provide monopoly protection for every seed variety or medicine that Big Pharma and Agribusiness patent has meant vastly
increasing prices for consumers in rich and poor countries alike – and many cut off of these life sustaining goods.
Instead of having to adhere to new restrictions on trade that protect corporate profits, countries must be free to prioritize
other values and goals, particularly regarding the saving of millions of lives by getting access to low-cost life-saving drugs.
For example, African nations facing the HIV-AIDS epidemic must be free to decide that access to essential medicines takes
priority over U.S. pharmaceutical profits, even if those corporations are one of the largest lobbies on trade in the United
States.
The Way Forward: Saving Global Trade from the WTO

Taken together, the evidence points conclusively to a global shift away from the neo-liberal corporate globalization model
embodied by the WTO based on people’s experience of the model’s failure. With the Doha Round’s collapse, the story to be
written is about viable alternatives to the WTO - as well as to the bilateral or regional trade agreements based on the same
failed model.
Instead of pinning blame on specific countries, the focus of energy should be on how the world’s governments can develop
a multilateral trade system that preserves the benefits of trade for growth and development, while pruning away the many
anti-democratic constraints on domestic policy making contained in the existing WTO rules. These rules are designed to
create a world that operates as one single homogenized global market rather than setting terms of trade between separate
nations with distinct priorities.
The critics of corporate globalization are for international trade between different, unique countries or regions when it is
mutually beneficial. To strike this balance between promoting trade while respecting the laws and values of different
countries, some existing international rules and institutions need to be cut back, while others need to be bolstered.
Currently, the WTO trumps all other international agreements. The WTO must be scaled back so that the human rights,
environmental, labor and other multilaterally agreed public interest standards already enshrined in various international
treaties can serve as a floor of conduct for corporations seeking the benefits of global trade rules. For instance, the
International Labor Organization provides core labor standards; there are more than 200 multilateral environmental treaties
covering toxics, air pollution, biodiversity and waste dumping; and the World Health Organization and the U.N. Charter on
Human Rights provide many standards on access to medicine and food security.
Two hundred and six civil society organizations, including social movements representing millions of people in poor and rich
countries alike, support a WTO transformation program dubbed “Stop Corporate Globalization: Another World is Possible,”
available at www.ourworldisnotforsale.org. The International Forum on Globalization has published the book Alternatives to
Economic Globalization: A Better World is Possible, which reports on proposals for alternatives gathered through years of
conversations with civil society leaders, scholars and government officials in poor and rich countries.
These are but a few of the rich alternatives being discussed everywhere but at the WTO. The WTO experiment has failed.
Replacing the overreaching WTO agenda with fair rules aimed at facilitating trade between willing countries is the only way
forward.
Such change globally requires work form us living here in the United States. We can start by building a majority in our
elected leadership who understand that the corporate globalization system implemented by the WTO has failed American
workers and farmers, failed the most basic tenants of democratic governance and failed the world. Time is long overdue to
change the way this policy is developed and thus whose needs it serves. This will only happen through citizen activism. For
ideas about how to get involved, please visit our website at www.tradewatch.org.
Lori Wallach, Director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, is the author of Whose Trade Organization? A
Comprehensive Guide to the WTO. Both she and Deborah James, Director of the WTO Program at the same organization,
are leaders in the worldwide struggle against corporate globalization.

Doha Round

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Doha Round

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The November 2001 declaration of the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, provides the mandate for

This is an unofficial explanation of what the declaration mandates.

In paragraph 12 of the Ministerial Declaration, ministers See also

The ministers established a two-track approach. Those

Those implementation issues where there is no mandate to

> Implementation decision explained

Agriculture Key dates: agriculture

• market access: substantial reductions

The declaration makes special and differential treatment for

The ministers also take note of the non-trade concerns (such

> current negotiations

Services Key dates: services

> current negotiations

Market access for non-agricultural products Key dates: market access

While average customs duties are now at their lowest levels

Another example is “tariff escalation”, in which higher

The negotiations take place in a Market Access

> current negotiations

Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) Key dates: intellectual

These negotiations take place in “special sessions” of the

Geographical indications — extending the “higher level

The Doha Declaration notes that the TRIPS Council will

In papers circulated at the Ministerial Conference, member

Argentina said it understands “there is no agreement to

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, EU, Hungary, India,

Reviews of TRIPS provisions. Two reviews have been

The Doha Declaration says that work in the TRIPS

> more on TRIPS

Relationship between trade and investment Key dates: trade and

This is a “Singapore issue” i.e. a working group set up by Continuing work in

> statement: chairman's understanding of the mandate ...

The declaration says the work must take full account of

> statement: chairman's understanding of the mandate ...

Transparency in government procurement Key dates: government

Trade facilitation Key dates: trade

A fourth “Singapore issue” kicked off by the 1996 Continuing work in

Those issues were cited in the 1 August 2004 decision that

> statement: chairman's understanding of the mandate ...

WTO rules: anti-dumping and subsidies Key dates: anti-dumping,

The ministers agreed to negotiations on the Anti-Dumping Start: January 2002

Negotiations take place in the Rules Negotiating Group.

> current negotiations

WTO rules: regional trade agreements Key dates: regional trade

The declaration mandates negotiations aimed at “clarifying

These negotiations fell into the general timetable

Negotiations take place in the Rules Negotiating Group.

> current negotiations

Dispute Settlement Understanding Key dates: disputes

The 1994 Marrakesh Ministerial Conference mandated Start: January 2002

The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) started the review in

The Doha Declaration mandates negotiations and states (in

> more on Dispute Settlement Understanding negotiations

Trade and environment Key dates: environment

So far no measure affecting trade taken under an Negotiations deadline:

Observer status. Overall, the situation concerning the

Trade barriers on environmental goods and services.

Fisheries subsidies. Ministers agreed to clarify and

Negotiations on these issues, including concepts of what are

Work in the committee back to top

Ministers instructed the Trade and Environment

• The effect of environmental measures on market

> more on trade and environment

Electronic commerce Key date: electronic