Chinese Sociological Review, vol. 46, no. 4, Summer 2014, pp. 318.

2014 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. Permissions: www.copyright.com

ISSN 21620555 (print)/ISSN 21620563 (online)
DOI: 10.2753/CSA2162-0555460401

The Decline of the Chauvinistic Model

of Chinese Masculinity
A Research Report
William Jankowiak, University of Nevada
Xuan Li, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Our study is the first study to explore the transformation of Chinese gen-
der stereotypes over a thirty-year period. Based on the field research conducted
in Hohhot, Inner Mongolia, Peoples Republic of China, and supplemental data
in Shanghai, Beijing, and Nanjing, we examine the way men and womens sup-
posed essence has been objectified in folk ideology to form a cognitive or ideal
model of gender. We argue that there is a decline in the 1980s chauvinistic model
of masculinity that centered around a simplistic dichotomy of wn (scholarly)/wu
(oriented toward bold action); whereby masculinity is associated with a presump-
tion of superiority and contempt toward women to a newer form of masculinity
organized around a blend of wn and wu cultural traits that highlight confidence,
decisiveness, politeness, and a cool demeanor, along with a heightened respect
for females.

Gender images and role expectations vary from culture to culture. This is often true
even where behavioral similarities across cultures persist in regard to gender-related
behaviors of males and females. In Imperial China, studies exploring the significance
of gender have noted that there was no word for masculinity or femininity in that
era. The absence of a linguistic term that identifies gender as a social configuration
has led some to infer that kinship in Imperial China was more essential than gender
(Brownell and Wasserstrom 2002). Rather than being bounded by availability of
linguistic labels, we argue that there are interesting and important aspects of male/
female subjective experiences, behaviors, and interactions (Jankowiak 1999, 2002,
2006), as it is one thing to assert that not every culture has labels in everyday lan-
guage for folk ideology of masculinity and femininity and quite another to conclude
that there are no recurrent sex-linked patterns of behavior.
After the fall of the Qing empire, many sex-linked behaviors continue to
cluster around specific orientations toward the erotic (Buss 2007; Symons 1979),

3
4chinese sociological review

parenting preferences (Gray 2010; Li and Lamb 2012), and risk-taking activities
(Bribiescas 2006; Schlegel and Barry 1991; Shan et al. 2011). Clearly, there are
differences and similarities in the ways that males and females are understood
to think and behave (Brandtstadter and Santos 2009; Gutmann 1996). Because
masculinity and femininity comprise a set of often rival or competing construc-
tions and not something that is timeless and fixed, it is essential to examine the
shifts in a societys folk assumptions as they relate to the way gender images
are objectified and performed (Herzfeld 1985, 2005; Johnson 1987; Johnson
and Lakoff 1980). Given Chinas dramatic social changes, we believe that par-
ticularly productive questions about the interplay between gender ideology and
gender-specific behaviors would include the following: What are the recurrent
societal folk notions of maleness? How are male-linked behaviors manifested in
ordinary life? And finally, to what extent, if any, have male and female personae
changed in recent decades?
In this article we explore how gender configurations have been imaged, trans-
formed, and performed in two different eras: the 1980s and the 2000s. We also
explore the cultural meanings linked to gender ideals that serve as powerful ideo-
logical devices influencing individual behavior. Specifically, we examine the way
mens and womens supposed essences have been objectified in folk ideology
to form cognitive or ideal models of gender. We argue that there is a decline in the
1980s chauvinistic model of masculinity to the extent that the current model now
includes a newer form of masculinity organized around a greater sense of self-
confidence, decisiveness, politeness, and a cool demeanor, yet one that incorporates
a heightened respect for females.
The data for this article come from field research conducted by Jankowiak
in Hohhot (the capital of Chinas Inner Mongolia) from 1981 to 1987, and from
numerous shorter field seasons (2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2013).
Additional data were also obtained in Shanghai, Beijing, and Nanjing between
2010 and 2013.
We relied on three sources of data. The central data presented here were based on
a gender stereotype survey that involved adjective checklists applied to conceptual
others. For this, subjects were asked to select traits thought to be characteristic of
women, men, or both sexes. The survey was first conducted in 1982 (n = 34 college
students), and then again in 2000 (n = 987 middle school, high school, and college
students in Chengdu and Hohhot). The survey data were interpreted and enriched
by interviews with 29 Hohhotian college students or graduates (none of whom took
the earlier survey) conducted in 2006, individually or in focus groups, concerning
their ideas about how males and females behave or should behave in a variety of
situations as well as extensive observational studies in a variety of settings, such
as city buses, restaurants, and workplace and sidewalk milieus where interactions
could be observed, which further document the manifestations of Chinese gender
in ordinary life.1
 summer 2014 5

Chinese Masculinity: An Overview

To be masculine in urban China is to embody certain attributes that men are

understood to represent or possess as revealed in their attitudes and behavior. To
trace the origin, historical continuity and shifts of these attributes, Kam Louie and
Louise Edwards (1994) adopted a historical sociological perspective to explore
Chinese literatures treatment of male behavior and found a recurrent theme:
men were conceptualized as being oriented toward embracing either a scholarly
(wn), that is, an intellectual, life posture, or a physical, action-oriented (wu) life
posture. These two masculine images are, at least superficially, opposed to each
other. The wn image idealizes the literary scholar and values studious endeavor,
mastery of classical knowledge, and gentility of manners. The wu image highlights
an action-oriented man who has physical strength, engages in bold action, and is
forceful when necessary (Kipnis 2011; Louie 2000a, 2000b, 2002). The typology
should not be viewed as an either/or relationship between two absolute opposites.
Rather, both versions of Chinese maleness share some common features, such as a
reserved attitude toward the expression of emotions and an emphasis on self-control.
Women, who had been portrayed as less capable of controlling their emotions and
less effective managers of their own lives have been deemed by males, and even
most females, as the inferior gender compared to men.
In every era, individuals with wn or wu personae are present. Different historical
eras, however, tend to highlight, esteem, and thus value one persona over the other.
For example, historians (Hinsch 2013; Louie 1991; Song 2004, 2010; Van Gulik
1975) have suggested that a motivation for the Ming elites exaggerated expres-
sion of a literary (wn) persona was a pragmatic reaction to the Manchu conquest.
In adopting a frail, scholarly male identity (Louie 2002: 19), the Han elite tacitly
rejected as vulgar the Manchu embracing of martial (or wu) masculinity. The Han
elite was also aware that a genteel literary persona would be less of a threat and
might placate the conquering Manchu, thus allowing the Han elite to continue to
hold administrative positions (ibid.). Throughout the Qing dynasty, the Han elite
cultivated the genteel (or wn) masculine image. The collapse of Imperial China
in 1911 did not noticeably alter the value placed on literary masculinity. The wu
image, on the other hand, has served historically as a default category for men who
find the scholarly ideal unobtainable. Thus, the wu posture is favored and often
embraced by working-class men, long-time bachelors, and bandits (Watson 1988).
Contemporary Chinese continue to place a lower value on the attributes associated
with a wu persona; thus, muscularity is not valued or admired (Yang, Gray, and Pope
2005). Even Maos China, with its official hostility toward the educated stratum,
paradoxically strengthened (at least for the college-educated) literary masculinity
as the preferred masculine ideal (Kipnis 2011).
It is true that Chinese males, especially educated ones, still frequently resort to
a wn or more genteel persona. This is especially so in regard to dating, marital
6chinese sociological review

relationships, and interactions among colleagues. Most ethnographic research on

contemporary Chinese masculinity reveals the other side of the story, however. Such
studies have focused on males interacting mainly in unisexual settings including
those involving the use of violence by unemployed rural youth to demand token
respect (Watson 1988; Watson and Rubie 2004), other sexually charged, often in-
tensely competitive, unisexual gatherings (Osberg 2013), semiformal professional
dining celebrations (Mason 2013), audacious adventures (Liu 2011), and other dem-
onstrations of bravery and mobility (Kohrman 2005, 2007). Although the activities
in these studies vary, they share some common themes, such as the use of violence
(real and symbolic), long distance sojourns as evidence of bravery, the consumption
of alcohol, the use of crude language, vulgar displays, sexually insensitive, overtly
competitive status assertions, materialistic displays of self-importance, and sexually
flirtatious encounters used to promote camaraderie and, thus, male solidarity, or,
in other words, the apparent embracing of the wu persona. This context-dependent
adroit shifting between wn and wu behavioral styles indicates a hybridization of
Chinese masculinity, which is increasingly inclined toward the recognition and
admiration of a newfound form of male polite assertiveness.

Chinese Socialism: Socioeconomic Background of Shift in

Gender Ideology

In the early 1980s, urban China remained organized around a danwi (work unit)
distribution system that was insular in its orientation and in its everyday policies.
Recruiting through a graduate allocation system (fen pi) with little flexibility for
voluntary change of employment, it was highly restrictive of individual, social, and
geographic mobility: people seldom left and new people seldom arrived; life was
organized around a succession of less than stimulating events and routine social
encounters. Although there were, in principle, no social classes in 1980s danwis,
political positions and bureaucratic ranks within the work units existed. The work
unit, the local embodiment of the communist state, stressed similar social values
to those emphasized in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. In both cultural set-
tings, being a good comrade means having a modest income while improving
knowledge of the communist doctrines, cooperating with the state bodies, watching
cautiously, and being observant so as to ensure that no one disturbed the socialist
order (Czech Communist Museum 2003).
The occupational and social insularity of Chinese danwis fostered a fortress
mentality that deemphasized the importance of choice, innovation, and change; pre-
dictability, loyalty, and control of emotions, on the other hand, were valued, esteemed,
and rewarded with promotions. College students, educated clerks, and government
officialselites of this social settingstrove to repeatedly demonstrate they were not
workers or peasants, but rather (at least while in public) intellectually accomplished
males who conform to the ideal of gentility (you wnhu in the 1980s, and youxiuyang
 summer 2014 7

in the 2000s). To construct such a persona, they controlled their affects, especially
negative emotions, thus avoiding public quarrels. For example, the esteem extended to
a reserved persona could be seen in the way the college-educated responded when un-
expectedly involved in a bicycle accident. Between 1981 and 1987, Jankowiak (1993)
observed over 100 bicycle accidents but never witnessed a single college-educated
male or female respond with rage. For members of the educated stratum, to enter
into a public quarrel was regarded as a sign of the inability to control ones emotions
that would entail a loss of face or social standing. The genteel persona embraced by
danwi elites was not adopted by noncollege-educated male workers or government
officials, apart from a few. Rather, the behavior of the latter group conformed more to
a physical action-oriented (wu) rather than a scholarly (wn) posture.
The dismantling of the work unit system, along with the maturing of the single-
child generation, produced an enormous social and psychological transformation
in how individuals conceptualized their places within society and the world. In
contemporary urban Chinas competitive, risk-taking market-organized society, men
and women have enormous opportunities for adventure, profitable employment,
and self-development. Maturing in an age of material abundance and participating
in an immensely competitive market economy, male and female youth in China
today are exposed to new experiences, new opportunities, and new ways of see-
ing the world, which drastically expanded their cognitive horizons. Among many
important issues, Chinese youth are using the exploding volume of information
accessible to them to reevaluate what it means to be a male or female. It could
be argued that the openness to social experimentation, itself a consequence of the
economic reform, influences the way that gender ideals are conceptualized, and
promotes new discourses about masculinity and femininity.
The single-child policy, which started almost simultaneously with the economic
reform, also contributed to a profound shift in the way masculinity is constructed.
In practical terms, Chinese parents consider their only child a precious limited
resource and only hope (sometimes for their own unrealized dreams) and conse-
quently push their offspring to excel, regardless of gender (Fong 2004), leading
to a narrowing gap between male and female children in resource availability as
well as their potential to achieve. More fundamentally, however, this policy guided
the social construction of the child from being seen merely as the extension of the
family line to being seen as an individual (and more often than not, the only one
in each family) recipient of care, concern, and nurturance. The individualized,
personalized view of the child makes it a central task for parents to best help their
children achieve individual happiness within and outside of established social
institutions. This, in turn, has led to a shift of parenting practices away from an
aloof, instrumental stance to an intensely affectionate child-centered orientation. A
by-product of parents heightened concern for their childs well-being has been the
bestowing on the child of the freedom to experience a richer inner life that needs
to be demonstrated in socially appropriate gendered manners.
8chinese sociological review

Cultural Images of Maleness and Femaleness: 1980s2000s

Would the maturing of Chinas single-child generation, combined with participa-

tion in a globalized market system, challenge, and ultimately alter, traditional
assumptions about the basic attributes of the male and female genders as expected
(Jankowiak, Joiner, and Klabia 2011)? To appreciate how gender images have
changed in the perception of Chinese youngsters, Jankowiak, in 1982 and again in
2000 and 2004, conducted separate gender stereotype surveys designed to identify
traits that urban Chinese associate with each gender, which were followed by in-
depth interviews and accompanied by observations at multiple fieldsites (Williams
and Best 1990).
A lexical approach for the survey was chosen because research (Eagly 1995;
McCauley 1995) has repeatedly found that gender stereotypic perceptions and the
relevant everyday vocabulary are not arbitrary exaggerations but rather describe
real personality differences (Lueptow, Garovich-Szabo, and Lueptow 2001: 6)
and rest on real behavioral differences (McCauley 1995). Most recently, Lckenoff
and colleagues (2014), including Robert McCrae andPaul Costa (2001) who built
the prominent Big-Five personality model based on the same approach, explored
whether genderstereotypes ofpersonality are universal and accurate. They found
that gender stereotypes reflect valid socialjudgments aboutthe size and direction
of sex differences in personality butthe sexdifferences are small in size for both
and are perhaps morepronounced forreadily observable characteristics.
To take it one step further, we believe that the comparison between lexicons
related to gendered traits across time is useful to document the degree to which
meanings attached to a cultures gender ideals are altered. By comparing and
contrasting two distinct cultural erasthe 1980s and the 2000swe can identify
the shifts and continuities in Chinese gender configuration that are most apparent
and the social factors behind these transformations. Results of the two waves of
gender stereotype survey are listed below, with their interpretations substantiated
by interview and observational data.

1980s Survey Results

Men, according to our respondents in 1980s, are perceived as rough (culu), users
of crude language (shuo cuhua), self-confident (zixin), serious (yansu), adventur-
ous (you tansuo jingshen), clever (congming), easygoing (suihe), quiet (anjing),
aggressive (haoshengxin qiang), reluctant to reveal emotions (hanxu), strong
(qiangzhuang), shy (haixiu), and ambitious (for a promotion) (you yexin). In contrast,
females are thought to be pretty (piaoliang), soft-spoken (roushengxiyu), lacking in
strength (rouruo), gossipy (chuan xianhua), timid (paxiu), prone to use polite language
(you limao), gentle (wnrou), anxious (jiaolu), sentimental (youyu), and inclined to
make a fuss out of nothing (meishi zhaoshi).
 summer 2014 9

Most gender stereotype studies neglect to record the traits identified as gender
irrelevant, that is, not useful in signifying gender identity, but connotative of ethical
or character traits available to either sex. We found that both genders are understood
to be equally honest (chengshi), trustworthy (xin de guo), jealous (jidu), angry
(shengqi), stubborn (guzhi), deceitful (pianren), reasonable (lizhi), sympathetic (you
tongqingxin), diligent (qinlao), easily depressed (yiyu), responsible (you zerengan
de), loyal (zhongcheng), selfish (zisi), excitable (rongyi jidong), kind (haoxin), and
genteel (youxiuyang).
The 1980s gender stereotype survey revealed the persistence of vestiges of sex-
ist ideology. In the 1980s, educated males were perceived to have more positive
attributes: They were smarter, more confident, and more career-oriented. Females,
on the other hand, were considered to be less smart and more fragile, although more
family-centered, and nurturing at the same time. The urban Chinese conceptualiza-
tion of gender in that era is consistent with gender ideals found in many agrarian
societies. In such cultural contexts, males are often viewed as more courageous,
more intelligent, stronger, and more emotionally mature than females. Women,
in contrast, are viewed as passive, sexually conservative, faithful, and obedient.
Although women, in actuality, overwhelmingly and consistently deviated from
these stereotypes and repeatedly engaged in behaviors that demonstrated keen
intelligence, ambition for a promotion, and ability to form and maintain both weak
and strong social networks, their individual actions did little to alter long-standing
folk ideals of what were considered to be innate sex differences.

2000s Survey Results

In our more recent surveys, respondents indicated that they regarded males as
serious (yansu), ambitious (you yexin de), stubborn (guzhi), deceitful (pianren),
independent (duli), and powerful (qiang zhuang). Females, in contrast, were seen
as quiet (anjing), anxious (jiaoji), excitable (rongyi jidong), gentle (wenrou), de-
pressed (yiyu), timid or shy (paxiu), inclined to make a fuss out of nothing (meishi
zhaoshi), and jealous (jidu).
With equal prevalence males and females were regarded as selfish (zisi), honest
(chengshi), absent-minded (madaha), self-confident (zixin), kind (haoxin), loyal
(zhong cheng), trustworthy (chengxin), reasonable (jiangdaoli), responsible (you-
zerengande), diligent (qinlao), angry (shengqi), clever/intelligent (congming), and
incapable of doing hard work (jiaoqi).

Discussion

The 1980s and 2000s surveys indicate that some perceived sex differences have per-
sisted across time and space, though others have undergone significant changes.
Starting with continuities: Crude (culu) language is seen as a specifically male
10chinese sociological review

trait in both eras. Research finds that cursing has two essential meanings: (1) to voice
anger or disgust at something or someone, and (2) to signal camaraderie. In effect,
cursing, in some contexts, can promote a feeling of in-groupness and belonging.
In agreement with the aforementioned ethnographic research on Chinese males in
unisex gatherings, crude language continued to be used as a gender-restrictive way
to celebrate and express masculine fellowship.
The first shift worth noting lies in the tone that people use to explain their
responses. In the 1980s males overwhelmingly responded with a distinctly conde-
scending tone that suggested a deep-seated contempt and hostility for the opposite
sex. The condescending tone is consistent with a superficially egalitarian society
with lingering patriarchal ethos that holds males as superior to females. In the
2000s, Jankowiak noticed that less hostility was openly expressed toward the op-
posite sex. Men and women may certainly express anger at a specific member of
the opposite sex but their anger was seldom generalized into an all-encompassing
gender slur.
In the 1980s, men and women, most of whom had a number of brothers and/
or sisters, nevertheless seldom had many casual interactions with the opposite sex
with peers outside of the family and therefore had fewer opportunities to observe
variations in behavior. In contrast, the single-child generation, beneficiaries of ex-
panded educational opportunities and thus a reduction in sexual inequality, has had
more frequent cross-gender interaction in school settings and, consequently, more
opportunities to interact with the opposite sex, which has contributed to increased
knowledge about the opposite sex, if not the reduction of sexual anxiety.
Second, compared to the 1980s survey, urbanities gender trait evaluations are
now more blurred. For example, an increased number of traits are deemed gender
irrelevant. The reevaluation of intelligence (congming) from an exclusively male
trait to gender irrelevancy is one of these profound changes. It is vivid evidence
of the shift away from the lingering patriarchal sentiment that intelligence was an
exclusively male trait underlying male superiority, an attitude held by only a few
singletons in the 2000s.
The influx of intelligence into gender-irrelevancy could be interpreted by high
academic achievements of singleton females, sometimes over their male counter-
parts, one of the many unintended consequences of the states single-child policy.
Under parental encouragement, females constitute more than 50 percent of Chinas
college student body today (as is typical around the globe), compared to 23 percent
in 1980 (Hewitt 2009). The result of this massive sociological transformation pro-
vided living proof that girls are perceived to be just as intelligent as boys.
Female academic success may also be a factor for the personality trait of confi-
dence being shifted from an exclusively male trait in the 1980s to become, by the
2000s, a gender-irrelevant trait. Further expanding Chinas folk ideas of gender
irrelevancy is the conviction that singleton-generation females have become,
like males, equally diligent (qinfen) as well as absent-minded (mahu). This is
not surprising in view of the close-knit relationship between intelligence, taking
 summer 2014 11

on expanded commitments, competently completing a task, and often forgetting

things (i.e., becoming absentminded about trivial issues due to concentration on
major tasks).
The examples given above are in line with the report of Vanessa Fong (2004)
that Dalian single children, such as Hohhot and Chengdu single children, prefer
individuals characterized by more gender-irrelevant traits rather than those tradi-
tionally associated with one gender or another. This shift is typical of cultures no
longer being organized around a rigid, thus restrictive, sexual division of labor
(Lueptow, Garovich-Szabo, and Lueptow 2001). The normative conceptual shift
suggests a more fluid tolerance for variation in personality display that may or
may not be consistent with a societys overarching gender ideology. This may
be a global pattern and, thus, a by-product of modernizing forces that tolerate a
wider expression of individuality and thus a decreasing adherence to a previous
eras gender ideology.
The tendency of Chinas urban youth to see more traits as gender irrelevant is
also consistent with the modernity thesis that associates urbanization and a capital-
ist economy with an increase in plural social worlds. The pluralization of social
worlds provides more opportunities for social experimentation and tolerance, if
not acceptance, of idiosyncratic personalities as well as acceptance of new social
personae (Berger, Berger, and Keller 1973).
Still, gender differences persist. This difference has less to do, however, with a
previous eras sexual division of labor based in a redistributive command economy
and more to do with the market economys requirements and expectations. For ex-
ample, Hohhotian youth readily associated jobs advertised in the local newspaper
with a specific gender. Jobs considered suitable for women were confined to the
service industry (e.g., secretarial positions, waitressing, cleaning and laundry, light
industry) whereas jobs thought best for men (e.g., carpenter, budget supervisor,
apartment manager, interior designer) included managerial and leadership positions.
Significantly, there were also gender-irrelevant jobs (e.g., television salesperson,
software designer, newspaper reporter, and interior designer). Beyond the profes-
sional domain, many persistent sex differences (e.g., male risk-taking, female
emotional labor) continue to be manifested in a distinct performance style each
sex finds preferable within specific settings such as dating, marital interaction, and
parenting (Duncombe and Marsden 1994; Jankowiak 2013; Li and Lamb 2013).
Between the two surveys, a few traits made their way into the group of traits
labeled as masculine. One superficial indicator of the effect of the market economy
is that deceitfulness (pianren), a previously gender-irrelevant trait, has become a
trait associated with maleness. It is possible that the expanded market economy,
alongside a shift in public morality, has given males increased opportunities to
flirt and engage in extramarital affairs (Moore 2005). A more tolerant morality has
emerged in the new risk economy and the accompanying social arena that is not
regulated by a mature legal system or a new normative order. This context serves,
promotes and, at times, may reward deceitful social transactions. The second
12chinese sociological review

possible explanation is that deceitfulness arises from the emergent dating culture
whereby men are thought to make promises they seldom intend to keep in order to
seduce women. The sexual morality of the 1980s negatively sanctioned men who
had too many lovers. But today, youthful females report that their mothers, aware
of the shift away from the sexual morality of the 1980s to a new one that allows
men to admit to having had previous lovers, advise their daughters to pay careful
attention to the words men use in courtship.
The latter hypothesis is partially supported by the movement of jealousy (jidu)
from a gender-irrelevant category to a more female trait. We suspect that this shift
arises partly from status competition in the workplace, which Chinese women
today increasingly experience as sole supporters of themselves or coproviders for
their families, and partly from a heightened suspicion of real and imagined sexual
affairs. Chinas rapid urbanization has expanded neutral areas or privacy zones in
which individuals can become anonymous and thus protect their reputations while
pursuing extramarital relationships. Throughout the city are small hotels (xiao
lvguan) that are popular with couples to engage in sexual liaisons. In this new
social setting, women have learned to more readily voice their suspicions and this
makes them appear to be the more jealous sex.
The most surprising shift in the 2000 stereotypic survey involves the personality
attribute of shyness (haixiu). The cultural shift away from viewing shyness as a
positive male attribute to a more negative quality is consistent with other studies
that suggested behavioral inhibitions as preferred traits among Chinese children
and adolescents (Chen, Liu, and Li 2000). In the 1980s and earlier, shy Chinese
male children, in comparison to their noisy, mischievous peers who would poten-
tially break family and classroom rules, disturb their friends and adults and make
lives difficult for parents and teachers, were considered to be well-behaved and
to have a high capacity for empathy. They were accepted by peers and adults and
were thought to have socially appropriate personalities. Shyness in both children
and adults is consistent with a closed hierarchy that emphasizes modesty, loyalty,
and obedience above all else. In this social order, shy men were considered to be
well-adjusted, trustworthy, solid citizens.
By the late 1990s, however, Chinas market reforms had significantly altered
society so that the personality traits of assertiveness, a propensity for engaged
conversation and personal exploration started to be valued and admired (Chen,
Wang, and Wang 2009). In this new milieu, men, who are expected to shoulder
greater financial responsibility for the family, are consequently expected to be
more competitive and thus more assertive in the context of the market economy.
Consequently, shyness in males, but not necessarily females, came to be perceived
as a more negative than positive trait. For females, shyness, quietness, and perhaps
coyness are intertwined to become, at least in the dating context, the preferred female
image, although it is a persona no one expects will continue after marriage.
One of the concepts pertaining to gender differences that were not included in
 summer 2014 13

the lexical surveys but emerged in later interviews is yali. In the 1980s, no one men-
tioned feeling too much pressure (yali). The preferred term in polite discourse was
being busy (hen mang), which was something of an inside joke when low-ranking
government officials (xiao ganbu), who were notorious for doing nothing, claimed
to be busy. In the 2000s, as a consequence of the market economy, both males
and females readily admitted feeling intense pressure to succeed. In this context,
no one laughed. The competitive economy had made work essential and exhaust-
ing. By 2000, for example, whenever we asked men or women if they enjoyed
their work, many asserted that they did not especially enjoy working. Because
males are perceived to have more responsibilities, they often feel greater pressure
(yali)men and women both stress, repeatedly, that it is the obligation of men to
find a good job, buy an apartment, and support the family financially. Women are
also under similar pressure but it is not as readily acknowledged. For example,
thirty-something females who are married and have a child readily acknowledge
that they sometimes feel pressured to such an extent that they experience depres-
sion. Besides stress from their own job and family obligations, female informants
receive indirect pressure from their husbands careers, as behind every successful
man is a woman who worries about and supports his career, a stressor seldom
mentioned at a time when work was not deemed essential, important, or valued,
and relevant spousal support not necessary.
Someboth males and femalesfind working a rewarding experience, however.
A thirty-two-year-old college-educated woman who worked in sales admitted that
she was always trying to think of ways to improve her salesmanship and that she
found the work interesting. A forty-five-year-old female real estate agent also de-
scribed her work as very interesting. She liked meeting new people and enjoyed
the bargaining exchange process. A twenty-six-year-old female also concurred,
acknowledging: work helped me to take control of my social life and improve
myself. A fifty-two-year-old professional photographer agreed that his work was
far more interesting than it had been in the 1980s. He said, I now can do what I
want, create beauty, and sell it to whoever I want. He added: I am in control of
my life. These quotes suggested that in the reform era, Chineseregardless of
genderare able to think of work as the primary domain in which to define and
express self-worth. In this setting, Chinese male and female identities, like the
identities of many American males and females, have become intertwined with
relative success in the workplace. However, women much more than men continue
to insist that work was only part of their identity. For women rather than men, being
a good parent and spouse remained core values.
New terms were created in response to the changing social contexts, such as
ku (phonetic translation of the English word cool). Coming out of the mouths
of singletons who believe that it is best to always look cool (ku) under pressure
(Moore 2005),2 ku shares some of the components of wn/wu masculinities, such
as emotional calmness, and self-control, which are indicators of social maturity. In
14chinese sociological review

contrast to earlier socially oriented goals of emotional composure that were orga-
nized around proper role performance and maintenance of interpersonal harmony,
however, the ku demeanor popular among Chinese males today serves multiple
individual goals that involve the demonstration of independence, competence, and
mastery of external situations. Moore found that for Beijing youth who have em-
braced the Western image of coolness, ku referenced a degree of both flamboyance
and emotional distance, for instance. Ku, as a public style based on quiet confidence,
is built into the behavioral profile of successful men such as entrepreneurs and
professionals, and used sometimes to mask an unvoiced fear of failure. As noted
above, males feel an enormous responsibility to succeed. Many strive for this ideal,
but few succeed. Adopting a ku demeanor enables everyone, especially the more
socially marginal males, to claim that they are in charge of their lives even when
the exact opposite is closer to the truth.

Conclusion

For the Chinese, as for others, manhood must be demonstrated and it cannot be
presumed. The need for a man to publicly affirm his masculinity (Hinsch 2013: 4)
is a salient part of the social identity of Chinese men. The construction and recon-
ceptualization of masculinity (and femininity) continue to constitute an issue central
to the building of a wide network of social relationships.
Throughout Chinese history, two competing images of maleness have prevailed:
the wu persona embodied in physical toughness and the gentlemanly wn of those
who disdained physical exercise in favor of literary refinement. Although the
shift away from insularity to market expansion has not resulted in the formation
of completely new notions of maleness or femaleness that have been historically
derived from agriculture, labor, and government service, uniformity or consistency
in the presentation of ones self and sexuality is no longer, if it ever was, deemed
an essential component of personhood. Today, a man can be more wn in one set-
ting and more wu in another. In this new milieu, men and women have increasing
space to experiment with social personae that in their own way range somewhere
along the wn/wu continuum.
The image of the confident, assertive, albeit still respectful, male is consistent
with the ability to survive, if not thrive, in a competitive market economy. The rise
of the businessman who is perceived as capable, decisive, and confident forms a
new masculine role model.
In reform-era China, educated males are blending attributes common to the socialist
eranotably, paying homage to the genteel, professorial wn personayet combined
with a more aggressive, strong-minded, and take-charge leadership style (all wu at-
tributes). In the process, most singleton males strive to present a public persona that is
less timid, more decisive, and cool, yet ready to switch when the occasion calls for a
polite demeanor and the use of a refined discourse, as in interactions with colleagues,
 summer 2014 15

girlfriends, or spouses. Furthermore, college-educated men, but not necessarily less-

educated men, are becoming more involved in the home in interacting with their only
child. Affectionate discourse is now the preferred ideal, even though it may not be
voiced, as wives might prefer (Li and Lamb 2013). In this context, Chinese masculin-
ity does not have to brag or be violent in order to demonstrate maleness.
Clearly, the single-child generation is in the process of redefining the meaning
of masculinity away from Chinas historic wn/wu continuum into a hybrid or
synthetic blend (Song 2010; Song and Hird 2013). Today, there is a more mixed
understanding of appropriate male behavior, which fluctuates between the two key
stereotypes of wn and wu, based on circumstances. In the process, the meaning of
manhood, masculinity, and gender identity is being profoundly transformed.

Notes

1. There is remarkable continuity in the domains that individuals offer in conversation

as evidence of a given trait being male or female. Overwhelmingly the family, dating, or
school settings constitute their social universe.
2. This does not mean that women cannot also be ku. Some are, but ku is not regarded
as an indexical quality of femininity, while it is for masculinity.

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About the Authors

William Jankowiak is Barrick Distinguished Professor of Anthropology at the University

of Nevada, Las Vegas. He is author of Sex, Death and Hierarchy in a Chinese City:
18chinese sociological review

An Anthropological Account (1993), editor of Romantic Passion: A Universal Experi-

ence? (1995), Intimacies: Between Love and Sex (2008), and (with Daniel Bradburd)
Stimulating Trade: Drugs, Labor and Expansion (2003). In addition to numerous
academic publications on Chinese society and cross-cultural topics, he has written for
The World and I and Natural History, and has given interviews to Time, Newsweek, the
New York Times, ABC Primetime, the History Channel, and other popular media. His
current writing projects include producing an ethnography of a Mormon polygamous
community and a book-length restudy of Hohhot, Inner Mongolia.

Xuan Li is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge.

Her main research interest is the influence of social and cultural contexts on parenting
and child development. Her doctoral dissertation, using a multi-informant and mixed-
method approach, looks into fathers display of love and affection in rural and urban
China. She is also interested in childrens and adolescents peer relationships, mental
health and well-being as well as changing gender roles in different societies.