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Influence of Religious Integration on Attitudes: A Comparative Analysis of European

Countries
Author(s): Pierre Brchon
Source: Revue franaise de sociologie, Vol. 45, Supplement: An Annual English Selection
(2004), pp. 27-49
Published by: Sciences Po University Press on behalf of the Association Revue Franaise de
Sociologie
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R. franc. sociol., 45, Supplement, 2004, 27-49
Pierre BRECHON
Influence of Religious Integration on Att

a Comparative Analysis of European Coun
ABSTRACT
A panoramic view of religion in Europe is sketched on the basis of an international sur-

vey of religious attitudes (International Social Survey Programme, 1998). It is then shown
that integration into a religious system (on a scale from "regular church-goer" to "no reli-
gion") has significant effects on ethical and political attitudes (regarding sexual permissive-
ness, men's and women's roles in society, abortion, civic morality, confidence in
institutions, political orientation). Whatever the European country, integration into Catholi-
cism or Protestantism corresponds to attitudes that are more traditional, conformist, and
politically to the right. No clear difference may be observed between Catholics and Protes-
tants, groups that today are culturally fairly close.
Political sociology studies have long shown that degree of integration into
Catholicism in France strongly marks attitude systems, particularly political
attitudes. As Andre Seigfried (1913), who may be considered the father of
electoral sociology, explained early in the twentieth century, voting in
geographical zones where the clergy was influential and exercised a high
degree of control over society was strongly oriented to the right. A 1952
survey showed that distribution within the different electorates of various
categories of Catholic (determined by intensity of church attendance) was
quite uneven. (1) The first French presidential elections by universal suffrage,
in 1965, demonstrated the phenomenon's endurance (Brul6, 1966): in the first
round, 8% of regular church-going Catholics (attending mass every Sunday),
49% of non-church-going Catholics and 72% of persons stating they belonged
to no religion voted for the socialist candidate Francois Mitterrand. Guy
Michelat (2000) and Guy Michelat and Michel Simon (1977, 1985) explained
and theorized the phenomenon in detail. For them, the problem was not only
Catholic voting but the whole Catholic attitude system. French Catholics do
vote heavily for the right, but this is not due to voting instructions from the
clergy or episcopate, rather to the fact that Catholics have internalized a
system of values, a set of conservative political-cultural attitudes that orient
their voting behavior. The authors sought to better identify the Catholic
(1) Survey of the French Catholic Publique or IFOP (Sondages, 1952, 14, 4,
p. 40).
population by the Institut Franqais d'Opinion
27
Revue frangaise de sociologie
cultural system by studying relations between degree of belonging to a reli-

gious group and a large number of attitudes. They concluded that the stronger
one's membership and participation in a group, the more one shared the
group's symbolic system and values. They looked at political and cultural
atttitudes not just by religious denomination but degree of integration, from
Catholics attending church services every Sunday (or once a month) to
persons stating they belonged to no religion.
While the relation between degree of Catholic integration and value system
is clearly attested for France, the phenomenon has nevertheless been debated
and contested. French Catholicism changed in the 1970s. The bishops recog-
nized the legitimacy of political pluralism for Catholics; leftist tendencies
among Catholics seemed to grow stronger and were expressed more strongly
in the public sphere. Some observers began to believe that Catholicism in
general was moving sharply to the left. While this does not seem plausible, it
is clear that certain consistently minority groups within Catholicism do adopt
leftist attitudes and actively commit themselves in society. The idea is that
there is no single Catholic culture but several, though conservative Catholic
culture remains statistically dominant (Brechon and Denni, 1983; Donegani,
1993). Other critical arguments have been put forward. Those who believe
that voting has become volatile and is determined only by reasoning about
campaign issues cannot accept the idea that strong voting behavior variables
continue to exist and that religious attitude, perhaps associated with social
category, is the best predictor of voting behavior (Brechon, 2000b). It has also
been claimed that with increasing secularization in Europe, fewer and fewer
individuals have experienced strong religious socialization or have integrated
Catholic cultural values; degree of Catholic integration should therefore have
less and less impact on voting. This argument is debatable. There are indeed
minorities at the two extremes of the Catholic integration scale who are
always opposed to each other on an entire set of values. And while practicing
(ie, church-going) Catholics become more rare, there are more and more
persons without religious affiliation, and they are likely to be left-oriented.
It is not my purpose here to demonstrate once again that the relation
between religious integration and value system obtains for France, but rather
to show that it is operative in a high number of European countries. The ques-
tions here discussed are: Does integration or non-integration into a religious
system affect political attitudes and ethical values in the different European
national contexts? If so, are the effects the same in countries that do not share
exactly the same culture? Is the effect of religious integration the same for
Catholics and Protestants? It is often believed that Protestants in France
partake of a left-oriented culture, though this too is in part debatable (Dargen
1997), and the postulate has been put forth that this is true in all other cou
tries. Here I show that, in general, being integrated into Protestantism has
same sort of conservative effects as Catholic integration. (2) I do not claim
Talin (1998); Halman and Riis (1999);

(2) I handle these questions in Brechon
Broughton and ten Napel (2000).
(1996 and 1999). See also Cautres, Pina, and
28
Pierre Brechon
strong Catholic or Protestant integration can have only conservative effects

regardless of country. Religious systems have a certain flexibility. Certain
groups within Catholicism interpret the scriptural message critically. We
know, for example, that there can be revolutionary Christian tendencies; liber-
ation theology continues to have meaning in some Latin American countries.
Protestantism is highly diversified; over time, new Protestant consciousness
has regularly risen up and led to critiques of older Christian institutions. (3) We
also know from Max Weber that critical sectarian movements often become
churches for the multitude, and are therefore inevitably led to make compro-
mises with the world. The different forms of Protestantism -majority and
minority varieties, with or without ties to the state, of Calvinist, Lutheran, or
evangelical tradition, fundamentalist, orthodox, or liberal- obviously do not
all have the same influence on social and political attitudes. (4) However,
overall, as I show (and though I do not have the means to produce a total
explanation of the phenomenon), integration into majority Protestant denomi-
nations in Europe has conservative effects.
To answer the questions above, I've used the 1998 survey of the Interna-
tional Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which was mainly concerned with
religion but included a few indicators of individuals' ethical and political atti-
tudes. (5) Influence of religious integration may be studied on the basis of this
data. I have, however, been limited by the questionnaire, since we can only study
effect of religious integration on attitude areas touched upon in the survey.
This type of survey is quite useful for comparing different societies. Quan-
titative survey data are a fundamental tool if we want to go beyond facile
national group images or stereotypes. They enable us to go beyond mere
impressions, to objectify what individuals of different countries think and
experience. The system of statistical relations observable in such data makes
it possible to test hypothetical explanations. There are of course cultural indi-
cators other than survey data. We could study the situation of religions
through their presence in the media, place of the sacred or spiritual in contem-
porary architecture, links between religions and state, qualitative interviews,
etc. All this would be very rich, but would not enable us to learn what a
society as a whole, rather than just its elites, thinks at a given period.
(3) In Nordic countries, for example, in a face-to-face interview, excepting socio-

certain Protestant parties were created in the demographic variables), focuses on a topic that
twentieth century in reaction against Lutheran can be presented again a few years later. The
national churches and in defense of traditional 1996 survey topic was the role of government;
values (see Vignaux, 2001). in 1997 it was work orientations; in 1998,
(4) On the history of different Protestantreligion; in 1999, social inequalities; 2000, the
traditions see Willaime and Cusenier (1998), environment;
a 2001, social networks. The topic
highly useful tool for teaching Protestantfor 2002 was family and gender roles, and for
history. 2003, national identity. ISSP data are available
(5) Every year the ISSP conducts an inter- to the research community at the CIDSP
national survey in nearly 30 countries. Each (Centre d 'Informatisation des Donnees
national representative sample comprises in Socio-Politiques), Banque de donnees socio-
principle at least a thousand responses. The politiques, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de
questionnaire, which is fairly short (15 minutes Grenoble, BP 48, 38040 Grenoble cedex 9.
29
However, the limitations of such surveys should also be kept in mind. We

know that the way questions are worded can affect results. A question trans-
lated into several languages is not fully the same question, because of the
language-specific connotations of certain words and terms. Samples are not
always big enough to allow for valid multivariate analysis. (6) Sample size for
the countries chosen here varies greatly: 804 for Great Britain, 2,488 for
Spain (see Appendix, top of Table I). We know that samples are systemati-
cally biased in that not all population categories are equally willing to partici-
pate in surveys. The more integrated one is into a given society, the more
likely one is to agree to participate. One thing this leads to is "over-educated"
samples. And in surveys concerning religion, it leads to underrepresented reli-
gious minorities, due to their members' lower degree of social integration.
This is particularly clear for Muslims in Europe. In this text I consider only
majority religions, and I have accepted simplifications for the religious cluster
of which Protestantism is composed. Different Protestant components within
a given country do not necessarily have the same effects. What is affirmed
here is therefore only applicable to majority Protestant groups, dominant in
the samples.
The article takes into account the eleven European Union countries
included in the survey (Belgium, Finland, Greece, and Luxembourg are not
included). The United States is added for comparison purposes, as modernity
in that country seems to go hand in hand with the maintenance and
recomposition of religious values, whereas in many European countries secu-
larization is much stronger. Before considering the major questions of this
study, it is useful to recall briefly the religious characteristics of the countries
studied.
Strong national differences, but secularization at work everywhere
There are of course several ways of measuring a country's degree of religio-

sity. One classic measure is denominational membership. But individuals may
mean different things when they say they belong to a religious denomination.
For many today, this statement refers to a religious origin or upbringing.
Denominational membership is thus not experienced as a strong identity; it
does not imply a belief system or particular relation to the world. Only for a
minority of individuals does denominational membership go together with
religious behaviour involving individual practices (personal prayer, for
example) or collective ones (more or less frequent church attendance) and
adherence to the belief system put forward by that religion. Conversely,
certain individuals who say they are not members of any religious denomina-
tion may adhere to some religious beliefs: they refuse to conform to the
(6) Given national samples of between terms of subgroups, the margin of error widens
1,000 and 2,000 individuals, if we reason in fast: 10 points for a group of 100.
30
Pierre Brechon
denominational norm but may believe in a more or less formalized "beyond",

or, more often, in the possibility of one. The top of Table I presents the results
of combining denominational membership with degree of practice. (7) The
percentages of respondents stating they belong to no denomination is striking.
In fact this figure varies greatly from country to country. The European Union
is not at all homogeneous on this point.
Countries with low membership in religious denominations
By the membership criterion, three and a half countries (former East

Germany, (8) the Netherlands, Great Britain, and France) appear particularly
secularized, with "no religion" rates ranging from 69% to 45%. Instituted reli-
gions have lost much of their legitimacy and influence in these countries. For
many individuals they no longer have meaning. In the eastern part of
Germany, fifty years of anti-religious communism have left their mark. The
other three countries do not share the same religious traditions. Great Britain
has been strongly marked by Anglicanism, an established religion with ties to
the state, even though Protestant denominations and a Catholic minority have
been well established there for centuries, (9) particularly in Scotland, where
the Scottish Presbyterian Church, Calvinist, termed non-conformist, is domi-
nant and functions as a vector of cultural identity and sense of nationhood.
The Netherlands have a strong bi-denominational religious tradition. This
society was in fact divided into three pillars: Catholic, Protestant, and secular;
that is, three networks that framed the entire set of an individual's activities
(Janssen and Prins, 2000). This country is perhaps undergoing not so much
real secularization as disinstitutionalization of these religions and unstable
religious recompositions, for though many in the Netherlands refuse to say
they belong to a religious denomination, this does not prevent them from
acknowledging they are religious. The Netherlands is the European country
with the highest proportion of individuals stating they belong to "no religion"
while feeling religious. (10) France, by contrast, is a mono-denominational
Catholic country, the "first-born daughter of the Church" (a now outdated
Catholic expression), culturally marked by both its Catholic matrix and two
centuries of secularist tradition. (11) France's secular heritage is manifest in the
statistics: 14% of the French declare themselves "confirmed atheists", and a
(7) All persons attending religious services of proceeding seemed to be to consider

at least once a month were categorized Anglicans a Protestant denomination.
"church-goer". (10) 28% of persons with no denomina-
(8) Given the specificity of former East tional membership say they are from extremely
Germany in certain areas, results for the two to somewhat religious, as opposed to 1% in
German subgroups are presented separately in Spain, 2% in East Germany, 3% in France, and
the tables. 7% in Italy and Sweden.
(9) On the religious situation in Great (11) On the religious situation in contem-
Britain see Davie (1996). In the present study porary
it France see Br6chon (2000a); Lambert
was not possible to increase the number of (2000); Willaime (1998).
religious categories; the most acceptable way
31
significant minority of people in France are firmly opposed to religious belief.

In all other Western European countries the figure is sharply lower. (12)
Strong denominational membership and weak religious practice
Countries fitting this description are highly secularized, but one or more
religious denominations continue to play important social and in some cases
political roles. Denmark and Sweden are characterized by both high percent-
ages of membership in the national Lutheran Church (13) and low percentages
of church-goers, people who feel religious (bottom of Table I), and people
who believe in God. Belonging to a religion in these countries is often more
an indicator of national identity than a strictly religious indicator (Riis, 1996).
The situation in Western Germany is not much different. 85% of West
Germans say they belong to a religion, with Protestants and Catholics nearly
even, but there are few church-goers, feelings of religious identity are not very
strong, and belief in God is at a fairly low level. In a system where the state
publicly recognizes the church and does the job of collecting the church tax,
membership is almost an objective datum, a registry office feature. (14)
Churches in these countries have much greater financial means than in many
others. They also co-manage many social services with the state, which gives
them significant power in society.
A slower secularizationprocess in countries ofcenturies-old Catholic culture
The third model concerns countries with a long-term Catholic culture that
have more successfully resisted secularization (right-hand side of Table I).
Ireland is the clearest case, with 68% monthly church-going Catholics. In the
United States religious institutions are also strong: more than four in ten
Americans are monthly church-goers. It is worth noting that Americans are
exceptional less for religious indicator level (comparable to that for relatively
unsecularized European countries) than religious dynamics: religious
pluralism is much more highly developed there; religious adherence does not
last as long; some individuals readily change religious denomination. This is
also the only country where Protestantism is resisting well in a context of
advanced modernity. In Europe, countries with high living standards are often
countries with many Protestants but low numbers of church-going Protes-
(12) Source: European Values Survey (14) Church tax represents an increase on
1999. income tax of 8 to 9%. Despite a decrease in
(13) In Sweden this church was officiallynumber of people paying church tax in recent
separated from the state on January 1, 2000.years, approximately 27 million Protestants and
But it continues to receive strong state support.as many Catholics in Germany pay it. See
Sweden recognizes the right of all recognizedFrangois (1994), and Galembert (2000).
religions to official state aid.
32
Pierre Brichon
tants. (15) Protestantism does not seem to be resisting secularization as well as

Catholicism (except in the orthodox Calvinist context of the Netherlands). (16)
It should be added that while the pace of secularization varies from country
to country, all countries are affected. If we compare classic religious indica-
tors by generation, we see considerable drops in religiosity and belief among
younger generations. (17) Only extremely irresolute beliefs such as "It is likely
there is something after death", indicating a vague hope for the future and
immortality rather than real belief in a credo, message, or religious narrative,
are holding their own and even increasing among young people.
From this brief overview, (18) we can turn to the central question: Does inte-
gration into a religious system have a strong effect on individuals' attitudes?
Degree of integration is measured here by the Table I indicator combining
membership in a denomination with degree of practice. (19) It has on occasion
been claimed that this indicator is not valid because church-going has become
a poor indicator of religious conviction. (20) Several recent quantitative studies
show that though religious integration can be measured by several different
indices (subjective religious feeling, a scale of degrees of belief in God, an
index of private religious practices, etc.), these are all strongly correlated. (21)
It therefore seems valid to use a synthetic indicator combining membership
and practice. What are the effects of religious integration on a few attitudes
regarding sexual and family morality, collective ethics, and political orienta-
tion?
Sexual and family ethics
It has often been claimed that religions are strongly reluctant to acknow-
ledge sexual pleasure and sexual liberation. But we also know that there can
be significant differences between what theologies and institutional norm
systems dictate and individuals' experience. Can a link be observed between
(15) Whereas in the United States more and no practice. I have had to limit the
than one Protestant in two is a monthly categories to two in order to have high enough
church-goer, this is the case for only one innumbers of Catholics and Protestants, namely
three in Great Britain, one in five in East in the bi-denominational countries.
Germany, one in seven in West Germany, one (20) That argument can be reversed,
in nine in Denmark, one in ten in Sweden. Onhowever. We could say this indicator is
this point the Netherlands are a Europeanactually more valid today than it was in the
exception: persons identifying themselves aspast: in a society suffused by the major
Protestant are often church-goers. Christian denominations, church-going may
(16) Willaime (1992) seeks to understand have been more a matter of sociability than a
and explain this phenomenon. religious act. On the contrary, going to church
(17) I develop this point in several texts, in a secularized society is more likely to be a
namely Brechon (2001a, 2001b). truly religious choice.
(18) Davie (2000) offers detailed, suggestive (21) Michelat (1990, 1997) provides a
interpretations of religious trends in Europe. methodical demonstration of this point for
(19) Ideally, there would be at least threeFrance.
categories: regular practice, irregular practice,
33
religious integration and opinions on sexuality? To answer this question, I

have constructed an index of sexual permissiveness; results are presented in
Table II. (22) The most religious countries also seem the least permissive, but
this relation is far from absolute. Two traditionally Catholic countries, Austria
and Spain, are characterized by high levels of sexual permissiveness. (23)
Sexual relations are often considered legitimate in continental northern Euro-
pean countries, more marked by Protestantism and more secularized. The
differences observed among European countries may be due as much to
national cultural traits as individuals' religious identities. It is striking to see
that for the same position on the denominational integration scale, levels of
sexual permissiveness are very different by society. Liberalism about sexu-
ality thus seems a trait that continues to differentiate European cultures in a
world understood as globalized. But within each country there are significant
differences by individual's degree of religious integration. Almost every-
where, people stating they belong to no religion are the most permissive, and
non-church-goers are always more liberal than church-goers. In bi-denomina-
tional countries, contrary to what might have been expected, Protestants often
turn out to be less permissive than Catholics. This is therefore an area where
integration into one of the major European religious systems brings about
highly significant differences in attitudes.
There are two survey questions that enable us to measure conception of
men's and women's roles in the family. Here I have constructed an index
isolating respondents favorable to women working (see Table III). (24) Four
countries (Italy, Portugal, Austria, West Germany) are generally not in favor
of women working and continue to favor the traditional maternal func-
tions. (25) All the other countries are much more in favor of women having
occupational responsibilities. Results by country do not seem closely linked to
degree of secularization. On the other hand, within each country, the lower the
degree of religious integration, the more likely one is to be in favor of women
working. The system of relations is the same as for sexual permissiveness, but
the disparities are on the average not as great from one category to another.
There is no significant difference between Catholics and Protestants on this
point.
(22) The index is based on four closely between Spain, strongly liberal, and Portugal,
interrelated indicators: legitimacy of a) sexual rigorously traditional.
relations before marriage, b) sexual relations (24) This index is based on two indicators:
between two adults of the same sex, c) living "A husband's job is to earn money; a wife's job
together without intending to get married, is to look after the home and family" and "All
d) living together before marriage. I did not use in all, family life suffers when the woman has a
legitimacy of extra-marital sexual relations full-time job". The table selects all those who
because this is less closely linked to the four disagree at least somewhat with those two
others. Table II selects persons who find each opinions.
of the four behaviors at least partly legitimate (25) The differences between East and
("Not wrong at all" or "Wrong only West Germany are strong here, as they are for
sometimes"). religious identity and abortion. Degree of
sexual permissiveness is the same, however.
(23) The index shows a striking difference
34
Pierre Brechon
The last family ethics index (Table IV) concerns number of persons willing
to accept abortion. (26) The most secularized and heavily Protestant countries
seem the most accepting (excepting West Germany and the Netherlands).
Catholic countries, notably Ireland and Italy, are much less accepting. We
once again find strong ties with religious identity within each country: the
more integrated one is into Catholicism or Protestantism, the less likely one is
to accept abortion. Persons belonging to no religion are thus most likely to
accept it. The differences between practicing Catholics and Protestants are not
as great as might have been expected given Catholic doctrines stressing prohi-
bition of abortion. Church-going Catholics are likely to look slightly less
favorably on abortion than church-going Protestants (though in the Nether-
lands the situation is once again reversed: Protestants seem more rigorously
anti-abortion than Catholics).
Collective ethics
Individuals can also have highly differentiated attitudes about the organiz
tion of collective life, and it is worthwhile considering possible explanations
for the development of such attitudes in terms of religious identity. The fi
index (Table V) isolates individuals who favor honesty and civic behavior
dealings with public authorities. They consider it illegitimate to defraud the
collectivity for personal benefit. Concretely, they consider it unjust to chea
on one's taxes or make false statements to receive state allowances one is not
entitled to. (27) It should be noted that the ranking of countries on this point
does not really fit the stereotype of northern European countries highly
respectful of public order and civic honesty and southern European countries
characterized by a spirit of self-interested calculation or trucco reflected in
the statement "It's perfectly alright to defraud the public authorities, just don't
get caught". It is not surprising to see civic morality championed in Scandina-
vian countries, the United States, and Great Britain. It is more surprising to
find similar levels of the same attitudes in Portugal, Spain, and Italy. Civi
consciousness appears least developed in West Germany and Austria. Of
course these results are based on statements, not behavior. While it may b
true that southern European countries are more fond of small fraudulent prac
tices than northern European ones, we can at least affirm that individuals in
Mediterranean countries do not dare (or no longer dare) acknowledge this
openly. It should also be noted that integration into a religious system brings
about finer differences in this area than for sexual and family morality.
Church-goers are only slightly more civic-minded than non-church-goers. The
least civic-minded seem to be persons belonging to no religion, followed b
(26) Again, the table selects those who find

afford any more children".
it is "wrong only sometimes or not wrong at all (27) This index selects those who say it is
for a woman to have an abortion if there is a bad or very bad to engage in these two
strong chance of serious defect in the baby;behaviors.
if
the family has a very low income and cannot
35
Catholics; Protestants seem slightly more civic-minded (Table V). The diffe-
rences are slight, but they do exist. The fact that they are slighter than for
sexual and family morality is probably to be explained by a difference in
strategy in religious circles. Whereas there is a great tradition of religion regu-
lating sexual ethics -such questions are handled not only by church authori-
ties and theologians but also church activists and permanent paid church
employees- religious organizations have never shown the same intense concern
to remind people of norms pertaining to acts that affect the collectivity.
The second attitude concerns perceptions of others and type of social rela-
tions favored in a given society. Do we spontaneously trust others or, on the
contrary, are we highly distrustful of them? Comparative literature indicates
that this is an important cultural trait (Inglehart, 1999). (28) There seem to be
connections between a country's level of economic development and its
degree of interpersonal trust, (29) but also between level of trust and religious
culture. Protestant or Confucian societies show sharply higher levels of trust
than Catholic or Muslim countries. (30) Table VI uses a constructed distrust
index. (31) There are perceptible differences by country. Southern European
countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain) and France are not societies of spontaneous
trust. Once again, it might have been expected that extroverted southern socie-
ties would be characterized by strong interpersonal trust. In fact, there is
probably a significant difference between easy social contact and spontaneous
trust. To trust others is to think of oneself as functioning in an upright, honest
world where everyone respects the collective rules. In northern European
societies, where values of order are better integrated, there is much less spon-
taneous distrust of others; the Netherlands is the most typical case. The
differences observed here thus follow those found in previous surveys. Highly
developed Protestant countries seem to have a high level of trust. However,
distrust is not high in all Catholic countries (the model is not confirmed for
Austria or Ireland). (32) Within each country, integration into a religious
(28) Current sociological discussions about positions on distrust for each question. Persons
interpersonal trust are linked to discussions saying both a) most of the time or all of the
concerning social capital. See Putnam (2000); time people try to take advantage of others, and
Forse (2001); Mendras (2001); Milner (2002); b) one usually or almost always can't be too
Galland (2002). careful in dealing with others are categorized as
(29) This relation can be explained two distrustful.
ways: either well-established trust in a given (32) The Irish exception already appeared
culture makes major economic development in the results of the 1990 Values survey and
possible, or acquired economic development may be explained by the fact that the country
makes it easier to trust others; in a situation of long remained dominated by Great Britain and
economic scarcity, on the other hand, it may be thus marked not only by Catholic but also
highly risky for individuals to trust others Anglican-Protestant tradition. This in any case
spontaneously. is Inglehart's claim (1999, p. 39): "One society
(30) For Putnam (1993), this difference with a Catholic majority -Ireland- is
may be explained by the fact that Protestant caracterized by an exceptionally high level of
cultures value equality and decentralization interpersonal trust. But up until 1921, Ireland
whereas Catholic cultures value inequality and was part of the United Kingdom, with its
hierarchy. Protestant majority, and it continues to be a
(31) The index was constructed from two culturally distinct English-speaking region."
questions composed of four items with two
36
Pierre Brechon
system does not bring about real differences on this point. In some countries,
practicing Catholics are more distrustful than non-practicing ones, but that
relation is not present everywhere. It almost never obtains for Protestants. If
there is a link between religion and trust, it is therefore not operative at the
level of individual identities but rather for cultural traits of societies that have
been marked for centuries by particular religions.
The last attitude in this area concerns trust in public institutions. The index
used considers confidence in the parliament, courts and the legal system,
schools and the educational system. (33) The question was whether respondent
had a positive perception of representative governing authorities and the insti-
tutions organizing collective life. This variable is connected to the preceding
one: the more distrustful one is of others, the less confidence one has in so-
ciety's major institutions, as if looking critically on others went hand in hand
with looking critically on the authorities. (34) In the data used here, countries
most trusting of institutions (Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands, Ireland) also
had low levels of interpersonal distrust (Table VII). For other countries, the
relation is less clear and may be explained differently. In Italy and perhaps in
France, weak confidence in institutions may be due more to the crisis of repre-
sentations currently affecting institutions and representatives in these societies
than to weak interpersonal trust. Within each society, individuals' religious
integration has an important effect: church-goers are more conformist and
legitimist than the other categories. Persons belonging to no religion are often
the most critical. It should be noted lastly that here as elsewhere there is no
clear difference between Protestants and Catholics of the same country.
Political orientation
Measuring individuals' political orientations with these data is no si

matter because there is only one indicator and it is not homogeneous
country to country. In some countries, the question was what political pa
respondent would vote for if there were general elections the follo
Sunday, whereas in others it bore on political party respondent was
sympathetic to. (35) Since responses corresponded to the names of va
national parties, it was necessary to organize these into synthetic categor
(33) Five responses were possible for Working

each from the 1999 Values survey results,
of these three variables, ranging from Galland (1999) found a similar phenomenon.
"complete confidence" (rating of 1) toSpontaneous
"no trust in others supports confidence
confidence at all" (rating of 5). The index
in institutions in countries where the level of
tallies responses; each individual was rated the
on first
a is high. When interpersonal trust is
low, however, the relation is no longer
trust scale ranging from 3 to 15. All ratings
observed.
between 3 and 8 qualify as strong trust in insti-
tutions. (35) Proportion of respondents not wishing
(34) The relation is observed in all to state can vary significantly by indicator used
countries but tends to be less strong in some
(upcoming elections or party affiliation).
(Ireland, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Austria).
37
and this in turn requires strong knowledge of each country's party system and
is always open to debate in any case. (36)
Table VIII shows political orientation to the right (including, in principle,
both liberals and conservatives). (37) Data for France fit expectations fairly
well. Given that integration into Catholicism has always been a strong vari-
able for voting behavior (Brechon, 2000b), it is hardly surprising to see that
support for the right drops from 48% among church-going Catholics to 10%
among persons belonging to no religion. France is not unique: the table shows
that this relation functions well in almost all countries except Great
Britain. (38) Being strongly integrated into a Christian religious system pushes
people to support the right. As could be expected, the right wins few votes
among persons stating no religion. Church-goers, whether Catholic or
Protestant, are always more right-oriented than non church-goers. Differences
between Catholics and Protestants are not the same by country: in the Nether-
lands and the United States, Protestants seem more likely to vote for the right
than Catholics, while the opposite obtains in Germany. (39)
Table IX is based on the same indicator and presents orientation to the left
(from extreme to center left and generally including Green parties). Results
here generally confirm the preceding account: the less one is integrated into a
religious system, the more likely one is to vote for the left. Persons belonging
to no religion are thus more likely to be on the left than non-church-goers.
Still, in some countries the connections are less clear than for political orien-
tation to the right. There is no relation with religious integration for American
Democrats, for example, and the relation is doubtful for Austria and Portugal.
Table X takes into account all respondents who did not reply to the ques-
tion on political orientation; that is, who either did not wish to state their
political orientation or did not know how to define themselves politically. (40)
(36) As part of the process of fixing the for Catholics. Anglicans are much more conser-
international data file, the Zentral Archiv in vative than Catholics (who often vote Labour),
Cologne fit all parties in each country into a and strong Anglican support for the conser-
single left/right variable. They proceeded on vative party is to be found among both
the basis of recodings provided by national church-goers and non. This is largely explained
teams. In cases where recodings appeared by the fact that the Anglican Church is the
questionable, I have occasionally redistributed established national church.
national source data to obtain my own (39) The situation in the Netherlands is
recodings. particularly interesting because religions have
(37) Level of right-oriented respondents played an important historical role in shaping
can vary significantly by whether a party is the party system. Religious and social splits
considered part of the right or the extreme have given rise to strong multipartism. The
right. For Austria, and in contrast to the inter- right encompasses many religious parties but
national coding, I did not put Jtirg Haider's also some more secular ones. The weight of
party with the right. Likewise, for the United religious parties keeps the relation with the
States I kept only Republicans, whereas the religious variable strong.
international coding included numerous respon- (40) When we add up the percentages for
dents stating an affiliation independent of the the same box in Tables VIII, IX, and X, the
two major parties. result obtained is close to 100. All deviations
(38) The observation that church-goers are from 100 are due to extreme right parties or
more likely to be to the right is only confirmed non-classifiable political forces. For the United
38
Pierre Brechon
This is obviously not a very politicized category. In contrast to the preceding

two tables, the fact of being a church-goer seems to make people slightly
more likely to identify themselves with a party, but there are many
counter-examples.
Multivariate analysis
As we have just seen, religious integration seems to work well as an expla-

nation for ethical and political attitudes on a whole series of variables. There
are, however, an ambiguity and a criticism that should be addressed. We know
that practicing believers are on average older while persons belonging to no
religion are younger. We also know that age and education level are linked,
and that overall, women continue to be more religious than men. Mightn't the
relations brought to light here be explained by such third variables? Does inte-
gration into a religious or non-religious system have its own effect? I used
logistic regression to check whether, all else kept equal, there is indeed such
an effect. All dependent variables were dichotomized; sex, religious integra-
tion, age, education level, and country were introduced as possible inde-
pendent variables. Beta coefficients are presented in Table XI. Sex and age do
not always have an effect. The most significant effects are those of country
and religious integration, and the second of these resists quite well when all
other variables are controlled for. (41) The relations brought to light are thus
not the combined effect of age, sex, and education level. Degree of adhesion
to a religious system does have structuring effects on representations of the
world.
In all countries there are salient and privileged links between certain reli-
gious positions and ethical and political options. Though it is doubtful that
religious integration has an effect on distrust of others, there are fairly strong
and surprisingly stable connections from one country to another for individual
ethics variables, trust in institutions, and political orientation. Integration into
Catholicism or Protestantism goes together with more traditional, more
conformist, and more right-oriented attitudes. But in fact, Catholics and Pro-
testants, who were once opposed on many matters, today present quite similar
sociocultural profiles. Efforts at inter-religious dialogue have not been as
States, Table X selects persons stating they are (41) The beta coefficient is significant even
independent of the two major parties. 16% for distrust of others (though Table VI does not
remain unclassified: these are independents confirm the existence of a country-by-country
somewhat close to either the Republicans link between this dependent variable and
or Democrats. Neither of these types of religious integration), but effect of religious
independent was included in Tables VIII or IX. integration is weakest on this variable.
39
effective as certain actors would have liked, but at the base level, the two
groups do seem to have drawn significantly closer. Catholics and Protestants
are no longer two separate subcultures. Intermarriage is frequent, and the
base-level actors affiliated with the two denominations are often closer to
each other than are their central apparatuses.
In societies that are well on their way to being secularized, where religiou
systems are considered by many with scepticism or indifference, onl
minority of persons construct strong religious identities. Irresolute beliefs
becoming more frequent and "may be religious" thinking more widespre
The world is not becoming atheist; rather, the religious sphere of concerns
becoming highly relative. However, the minority groups in this cultural sit
tion, those who have constructed religious or a-religious attitudes, also h
highly specific ethical, social, and political attitudes.
Pierre BRECHON
Centre d 'Informatisation des Donnees Socio-Politiques (CI

CNRS - Universite Pierre-Mendes-France Grenoble 2
Institut d 'Etudes Politiques
BP 48 - 38040 Grenoble - cedex 9 - France
Pierre.Brechon@iep. upmf-grenoblefr
Translation: Amy Jacobs
Previously published: RFS, 2002, 43, 3
40
APPENDICES
TABLE I. - Degree of religious integrati
Great France Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden

Britain
West East
Sample size (N=) 804 1,133[ 2,020 1,000

Church-going Catholic 4 16 8 14 2 -
Non-church-going Catholic 4 36 11 24 3
Church-going Protestant 12 - 11 6
Non-church-going Protestant 25 2 7 38
No religion 51 45 58 15 69 12 2
Religious (position 1-3) 40 31 54 43 18 28
Neither religious 31 31 19 20 8 42 4
nor non-religious
Non-religious (position 5-7) 29 38 27 37 74 3
Note: In top half of table, other religions make up
TABLE II. - Sexual relations always legitimate b
t'l
Great France Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden Spai
Britain S
West East
Church-going 47 16 64 43 30* - -
Catholic
Non-church-going 66 49 77 68 32* -
Catholic
Church-going 25 - 30 42 35 31 31
Protestant
Non-church-going 40 33* 67 59 52 63
Protestant
No religion 61 71 84 75 62 73 62 8
Mean 50 53 72 59 57 61 60 57 1
Note (for Tables II to X): Percentages not given for c
TABLE III. - In favor of women

Britain S
West East
Church-going 58 31 49 27 55* - -
Catholic
Catholic
Church-going 55 - 42 30 48 56 64
Protestant
Protestant
No religion 70 63 68 56 60 73 76 7
Mean 66 53 60 37 58 68 76 52
TABLE IV. - In favor of abortion by degree of denominational/re

Britain
West East
Church-going Catholic 34 44 39 26 35* -

Non-church-going Catholic 58 77 44 47 48*
Church-going Protestant 48 - 22 38 38 3
Non-church-going Protestant 69 52* 34 48 5
No religion 65 86 59 63 70 73 73 7
Mean 62 1 75 48 L 46 1 65 1 61 66
TABLE V. - Rejection of cheating by degree o

Britain
West East

Non-church-going Protestant 77 52* 64 47 6
No religion 63 49 58 35 51 74 77
Mean 70 54 59 46 56 74 79 76
P
w
4
4 TABLE VI. - Distrust of other
Great France Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden Sp

Britain
West East

Protestant
No religion 25 31 7 21 17 19 16 3
Mean 21 30 6 17 15 15 14 38 1
TABLE VII. - Confidence in public
Great France Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden S

Britain
West East

Protestant
No religion 22 19 48 18 19 51 36 2
Mean 24 17 48 36 24 58 38 37
TABLE VIII. - Political orientation to the right by degree of denominatio

Britain
West East
Church-going Catholic 29 48 61 61 40*

Catholic
Church-going 45 - 74 42 58 53 56
Protestant
Protestant
No religion 31 10 33 17 21 27 27
Mean 36 22 42 30 28 35 34 1 36
TABLE IX. - Political orientati

Britain
West East
Catholic
Church-going 39 - 14 20 23 30 1
Protestant
Protestant
No religion 52 44 43 39 36 45 32 5
4
t
Mean 49 39 35 37 1 32 43 1 30 3
P
TABLE X. - Undefined political orientat

Britain S
West East
Church-going 9 21 13 20 55* - -
Catholic
Catholic
Church-going 14 - 11 35 19 13 2
Protestant
Protestant
No religion 16 30 23 39 42 20 39
Mean 13 31 21 32 40 16 35 30
Pierre Brechon
TABLE XI. - Binary logistic regression: beta coefficients for dependent variables
Sexuality Modem role Abortion Cheating Trust in Confidence Right-

legitimate for women legitimate legitimate others in institutions oriented
Sex * * *
Man 0.24 0.11 0.05 - 0.05 0.03 - 0.11 - 0.14
Woman - 0.24 - 0.11 - 0.05 0.05 - 0.03 0.11 0.14
Religious integration
Church-going 0.39 0.26 0.66 - 0.01 - 0.08 - 0.35 - 0.56
Catholic
Non-church-going - 0.50 - 0.07 - 0.22 - 0.26 0.12 0.05 - 0.02

Catholic
Church-going 0.86 0.21 0.58 0.51 - 0.19 - 0.21 -0.33

Protestant
Non-church- - 0.45 - 0.28 - 0.40 - 0.03 - 0.11 0.03 0.06

going Protestant
Other religions 0.71 0.31 0.22 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.23
No religion - 1.01 - 0.43 - 0.86 - 0.34 0.06 0.26 0.62
Age * *
18-29 - 0.61 - 0.54 0.04 - 0.32 0.18 - 0.04 0.14
30-44 - 0.28 - 0.26 0.04 - 0.03 - 0.03 0.01 0.13
45-59 0.11 0.14 - 0.07 0.09 - 0.08 0.08 - 0.08
60 + 0.78 0.67 - 0.01 0.27 - 0.07 - 0.05 - 0.19
Education
Primary 0.44 0.43 0.20 - 0.17 0.52 0.20 0.23

Secondary 0.04 0.01 0.01 - 0.07 0.06 0.11 - 0.07
Higher - 0.48 - 0.44 - 0.21 0.24 - 0.58 - 0.31 - 0.16
Country
West Germany - 0.64 0.69 0.25 - 0.85 - 0.33 - 0.12 0.53

East Germany - 0.10 - 0.09 - 0.11 - 0.33 0.12 0.29 0.29
Great Britain 0.21 - 0.37 - 0.11 0.20 0.03 0.44 0.11
United States 0.86 - 0.29 0.24 0.43 0.01 0.24 - 0.71
Austria - 0.54 0.54 0.05 - 0.74 - 0.53 - 0.97 - 0.98
Italy 0.56 0.61 0.38 0.09 1.30 1.15 0.80

Ireland 0.39 - 0.24 0.51 -0.50 0.12 - 0.19 - 1.51
Netherlands - 0.93 - 0.12 0.42 -0.20 - 1.15 - 0.69 - 0.78
Sweden - 0.20 - 0.74 - 0.31 0.69 - 0.65 - 0.20 0.28
Spain - 0.53 - 0.03 - 0.21 0.63 0.37 - 0.08 0.33

France 0.17 0.28 - 0.83 - 0.43 0.43 0.93 0.63
Portugal 1.33 0.33 - 0.08 0.69 0.96 0.24 0.97

Denmark - 0.59 - 0.57 - 0.19 0.32 - 0.67 - 1.06 0.04
Note: * Coefficient not significant at 0.01; sum of estim

Reading: The higher the coefficients, the more signifi
equal, persons stating no religion are much more likely
Catholics or Protestants.
47
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Association Revue Franaise de Sociologie

Influence of Religious Integration on Attitudes: A Comparative Analysis of European

Influence of Religious Integration on Att

A panoramic view of religion in Europe is sketched on the basis of an international sur-

cultural system by studying relations between degree of belonging to a reli-

Talin (1998); Halman and Riis (1999);

strong Catholic or Protestant integration can have only conservative effects

(3) In Nordic countries, for example, in a face-to-face interview, excepting socio-

However, the limitations of such surveys should also be kept in mind. We

Strong national differences, but secularization at work everywhere

There are of course several ways of measuring a country's degree of religio-

denominational norm but may believe in a more or less formalized "beyond",

Countries with low membership in religious denominations

By the membership criterion, three and a half countries (former East

(7) All persons attending religious services of proceeding seemed to be to consider

significant minority of people in France are firmly opposed to religious belief.

Strong denominational membership and weak religious practice

A slower secularizationprocess in countries ofcenturies-old Catholic culture

tants. (15) Protestantism does not seem to be resisting secularization as well as

Sexual and family ethics

religious integration and opinions on sexuality? To answer this question, I

(26) Again, the table selects those who find

Measuring individuals' political orientations with these data is no si

(33) Five responses were possible for Working

This is obviously not a very politicized category. In contrast to the preceding

As we have just seen, religious integration seems to work well as an expla-

Centre d 'Informatisation des Donnees Socio-Politiques (CI

Translation: Amy Jacobs

Previously published: RFS, 2002, 43, 3

TABLE I. - Degree of religious integrati

Great France Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden

Sample size (N=) 804 1,133[ 2,020 1,000

TABLE III. - In favor of women

Great France Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden Spai

Great France Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden

Church-going Catholic 34 44 39 26 35* -

TABLE V. - Rejection of cheating by degree o

Great France Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden

Church-going Catholic 80 68 50 52 80* -

Great France Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden Sp

Church-going Catholic 6 26 4 11 10* -

TABLE VII. - Confidence in public

Great France Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden S

Church-going Catholic 35 20 51 53 42* -

Great France Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden Sp

Church-going Catholic 29 48 61 61 40*

TABLE IX. - Political orientati

Great France Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden Sp

TABLE X. - Undefined political orientat

Great France Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden Spai

Sexuality Modem role Abortion Cheating Trust in Confidence Right-

Non-church-going - 0.50 - 0.07 - 0.22 - 0.26 0.12 0.05 - 0.02

Church-going 0.86 0.21 0.58 0.51 - 0.19 - 0.21 -0.33

Non-church- - 0.45 - 0.28 - 0.40 - 0.03 - 0.11 0.03 0.06

30-44 - 0.28 - 0.26 0.04 - 0.03 - 0.03 0.01 0.13

45-59 0.11 0.14 - 0.07 0.09 - 0.08 0.08 - 0.08

60 + 0.78 0.67 - 0.01 0.27 - 0.07 - 0.05 - 0.19

Primary 0.44 0.43 0.20 - 0.17 0.52 0.20 0.23

West Germany - 0.64 0.69 0.25 - 0.85 - 0.33 - 0.12 0.53

United States 0.86 - 0.29 0.24 0.43 0.01 0.24 - 0.71

Austria - 0.54 0.54 0.05 - 0.74 - 0.53 - 0.97 - 0.98

Italy 0.56 0.61 0.38 0.09 1.30 1.15 0.80

Netherlands - 0.93 - 0.12 0.42 -0.20 - 1.15 - 0.69 - 0.78

Sweden - 0.20 - 0.74 - 0.31 0.69 - 0.65 - 0.20 0.28