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Modernizing

CO
and Upgrading
Low Pressure
Carbon Dioxide
Fire Extinguishing
Systems

FIRE PROTECTION
Contents Introduction
Introduction Since 1940 tens of thousands of Cardox, Chemetron,
or Reliable Low Pressure CO2 Fire Protection Sys-
tems have been installed. A great proportion are still
Part I - STORAGE UNITS in service providing vital fire protection of key fa-
Refrigeration Changeover cilities.
Safety Relief Valve Recertification Over the years, new technology, changes in appli-
Evaluating Older Storage Units cable fire protection standards, and governmental
regulations have resulted in changes to system de-
sign, equipment function, and interface with the op-
Part II - CONTROLS eration of the protected facility. This publication
Upgrading System Controls offers guidance to ensure that your fire protection
system will continue to function safely well into the
Electrical Wiring Evaluation
next century.
Supervision of Pressure Operated Controls
At the heart of each system is the CO2 storage unit.
Cardox Valve Upgrades
In Part I, Storage Units, we will discuss:
Environmental regulations that phase out certain
Part III - SAFETY refrigerants.
Safety Upgrades
Recertification of safety relief valves promul-
gated by the Compressed Gas Association (CGA).
Personnel Availability
Recommendations for dealing with problems that
may indicate a concern with the effectiveness of
existing insulation.
Part II, Controls, outlines: Part I STORAGE UNITS
Changes in NFPA Standard No. 12, Carbon Di-
oxide Extinguishing Systems, which now re- Refrigerant Changeover
quires supervision (i.e., a means of indicating a
system/component malfunction). Most of the refrigeration systems installed before
1995 on Cardox, Chemetron, or Reliable style Low
How to upgrade existing systems to meet these Pressure CO2 storage units used ozone depleting re-
requirements. frigerants CFC-12 (R12) or CFC-502 (R-502). The
Maintenance of vital control valves. EPA has mandated a phase out of ozone depleting
refrigerants R-12 and R-502 by 1996.
Reexamination of existing piping.
While these refrigerants have been found to be ozone
Part III, Safety, covers these safety concerns:
depleters, Chemetron does not recommend chang-
Conforming to Confined Space regulations while ing the refrigerant in any storage unit that is operat-
at the same time ensuring against accidents and ing properly without a loss of refrigerant. There is
fires when it is necessary to isolate protection no technical reason for change. However, it is pru-
during maintenance. dent to plan for replacement before it becomes an
urgent matter.
Providing alarms and operating controls that con-
form to Americans With Disabilities legislation. If the decision is made to change refrigerants, the
change should be to HFC R-404A (Suva HP62 or
System retesting requirements and the desirabil-
FX70). The use of HFC-134A is not recommended,
ity of a periodic training/retraining program for
as this requires an evaporator temperature above -
plant operators.
10F (-23C). The CO2 unit operates best with an
The Chemetron Engineering group, in concert with evaporator temperature near or below -10F (-23C).
a highly qualified distributor organization, is ready
to help evaluate your system to ensure that these vi-
tal needs for continued fire protection are met.
Where practical, refrigerant changeover involves:
Here are some basic guidelines for refrig-
a) Changing lubricant oil. Old oil residue in new erant changeover:
oil should be 2% or less. Use of a lubricant ap-
proved by the condensing unit manufacturer is 1. All work must be done by refrigera-
mandatory. (Obviously, the refrigerant must meet tion technicians, Class 2 or higher.
the manufacturers requirements as well.) 2. Retrofitting units with compressors
b) Changing the expansion valve. manufactured before 1973 is not rec-
ommended (per U.L. Standard U.L.
c) Changing the filter/dryers. 2170-2172 for field conversion/retrofit
d) Calibrating refrigeration pressure safety controls. to alternate refrigerants). The materi-
als in these older units have not been
e) Possibly adding a pressure relief valve on the
evaluated for compatibility with R-
compressor crank case.
404A.
f) Purging the coils at least 3 times to remove any
3. Retrofitting condensing units smaller
old oil.
than 2HP is not recommended. Due to
g) Complying with the condensing unit cost effectiveness, replacement is rec-
manufacturers recommendations on pressure ommended.
controllers, anti-flood-back pump down cycles,
For points 2 and 3 above where replacement
and liquid stop solenoid valves.
of the condensing unit is needed, the evapo-
rator coils in the storage unit vessel must
be large enough for operation with the new
refrigerant. Consult Chemetron Engineer-
ing for information.
Safety Relief Valve Recertification For your reference, paragraph 6.2.3 of G-6.1, which
addresses relief valve testing, is reprinted on the back
It is vital that safety relief valves protecting refrig-
page of this publication.
erated CO2 pressure vessels function properly. To
ensure their reliability, these valves should be tested Fire system storage units below 13 ton capacity use
and recertified periodically. Reference documents relief valves in pairs and a switching valve. One
from the Compressed Gas Association are: valve is always connected to the vapor space of the
CO2 vessel. The switching valve is used to switch
over to the second valve, depressurizing the first
S-1.1, S-1.2, S-1.3 valve to allow for service.
- Pressure Relief Devices Larger storage units were sometimes also built with
double valves. Other models had a single pilot op-
G-6.1 (1986)
erated relief valve. Later models have a provision
- CO2 Systems At Consumer Sites for testing this single valve without taking the unit
out of service. For those, the manufacturers test
procedures should be followed. Contact Chemetron
Engineering for guidance on those that cannot be
tested without emptying the storage unit.
Evaluating Older Storage Units
For your reference, paragraph 6.2.2 of CGA docu-
ment G-6.1, which addresses storage unit inspection,
can be found on the back page of this publication.
Various construction methods were used to fabricate Storage unit pressure vessels produced prior to 1976
Low Pressure CO2 units over the years. All were were probably constructed of SA-212 or SA-515
intended to ensure a vapor seal to keep air (with its carbon steel, which do not meet current code require-
inherent moisture) from coming in contact with the ments. There is no problem with keeping these units
cold surface of the pressure vessel. Maintenance of in service as long as there are no problems as de-
the insulation is an important part of an overall main- scribed above.
tenance program.
However, Compressed Gas Associations position
The insulation must be kept dry to ensure effective- statement PS-5-1992 states, among other cautions,
ness. If any older unit shows cracking or a breach in that;
the insulation covering or housing with resultant
moisture or ice formation, there is a problem. Mois-
Those that require overhauls, major
ture is most likely to collect in the bottom of the
repairs, or show sign of corrosion
storage units insulation jacket. Excessive opera-
should be considered for scrapping
tion of the refrigeration system may also be a symp-
rather than extending their service life.
tom of trouble.
Correction of this problem is mandatory. Chemetron
can provide qualified individuals to help determine Note: The fire system outlet (dip tube) and fill line
the extent of the problem. This usually involves re- connections are a part of the pressure vessel. If ex-
building or replacing the unit. tensive corrosion is shown, then replacement is prob-
ably necessary.
On units smaller than 13 - 14 tons (1 1,800 12,800
Kg), it is often cheaper to replace the entire storage
unit rather than replacing the refrigeration and insu-
lation components.
Part II CONTROLS to open CO2 control valves and sound a multitude of
alarms prevented the use of the lower voltages used
Upgrading System Controls in fire alarm systems. Providing a 60 cell (125V)
battery for CO2 system control was expensive and
Electrical Supervision required substantial maintenance of the battery set.
For many years, systems that were electrically con- Over the years, technological advances provided low
trolled utilized the power that was available at the power controls and alarms, as well as batteries suit-
site. The only admonition was that the power was able to providing this power. This allowed a change
to be from a noninterruptible source. Thus, a fire in in NFPA Standard No. 12 (in mid-1980s) to man-
the protected area and the mandatory shutdown of date supervision of CO2 system electrical controls.
potential ignition sources and/or ventilation would A big jump in system reliability occurred as these
not de-energize the CO2 system controls. Thus, many controls began to be used on every system.
systems operated on 110 volt AC power. Numerous
systems were installed in mills or power plants where For systems protecting critical facilities, it is highly
an emergency power supply (usually 125V or 250V recommended that existing Low Pressure CO2 sys-
DC) was available. tem controls be upgraded to 24 Volt DC power with
Class B (2-wire) electrical supervision. This not only
Fire alarm systems (only required to initiate a sig- increases reliability, but also improves safe opera-
nal) used proprietary batteries; circuits were electri- tion of the system.
cally supervised. Loss of power, an open circuit, or
a ground fault was identified when it occurred, mak-
Note: Low Pressure CO2 system control requires the
ing alarm systems much more reliable than the com-
opening and closing of control valves in a pro-
parable CO2 system controls. On some CO2 sys-
grammed manner. Control panels designed and ap-
tems, higher voltage DC electrical controls were
proved or listed specifically for low pressure CO2
supervised, but this was an exception rather than the
system service are required. The Chemetron Fire
rule. However, when many of the existing systems
Systems Micro 1-EV (illustrated in figure 1 ) is the
were installed, the greater electrical energy required
recommended control panel.
With the nonsupervised system, it was possible that Electrical Wiring Evaluation
a fault in an alarm or detection circuit could blow
During initial system design, a strong attempt is made
the fuse after a CO2 discharge had started. This
to ensure that the electrical installation is suitable
would leave no alarms for personnel warning and
for the environment in which it is installed, i.e., that
could stop the discharge. Proper electrical super-
moisture, combustibles or contaminants do not have
vision is designed to identify such a fault.
the opportunity to affect the wiring. However, con-
Upgrading involves changing control/alarm equip- ditions may have changed in the hazard over the
ment to 24VDC, providing a proper Chemetron panel years and periodic reevaluation is appropriate.
with batteries, and some minimal wiring changes.
If the detector wiring is in a hazard where a quickly
Chemetron Engineering is available to help with
developing fire could affect it before the system op-
evaluating such changes.
erates, special installations, such as silicone insu-
lated wire or mineral insulated (MI) cable, are ap-
Notes: Tee tapped wiring is not acceptable propriate. Detector wiring retrofit should be con-
on supervised circuits. This may necessitate rewir- sidered during your electrical system reevaluation.
ing Lit manual release stations and detectors.
Supervision of Pressure Operated Controls
Most current 24VDC alarm circuits are reverse- Since Low Pressure CO2 control valves open by
polarity type that require proper parallel circuit wir- utilizing the inherent vapor pressure of the CO2 as
ing. an energy source, the reliability of the pressure pilot
In addition, AC wiring for hose reels, nonsupervised piping system is crucial. Our experience has shown
audible/visual devices, and shutdown circuits must that this pilot piping network can be damaged, re-
be isolated and run in separate wire-ways to avoid sulting in an operational failure. Sometimes this
ground faults in the DC wiring from induced or stray piping damage is not obvious, which motivated the
voltages. development of a scheme to monitor the system pi-
lot piping. This is now recommended by NFPA Stan-
dard No. 12.
The Chemetron design is described in the publica- Cardox Valve Upgrade
tion General Description, Chemetron Fire Systems
Chemetron (Cardox) pressure operated discharge
Low Pressure CO2 Supervisory Control Arrange-
valves need periodic maintenance to ensure they will
ment. Figure 2 illustrates this scheme. Again,
always open fully when operated. We recommend
Chemetron Engineering is available to help evalu-
that these valves be inspected at least annually in
ate modifications of existing systems to provide this
accordance with the procedures outlined in the pub-
important feature.
lication Inspection & Maintenance Procedures for
Chemetron (Cardox) Valves 1 through 6 Inches. ment being protected. The design of the nozzle, the
Frequent operation or installation in a hostile en- projection distance from the face of the nozzle to
vironment may necessitate more frequent inspec- the hazard surface, and the CO2 discharge rate de-
tion. Maintenance kits are available from Chemetron termine how much surface area that nozzle can pro-
Fire Systems to facilitate maintenance work. tect. (An increase in area is allowed if the protected
surface is coated rather than a liquid surface.)
This procedure is not intended to diagnose leakage
problems. Chemetron or an authorized distributor Local application CO2 systems are designed based
can assist if leakage is suspected. The procedure is on the use of specific nozzles, as well as specific
intended to ensure proper valve operation and long placement and direction of discharge. If they are
life. Only those fully qualified and trained should moved in the field, gaps in the protection coverage
work on these valves. may result. If nozzles are interchanged with one
another, moved or removed, the protection system
Piping Evaluation
may fail.
Until about 1975, it was common to find Class 150
The nozzle code number is stamped into the nozzle
pipe fittings used on CO2 systems. In reconciling
and shown on the system design drawings. Verifi-
the Universal Piping Code with traditional CO2 sys-
cation that the proper nozzles are installed, and in-
tem installation practices, it was determined that this
stalled where they belong, is very important to good
class fitting did not have the proper strength to handle
fire protection.
CO2 system discharges. Thus, their use was banned.
Therefore, system piping should be examined and Nozzles provided with covers, frangible discs, or
any Class 150 fittings replaced. They are recognized seals are used where it is necessary to keep material
by the thinner flange type boss at the fitting pipe from plugging nozzle orifices and piping. When
connection. evaluating any nozzle arrangement, it is important
to see that this nozzle protection is intact. If any
Nozzle Placement
nozzle is not so protected but requires same, this fea-
In local application CO2 systems, protection is pro- ture should be added.
vided by the direct discharge Of CO2 on the equip-
Part III SAFETY An adequate fire watch should be in place to deal
with any fire that might occur during system lock-
Safety Upgrades out. When protection is locked out, the following
should occur:
It has always been recognized that CO2 flooding to
fire extinguishing levels presents a severe hazard to a signal of trouble should appear on the con-
any personnel who might inadvertently be in the area trol panel.
where the CO2 is discharged. Precautions to be taken a signal of protection impairment should be given
to protect facility personnel are covered in NFPA at a constantly manned location.
Standard No. 12 and the Chemetron publication
Carbon Dioxide Safety Manual. Over the years the equipment protected should be rendered in-
we have learned how to enhance the safety aspects operable until the protection is back in service.
Of CO2 system installation while government regu- This is accomplished by interlocking the lockout
lations have also been promulgated in this regard. with the protected equipment.
Safety should be a key consideration in any sys- Consult Chemetron Engineering regarding the best
tem reevaluation or upgrade. Incorporation of way to handle this lockout. For critical Low Pres-
these features may include: sure CO2 systems, Chemetron has used a double
a) Lockout Systems - When it is necessary for block and bleed arrangement (as shown below) in
maintenance, operating, or contractor personnel to retrofitting the system.
work in an area adjacent to or subject to CO2 flood- b) Alarm Enhancement - It is imperative that
ing, it is considered necessary to lock out the pro- alarms provided to evacuate an area before a CO2
tection for that area while personnel are present. discharge, or to alert personnel that an area has al-
Refer to OSHAs Lockout & Tag-Out Standard, ready been flooded so they will not enter same, be
29CFR Part 1.910,146. not only instantly recognizable, but also be impos-
sible to ignore. This can involve adding alarms that
are louder and have a distinctive tone quality from
any other alarms.
Older systems almost always depend solely on au- When revamping an existing system, a priority
dible alarms. Today, visual alarms are required. should be placed on evaluating the warning systems.
Warning signs* must be adequate and be provided
c) Hose Testing - NFPA Standard No. 12, paragraph
in all appropriate languages. Where CO2 may drift
1-1 0.2.1 requires that all system hoses and flexible
to an adjacent area or remain anywhere after a dis-
connectors be tested every five (5) years. A test re-
charge, it is appropriate to odorize* the CO2 dis-
quirement is given in the Standard. It is often best
charged. *See the Carbon Dioxide Safety
to replace a portion of older hose, retest it and keep
Manual for further information.
it as a spare. This prevents the need for taking the If the CO2 storage unit of an older system must be
protection system out of service for the time period emptied for maintenance, we strongly recommend
required to do the testing. that it be done by discharging the system in a prop-
erly planned manner with appropriate safety precau-
d) Retraining - When initially installed, almost
tions taken. Chemetron can arrange for trained com-
every Low Pressure CO2 system was given a full
pany or distributor personnel, with appropriate in-
discharge test. For hazards totally flooded, this veri-
strumentation, to help in this regard.
fied that the design concentration was reached and
indicated how long it was held. For hazards pro- Even if a retest is not done, continual training of
tected by local application, this test compared the plant personnel is critical. Chemetron and its dis-
actual discharge rate against the calculated rate. It tributor organization are available to help set up such
also showed whether or not the discharge covered a program.
all parts of the hazard.
Personnel Availability for System
Most importantly, full discharge tests provided an Enhancement and/or Evaluation
opportunity to show plant personnel what happened
during a discharge. It also made it possible to deter- Chemetron and its highly qualified worldwide dis-
mine where the CO2 might flow and provide for the tributor network stand ready to assist in any aspect
development of a proper safety program. It provided of a system enhancement. We will be pleased to put
valuable training for those working at the site. you in touch with the appropriate organization to
meet your specific needs.
Conditions may have changed for systems that have
been in service for some time, making a retest valu-
able in reevaluating the protection provided. More
importantly, personnel most certainly will have
changed. Therefore, a retest can be very important
as important as the test done at the time of the origi-
nal installation - by training those whose work takes
them into the protected area.
Make Chemetron your source for insuring that the reputation of special hazards fire
fire suppression equipment protection excellence built over the past 50 years is
maintained and enhanced.
Low Pressure CO2
High Pressure CO2 Compressed Gas Association
FM-200 Document G-6.1
Control Panels
6.2.2 The visible portions of the system, including
Chemetron Fire Systems products have been manu-
the storage container and appurtenances such as pres-
factured for more than fifty years and remain a vital
sure relief devices, the piping system, and the hose
link to the gaseous agent fire protection market.
lines, shall be inspected by a qualified individual at
As a leader in the fire protection industry, we have least once a year or more frequently, as required.
brought to market many innovative products and Frost spots, leaks, or any other indication of a pos-
extinguishing system design techniques. Chemetron sible unsafe condition such as mechanical damage
designs and manufactures Low Pressure Carbon or corrosion shall be corrected by repairs or replace-
Dioxide, High Pressure Carbon Dioxide, FM-200, ment of the faulty component.
and Water Mist fire suppression systems and elec-
6.2.3. Each pressure relief valve shall be tested at
tronic control panels. Chemetron Fire Systems also
least once every five years. If the start-to-discharge
offers design engineering and related technical sup-
pressure is not within the limits required for the ap-
port services for a wide range of applications. Cus-
plication and marked on the valve, it shall be re-
tom developed computer programs aid our design-
paired or replaced. Each pressure relief valve shall
ers in their design tasks, while allowing more accu-
be tagged and dated at the time of testing. Care shall
racy and flexibility in your application.
be exercised to avoid damage to pressure relief de-
Chemetron Fire Systems has established a world- vices. Care shall also be exercised to avoid plug-
wide distribution network that provides engineering, ging by paint and other dirt accumulation on pres-
technical support, installation, commissioning, in- sure relief device channels or other parts which could
spection and repair services. We are dedicated to interfere with the functioning of the device.
The seller makes no warranties, express or implied
including, but not limited to, the implied warranties
of merchantability and fitness for a particular pur-
pose, except as expressly stated in sellers sales con-
tract or sales acknowledgment form.

Headquarters
4801 Southwick Drive
Third Floor
Matteson, Illinois 60443
Phone: (708) 748-1503
Fax: (708) 748-2847
1996 Chemetron Fire Systems. All rights
reserved. Chemetron Fire Systems, Cardox, and
Chemetronics are registered trademarks.

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