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JEREMY ADELMAN
H E "failure"ofArgentine
socialismpriorto WorldWar
II has stirredthe interestof historiansand social scien-
tists. Whereas the European working classes became
strong supporters of democratic socialism, the Argentine working class,
even in free elections, spurned and continues to spurn a Socialist option.
What's more, the working class of Argentina, and of Latin America as
a whole (with the arguable exception of Chile), traditionallyhas thrown
its support behind populist parties. The failure of socialism and the suc-
cess of populism are connected: the weakness of socialism in Argentina,
and in Latin America in general, opened the way for populist politicians
to galvanize the unintegrated masses into a forcefulpolitical movement.
In Argentina, this correlation is especially pronounced: the failure of
democratic socialism before 1930 leftvacant a political space that Colonel
Juan Domingo Peron successfullyexploited in the wake of the 1943 coup
d'etat.'
Year Vote
1896 134
1898 105
1goo 135
1902 165
1904 1,257
1906 3,495
1908 5,178
1g9o 7,oo6
49. La Vanguardia,May 1i, Aug.31, Oct. 8, and Nov. 23, 1912, respectively.
In the wake of the 1913 and 1914 resultsin the capital,the PS also
reassessed its principalopponent,the UCR. While in 1912 the PS had
treatedthe UCR as a potentially forcerepresenting
progressive a dynamic
factionof the elite allied withthe middleclass, the Radicals' success in
the interior,along withtheirvague campaignpromises,now prompted
the Socialiststo dismissthemas just a new visage of the old oligarchy.
One militantobservedthatthe UCR "is a simplefactionofcriollopoliti-
cians,who ignoreor are ignorantofgenuineradicalism."59 This view fed
the illusionthatthe UCR was doomedto be squeezed betweentheforces
ofreaction,representedbytheconservative parties,and genuineforcesof
The WaningIdeal
In thewakeofthe 1916 results,theSocialistssankintodepression.Iftheir
expectationsremainedunfulfilled, itdid nothelp thattheworldwas tear-
ing itselfapart in a nationalistic
war. The consentofferedby European
Socialistpartiesto the war effortin theirrespectivecountriesdestroyed
theillusionofsocialism'sinternationalist
credentials.Meanwhile,theRus-
sian Revolutionposed an alternative routeto socialism.At firstJustosup-
portedthe Bolshevikeffort, but as it drovea wedge between members
Conclusion
From the 189os to WorldWar I, the heydayof Second Internationalism,
ArgentineSocialistsconceivedof social classes as the bearers of objec-
interests.Working-class
tivelyconstituted voterswereexpectedto voteas
workersand the bourgeoisieas bourgeois.This meantthatonce workers
became consciousoftheirclassposition,theywouldnaturally vote Social-
74. For a catalogueof the PSI involvement in the 1930 coup, see PartidoSocialista
Independiente,La revoluci6ndel 6 de setiembrey los socialistasindependientes (Buenos
Aires:n.p., 1961).
75. For the PS positionand role in the 1930 coup, see PartidoSocialista,El Partido
Socialistay el movimiento
militardel 6 de setiembre:documentos civiles(BuenosAires,n.p.,
1931). See also JulioGodio, El movimiento obreroargentino,(1g9o-1930), vol. 2 (Buenos
Aires:EditorialLegasa, 1987),394-408.
76. For a recent chronicleof the eventsof 1945, see JuanCarlos Torre, La vieja
guardia sindical y Per6n: sobre los ortgenesdel peronismo(Buenos Aires: EditorialSud-
americana,1990).
light.The forceoftradition,
manySocialistsbelieved,ultimately defeated
the purposeof elections.The PartidoSocialistaclungto the rules in the
convictionthateventuallyitsmessagewouldbe heard.But ratherthanre-
assess theirattitudetowardthe voters,the Socialistsinvokedthe circular
logicoffalseconsciousness.Disappointingperformances at the polls thus
became a self-fulfilling
prophecy.