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ACTIONS
Lopez v. Compania de Seguros, 16 SCRA 855, 859
ISSUE #1:
Whether the action of the petitioner in the MTC against the respondent is an action
in personam or quasi in rem.
RULING:
Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is
determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only.
An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam because
the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant
A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations
brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may
involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel
him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. In an action in
personam, no one other than the defendant is sought to be held liable, not the whole
world.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to
subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action
quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions
quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which
are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants.
The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
ISSUE #2:
Whether respondent was validly served with summons
RULING
NO. The house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was not the latters residence nor
that of the respondent. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a
visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode.
Thus, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint by
substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent.
ISSUE:
RULING:
An action for the declaration of nullity of a marriage is a personal action because it is not
founded on real estate. It is also an in rem action because the issue of the status of a person is one
directed against the whole world. Ones status is a matter that can be set up against anyone in the
world.
ISSUE:
RULING:
A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication
of the petition the courts jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the
settlement of the estate of the decedent
ISSUE:
RULING:
A land registration proceeding is an action in rem. Hence, the failure to give a personal notice to
the owners or claimants of the land is not a jurisdictional defect. It is the publication of such
notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction
ISSUE:
RULING:
In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding
is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi
in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended
to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to
ascertain or cut-off the rights or interests of all possible claimants
Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, 515 SCRA 106,118
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Attachment and foreclosure proceedings are both actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over
the person of the nonresident defendant is not essential. Service of summons on a non-resident
defendant who is not found in the country is required, not for the purpose of physically acquiring
jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of the requirements of fair play, so that he
may be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property
belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a
resident, and that he may thereby be accorded an opportunity to defend in the action, should he
be so minded
ISSUE:
RULING:
Summons by publication, as far as existing jurisprudence is concerned, will not enable the court
to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
CAUSE OF ACTION
Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 514 SCRA 569
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the rights of another
ISSUE:
RULING:
While the concept of a cause of action is one that is essential to the existence of a civil action, in
administrative cases however, the issue is not whether the complainant has a cause of action
against the respondent, but whether the respondent has breached the norms and standards of the
office
ISSUE:
RULING:
the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima
facie, a corresponding right of relief
ISSUE:
RULING:
when an injury is caused to another by the negligence of the employee there instantly arises the
juris tantum presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in
the selection or in the supervision, or both of the employee. The liability of the employer is direct
and immediate and is not conditioned upon a prior recourse against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the employer
to prove his exercise of diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
the employee
ISSUE:
RULING:
In an unlawful detainer case, the cause of action does not accrue unless there is a demand to
vacate and is not complied with. If however, the suit is based on expiration of the lease, notice
and demand are not required
De los Reyes v. Spouses Odones, 646 SCRA 328,334, G.R. No. 178096, March 23,2011
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds pos-session after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied.
The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to
the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in nature,
jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or Metropolitan Trial Court. The action must
be brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the issue in the case must be the
right to physical possession.
a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;
2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latters right of possession;
3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment thereof; and
4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment
The requirement that the complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and how entry into
the property was made by the defendants applies only when the issue is the timeliness of the
filing of the complaint before the MTC, and not when the jurisdiction of the MTC is assailed
because the case is one for accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC. This is because, in forcible
entry cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the date of defendants actual entiy into the
property; whereas, in unlawful detainer cases, it is counted from the date of the last demand to
vacate. Hence, to determine whether the case was filed on time, there is a necessity to ascertain
whether the complaint is one for forcible entry or for un-lawful detainer; and since the main
distinction between the two actions is when and how defendant entered the property, the
determinative facts should be alleged in the complaint
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY
Sarmienta v. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc., 632 SCRA 538
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior
physical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by
any of the means provided in Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth.
The above allegations are not required in an unlawful detainer case.
Instead, in unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession
of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant
holds possession of the land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Magbanua v. Junsay, 515 SCRA 419
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
For a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following:
(1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated
its commencement;
(2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal;
(3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
(4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice an improper or a sinister motive. The
gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision
of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false
and groundless
ISSUE:
RULING:
Under Rule 16, the ground for dismissal in relation to a cause of action is not lack or absence of
a cause of action. The ground is that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action
This ground points merely to a failure to state a cause of action and not to a lack or absence of
a cause of action.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Much later, the Court found the occasion to emphasize once more that a motion to dismiss based
on lack of cause of action is filed by the defendant after the plaintiff has presented his evidence
on the ground that the latter has shown no right to the relief sought. While a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be ventilated before the beginning of
the trial, a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case
RULING:
in actions for forcible entry, three (3) requisites have to be alleged for the municipal trial court to
acquire jurisdiction over the case. First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of
the land or building. Second, he must also assert that he was deprived of possession of the
property either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, the action must be filed
within one (1) year from the time he learned of his deprivation of physical possession of the
property
The other kind of ejectment proceeding is unlawful detainer (desahucio), where one unlawfully
withholds possession of the subject property after the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. Here, the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive; for in such action, the
defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of
the defendants right to continue in possession
As earlier mentioned, so that there would be no failure to state a cause of action in a complaint
for unlawful detainer, the following essential requisites must appear in the complaint:
(1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract express or implied;
(2) the expiration or termination of the possessors right to hold possession; (3) withholding by
the lessee of the possession of the land or building after expiration or termination of the right to
possession; (4) demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and
vacate the premises; and (5) the action must be filed within one (1) year from date of last demand
received by the defendant
ISSUE:
RULING:
If there is a sufficiency of the allegations in the pleading but the evidence presented do not prove
the cause of action, then there is a failure to establish a cause of action. Usually, the
declaration that a plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action is postponed until after the parties
are given the opportunity to present all relevant evidence on questions of fact. Hence, it would
not be correct for the trial court to dismiss a complaint on the ground of failure to establish its
cause of action without giving the parties an opportunity to present their evidence
ISSUE:
RULING:
In determining whether or not a cause of action is sufficiently stated in the complaint, the
statements in the complaint may be properly considered. It is error for the court to take
cognizance of external facts or to hold preliminary hearings to determine its existence
ISSUE:
RULING:
In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action, the test is as follows:
Admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with
the prayer? To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint;
extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered
ISSUE:
RULING:
Splitting a single cause of action is the act of instituting two or more suits for the same cause of
action (Sec. 4, Rule 2, Rules of Court). In splitting a cause of action, the pleader divides a single
cause of action, claim or demand into two or more parts and brings a suit for one of such parts
with the intent to reserve the rest for another separate action
ISSUE:
RULING:
Thus, it was held, that to interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again invoke it in a
complaint against the same person or party would be splitting a cause of action not sanctioned by
the Rules
ISSUE:
RULING:
A tenant illegally ejected from the land is entitled to two reliefs one for reinstatement and
another for damages. Since both reliefs arose from the same cause of action, they should be
alleged in one complaint
ISSUE:
RULING:
A bank cannot file a civil action against the debtor for the collection of the debt and then
subsequently file an action to foreclose the mortgage. This would be splitting a single cause of
action
ISSUE:
RULING:
the respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner even before the expiration of
the lease contract, because of alleged violation of stipulations in the lease contract regarding the
use of the property. It was alleged that under the lease contract, the petitioner shall use the leased
lot as a parking space for light vehicles and as a site for a small drivers canteen, and may not
utilize the subject premises for other purposes without the respondents prior written consent.
The petitioner, however, constructed restaurant buildings and other commercial establishments
on the lot, without first securing the required written consent from the respondent, and the
necessary permits and also subleased the property to various merchants-tenants in violation of
the lease contract. The MTC decided the case in favor of the respondent which decision was
affirmed by the RTC. The case however, was re-raffled to another branch of the RTC when the
Presiding Judge inhibited himself from resolving the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The
RTC to which the case was this time assigned granted the petitioners motion for reconsideration
thereby reversing and setting aside the MTC decision. Accordingly, the case was dismissed for
being prematurely filed. Thus, the respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals.
During the pendency of the petition for review, the respondent filed another case for unlawful
detainer against the petitioner. This time the respondent used as a ground for ejectment the
expiration of the parties lease contract. Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondent. On
appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTC on the ground of litis pendentia.
In the CA, the respondent argued that there exists no litis pendentia between the parties because
the two cases involved different grounds for ejectment. The first case was filed because of
violations of the lease contract, while the second case was filed due to the expiration of the lease
contract. The respondent emphasized that the second case was filed based on an event or a cause
not yet in existence at the time of the filing of the first case. The CA agreed and ordered the
reinstatement of the decision of the MTC. It ruled that there was no litis pendentia because the
two civil cases have different causes of action.
In a petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioner, the Court ruled that there was no litis
pendentia, thus:
xxx
As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two
actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them
becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present: identity of the parties in the two
actions; sub-stantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and
the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in
one case, regardless of which party is success-ful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
In resolving the issue the Court mentioned the three tests to ascertain whether two suits relate to
a single or common cause of action. The court proceeds thus:
x x x Of the three tests cited, the third one is es-pecially applicable to the present case, i.e.,
whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint - and to which [th]e [Court] answer[ed] in the negative. The facts clearly show that the
filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioners violation of stipulations in the
lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease
contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint xxx the lease contract
between the parties was still in effect, x x x It was only at the expiration of the lease contract that
the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the
respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the second case
was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment case.
In response to the petitioners contention that the similarity xxx rests on the reiteration in the
second case of the cause of action in the first case, [th]e [Court] rule[s]
that the restatement does not result in substantial iden-tity between the two cases. Even if the
respondent alleged violations of the lease contract as a ground for ejectment in the second
complaint, the main basis for ejecting the petitioner in the second case was the expiration of the
lease contract. If not for this subsequent development, the respondent could no longer file a
second complaint for unlawful detainer because an ejectment complaint may only be filed within
one year after the accrual of the cause of action, which, in the second case, was the expiration of
the lease contract.
CHAPTER IV
NECESSITY AND PURPOSE OF PLEADINGS
Santiago v. De los Santos, 61 SCRA 146,150
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
Pleadings are intended to secure a method by which the issues may be properly laid before the
court
CONSTRUCTION OF PLEADINGS
Santiago v. De los Santos, 61 SCRA 146,149
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
While it is the rule that pleadings should be liberally construed, it is also a rule that a party is
strictly bound by the allegations, statements or admissions made in his pleadings and cannot be
permitted to take a contradictory position.
Thus, it has been held that an admission in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party
making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him
contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed or
not
ISSUE:
RULING:
Elementary is the rule of procedure that the nature of a pleading is to be determined by the
averments in it and not by its title
ISSUE:
RULING:
It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein which determine the nature of the
action and the court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and proof even if no such
relief is prayed for
ISSUE:
RULING:
In one case, while the complaint was denominated as one for specific performance, the
allegations of the complaint and the relief prayed for actually and ultimately sought for the
execution of a deed of conveyance to effect a transfer of ownership of the real property in
question. The action therefore, is a real action
ISSUE:
RULING:
The ultimate facts are to be stated in a methodical and logical form and in a plain, concise and
direct manner
RELIEF
Prince Transport, Inc. v. Garcia, 639 SCRA 312, 330, January 12, 2011
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
It was ruled that under Sec. 2 (c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, a court can grant the relief
warranted by the allegation and the proof even if it is not specifically sought by the injured party;
the inclusion of a general prayer may justify the grant of a remedy different from or together
with the specific remedy sought, if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced
so warrant
ISSUE:
RULING:
The relief or prayer, although part of the complaint, does not constitute a part of the statement of
the cause of action and the plaintiff is entitled to as much relief as the facts may warrant
ISSUE:
RULING:
In the absence of a proper notice to the court of a change of address, service upon the parties
must be made at the last address of their counsel of record
ISSUE:
RULING:
A signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party himself or his counsel. Sec. 3, Rule 7
is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him. Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates
to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed
ISSUE:
RULING:
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which
is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Accordingly however, counsel
may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is
not. In so ruling, the Court cites The Code of Professional Responsibility, the pertinent provision
on which provides:
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any un-qualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
A signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, something the law
strongly proscribes. Therefore, the blanket authority entrusted to just anyone is void. Any act
taken pursuant to that authority is likewise void. Hence, there is no way it could be cured or
ratified by counsel