CHAPTER III

ACTIONS
Lopez v. Compania de Seguros, 16 SCRA 855, 859

CIVI ACTIONS AND CRIMINAL ACTIONS

People v. Godoy, 243 SCRA 64, 78

REAL AND PERSONAL ACTIONS

Siosoco v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 186, 196
Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584, 588
National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 522, 529-530
Adamos v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 25 SCRA 529, 534
Hernandez v. Development Bank of the Philippines, 71 SCRA 290, 293

Sinforoso Pascual v. Ponciano Pascual, et. al 73 Phil. 561, 562

FACTS:
While the proceedings for the probate of the will of the deceased Eduarda de los Santos
were pending, Sinforoso Pascual, instituted in CFI Pampanga against Ponciano S. Pascual
and others, an action for the annulment of a contract of sale of a fishpond situated in
Pampanga, supposedly executed without consideration by said deceased in her lifetime in
favor of the defendants.
o The complaint alleges that plaintiff and defendants are all residents of Rizal, and
are legitimate children of the testatrix, Eduarda de los Santos.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging wrong venue
o They argue that an action for the annulment of a contract of sale is a personal
action which must be commenced at the place of residence of either the plaintiff
or the defendant, at the election of the plaintiff
ISSUE:
Is the action brought by plaintiff a real action or a personal action?
RULING:
It is a real action. It appearing that the sale made by the deceased to the defendants is
alleged to be fictitious, with absolutely no consideration, it should be regarded as a
nonexistent, not merely null, contract. And there being no contract between the deceased
and the defendants, there is in truth nothing to annul by action.
The action brought cannot thus be for annulment of contract, but is one for recovery of a
fishpond, a real action that should be, as it has been, brought in Pampanga, where the
property is located.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A PERSONAL AND A REAL
ACTION
Emergency Loan Pawnshop, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Traders Royal Bank, 353 SCRA
89, 93
FACTS:
Traders Royal Bank sold in favor of petitioner Emergency Loan Pawnshop Incorporated
(ELPI) a parcel of land located at Baguio City for P500,000.00
o At the time of the sale, TRB misrepresented to ELPI that the subject property was
a vacant residential lot with a usable land area of 1,143.75 square meters without
any illegal occupants or squatters, when it truth the subject property was
dominantly a public road with only 140 square meters usable area.
ELPI demanded from TRB the rescission and cancellation of the sale of the property.
TRB refused, hence, ELPI filed with the RTC Davao a complaint for annulment of sale
TRB filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue.
ISSUE:
Whether RTC Davao is the proper venue
RULING:
NO. The action was for annulment of sale involving a parcel of land located at Baguio
City. The venue of such action is within the territorial jurisdiction of the proper court
where the real property or part thereof lies. Thus, it should be filed in Baguio City.
Where the action to annul or rescind a sale of real property has as its fundamental and
prime objective the recovery of real property, the action is real. The venue therefore of
the action is where the real property subject of the action is situated.
An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of, or foreclosure of mortgage on
real property, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over
the area where the real property or any part thereof lies

Hernandez v. Development Bank of the Philippines, 71 SCRA 290,293

FACTS:
Hernandez was an employee of private respondent DBP for 21 years until his retirement
due to illness.
In due recognition of his unqualified service as Assistant Attorney in its Legal
Department, the private respondent awarded to the petitioner a lot in the private
respondent's Housing Project at Quezon City.
Months later, private respondent cancelled the award of the lot and house on the
following grounds: that there are a big number of employees who have no houses or lots
and that he has been given his retirement gratuity.
Petitioner filed a complaint in the CFI Batangas against private respondent seeking the
annulment of the cancellation of the award of the lot and house in his favor and the
restoration of all his rights thereto.
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper
venue, contending that since the petitioner's action affects the title to a house and lot
situated in Quezon City, the same should have been commenced in the CFI Quezon City
where the real property is located and not in the CFI Batangas, where petitioner resides
ISSUE:
Whether CFI Batangas is the proper venue
RULING:
YES. Where an award of a house and lot to the plaintiff was unilaterally cancelled, an
action that seeks to annul the cancellation of the award over the said house and lot is a
personal action. Thus, it may be brought in the court of the province where petitioner
resides (Batangas City)
o The action does not involve title to, ownership, or possession of real property. The
nature of the action is one to compel the recognition of the validity of the previous
award by seeking a declaration that the cancellation is null and void.

IN PERSONAM AND IN REM ACTIONS

Domagas v. Jensen, 448 SCRA 663
FACTS:
Petitioner Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Jensen before
the MTC Pangasinan.
o The petitioner alleged in her complaint that she was the registered owner of a
parcel of land in Pangasinan, and that the respondent, by means of force, strategy
and stealth, gained entry into her property by excavating a portion thereof and
thereafter constructing a fence
MTC ruled in favor of petitioner
Respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC Dagupan City for the
annulment of the decision of the MTC, on the ground that due to the Sheriffs failure to
serve the complaint and summons on her because she was in Norway, the MTC never
acquired jurisdiction over her person.
The respondent alleged therein that the service of the complaint and summons through
substituted service on her brother, Oscar Layno, was improper because of the following:
o Although she owned the house where Oscar Layno received the summons and the
complaint, she had then leased it to a certain Gonzales. Oscar Layno was in the
premises only to collect the rentals from Gonzales
RTC ruled in favor of respondent

ISSUE #1:
Whether the action of the petitioner in the MTC against the respondent is an action
in personam or quasi in rem.
RULING:
Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is
determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only.
An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam because
the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant
A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations
brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may
involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel
him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. In an action in
personam, no one other than the defendant is sought to be held liable, not the whole
world.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to
subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action
 quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions
quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which
are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants.
The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

ISSUE #2:
Whether respondent was validly served with summons
RULING
NO. The house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was not the latters residence nor
that of the respondent. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a
visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode.

o In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who

does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of
summons. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable
time, substituted service may be made in.
If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be
resorted to:
(a) substituted service;
1) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or
2) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof
(b) personal service outside the country, with leave of court;
(c) service by publication, also with leave of court;
(d) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Thus, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint by
substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent.

Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 425 SCRA 98

FACTS:
Private respondents mortgaged two parcels of land to Dr. Yujuico. The mortgage was
subsequently foreclosed and the properties sold at public auction, and before the expiry of
the redemption period, the respondents (Trajanos) sold the property to petitioners.
Respondents however, refused to convey ownership of the properties to petitioners,
hence, an action for specific performance and/or rescission was filed by petitioners
against private respondents in the RTC Cebu
o RTC ruled in favor of petitioners
Private respondents filed with the CA, a petition for the annulment of the judgment
rendered by the RTC on the ground that it did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons
as they were not validly served with a copy of the summons and the complaint
 o One respondent was already a resident of Ohio, U.S.A., while the other
respondent was a resident of Bohol
Petitioners argue that the complaint they filed for specific performance and/or rescission
is an action in rem, thus, personal service of summons is not required.
CA ruled in favor of private respondents
ISSUE:
Whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem
RULING:
The action instituted by petitioners affects the parties alone, not the whole world. Hence,
it is an action in personam. Hence, personal service of summons is required.
o Contrary to petitioners belief, the complaint they filed for specific performance
and/or rescission is not an action in rem. While it is a real action because it affects
title to or possession of the two parcels of land covered, it does not automatically
follow that the action is already one in rem
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability,
while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person.
Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in personam and not necessarily
an action in rem. When an action is real because it affects title to or possession of land, it
does not automatically follow that the action is already in rem

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 600, 606

FACTS:
Bustamante filed with the then CFI an application for registration of a tract of land
situated in Pangasinan.
Private respondents (Bustrias) opposed the said application for land registration, alleging
that they have occupied in good faith a certain portion of the land
CFI ruled in favor of Bustamante
Upon appeal, CA found that a portion of the land now registered with Bustamante were
accretions caused by the sea
o Thus the CA ruled that said accretion belongs to the State. This was affirmed by
SC.
Later, that said portion of land which belonged to the State/public domain was leased to
Morado for a period of 25 years, or up to year 2013 by the Republic of the Phil
represented by the Secretary of Agriculture under a Fishpond Lease Agreement
Several years later, the daughter of Bustrias filed a complaint against Morado in the RTC
Pangasinan, for ownership and possession over the lot in question.
o Herein petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, was not made a party to that
suit.
RTC ruled in favor of Bustrias daughter
CA dismissed Morados petition for the annulment of the trial courts decision
ISSUE:
Whether the government can bring such action even though it was not a party to the
action in which the decision sought to be annulled was rendered.
o YES. Republic can on its own institute the proper action to assert its claim since
the subject lot is a land forming part of the public domain. It need not seek the
annulment of CAs judgment in which it was not a party and involves merely a
 question of ownership and possession between Bustria and Morado and which
decision is not binding on it, to be able to assert its claim or interest in the
property.
Whether the action between Bustria and Morada is an action in personam (PERTINENT)
RULING:
YES. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam,
for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.
Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against
specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the
thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against
the whole world

Afdal v. Carlos, 636 SCRA 389

FACTS:
Petitioner Afdal sold a certain lot to respondent Carlos.
Respondent allowed petitioners to stay in the said property.
Later, respondent demanded petitioners to turn over the property to him because he needed
the property for his personal use.
Petitioners refused to heed his demand, thus, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against petitioners and all persons claiming rights under them before the MTC.
There were three attempts to serve the summons and complaint on petitioners. However,
petitioners failed to file an answer.
o 1st attempt = unsatisfied/given address cannot be located
o 2nd attempt = summons were duly served as evidenced by signature of one Gary
Acob
o 3rd attempt= duly served but refused to sign without specifying to whom it was
served.
MTC ruled in favor of respondent
ISSUE:
Whether the action for unlawful detainer is an action in personam
RULING:
YES. An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam
because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation on the defendant for the latter
to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical possession thereof to the
plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or
occupation of the property
Thus, service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first, and only
when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed
of.
o In this case, the indorsements failed to show the reason why personal service could
not be made. It was also not shown that efforts were made to find petitioners
personally and that said efforts failed. Also, nowhere in the return of summons was
it shown that Gary Acob, the person on whom substituted service of summons was
effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing in petitioners
residence
 Thus, petitioners were not validly served with summons and the complaint. Hence, the
MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners.

Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584, 588

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
An action for the declaration of nullity of a marriage is a personal action because it is not
founded on real estate. It is also an in rem action because the issue of the status of a person is one
directed against the whole world. Ones status is a matter that can be set up against anyone in the
world.

Alaban v. Court of Appeals, 470 SCRA 697, 706

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication
of the petition the courts jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the
settlement of the estate of the decedent

Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 623, 628

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
A land registration proceeding is an action in rem. Hence, the failure to give a personal notice to
the owners or claimants of the land is not a jurisdictional defect. It is the publication of such
notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction

QUASI IN REM ACTIONS

Domagas v. Jensen, 448 SCRA 663, 674; Bar
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding
is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi
in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended
to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to
ascertain or cut-off the rights or interests of all possible claimants
Biaco v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, 515 SCRA 106,118
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Attachment and foreclosure proceedings are both actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over
the person of the nonresident defendant is not essential. Service of summons on a non-resident
defendant who is not found in the country is required, not for the purpose of physically acquiring
jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of the requirements of fair play, so that he
may be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property
belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a
resident, and that he may thereby be accorded an opportunity to defend in the action, should he
be so minded

WHEN SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION MAY BE MADE IN AN ACTION IN

PERSONAM
Pantaleon v. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 761
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Summons by publication, as far as existing jurisprudence is concerned, will not enable the court
to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant

CAUSE OF ACTION
Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 514 SCRA 569
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the rights of another

CAUSE OF ACTION AS APPLIED TO ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

Mutia v. Pacariem, 494 SCRA 448
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
While the concept of a cause of action is one that is essential to the existence of a civil action, in
administrative cases however, the issue is not whether the complainant has a cause of action
against the respondent, but whether the respondent has breached the norms and standards of the
office

CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON CONTRACTS

Guanio v. Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc., 641 SCRA 591, 596, February 7, 2011
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima
facie, a corresponding right of relief

CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF AN EMPLOYER

Manliclic v. Calaunan, 512 SCRA 642, 662-553
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
when an injury is caused to another by the negligence of the employee there instantly arises the
juris tantum presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in
the selection or in the supervision, or both of the employee. The liability of the employer is direct
and immediate and is not conditioned upon a prior recourse against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the employer
to prove his exercise of diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
the employee

CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Labastida v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 662, 671
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
In an unlawful detainer case, the cause of action does not accrue unless there is a demand to
vacate and is not complied with. If however, the suit is based on expiration of the lease, notice
and demand are not required

De los Reyes v. Spouses Odones, 646 SCRA 328,334, G.R. No. 178096, March 23,2011
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds pos-session after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied.
The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to
the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in nature,
jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or Metropolitan Trial Court. The action must
be brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the issue in the case must be the
right to physical possession.

a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;
2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latters right of possession;
3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment thereof; and
4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment

The requirement that the complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and how entry into
the property was made by the defendants applies only when the issue is the timeliness of the
filing of the complaint before the MTC, and not when the jurisdiction of the MTC is assailed
because the case is one for accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC. This is because, in forcible
entry cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the date of defendants actual entiy into the
property; whereas, in unlawful detainer cases, it is counted from the date of the last demand to
vacate. Hence, to determine whether the case was filed on time, there is a necessity to ascertain
whether the complaint is one for forcible entry or for un-lawful detainer; and since the main
distinction between the two actions is when and how defendant entered the property, the
determinative facts should be alleged in the complaint
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY
Sarmienta v. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc., 632 SCRA 538
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior
physical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by
any of the means provided in Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth.
The above allegations are not required in an unlawful detainer case.
Instead, in unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession
of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant
holds possession of the land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Magbanua v. Junsay, 515 SCRA 419
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
For a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following:
(1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated
its commencement;
(2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal;
(3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
(4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice an improper or a sinister motive. The
gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision
of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false
and groundless

FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AND LACK OF A CAUSE OF ACTION;

FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A CAUSE OF ACTION
San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 115, 126
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Under Rule 16, the ground for dismissal in relation to a cause of action is not lack or absence of
a cause of action. The ground is that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action
This ground points merely to a failure to state a cause of action and not to a lack or absence of
a cause of action.

People v. Juan Tuvera, 516 SCRA

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Much later, the Court found the occasion to emphasize once more that a motion to dismiss based
on lack of cause of action is filed by the defendant after the plaintiff has presented his evidence
on the ground that the latter has shown no right to the relief sought. While a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be ventilated before the beginning of
the trial, a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case

De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 510 SCRA 103

FACTS:
ISSUE:

RULING:
in actions for forcible entry, three (3) requisites have to be alleged for the municipal trial court to
acquire jurisdiction over the case. First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of
the land or building. Second, he must also assert that he was deprived of possession of the
property either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, the action must be filed
within one (1) year from the time he learned of his deprivation of physical possession of the
property
The other kind of ejectment proceeding is unlawful detainer (desahucio), where one unlawfully
withholds possession of the subject property after the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. Here, the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive; for in such action, the
defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of
the defendants right to continue in possession
As earlier mentioned, so that there would be no failure to state a cause of action in a complaint
for unlawful detainer, the following essential requisites must appear in the complaint:
(1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract express or implied;
(2) the expiration or termination of the possessors right to hold possession; (3) withholding by
the lessee of the possession of the land or building after expiration or termination of the right to
possession; (4) demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and
vacate the premises; and (5) the action must be filed within one (1) year from date of last demand
received by the defendant

FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A CAUSE OF ACTION

Luzon Development Bank v. Conquilla, 470 SCRA 533
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
If there is a sufficiency of the allegations in the pleading but the evidence presented do not prove
the cause of action, then there is a failure to establish a cause of action. Usually, the
declaration that a plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action is postponed until after the parties
are given the opportunity to present all relevant evidence on questions of fact. Hence, it would
not be correct for the trial court to dismiss a complaint on the ground of failure to establish its
cause of action without giving the parties an opportunity to present their evidence

ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE

COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION
Diaz v. Diaz, 331 SCRA 302, 316
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
In determining whether or not a cause of action is sufficiently stated in the complaint, the
statements in the complaint may be properly considered. It is error for the court to take
cognizance of external facts or to hold preliminary hearings to determine its existence

Zepeda v. China Banking Corporation, 504 SCRA 126

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action, the test is as follows:
Admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with
the prayer? To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint;
extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered

SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION

Quadra v. Court of Appeals, 497 SCRA 221
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Splitting a single cause of action is the act of instituting two or more suits for the same cause of
action (Sec. 4, Rule 2, Rules of Court). In splitting a cause of action, the pleader divides a single
cause of action, claim or demand into two or more parts and brings a suit for one of such parts
with the intent to reserve the rest for another separate action

PROHIBITION AGAINST SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION

Mariscal v. Court of Appeals, 311 SCRA 51, 56
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Thus, it was held, that to interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again invoke it in a
complaint against the same person or party would be splitting a cause of action not sanctioned by
the Rules

Gozon v. Vda. De Barrameda, 11 SCRA 376, 379

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
A tenant illegally ejected from the land is entitled to two reliefs one for reinstatement and
another for damages. Since both reliefs arose from the same cause of action, they should be
alleged in one complaint

Industrial Finance Corp. v. Apostol, 177 SCRA 521

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
A bank cannot file a civil action against the debtor for the collection of the debt and then
subsequently file an action to foreclose the mortgage. This would be splitting a single cause of
action

THE THREE TESTS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER TWO SUITS RELATE TO A

SINGLE OR COMMON CAUSE OF ACTION
Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corporation, 654 SCRA 155, G.R. No. 167246, July
20,2011
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
the respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner even before the expiration of
the lease contract, because of alleged violation of stipulations in the lease contract regarding the
use of the property. It was alleged that under the lease contract, the petitioner shall use the leased
lot as a parking space for light vehicles and as a site for a small drivers canteen, and may not
utilize the subject premises for other purposes without the respondents prior written consent.
The petitioner, however, constructed restaurant buildings and other commercial establishments
on the lot, without first securing the required written consent from the respondent, and the
necessary permits and also subleased the property to various merchants-tenants in violation of
the lease contract. The MTC decided the case in favor of the respondent which decision was
affirmed by the RTC. The case however, was re-raffled to another branch of the RTC when the
Presiding Judge inhibited himself from resolving the petitioners motion for reconsideration. The
RTC to which the case was this time assigned granted the petitioners motion for reconsideration
thereby reversing and setting aside the MTC decision. Accordingly, the case was dismissed for
being prematurely filed. Thus, the respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals.
During the pendency of the petition for review, the respondent filed another case for unlawful
detainer against the petitioner. This time the respondent used as a ground for ejectment the
expiration of the parties lease contract. Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondent. On
appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTC on the ground of litis pendentia.
In the CA, the respondent argued that there exists no litis pendentia between the parties because
the two cases involved different grounds for ejectment. The first case was filed because of
violations of the lease contract, while the second case was filed due to the expiration of the lease
contract. The respondent emphasized that the second case was filed based on an event or a cause
not yet in existence at the time of the filing of the first case. The CA agreed and ordered the
reinstatement of the decision of the MTC. It ruled that there was no litis pendentia because the
two civil cases have different causes of action.
In a petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioner, the Court ruled that there was no litis
pendentia, thus:
xxx
As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two
actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them
becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present: identity of the parties in the two
actions; sub-stantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and
the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in
one case, regardless of which party is success-ful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
In resolving the issue the Court mentioned the three tests to ascertain whether two suits relate to
a single or common cause of action. The court proceeds thus:
x x x Of the three tests cited, the third one is es-pecially applicable to the present case, i.e.,
whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint - and to which [th]e [Court] answer[ed] in the negative. The facts clearly show that the
filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioners violation of stipulations in the
lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease
contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint xxx the lease contract
between the parties was still in effect, x x x It was only at the expiration of the lease contract that
the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the
respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the second case
was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment case.
In response to the petitioners contention that the similarity xxx rests on the reiteration in the
second case of the cause of action in the first case, [th]e [Court] rule[s]

that the restatement does not result in substantial iden-tity between the two cases. Even if the
respondent alleged violations of the lease contract as a ground for ejectment in the second
complaint, the main basis for ejecting the petitioner in the second case was the expiration of the
lease contract. If not for this subsequent development, the respondent could no longer file a
second complaint for unlawful detainer because an ejectment complaint may only be filed within
one year after the accrual of the cause of action, which, in the second case, was the expiration of
the lease contract.

CHAPTER IV
NECESSITY AND PURPOSE OF PLEADINGS
Santiago v. De los Santos, 61 SCRA 146,150
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Pleadings are intended to secure a method by which the issues may be properly laid before the
court
CONSTRUCTION OF PLEADINGS
Santiago v. De los Santos, 61 SCRA 146,149
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
While it is the rule that pleadings should be liberally construed, it is also a rule that a party is
strictly bound by the allegations, statements or admissions made in his pleadings and cannot be
permitted to take a contradictory position.
Thus, it has been held that an admission in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party
making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him
contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed or
not

NATURE OF THE PLEADING; HOW DETERMINED

Bank of Commerce v. Perlas-Bernabe, 634 SCRA 107, 118, October 20, 2010
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
Elementary is the rule of procedure that the nature of a pleading is to be determined by the
averments in it and not by its title

VARIANCE BETWEEN CAPTION AND ALLEGATIONS IN THE PLEADING

Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 157,164
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein which determine the nature of the
action and the court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and proof even if no such
relief is prayed for

Gochan v. Gochan, 372 SCRA 256, 263-264

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
In one case, while the complaint was denominated as one for specific performance, the
allegations of the complaint and the relief prayed for actually and ultimately sought for the
execution of a deed of conveyance to effect a transfer of ownership of the real property in
question. The action therefore, is a real action

ALLEGATIONS OF ULTIMATE FACTS

Philippine Bank of Communications v. Go, 642 SCRA 693, 706, February14, 2011
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
The ultimate facts are to be stated in a methodical and logical form and in a plain, concise and
direct manner

RELIEF
Prince Transport, Inc. v. Garcia, 639 SCRA 312, 330, January 12, 2011
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
It was ruled that under Sec. 2 (c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, a court can grant the relief
warranted by the allegation and the proof even if it is not specifically sought by the injured party;
the inclusion of a general prayer may justify the grant of a remedy different from or together
with the specific remedy sought, if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced
so warrant

UBS Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 534, 545

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
The relief or prayer, although part of the complaint, does not constitute a part of the statement of
the cause of action and the plaintiff is entitled to as much relief as the facts may warrant

SIGNATURE AND ADDRESS

Garrucho v. Court of Appeals, 448 SCRA 165, 172
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
In the absence of a proper notice to the court of a change of address, service upon the parties
must be made at the last address of their counsel of record

Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 498 SCRA 220, 229

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
A signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party himself or his counsel. Sec. 3, Rule 7
is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him. Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates
to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SIGNATURE OF COUNSEL

Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 498 SCRA 220, 230
FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which
is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Accordingly however, counsel
may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is
not. In so ruling, the Court cites The Code of Professional Responsibility, the pertinent provision
on which provides:
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any un-qualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
A signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, something the law
strongly proscribes. Therefore, the blanket authority entrusted to just anyone is void. Any act
taken pursuant to that authority is likewise void. Hence, there is no way it could be cured or
ratified by counsel