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STATE 0 F ISRAEL
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE

Tel-Aviv, June 3, 1991

Mr. Steve Arroyo

15401 Beach Blvd. # 123
Wes tmi ns t e r , CA 92683
USA

Dear Si r ,
We have been asked t o acknowledge
the receipt of your l e t t e r addressed t o the Minister
of Defence.
W i t h best regards,

Yours sincerely,

In Charge of Information
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Breaking News

We Need a New, Comprehensive Arms Control

Treaty

DESBIC AGENDA AGENCY

Senior Staff Advisor

Col. Stanislav Lunev

Thursday April 21, 2,005

We finally have an administration that recognizes the threat

posed by ballistic missile programs in Iraq, Iran, North Korea
and other rogue states, as well as a threat posed by an
accidental launch of missiles by nations that are traditional
members of the so-called nuclear-missile club.

However, Washington's plans to build a National Missile

Defense (NMD) system has met strong resistance from some
Democrats on Capital Hill, as well as from Moscow and Beijing
both of whom strongly oppose such American initiatives.

The achievement of Washington's plans for the NMS system are

also seriously limited by 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
and other arms control agreements which are considered by
some American policy makers and their friends in Moscow and
Beijing as a cornerstone of the world strategic stability.

There is no doubt that at the time when these arms control

treaties were signed they played an important role in the peace-
keeping process, but today their importance is questionable.

Last week in Moscow Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said

that Russia and the U.S. should reduce their vast nuclear
arsenals, but warned that new security ties would not come
quickly for both countries. During his talks with former KGB Lt.-
Colonel Putin, now Russia's president, and former KGB Lt.-
General Ivanov, now Russia's Defense Minister, Mr.Rumsfeld
said proposed nuclear reductions and expanded military,
political and economic cooperation could become pillars of a
strategic relationship between Moscow and Washington.

However, President Putin firmly rejected the Bush

administration's push to jointly withdraw from 1972 ABM treaty
but spoke hopefully of agreeing to mutual cuts in nuclear
weapons.

"You know our attitude toward the ABM treaty," Putin told
reporters in the Kremlin. "For us, it's unconditionally linked with
both the START-I and START-II treaties. I would like to
underline that."

We know that today's Russian leaders, as well as their Soviet

predecessors, have systematically violated and are still violating
their international obligations, including all these treaties.

Using the ABM treaty, signed by the U.S. with the no-longer
existing USSR, Moscow has been trying to prevent America
from building an NMD, which is vital for America's national
security.

Having its own territorial anti-missile defense in place today, the

Kremlin is also using the ABM treaty to extort money from
America on the basis a future "strategic relationship" which
would recognize Moscow's new international status, as well as
supply new credits, loans and other benefits.

As the 20 years that followed the signing of the ABM treaty

clearly demonstrated, the U.S. was, and is, the only party to this
treaty that followed its international obligations. At the same
time, Moscow continued to build up and modernize its own
missile defenses and the development of its nuclear and missile
arsenal.

In 1972, the U.S. had 5,700 nuclear weapons (which could be

delivered by the inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM), sea-
launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, while the USSR
had 2,164 of the same weapons.
In 1991, the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal exceeded 12,000,
reflecting a post-ABM treaty increase of 112 percent, and the
Soviet arsenal was nearly 11,000, having increased by more
than 400 percent. Do we need to say anything else?

Moscow also likes the START-I treaty, which was signed by

former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President
George Bush during their Moscow summit in 1991. As the
Russian press has reported, according to this treaty's basic
provisions, Russia and the U.S. must have no more than 1,600
delivery vehicles (i.e. ICBMs, sea-launched ballistic missiles and
heavy bombers) and 6,000 nuclear strategic warheads by
December 2009 and thereafter.

Moscow likes this treaty because under START-I's provisions it

had a chance to dismantle old and extremely costly strategic
nuclear weapons and develop and deploy the new generation of
strategic ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads.

According to Russia's state-run press, the START-I treaty "is the

only document today that really works in the sphere of strategic
offensive arms reduction."

However, in 1993, President George Bush and his Russian

counterpart Boris Yeltsin signed the START-II treaty, which
could once more dramatically reduce the strategic nuclear-
missile arsenals of the both nations. In particular, it was
supposed to result in the early elimination of all of the former
Soviets' vast arsenal of SS-18s - heavy ballistic missiles
capable of pre-emptively attacking the U.S. with large numbers
of independently targetable multiple warheads. This was exactly
the treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate in January 1996.

Unfortunately, the Clinton-Gore administration agreed in

September 1997 to defer the dismantling of these and other
threatening Russian missiles until as late as 2007. And that was
the arrangement the Russian Duma (Lower House of
parliament) approved in April 2000. As a result, until now
START-II is not in effect because the U.S. Senate and Russian
Duma ratified different documents and the last version of the
treaty has yet to be approved by the U.S. Congress.

Putin's position on this question is well known and he

subsequently indicated that none of Russia's long-range
missiles would be retired until they reach the end of their useful
service life. He also has said Russia would pull out of other
arms control treaties and could equip existing single-warhead
missiles with multiple warheads if the U.S. goes ahead with its
plans for the NMD system.

At the same time Russia continues to develop and deploy a new

generation of its strategic nuclear-missile arsenal. According to
press reports, Russia conducted a test of a long-range SS-25
missile last month that may be designed to scuttle U.S. missile
defenses.

The missile's engine - a supersonic-combustion ramjet - is just

as powerful as it sounds, and can generate speeds five times
the speed of sound. The missile was fired into space from a
launch site in Central Russia, and its last stage dropped down
into the atmosphere, flying at supersonic speed to the
Kamchatka Peninsula, The missile has a range of more than
7,000 miles.

We know that currently the number of warheads in the U.S. and

Russian strategic arsenals is more than enough to destroy our
planet several times. There is no doubt that the old arms control
treaties, which were good at the time they were signed, are not
good for the present day. And it would be a really good idea for
the U.S. to find a way for forging a new and comprehensive
arms control treaty that could combine positive parts of old
agreements and limit offensive as well as defensive nuclear,
missile and other weapons.

But of course, any new and comprehensive treaty needs to work

for America and our friends and allies, as well as for
international peace and real stability.
 Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at
DESBIC

DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR BASED

INTERNAL COMMAND
Modernization Of Strategic Nuclear Weapons In Russia:
The Emerging New Posture

THE DESBIC Institute for International Studies

AGENCY FACT FINDING FILES

The Context: In Search of a Predictive
HTU

Paradigm UTH

The analysis of the nuclear debate presented above has inherent

limitations. First, the proposed classification, albeit sufficiently accurate
for the purposes of this paper, overlooks many potentially significant
differences between various experts and organizations that have to be
lumped together to achieve a semblance of descriptive order. As noted
above, the structure of the debate is not reducible to a simple dichotomy of
"good" and "bad," "hawks" and "doves," the proponents and the opponents
of START II. Second, the simple classification does not provide an
adequate picture of the dynamic of the debate. One needs "objective"40 TUHP UTHP

criteria to understand the preceding evolution and predict its future

development: a simple extrapolation of the last five-seven years might be
wrong if the process is not linear.

Two variables stand out in the previous section: the perceived utility of
nuclear weapons and the perceived level of threat. The first refers to the
extent that nuclear weapons are expected to achieve "positive" goals: if
nuclear weapons can only threaten "punishment" (i.e. a reactive mission),
their utility is assumed to be low, but if they can help solve local conflicts
or dissuade the United States from interfering in the Caspian Sea basin,
utility is coded as high. The level of threat is more self-explanatory and its
coding generally follows the lines in the previous sections (from the West
as a friend and ally to the West as an implacable foe bent on eliminating
Russia). Graphically, the current debate could be represented as a function
of these two variables in the following way:
 Picture 1

Of course, this diagram is only an approximation intended to convey the

general idea and the author's estimate of the situation; an accurate diagram
would require a survey (or, rather, a series of surveys) of the Russian
political establishment. Still, it does provide an idea of how the views are
distributed across the spectrum. The location of the views represented by
the 1993 military doctrine (and, as is now clear, the 1998 doctrine) serves
as a point of reference for the rest of the field. The area in the lower-left
comer represents the "minimalists," while the upper-right comer is the
"maxima lists." Of course, the blank spaces are not necessarily empty:
there are just too few people whose positions fall there. There are areas of
overlap, where positions of individuals and institutions are difficult to
distinguish in terms of the two proposed variables, but prescriptions could
still differ as a result of affiliation, sources of funding, personal
predispositions, etc.

Arrows show the trends of change in the distribution of views over the last
seven-ten years. An analysis of publications and interviews suggests that
in the late 1980s--early 1990s the distribution was even less even than
today. There were three poles located approximately on one line from the
lower-left to the upper-right comer. One proceeded from very low utility
of nuclear weapons and very low external threat; this position boiled down
to existential deterrence, the assumption that even a few nuclear weapons
could prevent an all-out war. The other pole united what could be termed
unreformed Cold War warriors, who stressed unilateralism and reliance on
almost unrestricted nuclear arms buildup. The third, in the middle, were
the "classic" Soviet moderate proponents of arms control, who were
behind the INF and START I Treaties. They preferred reductions as a way
to optimize the nuclear arsenal, regulate arms modernization and
deployment, but still remained on the side of rather large stockpiles of
weapons.

Since then, the number of proponents of absolutely minimal, existential

deterrence has significantly dwindled. Apparently, the biggest change was
caused not by a greater belief in the utility of nuclear weapons but rather
by disenchantment with the United States, which is often expressed by a
popular phrase, "the end of the honeymoon." Probably, the perceived
utility of nuclear weapons has increased as well, at least among some
erstwhile liberals, primarily as a result of a perceived need for a more
credible and robust second strike capability.

The differences between the early 1990s "idealists" and today's

"minimalists" boil down to the following: (a) larger estimated minimally
sufficient arsenal, (b) lower propensity to make concessions at arms
control negotiations, and (c) greater propensity to hedge against possible
unpleasant surprises. The first two points simply represent formal
attributes of nuclear balance, first and foremost the maintenance of a
credible second-strike capability: the current views demand high
probability of delivering a significant number of warheads in response to
an attack, more or less along McNamara's criteria. The third component is
primarily political: even rather liberal experts and politicians are no longer
optimistic about relations with the United States.

The evolution of the Cold War warriors depicted in the diagram is not
intended to suggest that they have necessarily moderated their views,
although some might have. Rather, over time their views have become
more diverse and now occupy a larger area. One only has to compare
intense, focused criticism of START II in 1992-93 with the proposals
advanced today. The limited moderation was a consequence of a clearer
understanding of the economic constraints on Russia's ability to modernize
and build up its nuclear weapons, and recognition that the dissolution of
the Soviet Union is permanent.

The evolution of the former centrists, which have now become largely
extinct, is particularly interesting. It is well known but rarely recognized
that a very large part of the Soviet political-military establishment in the
mid-1980s favored reduction of nuclear weapons. For a variety of reasons
(personal convictions, institutional interests political expediency) their
positions were far from radical. The actual process of arms reductions split
this group apart. Some continued the evolution and joined the ranks of a
more liberal "minimalist" group. The growing disenchantment of others in
the arms reduction process in the late 1980s led them to more hard-line
positions.

To a large extent, the evolution of the centrists was caused by the loss of
conventional superiority or at least parity with NATO. It was easy to
consider deep reduction of nuclear weapons while the Soviet Union
possessed sufficient conventional armed forces to support a broad variety
of missions. Today, the choice of military instruments is so limited that
some centrists no longer consider nuclear arms reduction feasible.
Subsequent evolution of the debate is likely to depend on the changing
perception of threat. It is formed by many different developments, not
necessarily limited to military power. Almost anything can affect the
perception of threat: economic sanctions, further enlargement of NATO,
Caspian oil pipelines, a new crisis around Iraq, etc. Such events are also
subject to interpretation: some will treat them as evidence of growing
threat, while others will tend to discount their significance.

In the meantime, the perception of the utility of nuclear weapons is likely

to change more slowly since there are fewer reasons to reevaluate the
currently held views. After all, people will be dealing with the same
amount of information and the same tools for interpreting it. As a result, in
the near future polarization is likely to stay and perhaps even increase. The
existing groups will consolidate around two different assessments of the
level of threat; each group will stretch vertically.

Picture 2
From this line of reasoning it follows that for some time a rather
contradictory combination of views might become possible: either
perception of immediate threat coupled with perception of low utility of
nuclear weapons or, alternatively, perception of low threat coupled with
high utility of nuclear weapons. Without doubt, such mixed views will be
internally contradictory and will not remain stable for long, making further
evolution likely.

By definition, long-term evolution is difficult to predict. Several options

seem possible. First, the Russian elite might develop some sort of
consensus on their perception of US policy. Recent trends indicate that a
mainstream, "hard-headed" position is already emerging, approximately
around the views espoused by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy.
In addition, the growing marginalization of military and political aspects
of US-Russian relations could stimulate the emergence of a centrist
position as well: the increasingly influential business groups tend to judge
these relations by the degree to which they are conducive to business, not
by geopolitical schemes. If business is reasonably successful, then
geopolitics and ideology will be more or less suppressed. In both cases the
groups depicted in the diagram will tend to concentrate around one pole.

Second, if military reform is successful, Russia will come to rely

somewhat less on nuclear weapons; accordingly their perceived utility will
decrease. This will be a necessarily lengthy process since it involves
restructuring, reductions, replacement and education of personnel,
modernization of weapons, etc. All of this has to be done under severe
financial constraints. Furthermore, in all likelihood the military reform,
regardless of its success will not affect policyrnaking until there is some
sort of a "small successful war" (like the US operation in Grenada) to
visibly demonstrate that conventional forces could be relied upon for a
certain category of contingencies. The second option will help consolidate
the elite. If the perception of threat remains constant, there will be two
poles gravitating toward the lower left and the upper right corners. If
consensus on US-Russian relations emerges, then one pole will emerge.
Under any scenario, successful military reform is likely to benefit the
"minimalists" more.

Yet another option is continued uncertainty: the distribution of views

could remain frozen for a long time and experience only slow
consolidation. The most likely result is still the emergence of two opposite
poles in the lower left and upper right comers.

Much in the evolution of the debate will depend on economic and political
stabilization in Russia. If optimistic forecasts come true, Russia will
become more self-confident and its global positions will improve, in
particular in such sensitive areas as relations with other new independent
states of the former Soviet Union and with Europe. After all, many
problems are caused by inadequate competitiveness in international
markets, the inability to offer credits (as a rule, export of high-tech
products often depends on the ability of the exporting country to offer
cheap credits to finance purchases), and the low attraction of Russia's
domestic market. An improvement of these three parameters will reduce
the sense of dependency and help reduce the perceived external threat.

The United States could do much to shape the development of the debate
on nuclear weapons in Russia, even without sacrificing any major policy
goals. For example, the US Government could make it clear that the views
of Zbignew Brzezinski do not represent official policy. More active
pursuit of integration within the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
could also yield significant results. More cautious policy in the Caspian
Sea region would help as well, especially if it is "packaged" in terms
friendly to Russia and sensitive to Russian concerns (e.g., it would be
advisable to avoid proclaiming the region an area of vital US interests,
since such declarations are invariably interpreted as hostile). These are
only illustrations, of course, since a detailed analysis of possible steps is
beyond the scope of this paper.

The Views of the Military Leadership

HTU UTH

The current debate has two unique characteristics. One is a curious

detachment of the government (meaning first of all the Administration of
the President, including the Security Council and the recently deceased
Defense Council) and the military leadership from the public debate. Little
is said on the matters, which are heatedly discussed by the elite; the
process of modernization, reduction and reshaping the arsenal proceeds on
its own.

The second characteristic is that the uniformed military is actually playing

the "doves:" they support START II and oppose plans for large-scale
MIRVing of ICBMs. Only rarely does one see sudden outbursts of
emotion, such as Vladimir Dvorkin's recent response to an article by
Podberezkin and Surikov.41 The military have not turned into proponents
HPTU UTHP

of total and complete nuclear disarmament, but they certainly do not seem
to support extreme proposals for a nuclear arms race.

The result is rather unusual. While the political elite appears to move to
the right and increasingly embrace the idea of a large, MIRVed nuclear
arsenal (funding, of course, is not available, but the attitudes are almost
ripe for that), the military's ambitions are more modest. They are more or
less comfortable with START II and are very serious about START III,
which is certain to confirm a ban on MIRVed ICBMs and will further
reduce the Russian force.
Since the government's policy on nuclear weapons is relatively
independent from the broader political context, it requires a separate,
independent inquiry. This section will attempt to reconstruct the rationales
for this policy; a review of the actual modernization programs in the next
section will serve as an additional test for the hypotheses about the "real"
Russian nuclear doctrine. The detachment, however, is clearly temporary
and cannot hold forever. The big question is whether the military would
eventually embrace the increasingly popular conservative views or
whether the political elite will reconcile itself with the more moderate
views of the military. But at the moment the public debate and the official
views have to be analyzed separately, even while both are important
ingredients of a study that attempts to predict the evolution of the Russian
strategic arsenal and doctrine.

It would be easy to explain away the military's moderate position as

simply an honest recognition of economic constraints. After ten years of
ever-deepening economic crisis, Russia can ill afford the nuclear arsenal it
inherited from the Soviet Union. Indeed, one of the key arguments in favor
of the START II Treaty is that deep reductions are the only way to keep
the imbalance with the United States within tolerable limits. With or
without START II it will have to reduce its nuclear arsenal to 2,000
warheads at best (START II counting rules). If START II is ratified, then
the US will be at the 3,500 level, if not--at 7,000-8,000.42
HPTU UTHP

For that reason, Russia kept insisting that the United States agrees to
negotiate and preferably sign START III even before START II is ratified,
so that the Russian parliament could consider both treaties simultaneously
or at least had a clearer picture of the future balance. In the spring of 1997,
at the Helsinki summit, the United States made a partial concession by
agreeing to establish the overall limit of warheads for START III at the
level preferred by Russia. Consultations on the new treaty have begun, and
since September 1997 have been very active, but are unlikely to result in a
treaty or even assume formal character until START II is ratified.

It remains uncertain, however, whether the United States will actually

pursue START III if START II is ratified, or if it will just mark time and
put Russia into an awkward position by codifying its inferiority.
Theoretically, the talks could continue forever, keeping the United States
at the START II level of 3,500, while Russia stays at a much lower level
(below 2,000 warheads) in anticipation of a new treaty. To some extent,
this uncertainly clouds the START II ratification process.

Economic constraints are hardly the only variable to affect the position of
the military. There is a widespread certainty that the United States will
significantly reduce its strategic weapons regardless of whether START II
is ratified; if this logic is correct, then Russia could MIRV its ICBMs, but
the imbalance might still remain within tolerable limits. After all, if there
is no START III, then Russia will have 1,500 to 2,000 warheads compared
to 3,500 on the US side; if there is no START II, then Russia can have
3,000 to 3,500 warheads (calculation is approximate) to something like
3,500 to 4,500 warheads on the US side. But in the latter case Russia
would have MIRVed ICBMs, which are considered a better response to an
NMD system.

This means that support of START II is a conscious decision of the

military and their policy reflects long-term planning and certain doctrinal
innovations. Apparently, this policy is connected first and foremost with
the former commander-in-chief of the SRF Igor Sergeev, who was
appointed the minister of defense in 1997.

Since his appointment as the SRF commander-in-chief in 1992, Sergeev

has become a veritable "nuclear czar," who determines not only the
policies of the SRF, but to a large extent the relevant aspects of the
policies of the Navy and the Air Force. His close ally is the director of the
4th Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense (the SRF institute)
P P

Vladimir Dvorkin.

In what was a unique experience for Russia, Sergeev became the SRF
commander as a result of genuine competition, after a special commission
interviewed several candidates for the position. Reportedly, the
commission was swayed by his response to the question about the impact
of a US strategic defense system. Other candidates proposed large-scale
MIRVing of ICBMs and abandonment of START II and even START I
(in 1992, to some this still seemed feasible), but Sergeev advocated a
"qualitative" response, in particular based on enhanced ability of single-
warhead ICBMs to penetrate the defense. Sergeev also advocated a faster
transition toward a pure second-strike posture to replace the "vstrechno-
otvetnyi udar" (launch under attack) strategy.

Subsequent modernization and reduction activities followed Sergeev's

initial statement without deviation. It is significant that he has not even
once proposed a different course of action (e.g., reject START III,
consider MIRVing, etc.), which leads one to conclude that fiscal
constraints are not the only motivation behind his behavior. Only recently,
as mentioned above, the new SRF commander-in-chief suggested that
MIRVing Topol-M was possible, but even then he did not declare it a top
priority option.

From the point of view of the military, nuclear weapons will remain the
core element in Russia's security. There exists an obvious relationship
between the role of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and Russia's
economic potential and its (insufficient) involvement in international
security regimes, on the other. Economic weakness means, among other
things, weak conventional forces and fewer instruments of influencing
international politics. Underdeveloped security regimes mean that Russia
lacks effective means of presenting and defending its interests through
international institutions, economic and political vulnerability, and
reliance on raw power to a greater extent than would have been otherwise
necessary.

For the government, nuclear weapons are apparently even more valuable,
in a sense. Their impact on Russian domestic and foreign policy has been
counterintuitive. They have played a positive role and are likely to
continue playing it in the foreseeable future. Their presence has helped to
alleviate concerns about the security environment during the difficult
transition period. Nuclear weapons probably played a critical role in the
(so far) successful transition toward democracy and a market economy:
without them, the (perceived) reduction of security could have provoked
an arms buildup, requiring concentration of resources and political power,
i.e. restoration of an authoritarian regime. But proponents of reforms could
always invoke nuclear weapons and claim that security was assured, that
armed forces could be reduced and the defense budget cut down--even
below the reasonable level. In a sense, the ongoing modernization of
nuclear weapons is an inevitable "price" for reforms. Apparently, one can
hardly exist without the other.

Taken together, Russian strategic weapons modernization programs fall

rather neatly into a certain well-structured and logical framework. The
force will be smaller, but will consist of relatively invulnerable weapons
systems. The posture is likely to be oriented toward the second-strike
strategy meaning that it will be able to "ride out" the first strike of any
nuclear power, including the United States, and still be able to inflict
unacceptable damage in retaliation.

A particularly advantageous feature of the Russian arsenal will be

congruence between the low overall level and low concentration of
warheads on delivery vehicles, which will help to increase survivability.
As a result, the arsenal will be almost perfect for low levels of nuclear
weapons and will fit any probable arms control scheme, whether bilateral
with the United States or multilateral, with participation of other nuclear-
weapons states.

Funding is the only element missing today from the overall picture. After
economic growth resumes (and a period of protracted economic growth
might begin as early as this year), the current modernization effort will
reacquire common sense: the economically developing Russia will
ultimately cease to be the Upper Volta with nuclear weapons, to quote
Margaret Thatcher, and then nuclear weapons will look "natural."
Modernization also fits the strategy developed by the former first deputy
minister of defense Andrei Kokoshin (who has been promoted since to the
secretary of the Security Council). According to Kokoshin, the period of
scarcity should be devoted to research and development, with acquisition
postponed until approximately 2005. The number of types of weapons
(including nuclear) should be reduced. Until 2005, weapons producing
plants should be allocated the absolute minimum of contracts, just enough
to enable them to survive; plants that are no longer needed to support the
reduced armed forces and the relatively fewer types of equipment should
be closed or converted.43
HPTU UTHP

In hindsight, it is an ultimate irony that economic and political hardships

have probably rendered Russian strategic weapons a service, after all.
Russia skipped one or two stages in the modernization plans originally
projected by the Soviet Union and, under reasonably favorable economic
conditions, by the year 2010 it will have a rather small, fully optimized
arsenal, which will consist almost exclusively of the most modern
weapons (the word modern applies to delivery vehicles only; the CTBT
will limit modernization of warheads).

Modernization programs display a decisive turn toward putting quality of

delivery vehicles above quantity and survivable second-strike potential
above war-fighting capability. The new weapons will have the following
characteristics:

low concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles: ICBMs are

single-warhead and new submarines are likely to carry only 48
warheads each (more on that in the next section);
mobility or other means to ensure survivability: a significant share
of ICBMs will be mobile, the rest will be based in hardened silos;
submarines on patrol are highly invulnerable by definition;
improved accuracy, which includes air-launched cruise missiles;
and
increased ability to penetrate defense systems.

All these characteristics, with the exception of improved accuracy, meet

the traditional requirements of a second strike posture. Accuracy is usually
considered a property of war fighting, since the so-called countervalue
strike (the threat of punishment through elimination of cities) does not
require high accuracy. Improved accuracy is likely to be a by-product of
general improvement of all characteristics of delivery vehicles, however,
and apparently cannot be construed to mean that Russia is preparing for
more than a pure second strike: this would have required greater numbers
and/or heavily MIRVed ICBMs.44 HPTU UTHP
Close attention to qualitative characteristics suggests that the military
leadership is not content with simple "existential deterrence," which could
be achieved by relatively low quantities of any weapons systems and
would have required maintenance of the existing types instead of creation
of new ones. The goal is, rather, to maintain a robust reliable second-strike
arsenal capable of delivering a rather large number of warheads under the
worst (or realistically bad) circumstances. The realistically bad
circumstances probably include a first US strike and the ability to "ride it
out." In any event, this interpretation comfortably explains the absolute
majority of data on modernization programs.

In one of the very few public statements on the subject, the first deputy
minister of defense Nikolai Mikhailov (he replaced Kokoshin after the
latter moved to the Defense and then the Security Council) stated that
deterrence should be ensured not by the quantity of warheads but by
guaranteed delivery of warheads to the territory of the aggressor: At the
forefront here are the qualitative factors, rather than quantitative ones.
The goal of the defense ministry, according to Mikhailov, is to retain a
reliable deterrent while simultaneously reducing the number of both
delivery vehicles and warheads. This would require, among other things, a
new technological level of delivery vehicles and warheads, as well as of
information, command and control systems.45 Dvorkin, in the above-
HPTU UTHP

mentioned letter, confirmed that the military leadership46 did not consider
HPTU UTHP

it wise to retain old-type MIRVed ICBMs (as Podberezkin and Surikov

proposed) simply because their 1970s technology was hopelessly
outdated.

The attention to the qualitative parameters has a number of positive

implications for the strategic balance and arms control. First of all, the
requirements of numerical parity could be further relaxed. Exact parity has
never been achievable, nor vital. It was, to a large extent, a political
requirement, while in strictly military terms it was, as one analyst put it,
the roughest indicator of the strategic balance.47 The stability of the
HPTU UTHP

balance always depended on qualitative characteristics of weapons

systems. The purposeful creation of a reliable second-strike capability,
which stresses survivability, makes parity even less relevant. Russia will
be truly able to abandon it (of course, if the domestic political scene
permits it) and feel reasonably comfortable under a quite significant
disparity. Of course, numbers will continue to matter--no one suggests
they will not--but less than ever before.

Second, a combination of survivability and penetrability eases the impact

of national missile defense. Survivability means that more delivery
vehicles will survive the first strike to be used in retaliation, and
penetrability means that more of those will be able to deliver warheads. As
a result, the pressure to counter NMD deployment with additional
deployment of offensive weapons and MIRVing would decrease. As in the
previous case, the NMD problem will not disappear completely: at a
certain level of offensive arms and certain effectiveness of defense it will
reemerge, but the elasticity of the balance will increase, and the ABM
Treaty, including the issue of ABM demarcation, will not be as serious an
impediment to nuclear arms reduction as in the past.

Still, major uncertainties and unsolved problems will exist even when the
transition to the new posture has been completed. First, it is unclear if the
second strike capability will continue to exist under the combined impact
of numerical imbalance and an NMD system. The positive implications
described above treated the two separately; taken together, they might
substantially affect the calculations. It is likely that this uncertainty was
behind the statement of the current SRF commander-in-chief Yakovlev
about the possibility of MIRVing Topol-M.

Second, even a very reliable second strike capability might not be enough
to ensure security. At least, under the NSC-68 criteria further elaborated in
the subsequent decades (and still to a large extent guiding the thinking on
nuclear weapons), reliable nuclear deterrence requires the maintenance of
strong conventional deterrence in parallel. Thus, the current approach of
the Russian military, i.e. reliance on nuclear weapons as the main provider
of security, is a rather big gamble. After all, nuclear weapons are a means
of last resort, and if confronted with a choice between a relatively limited
concession and the use of nuclear weapons, Russia might choose the first.

Tactical nuclear weapons are supposed to compensate for that problem,

but they are still nuclear weapons and carry with them all the associated
limitations. The self-imposed restrictions on who could be targeted with
nuclear weapons (the negative guarantees, which were confirmed in the
military doctrine) exacerbate the problem further: since Russia cannot
threaten certain categories of states with nuclear weapons, nuclear
deterrence works only weakly against the rest.

Let us consider, as an example, the so-called Southern Flank, the states to

the south of Russia. Only Turkey in that region falls under the first use
provision, since it is formally allied with a nuclear power, the United
States. All others are formally non-nuclear, and the use of nuclear
weapons cannot be convincingly invoked. Even Pakistan, which is widely
assumed to have nuclear weapons and is viewed as generally unfriendly to
Russia (primarily because of its role in Afghanistan and the support of the
Taliban movement) presents problems because threatening the use of
nuclear weapons against Pakistan would amount to recognition of its
nuclear status. Without doubt, the specter of the use of nuclear weapons is
still present regardless of anything, but its credibility and thus the utility of
threat should be judged as low.
The same problems apply to Europe, the region which seems to have
become the focal point of worries for Russian strategic planners. Armed
conflicts there seem infeasible today, but if they emerge (e.g., as a result
of an attempt to challenge the existing borders), Russia would still face a
choice between the use of nuclear weapons over a relatively small issue
and surrendering its position. Again, the credibility of the threat should be
judged as low.

Of course, it is possible that vagueness is intentional and should help to

contain any, no matter how limited, military clash or provocation. After
all, if there exists even a miniscule chance of escalation to the nuclear
level, no NATO country would think about challenging Russia; at least
this follows from a Schelling-like analysis which is popular in Russia.
Still, these calculations are rather shaky, and the probability of benefits
and harm appears equal.48TUHP UTHP

These problems point at an important conclusion: the current degree of

reliance on nuclear weapons is temporary. They cannot fully substitute for
modernization of conventional armed forces. This area lies outside the
purview of this paper, and it is sufficient to note that the same logic is
likely to be applied to strategic weapons. This means putting quality above
quantity: the troops will be better suited for the types of conflicts that are
anticipated as most likely, conventional weapons will be "smarter," etc. In
other words, a return to the Soviet-type army is hardly possible.49HPTU UTHP

Comprehensive military reform will take a long time. So far, one can
guess only the broad contours. The outline of the future strategic posture
is, in contrast, more or less clear. The modernization programs, taken
together with the reduction of weapons and the position at arms control
negotiations, suggest that the goal is close to what in the 1980s was often
called "defensive defense"--a posture defined by a fine balance between
the ability to defend and inability to attack. At the same time, the likely
direction of further development is hardly toward "existential deterrence:"
the current plans stress reliable second-strike capability measured in
probably two or three hundred warheads. Still, even that arsenal will not
be suitable for a first strike, and in this sense will conform to "defensive
defense." It will also provide significant (but not unlimited) flexibility in
terms of numerical imbalance and resistance to the impact of a large-scale
defense system.

Whether these plans will be implemented remains to be seen. As noted

above, there are major uncertainties directly related to the planned posture
and the level of credibility of nuclear retaliation. There are also significant
domestic constraints, which might affect the preferences of the military.
Finally, there is a larger international context to keep in mind, in particular
the perception of external threat, which could emerge from economic and
political conflicts rather than from the more traditional military challenges.

In spite of major conceptual uncertainties, Russia is definitely bent on

keeping its nuclear weapons and even modernizing them. This is natural:
historically, nuclear weapons appeared first and only then the conceptual
basis for them was invented to suit the already existing systems.50 The
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practical impact of these conceptual uncertainties is that in the absence of

a clearly defined role, the benchmark for nuclear planning remains the US-
Russian nuclear balance. The fact that these two countries have the largest
arsenals appears to be only a superfluous reason, a convenient habitual
way to rationalize certain established methods of planning. Deep under it
hides what is probably the real rationale--the absence of a widely accepted
hypothesis about the missions of nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War
world.

References
HTU UTH

40. For the purposes of this paper, "objective" means exogenous criteria,
i.e. not derived from the phenomenon under inquiry. It would be pointless
to take position on START II or MIRVing as such criteria, since these
issues are an integral part of the debate and could change over time: if
START II is ratified, the debate would not stop nor would it stop if Russia
returns to MIRVed ICBMs. In either case new issues would come to the
fore. In this sense START II and MIRVing are the endogenous criteria and
cannot serve as a basis for a predictive framework. An example of
endogenous criteria is Jack Snyder's treatment of interest groups' impact
on foreign policy (Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell Univ.
Press, 1992)). In each country case, Snyder found groups, which
influenced foreign policy, but each time the type of groups was different:
economy-based, ideology-based, social stratum-based, etc. Apparently, he
needed criteria not directly related to the cases under consideration, for
example, derived from the social structure of any society (economy-based
interest groups) or of a particular type of societies (totalitarian,
democratic, etc.). This would make a comparison across cases more
rigorous.

41. Vladimir Dvorkin, "O Polze Diskussii po Povodu Dogovora SNV-2"

(On the Benefits of Debates over the START II Treaty), Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, March 27, 1998, p. 7.

H
 Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at
DESBIC

DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR BASED

INTERNAL COMMAND
Program on Approaches to Russian Security

Modernization Of Strategic
Nuclear Weapons In Russia:
The Emerging New Posture

DESBIC INTELLIGENCE FACT

FINDINGS AND

INFORMATION GATHERING FOR START

II, III, IV

Contents
Why Study Strategic Modernization?
HTU UTH

The "Minimalists:" Back to the Classic Age of Deterrence | The

HTU UTH HTU

"Maximalists:" Back to a War-Fighting Capability UTH

The Nuclear Debate

HTU UTH

HTU The Context: In Search of a Predictive Paradigm UTH

The Views of the Military Leadership

HTU UTH

Modernization of the Russian Nuclear Triad

HTU UTH
 (I) Land-Based Strategic Missiles | (II) Sea-Based Strategic
HTU UTH HTU

Weapons | (III) Air-Based Strategic Weapons

UTH HTU UTH

Conclusion
HTU UTH

Why Study Strategic Modernization?

HTU UTH

Modernization of strategic weapons belongs to what some call the

"traditional agenda" of security studies, an area of research whose
popularity has plummeted with the passing of the Cold War. The treaties
signed by the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States (INF, START 1,
START II,1 and lesser ones) as well as other steps, including the 1991
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initiatives of Bush and Gorbachev,2 were broadly viewed as putting an end

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to the nuclear arms race. Accordingly, mastery of arcane nuclear war-

fighting theories and the intricacies of arms control negotiations seems
increasingly irrelevant. More salient issues, such as economic and political
integration, ethnic conflicts, and WMD proliferation occupy the attention
of policymakers and academics.

But old problems do not go away quietly. The place and the role of
nuclear weapons has changed, as has the nature of interest in them, but in
some way they continue to be relevant. During the Cold War, the threat of
nuclear war seemed so great that any progress in arms control was
welcome; common interest in preventing war was like a locomotive,
which could pull superpower relations out of crises. Today, this is no
longer the case. Arms control plays a visible role in great power politics
(and rightly so), progress on new treaties is no longer a necessary
condition for progress on other issues. To the contrary, the lack of
progress or, even worse, a setback can easily disrupt broader cooperation.
Arms control and the politics of nuclear balance have become a disruptive
force, to an extent, as exemplified by the deadlock over START II
ratification in Russia.

There are two alternative ways the politics of nuclear balance could affect
relations between Russia and the United States: one is negative. Some
Russian modernization options could undermine the stability of the
nuclear balance and stimulate a launch-on-warning posture; this could be
perceived in the United States as a threat, in the same fashion as the Soviet
arsenal was perceived as a threat in the 1970s and the 1980s. It should be
noted that the Soviet Union never actually had a first-strike capability; the
key here is the reaction of the United States and the modernization
programs it adopted in response.

The same option could also result from the deployment of a national
missile defense (NMD) system by the United States. Russia will see it as
destabilizing and is likely to respond by modernization and/or buildup of
its offensive forces, which, in its turn, would cause negative reaction in the
United States. Given the nature of the issue, the impact on the domestic
political situation in both countries is likely to be highly disruptive.

The other alternative is positive. Russian strategic modernization could

proceed in a stabilizing manner and facilitate eventual transition toward a
pure second strike posture. The real significance of this development,
however, will not be in its impact upon the nuclear balance: nuclear war is
clearly not in the cards. Rather, stable nuclear balance will enable the sides
to "forget' 'about those weapons; the arsenals will become useless not only
for combat, but also as a political instrument. Since complete nuclear
disarmament is hardly possible in the foreseeable future, putting weapons
"aside," relegating them to irrelevance is as close to their elimination as
realistically possible. Thus, the purpose of studying strategic
modernization is not to learn more about possible scenarios of a nuclear
exchange, but rather to understand an important aspect of domestic
politics in Russia and the United States and, through it, the dynamic of the
future relationship between them.

The potentially disruptive impact of the politics of nuclear balance is

demonstrated by the continuing saga of START 11 ratification in Russia.
The shortcomings of START II have already provided fertile ground for
conservative/nationalist opposition and helped mobilize voters around
their platform. Whether these shortcomings are militarily significant or not
seems irrelevant: what counts is how the potential imbalance is used in the
political games. Although the government is likely to push START II
through the parliament,3 it might have to make concessions in other areas
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of the domestic political process.

The materials presented in this paper suggest that the current

modernization programs in Russia lean toward the second, positive
alternative. Its future nuclear arsenal is likely to be small, conducive for
strategic stability, and non-provocative. It might even be unnecessary for
Russia to engage in a significant buildup effort in response to a US NMD
system, if one is deployed.

The positive outcome depends on two conditions. One is the minimum

level of funding. Without it, the strategic triad could quickly disintegrate.
This would be a potentially dangerous development, since it might
provoke a massive buildup once the economic situation improves and/or
might increase the likelihood of an authoritarian regime that would
mobilize resources to support such a buildup. Second, the transition
toward the new posture is politically difficult: its proponents will remain
vulnerable for at least the next five-seven years, until the new posture
finally takes shape and Russia's international situation stabilizes.
In this regard the US policy toward Russia will have a lasting influence on
the ongoing transition. Since Russia lacks financial and political resources
today, the full impact of current US policy will be delayed until the next
decade: no matter what the United States does, Russia will have to
ultimately accept it, but this acceptance could be short-lived, depending on
what is at stake. This means that today's reaction of the Russian
government to US policy is not necessarily a reliable indicator of long-
term relations; the "shadow of the future" should never be absent from
policy planning in either country.

This paper begins with an analysis of the ongoing debate over the strategic
modernization in Russia, reviews the policy of the government and the
military leadership, and then proceeds to the available data on actual
modernization programs. The last part will draw conclusions regarding the
possible evolution of these views under various scenarios.

The Nuclear Debate

HTU UTH

The well-known thesis that nuclear weapons are valued in Russia because
they are the last vestige of its great-power status is generally correct but
hardly sufficient to explain the attention to the nuclear arsenal. Nor is it
sufficient to say that nuclear weapons are a key security guarantee. These
statements yield little value in terms of predicting the size and the shape of
the arsenal since they do not contain criteria by which one could judge
whether the existing arsenal is sufficient, or have to be increased, or
modernized, etc. Without such criteria, decision-making is virtually
impossible: any decision would be arbitrary and subject to intense
challenge from the opposition, both within and outside the government.

Apparently, the benefits and losses resulting from the START II Treaty
are not at the center of the debate, either. The impact of START II is
rather easy to calculate, and a decision would have been made earlier. Nor
is the matter of funding necessarily at stake: everyone knows that Russia
cannot afford to reject STARTIII, but this does not dissuade its opponents.
Some suggest that START II simply should not be ratified in order to keep
more options open for the future, when the economic situation improves;
others prefer to ratify START II because it does not contradict what they
consider the optimal future strategic posture. Rather, the debate is about
the criteria by which the Russian nuclear arsenal should be judged. An
agreement on the criteria will determine its eventual size, structure,
missions, and capabilities.

This frame of reference has several important implications. The most

important among them is that the approval or the rejection of START II
will not end the debate: the decision of the Duma will affect the
probabilities of various outcomes, but will not completely foreclose any of
those. If the treaty is ratified, the option of MIRVing ICBMs will not be
removed completely: Russia could still return to them, for example, if the
United States deploys an NMD. On the other hand, the rejection of
START II does not automatically mean that Russia will MIRV its ICBMs:
it might still stick to that key provision. At this writing, the ratification
resolution, which will be sent to the floor of the Duma, is likely to espouse
the first option: START II would be subject to a review in the case the
United States deploys an NMD to determine whether MIRVing is
advisable. At the same time, the resolution will insist on even deeper
reductions, a START III treaty.

Another characteristic of the debate could be detected in frank discussions

with many Russian experts: the lines between various positions are not
necessarily drawn according to political, ideological, or institutional
boundaries. Rather, they often run within individuals: quite a few experts
cannot decide on their own preferences. It would be a mistake to picture
the situation in simple black and white colors, as a standoff between
"liberals" and "conservatives" or between "hawks" and "doves." In this
sense, the disagreements described below are relative: in some cases, they
refer to whole groups, but in others they describe the uncertainty that
exists in the minds of experts and politicians.

All sides in the debate share a number of positions, first and foremost that
Russia needs nuclear weapons and that their role has increased since the
end of the Cold War. At a minimum, they are supposed to prevent large-
scale aggression and guarantee Russia's sovereignty and survival. A study
of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISI) underscored that
"humankind has not created a substitute to nuclear weapons in terms of
their deterrent effect in the situations of escalating large-scale armed
conflicts. This means that in the foreseeable future nuclear weapons will
remain an important element of global politics despite all the
'inconveniences' related to their maintenance and the continuing debate
over the actual role of nuclear weapons in preventing world wars during
the last fifty years.4 In other words, the special role of nuclear weapons is
HPTU UTHP

determined by their real or perceived "absolute" character.

From here, it follows that nuclear weapons can compensate for Russia's
inferiority in conventional armed forces relative to NATO and China. The
new military doctrine, which is expected to be adopted sometime in 1998,
will provide for the use of nuclear weapons "in the case of an immediate
threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia that has
emerged as a result of an external aggression.5 This will be a
HPTU UTHP

reaffirmation of the provision of the 1993 doctrine, which, in its turn,

repudiated the 1982 Soviet policy of no-first-use. The 1993 first-use plank
was also confirmed in the 1997 national security concept.6 HPTU UTHP
Having introduced the first-use plank, however, the 1993 doctrine retained
certain restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
states in line with the negative guarantees provided by the Soviet Union
(as well as all other "legitimate" nuclear states) in connection with the
Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Only nuclear-
weapons states and their allies can be threatened with nuclear weapons.
The new, 1998 doctrine will keep these limitations together with the first-
use provision: Anatoli Klimenko and Aleksandr Koltukov underlined that
the 1993 document enjoyed the support of the Foreign Ministry (meaning,
it did not contradict international obligations) and thus it was decided to
keep it. They also noted that while the doctrine was still under
development unnamed experts attempted to broaden the first-use plank.7 HPTU UTHP

A broader, less official approach to the use of nuclear weapons includes,

for example, deterrence against "a belt of unstable, and sometimes
unfriendly, states and countries, which covertly seek weapons of mass
destruction.8 This definition embraces the majority of states to the south
TUHP UTHP

of Russia; it is interesting to note, however, that the recent shifts in

Russia's relations with Iran and Iraq have probably weakened the
perceived necessity to rely on nuclear weapons. Still, some states could be
viewed as "candidates" for deterrence by nuclear weapons, e.g. Pakistan,
whose policy in Afghanistan and Central Asia is assessed in Russia as
unfriendly.

The disagreements within the Russian elite regarding nuclear weapons

rather closely mirror the debates in the United States in the end of 1960s--
early 1970s and in the 1980s between the proponents of mutual assured
destruction (MAD), war-fighting, and war-winning approaches9 with just
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one important exception: almost no one in Russia advocates a transition to

defense programs similar to SDI. A comparison of the current debate in
Russia to the 30-year old debate in the United States sheds additional light
on its substance and the views expressed by different sides. It could also
provide a better grasp on how various doctrines emerge. Some are likely
to relate to the nature of nuclear weapons, others to the conventional
balance, still others to specific weapons systems that provide new
capabilities.

To a large extent, the perceptions and the prescriptions regarding nuclear

weapons appear to be determined by two related variables. One is the
relationship with the United States and NATO, another is the prospect that
the United States might deploy an NMD system and yield the Russian
deterrent potential useless. These variables are related to the extent that the
latter could be viewed as part of a "devious plan" to dominate and
subjugate Russia. They differ to the extent that the NMD could be
conceptualized as an independent phenomenon: the United States does not
harbor hostile plans toward Russia, but, regardless of intentions, the
deployment of an NMD could undermine the hedge against future threats
that might unexpectedly emerge, for example, as a result of elections ten
or twenty years from now.

The "Minimalists:" Back to the Classic Age of Deterrence

HTU UTH

Broadly speaking, there are two loose, ill-defined groups. One could be
called the "minimalists"--those who perceive a limited role for nuclear
weapons and favor a relatively small arsenal. Another is the
"maximalists"--those who tend to assign a broad range of missions to
nuclear weapons and insist that Russia needs a large arsenal.

On the question of relations with the West, very few members of the
Russian political establishment continue to adhere to the 1992-style
positive view of these relations. But the end of the "honeymoon" conceals
two rather distinct interpretations of the events, past and future. Most
"minimalists" say that there are no fundamental differences between
Russia and the United States, but cooperation is difficult and sometimes
impossible because the United States simply does not want it. In their
view, the United States often substitutes cooperation with complete
acceptance of its position by Russia and tends to label any disagreement as
a return to the Soviet/imperial policy. Examples abound, from the early
disagreements on Bosnia to the continuing conflicts around NATO
enlargement and Iraq.

More specifically, there is growing dissatisfaction with the failure of the

United States to accommodate Russian complaints about START I
implementation.10 According to the Russian view, these problems could be
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solved, but the United States does not wish to; a narrower focus is on the
US Navy, which, some say, refuses to budge even where it is possible and
necessary. A more traditional area of concern is the ABM Treaty: the
American arguments in favor of a national missile defense are simply not
taken seriously by Russian experts. The agreements on demarcation of
tactical and strategic defenses signed in New York in the fall of 1997 were
met with wide-spread dissatisfaction as well: they are viewed as
insufficient since the United States can still interpret them to allow
development of TMD systems, which, in Russian eyes, have strategic
potential.11 Some Russian experts believe that a more restrictive
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agreement was possible, but the United States refused to accept it (of
course, many US experts will not agree, but it is significant that this
perception is widely spread in Russia).

Still, the situation is far from critical, and patience and diplomacy are seen
as the main policy tools. This line has been evident in the acceptance of
the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council "in exchange" for NATO
enlargement and in the maneuvers around Iraq in the fall of 1997 and in
the early 1998. Within this paradigm, nuclear weapons are important, but
are expected to back up policy rather than play an independent role. In
addition to a fundamental role as a security guarantee, they also guard
against uncertainties in the future: a real large-scale conflict with NATO
and/or deployment of a national missile defense by the United States.

These views produce the perception of a rather limited role for nuclear
weapons. In many respects, it is close to what Bernard Brodie wrote in
1946: The first and most vital step in any American security program for
the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in
case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind.12 The "minimalist"
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view of nuclear weapons is also in line with the views postulated in the
first Soviet official recognition of possession of nuclear weapons, in 1951:
the TASS statement declared that the purpose of Soviet nuclear weapons
was deterrence of nuclear war.13 The core of this view is the ability to
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retaliate in case of an attack--a nuclear attack in the "classic" formulation

or a large-scale conventional attack under a more recent policy.

A more liberal version of the "minimalist" view was expressed by Sergei

Kortunov: "The optimal version of Russia's nuclear strategy today is a
variant of non-aggressive, non-offensive and non-provocative (one could
even say 'friendly'), but also credible deterrence, which should be aimed
not only at the USA, but 'at all azimuths'--a Russian version of the classic
French, de Gaulle's doctrine of 'dissuasion' as opposed to the American
doctrine of 'deterrence' through the threat of annihilation.14 Although this HPTU UTHP

view enjoys some popularity, it is yet hardly feasible politically or even

bureaucratically: the military and politicians would still search for
"objective" criteria to determine "how much is enough," and these criteria
will inescapably be relative to the US nuclear arsenal, which is the largest
in the world. Still, this might represent the future of Russian thinking on
nuclear weapons if external and domestic conditions are right.

The dominant view of "minimalists" today does not boil down to simple
existential deterrence, in which the very presence of nuclear weapons
deters the other side. Rather, the core principle is that of assured second
strike capability, in line with McNamara's doctrinal innovations of the
1960s.15 Following McNamara, Russian experts and military planners
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attach considerable value to the ability to "ride out" the first strike and still
retain a second-strike capability. In this, they are closer to the views
expounded by Paul Nitze who said that even in the early days of the
nuclear era he and his associates believed that the quality of deterrence
depends upon one's ability to deal with the potential failure of deterrence.
The vital factor is that one's ability to deal with the contingency of
deterrence failing be understood by the other side.16 HPTU UTHP
The requirements outlined by Nitze are considerable. First, the number
and/or the survivability of nuclear weapons must be sufficient to ride out a
first strike by the other side. Second, the number and the quality of nuclear
weapons that survive the first strike of the other side must be sufficient for
it to believe that second-strike capability exists. Third, the surviving
weapons must match reasonably liberal estimates of unacceptable damage.
This calls for a rather large arsenal of deployed nuclear weapons, which,
in turn, presents the risk of a classic security dilemma: in pursuit of
second-strike capability "my" nuclear arsenal becomes so large that the
other side begins to worry about its second-strike capability.

Nitze, like many others, solved this dilemma by simply assuming that the
United States would never attack, so the Soviet Union did not have to
worry about the survivability of its deterrent force, it was only the US
headache. But, of course, the security dilemma would still emerge, and an
arms race would (and did) follow. Another solution is launch-on-warning,
whereby weapons do not have to ride out the first strike of the other side
because they are launched before the incoming warheads reach targets.

A way to avoid the security dilemma was proposed by the Scowcroft

commission in 1983: reduction of vulnerability of weapons, specifically
through the deployment of single-warhead mobile ICBMs--the route
which the Soviet Union was already taking and the United States planned
to take. In this way one can, theoretically, retain a second-strike capability
without inadvertently creating a first-strike capability. Apparently, this is
the favorite option of the Russian"minimalists."

Yet another solution is an NMD, but Russian experts and politicians

almost uniformly reject it on the grounds that a response in offensive
weapons would be cheaper and easier; thus mutual deterrence would be
reproduced at a higher level of arsenals. There is not consensus among the
"minimalists," however, on the proper response to a US NMD.

Even one of the experts of a conservative think tank, Spiritual Heritage

Foundation,17 concluded that under the most unfavorable circumstances
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(US first strike with 70-80 percent of Russian warheads lost and 50
percent effectiveness of the US ABM system) between 350 and 500
warheads would still reach US territory. The author also claimed that a 50
percent effective system would not be available until 2010-2015.

The official position stresses negotiations as the way to regulate and limit
the impact of defense systems. Recently, indications appeared that the
option of MIRVing of Topol-M with up to three warheads is kept open as
well. Vladimir Yakovlev, the SRF commander-in-chief, has openly
declared that Topol-M could be MIRVed if necessary as a hedge against a
US NMD.18 MIRVed ICBMs are considered the best means of
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overcoming defense because they can overwhelm it with warheads and
decoys. A simultaneous launch of a handful of MIRVed ICBMs is
obviously easier to coordinate than a simultaneous launch of several
hundred single-warhead ICBMs.19 Still, this is a far cry from the more
TUHP UTHP

conservative proposals discussed below.

The prescriptions of Russian "minimalists" do not necessarily match all

postulates of the "classic" deterrence theory, in particular the NSC-68
requirement of a sizable conventional force to supplement nuclear
deterrence, nor do they appear to fully account for the complex problems
of misperception, credibility, etc.20 A detailed discussion of these belongs
HPTU UTHP

elsewhere. It is sufficient to note that the threat of an East-West military

conflict is seen as low, and this helps to decrease many concerns that
otherwise could have emerged.

To summarize, the "minimalists" see nuclear weapons as an insurance

against a possible future threat, which will not necessarily materialize;
thus the insurance can be minimal. This insurance is not immediately
usable, like any insurance, and the size should be a reasonable
compromise between the need to guard against uncertainty and the risk of
buying an excessively expensive policy.

The "Maximalists:" Back to a War-Fighting Capability

HTU UTH

A considerable part of the Russian elite suspects, however, that more than
just the unwillingness to cooperate or high-handed American behavior is
at stake. Many think that the goals of the United States are outright anti-
Russian and that the threat to the country's survival is much more
imminent and requires a more robust military response.

The "maximalists" tend to conceptualize US policy toward Russia in terms

of Zbignew Brzezinski's writings.21 His idea is essentially about dividing
HPTU UTHP

Russia into several parts, of which the Western third should be integrated
into the "Atlanticist Europe," the Eastern third fall into China's sphere of
influence, while the middle would remain a "political black hole." This
proposal, predictably, infuriated the Russian political establishment, and
some suspect that Brzezinski simply made public the real goals of the
United States.22 If one adds to this the perception of threats from other
TUHP UTHP

"azimuths" such as China, Islamic countries, etc.,23 then the prescription HPTU UTHP

would be obvious: Russia needs a large nuclear force capable of

performing various missions, both strategic and theater-wide, to deter and
if necessary defeat almost any country or group of countries. Nuclear
weapons are supposed to have immediate value as a foreign policy tool
and be useful in a wide variety of global and local conflicts (after all,
within this world-view every local conflict is only part of a larger, global
US strategy aimed at eliminating Russia).
Same as with the "minimalists," the recommendations of this group
largely mirror relevant American theories. Consider, for example, the
warning Richard Perle gave after the collapse of the Berlin Wall but
before the collapse of the Soviet Union: it would be dangerous, he wrote,
to "disarm the West after the Cold War [and] ... run the risk that we might
yet again make Europe safe for the exertion of Soviet military power."24 TUHP UTHP

One only needs to replace the Soviet Union with the United States in that
quote and adjust for the geostrategic situation to arrive at a statement by
Sergei Glaziev, a prominent nationalist politician: [We need to] rethink
our foreign policy and defense doctrine, as well as the national security
doctrine. The thesis about the absence of enemies to Russia is obviously
wrong. ...[We need to] create necessary conditions for preservation and
development of strategic nuclear forces as a necessary and the most
important element of national security. ...[W]e should abstain from
ratification, implementation, and signing of treaties, which could reduce
the effectiveness of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, and particularly those
[treaties] that provide for unilateral concessions.25 HPTU UTHP

Much as some US theorists during the Cold War expected a first

disarming Soviet nuclear strike,26 these experts believe that the United
HPTU UTHP

States could strike first, or at least achieve a position where a successful

first strike would be possible. This concern is similar to that of the
American proponents of the infamous "bomber gap" and the "missile gap"
in the late 1950s27 -- that the United States would use its theoretical ability
HPTU UTHP

to defeat Russia in a nuclear war to chip away at its interests and

geopolitical positions. Nuclear inferiority would weaken Russia's ability to
resist because it would not be able to up the ante in an (inevitable?)
brinkmanship game. To avoid this gloomy scenario, they insist that
Russia's nuclear arsenal should be rather large (probably the same as or
larger than the START II limit of 3,500 warheads, and include a
significant number of MIRVed ICBMs).

MIRVed ICBMs are supposed to perform two functions. One is making a

US NMD incapable of defending against a Russian response--this mission
generally follows the logic of deterrence with the exceptions noted below.
The second function is to return to the situation of the 1980s, which made
possible greater versatility of scenarios of employment of nuclear weapons
beyond the straightforward second-strike option. This is essentially about
the ability to fight a nuclear war rather than simply threaten to "punish"
the aggressor. Or, as Brodie wrote in 1959 in a departure from his 1946
views, if deterrence fails we shall want enough forces to fight a total war
effectively.28
HPTU UTHP

The key difference between the "minimalists" and the "maximalists"

regarding the value of MIRVed ICBMs boils down to the following. The
former propose MIRVing only in response to a US NMD (and not all of
them think it necessary), the proposed scale of MIRVing is limited. The
latter consider MIRVing essential irrespective of the NMD, and when
(rather than if) it is deployed, the number of MIRVed ICBMs should be
increased even further. The scale of MIRVing is massive with or without
NMD and "heavy"--up to ten warheads per missile rather than up to three
for the "minimalists."

Two of the leading opponents of START II a deputy head of the

International Affairs Committee of the Duma Alexei Podberezkin and his
advisor Anton Surikov asserted: "Specialists think that in the case of
ratification of START II and especially if in five-six years Washington
would decide to annul the 1972 ABM Treaty, then in ten years Russia
would lose the ability to inflict guaranteed unacceptable damage to the
United States in a response strike.29 They argue that Russia should HPTU UTHP

transfer to its territory the production of heavy SS18 ICBMs (R-36M2 in

Soviet designation) and deploy 154 of those in the existing silos; in the
case the United States deploys an NMD, Russia should additionally
deploy 180 heavy ICBMs.30 In an earlier publication Anton SurikovHPTU UTHP

suggested that deploying up to seven warheads on Topol-M was possible

and advisable.31 HPTU UTHP

A crucial element in this system of views are tactical nuclear weapons,

which are expected to compensate for NATO's superiority in conventional
armed forces--superiority that will increase after the enlargement of
NATO. Tactical weapons should enable Russia to feel more self-assured
in local/regional conflicts and either help prevent or terminate them at
favorable conditions.32 During his tenure as a minister of defense, Igor
HPTU UTHP

Rodionov declared that in the view of NATO enlargement Russia "might

objectively face the task of increasing tactical nuclear weapons at [its]
borders.33 One of the most vocal proponents of greater reliance on TNF,
HPTU UTHP

Gen. Vladimir Belous (Ret.) proclaimed that "in contrast to strategic

weapons, whose central mission is 'deterrence' and, in the case it did not
succeed, 'punishment,' tactical weapons, even as they perform the function
of deterrence, could fulfill the mission of 'repulsing' aggression.34 In line HPTU UTHP

with NATO's Cold War-period rationalization, the "maximalists" suggest

that without tactical nuclear weapons Russia might have to choose
between defeat and an all-out war. The ability to prevail at the tactical
level is supposed to take care of this grim choice.

Overall, the perception of an imminent threat has created a host of (still

rather poorly developed) theories analogous to American doctrines of
limited nuclear strike, flexible response, limited war, escalation
dominance, etc.35 The purpose is to enable nuclear weapons to achieve a
HPTU UTHP

broad variety of missions when less than survival of the country is at

stake. To support these missions the strategic force should be capable of a
limited exchange, or a "demonstration" strike (similar to what Alexander
Haig proposed in the 1980s), or of deadlocking the strategic situation in
order to improve the chances of success at the substrategic level. Broad
missions also require a substantial tactical nuclear potential capable of
deterring NATO's conventional forces and dealing with other
contingencies (such as conflicts to the south of Russia).

The advocates of a more limited approach to nuclear weapons, the

"minimalists," display a rather ambiguous attitude toward tactical nuclear
weapons. They seem to avoid public statements on this subject and rarely
offer ideas on how exactly these weapons could be used. A mainstream
think tank, the Institute of Geopolitical and Military Forecasts (part of
IMEMO) cautiously suggested that "Russia needs a certain tactical nuclear
weapons potential as one of [the] guarantees of national security in the
case of possible radical changes in the European or Asian strategic scenes.
TNF could also be [a] somewhat useful36 addition in the case the balance
TUHP UTHP

in conventional armed forces is disrupted; they could be used primarily as

a political tool to prevent war."37 But they also said that the existing TNF
TUHP UTHP

arsenals were excessive and could be significantly reduced. Caution is

easy to explain by the domestic political situation in Russia, as well as its
uncertain international situation: the enlargement of NATO has
significantly increased the value of tactical nuclear weapons.

In a recent publication, Alexei Arbatov pointed at a fundamental

contradiction related to tactical nuclear weapons. On one hand, there is
widespread consensus that Russia needs them to balance NATO's
conventional superiority; on the other, the United States could destroy up
to 70 percent of Russian strategic weapons using only its tactical nuclear
and conventional weapons. A first strike using a combination of strategic
and tactical weapons, he said, would be 1.5-2 times more effective than
the one with only strategic weapons. Thus, Russia would do best if only it
had tactical nuclear weapons, but this is hardly possible.38HPTU UTHP

The brief description of the views espoused by the two groups, the
"minimalists" and the "maximalists," reveals that differences between
them relate to fundamental concepts of nuclear weapons and their role in
the international system. Regardless, there are certain trends common
both. They are situation-specific and are caused by shared concerns over
possible unfavorable developments in the international environment:
doubts still linger about US policy, particularly the prospect of
deployment of an NMD. Of course, the proposed responses radically
differ, but it seems significant that at least some concerns are shared and
the groups are apparently moving closer. It is not inconceivable that the
above-mentioned ambiguity in the minds of some experts and politicians
stems from this--for example, when the "minimalist" view of nuclear
weapons contradicts the "maximalist" assessment of the international
situation. The perceived weakness of the current Administration and the
influence of Congressional Republicans who advocate an NMD increases
the propensity to seek a hedge against unpleasant surprises.39 Unless the
HPTU UTHP

United States takes these concerns and uncertainties seriously, the still
slow drift of the Russian political establishment toward negative
expectations could become widespread.

In terms of START II, it is worth repeating that the treaty itself is of

relatively marginal concern and few actually like it. For the "minimalists,"
START II is consistent with their image of the future Russian nuclear
arsenal and, in addition, it helps somewhat constrain the US arsenal.
Though critical of many provisions of START II, they are willing to go
along with it. The "maximalists" oppose START II not simply because
they are concerned about its deficiencies, but primarily because it is
inconsistent with their preference for the future Russian arsenal.
Regardless, the "minimalists" might still abandon START II if they come
to the conclusion that a future US NMD system would deprive Russia of
its retaliatory capability.

References
HTU UTH

1. INF-Intermediate Nuclear Forces, i.e. the 1987 Treaty, which

eliminated land-based missiles with the range from 500 to 5,500 Ian;
START I-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the 1991 Treaty, which
reduced the strategic weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States to
6,000 accountable warheads (due to special accounting rules, the actual
number of warheads was higher for both sides); START II-the 1993
Treaty, which reduced the strategic weapons of Russia and the United
States to 3,500 warheads (the number of accountable and real warheads is
equal under the rules of that treaty). The INF Treaty has been
implemented, START I is being implemented now, START II has not
been ratified by Russia.

2. In the late September-early October, 1991 Presidents Bush and

Gorbachev made unilateral, more or less parallel statements with regard to
both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Both sides canceled one
ICBM program each, the Soviet Union promised to unilaterally reduce its
strategic forces under START I to 5,000 warheads, and-the most
significant part-both sides promised to significantly reduce their tactical
nuclear weapons by removing to central storage facilities or eliminating
warheads for all land- and sea-based tactical delivery systems and a
significant portion of warheads for air-based non-strategic delivery
systems. These statements also included other important steps.
3. For a comprehensive analysis of the prospects of START II ratification
see "Problemy Ratifikatsii Dogovora SNV-2 Na Vesennei Sessii 1998
goda v Gosudarstvennoi Dume" (The Problems of Ratification of the
START II Treaty during the Spring 1998 Session of the State Duma) in
Voprosy Bezopasnosti, Vol. 23, No. 3
FACT FINDING START III-

Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at DESBIC

DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR BASED

INTERNAL COMMAND
Modernization Of Strategic Nuclear Weapons In Russia:
The Emerging New Posture

THE DESBIC Institute for International Studies

AGENCY FACT FINDING FILES

The Context: In Search of a Predictive Paradigm

The analysis of the nuclear debate presented above has inherent limitations. First,
the proposed classification, albeit sufficiently accurate for the purposes of this
paper, overlooks many potentially significant differences between various experts
and organizations that have to be lumped together to achieve a semblance of
descriptive order. As noted above, the structure of the debate is not reducible to a
simple dichotomy of "good" and "bad," "hawks" and "doves," the proponents and
the opponents of START II. Second, the simple classification does not provide an
40
adequate picture of the dynamic of the debate. One needs "objective" criteria to
understand the preceding evolution and predict its future development: a simple
extrapolation of the last five-seven years might be wrong if the process is not linear.

Two variables stand out in the previous section: the perceived utility of nuclear
weapons and the perceived level of threat. The first refers to the extent that nuclear
weapons are expected to achieve "positive" goals: if nuclear weapons can only
threaten "punishment" (i.e. a reactive mission), their utility is assumed to be low,
but if they can help solve local conflicts or dissuade the United States from
interfering in the Caspian Sea basin, utility is coded as high. The level of threat is
more self-explanatory and its coding generally follows the lines in the previous
sections (from the West as a friend and ally to the West as an implacable foe bent on
eliminating Russia). Graphically, the current debate could be represented as a
function of these two variables in the following way:

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Picture 1

Picture 1

Of course, this diagram is only an approximation intended to convey the general

idea and the author's estimate of the situation; an accurate diagram would require a
survey (or, rather, a series of surveys) of the Russian political establishment. Still, it
does provide an idea of how the views are distributed across the spectrum. The
location of the views represented by the 1993 military doctrine (and, as is now clear,
the 1998 doctrine) serves as a point of reference for the rest of the field. The area in
the lower-left comer represents the "minimalists," while the upper-right comer is the
"maxima lists." Of course, the blank spaces are not necessarily empty: there are just
too few people whose positions fall there. There are areas of overlap, where
positions of individuals and institutions are difficult to distinguish in terms of the
two proposed variables, but prescriptions could still differ as a result of affiliation,
sources of funding, personal predispositions, etc.

Arrows show the trends of change in the distribution of views over the last seven-
ten years. An analysis of publications and interviews suggests that in the late 1980s--
early 1990s the distribution was even less even than today. There were three poles

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located approximately on one line from the lower-left to the upper-right comer. One
proceeded from very low utility of nuclear weapons and very low external threat;
this position boiled down to existential deterrence, the assumption that even a few
nuclear weapons could prevent an all-out war. The other pole united what could be
termed unreformed Cold War warriors, who stressed unilateralism and reliance on
almost unrestricted nuclear arms buildup. The third, in the middle, were the
"classic" Soviet moderate proponents of arms control, who were behind the INF and
START I Treaties. They preferred reductions as a way to optimize the nuclear
arsenal, regulate arms modernization and deployment, but still remained on the side
of rather large stockpiles of weapons.

Since then, the number of proponents of absolutely minimal, existential deterrence

has significantly dwindled. Apparently, the biggest change was caused not by a
greater belief in the utility of nuclear weapons but rather by disenchantment with the
United States, which is often expressed by a popular phrase, "the end of the
honeymoon." Probably, the perceived utility of nuclear weapons has increased as
well, at least among some erstwhile liberals, primarily as a result of a perceived
need for a more credible and robust second strike capability.

The differences between the early 1990s "idealists" and today's "minimalists" boil
down to the following: (a) larger estimated minimally sufficient arsenal, (b) lower
propensity to make concessions at arms control negotiations, and (c) greater
propensity to hedge against possible unpleasant surprises. The first two points
simply represent formal attributes of nuclear balance, first and foremost the
maintenance of a credible second-strike capability: the current views demand high
probability of delivering a significant number of warheads in response to an attack,
more or less along McNamara's criteria. The third component is primarily political:
even rather liberal experts and politicians are no longer optimistic about relations
with the United States.

The evolution of the Cold War warriors depicted in the diagram is not intended to
suggest that they have necessarily moderated their views, although some might
have. Rather, over time their views have become more diverse and now occupy a
larger area. One only has to compare intense, focused criticism of START II in
1992-93 with the proposals advanced today. The limited moderation was a
consequence of a clearer understanding of the economic constraints on Russia's
ability to modernize and build up its nuclear weapons, and recognition that the
dissolution of the Soviet Union is permanent.

The evolution of the former centrists, which have now become largely extinct, is

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particularly interesting. It is well known but rarely recognized that a very large part
of the Soviet political-military establishment in the mid-1980s favored reduction of
nuclear weapons. For a variety of reasons (personal convictions, institutional
interests political expediency) their positions were far from radical. The actual
process of arms reductions split this group apart. Some continued the evolution and
joined the ranks of a more liberal "minimalist" group. The growing disenchantment
of others in the arms reduction process in the late 1980s led them to more hard-line
positions.

To a large extent, the evolution of the centrists was caused by the loss of
conventional superiority or at least parity with NATO. It was easy to consider deep
reduction of nuclear weapons while the Soviet Union possessed sufficient
conventional armed forces to support a broad variety of missions. Today, the choice
of military instruments is so limited that some centrists no longer consider nuclear
arms reduction feasible. Subsequent evolution of the debate is likely to depend on
the changing perception of threat. It is formed by many different developments, not
necessarily limited to military power. Almost anything can affect the perception of
threat: economic sanctions, further enlargement of NATO, Caspian oil pipelines, a
new crisis around Iraq, etc. Such events are also subject to interpretation: some will
treat them as evidence of growing threat, while others will tend to discount their
significance.

In the meantime, the perception of the utility of nuclear weapons is likely to change
more slowly since there are fewer reasons to reevaluate the currently held views.
After all, people will be dealing with the same amount of information and the same
tools for interpreting it. As a result, in the near future polarization is likely to stay
and perhaps even increase. The existing groups will consolidate around two
different assessments of the level of threat; each group will stretch vertically.

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Picture 2

Picture 2

From this line of reasoning it follows that for some time a rather contradictory
combination of views might become possible: either perception of immediate threat
coupled with perception of low utility of nuclear weapons or, alternatively,
perception of low threat coupled with high utility of nuclear weapons. Without
doubt, such mixed views will be internally contradictory and will not remain stable
for long, making further evolution likely.

By definition, long-term evolution is difficult to predict. Several options seem

possible. First, the Russian elite might develop some sort of consensus on their
perception of US policy. Recent trends indicate that a mainstream, "hard-headed"
position is already emerging, approximately around the views espoused by the
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. In addition, the growing marginalization of
military and political aspects of US-Russian relations could stimulate the emergence
of a centrist position as well: the increasingly influential business groups tend to
judge these relations by the degree to which they are conducive to business, not by
geopolitical schemes. If business is reasonably successful, then geopolitics and

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ideology will be more or less suppressed. In both cases the groups depicted in the
diagram will tend to concentrate around one pole.

Second, if military reform is successful, Russia will come to rely somewhat less on
nuclear weapons; accordingly their perceived utility will decrease. This will be a
necessarily lengthy process since it involves restructuring, reductions, replacement
and education of personnel, modernization of weapons, etc. All of this has to be
done under severe financial constraints. Furthermore, in all likelihood the military
reform, regardless of its success will not affect policyrnaking until there is some sort
of a "small successful war" (like the US operation in Grenada) to visibly
demonstrate that conventional forces could be relied upon for a certain category of
contingencies. The second option will help consolidate the elite. If the perception of
threat remains constant, there will be two poles gravitating toward the lower left and
the upper right corners. If consensus on US-Russian relations emerges, then one
pole will emerge. Under any scenario, successful military reform is likely to benefit
the "minimalists" more.

Yet another option is continued uncertainty: the distribution of views could remain
frozen for a long time and experience only slow consolidation. The most likely
result is still the emergence of two opposite poles in the lower left and upper right
comers.

Much in the evolution of the debate will depend on economic and political
stabilization in Russia. If optimistic forecasts come true, Russia will become more
self-confident and its global positions will improve, in particular in such sensitive
areas as relations with other new independent states of the former Soviet Union and
with Europe. After all, many problems are caused by inadequate competitiveness in
international markets, the inability to offer credits (as a rule, export of high-tech
products often depends on the ability of the exporting country to offer cheap credits
to finance purchases), and the low attraction of Russia's domestic market. An
improvement of these three parameters will reduce the sense of dependency and
help reduce the perceived external threat.

The United States could do much to shape the development of the debate on nuclear
weapons in Russia, even without sacrificing any major policy goals. For example,
the US Government could make it clear that the views of Zbignew Brzezinski do
not represent official policy. More active pursuit of integration within the NATO-
Russia Permanent Joint Council could also yield significant results. More cautious
policy in the Caspian Sea region would help as well, especially if it is "packaged" in
terms friendly to Russia and sensitive to Russian concerns (e.g., it would be

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advisable to avoid proclaiming the region an area of vital US interests, since such
declarations are invariably interpreted as hostile). These are only illustrations, of
course, since a detailed analysis of possible steps is beyond the scope of this paper.

The Views of the Military Leadership

The current debate has two unique characteristics. One is a curious detachment of
the government (meaning first of all the Administration of the President, including
the Security Council and the recently deceased Defense Council) and the military
leadership from the public debate. Little is said on the matters, which are heatedly
discussed by the elite; the process of modernization, reduction and reshaping the
arsenal proceeds on its own.

The second characteristic is that the uniformed military is actually playing the
"doves:" they support START II and oppose plans for large-scale MIRVing of
ICBMs. Only rarely does one see sudden outbursts of emotion, such as Vladimir
41
Dvorkin's recent response to an article by Podberezkin and Surikov. The military
have not turned into proponents of total and complete nuclear disarmament, but they
certainly do not seem to support extreme proposals for a nuclear arms race.

The result is rather unusual. While the political elite appears to move to the right
and increasingly embrace the idea of a large, MIRVed nuclear arsenal (funding, of
course, is not available, but the attitudes are almost ripe for that), the military's
ambitions are more modest. They are more or less comfortable with START II and
are very serious about START III, which is certain to confirm a ban on MIRVed
ICBMs and will further reduce the Russian force.

Since the government's policy on nuclear weapons is relatively independent from

the broader political context, it requires a separate, independent inquiry. This section
will attempt to reconstruct the rationales for this policy; a review of the actual
modernization programs in the next section will serve as an additional test for the
hypotheses about the "real" Russian nuclear doctrine. The detachment, however, is
clearly temporary and cannot hold forever. The big question is whether the military
would eventually embrace the increasingly popular conservative views or whether
the political elite will reconcile itself with the more moderate views of the military.
But at the moment the public debate and the official views have to be analyzed
separately, even while both are important ingredients of a study that attempts to
predict the evolution of the Russian strategic arsenal and doctrine.

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It would be easy to explain away the military's moderate position as simply an

honest recognition of economic constraints. After ten years of ever-deepening
economic crisis, Russia can ill afford the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the Soviet
Union. Indeed, one of the key arguments in favor of the START II Treaty is that
deep reductions are the only way to keep the imbalance with the United States
within tolerable limits. With or without START II it will have to reduce its nuclear
arsenal to 2,000 warheads at best (START II counting rules). If START II is
42
ratified, then the US will be at the 3,500 level, if not--at 7,000-8,000.

For that reason, Russia kept insisting that the United States agrees to negotiate and
preferably sign START III even before START II is ratified, so that the Russian
parliament could consider both treaties simultaneously or at least had a clearer
picture of the future balance. In the spring of 1997, at the Helsinki summit, the
United States made a partial concession by agreeing to establish the overall limit of
warheads for START III at the level preferred by Russia. Consultations on the new
treaty have begun, and since September 1997 have been very active, but are unlikely
to result in a treaty or even assume formal character until START II is ratified.

It remains uncertain, however, whether the United States will actually pursue
START III if START II is ratified, or if it will just mark time and put Russia into an
awkward position by codifying its inferiority. Theoretically, the talks could continue
forever, keeping the United States at the START II level of 3,500, while Russia
stays at a much lower level (below 2,000 warheads) in anticipation of a new treaty.
To some extent, this uncertainly clouds the START II ratification process.

Economic constraints are hardly the only variable to affect the position of the
military. There is a widespread certainty that the United States will significantly
reduce its strategic weapons regardless of whether START II is ratified; if this logic
is correct, then Russia could MIRV its ICBMs, but the imbalance might still remain
within tolerable limits. After all, if there is no START III, then Russia will have
1,500 to 2,000 warheads compared to 3,500 on the US side; if there is no START II,
then Russia can have 3,000 to 3,500 warheads (calculation is approximate) to
something like 3,500 to 4,500 warheads on the US side. But in the latter case Russia
would have MIRVed ICBMs, which are considered a better response to an NMD
system.

This means that support of START II is a conscious decision of the military and
their policy reflects long-term planning and certain doctrinal innovations.
Apparently, this policy is connected first and foremost with the former commander-
in-chief of the SRF Igor Sergeev, who was appointed the minister of defense in

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1997.

Since his appointment as the SRF commander-in-chief in 1992, Sergeev has become
a veritable "nuclear czar," who determines not only the policies of the SRF, but to a
large extent the relevant aspects of the policies of the Navy and the Air Force. His
close ally is the director of the 4th Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense (the
SRF institute) Vladimir Dvorkin.

In what was a unique experience for Russia, Sergeev became the SRF commander
as a result of genuine competition, after a special commission interviewed several
candidates for the position. Reportedly, the commission was swayed by his response
to the question about the impact of a US strategic defense system. Other candidates
proposed large-scale MIRVing of ICBMs and abandonment of START II and even
START I (in 1992, to some this still seemed feasible), but Sergeev advocated a
"qualitative" response, in particular based on enhanced ability of single-warhead
ICBMs to penetrate the defense. Sergeev also advocated a faster transition toward a
pure second-strike posture to replace the "vstrechno-otvetnyi udar" (launch under
attack) strategy.

Subsequent modernization and reduction activities followed Sergeev's initial

statement without deviation. It is significant that he has not even once proposed a
different course of action (e.g., reject START III, consider MIRVing, etc.), which
leads one to conclude that fiscal constraints are not the only motivation behind his
behavior. Only recently, as mentioned above, the new SRF commander-in-chief
suggested that MIRVing Topol-M was possible, but even then he did not declare it a
top priority option.

From the point of view of the military, nuclear weapons will remain the core
element in Russia's security. There exists an obvious relationship between the role
of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and Russia's economic potential and its
(insufficient) involvement in international security regimes, on the other. Economic
weakness means, among other things, weak conventional forces and fewer
instruments of influencing international politics. Underdeveloped security regimes
mean that Russia lacks effective means of presenting and defending its interests
through international institutions, economic and political vulnerability, and reliance
on raw power to a greater extent than would have been otherwise necessary.

For the government, nuclear weapons are apparently even more valuable, in a sense.
Their impact on Russian domestic and foreign policy has been counterintuitive.
They have played a positive role and are likely to continue playing it in the

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foreseeable future. Their presence has helped to alleviate concerns about the
security environment during the difficult transition period. Nuclear weapons
probably played a critical role in the (so far) successful transition toward democracy
and a market economy: without them, the (perceived) reduction of security could
have provoked an arms buildup, requiring concentration of resources and political
power, i.e. restoration of an authoritarian regime. But proponents of reforms could
always invoke nuclear weapons and claim that security was assured, that armed
forces could be reduced and the defense budget cut down--even below the
reasonable level. In a sense, the ongoing modernization of nuclear weapons is an
inevitable "price" for reforms. Apparently, one can hardly exist without the other.

Taken together, Russian strategic weapons modernization programs fall rather

neatly into a certain well-structured and logical framework. The force will be
smaller, but will consist of relatively invulnerable weapons systems. The posture is
likely to be oriented toward the second-strike strategy meaning that it will be able to
"ride out" the first strike of any nuclear power, including the United States, and still
be able to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation.

A particularly advantageous feature of the Russian arsenal will be congruence

between the low overall level and low concentration of warheads on delivery
vehicles, which will help to increase survivability. As a result, the arsenal will be
almost perfect for low levels of nuclear weapons and will fit any probable arms
control scheme, whether bilateral with the United States or multilateral, with
participation of other nuclear-weapons states.

Funding is the only element missing today from the overall picture. After economic
growth resumes (and a period of protracted economic growth might begin as early
as this year), the current modernization effort will reacquire common sense: the
economically developing Russia will ultimately cease to be the Upper Volta with
nuclear weapons, to quote Margaret Thatcher, and then nuclear weapons will look
"natural."

Modernization also fits the strategy developed by the former first deputy minister of
defense Andrei Kokoshin (who has been promoted since to the secretary of the
Security Council). According to Kokoshin, the period of scarcity should be devoted
to research and development, with acquisition postponed until approximately 2005.
The number of types of weapons (including nuclear) should be reduced. Until 2005,
weapons producing plants should be allocated the absolute minimum of contracts,
just enough to enable them to survive; plants that are no longer needed to support
the reduced armed forces and the relatively fewer types of equipment should be

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43
closed or converted.

In hindsight, it is an ultimate irony that economic and political hardships have

probably rendered Russian strategic weapons a service, after all. Russia skipped one
or two stages in the modernization plans originally projected by the Soviet Union
and, under reasonably favorable economic conditions, by the year 2010 it will have
a rather small, fully optimized arsenal, which will consist almost exclusively of the
most modern weapons (the word modern applies to delivery vehicles only; the
CTBT will limit modernization of warheads).

Modernization programs display a decisive turn toward putting quality of delivery

vehicles above quantity and survivable second-strike potential above war-fighting
capability. The new weapons will have the following characteristics:

low concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles: ICBMs are single-

warhead and new submarines are likely to carry only 48 warheads each (more
on that in the next section);
mobility or other means to ensure survivability: a significant share of ICBMs
will be mobile, the rest will be based in hardened silos; submarines on patrol
are highly invulnerable by definition;
improved accuracy, which includes air-launched cruise missiles; and
increased ability to penetrate defense systems.

All these characteristics, with the exception of improved accuracy, meet the
traditional requirements of a second strike posture. Accuracy is usually considered a
property of war fighting, since the so-called countervalue strike (the threat of
punishment through elimination of cities) does not require high accuracy.
Improved accuracy is likely to be a by-product of general improvement of all
characteristics of delivery vehicles, however, and apparently cannot be construed to
mean that Russia is preparing for more than a pure second strike: this would have
44
required greater numbers and/or heavily MIRVed ICBMs.

Close attention to qualitative characteristics suggests that the military leadership is

not content with simple "existential deterrence," which could be achieved by
relatively low quantities of any weapons systems and would have required
maintenance of the existing types instead of creation of new ones. The goal is,
rather, to maintain a robust reliable second-strike arsenal capable of delivering a
rather large number of warheads under the worst (or realistically bad)
circumstances. The realistically bad circumstances probably include a first US strike

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and the ability to "ride it out." In any event, this interpretation comfortably explains
the absolute majority of data on modernization programs.

In one of the very few public statements on the subject, the first deputy minister of
defense Nikolai Mikhailov (he replaced Kokoshin after the latter moved to the
Defense and then the Security Council) stated that deterrence should be ensured not
by the quantity of warheads but by guaranteed delivery of warheads to the territory
of the aggressor: At the forefront here are the qualitative factors, rather than
quantitative ones. The goal of the defense ministry, according to Mikhailov, is to
retain a reliable deterrent while simultaneously reducing the number of both
delivery vehicles and warheads. This would require, among other things, a new
technological level of delivery vehicles and warheads, as well as of information,
45
command and control systems. Dvorkin, in the above-mentioned letter, confirmed
46
that the military leadership did not consider it wise to retain old-type MIRVed
ICBMs (as Podberezkin and Surikov proposed) simply because their 1970s
technology was hopelessly outdated.

The attention to the qualitative parameters has a number of positive implications for
the strategic balance and arms control. First of all, the requirements of numerical
parity could be further relaxed. Exact parity has never been achievable, nor vital. It
was, to a large extent, a political requirement, while in strictly military terms it was,
47
as one analyst put it, the roughest indicator of the strategic balance. The stability
of the balance always depended on qualitative characteristics of weapons systems.
The purposeful creation of a reliable second-strike capability, which stresses
survivability, makes parity even less relevant. Russia will be truly able to abandon it
(of course, if the domestic political scene permits it) and feel reasonably
comfortable under a quite significant disparity. Of course, numbers will continue to
matter--no one suggests they will not--but less than ever before.

Second, a combination of survivability and penetrability eases the impact of

national missile defense. Survivability means that more delivery vehicles will
survive the first strike to be used in retaliation, and penetrability means that more of
those will be able to deliver warheads. As a result, the pressure to counter NMD
deployment with additional deployment of offensive weapons and MIRVing would
decrease. As in the previous case, the NMD problem will not disappear completely:
at a certain level of offensive arms and certain effectiveness of defense it will
reemerge, but the elasticity of the balance will increase, and the ABM Treaty,
including the issue of ABM demarcation, will not be as serious an impediment to
nuclear arms reduction as in the past.

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Still, major uncertainties and unsolved problems will exist even when the transition
to the new posture has been completed. First, it is unclear if the second strike
capability will continue to exist under the combined impact of numerical imbalance
and an NMD system. The positive implications described above treated the two
separately; taken together, they might substantially affect the calculations. It is
likely that this uncertainty was behind the statement of the current SRF commander-
in-chief Yakovlev about the possibility of MIRVing Topol-M.

Second, even a very reliable second strike capability might not be enough to ensure
security. At least, under the NSC-68 criteria further elaborated in the subsequent
decades (and still to a large extent guiding the thinking on nuclear weapons),
reliable nuclear deterrence requires the maintenance of strong conventional
deterrence in parallel. Thus, the current approach of the Russian military, i.e.
reliance on nuclear weapons as the main provider of security, is a rather big gamble.
After all, nuclear weapons are a means of last resort, and if confronted with a choice
between a relatively limited concession and the use of nuclear weapons, Russia
might choose the first.

Tactical nuclear weapons are supposed to compensate for that problem, but they are
still nuclear weapons and carry with them all the associated limitations. The self-
imposed restrictions on who could be targeted with nuclear weapons (the negative
guarantees, which were confirmed in the military doctrine) exacerbate the problem
further: since Russia cannot threaten certain categories of states with nuclear
weapons, nuclear deterrence works only weakly against the rest.

Let us consider, as an example, the so-called Southern Flank, the states to the south
of Russia. Only Turkey in that region falls under the first use provision, since it is
formally allied with a nuclear power, the United States. All others are formally non-
nuclear, and the use of nuclear weapons cannot be convincingly invoked. Even
Pakistan, which is widely assumed to have nuclear weapons and is viewed as
generally unfriendly to Russia (primarily because of its role in Afghanistan and the
support of the Taliban movement) presents problems because threatening the use of
nuclear weapons against Pakistan would amount to recognition of its nuclear status.
Without doubt, the specter of the use of nuclear weapons is still present regardless
of anything, but its credibility and thus the utility of threat should be judged as low.

The same problems apply to Europe, the region which seems to have become the
focal point of worries for Russian strategic planners. Armed conflicts there seem
infeasible today, but if they emerge (e.g., as a result of an attempt to challenge the

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existing borders), Russia would still face a choice between the use of nuclear
weapons over a relatively small issue and surrendering its position. Again, the
credibility of the threat should be judged as low.

Of course, it is possible that vagueness is intentional and should help to contain any,
no matter how limited, military clash or provocation. After all, if there exists even a
miniscule chance of escalation to the nuclear level, no NATO country would think
about challenging Russia; at least this follows from a Schelling-like analysis which
is popular in Russia. Still, these calculations are rather shaky, and the probability of
48
benefits and harm appears equal.

These problems point at an important conclusion: the current degree of reliance on

nuclear weapons is temporary. They cannot fully substitute for modernization of
conventional armed forces. This area lies outside the purview of this paper, and it is
sufficient to note that the same logic is likely to be applied to strategic weapons.
This means putting quality above quantity: the troops will be better suited for the
types of conflicts that are anticipated as most likely, conventional weapons will be
49
"smarter," etc. In other words, a return to the Soviet-type army is hardly possible.

Comprehensive military reform will take a long time. So far, one can guess only the
broad contours. The outline of the future strategic posture is, in contrast, more or
less clear. The modernization programs, taken together with the reduction of
weapons and the position at arms control negotiations, suggest that the goal is close
to what in the 1980s was often called "defensive defense"--a posture defined by a
fine balance between the ability to defend and inability to attack. At the same time,
the likely direction of further development is hardly toward "existential deterrence:"
the current plans stress reliable second-strike capability measured in probably two
or three hundred warheads. Still, even that arsenal will not be suitable for a first
strike, and in this sense will conform to "defensive defense." It will also provide
significant (but not unlimited) flexibility in terms of numerical imbalance and
resistance to the impact of a large-scale defense system.

Whether these plans will be implemented remains to be seen. As noted above, there
are major uncertainties directly related to the planned posture and the level of
credibility of nuclear retaliation. There are also significant domestic constraints,
which might affect the preferences of the military. Finally, there is a larger
international context to keep in mind, in particular the perception of external threat,
which could emerge from economic and political conflicts rather than from the more
traditional military challenges.

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In spite of major conceptual uncertainties, Russia is definitely bent on keeping its

nuclear weapons and even modernizing them. This is natural: historically, nuclear
weapons appeared first and only then the conceptual basis for them was invented to
50
suit the already existing systems. The practical impact of these conceptual
uncertainties is that in the absence of a clearly defined role, the benchmark for
nuclear planning remains the US-Russian nuclear balance. The fact that these two
countries have the largest arsenals appears to be only a superfluous reason, a
convenient habitual way to rationalize certain established methods of planning.
Deep under it hides what is probably the real rationale--the absence of a widely
accepted hypothesis about the missions of nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War
world.

References
40. For the purposes of this paper, "objective" means exogenous criteria, i.e. not
derived from the phenomenon under inquiry. It would be pointless to take position
on START II or MIRVing as such criteria, since these issues are an integral part of
the debate and could change over time: if START II is ratified, the debate would not
stop nor would it stop if Russia returns to MIRVed ICBMs. In either case new
issues would come to the fore. In this sense START II and MIRVing are the
endogenous criteria and cannot serve as a basis for a predictive framework. An
example of endogenous criteria is Jack Snyder's treatment of interest groups' impact
on foreign policy (Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press,
1992)). In each country case, Snyder found groups, which influenced foreign policy,
but each time the type of groups was different: economy-based, ideology-based,
social stratum-based, etc. Apparently, he needed criteria not directly related to the
cases under consideration, for example, derived from the social structure of any
society (economy-based interest groups) or of a particular type of societies
(totalitarian, democratic, etc.). This would make a comparison across cases more
rigorous.

41. Vladimir Dvorkin, "O Polze Diskussii po Povodu Dogovora SNV-2" (On the
Benefits of Debates over the START II Treaty), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 27,
1998, p. 7.

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IDF Treaty Series The State of Non-Proliferation # 51305

IDF Treaty Series State of Non-Proliferation

DESBIC AGENDA START- III +
Treaty Between the United States of America, the Nuclear Powers, and the Russian Federation On
Strategic Offensive Reductions

DESBIC Agency Bureau of Arms Control

May 13, 2005 Israeli Intelligence Report # 51305 (AMENDED)

TABLE OF CONTENTS THE SORT COMPACT

Documents Submitted to Congress

1. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions
2. Letter of Transmittal
3. Letter of Submittal
4. Article-by-Article Analysis of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions

STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL ATTRIBUTION

Documents Pertaining To U N and NATO Strategic Offensive Reductions

Considered Subject To an 33% Aspect to Ratio 5 year Reduction Rate Scale of De-limitations

U N, NATO and The Nuclear Powers are to Furnish an Contingency Statement Based Upon:

Verifiable Means, conclusion and compliancy, respective to the START II, III Convention set forth
for 31 December 2,007, whereby a full Accounting of accumulative devices and WMD s of any said
deliverable deployablity may be formally addressed, advised, and called attention to hereinafter. All
sales oriented joint strike, or naval flotilla construction of armament is subject to U N Membership
approval. All Aircraft carriers and battle ship and escort cruisers destroyers and their manufacturers
emphasis are to be recalled, and existing fleets are expected to become retrofitted as not to hasten the
arrival of an out of control combatative competitive state of un necessary militancys for a device.

The said International Statements of Attribution are an integral part of the Treaty terms thereof.
The said descriptive accountings of the Nuclear Powers are to be counted and be seen every five
years, by, for and by the United States, Russia, Israel, and the United Nations Generals Secretarys
quarter upon demand or by formal request within 66 hours of a formal demand. The Four Leadership
positions of rank and file have say over what may remain to be seen as tolerable ordnance or whats to
dispose of or silently erase from strategic stockpiles herein under to this entry.

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------------DONE the Twelth of May, 2,005_in H B. Calif. 92649 U S A----------------

Moscow Treaty Supporting Documents

5. Joint Statement by U.S. President George W. Bush and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V.
Putin on Upcoming Consultations on Strategic Issues (Genoa Statement), July 22, 2001
6. Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on a New Relationship
Between the United States and Russia, November 13, 2001
7. Press Conference by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, The East Room, November
13, 2001
8. Speech by RF President V.V. Putin in Response to Questions by Journalists at the Joint Press
Conference with U.S. President George Bush, November 13, 2001
9. Speech of Russian Federation President V. V. Putin to Representatives of the American Public and
U.S. Politicians, November 13, 2001, Russian Embassy in Washington
10. Text of Diplomatic Notes Sent to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on U.S. Withdrawal from
the ABM Treaty, December 13, 2001
11. A Statement Made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 13, 2001, Regarding the
Decision of the Administration of the United States of America to Withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile
Treaty of 1972
12. Response to Russian Statement on U.S. ABM Treaty Withdrawal, December 13, 2001
13. Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, May 24, 2002
14. Fact Sheet on the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, June 5, 2002
15. Statement by the Russian MFA on the Legal Status of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and
the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II),
June 14, 2002

(SORT) STATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS TREATY

TEXT OF TREATY

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, and All Insignias to an Marquis
Including the United Nations Organization and Memberships of NATO Unified Alliances
hereinafter shall be referred to as the Parties,

Embarking upon the path of new relations for a new century and committed to the goal of
strengthening their relationship through cooperation and friendship,

Believing that new global challenges and threats require a continuous and balanced expansion
to create uniform provisions to settle any international disputes to further the collective
efforts of governments toward these ends for strategic relations between the Parties,

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IDF Treaty Series The State of Non-Proliferation # 51305

Desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of capital resources,

alternative fuel utilities, mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, expect and
predictability,

Commit to implementing significant reductions in weapons of mass destruction (WMD s) and

strategic offensive arms thereto,

Proceeding from the premise of a Faith wherefore; and also the Joint Statements by the
President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on
Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship between the United
States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington,

Mindful of their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialists Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treatys START I

Respective to the entry into force under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and

Convinced that the purpose of the START Treaty Series will help to establish more favorable
conditions for actively promoting security, cooperation, and enhancing international stability,

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS;

Article I

Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by vested authorities of
the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001, and as stated by the
President of the Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001
respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of highest yielding
frequency devices, ICBM missiles respective of heaviest throw weight, of that order, and
warheads and launchers, multiple independently target able re-entry vehicles, or (MIRVs),
missiles and their launchers; to that of which such WMD s, Missiles, warheads, and variant
launchers shall not exceed 1700-2200 for all aforementioned categories such as the U S and
Russia and her former Unionist Republics.

Each Party to an Ensign do solemnly swear to protect, preserve, defend and bear true Faith,
consistent with the purpose of a formal Declaration for a stronger flag and a higher mass and
an United Nations for utopian order thereto herein wherefore.

Having considered the views expressed the same total aggregate numerical integers will
apply to all the Nuclear Powers collectively, to that of which shall not exceed 33% of the
combinative categorically identified status quo standards. In order to make fuller contribution

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to their common military grade resonance as set forth above with all due regard for
reciprocity; all Partys to a State in accordance with this Chapters design apertures are
considered obligated to conform to the standard maximum 33 % combinative total levels of
compliancy hereof.

Should any relevant questions be put to the witnesses and violate the conditions the general
principles of Law recognized by civilized nations, the Partys to a citation, shall contribute
toward the expenses of the Depositary Trust Foundation an penalty assessment made payable
to a United Nations Organization underwritten by all who come to serve.

Within the aggregate numbers provided for and time to time make payable to the Ministry of
Defence, the State of Israel of a Faith there bouts whereby a Ministry of Defense and a
Politburo, and a U S Joint Chiefs Chair has a say even in the event of conducting military
activities for the purpose of promoting disarmament and biologically sensitive research and
development which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world
whereas.

Article II

The Parties agree that the START Treaty Series remains in force in accordance with its
generally accepted terms.

Article III The Statute for the Army Corps of Engineers On Site Agencys US UN

It is strongly urged to model the Organizations Bureau similarly nearways to the:

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY Except

for the said cause of safe preconditions rancor set forth to allow proliferation of nuclear
explosive charges and resonances; when safe support becomes a thief in the night there as
wherein will try forasmuch as follows:

1. For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall institute the DESBIC
International Bureau of Nuclear Non-proliferation. The International Organization shall be
composed of 16 or so global, mile square said heavier duty Industrial utility
complexes.

2.Each complex shall be manned by 500 employees in the various services that necessitate
the application for transportation, processing, reprocessing, storage containment, temporary
storage, and stationary housing units as 24- 7- 365 round the clock efficiency.

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3. Pursuant to the foregoing grant of rights the U S Army Corps of engineers shall Head the
mission. To assure viability, if and when a Partys to a State have not provided an syndicated
engineering station then the application or an interpretation of financial indemnification is
initialized by U S supported financing at the interim. Each Party to an Ensign agreed to
repatriate the Party to which specific loan indemnification is administered and shall be
considered bonded by an liability obligation loan and consultancy contract to be repaid at 50
% or less interest rates to that of which is considered standard and current market value of
exchange rates. In the event of a dispute over remuneration of funding the Group 4 shall have
a final say over the matter.

4. In carrying out the foregoing responsibilities mile square park industrial enclaves should
be expected to support various scientific and engineering services and reasonably large scale
loading and unloading; treatment with say perhaps upwards of up to 30 or more docking
stations, decontamination stations; exspent fuel rod cold storage recesses; thereabouts the full
scope of On Site Inspection supplies and amenities to facilitate the various services of
exchange and scientific occupancy as shall be maintained and given priority defense status
quo in a time of peace, and shall qualify to all Nations, States, or independent leftist novelty
implacable opposition or defectors, as the common standard of denominate theory agenda
hereinafter.

5. The U S On Site Inspection Agency is to be revitalized to an army of many thousand as

would be the exchange accommodations necessary to undertake a ridged and unyielding
approach to the nuclear military grade explosives whereabouts and to make available to the
Corp of Engineers those said accompaniments.

6. Having considered the views expressed on various subjects pertaining to a fast time shot to
the Martian subsoil landings for answers toward a budgetary assimilation or allocation to
upward of 12 billion dollars biannually thereabouts hereon, of the 16 locations worldwide the
International Atomic Energy Agency shall be instructed of a new peaceful policy projection
toward the incineration of oxygen molecules for a purpose of employability under the guns of
numerous sentry exchanges for hires thereon. Starting salarys, depending on experience vary
and are to be taken up with the United Nations ombudsman for human resources and shall
more than likely be based on the aspect to ratio rate of exchange respective to the domicile of
the IAEA employee status quotient to that of the expectancy rate, which shall be recognized
and defined asUnited Nations dollars therefore.

7. US Army minimum danger pay included will be around 4,000$ a month, the dutys vary in
scope and nature and are considered very dangerous in some areas of the world as to reassign
and sub contract the IAEA for the US Army Chief of Staff Department of Corps of

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Engineers. Mission priorities are to provide hospitable accommodations for numerous

Russian counterparts who shall be permitted ever so closely now to share the same multi
protractile assignments as such is recommended of the Israeli Garrisons in industrial
counterbalance closeness in-factus to observe and in so doing share accompaniments, postal
resources, general store provisions, sundries, restrooms, mess halls, recreational accessories
and visa versa as provided for in this Chapter in order to make fuller contribution to their
common objective therefore.

8.To promote constructive measures of development and to encourage demilitarization

amongst such States and Republics as they are called our Group 4 selective special services
such as the KGB, the CIA, and other Israeli special Green Beret attachments, and the
Specialized Function for a United Nations Secret Services accountings, shall:

(a) proceed without delay to locate and identify weapons manufacturing plants worldwide
such as in India Pakistan, France Sweden Germany, Israel too now, China, Japan, U S A,
especially, South Africa, and all other Republics to an Emblem engraver for currency Ill
believed, to other report to they of The space based research consulting Sector that are as
indiscreet as have decided the cut off date for weapons systems manufacturing concepts and
contracting accessories to believe 31 December 2,007 as so such an evocation after or around
the act or fact of a U N condition of obligations assumed acts and/or descends upon costly
and disturbingly noteworthy attributable penalty assessment fines herein their.

(b) no military weapons contracting Party without written and approved consent from the
Commissioner of the majority Delegation General Assembly popular vote,(51%) bouts, shall
be issued licensing rights, titles, nor interest in every and all said weapons systems with
exception to bio-molecular aspect to ratio of said people presences with star based modular
conceptions of Gods Love, as discussed pursuant of the Protocols ,7, 8 , IC Black X file of
the DESBIC AGENDA and also in accordances to the S.Q. Security Docket Pre ambulance
to the DESBIC AGENDA, IDF Treaty series which along with INF, NPT and NPT 2-3,
START I, in concise, START II, III and other annexes, Protocols and Texts introduced
during the Coming of the Lord of Israel is hereinafter to be considered an integral part of this
vocational exercise in star elder presences I do declare for certainties, in order to form a more
desirable and dependable respective frame advisory activator there as.

9.The principle objective of the Organizations weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation

mission is that of collecting, disposing and storage containment, and sentry detail of
descriptive afore specified, as when in the courses of human characterization it becomes
obvious to see the note to need and diffuse surplus stock piles and sales, acquisitioning of
Chinese rockets, launchers, boosters MIRV s, ICBM s, nuclear bombs, biological and higher
grade chemical reactivation properties of military grade resonancys, nuclear fuel rods, and

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supervisory accounting for major nuclear energy utilities disassembly standards protocols and
applications, suspend aquisitionment as inevitably will concern: naval vessels of every
standard aggregate displacement, whose last shipyard contracts are slated for closures on 31
December 2,007; upon unanimous consent as agreed upon by the Group 4 and the majority
vote and decision of a U N full Assembly to that of an exclusionary precedence, noting all
too well what disarmament projection brings to the tables there as; side winding to, that it
become strongly urged by the U N General Assembly memberships who best personify a
May Day simplex in granting of rights, titles and deeds, with all due regard for interest in
handing out the awarding contractorship for international Maritime Primary care coordination
to the U S Navys and special stipulatory amendments to qualify transitioning exchange of on
board 24- 7- 365 Multinational factions including especially Israeli, Russian ready reserve
Officers thereby.

10. To make Provision in accordance with this Statute, Star Fleet has long been charged with
the obligations assumed under an Israeli Galaxy Class saucer modular request that we act as
if the organization U N belongs to eng@it.pmo.gov.il and the scattered industrial simplexes
shall be located in the arrangements made by chief scientists at Army Headquarters bearing
in mind the ideals of trust and subcontracted on the dollar, exchange payroll aspect to ratio;
also bearing in mind that naval flotilla battle or such terminology of group with aircraft
carriers are scheduled for multinational membership moth ball phase off to better
comprehend the biological specimen samples of aerodynamically aligned perspectives at
a ,000 nuclear energy utility cut off date reminder as expressly reserved for the year 2,022, A
D. Having considered the reports, issued by the Secretary Generals; licensing fees will be
increased to 5 million dollars per unit by 2,012; and $666,666 dollars commencing 31
December, 2,007, unless show cause by, for and by again with a best interest of safety
oriented U N Membership Assembly Delegation appearance as required by Law. To further
the purpose of this Treaty and in order to facilitate the practice of International Government
security and equality, it shall be the finding of this exchange of instruments that the quorum
call and calendar for General Assembly Ad judgments and Ad policy in separation be
counted and be heard, recognized, and seen an minimal of 4-four times a calendar month, as
to vote and decide on matters of relative new age scientific as global security so to purpose a
denuclearization profile for the cause of common approach and attainment of these ends,
therefore it is qualified as a necessary side of a say, to invest in their approach hereinafter
thereupon.

11. For the purpose of reducing and averting the risk of outbreak of wars the Israelis are to
assist the Russians and the U S in chastising or neutralizing U N Employees who are
entruantly absolved in their mercenary derelective opted nay saying, to find cause for
replacement or repair of note to need, or need to note filing fees for the licensing as cause of

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liability risks assumed, to engage in nuclear non proliferation within the bounds but not too
far away from dissident or soon to become dishonest accounts made to U S backed Russia,
aspect to ratio payroll to be jointly discussed with formers defense and knowledgeable
coordinators along with the distinctive and pleasant current administrative branches as
proces verbal in an effective and sound alliance as to be certain to import exchange duty
sailors for ease some slack tour of duly authorized naval attention gathering herein store to
these ends .

12. In another way we come to understand as to offside the naval shipyard reminders of a
competitive state of exportation in as much as to foster the exchange of scientific buy backs
and buy outs with that money to make provision in accordance with this chapter to assign a
scheduled plan of nuclear energy utility decommissionment, and request of the Russian
defense counsel sub contracting missionarys as obligate the Swiss and Western money
lenders with reasonably sound and generously robust financial overtures before another
judgment ruling come handed to the U N licensing assessment offices, take notice of rate
increases is why I invented my Uzi other than to shoot a starving lion thereto; resurrect hold
meetings at least twice a week of a Multilateral Implementation Commission.

Article IV

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures
of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of
ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and will be extended by
agreement of the Parties or earlier by subsequent agreement.

3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, is bound by life assurances as to not
negate nor withdraw from this Treaty. All Ensigns independent or clandestine as it may cause
to flee are superficially bound by words, thoughts, and deeds indeed to the other Party.

Article V

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on May 24, 2002, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic. Amended May 13, 2,005

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, U N AND STATE OF ISRAEL

George W. Bush OF FAITH WHEREFORE IN STAR BASE INTERNAL COMMAND

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, NATO ALLIANCES AND ALL ENSIGNS

Vladimir V. Putin OF FAITH WHEREFORE IN STAR BASE INTERNAL

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COMMAND

*************************************************

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

The White House

June 20, 2002

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive
Reductions, signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (the Moscow Treaty).

The Moscow Treaty represents an important element of the new strategic relationship
between the United States and Russia. It will take our two nations along a stable, predictable
path to substantial reductions in our deployed strategic nuclear warhead arsenals by
December 31, 2012. When these reductions are completed, each country will be at the lowest
level of deployed strategic nuclear warheads in decades. This will benefit the peoples of both
the United States and Russia and contribute to a more secure world.

The Moscow Treaty codifies my determination to break through the long impasse in further
nuclear weapons reductions caused by the inability to finalize agreements through traditional
arms control efforts. In the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, both countries
strategic nuclear arsenals remained far larger than needed, even as the United States and
Russia moved toward a more cooperative relationship. On May 1, 2001, I called for a new
framework for our strategic relationship with Russia, including further cuts in nuclear
weapons to reflect the reality that the Cold War is over. On November 13, 2001, I announced
the United States plan for such cuts--to reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads to a level of between 1700 and 2200 over the next decade. I announced these
planned reductions following a careful study within the Department of Defense. That study,
the Nuclear Posture Review, concluded that these force levels were sufficient to maintain the
security of the United States. In reaching this decision, I recognized that it would be
preferable for the United States to make such reductions on a reciprocal basis with Russia,
but that the United States would be prepared to proceed unilaterally.

My Russian counterpart, President Putin, responded immediately and made clear that he
shared these goals. President Putin and I agreed that our nations respective reductions should
be recorded in a legally binding document that would outlast both of our presidencies and
provide predictability over the longer term. The result is a Treaty that was agreed without
protracted negotiations. This Treaty fully meets the goals I set out for these reductions.

It is important for there to be sufficient openness so that the United States and Russia can

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each be confident that the other is fulfilling its reductions commitment. The Parties will use
the comprehensive verification regime of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty) to provide the foundation for confidence,
transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions. In our Joint
Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the United States and Russia,
President Putin and I also decided to establish a Consultative Group for Strategic Security to
be chaired by Foreign and Defense Ministers. This body will be the principal mechanism
through which the United States and Russia strengthen mutual confidence, expand
transparency, share information and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest.

The Moscow Treaty is emblematic of our new, cooperative relationship with Russia, but it is
neither the primary basis for this relationship nor its main component. The United States and
Russia are partners in dealing with the threat of terrorism and resolving regional conflicts.
There is growing economic interaction between the business communities of our two
countries and ever-increasing people-to-people and cultural contacts and exchanges. The U.S.
military has put Cold War practices behind it, and now plans, sizes, and sustains its forces in
recognition that Russia is not an enemy, Russia is a friend. Military-to-military and
intelligence exchanges are well established and growing.

The Moscow Treaty reflects this new relationship with Russia. Under it, each Party retains
the flexibility to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive
arms, and how reductions are made. This flexibility allows each Party to determine how best
to respond to future security challenges.

There is no longer the need to narrowly regulate every step we each take, as did Cold War
treaties founded on mutual suspicion and an adversarial relationship.

In sum, the Moscow Treaty is clearly in the best interests of the United States and represents
an important contribution to U.S. national security and strategic stability. I therefore urge the
Senate to give prompt and favorable consideration to the Treaty, and to advise and consent to
its ratification.

George W. Bush.

*************************************************

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

The President,
The White House.

Mr. President: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty Between the United States of

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America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty),
signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002.

INTRODUCTION

The Moscow Treaty marks a new era in the relationship between the United States and
Russia. This short, legally binding document codifies in a flexible manner both countries
commitment to make deep strategic offensive reductions. It facilitates the transition from
strategic rivalry to a genuine strategic partnership based on the principles of mutual security,
trust, openness, cooperation and predictability. The Moscow Treaty is one important element
of a new strategic framework, which involves a broad array of cooperative efforts in political,
economic and security areas.

BACKGROUND

The Moscow Treaty codifies the deep reductions that you announced during the November
2001 Washington/Crawford Summit and President Putin announced at that time and a month
later. It reflects the shared desire to conclude a legally binding document that would outlast
both of your presidencies and to provide openness and predictability over the longer term in
this important area of the U.S.-Russian relationship. The transition to a relationship based on
mutual trust and cooperation enabled us to conclude an agreement in months, not years. At
the same time, the Treaty affords flexibility to each Party to meet unforeseen future
contingencies, while avoiding unnecessary restrictions on either Partys forces or activities.

REDUCTION REQUIREMENTS

The United States and Russia both intend to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the
lowest possible levels consistent with their national security requirements and alliance
obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations. The Treaty requires the
United States and Russia to reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200
each by December 31, 2012, a reduction of nearly two-thirds below current levels. The
United States intends to implement the Treaty by reducing its operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 through removal of warheads from missiles in their
launchers and from heavy bomber bases, and by removing some missiles, launchers, and
bombers from operational service.

For purposes of this Treaty, the United States considers operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads to be reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in their
launchers, reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in their
launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in
weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases. In addition, a small number of spare strategic
nuclear warheads (including spare ICBM warheads) are located at heavy bomber bases. The
United States does not consider these spares to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads. In the context of this Treaty, it is clear that only nuclear reentry vehicles, as well
as nuclear armaments, are subject to the 1700-2200 limit.

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RELATIONSHIP TO START

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) continues in force unchanged by this Treaty.
In accordance with its own terms, START will remain in force until December 5, 2009,
unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended.

STARTs comprehensive verification regime will provide the foundation for confidence,
transparency and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions. As noted in the May
24 Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, other supplementary measures,
including transparency measures, may be agreed in the future.

BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION COMMISSION

The Treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), a diplomatic

consultative forum that will meet at least twice a year to discuss issues related to
implementation of the Treaty. The BIC will be separate and distinct from the Consultative
Group for Strategic Security, established by the Joint Declaration of May 24, which will be
chaired by Foreign and Defense Ministers with the participation of other senior officials.

ENTRY INTO FORCE; DURATION; RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL

The Treaty will enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. It is
to remain in force until December 31, 2012, and may be extended by agreement of the Parties
or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.

The Treaty also provides that each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw
from the Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party.

STATUS OF START II TREATY

The START II Treaty, which was signed in 1993, and to which the Senate gave its advice and
consent in 1996, never entered into force because Russia placed unacceptable conditions on
its own ratification of START II. Russias explicit linkage of START II to preservation of the
ABM Treaty and entry into force of several agreements, signed in 1997, which related to
ABM Treaty succession and ABM/TMD demarcation, made it impossible for START II to
enter into force. With signature of the Moscow Treaty, the United States and Russia have
now taken a decisive step beyond START II.

CONCLUSION

Accompanying this report is an article-by-article analysis of the Treaty. By deeply reducing

operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads while preserving each Partys flexibility to
meet unforeseen future contingencies, the Moscow Treaty will enhance the national security
of the United States. I strongly recommend its transmission to the Senate for advice and
consent to ratification at the earliest possible date.

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Respectfully submitted,
Colin L. Powell.

Enclosures: As stated1.

___________________
1 Enclosures include the Moscow Treaty and the Article-by-Article Analysis

Israeli Intelligence Report : State of the State Department U S/U N

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions, signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (the Moscow Treaty) consists of a
Preamble and five Articles.

TITLE AND PREAMBLE

The title of the Moscow Treaty is Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions. This title was deliberately chosen to
reflect the fact that this Treaty focuses on reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, rather
than on strategic offensive arms, which traditionally have been considered to be delivery
vehicles and launchers. For linguistic reasons, the title of the Russian language version of the
Treaty is ... on Reductions in Strategic Offensive Potential. The English language text of
the Treaty was agreed first, but the phrase strategic offensive reductions could not be
literally translated into Russian. The substantive meanings of the titles are said to be the
same.

The Preamble to the Moscow Treaty sets forth the intentions of the Parties in broad terms.
The first preambular paragraph designates the United States and Russia as the Parties to
obviate the use of their full names throughout the Treaty. The second, third and fourth
preambular paragraphs set forth the Parties shared commitment to conducting their relations
in the new century on a fundamentally different and more cooperative basis than had
characterized their relations in the past. The reference to mutual security in the fourth
paragraph refers to the non-threatening nature of the Parties' new strategic relationship; it
does not imply a specific relationship between the Parties forces. The fifth paragraph
reaffirms the Parties general, longstanding commitment to implementing significant
reductions in strategic offensive arms. This paragraph introduces references to specific prior
commitments and obligations by the Parties in the sixth, seventh and eighth paragraphs that
immediately follow, including those in the Treaty Between the United States of America and

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the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (the START Treaty) and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 (the NPT). The sixth paragraph recognizes Joint Statements
made by Presidents Bush and Putin in Genoa on July 22, 2001 and in Washington, DC on
November 13, 2001 that detail the new basis for relations between the United States and
Russia. This preambular language does not imply any restrictions or obligations relating to
defensive programs. The seventh and eighth paragraphs make reference to two existing
agreements of the Parties with regard to nuclear weapons, the START Treaty and Article VI
of the NPT. The final paragraph sets forth the Parties conviction that this Treaty will
establish more favorable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation and
enhancing international security.

ARTICLE I

Article I contains the central obligation of the Moscow Treaty. The first sentence of this
paragraph obligates the Parties to reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warheads, as stated
by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the
President of the Russian Federation on November 13 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so
that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-
2200 for each Party. The Moscow Treaty's limits relate solely to the number of each Partys
strategic nuclear warheads. The Moscow Treaty does not limit the number of U.S. or Russian
inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) or their associated launchers, or heavy bombers. Article I, by referencing the
statements of both Presidents, makes clear that the Parties need not implement their
reductions in an identical manner.

The United States will implement Article I as stated by President Bush on November 13,
2001: ... the United States will reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads
to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade, a level fully consistent with
American security.2 U.S. negotiators noted to their Russian counterparts that, in carrying out
the reductions provided for in this Treaty, in using the term operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads the United States means reentry vehicles on ICBMs in their launchers,
reentry vehicles on SLBMs in their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments
loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases. The
United States also made clear that a small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads
(including spare ICBM warheads) would be located at heavy bomber bases and that the
United States would not consider these warheads to be operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads. The United States intends to reduce its operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads in a manner consistent with these statements. In the context of this Treaty,
it is clear that only nuclear reentry vehicles, as well as nuclear armaments, are subject to
the 1700-2200 limit.

The method by which U.S. warhead numbers will be determined under the Moscow Treaty
differs from the START Treaty methodology. The START Treaty contains counting rules
that attribute specific numbers of warheads to each type of ICBM, SLBM or heavy bomber
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regardless of the actual number of warheads on the missile or bomber. These numbers may be
different from both the actual capacity of the specific system and the number actually carried
by the system.

Under the U.S. approach, certain strategic nuclear warheads, such as those nominally
associated with submarines in overhaul or submarines modified for other purposes, those
downloaded from ICBMs and SLBMs, and those nominally associated with deactivated
Peacekeeper ICBMs, will continue to be subject to the START Treaty unless such ICBMs or
SLBMs and their associated launchers are eliminated or converted in accordance with
START Treaty procedures. At the same time, however, under the Moscow Treaty, once such
warheads are no longer in operationally-deployed status, they will be included as part of the
United States reductions. Thus, among other things, missiles from which some warheads
have been removed will be considered for purposes of the START Treaty as carrying more
warheads than they in fact carry. By contrast, under the Moscow Treaty, the United States
will limit its strategic nuclear warheads based on the actual number of warheads on missiles
in their launchers and at bomber bases (other than spare warheads).

President Putin, for his part, stated at the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC on November
13, 2001:

... Russia is stating its readiness to proceed with significant reductions of strategic offensive
arms. That is why today we are proposing a radical program of further reductions of SOA --
at the least, by a factor of three -- to the minimum level necessary to maintain strategic
equilibrium in the world.3

and in a statement on December 13, 2001:

... a particularly important task in these conditions is to legally formalize the agreements that
have been reached on further drastic, irreversible, and verifiable reductions in strategic
offensive arms, which we believe should be at the level of 1,500-2,200 nuclear warheads for
each side.4

President Putin did not state explicitly how Russia intends to implement its reductions.
During the negotiations the Russians suggested that they anticipated reducing warheads by
eliminating or converting missiles, launchers and heavy bombers. As noted above, Russia,
like the United States, may reduce its strategic nuclear warheads by any method it chooses.
Russia did not state conclusively during the negotiations how it intends to carry out its
reductions.

The Moscow Treaty does not provide for sublimits or interim reduction levels or require a
Party to reach the final reduction level prior to December 31, 2012. Therefore, prior to
December 31, 2012, each Party is free to maintain whatever level of strategic nuclear
warheads it deems appropriate, consistent with its obligations under the START Treaty and
its obligation to meet the specified limit by the specified date.

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The second sentence of Article I states that each Party shall determine for itself the
composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate
limit for the number of such warheads. As noted earlier, the Moscow Treaty does not limit
the total number of strategic offensive arms, or contain either numerical sublimits or bans on
categories of forces. Under the Moscow Treaty, each Party will thus have flexibility in
structuring its forces to reach these new low levels for strategic nuclear warheads. The Treaty
does not restrict a Partys decisions regarding how it will implement the required reductions.

___________________
2 Press Conference by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, The East
Room, on November 13, 2001.
3 Speech of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin to Representatives of the
American Public and U.S. Politicians, November 13, 2001, Russian Embassy in Washington.
[Official U.S. translation]
4 Statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 13, 2001, Regarding the
Decision of the U.S. Administration to Withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty. [Official U.S.
translation]

ARTICLE II

In Article II, the Parties recognize that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance
with its terms. The purpose of this Article is to make clear that the Moscow Treaty and the
START Treaty are separate. The START Treatys provisions do not extend to the Moscow
Treaty, and the Moscow Treaty does not terminate, extend or in any other way affect the
status of the START Treaty. The START Treaty will remain in force until December 5, 2009,
unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended.

ARTICLE III

Article III establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), a diplomatic

consultative forum which shall meet at least twice a year, to discuss issues related to
implementation of the Moscow Treaty.

ARTICLE IV

Article IV consists of three paragraphs covering ratification, entry into force, duration and
withdrawal.

Paragraph 1 of Article IV provides that the Moscow Treaty shall be subject to ratification in
accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party and shall enter into force on the
date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Paragraph 2 of Article IV provides that the Moscow Treaty shall remain in force until
December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by
a subsequent agreement. Extension of the Treaty is not automatic but must be done by

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agreement of the Parties. Since such an extension is authorized by the Treaty, it would
constitute an agreement pursuant to the Treaty and would accordingly not be subject to
Senate advice and consent.

Paragraph 3 of Article IV provides that each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may
withdraw from the Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party. Unlike some
other arms control agreements, this withdrawal clause is not tied to a Partys determination
that extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing its supreme national interests exist. Rather, the
Moscow Treaty includes a more general formulation that allows greater flexibility for each
Party to respond to unforeseen circumstances.

Unlike several earlier arms control agreements, including the START Treaty, there are no
specific provisions for either amending the Moscow Treaty or for making viability and
effectiveness changes to the Treaty. Such provisions were not seen as necessary given the
structure and content of this Treaty.

For international agreements submitted to the Senate that do not have specific amendment
procedures, U.S. practice has been to submit amendments to the Senate for its advice and
consent unless the Senate agrees that submission is not required.

ARTICLE V

Article V sets forth standard provisions for registration of the Treaty pursuant to Article 102
of the Charter of the United Nations.

*************************************************

July 22, 2001

Joint Statement by U.S. President George W. Bush and President of the

Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin on Upcoming Consultations on Strategic
Issues 5

We agreed that major changes in the world require concrete discussions of both offensive and
defensive systems. We already have some strong and tangible points of agreement. We will
shortly begin intensive consultations on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive
systems.

___________________
5 This joint statement was made on the margins of the G-7/8 Summit in Genoa, Italy.

*************************************************

November 13, 2001

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Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on a

New Relationship Between the United States and Russia

Our countries are embarked on a new relationship for the 21st century, founded on a
commitment to the values of democracy, the free market, and the rule of law. The United
States and Russia have overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the
other as an enemy or threat. Aware of our responsibility to contribute to international
security, we are determined to work together, and with other nations and international
organizations, including the United Nations, to promote security, economic well-being, and a
peaceful, prosperous, free world.

We affirm our determination to meet the threats to peace in the 21st century. Among these
threats are terrorism, the new horror of which was vividly demonstrated by the evil crimes of
September 11, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, militant nationalism, ethnic and
religious intolerance, and regional instability. These threats endanger the security of both
countries and the world at large. Dealing with these challenges calls for the creation of a new
strategic framework to ensure the mutual security of the United States and Russia, and the
world community.

We have agreed that the current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect the strategic
realities of today. Therefore, we have confirmed our respective commitments to implement
substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons. On strategic defenses and the ABM
Treaty, we have agreed, in light of the changing global security environment, to continue
consultations within the broad framework of the new strategic relationship. On
nonproliferation matters, we reaffirm our mutual commitment to the Biological and Chemical
Weapons Conventions, and endorse efforts to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Both sides agree that urgent attention must continue to be given to improving the physical
protection and accounting of nuclear materials of all possessor states, and preventing illicit
nuclear trafficking.

We support the building of a European-Atlantic community whole, free, and at peace,

excluding no one, and respecting the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
nations. To this end, the United States and Russia will work, together with NATO and other
NATO members, to improve, strengthen, and enhance the relationship between NATO and
Russia, with a view to developing new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation,
joint decision, and coordinated/joint action. We believe that these mechanisms should reflect
the fact that the members of NATO and Russia are increasingly allied against terrorism,
regional instability and other contemporary threats, and that the NATO-Russia relationship
should therefore evolve accordingly. We will also work to strengthen our cooperation in
OSCE as a broadly representative, inclusive organization for conducting consultations, taking
decisions, and working together in the region.

We recognize a market economy, the freedom of economic choice and an open democratic
society as the most effective means to provide for the welfare of our citizens. The United
States and Russia will cooperate, including through the support of direct contacts between the

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business communities of our countries, to advance U.S.-Russian economic, trade, and

investment relations. The achievement of these goals requires the removal of legislative and
administrative barriers, a transparent, predictable investment climate, the rule of law, and
market-based economic reforms. To this end, it is important to reduce bureaucratic
constraints on the economy and to combat economic crime and corruption.

Reaffirming our commitment to advance common values, the United States and Russia will
continue to work together to protect and advance human rights, tolerance, religious freedom,
free speech and independent media, economic opportunity, and the rule of law. In keeping
with these commitments, we welcome the initiative of Russian and American media
executives, journalists, and independent organizations to convene a Russian-American Media
Entrepreneurship Dialogue. We will promote intense people-to-people exchanges as an
important factor for enhancing mutual understanding between the American and Russian
peoples. We pledge ourselves to the principles and values that represent the best traditions of
both our nations, and to cooperation in order to realize them now and in the future.

*************************************************

November 13, 2001

Press Conference by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin

6
The East Room

Its a great honor for me to welcome President Vladimir Putin to the White House, and to
welcome his wife as well. This is a new day in the long history of Russian-American
relations, a day of progress and a day of hope.

The United States and Russia are in the midst of a transformation of a relationship that will
yield peace and progress. Were transforming our relationship from one of hostility and
suspicion to one based on cooperation and trust, that will enhance opportunities for peace and
progress for our citizens and for people all around the world.

The challenge of terrorism makes our close cooperation on all issues even more urgent.
Russia and America share the same threat and the same resolve. We will fight and defeat
terrorist networks wherever they exist. Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from
acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Today, we agreed that Russian and American experts will work together to share information
and expertise to counter the threat from bioterrorism. We agreed that it is urgent that we
improve the physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials and prevent illicit
nuclear trafficking.

And we will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical
and nuclear weapons, materials and expertise. Today, we also agreed to work more closely to
combat organized crime and drug-trafficking, a leading source of terrorist financing.

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Both nations are committed to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, once hostilities there have
ceased and the Taliban are no longer in control. We support the UNs efforts to fashion a post-
Taliban government that is broadly based and multi-ethnic. The new government must export
neither terror nor drugs, and it must respect fundamental human rights.

And Russia and the United States -- as Russia and the United States work more closely to
meet new 21st century threats, were also working hard to put the threats of the 20th century
behind us once and for all. And we can report great progress.

The current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect todays strategic realities. I have
informed President Putin that the United States will reduce our operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade, a level
fully consistent with American security.

Russia and the United States have also had vast discussions about our defensive capabilities,
the ability to defend ourselves as we head into the 21st century. We have different points of
view about the ABM Treaty, and we will continue dialogue and discussions about the ABM
Treaty, so that we may be able to develop a new strategic framework that enables both of us
to meet the true threats of the 21st century as partners and friends, not as adversaries.

The spirit of partnership that now runs through our relationship is allowing the United States
and Russia to form common approaches to important regional issues. In the Middle East, we
agree that all parties must take practical actions to ease tensions so that peace talks can
resume. We urge the parties to move without delay to implement the Tenet work plan and the
Mitchell Report recommendations.

In Europe, we share a vision of a European Atlantic community whole, free and at peace; one
that includes all of Europes democracies, and where the independence and sovereignty of all
nations are respected. Russia should be a part of this Europe.

We will work together with NATO and NATO members to build new avenues of cooperation
and consultation between Russia and NATO. NATO members and Russia are increasingly
allied against terrorism, regional instability, and other threats of our age. And NATO must
reflect this alliance.

Were encouraged by President Putins commitment to a political dialogue in Chechnya.

Russia has also made important strides on immigration and the protection of religious and
ethnic minorities, including Russias Jewish community. On this issue, Russia is in a
fundamentally different place than it was during the Soviet era. President Putin told me that
these gains for freedom will be protected and expanded.

Our Foreign Ministers have sealed this understanding in an exchange of letters. Because of
this progress, my administration will work with Congress to end the application of Jackson-
Vanik Amendment to Russia.

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Russia has set out to strengthen free market institutions and the rule of law. On this basis, our
economic relationship is developing quickly, and we will look for further ways to expand it.

A strong, independent media is a vital part of a new Russia. Weve agreed to launch a
dialogue on media entrepreneurship, so that American and Russian media representatives can
meet and make practical recommendations to both our governments, in order to advance our
goal of free media, and free exchange of ideas.

Russia and the United States will continue to face complex and difficult issues. Yet, weve
made great progress in a very short period of time. Today, because we are working together,
both our countries and the world are more secure and safe.

I want to thank President Putin for the spirit of our meetings. Together, were making history,
as we make progress. Laura and I are looking forward to welcoming the Putins to our ranch
in Crawford, Texas. I cant wait to show you my state, and where I live. In the meantime, I
hope you have a fine stay here in Washington, D.C. And its my honor to welcome you to the
White House, sir, and welcome you to the podium.

___________________
6 For clarity, only the transcript of President Bush's statement is included here. The official
U.S. translation of President Putin's statement is provided on page 18. A question and answer
session has been omitted.

*************************************************

November 13, 2001

Speech by RF President V.V. Putin in Response to Questions by Journalists at

the Joint Press Conference with U.S. President George Bush 7

Ladies and Gentlemen!

I dont know if I will have another opportunity to appear before such an impressive gathering
of the press. Therefore, I would like to start by thanking the President of the United States not
only for his kind invitation to visit the United States and Washington, but also for the
informal way in which our negotiations have begun today.

Both I and my colleagues are gratified to be at the White House. This is a historic place. And
President Bush most graciously gave me a tour not only of the formal reception areas but also
the quarters where he lives. He showed and told me everything. We stopped in front of
almost picture [sic]. This not only interested me but also changed the quality of our
relationship for the better, as it were.

I would like to express my condolences to the U.S. President and all the American people in

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connection with the disaster in New York as a result of the airplane crash [sic]. You know,
there is a Russian proverb that says Misfortunes never come alone, but strike one after the
other. We commiserate with you in this tragedy and are certain that the inhabitants of New
York and all the American people will face these adversities with fortitude.

Now let me tell you directly about the progress of our work. The Washington phase of the
talks is coming to an end, and I must note that our conversations already have been very
substantive, interesting, and useful, but they will be continued at Crawford as well. However,
we view the preliminary results as being very positive. This is my fourth meeting with
President Bush in the last several months. I believe that this graphically demonstrates the
current dynamic nature of Russian-U.S. relations. We have come to understand each other
better, moving step by step to bring our positions closer together on key issues of bilateral
and international relations. Today we are already prepared to seek solutions in all areas of our
joint activities. We are willing to dismantle, once and for all, the legacy of the Cold War and
begin fashioning a strategic partnership for the long term.

Naturally, we discussed in detail the fight against international terrorism. The tragic events of
September 11 vividly demonstrated the need to join forces to counter this global threat
decisively. And we do indeed regard it as a global threat. Terrorists and those who abet them
must know that just retribution is inescapable and will overtake them wherever they try to
hide.

The question of the post-crisis political structure of Afghanistan was also addressed. Right
now the most important thing is that peace and a decent life be restored in the country, and
that there be no threat to other countries, or to international stability, emanating from
Afghanistan. Of course, we do not intend to impose our own plans on the Afghan people.
They must decide their fates for themselves, with the active participation of the UN.

We also discussed in detail the course of our dialogue on the interrelated issues of strategic
offensive and defensive arms. We have succeeded in making some progress in this area,
particularly with respect to the prospects for working out a reliable and verifiable agreement
on further major reductions in the nuclear potential of Russia and the United States. In this
connection, I must say that we deeply appreciate the decision by the U.S. President on
reducing strategic offensive arms to a designated threshold and we, for our part, will
endeavor to respond in an appropriate manner. On missile defense issues Russias position
remains unchanged, and we agreed that we will continue the dialogue and consultations on
this matter. I believe that it is too early to provide a final summary of the results of the
discussion of this problem as well. We will have an opportunity to continue our work at
President Bushs ranch in Crawford.

We also exchanged opinions on critical international problems. We discussed the situation in

the Balkans and the situation surrounding Iraq. In the Joint Statement adopted, we reaffirmed
that Russia and the U.S. are determined to facilitate resolution of the crisis in the Middle East
and, above all, early resumption of negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians.

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There was also a serious discussion of the development of relations between Russia and
NATO. This includes taking into account the changed international situation. I believe that it
is possible to establish qualitatively new mechanisms for cooperation, specifically, joint
decision-making and coordinated actions in the area of security and strengthening stability.

There was detailed discussion of a number of fundamental issues related to economic

interaction. As you know, the Russian-U.S. dialogue in this area has recently become more
intensive and substantive. The implementation of such major investment projects as Sakhalin
I and the Caspian Pipeline Consortiums oil pipeline is gaining momentum. We are
successfully moving ahead with cooperation in the aerospace field, the mining and chemical
industries, automobile manufacturing, and other areas. Direct contacts among our countries
entrepreneurs are expanding, specifically, within the framework of the Russian-American
Business Dialogue. We are pleased to note that definite progress has been made in resolving
issues related to Russias accession to the WTO and granting Russia market economy status.
And we sensed a clear understanding that the question of graduating Russia from the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment must finally be resolved-not de facto, but de jure. In this context, our
Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State, Messrs. Ivanov and Powell, exchanged
letters confirming the commitment of Russia and the United States to common values in the
area of human rights and religious freedoms.

Of course, the potential for bilateral economic cooperation is still far from being fully
realized. Here, as in other areas, a great deal of joint work lies ahead of us. But we strongly
believe that success is already, to a large extent, predetermined. It is predetermined by our
common willingness to cooperate actively and constructively. I am absolutely certain that this
cooperation, which is reflected in todays visit, will benefit both countries.

___________________
7 Official U.S. translation of the Kremlin's transcript of the Press Conference by President
Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, The East Room, November 13, 2001. For
clarity, only the transcript of President Putin's statement is included here. The transcript of
President Bush's statement is provided on page 16. A question and answer session has been
omitted.

*************************************************

November 13, 2001

Speech of Russian Federation President V. V. Putin to Representatives of the

American Public and U.S. Politicians, November 13, 2001, Russian Embassy in
Washington8

It is of fundamental importance that our countries collaboration in combatting terrorism not

remain merely an episode in the history of Russian-U.S. relations, but become the start of
long-term partnership and cooperation. Today we must once more look back at the history of
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our relations. History, said our great thinker, the Russian historian Vladimir Klyuchevskiy,
is not a teacher, but a supervisor. She does not teach anything, but only punishes us for not
knowing our lessons.

After the Second World War, the ties between our countries developed differently.
Nonetheless, we achieved the main aim in the end: our countries have ceased to be afraid of
each other. This opened the possibility of freeing ourselves also from what, for decades,
aroused horror in the whole worlds peoples: the arsenals of nuclear and other forms of
weapons of mass destruction. Their current quantitative level is not at all in keeping with the
current world situation or the nature of todays threats.

I did not doubt that on this issue we should encounter the understanding of the United States;
and President Bushs statement today confirms this. That is why Russia is stating its readiness
to proceed with significant reductions of strategic arms. That is why today we are proposing a
radical program of further reductions of SOAs--at the least, by a factor of three--to the
minimum level necessary to maintain strategic equilibrium in the world. We no longer need
to frighten each other in order to arrive at agreements. Security is established, not by weapons
and mountains of metal, but by the political will of states and of the leaders of these states.

Yes, today the world is still far from having international relations built exclusively upon
trust. Unfortunately. That is why it is so important today to rely upon the existing foundation
of treaties and agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control.

___________________
8 Official U.S. translation of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs transcript
of President Putin's November 13, 2001, speech at the Russian Embassy in Washington. For
clarity, only the text relevant to the Moscow Treaty is included.

*************************************************

December 13, 2001

Text of Diplomatic Notes Sent to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on U.S.
Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

The following is the text of diplomatic notes sent to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine on December 13, 2001:

The Embassy of the United States of America has the honor to refer to the Treaty between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed at Moscow May 26,1972.

Article XV, paragraph 2, gives each Party the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides
that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its

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supreme interests.

The United States recognizes that the Treaty was entered into with the USSR, which ceased
to exist in 1991. Since then, we have entered into a new strategic relationship with Russia that
is cooperative rather than adversarial, and are building strong relationships with most states
of the former USSR.

Since the Treaty entered into force in 1972, a number of state and non-state entities have
acquired or are actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It is clear, and has
recently been demonstrated, that some of these entities are prepared to employ these weapons
against the United States. Moreover, a number of states are developing ballistic missiles,
including long-range ballistic missiles, as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
These events pose a direct threat to the territory and security of the United States and
jeopardize its supreme interests. As a result, the United States has concluded that it must
develop, test, and deploy anti-ballistic missile systems for the defense of its national territory,
of its forces outside the United States, and of its friends and allies.

Pursuant to Article XV, paragraph 2, the United States has decided that extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Therefore,
in the exercise of the right to withdraw from the Treaty provided in Article XV, paragraph 2,
the United States hereby gives notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty. In accordance with
the terms of the Treaty, withdrawal will be effective six months from the date of this notice.

*************************************************

December 13, 2001

A Statement Made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 13, 2001,

Regarding the Decision of the Administration of the United States of America
to Withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 19729

The U.S. Administration today announced that it will withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty
in six months time.

The Treaty does indeed allow each of the parties to withdraw from it under exceptional
circumstances. The leadership of the United States has spoken about it repeatedly and this
step has not come as a surprise to us. But we believe this decision to be mistaken.

As is known, Russia, like the United States and unlike other nuclear powers, has long
possessed an effective system to overcome anti-missile defense. So, I can say with full
confidence that the decision made by the President of the United States does not pose a threat
to the national security of the Russian Federation.

At the same time our country elected not to accept the insistent proposals on the part of the U.

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S. to jointly withdraw from the ABM Treaty and did everything it could to preserve the
Treaty. I still think that this is a correct and valid position. Russia was guided above all by the
aim of preserving and strengthening the international legal foundation in the field of
disarmament and non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons.

The ABM Treaty is one of the supporting elements of the legal system in this field. That
system was created through joint efforts during past decades.

It is our conviction that the development of the situation in the present world dictates a
certain logic of actions.

Now that the world has been confronted with new threats one cannot allow a legal vacuum to
be formed in the sphere of strategic stability. One should not undermine the regimes of non-
proliferation of mass destruction weapons.

I believe that the present level of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the U.
S. should not only be preserved but should be used for working out a new framework of
strategic relations as soon as possible.

Along with the problem of anti-missile defense a particularly important task under these
conditions is putting a legal seal on the achieved agreements on further radical, irreversible
and verifiable cuts of strategic offensive weapons, in our opinion to the level of 1,500-2,200
nuclear warheads for each side.

In conclusion I would like to note that Russia will continue to adhere firmly to its course in
world affairs aimed at strengthening strategic stability and international security.

___________________
9 From the English transcript by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
Daily News Bulletin, December 14, 2001.

*************************************************

December 13, 2001

Response to Russian Statement on U.S. ABM Treaty Withdrawal

The United States welcomes President Putins statement. We agree with President Putin that
the decision taken by the President of the United States presents no threat to the national
security of the Russian Federation.

We have worked intensively with Russia to create a new strategic framework for our
relationship based on mutual interests and cooperation across a broad range of political,
economic, and security issues. Together, the United States and Russia have made substantial
progress in our efforts and look forward to even greater progress in the future.
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The United States in particular welcomes Russias commitment to deep reductions in its level
of offensive strategic nuclear forces. Combined with the reductions of U.S. strategic nuclear
forces announced by President Bush in November, this action will result in the lowest level of
strategic nuclear weapons deployed by our two countries in decades. We will work with
Russia to formalize this arrangement on offensive forces, including appropriate verification
and transparency measures.

Russias announcement of nuclear reductions and its commitment to continue to conduct

close consultations with the United States reflect our shared desire to continue the essential
work of building a new relationship for a new century.

*************************************************

May 24, 2002

Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship

The United States of America and the Russian Federation,

Recalling the accomplishments at the Ljubljana, Genoa, Shanghai, and Washington/Crawford

Summits and the new spirit of cooperation already achieved;

Building on the November 13, 2001 Joint Statement on a New Relationship Between the
United States and Russia, having embarked upon the path of new relations for the twenty-first
century, and committed to developing a relationship based on friendship, cooperation,
common values, trust, openness, and predictability;

Reaffirming our belief that new global challenges and threats require a qualitatively new
foundation for our relationship;

Determined to work together, with other nations and with international organizations, to
respond to these new challenges and threats, and thus contribute to a peaceful, prosperous,
and free world and to strengthening strategic security;

Declare as follows:

A Foundation for Cooperation

We are achieving a new strategic relationship. The era in which the United States and Russia
saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat has ended. We are partners and we will
cooperate to advance stability, security, and economic integration, and to jointly counter
global challenges and to help resolve regional conflicts.

To advance these objectives the United States and Russia will continue an intensive dialogue

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on pressing international and regional problems, both on a bilateral basis and in international
fora, including in the UN Security Council, the G-8, and the OSCE. Where we have
differences, we will work to resolve them in a spirit of mutual respect.

We will respect the essential values of democracy, human rights, free speech and free media,
tolerance, the rule of law, and economic opportunity.

We recognize that the security, prosperity, and future hopes of our peoples rest on a benign
security environment, the advancement of political and economic freedoms, and international
cooperation.

The further development of U.S.-Russian relations and the strengthening of mutual

understanding and trust will also rest on a growing network of ties between our societies and
peoples. We will support growing economic interaction between the business communities of
our two countries and people-to-people and cultural contacts and exchanges.

Political Cooperation

The United States and Russia are already acting as partners and friends in meeting the new
challenges of the 21st century; affirming our Joint Statement of October 21, 2001, our
countries are already allied in the global struggle against international terrorism.

The United States and Russia will continue to cooperate to support the Afghan peoples
efforts to transform Afghanistan into a stable, viable nation at peace with itself and its
neighbors. Our cooperation, bilaterally and through the United Nations, the Six-Plus-Two'
diplomatic process, and in other multilateral fora, has proved important to our success so far
in ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban and al-Qaida.

In Central Asia and the South Caucasus, we recognize our common interest in promoting the
stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all the nations of this region. The United
States and Russia reject the failed model of "Great Power" rivalry that can only increase the
potential for conflict in those regions. We will support economic and political development
and respect for human rights while we broaden our humanitarian cooperation and cooperation
on counterterrorism and counternarcotics.

The United States and Russia will cooperate to resolve regional conflicts, including those in
Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Transnistrian issue in Moldova. We strongly
encourage the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia to exhibit flexibility and a constructive
approach to resolving the conflict concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. As two of the Co-
Chairmen of the OSCEs Minsk Group, the United States and Russia stand ready to assist in
these efforts.

On November 13, 2001, we pledged to work together to develop a new relationship between
NATO and Russia that reflects the new strategic reality in the Euro-Atlantic region. We
stressed that the members of NATO and Russia are increasingly allied against terrorism,

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regional instability, and other contemporary threats. We therefore welcome the inauguration
at the May 28, 2002 NATO-Russia summit in Rome of a new NATO-Russia Council, whose
members, acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respective
collective commitments and obligations, will identify common approaches, take joint
decisions, and bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation. In
this context, they will observe in good faith their obligations under international law,
including the UN Charter, provisions and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and
the OSCE Charter for European Security. In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council,
NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest.
They aim to stand together against common threats and risks to their security.

As co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process, the United States and Russia will continue
to exert joint and parallel efforts, including in the framework of the Quartet, to overcome
the current crisis in the Middle East, to restart negotiations, and to encourage a negotiated
settlement. In the Balkans, we will promote democracy, ethnic tolerance, self-sustaining
peace, and long-term stability, based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the states in the region and United Nations Security Council resolutions. The United States
and Russia will continue their constructive dialogue on Iraq and welcome the continuation of
special bilateral discussions that opened the way for UN Security Council adoption of the
Goods Review List.

Recalling our Joint Statement of November 13, 2001 on counternarcotics cooperation, we

note that illegal drug trafficking poses a threat to our peoples and to international security,
and represents a substantial source of financial support for international terrorism. We are
committed to intensifying cooperation against this threat, which will bolster both the security
and health of the citizens of our countries.

The United States and Russia remain committed to intensifying cooperation in the fight
against transnational organized crime. In this regard, we welcome the entry into force of the
Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters on January 31, 2002.

Economic Cooperation

The United States and Russia believe that successful national development in the 21st century
demands respect for the discipline and practices of the free market. As we stated on
November 13, 2001, an open market economy, the freedom of economic choice, and an open
democratic society are the most effective means to provide for the welfare of the citizens of
our countries.

The United States and Russia will endeavor to make use of the potential of world trade to
expand the economic ties between the two countries, and to further integrate Russia into the
world economy as a leading participant, with full rights and responsibilities, consistent with
the rule of law, in the world economic system. In this connection, the sides give high priority
to Russias accession to the World Trade Organization on standard terms.

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Success in our bilateral economic and trade relations demands that we move beyond the
limitations of the past. We stress the importance and desirability of graduating Russia from
the emigration provisions of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, also known as the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment. We note that the Department of Commerce, based on its ongoing thorough and
deliberative inquiry, expects to make its final decision no later than June 14, 2002 on whether
Russia should be treated as a market economy under the provisions of U.S. trade law. The
sides will take further practical steps to eliminate obstacles and barriers, including as
appropriate in the legislative area, to strengthen economic cooperation.

We have established a new dynamic in our economic relations and between our business
communities, aimed at advancing trade and investment opportunities while resolving
disputes, where they occur, constructively and transparently.

The United States and Russia acknowledge the great potential for expanding bilateral trade
and investment, which would bring significant benefits to both of our economies. Welcoming
the recommendations of the Russian-American Business Dialogue, we are committed to
working with the private sectors of our countries to realize the full potential of our economic
interaction. We also welcome the opportunity to intensify cooperation in energy exploration
and development, especially in oil and gas, including in the Caspian region.

Strengthening People-to-People Contacts

The greatest strength of our societies is the creative energy of our citizens. We welcome the
dramatic expansion of contacts between Americans and Russians in the past ten years in
many areas, including joint efforts to resolve common problems in education, health, the
sciences, and environment, as well as through tourism, sister-city relationships, and other
people-to-people contacts. We pledge to continue supporting these efforts, which help
broaden and deepen good relations between our two countries.

Battling the scourge of HIV/AIDS and other deadly diseases, ending family violence,
protecting the environment, and defending the rights of women are areas where U.S. and
Russian institutions, and especially non-governmental organizations, can successfully expand
their cooperation.

Israeli Intelligence Report (State Department Release)

Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Non-Proliferation and

International Terrorism

The United States and Russia will intensify joint efforts to confront the new global challenges
of the twenty-first century, including combating the closely linked threats of international
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
We believe that international terrorism represents a particular danger to international stability
as shown once more by the tragic events of September 11, 2001. It is imperative that all

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nations of the world cooperate to combat this threat decisively. Toward this end, the United
States and Russia reaffirm our commitment to work together bilaterally and multilaterally.

The United States and Russia recognize the profound importance of preventing the spread of
weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The specter that such weapons could fall into the
hands of terrorists and those who support them illustrates the priority all nations must give to
combating proliferation.

To that end, we will work closely together, including through cooperative programs, to
ensure the security of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, information,
expertise, and material. We will also continue cooperative threat reduction programs and
expand efforts to reduce weapons-usable fissile material. In that regard, we will establish
joint experts groups to investigate means of increasing the amount of weapons-usable fissile
material to be eliminated, and to recommend collaborative research and development efforts
on advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies. We also
intend to intensify our cooperation concerning destruction of chemical weapons.

The United States and Russia will also seek broad international support for a strategy of
proactive non-proliferation, including by implementing and bolstering the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the conventions on the prohibition of chemical and
biological weapons. The United States and Russia call on all countries to strengthen and
strictly enforce export controls, interdict illegal transfers, prosecute violators, and tighten
border controls to prevent and protect against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Missile Defense, Further Strategic Offensive Reductions, New Consultative Mechanism

on Strategic Security

The United States and Russia proceed from the Joint Statements by the President of the
United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of
July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia of
November 13, 2001 in Washington.

The United States and Russia are taking steps to reflect, in the military field, the changed
nature of the strategic relationship between them.

The United States and Russia acknowledge that todays security environment is
fundamentally different than during the Cold War.

In this connection, the United States and Russia have agreed to implement a number of steps
aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in the area of missile defense,
including the exchange of information on missile defense programs and tests in this area,
reciprocal visits to observe missile defense tests, and observation aimed at familiarization
with missile defense systems. They also intend to take the steps necessary to bring a joint
center for the exchange of data from early warning systems into operation.

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The United States and Russia have also agreed to study possible areas for missile defense
cooperation, including the expansion of joint exercises related to missile defense, and the
exploration of potential programs for the joint research and development of missile defense
technologies, bearing in mind the importance of the mutual protection of classified
information and the safeguarding of intellectual property rights.

The United States and Russia will, within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council,
explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation on missile defense for Europe.

The United States and Russia declare their intention to carry out strategic offensive
reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with their national security requirements
and alliance obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations.

A major step in this direction is the conclusion of the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions.

In this connection, both sides proceed on the basis that the Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, remains in force in accordance with its terms and
that its provisions will provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency, and
predictability in further strategic offensive reductions, along with other supplementary
measures, including transparency measures, to be agreed.

The United States and Russia agree that a new strategic relationship between the two
countries, based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation, and
predictability requires substantive consultation across a broad range of international security
issues. To that end we have decided to:

establish a Consultative Group for Strategic Security to be chaired by Foreign

Ministers and Defense Ministers with the participation of other senior officials.
This group will be the principal mechanism through which the sides strengthen
mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans, and
discuss strategic issues of mutual interest; and
seek ways to expand and regularize contacts between our two countries
Defense Ministries and Foreign Ministries, and our intelligence agencies.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Moscow
May 24, 2002.

*************************************************

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June 5, 2002

Fact Sheet on the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions

On May 24, President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin signed the Moscow
Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. Under this Treaty, the United States and Russia
will reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to a level of 1700-2200 by December 31, 2012, a
level nearly two-thirds below current levels.

This new, legally-binding Treaty codifies the deep reductions announced by President Bush
during the November 2001 Washington/Crawford Summit and by President Putin at that
summit and one month later. The two Presidents agreed on the need for a legally binding
document that would outlast both of their presidencies, to provide openness and predictability
over the longer term in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. At the same time, reflecting
the mutual trust in this relationship, the Treaty affords flexibility to each Party to meet
unforeseen future contingencies.

The Treaty is part of the new strategic framework that the United States and Russia have
established. The Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, also issued in Moscow
on May 24, records mutual commitments to a broad array of cooperative efforts in political,
economic, and security areas. It marks a new era in our bilateral relationship.

Treaty Provisions

The Treaty requires each country to reduce and limit its strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-
2200 by December 31, 2012. Each side may determine for itself the composition and
structure of its strategic forces consistent with this limit.

Both the United States and Russia intend to reduce their strategic offensive forces to the
lowest possible levels, consistent with their national security requirements and alliance
obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations. The U.S. intends to
reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200, as President Bush
announced on November 13, 2001. The United States considers operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads to be reentry vehicles on ICBMs in their launchers, reentry
vehicles on SLBMs in their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments located at
heavy bomber bases. In addition, there will be some spares stored at heavy bomber bases.

A Bilateral Implementation Commission will meet at least twice a year to discuss issues
related to implementation of the Treaty.

Ratification Process

The Treaty will be transmitted to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification; in Russia, the two Chambers of the Federal Assembly must approve a bill on its
ratification. Assuming positive action by the legislatures of both countries, the United States

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and Russia will exchange instruments of ratification and the Treaty will enter into force. It
will remain in force until December 31, 2012, and may be extended or replaced with a
subsequent agreement.

Relationship to START

The five-Party Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 1991 continues in force
unchanged. (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and the United States are Parties to
START.) START's comprehensive verification regime will provide the foundation for
providing confidence, transparency and predictability in further strategic reductions. As noted
in the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship also issued in Moscow on May 24,
supplementary measures, including transparency measures, may be agreed in the future. The
United States and Russia will establish a Consultative Group for Strategic Security to be
chaired by Foreign and Defense Ministers. This group will be the principal mechanism
through which the sides strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share
information and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest.

The 1993 START II Treaty never entered into force because of the long delay in Russian
ratification and the fact that Russia conditioned its ratification of START II on preservation
of the ABM Treaty. The new Moscow Treaty moves us beyond START II, both in reductions
to even lower levels of operationally deployed warheads and in our relationship with Russia.

U.S. Reduction Plans

As outlined in the Department of Defenses Nuclear Posture Review submitted to Congress in

January of this year, the United States plans to deactivate all 50 of its ten-warhead
Peacekeeper ICBMs and remove four Trident submarines from strategic service. Additional
steps to reduce the number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the
1700-2200 level, including missile downloading and lowering the number of operationally
deployed weapons at heavy bomber bases, will be decided subsequently.

Some of the warheads removed from deployed status will be used as spares, some will be
stored, and some will be destroyed. The U.S. will continue to deploy land-, sea- and air-based
strategic forces as part of one element of the New Triad described in the Nuclear Posture
Review Report to Congress.

*************************************************

June 14, 2002

Statement by the Russian MFA on the Legal Status of the Treaty Between the
Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II)10

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In May 2000, the Russian Federation ratified the START II Treaty and the New York
agreements of September 26, 1997, regarding the ABM Treaty. In this connection, there was
a mutual understanding with the U.S. side that the U.S. would act in a similar fashion. This
would have made it possible to implement the aforementioned, very important agreements on
the strategic offensive and defensive arms of both Parties.

However, the U.S. declined to ratify the START II Treaty and the New York agreements.
Moreover, on June 13, 2002, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty and, as a
result, this instrument of international law, which for three decades had served as the
cornerstone of strategic stability, is no longer in effect.

Taking into account the above mentioned actions of the U.S. and based on the provisions of
the Federal Law on Ratification of the START II Treaty, the Russian Federation notes the
absence of any of the prerequisites for entry into force of the START II Treaty and no longer
considers itself bound by the obligation, provided for under international law, to refrain from
actions that could deprive this Treaty of its object and purpose.

___________________
10
Official U.S. translation of a Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement of June 14, 2002.

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START III AGENDA

IDF TREATY SERIES START III

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE PEOPLES STATE OF ISRAEL THE UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLYS
THE NUCLEAR POWERS AND ALL ENSIGNS TO THE STATES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
PROVISIONAL APPLICATION
ON FURTHER DISPOSAL REDUCTION AND LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

(Note: Certain dates and deadlines of the Treaty have been modified by the START II and III Protocols, as ascribed for Signatory endorsements,
and previously signed in New York on September 26, 1997, whereas a Head of State may be excused from service assignment in view of both
the United States Senate, the Russian Duma, as so forth, The Republics to an Ensign and, or States as said, found to be willfully or negligibly in
disagreement or violation of Provisions , as expressly agreed upon by a majority consensus herein afore in observance forgo. These changes
have been incorporated in the following text.)

The United States of America, The Peoples State of Israel, The United Nations Organization, and all insignias to a Marquis, hereinafter
referred to as The Nuclear Powers or the Parties,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START, START I, II, III, IDF
Treaty Series START I-III, DESBIC AGENDA START III, and SORT Compact,

Stressing their firm commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and their desire to
contribute to its strengthening,

Taking into account the commitment by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to accede to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties,

Mindful of their undertakings with respect to strategic offensive arms under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of July 1, 1968, and under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
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START III AGENDA

Limitation of the explosive grade dangers imposed by Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, as well as the provisions of the
Joint Understanding signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992, and the
vitality of the Joint Statement on a Global Protection System signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on June 17, 1992,

Desiring to enhance strategic stability and predictability, and, in doing so, to eliminate further strategic offensive arms such as nuclear
warheads for sale and nuclear biological, and chemical formulations and said crude devices, in addition to the reductions and limitations
provided for in NPT I, II, INF, DESBIC AGENDA and the drafts of START II, III, and other agreements reached, to this Treaty,

Considering that further progress toward that end will help lay a solid foundation for a new world order, and to the extent possible
consistent with its primary responsibility, recessitate fair and orderly values. In the interests pending the disarmament obligations of The
Nuclear Powers, take the necessary steps that would preclude the risk of outbreak of pre-emptive secondary attacks and the
consequential aftermath of radioactive contamination of the critical life support systems,

Recognizing their special responsibility as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining international
peace and security, and their inherent obligation assumed as opted for multilateralism and combined efforts;

Taking note of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/52K of December 9, 1992.
Conscious of the new realities that have transformed the political and strategic relations between the Parties, and the relations of
partnership that have been established between them; and particularly to cause, the nuclear energy utility industries and the fuel
enrichment aiding and abetment concerns here at;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall reduce, dispose and limit its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, all nuclear warheads of any
standard displacement; and heavy bomber armaments considered a nuclear, biological, and chemical attack platform or program. In and
though, START III shall conjoin the obligations assumed under START II commencing December 31,
2007.

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START III AGENDA

(a) All Partys to a nuclear utility energy complex shall be considered a Nuclear Power hereinafter, the aggregate numbers for each
Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, is not to exceed, 00, 666 low yield chemical formulation warheads
for the U S and Russia and not to exceed ,066 for all other insignias to a Marquis as the conditions set forth in this Article by lot later
than 2,012 and assessment penaltys pending for those who adopt negligible or perjury as actions expressly prohibited as ascribed for by
the Will of the General Assembly United Nations
Organization.
(b) the total attribution of all the worlds combined chemical low, C grade formulation contingencies may not exceed 0,666 of the
aforementioned formulation, as to not upset the balance of powers. In carrying out the foregoing responsibilities it shall be the Israeli
Defence Ministry quarter that has a relatively final say on this subject of bio-molecular disposition reapportionment. Stated and to
reiterate, pursuant to the aforementioned specification, the United States, Canada, and to the Republics for where she is supplying, and
furnishing, extracted as fissionable matter and abetment prosthesis, the limitations set forth are 0,666 low grade C canisters, of
ordnance, limited to 10 megaton explosive yielding charge withstanding, To the extent possible consistent with its primary responsibility
The Russian Federation, the Baltic States, the East European Former States and Enclaves by and for the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics are to enjoy a hospitable total limitation cap and/nor numerical quotation of not an excess of the fair and balanced accounting
herein as projected, 0,666 pieces-grade C chemical weapons of any deploy ability aspect to ration thereon after. Stressing their desires
for long and enduring friendships, in conformity with the accompanying statements furnished in subjective callousness to the Protocols,
Texts, Memorandums Understood, and long lived lifetimes with rhymes for every reason wherein fore hereon. Side winding through the
remaining places and attributions to a charge of weapons possessions whereat, in accordance with its obligations not to exceed the total
aggregate strategically offensive or defensive quantities, for all the worlds landscapes of physics there shall not exceed 0,666, aspect to
ratio par 0,066 for 75, million populace to these agreed amount in writing as not later than 31 December 2,022 pending notifications to
metered disarmament yearly standards at 6.66 % percentile in all nuclear, bio-molecular reduce, disposal, and disassembly supplications,
including nuclear fuel enrichment abetment and coincidental return to magistrates referral as agreed upon by the interest of all. In the
fields of isometric forces and to protect the counter subversive activities and their territorial integrity and in accordance with this Treaty;
if for some reason the Partys to this confirmation willfully, or negligibly violate the said limitable attributes, a citation and penalty
assessment conscript may be issued by the U N Commissioners representing the General Assemblys decision thereof therefore;
(c)
(c) In the exercising of rights and supervision the U N and ,or The Finance Ministry The State of Israel, are considered International
Courts therefore. To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Convention an amount of 1 billion dollars on behalf of The
International Court, and the Israeli Ministry of Justices; per act or fact pertaining to deliberate concealment, or numerical discrepancies
in the cause for nuclear warheads available for purchase; suitcase bombs, crude radioactive devices as so it is to, the financial
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START III AGENDA

responsibility of that State on behalf of the convicted to repatriate U N Ministers of an alliance here withal thereabouts concurrent to date
deploy ability. Upon entry into force of START III the nuclear warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed
heavy bombers, are considered retro-effective as conditions of submergence from START I and II.. In view of the obligations assumed,
for Russia and the United States, the two Partys agreed to reduce one anothers strategic nuclear arsenals to somewhere in between 3800
and 4250 or fewer thereof.. Therefore within the framework of this Article, by December 31, 2,012 that their be ,666 or less, for
explosive low yielding chemical devices on each side sanctified here as. Russia and the U S, and all Independent sponsorships, and
Partys to a status quo shall be considered under orders to collaborate scheduled reduction Agreements as Multinational Contracting
Partys of the Powers thereto here withal.
(d) Apart from the obligations undertaken to the Conventions, .the decision of the supreme interest of the U S Russian entire relative
nuclear explosive detonating forces such as a warhead or multiple warheads, including in particularly the cause of high frequency yield
devices shall be considered priority deactivation sequences and sequential apparatus hereinafter. The zone of application for the purpose
of this Treaty shall include the North and South hemispheres and the breadth of the atmosphere here as therewith. The Partys hereto
establish France, Britain, China and all others believed to be harboring fissile enzymes to a noxious disciple such as is reported as so, are
required to allow U N and U S, Israeli, and their assigned On Site Inspection Teams permanent accessible means to verify said
substantial arsenal contingencies as ordered to do so from star based research and design insignias to the Convention. Aside from the IDF
Treaty series and the START II follow through obligations, all other States or Partys to a weapons grade explosive numerical
identification shall commence disassemble, de-limit, reduce, dispose and employ numerous sentry observation and standby projection
applicable measures to best perform our duty. The secondary Nuclear Powers France, Great Britain, China, and more over, are
considered under orders to reduce, dispose and de-target said nuclear devices for sale and business management to the point of, 066
crude or secondary warheads with low C graded chemical tolerability of frequency yield forgo, devisable at a 6.66 percent yearly agreed
upon reduction radius into force retro activated also by December 31, 2,012. and, cease and desist upgrades in explosive charges with
nuclear contraption engineering such as nuclear warheads of any standard attribution, hydrogen bombs, or warheads of any unit of
bombardment, and any of the sort of mentioning, thermo, and thermal fusion, nor propertys unidentifiable, yet considered to be
identifiably similar in isotopic research as fissile frequency defoliant, to avoid as similarities of reverse polar engineering contraptions by
31 December 2,012, and/or face considerable fines instilled here at thereupon.
For the purpose of providing assurance of the objective stated, operational custody of said devices, to that of which is considered the
higher explosive yield shall positively be given a higher priority interest of dismissal in the strategic deductive or dismantling and
disposal procedures as provided for in this Provisionment in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty
(s), is as follows:

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START III AGENDA

Section 2.

2. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for The Nuclear Powers, The U S and Russia
from START II to START III entry into force, shall not exceed:
(a) 2160, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs;
(b) 1200 for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and
(c) 650, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs. Memorandum of Attribution;
3. Upon fulfillment of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, The U S and Russia shall further reduce and limit its
ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, s, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that
no later than [January 1, 2003] December 31, 2007, and thereafter, the aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with
Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMS, and deployed heavy
bombers, a number between 3000 and 3500 or such lower number as each Party shall agree as such, but in no case shall such number
exceed 3500.
4. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for The Nuclear Powers, The U S and
Russia, their sponsor States as well, shall not exceed:
(a) a number between 1700 and 1750, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMS or such lower number as all insignias intended
victims to a Party shall have agreed so, but in no case shall such number exceed 1750; [Memorandum of Attribution]Same as for all
Partys;
(b) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and same as for all insignias
to a Marquis with similar attribution;
(c) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.; Memorandum of Attribution
5. The process of reductions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall begin upon entry into force of this Treaty, it shall be
sustained throughout the reductions period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, and a 6.66% reduction to aspect ratio per year for
all The Nuclear Powers, shall be the cause for U N penalty assessments fines, and shall be completed no later than [seven years after
entry into force of the START Treaty] December 31, 2012. Upon completion of these reductions, the Parties shall begin further
reductions provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, which shall also be sustained throughout the reductions period defined in
accordance with paragraphs 3 and 6 of this Article.
6. [Provided that the Parties conclude, within one year after entry into force of this Treaty, an agreement on a program of assistance to
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START III AGENDA

promote the fulfillment of the provisions of this Article, the obligations provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article and in Article II
of this Treaty shall be fulfilled by every Party no later than December 31, 2012.] The Parties may conclude an agreement on a program of
assistance for the purpose of facilitating implementation of the provisions of this Article, including for the purpose of accelerating such
implementation.

Article II

1. No later than December 31, 2007, in order to facilitate the aspect to ratio progress as foregoing and in order to insure the peoples
propertys from radioactive debris and said accumulations, permits and termination orders shall be issue of the days we went deliberating
hostile quotations, even so, each Party undertakes to have eliminated or to have converted to launchers of ICBMs to which one warhead
is attributed all its deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this
Treaty (including test launchers and training launchers), without exception, inclusive to those launchers of ICBMs other than heavy
ICBMs at space launch facilities allowed under the START Treaty, and disavowed hereby and not to have thereafter launchers of ICBMs
to which more than one warhead is attributed. ICBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM of a different type shall not
have a capability of launching an ICBM of the pre-existing or modernized attribution therefore. Each Party shall carry out such
elimination or conversion using the procedures provided for in the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided for, in DESBIC
AGENDAS multimodalities nuclear non-proliferation upgrades and revisions, as so called for in this paragraph and in paragraph 3 of
this Article.
2. To insure implementation to the execution of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article each Party to an insignia
decoration is bound by Israeli Firing squad tactics which shall also apply to silo launchers of ICBMs on which the number of warheads
has been reduced to one pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article III and the Partys to this entry of this Treaty.
3. Elimination of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, including test launchers and training launchers, shall be implemented by means of
either:
(a) elimination in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or
Elimination of the Items Subject to the START, II and START III, IVs retroactive implementation to Treatys agendas as fulfill
obligations and; or [Memorandum of Attribution]
(b) conversion to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on
Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs, as
so, for all Partys to a nuclear weapons grade manufactures warning of time tables availability as related for the Treaty Between The
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Nuclear Powers, the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Elimination and Conversion Protocol. No more silo launchers of heavy ICBMs may be so converted.
Memorandum of Attribution]
4. Each Party undertakes not to emplace an ICBM, the launch canister of which has a diameter greater than 2.5 meters, in any silo
launcher of heavy ICBMs converted in accordance with subparagraph 3(b) of this Article.
5. Elimination of launchers of heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities shall be phased out; orders are to be carried out in accordance with
subparagraph 3(a) of this Article.
6. No later than December 31, 2012, each Party undertakes to have eliminated all of its deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs and
their launch canisters in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or by using such
missiles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, and not to have such missiles or launch canisters unless authorized by
The U N General Assembly quorum call as in the cause for engineering modernization developers and space flight to the Lunar surfaces
or as such thereto.
7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections in connection with the elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, as
well as inspections in connection with the conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. Except as otherwise provided for in the
Elimination and Conversion Protocol, such inspections shall be conducted subject to the applicable provisions by the assessment of Israel
of the threats imposed by neighboring ideals and solutions indecisive of the objectives at launching coded reminders of a Saturday that
was once free so then.
8. Each Party undertakes not to transfer heavy ICBMs to any
recipient whatsoever, including any other Party to the START,-I, III, DESBIC-IDF-T. S.
9. Beginning on December 31, 2007, and thereafter, each Party undertakes not to produce, acquire, flight-test (except for flight tests
from space launch facilities conducted in accordance with the provisions of the descriptive encodes entrys as formal Treatys; nor
deploy ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty bearing in mind that the two cut off dates
implied are Governed by United Nations attributable fines annually imposed in light of the 6.66% aspect to ratio disarmament dictates
of martial law therefore.

Article III

1. For the purposes of attributing warheads to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs under this Treaty, the Parties shall, in this Articles
secular denominate secondary etiquette, take Provisionment up and use the provisions provided for in Article III of the START Treaty,
except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article.
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2. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs only of existing
types, except for heavy ICBMs. Reduction in the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs of existing
types that are not heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty,
except that: in as much as so follows;
(a) the aggregate number by which warheads are reduced may not exceed the 1250 limit provided for in paragraph 5 of Article III of the
START Treaty
(b) the number by which warheads are reduced on ICBMs and SLBMS, other than the Minuteman III ICBM for the United States of
America and the SS-N-18 SLBM for the Russian Federation, may at any one time not exceed the limit of 666 warheads for each Party
provided for herewith subparagraph 5(c)(i) of Article III of the START Treaty ;
each Party shall have no such right to reduce by more than four warheads, but not by more than five warheads, the number of
warheads attributed to each ICBM out of no more than 105 ICBMs of one existing type of ICBM. An ICBM to which the number of
warheads attributed has been reduced, because all ICBMs and are to be disassembled and all nuclear war heads are to be destroyed not
later than 2,012, December 31 in accordance with this paragraph shall never anymore be deployed in an ICBM launcher in which an
ICBM of that type was deployed as of the date of signature of the START Treaty; RE: DESBIC AGENDAS IDF Treaty Series START
I, II, II & NPT II; and
(d) the reentry vehicle platform for an ICBM or SLBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed is required to be destroyed
and a new reentry vehicle platform. is a matter of 6.66% upgrades for the said limitations discussed in DESBIC ABENDA for chemical
low frequency yield property exceptions where the aggregate integers provided for are U S, U N, Russia and Formers, and China 0,666
non-ICBM chemical low C graded agreed to frequency yield non-explosive devices and no biological weapons or devices of such to
orders and such as that chemical property not much more lethal than agent orange therefore whatsoever therein.
3. Notwithstanding the number of warheads attributed to a type of ICBM or SLBM in accordance with the purpose of a Treaty, each
Party undertakes not to:
(a)produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to
within the grounds of recognizing Israels rights to existence, as it is to supply it under terms of this Treaty; nor
(b) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM that has had the number of warheads attributed to it reduced in
accordance with the provisions of this Article. [ Memorandums and Attribution]

Article IV

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1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of warheads attributed to each deployed heavy bombers shall be equal to the number of
nuclear weapons for which any heavy bomber of the same type or variant of a type is actually equipped, with the exception of heavy
bombers reoriented to a conventional role as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article. Each nuclear weapon for which a heavy bomber
is actually equipped shall count as one warhead toward the limitations provided for in Article I of this Treaty. For the purpose of such
counting, nuclear weapons include long-range nuclear air-launched , nuclear warhead accounting with numerous sentry detail assigned to
guard your safety monitors average Intelligences aspect to ratio consideration of the weapons grade crude device management
teleprompter as such are (ALCMs), nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers, and nuclear bombs.
2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall be the number
specified for heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type in the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy
Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the Nuclear Powers, the United States of America, the Russian Federation and all Jungle
areas of incalculable measurements on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the
Memorandum on Attribution.
3. Each Party undertakes not to equip any heavy bomber with a greater number of nuclear weapons than the number specified for heavy
bombers of that type or variant of a type in the aforementioned descriptive and a Memorandum on Attribution. Therewith;
4. No later than 180 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a
type specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the number of
nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber of a given type or variant of a type is capable friendly a payload bank can appear, as actually
equipped.
5. If either Party intends to change the number of nuclear weapons specified in the Memorandums of Combined efforts on Attribution,
for which a heavy bomber of a type or variant of a type is actually equipped, it shall provide a 90-day advance notification of such
intention to the other Party. Ninety days after providing such a notification or at a later date agreed by the Parties, the Party changing the
number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each such type or variant
of a type. The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the revised number of nuclear weapons for which
heavy bombers of the specified type or variant of a type are actually equipped. The number of nuclear weapons attributed to the specified
type and variant of a type of heavy bomber shall change on the ninetieth day after the notification of such intent. On that day, the Party
changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall provide to the other Party a notification of
each change in data according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum on Attribution. However the 90 day advance notice
section denotes an intention to comply and is strongly advised that we not seek to competitively supply industrial railcars of a passage
whereat.
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6. The exhibitions and inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the
procedures provided for in the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between The Nuclear
Powers, the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections. However in accordance to the Final Recommendation the
participating status quo to an insignia agree to undertake the responsibilities as do the United States and Russia and The Nuclear
Powers, to disassembly standards Protocol as specified to do so or willing to force an evacuation efforts should be made to create a
suitable environment to altercate in another manner hereof.
7. Each Party shall have the right to reorient to a conventional role heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range
nuclear ALCMS. For the purposes of this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are those heavy bombers specified by
a Party from among its heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs that have never been
accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMS. The reorienting Party shall provide to
the other Party a notification of its intent to reorient a heavy bomber to a conventional role no less than 90 days in advance of such
reorientation; conversion procedures shall be required for such a heavy bomber to be specified as a heavy bomber reoriented to a
conventional role.
8. Heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role shall be subject to the following requirements
(a) the number of such heavy bombers shall not exceed 100 between them at 50 apiece at any one time for the U S and the Soviet Empire
by reason of close military exercise and joint supplications to the former Republics, as so the same for the United Nations contingencies,
so as to be stated perspective of an aspect to ratio disarmament Protocol objective herein;
(b) such heavy bombers shall be based separately from heavy bombers with nuclear roles; [
such heavy bombers shall be used only for non-nuclear missions. Such heavy bombers shall not be used in exercises for nuclear
missions, and their aircrews shall not train or exercise for such missions; and
(d) heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall have differences from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that
are observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.
9. Each Party shall have every right to return a nuclear role heavy bombers
that has been reoriented in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article to a conventional role. The Party carrying out such action shall
provide to the other Party through diplomatic channels notification of its intent to return a heavy bomber no less than 90 days in advance
of taking such action. Such a heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role would be considered counterpoint, and only subsequently be
reoriented to a conventional role. Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall have differences observable by national technical
means of verification and visible during inspection from other heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that have not been
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reoriented to a conventional role, as well as from heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that are still reoriented to a
conventional role.
10. Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than 100 kilometers from any air base where heavy
bombers reoriented to a conventional role are based.
11. Except as otherwise provided for in this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall remain subject to the
provisions of Treaty, including the inspection provisions.
12. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type are reoriented to a conventional role, one heavy bomber of each type or
variant of a type of heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of demonstrating to the
other Party the differences referred to in subparagraph 8(d) of this Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other
Partys.
13. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional role are returned to a nuclear role, it will be
considered a retractable citation subject to fines and, or sanctions therefore one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type of heavy
bomber shall not be returned to a nuclear role so be an exhibition in the open for the purpose of demonstrating to the other Partys the
differences referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the On Site Inspection Agencys
and other collective arrangements of the duly sworn approach to detonation powers here when;
14. The exhibitions and inspections provided for in paragraphs 12 and 13 of this Article shall be carried out in accordance with the
procedures provided for in the START II Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections.

Article V

1. Except as provided for in this Treaty, the provisions of the NPT-,II and START, II, III, , and DESBIC IDF Treaty Series, including
the verification provisions, shall be used for implementation of this unconditional responsibility;
2. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Multilateral
Implementation Commission, (MIC). The MIC Commission shall be an impartial unbiased conciliatory Israeli bonded branch of the
United Nations Organization for International accordance. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the
framework of the Multilateral Implementation Commission to:
(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and
(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

Article VI

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START III AGENDA

1. This Treaty, including its Memorandum on Attribution., Elimination and Conversion Protocol, and Protocol on Exhibitions and
Inspections, DESBIC AGENDA, START III, IDF Treaty Series NPT-II, INF, and its executions , all of which are integral parts thereof,
shall be compulsory and bound by ratification in accordance with the constitutional Faith here withal of each Party. This Treaty has
entered into force the date of the exchange has been modified and subsequently waived as full powers delivered in all manner of
instrumental acceptance, the designation of Depositary status quo shall constitute authorization for it to perform the acts specified in the
proceeding paragraph;
2. The provisions of paragraph 8 of Article II of this Treaty shall be applied provisionally by the Parties from the date of its signature.
3. This Treaty shall remain in force and is of unlimited duration here withal we do.
4. Make known to all who come to call by these presents; All Partys to a State in any manner of etiquette shall be Contracted as
requirements herein therefore to suggest other wise to rescind or withdraw from this Treaty constitutes a breach of International security.
All nuclear energy utility status memberships are a nay say for fire works displays it cant be a matter of options on the disc Ill never
received. All Partys were bound to it so stipulated tonight. Therefore in and if extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this
Treaty have produced an enzyme of sparks; it will be deemed as the choice of judgment and the sign of the end to come for mankind
sooner then we suck you said hello;

Article VII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures
governing the principles of an entry into force of this Treaty Series and Compact of the SORT..

Article VIII

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Revised: DONE at H B. U S A. on the 13th day of May 2,005 in the English language; text being authentic.

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START III AGENDA

** IN WITNESS WHEREOF DONE FOR; THE

STATE OF ISRAEL; THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA; ALL INSIGNIAS TO AN MARQUIS;
AND ALL ENSIGNS TO AN UNITED NATIONS
ORGANIZATION; NATO ALLIANCES; THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION(S); THE REPUBLIC OF
JAPAN; HERETO THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF
CHINA AND SPONSORED STATES; OF FAITH
WHEREFORE IN GODS WILL WE TRUST
HEREINAFTER AMEN

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START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

START III TREATY

MEMORANDUM *

OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THE PEOPLES STATE OF ISRAEL
THE UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLYS THE NUCLEAR POWERS
AND ALL ENSIGNS TO THE STATES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
PROVISIONAL APPLICATION ON FURTHER DISPOSAL REDUCTION AND
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION

The United States of America, The Peoples State of Israel, The United Nations
Organization, and All Insignias to a Marquis, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all humanity,
that it cannot be won and must never be fought,
Convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of
strategic
obligations set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear
war and strengthen International peace and
security,
Recognizing that the interests of the Parties and the interests of international
security require the strengthening of strategic stability,
Mindful of their undertakings with regard to strategic offensive arms in Article VI
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968; Article
XI of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26,
1972; the dangers of nuclear detonation combust able matters, and the Washington
Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990,

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Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I
Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty, and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this
Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding.

ARTICLE II
1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBM s and
SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, heavy
bomber armaments, and all nuclear and biological components such as warheads of
any standard displacement, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty
and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of
this Treaty, do not exceed:
(a) 000, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBM s and
their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, including 000 for
deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers; [RF MOU, Section II] [US
MOU, Section II The United National Accounting, (U N] [Agreed State of
Protocols as Referred to as the IDF Treaty Series ]
(b) 0000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBM s, and
deployed heavy bombers, including: [START III, Art. I,5]
(i) 0000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBM s;
(ii) 0000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of
ICBMs;
(iii) 0000, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs. [phased heavy
reductions)
2. Each Party shall implement the reductions pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article
in to multiple phases, so that its strategic offensive arms do not exceed:
(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 31 December 2,007,after entry
into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:
(i) 0,666, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBM s
and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers;

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(ii) 0,666, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBM s, and
deployed heavy bombers;
(iii) 0.666, warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBM s;
(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than 31 December 2,017 after
entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:
(i) 0,000, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBM s
and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers;
(ii) 0,000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBM s, and
deployed heavy bombers;
(iii) 0,000, warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBM s;
(c) by the end of the third phase, and with attributable fines sanctioned and
impugned, that is, no later than 31 December 2,022 after entry into force of this
Treaty: the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
reduced and disposed of properly to the points of aggregate uniform numerical
contingencies of 0,000, including crude radioactive contraptions thereupon
3. Each Party shall limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs and
deployed SLBM s so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and
thereafter such aggregate throw-weight does not exceed 10% per annum
accumulative reduction aspect to ratio of metric tons. [Throw-weight Limits/
Provisions Provided hereupon for Types of ICBMs and SLBM s]

4. If under any circumstances a Party to the Provisions of this entry are not in
standard conformity of the per annum 10% aspect to ratio reduction phase of
uniform disarmament Protocols; a Promissory report must be received by the U N
Supervisory Unit, The Chief of Staffs U S and Israeli Defense quarters; and a
determination will be made if any late charges or penalty fees are to be assessed
thereto

ARTICLE III

1. For the purposes of counting toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for
in subparagraphs 1(a), 2(a)(i), and 2(b)(i) of Article II of this Treaty:
(a) Each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit;
each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher; shall be counted as one unit.

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(b) Each deployed heavy bombers shall be counted as one unit.

2. For the purposes of counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers and
deployed SLBM s and their associated launchers
(a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs and each deployed launcher of SLBM s shall
be considered to contain one deployed ICBM or one deployed SLBM, respectively.
(b) If a deployed ICBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile
has not been installed in that launcher, such an ICBM removed from its launcher
and located at that ICBM base shall continue to be considered to be contained in
that launcher.
(c) If a deployed SLBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile
has not been installed in that launcher, such an SLBM removed from its launcher
shall be considered to be contained in that launcher. Such an SLBM removed from
its launcher shall be located only at a facility at which non-deployed SLBM s may
be located pursuant to subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of this Treaty or be in
movement to such a facility.
3. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBM s:
(a) For ICBMs or SLBM s that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the
first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an
ICBM or SLBM of that type.
(b) For ICBMs or SLBM s that are maintained, stored, and transported as
assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular
type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
(c) For ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in
launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister,
shall be considered to be an ICBM of that type.
(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM from the time it
first leaves a facility at which an ICBM is installed in it until an ICBM has been
launched from it or until an ICBM has been removed from it for elimination. a
launch canisters shall not be considered to contain an ICBM if it contains a
training model of a missile or has been placed on static display . Launch
canisters for ICBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch
canisters for ICBMs of a different type.
4. For the purposes of counting warheads:
(a) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of each existing type

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shall be the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding [RF MOU,

Section I] [US MOU, Section I]on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to
this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.
(b) The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new
type shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or
SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. The number of warheads that will be
attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of an existing
design with multiple reentry vehicles, or to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with
one reentry vehicle, shall be no less than the nearest integer that is smaller than the
result of dividing 40 percent of the accountable throw-weight of the ICBM or
SLBM by the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested on an ICBM of
SLBM of a new type. In the case of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with or of
warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM of SLBM of a new type with a front
section of a fundamentally new design, the question of the applicability of the 40-
percent rule to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be subject to agreement within the
framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Until agreement
has been reached regarding the rule that will apply to such an ICBM or SLBM, the
number of warheads that will be attributed to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be
subject, as considered the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an
ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. The number of new types of
ICBMs or SLBM s with a front section of a fundamentally new design shall not
exceed two for each Party as long as this Treaty remains in force.[Agreed State to
upgrade expect abilities Pursuant of DESBIC AGENDA Article IV Section 7s
exclusive limitations set forth for lower yield frequency chemical formulation
ordnance acceptances here with thereabouts.]
(c) The number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM has been flight-
tested shall be considered to be the sum of the number of reentry vehicles actually
released during the flight test, plus the number of procedures for dispensing reentry
vehicles performed during that same flight test when no reentry vehicle was
released. A procedure for dispensing penetration aids shall not be considered to be
a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, provided that the procedure for
dispensing penetration aids differs from a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.
(d) Each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be one
warhead.

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(e) For the United States of America, by 31 December 2,012 each heavy bomber
equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 66 such heavy bombers,
shall be attributed[MOU US Section I] with six warheads. Each heavy bomber
equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 66 such heavy bombers shall
be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the number of long-range nuclear
ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The United States of America shall
specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in
excess of 66 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at
which they are based. The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each
heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 66 such heavy
bombers is considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of
long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant
is actually equipped.[category]
(f) For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to that very same time reference
afore specified, each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to
a total of 66 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed[MOU RF Section I] with six
warheads. Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess
of 66 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to
the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for
long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 66 such heavy bombers by
number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. The number of
long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range
nuclear ALCMs in excess of 66 such heavy bombers is considered to be actually
equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a
heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped.[category]

Article IV

Each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear
ALCMs shall be attributed[MOU US Section I] [MOU RF Section I] with one
warhead. All heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be
considered to be heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-
range nuclear ALCMs, with the exception of heavy bombers equipped for non-

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nuclear armaments, test heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers. [category]
[START II, Art. IV.1,2]
5. Each Party shall reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBM
s only of existing types, up to an aggregate number of 66 by the time references
indicative o f progressive engagement afore specified as 31 December 2,012 at any
one time. [START III Art III. 2 (a)]
(a) Such aggregate number shall consist of the following:
(i) for the United States of America, the reduction in the number of warheads
attributed to the type of ICBM designated by the United States of America as, and
known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman III, plus the
reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBM s of no more
than two other existing types except whereas upgrades and revision are or were not
accounted for; the same is for Russia, also recognized to be in charge and the
supplier of weapons grade uranium exportation inter alia The Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of four multiplied by the number of
deployed SLBM s designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RSM-
50, which is known to the United States of America as SS-N-18, [MOU RF
Section III]plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and
SLBM s of no more than two other existing types forgo the afore mentioned
upgrades and descriptive to date 31 December 2,012 .
(b) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to Minuteman III shall be
carried out subject to the following:
(i) Minuteman III to which different numbers of warheads are attributed shall not
be deployed at the same ICBM base.
(ii) Any such reductions shall be carried out no later than seven years after entry
into force of this Treaty.
(iii) The reentry vehicle platform of each Minuteman III to which a reduced number
of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle
platform.
(c) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBM s of
types other than Minuteman III shall be carried out subject to the following:
(i) Such reductions include disassembly multi National standing and numerous
sentry observation are urged to reduce and dispose at a 10% per annum aspect to

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ratio as ascertained, however within a 30 day period reduction oversight may be

limited to 500 warheads at any one time for each Party ; inclusive of the same
relative abstracts pursuant of these Provisions of The Nuclear Powers, who as a
combined assertion are collectively assumed to be in possession and control of the
same amounts comb natively articulating, as the said U S Russian dealers of those
enchantments; and in furtherance for the mark of suggestion the abstracts,
timetables, descriptions of Weapon of Mass Destruction, hereinafter referred to as
WMD, are duly subject to the coinciding aspect to ratio disarmament obligations
here withal. [START II Art III.2(b)]
(ii) Afore and after a Party has reduced the number of warheads attributed to
ICBMs or SLBM s of two existing types, that Party shall delimitate and continue to
reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBM s of any additional
type.

(III) SLBM s of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are
attributed, shall be discontinued as of not later than 31 December 2,012 and are not
be deployed on submarines based at submarine bases adjacent to International or
internal water destinations, arrivals, Ports of Call adversary air and sovereign
territorial bounds therein.
(IV) If the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type
is reduced by more than two, the reentry vehicle platform of each ICBM or SLBM
to which such a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed
herein. (d) A Party
shall not have the right to attribute to ICBMs of a new type a number of warheads
greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any ICBM to which that
Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of
this paragraph. A Party shall not have the right to attribute to SLBM s of a new
type a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed
to any SLBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads
pursuant to31 December 2,012 and subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.
6. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to the
limitations provided for in this Treaty as follows:
(a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility for
mobile launchers of ICBMs;

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(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when excavation for that launcher has been
completed and if and when the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed,
or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier;
(d) for the purpose of counting a deployed ICBM and its associated launcher, a silo
launchers of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when
excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the
silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever
occurs earlier, and a mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a
deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility, even so as for the non-
deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article
IV of this Treaty, or when it leaves an ICBM loading facility;
(e) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
(f) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is
first launched;
(g) for the purpose of counting a deployed SLBM and its associated launcher, an
SLBM launcher shall be considered to contain a deployed SLBM when the
submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched
(h) a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, when its airframe is first brought out
of the shop, plant, or building in which components of a heavy bomber or former
heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is
first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes
are converted to heavy bomber or former heavy bomber airframes. [Agreed State
12]

Article V

7. ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers that have been converted to launch an
ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of a different type shall not be capable of launching
an ICBM or SLBM of the previous type. Such converted launchers shall be
considered to be launchers of ICBMs or SLBM s of that different type as follows:
(a) a silo launchers of ICBMs, when an ICBM of a different type or a training
model of a missile of a different type is first installed in that launcher, or when the

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silo door is reinstalled, whichever occurs first;

(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, as agreed within the framework of the Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission;
(c) an SLBM launcher, when all launchers on the submarine on which that launcher
is installed have been converted to launch an SLBM of that different type and that
submarine begins sea trials, that is, when that submarine first operates under its
own power away from the harbor or port in which the conversion of launchers was
performed.
8. Heavy bombers that have been converted into heavy bombers of a different
category or into former heavy bombers shall be considered to be heavy bombers of
that different category or former heavy bombers as follows:
(a) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear
ALCMs converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs,
when it is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building where it was equipped for
long-range nuclear ALCMs;
.
9. For the purposes of this Treaty:
(a) A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter
objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a
ballistic missile to which the limitations provided for in this Treaty apply.
(b) If a ballistic missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all
ballistic missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.
(c) If a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all
cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.
(d) If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has contained an ICBM or SLBM
of a particular type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBM s of
that type. If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has been converted into a
launcher of ICBMs or SLBM s of a different type, it shall be considered to be a
launcher of ICBMs or SLBM s of the type for which it has been converted.
(e) If a heavy bomber is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all heavy
bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear
ALCMs, except those that are not so equipped and are distinguishable from heavy
bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. If long-range
nuclear ALCMs have not been flight-tested from any heavy bomber of a particular

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type, no heavy bomber of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-
range nuclear ALCMs. Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for long-
range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than
long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments,
a training heavy bomber, and a former heavy bomber shall be distinguishable from
one another.
(f) Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-
tested from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988, shall be considered to
be a long-range nuclear ALCM. Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of
which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31,
2,007, shall be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM if it is a long-range
non-nuclear ALCM and is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. Long-
range non-nuclear ALCMs not so distinguishable shall be considered to be long-
range nuclear ALCMs.
(g) Mobile launchers of ICBMs of each new type of ICBM shall be distinguishable
from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs and from mobile
launchers of ICBMs of other new type of ICBMs. Such new launchers, with their
associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of
ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed, and
from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs with their
associated missiles installed.
(h) Mobile launchers of ICBMs converted into launchers of ICBMs of another type
of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous
type of ICBM. Such converted launchers, with their associated missiles installed,
shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of
ICBM with their associated missiles installed. Conversion of mobile launchers of
ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed within the
framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
10. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:
(a) Existing types of ICBMs and SLBM s are:
(i) for the United States of America, the types of missiles designated by the United
States of America as Minuteman II, Minuteman III, Peacekeeper, Poseidon, Trident
I, and Trident II, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as
Minuteman II, Minuteman III, MX, Poseidon, Trident I, Trident II, and other

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respectively;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-10, RS-12, RS-16, RS-20, RS-18,
RS-22, RS-12M, RSM-25, RSM-40, RSM-50, RSM-52, and RSM-54, which are
known to the United States of America as SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, SS-
24, SS-25, SS-N-6, SS-N-8, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23, and other
respectively.
(b) Existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and all other insignias
to a missile complex.:
(i) for the United States of America, the type of missile designated by the United
States of America as Peacekeeper, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics as MX;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-22 and RS-12M, which are known to
the United States of America as SS-24 and SS-25, respectively.
(c) Former types of ICBMs and SLBM s are the types of missiles designated by the
United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
as, Minuteman I and Polaris A-3.
(d) Existing types of heavy bombers are:
(i) for the United States of America, the types of bombers designated by the United
States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-
52, B-1, and B-2;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of bombers designated by
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95 and Tu-160, which are known to
the United States of America as Bear and Blackjack, respectively. [Soviet TU-22M
Declaration]
(e) Existing types of long-range nuclear ALCMs are:
(i) for the United States of America, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs
designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics as, AGM-86B and AGM-129;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of long-range nuclear
ALCMs designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RKV-500A and
RKV-500B, which are known to the United States of America as AS-15 A and AS-
15 B, respectively. [Nuclear SLCM Policy Declarations]
[Agreed State 28]

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ARTICLE VI

1. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be

based only in restricted areas. A restricted area shall not exceed five square
kilometers in size and shall not overlap another restricted area. No more than ten
deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be
based or located in a restricted area. A restricted area shall not contain deployed
ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of more than one type of ICBM.
2. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers
of ICBMs within each restricted areas so that these structures shall not be capable
of containing more road-mobile launchers of ICBMs than the number of road-
mobile launchers of ICBMs specified for that restricted area. 3. Each
restricted area shall be located within a deployment area. A deployment area shall
not exceed 125,000 square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another
deployment area. A deployment area shall contain no more than one ICBM base for
road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.
4. Deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be
based only in rail garrisons. Each Party shall have no more than seven rail
garrisons. No point on a portion of track located inside a rail garrison shall be more
than 20 kilometers from any entrance/exit for that rail garrison. This distance shall
be measured along the tracks. A rail garrison shall not overlap another rail
garrison. 5. Each rail garrison shall have no more than two rail entrances/
exits. Each such entrance/exit shall have no more than two separate sets of tracks
passing through it (a total of four rails).
6. Each Party shall limit the number of parking sites in each rail garrison to no more
than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison.
Each rail garrison shall have no more than five parking sites.
7. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of
ICBMs in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard
configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each such structure shall contain no
more than one train of standard configuration. 8. Each rail garrison shall contain no
more than one maintenance facility.

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9. Deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave
restricted areas or rail garrisons only for routine movements, relocations, or
dispersals [XIII.1] [XIV.1]. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their
associated missiles may leave deployment areas only for relocations or operational
dispersals.
10. Relocations shall be completed within 25 days. No more than 15 percent of the
total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated
missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater,
may be outside restricted areas at any one time for the purpose of relocation. No
more than 20 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of
ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated
missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside rail garrisons at any one time for the
purpose of relocation.
11. No more than 50 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers
of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be engaged in routine movements at
any one time
12. All trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated
missiles of a particular type shall be of one standard configuration. All such trains
shall conform to that standard configuration except those taking part in routine
movements, relocations, or dispersals, and except that portion of a train remaining
within a rail garrisons after the other portion of such a train has departed for the
maintenance facility associated with that rail garrison, has been relocated to another
facility, or has departed the rail garrison for routine movement. Except for
dispersals, notification of variations from standard configuration shall be provided
thereupon.

ARTICLE VII

1. Conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms, fixed structures for

mobile launchers of ICBMs, and facilities shall be carried out pursuant to this
Article and in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or
Elimination Protocol. Conversion and elimination shall be verified by national
technical means of verification and by inspection as provided for in Articles IX and

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XI of this Treaty; in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol; and in the Protocol on

Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to this Treaty,
hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol.
2. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers,
heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and support equipment shall be subject to
the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated, or
otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, in
accordance with
procedures.
3. ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBM s shall be subject to the
limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated by rendering
them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose, using procedures at
the discretion of the Party possessing the ICBMs or SLBM s.
4.The elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of
ICBMs, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and bombers shall be carried out at
conversion or elimination facilities,. A launch canister [Launch Canister Letters]
remaining at a test range or ICBM base after the flight test of an ICBM for mobile
launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated in the open or at a conversion or
elimination facility,

ARTICLE VIII

1. A data base pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty is set forth in the
Memorandum of Understanding, in which data with respect to items subject to the
limitations provided for in this Treaty are listed according to categories of
data. 2. In order to ensure the
fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty, each Party shall notify the
other Party of changes in data, as provided for in subparagraph 3(a) of this Article,
and shall also provide other notifications required by paragraph 3 of this Article, in
accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this
Article, the Notification Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol.
3. Each Party shall provide to the other Party, in accordance with the Notification
Protocol, and, for subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, in accordance with Section III
of the Inspection Protocol:[Agreed State 37]

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(a) notifications concerning data with respect to items subject to the limitations
provided for in this Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the
Memorandum of Understanding and other agreed categories of data;[Agreed State
21]
(b) notifications concerning movement of items subject to the limitations provided
for in this Treaty;
(c) notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection
with the Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight [MOU, Section I] Relating to
this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Throw-weight Protocol;
(d) notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the
limitations provided for in this Treaty or elimination of facilities subject to this
Treaty;
(e) notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of
national technical means of verification;
(f) notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBM s and notifications
concerning telemetric information; [Launch Notification Agreement]
(g) notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds;
[Agreed State 2]
(h) notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided
pursuant to this paragraph, including the rescheduling of activities;
(i) notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities; and
(j) notifications concerning operational dispersals.
4. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for
continuous communication between the Parties, to provide and receive notifications
in accordance with the Notification Protocol and the Inspection Protocol, unless
otherwise provided for in this Treaty, and to acknowledge receipt of such
notifications no later than one hour after receipt.
5. If a time is to be specified in a notification provided pursuant to this Article, that
time shall be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. If only a date is to be specified
in a notification, that date shall be specified as the 24-hour period that corresponds
to the date in local time, expressed in Greenwich Mean Time.
6. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, each Party shall have the right to
release to the public all data current as of September 1, 1990, that are listed in the

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Memorandum of Understanding, as well as the photographs that are appended

thereto. Geographic coordinates and site diagrams that are received pursuant to the
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic
Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty of July 31, 1991, shall not be
released to the public unless otherwise agreed. The Parties shall hold consultations
on releasing to the public data and other information provided pursuant to this
Article or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in this
Treaty. The provisions of this Article shall not affect the rights and obligations of
the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other information to
those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or
other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations
provided for in this Treaty. [Statements on Release to Public]

ARTICLE IX

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal
in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of
verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph l of this
Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use concealment measures that impede verification,
by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty. In this connection, the obligation not to use concealment measures
includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result
in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBM s, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or the
association between ICBMs or SLBM s and their launchers during testing. The
obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment
practices at ICBM bases and deployment areas, or to the use of environmental
shelters for strategic offensive arms.
4. To aid verification, each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have a
unique identifier as provided for in the Inspection Protocol.

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ARTICLE X

1. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test
shall make on-board technical measurements and shall broadcast all telemetric
information obtained from such measurements. The Party conducting the flight test
shall determine which technical parameters are to be measured during such flight
test, as well as the methods of processing and transmitting telemetric information.
2. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test
undertakes not to engage in any activity that denies full access to telemetric
information, including: [Statements on Encryption & Jamming]
(a) the use of encryption;
(b) the use of jamming;
(c) broadcasting telemetric information from an ICBM or SLBM using narrow
directional beaming; and
(d) encapsulation of telemetric information, including the use of eject able capsules
or recoverable reentry vehicles..
3. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test
undertakes not to broadcast from reentry vehicles. telemetric information that
pertains to the functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism
of the ICBM or SLBM.
4. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test
shall provide, in accordance with Section I of the Protocol on Telemetric
Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry
Protocol, tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is
broadcast during the flight test.
5. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test
shall provide, in accordance with Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, data
associated with the analysis of the telemetric information.[Agreed State 35]
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, each Party
shall have the right to encapsulate and encrypt on-board technical measurements
during no more than a total of eleven flight tests of ICBMs or SLBM s each year.
Of these eleven flight tests each year, no more than four shall be flight tests of
ICBMs or SLBM s of each type, any missile of which has been flight-tested with a
self-contained dispensing mechanism. Such encapsulation shall be carried out in

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accordance with Section I and paragraph 1 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol,
and such encryption shall be carried out in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section
III of the Telemetry Protocol. Encapsulation and encryption that are carried out on
the same flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall count as two flight tests against the
quotas specified in this paragraph.[Agreed State 31]

ARTICLE XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections and continuous
monitoring activities and shall conduct exhibitions pursuant to this Article and the
Inspection Protocol. Inspections, continuous monitoring activities, and exhibitions
shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection
Protocol and the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. [item of inspection] [size
criteria][Agreed State 36]
2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections at facilities to
confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such
facilities in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of
Section I of the Notification Protocol. [facility inspections at] [Agreed State 10]
3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections at facilities to
confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such
facilities in the notifications and regular exchanges of updated data provided in
accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.
[facility inspections at] [Agreed State 10]
4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections to confirm the
accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified in the notifications of
new facilities provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the
Notification Protocol.[facility inspections at]
5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections to confirm that
covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of
first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring. [facility inspections at] [Joint State
on Site Diagrams]
6. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections of

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deployed ICBMs and SLBM s to confirm that such ballistic missiles contain no
more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them.[facility
inspections]
7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-exercise dispersal inspections of
deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles to confirm that
the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that are
located at the inspected ICBM bases and those that have not returned to it after
completion of the dispersal does not exceed the number specified for that ICBM
base.
8. Each Party shall conduct or shall have the right to conduct conversion or
elimination inspections to confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic
offensive arms.
9. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections to confirm that
the elimination of facilities has been completed.
10. Each Party shall have the right to conduct formerly declared facility inspections
to confirm that facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided
in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, are not
being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.
11. Each Party shall conduct technical characteristics exhibitions, and shall have the
right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections of an ICBM
and an SLBM of each type, and each variant thereof, and of a mobile launcher of
ICBMs and each version of such launcher for each type of ICBM for mobile
launchers of ICBMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the
inspecting Party to confirm that technical characteristics correspond to the data
specified for these items.
12. Each Party shall conduct distinguish ability exhibitions for heavy bombers,
former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs, and shall have the right
during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of:
(a) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such
exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical
characteristics of each type and each variant of such heavy bombers correspond to
the data specified for these items in Annex G to the Memorandum of
Understanding; to demonstrate the maximum number of long-range nuclear
ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and each variant is actually

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equipped; and to demonstrate that this number does not exceed the number
provided for in paragraph 20 or21 of Article V of this Treaty, as applicable;
(b) for each type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range nuclear
ALCM has been flight-tested, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments
other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers. If, for such a type
of heavy bomber, there are no heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear
ALCMs, a test heavy bomber from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been
flight-tested shall be exhibited. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to
demonstrate to the inspecting Party that, for each exhibited type of heavy bomber,
each variant of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-
range nuclear ALCMs, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments, each variant of training heavy bombers, and a former heavy bomber are
distinguishable from one another and from each variant of heavy bombers of the
same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and
(c) long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit
the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and
each variant of such long-range ALCMs correspond to the data specified for these
items in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding. The further purpose of
such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate differences, notification of which has been
provided in accordance with paragraph 13, 14, or 15 of Section VII of the
Notification Protocol, that make long-range non-nuclear ALCMs distinguishable
from long-range nuclear ALCMs.
13. Each Party shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and shall have the right during
such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of all heavy bombers
equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all
training heavy bombers, and all former heavy bombers specified in the initial
exchange of data provided.. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to
demonstrate to the inspecting Party that such airplanes satisfy the requirements for.
After a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber of a
type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM had previously been flight-
tested, the Party conducting the flight test shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and
the other Party shall have the right during such exhibitions to conduct inspections,
of 30 percent of the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs of

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such type equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs at
each air base specified for such heavy bombers. The purpose of these exhibitions
shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party the presence of specified features
that make each exhibited heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of the
same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
14. Each Party shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at
production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm the
number of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs produced.[Agreed State]
[facilities] [Site Surveys Letters]

ARTICLE XII

1. To enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification, each

Party shall, if the other Party makes a request in accordance with the Protocol, carry
out the following cooperative measures:
(a) a display in the open of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within
restricted areas specified by the requesting Party. The number of road-mobile
launchers of ICBMs based at the restricted areas specified in each such request
shall not exceed ten percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers
of ICBMs of the requested Party, and such launchers shall be contained within one
ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. For each specified restricted area,
the roofs of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be open for
the duration of a display. The road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the
restricted area shall be displayed either located next to or moved halfway out of
such fixed structures;
(b) a display in the open of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at parking
sites specified by the requesting Party. Such launchers shall be displayed by
removing the entire train from its fixed structure and locating the train within the
rail garrison. The number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to display
pursuant to each such request shall include all such launchers located at no more
than eight parking sites, provided that no more than two parking sites may be
requested within any one rail garrison in any one request. Requests concerning
specific parking sites shall include the designation for each parking site as provided
for in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding; and[

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(c) a display in the open of all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers located
within one air base specified by the requesting Party, except those heavy bombers
and former heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or
operations. Such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall be displayed by
removing the entire airplane from its fixed structure, if any, and locating the
airplane within the air base. Those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at the
air base specified by the requesting Party that are not readily movable due to
maintenance or operations shall be specified by the requested Party in a notification
provided in accordance with Protocol. Such a notification shall be provided no
later than 12 hours after the request for display has been made.
2. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy
bombers, and former heavy bombers subject to each request pursuant to paragraph
1 of this Article shall be displayed in open view without using concealment
measures. Each Party shall have the right to make seven such requests each year,
but shall not request a display at any particular ICBM base for road-mobile
launchers of ICBMs, any particular parking site, or any particular air base more
than two times each year. A Party shall have the right to request, in any single
request, only a display of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a display of rail-mobile
launchers of ICBMs, or a display of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. A
display shall begin no later than 12 hours after the request is made and shall
continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that the request was made. If the
requested Party cannot conduct a display due to circumstances brought about by
force major, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party in accordance with
Protocol, and the display shall be cancelled. In such a case, the number of requests
to which the requesting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.
3. A request for cooperative measures shall not be made for a facility that has been
designated for inspection until such an inspection has been completed and the
inspectors have departed the facility. A facility for which cooperative measures
have been requested shall not be designated for inspection until the cooperative
measures have been completed or until notification has been provided in
accordance with Protocol.

ARTICLE XIII

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1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct exercise dispersal of deployed mobile
launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles from restricted areas or rail
garrisons. Such an exercise dispersal may involve either road-mobile launchers of
ICBMs or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or both road-mobile launchers of
ICBMs and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Exercise dispersals of deployed
mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be conducted as
provided for below:
(a) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II
of the Notification Protocol.
(b) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and
time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of
Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(c) Those ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the notification
provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol
shall be considered to be involved in exercise dispersal.
(d) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and
their associated missiles engaged in a routine movement from a restricted area or
rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in
such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal.
b(e) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and
their associated missiles engaged in a relocation from a restricted area or rail
garrisons of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such
a dispersal shall continue to be considered to be engaged in a relocation.
Notification of the completion of the relocation shall be provided in accordance
with paragraph 10 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of
the completion of the relocation was provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of
Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(f) During an exercise dispersal, all deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their
associated missiles that depart a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for
mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be
part of the dispersal, except for such launchers and missiles that relocate to a
facility outside their associated ICBM base during such a dispersal.

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(g) An exercise in dispersal shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.
(h) Exercise dispersals shall not be conducted:
(i) more than two times in any period of two calendar years;
(ii) during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections;
(iii) from a new ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs until a new facility
inspection has been conducted or until the period of time provided for such an
inspection has expired; or
(iv) from an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that has been designated
for a data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection, until completion of such
an inspection.
(i) If a notification of an exercise dispersal has been provided in accordance with
Protocol, the other Party shall not have the right to designate for data update
inspection or reentry vehicle inspection an ICBM base for mobile launchers of
ICBMs involved in such a dispersal, or to request cooperative measures for such an
ICBM base, until the completion of such a dispersal.
(j) When an exercise dispersal is completed, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs
and their associated missiles involved in such a dispersal shall be located at their
restricted areas or rail garrisons, except for those otherwise accounted for in
accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
2. A major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a notification
has been provided pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of
September 23, 1989, shall be conducted as provided for below:
(a) Such exercise shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II
of the Notification Protocol.
(b) Such exercise shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II
of the Notification Protocol.
(c) The air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II
of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in such exercise.

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(d) Such exercise shall begin no more than one time in any calendar year, and shall
be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.
(e) Such exercise shall not be conducted during the entire period of time provided
for baseline data inspections.
(f) During such exercise by a Party, the other Party shall not have the right to
conduct inspections of the air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former
heavy bombers involved in the exercise. The right to conduct inspections of such
air bases shall resume three days after notification of the completion of a major
strategic exercise involving heavy bombers has been provided in accordance with
Protocol.
(g) Within the 30-day period following the receipt of the notification of the
completion of such exercise, the receiving Party may make a request for
cooperative measures to be carried out in accordance with this Treaty at one of the
air bases involved in the exercise. Such a request shall not be counted toward the
quota provided for in this Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct operational dispersals of deployed
mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile
submarines, and heavy bombers. There shall be no limit on the number and
duration of operational dispersals, and there shall be no limit on the number of
deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile
submarines, or heavy bombers involved in such dispersals. When an operational
dispersal begins, all strategic offensive arms of a Party shall be considered to be
part of the dispersal. Operational dispersals shall be conducted as provided for
below:[Agreed State]
(a) An operational dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and
time specified in the notification provided in accordance with Protocol.
(b) An operational dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and
time specified in the notification provided in accordance with Protocol.
2. During an operational dispersal each Party shall have the right to:
(a) suspend notifications that it would otherwise provide in accordance with the

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Notification Protocol except for notification of flight tests provided under the
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988; provided that, if any
conversion or elimination processes are not suspended pursuant to subparagraph (d)
of this paragraph, the relevant notifications shall be provided in accordance with
Protocol;
(b) suspend the right of the other Party to conduct inspections;
(c) suspend the right of the other Party to request cooperative measures; and
(d) suspend conversion and elimination processes for its strategic offensive arms. In
such case, the number of converted and eliminated items shall correspond to the
number that has actually been converted and eliminated as of the date and time of
the beginning of the operational dispersal specified in the notification provided in
accordance with Protocol.
3. Notifications suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume no
later than three days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal
has been provided in accordance with Protocol. The right to conduct inspections
and to request cooperative measures suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this
Article shall resume four days after notification of the completion of the operational
dispersal has been provided in accordance with Protocol. Inspections or
cooperative measures being conducted at the time a Party provides notification that
it suspends inspections or cooperative measures during an operational dispersal
shall not count toward the appropriate annual quotas provided for by this Treaty.
4. When an operational dispersal is completed:
(a) All deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles
shall be located within their deployment areas or shall be engaged in relocations .
(b) All deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall
be located within their rail garrisons or shall be engaged in routine movements or
relocations .
(c) All heavy bombers shall be located within national territory and shall have
resumed normal operations. If it is necessary for heavy bombers to be located
outside national territory for purposes not inconsistent with this Treaty, the Parties
will immediately engage in diplomatic consultations so that appropriate assurances
can be provided.

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5. Within the 30 day period after the completion of an operational dispersal, the
Party not conducting the operational dispersal shall have the right to make no more
than two requests for cooperative measures, subject to the provisions of Article XII
of this Treaty, for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs or air bases. Such
requests shall count toward the quota of requests provided for in paragraph 2 of
Article XII of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XV

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the
Parties hereby establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The
Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework
of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to: United Nation Assemblies
Protocol]
(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed;
(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the
viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and
(c) resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of this Treaty
to a new kind of strategic offensive arm, after notification has been provided in
accordance with Protocol.

ARTICLE XVI

To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume
any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its
provisions. The Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article XV of
this Treaty in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. The
Parties [United Nations Assemblies Protocol] agree that this provision does apply
to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic
offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and
a third State. [Agreed State 1] [Soviet State on Non-Circumvention & Patterns of
Coop. The NATO Alliances and Its Supreme Commanders; The Republic of
China, Koreas and Japanese Multilateralism, The Persian Empires, The Arabian

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Peninsula, France, Switzerland, Spain Portugal, Sweden The States of Israel, and
India, Pakistan and all other insignias to developing needs to isotopic mentioning
there again in still.]

ARTICLE XVII

1. This Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of

Understanding, all of which form integral parts and are considered hereby to say
the IDF Treaty series, in which the purpose was to reserve adaptive language and
interceptive resurrection thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with
the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the
date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 15 years unless superseded earlier by a
subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.
No later than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period, the Parties shall
meet to consider whether this Treaty will be extended. If the Parties so decide, this
Treaty will be extended for a period of five years unless it is superseded before the
expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on the reduce, dispose and de-
limitation of strategic offensive arms. This Treaty shall be extended for successive
five-year periods, if the Parties so decide, in accordance with the procedures
governing the initial extension, and it shall remain in force for each agreed five-
year period of extension unless as was to be retro ceded by a subsequent agreement
on the reduction and elimination of strategic offensive arms.
3. There shall any Party in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to
withdraw from this Treaty. No such extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of this Treaty can jeopardized the supreme interests as willful or negligible
dissention... Such notice shall have no bearing on the situation implied as dire need
to comprehend a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards
as having Natures said orientation over its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XVIII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall
enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this

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Treaty.

ARTICLE XIX

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations.

Done at HB 92649 USA, one copy in English and authentic Text in all who come to
call upon it.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION THE U N

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION INTER ALIA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

THE PEOPLES STATE OF ISRAEL

THE NATO ALLIANCE ORGANIZATION

AND ALL INDEPENDENT ENSIGNS

TO A MARQUIS

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THE UNDERSIGNED BEING

DULY AUTHORIZED UNDERTAKE TO BEAR TRUE

FAITH ON THE BEHALF OF THE ESTABLISHMENT

OF DEVINE REVELATION FROM HERE ON IN

COUNTRY SIGNATURE DATES OF ACCESSION

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Protocol and Annexes to DESBIC AGENDA IDF Treaty Series START II, III

PROTOCOL ON NUCLEAR FUEL UTILITY

DISASSEMBLY AND DENUCLEARIZATION
STANDARDS FOR A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE

The Parties to this Treaty,

Guided by the Declaration on the Denuclearization of critical life support and breathable
oxygen supplies, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the State
of Israel and the Joint Command Organization of the United States of America and a
United Nations Unity (hereinafter referred to as The Principals) at its first ordinary
session, to be held in Tel-Aviv from 01 to 31 July 2,007 (N507/Res. 01.1 ), in which
The Nuclear Powers solemnly swear and declare their readiness to undertake, through
an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to
manufacture or acquire control nuclear weapons; to disarmament protocol, and to verify
and comply to one anothers requests by all honest means whether they be financially
solvent or even so therein still..

Guided also, by the resolutions of the Seminary I provided for an ordinary sessions of the
U N Security Councils advice, and Convention recommendations, to be held at Vienna on
a yearly basis, from 01 July to 31 July and the Assemblies shall establish such
Specialized Committee functions as it may deem necessary in Vienna or Tel-Aviv
respective whereby thereto affirm that the evolution of the international situation was
conducive to the implementation of the Israeli Intelligence descriptive Declarations, as
well as the relevant provisions relating to the obligations assumed under the START III
and the aforementioned fulfillment of this Treatys Provisions, and Declaration on
Security, Disarmament and Development hereto;

Recalling United Nations General Assembly resolution 3472 B (XXX) of 11 December

1975, in which it considers the nuclear-free zone of applications, one of the most
effective means for preventing the proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, of nuclear
weapons, to promote the objectives for mutual security under a universal sound regard
thereto.

Convinced of the need to take all steps in achieving the ultimate goal
of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, as well nuclear reactor utilities;
Convinced also that the new age world, far and free away from nuclear dependence and
fundamentalist waves of enticement in fuel enrichment plutonium sales and abetment will

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constitute an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation State of the

Unions, and in so doing, promote cooperation and a seriousness of purpose in general and
complete disarmament and enhancing regional and international peace and security;
Aware that regional disarmament measures contribute to global disarmament efforts,

Believing that the Inter-Continental nuclear-free zone will protect the Great Divide in
effect, the Law and Order of States against possible nuclear attacks on their territories, so
to believe,,
Noting with satisfaction existing statements read, and recognizing that the establishment
of other Star Based Utility Complexes, especially in the Middle East, would enhance the
security of State Parties to the descriptivist implication thereabouts,

Reaffirming the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(hereinafter referred to as the NPT and INF, IDF Treaty Series NPT 2, START III,
DESBIC Agendas role; SORT, inclusive of all Partys to a nuclear utilitys State of
affairs), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Topics, it is agreed that their exists therefore a
need upgrade and revision in the implementation of all its provisions,

Demanding an unconditional right of way, thats ridged and unyielding of any such
advantage of mythological Communist and Colonialist Provisionment, which recognizes
the inalienable right of all States Parties to develop research on, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as none other than counter
point insistency to they of whom are burdening the future with radioactive cargo. The said
cargo will only accumulate and never unload, and none other than hospital X-ray, and
detection of radioactive isotopes devices for a breathable atmospheric specification; their
shall no man, women, child, aggravate these circumstances to degenerate, or deplete
oxygen molecules forever as we know well do. For the purpose of a life to exist and for a
reason of all systems go, for a service of heroism, haunt, comedy, or horrific
consequences in the sight of our space based supervisors, versus the industrialist licensing
commissioners to a State of comprehensive defilation hereof; for the hour of in scripted
saboteurs are many and sooner than we sought, there again to boldly go within the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information
just to please the maker of a Faith whereby;

Determined to promote regional cooperation for the development and practical

application of peaceful purposes in the interest of sustainable social and economic
development, to the ends of the Earths atmospheric consideration whereat,

Determined to keep the Continental Divide free of environmental pollution by radioactive

wastes and other radioactive matter,

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 Protocol and Annexes to DESBIC AGENDA IDF Treaty Series START II, III

Welcoming the legally binding aspects of star based opinions, in and that all States and
governmental and non-governmental organizations shall face uninhabitable areas of
concern in the near future, its a forceful entry for the attainment of these objectives,

Have decided by this treaty to establish the DESBIC AGENDA and hereby agree as
follows:

Article 1

DEFINITION/USAGE OF TERMS

For the purpose of this Treaty and its Protocols hereof;

(a) "Inter-Continental nuclear-weapon-free zone" means the breath and territory of habitable and
uninhabitable planes of realitys to where we are coming from and when we are going to state
differently then the Law of Nature and Natures GOD(S), in the firmament and between the
advice and consent of star based definitions on usages of-.land, air, and sea bases and all the
continents in between as affixed, in Unity with its Resolution to descend upon here and now
therefore;

(b) "Territory" means not limited to the land territory, internal waters, territorial seas and
archipelagic waters and the airspace above them as well as the sea bed and subsoil beneath;

(c) "Nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of
releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term
includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, and may also
include

the means of transport of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an part of it;

(d) "Stationing" means implantation, emplacement, transport on land or inland waters,

stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment;

(e) "Nuclear installation" means a nuclear utility-power reactor, a nuclear research reactor, a
critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation
plant, a separate storage installation and any other installation or location in or at which fresh or
irradiated, and radiation of nuclear material or hazardous quantities of radioactive materials are
present;

(f) "Nuclear material" means any source material or special fissionable material as defined in
DESBIC AGENDAS Article IV Section 2 through 6 of the Statute and terms, of the accounts
and descriptions provided for therefore an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is
needless seekers of degeneracy lingers here withal and as amended from time to time by the

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existence of our star men hereinafter.

APPLICATION OF THE TREATY

1. Except where otherwise specified, this Treaty and in accordance with its free standing
Protocols shall apply to the territorial spheres within the Inter-Continental Hemispheres as
a nuclear-weapon-free zone, as illustrated on the maps and the global satellite photos
distributed by NASAs Jet Propulsion Laboratories, published by National Geographical
Topography indeed a societys of our Lords creating, who is whereat; annex I.
2. This Treaty may prejudice or affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State
under international law with regard to freedom of the seas.

Article 3

RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Each Party undertakes:

(a) Not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or
have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere, pursuant of our behind
schedule cleanup detail to that of which the time reference is upward of the sentencing rapture of
31, December 2,017-22 thereabouts herein hear why;

(b) Not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, development, manufacture,
stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device; not to seek or receive a
mark of anti-equation on thy forehead as we all do remember well supply in a Book of times to
come true;

(c) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the research on, development, manufacture,
stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device.

Article 4

PREVENTION OF STATIONING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

1. Each Party undertakes to prohibit, in its territory, the stationing of any nuclear
explosive device.
2. Without prejudice to the purposes and objectives of the treaty, each party in the
exercise of theater ballistic nuclear questions as such remains subject to vice and virtue

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realities as to decide for itself to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and
airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its
territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent
passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits.

Article 5

PROHIBITION OF TESTING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Each Party undertakes:

(a) Not to test any nuclear explosive device;

(b) To prohibit in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device;

(c) Not to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State anywhere.
Article 6

DECLARATION, DISMANTLING, DESTRUCTION OR CONVERSION OF NUCLEAR

EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AND THE FACILITIES FOR THEIR MANUFACTURE

Each Party undertakes:

(a) To declare any capability for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices;

(b) To dismantle and destroy any nuclear explosive device that it has manufactured prior to the
coming into force of this Treaty;

(c) To destroy facilities for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices or, where possible,
inform the Secretary General, U S State Department, Israeli Defence Chiefs, or the CIA if
information concerning the activities or whereabouts of such crude or explosive frequency field
dispositions may exceed your line of conformitys thereabouts again therefore;

(d) To permit the On Site Inspection Agencys and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(hereinafter referred to as OSIA & IAEA), and the Commission established in article 12 to verify
the processes of dismantling and destruction of the nuclear explosive devices, as well as the
destruction or conversion of the facilities for their production therefore it is established Israel and
a Faith that you have won.

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Article 7

PROHIBITION OF DUMPING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES

Each Party undertakes:

(a) To effectively implement or to use as guidelines the measures contained in this Convention on
the Ban of the Import and exportation of fewer than necessary units of measurable contents of
hazardous wastes within sub and inter continental Earth based relatives in so far as it is relevant
to radioactive contamination and void of fixation here with our agenda(s) therefore;

(b) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping of radioactive wastes and other
radioactive matter anywhere within the Inter and Sub-Continental nuclear-weapon-free zone
applications in an Entity hereof.

Article 8

NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as to support the use of nuclear science and
technology for peaceful purposes.
2. As part of their efforts to strengthen their security, stability and development, the
Parties undertake to denunciate individual and collective use of nuclear science and
technology for economic and social development. To this end they undertake to establish
and strengthen mechanisms for proliferation implied at the bilateral, sub regional and
regional levels.
3. Parties are encouraged to make use of the ecologically safe and sane means of
generating energy resources here withal. All Partys to the U N Declaration shall be
obligated to assume the characteristics of a nuclear hostile State when in the course of
human events it becomes inevitable to discern that ex-spent highly radioactive fuel rods
are an atomic weapon of natures void; of assistance available in IAEA and, in this
connection, to strengthen cooperation under the Multi-National Regional Cooperation

Agreement for disbandment of nuclear resource utilitys Training and Development

Related to Nuclear Science and Technology will be forces of Israeli Class saucer modules

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and telepathic say of our side to there is an unknown region.

Article 9

VERIFICATION OF PEACEFUL USES

Each Party undertakes:

(a) To conduct all activities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy under strict non-proliferation
measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful uses;

(b) To conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA for the purpose of verifying
compliance with the undertakings in subparagraph (a) of this article;

(c) Not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for
peaceful purposes of any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards
agreement considered safer than acceptability such as hospital X-ray and atomic Geiger counter
device utilities; concluded with Israeli Defence Ministrys results oriented approval or rejection
as need be, the Court of Justices newly found Faith; and as so with the IAEA.

Article 10

PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND FACILITIES

Each Party undertakes to maintain the highest standards of security and effective physical
protection of nuclear materials, facilities and equipment to prevent theft or unauthorized
use and handling. To that end each Party, inter alia, undertakes to apply measures of
physical protection equivalent to those provided for in the Convention on Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material and in recommendations and guidelines developed by
IAEA for that purpose.

Article 11

PROHIBITION OF ARMED ATTACK ON NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

Each Party undertakes not to take, or assist, or encourage any action aimed at an armed
attack by conventional or other means against nuclear installations in the nuclear-weapon-
free zone.

Article 12

MECHANISM FOR COMPLIANCE

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1. For the purpose of ensuring compliance with their undertakings under this Treaty, the
Parties agree to establish the Commission on Nuclear Energy (hereafter referred to as the
Commission) as set out in annex III.
2. The Commission shall be responsible inter alia for:
(a) Collating the reports and the exchange of information as provided for in article 13;

(b) Arranging consultations as provided for in annex IV, as well as convening conferences of
Parties on the concurrence of simple majority of State Parties on any matter arising from the
implementation of the Treaty;

(c) Reviewing the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by IAEA as elaborated
in annex II;

(d) Bringing into effect the complaints procedures as specified in annex IV;

(e) Discouraging regional and sub regional conditions for cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear science and technology;

(f) Denouncing international cooperation with extra-zonal States for the peaceful uses of nuclear
science and technology.

3. The Commission shall meet in ordinary session once a year, and may meet in
extraordinary session as may be required by the complaints and settlement of disputes;

Article 13

REPORT AND EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION

1. Each Party shall submit an annual report to the Commission on its nuclear activities as
well as other matters relating to the Treaty, in accordance with the format for reporting to
be developed by the Commission.
2. Each Party shall promptly report to the Commission any significant event affecting the
implementation of the Treaty.
3. The Commission shall request The Principals to provide it with an annual report on
the activities of the State in question therefore;.

Article 14

CONFERENCE OF PARTIES

1. A Conference of all Parties to the Treaty shall be convened by the Depositary as soon
as possible after the entry into force of the Treaty to, elect members of the commission
and determine its headquarters. Further conferences of State Parties shall be held as

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necessary and at least every two years, and convened in accordance with paragraph 2 (b)
of article 12.
2. The Conference of all Parties to the Treaty shall adopt the Commission's budget and a
scale of assessment to be paid by the State Parties.

Article 15

INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY

Any dispute arising out of the interpretation of the Treaty shall be settled by negotiation,
by recourse to The Principals, or another procedure agreed to by the Parties, which may
include air support against the said belligerent proliferation, to an arbitral panel or to the
Star Based designated procurers attention who are the Joint Chief of USA Military
Authority, and the Prime Ministry for Israel and, or his quarters thereupon an
International Court of Justice.

Article 16

RESERVATIONS

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. However on occasion of special

circumstance the afore specified authority may allow for collaboration, although the U N
reserves the duty rights of penalty assessments, waived for an Israeli Mission in the
presence of disqualifying retributions therein.

Article 17

DURATION

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration and shall remain in force indefinitely. IT shall
be the subject to a subsequent review, every five years at or upon 31 December 2,007;
2,012; continuously until or unless all Partys can agree that the numerical contingency
accountings are a nominal 00,000 nuclear warheads or attributable crude devices;
and ,000 nuclear energy utility programs cease to exact reference guidances howbeit
therefore;

Article 18

SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. The Protocols of this Treatys principles and purpose are stated simply and directly at
they who have broken Faith of at a handshaking in ceremonies; and when a
plenipotentiaries undersign to a compact or an agreement, their shall no escape clause

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exist that suggested that every State to a citation pronounced for all to say I, be considered
an if dismiss or detract from the record for a purpose of procedure in factual admonitions;
their shall every insignia to an denial or an sequential date with dissemination be counted
and be seen hereinafter looking to our future fearing nothing more than a nuclear free
new age of enlightenment; to that end It shall be subject, and required by all individual
personality reminders of transgender degenerative theorys.
2. It shall enter into force on the date of deposit upon the designated instruments of
ratification; unless an act or fact of emptive nuclear perdition such as Ill say will
transpire one and all thereof.
3. For a signatory that ratifies this Treaty after the date of the deposit, if it sits well with
The Principals, it shall enter into force for that signatory on the date of deposit of its
instrument of ratification. All Ensigns to a State are required by Star Based authorities to
be a Party to the START III Treaty, therefore it is incumbent for the Justice of the Peace
to set a motion of retro-into force time tablatures of 31 December 2,007 as citation and
permits will ascribe to a U N.

Article 19

AMENDMENTS

1. Any amendments to the Treaty proposed by a Party shall be submitted to The

Principals, which shall circulate it to all Parties.
2. Decision on the adoption of such an amendment shall be taken by a two-thirds majority
of the Parties either through written communication to The Principals or through a
conference of Parties convened upon an Israeli absolution waiver of consent.
3. An amendment so adopted shall enter into force for all Parties after receipt by the
Depositary of the instrument of ratification by the majority of Parties.

Article 20

WITHDRAWAL

1. Their shall not any such Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, have any such
right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject-matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Withdrawal shall be interpreted as an admission to aid and abet the enemy in an attempt
to become Party of, or Party to a State of nuclear and, or biological skullduggery, which is
a High Crime and act that may be characterized as soy lent aggression, punishable by
The Principals recommended actions, and the U N Secretary Generals agreed upon

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Statements. If exists their to be an impasse, the Israeli Prime Ministers quarter shall have
final say; unless the Joint Chief(s) USA can provide resource and evidence to star elders
at mission control that waive for an SBIC Interim Agreement hereby a Party giving
notice, which includes a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interest, twelve months in advance to the Depositary;

Article 21

DEPOSITARY FUNCTIONS

1. This Treaty, of which English is considered the majority language, shall be that of all
dialects of U N Memberships; texts shall be equally authentic, deposited with the
Secretary-General U N who recognizes the USA as such, as the hereby designated
Depositary of the Treaty; The State of Israel Also a common secondary in the event of a
schism thereto.
2. The Depositary shall:
(a) Receive instruments of ratification;

(b) Register this Treaty and its Protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations;

(c) Transmit certified copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all States in the nuclear-weapon-
free zone and to all States eligible to become Party to the Protocols to the Treaty, and shall notify
them of signatures and ratification of the Treaty and its Protocols.

Article 22

STATUS OF THE ANNEXES

The annexes form an integral part of this Treaty. Any reference to this Treaty may include
the annexes from other existing Treatys so much as it does not supercede the term safe
use or sales of fissionable U 2 35 or Plutonium of any isotopic bombardment to that of
will come to cause an radioactive frequency yield of alpha, beta, or gamma waves or rays;
nor shall be considered void of form any such escape clause as may withdraw or abstain
implies, when in the course of human events it became necessary to impose on succeeding
generations, life threatening submergences, as did decide or assumed therein here fore
that obligation in stilled.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have
signed this Treaty .

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ANNEXES OF THE IDF TREATY SERIES

START II, III, IV AND THE DESBIC AGENDA

INCORPORATIVE TO TEXTS AND PROTOCOLS

ANNEX I

THE UNITED NATIONS NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE ZONE

1. without prejudice to the Convention for the purpose of exercising their function, the

Northern Hemisphere, the Southern Hemisphere, all the Continents in between, the breadth
of

the airspaces and the open seas thereupon which are set forth in this document, shall be

observed and come to be recognized as The Nuclear Free Zone whereat thereabouts.

ANNEX II

SAFEGUARDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

1. The safeguards referred to in subparagraph (b) of the article 9 shall in respect of each
Party be applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency as set forth in an agreement
negotiated and concluded with U S and Israeli team Official On site Inspection Agencys
framework for the Partys on all source or special fissionable material issues, in all
nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out
under its control anywhere.
2. The Agreement referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be, or shall be equivalent in its
scope and effect to, the agreement required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and IDF Treaty Series NPT 2. A Party that has already
entered into a safeguards agreement with the OSIA & IAEA is deemed to have already
complied with the requirement. Each Party shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that
the Agreement referred to in paragraph 1 is in force for it not later than eighteen months
after the date of entry into force for that Party of this Treaty.
3. For the purpose of this Treaty, the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 above, a State
shall have as their purpose the verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material from

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peaceful nuclear activities the liability and obligations to neutralize any such diversionary
potentially lethal devices.
4. Each Party shall include in its annual report to the Commission, in conformity with
article 13, for its information and review, a copy of the overall conclusions of the most
recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on its inspection activities in the
territory of the Party concerned, and advise the Commission promptly of any change in
those conclusions. The information furnished by a Party shall not be, totally or partially,
disclosed or transmitted to third parties, by the addressees of the reports, except when that
Party gives its express consent. The subject of Commissions may be at the acceptance of
The Principals there as.

ANNEX III COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR ENERGY

1. The Commission established in article 12 shall be composed of twelve Members

elected by Parties to the Treaty, preferably non-nuclear prejudicial memberships to some
extent, for a three-year period, bearing in mind the need for equitable geographical
distribution as well as to include Members with advanced nuclear expertise, she preclude
capital or mortal sinners, and especially degenerates; their shall any such Membership to
an assigned foundry by their an transgender degenerate as so was. Each Member shall
have one representative nominated with particular regard for his/her principles in the
subject of the Treaty.
2. The Commission shall have a Bureau consisting of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman
and the Executive Secretary. it shall elect its Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The Secretary-
General of the organization of Israeli Unity, at the request of Parties to the Treaty and in
consultation with the chairman, shall designate the Executive Secretary of the
Commission. For the first meeting a quorum shall be constituted by representatives of the
members of the Commission.

For that meeting decisions of the Commission shall be taken as far as possible by
consensus or otherwise by a popular majority of the Members of the commission. The
Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure at that meeting.
3. The Commission shall develop a format for reporting by States as required under
articles 12 and 13.
4. (a) The budget of the Commission, including the costs of inspections pursuant to annex IV to
this Treaty, shall be disseminated by the Parties to the Treaty in accordance with a scale of
assessment to be determined by the Parties;

(b) The Commission may also accept additional funds from other sources provided such
donations are consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Treaty. ANNEX IV

COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

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1. A Party which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that another Party or a
Party to Protocol III is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty shall bring the subject-
matter of the complaint to the attention of the Party complained of and shall allow the
latter thirty days to provide it with an explanation and to resolve the matter. This may
include technical visits agreed upon between the Parties.
2. If the matter is not so resolved, the complainant Party may bring this complaint to the
Commission.
3. The Commission, taking account of efforts made under paragraph 1 above, shall afford
the Party complained of forty-five days to provide it with an explanation of the matter.
4. If, after considering any explanation given to it by the representatives of the Party
complained of, the Commission considers that there is sufficient substance in the
complaint to warrant an inspection in the territory of that Party or territory of a Party to
Protocol III, the Commission may request The Principals, who in turn may request The
OSIA or the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct such inspections as soon as
possible. The Commission may also designate its representatives to accompany the
Agency's inspection team.

(a) The request shall indicate the tasks and objectives of such inspection, as well as any
confidentiality requirements;

(b) If the Party complained of so requests, the inspection team shall be accompanied by
representatives of that Party provided that the inspectors shall not be thereby delayed or
otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions;

(c) Each Party shall give the inspection team full and free access to all information and places
within each territory that may be deemed relevant by the inspectors to the implementation of the
inspection;

(d) The Party complained of shall take all appropriate steps to facilitate the work of the inspection
team, and shall accord them the same privileges and immunities as those set forth in the relevant
provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, per say;

(e) The International Atomic Energy Agency, and The On Site Inspect Inspection Teams, shall
report its findings in writing as quickly as possible to the Commission, outlining its activities,
setting out relevant facts and information as ascertained by it, with supporting evidence and
documentation as appropriate, and stating its conclusions. The Commission shall report fully to
The Principals, and if need be: all States Parties to the Treaty giving its decision as to whether
the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty;

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(f ) If the Commission considers that the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under
this Treaty, or that the above provisions have not been complied with, States Parties to the Treaty
shall meet in extraordinary session to discuss the matter;

(g) The States Parties convened in extraordinary session may as necessary, make
recommendations to the Party held to be in breach of its obligations and to the organization of the
United Nations Unity.

(h) The costs involved in the procedure outlined above shall be borne by the responsibility of the
Membership resources and current index evaluation of the Partys holdings and title ship
accountings there as. In the case of abuse, the Commission shall decide whether the requesting
State Party should bear any of the financial implications.

5. The Commission must submit in writing to the Joint Chief of Staff USA, the Prime
Ministry Defense Israel, and the Secretary Generals quarter U N as so to establish its own
inspection mechanisms.

DONE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS ALL

INSIGNIAS TO THE CHARTER THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA AND THE STATE

OF ISRAEL IN FAITH WHEREOF

In Witness Whereof, the Undersigned Being Duly Authorized by Their

Respective Governments Undertake to Carry Out Settlement, Mediation,

And Reconciliation to create a Suitable Atmosphere For the Safeguard

And Vital Concerns of this Extraordinary Session Hereinafter Therefore

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On Behalf of the Establishment of Faith and Understanding the Oath and

Pledges Inscribed by the Collective Will of All Partys Shall be Guided by

Devine Revelation to Carry Out These Aims and Purposes; to These Ends

The Plenipotentiaries inter alia The Principals Will Recognize the

Legitimacy as Duly Sworn and Taken into Account From Hereon in

Ascribed This Day the _________of______________2,_________

In Witness of Our Lord and of a Faith Wherefore

Let Us Say Amen

COUNTRY SIGNATURE DATES OF ACCESSION

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 Employer
IC. Resume Steven V. Arroyo Resources
Page1 of 7
03-27-05 16941 Green St. # 13
Huntington Beach Ca. 92649
Home # 714 377-8903:
email; sarroyo1@socal.rr.com

This report may contain information bearing credit worthiness, credit standing,
and capacity, character, or general reputation from public record sources in
connection with the Job Search for employment purposes, including, but not limited
to, reassignment, or retention as an associate hereby.

Objectives: by a common determination to promote an

understanding among our peoples and co-operative growth in all
spheres of diplomatic endeavourment;

(a) establish our ground on the basis of a program of work, or

vocational service unto an Oath, to thee I bid, to address,
advise and call attention to, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense herein;
(b) support research and development of aero dynamical
space based resource and analysis to further the cause of
universal Law and Order for which Ill stand.
(c) Evaluate, interpret, and convey encoded communication
transcripts and Celestial Organized Agendas for the
purpose of a Mission, within the bounds of arbitrational
access for the free standing States of Naval Intelligence
inter-agency locations, on earth, or in space.
(d) Research: consolidate and acquire, to disarm numerous
ensigns to a statement of centrifically forged field
frequency contingencies, by order of a star people
consensus and a START Treaty so as to adjust for the
distance between senses and imbalances, and undertake
to arbitrate disputes without shots being fired therefore.
 Department of Naval Investigations
IC. Resume
Page 5 of 7
Steven V. Arroyo

Position applying for:

Communications care coordinator for Dugway and /or, other areas of research and aero
dynamical design in selective services.

Re: Cover Letter and Resume for S.B.I.C. Mediator and Telepath, Utility.

Contacts Name: Richard Cheney

Contacts Title: Vice President (USA)
Company of recommendations:
Admiral Bobby Inman;
Admiral Brent Scowcroft

March 31, 2,005

Dear Mr. Secretary,

My name is Steven Arroyo and I am contacting you in reference to employment with our
installations whereabouts. Now that I have put forth a draft of protocol called the
DESBIC AGENDA TREATY, I feel that I can wash my hands of critical consciousness,
I feel that I can entertain the thought of letting you utilize my extra sensory objectives for
the purpose of a Pledge; and try to hold a higher mass and a stronger flag without
walking inside a circle of danger, or stepping outside a line of conformity here withal.
My hours are flexible at the present time reference; say upward to 20 to 50 hours a week
or more as need be the courts. I specialize in inter-communion telepathic agenda
translation with star people and are considered a reasonably resonant medium.

I am interested in working in the special scientist field because I feel that, its not that far
to Groom Lake Research and Development Containers, or distant green lights of the
galaxys, but it is pretty far from just what type of disarmament questions need to be
addressed, advised, and descended upon, as a special orders in tact Sir, Your Honors
Sir. Sometimes it gets difficult to imagine how we succeed, by, for and of a thousand
generations for His Honor; but the renewable resources are said to be free as these spoken
words, and I would tend to believe they.

The star people chose me I believed, because I was a nose for news when CNN first got
started, and in furtherance of denials, I was a behemoth Secretary James A. Baker,
 The Department of Naval Criminal Investigations
IC. Resume
Page 6 of 7
Steven V. Arroyo

George Bush advocate to some extent within the bounds of intellectuality. The peace
overtures of Soviet to independent East Europe I viewed as a light to a not a mutually
assured deplorable trajectory path from iron curtains, to iron mules in the civics there
instead. So they summoned for a Handy Dandy; a Safety Personality, to possibly prove
that mission worthy of praise, in the face of battle lines that need not exist from a sub
marginal degrees of likely and unlikely courses of judgment and legal actionary
framework to every saucer module in U N operative custody(s) here and now thereto.

As the frame depicts, I am a portrait of a Faith defender. I fight for a cause if it fancys
my taste. I am not a rebel. I can be ridged and unyielding on one hand, exercise
precedence and etiquette on the cuff, slow to anger, slick as oil, dramatic and crude, not
too quick to speak though, in and that I get under tomorrow, lost in reminders that my
foreign policy beliefs are that to which is upward of, say 91% up to par U S A / U N
standards. Exception being, a bailout policy if the red Chinese make a try, on Taiwan;
and if you do that, love can be an angry word, and so. The Treaty terms are 31 December
2,017; re-unification, pending disarmament duties assumed here withal thereupon.
 Nuclear Preparednes

Nuclear War is a terrible possibility... and such

as it may become, access its value nonetheless
Regretfully this information will be necessary for the safety I seek
for my color bayonette, and my glory insignia to a charge; just in
case...

Each Party undertakes verification at its disposal, a secondary opt

to the act or facts of a soon forgotten world

Basic Information: There are volumes of information about nuclear weapons but to those who may
be subjected to them there is less. A total nuclear war likely will incinerate us so in order for the
many predictions to come true and for us to build a brave new world it has to be a limited nuclear
war. This is only a superficial less fortunate hypothetical. One nuclear weapon is nothing more
than devastating. With a download research device and some inside information, a limited
confrontation depending on your grades of resonancy,can not only be survivable but attained by
safeguards depicted so without lasting health effects or loss of life to you or your family.

Weapon types: There are many technical details about nuclear weapons but to the survivor there
are only two. There are airburst detonations and ground burst detonations. Airburst detonations
produce little of the deadly radioactive fallout that will kill the most people. These will be used on

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cities or industrial centers and detonated in the air to maximize surface damage... The other is the
ground burst which incinerates thousands of square feet of the ground, turning it into a radioactive
ash which is sucked high into the sky and falls like snow downwind killing people. This type of
detonation will be used on military targets like missile silos or bases. For all intents and purposes
the airburst is only dangerous to those in the area. The ground burst is dangerous for thousands of
miles downwind. It is the ground burst that you must defend against. A terrorist weapon will be
close to the ground and will create dangerous fallout... Unfortunately nuclear terrorism is an even
greater possibility... Remember that; hot energy Fallout can kill on this path of fate and the face of
values change for all of us who wait thereabouts..

Effects: Near a nuclear explosion, there is heat which can severely burn you and start large fires
and blast which can destroy buildings and throw debris much like a tornado. Then there is
radiation. Small particles of ash and dust will fall like snow onto the ground and will emit invisible
beams of energy, which is lethal radiation. You can be exposed to a fatal dose of radiation and not
know it for days so it is insidious. Things may seem normal but the beams of energy are
penetrating your cells and scrambling the DNA. This is the area which needs concentrating on
because it can be defended against while the other two effects (blast and heat) are much harder to
defend against and will kill less people.

Radiation Defense: The first thing you need is a decent basement, something below the ground will
do. If you do not have anything like that go to someone else's basement. Likely they will not know
what to do and you will be saving their lives as well. Dirt and concrete in sufficient amounts can
lessen the effects of the radiation so that it can not kill you. Cover openings, basement windows, etc.
with dirt and if more than a few feet of the walls of the basement are above ground level you may
need to build another structure within the basement. A few feet of dirt or concrete between you and
the radiation can save your life. If you stock food and water for about three weeks and stay in the
shelter for that period of time the radiation outside will usually have dissipated(a Geiger counter
can determine this)... At that point the danger is over in your area, as long as you avoid

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contaminated water or food. Open water is probably contaminated while well water should be fine.
Open food will be contaminated while canned or wrapped food will be fine as long as you wash the
dust off first.

Equipment: Yes, insulation of any sort can save your life... You can never have enough medical
supplies, especially iodine tablets, and other medications as needed by your family members. These
things will be necessary in any situation where medical care is far away or nonexistent. Another
item is a Geiger counter, used for detecting and measuring alpha, beta, and gamma radiation. This
is absolutely necessary for evaluating shelter and determining accumulated exposure, though you
can survive without if you are careful... Beware, many Geiger counters on the market can not
handle the amounts of radiation that will be produced by radioactive fallout, but were designed for
geological research, etc. Dosages: 150 rads, REMS, or roentgens will begin to make you sick and at
about 500 hundred you are dead, taking about two weeks of sickness. Also it is cumulative, 150
rads per hour is 300 in two hours and three hours you are probably going to die. Also keep in mind
that an accumulated dose of 150 rads will take about ten years off of your life.

This information is extremely rudimentary and as I stated earlier: If we work hard at improving
our relationship with each other and with God, as a group and as individuals, this information
would not be needed. Nevertheless The Gods did address, advise and gave a charge to a people in
uniform and perspective to the obligations assumed they still bread nuclear fuel enrichment
services abetment while pointing cruel fingers in an aftermath of explosive detonation and
accumulative insisstancies, to that end and then again; in another way we come to understand a
way to encourage you and the Israelites so they say, to plan ahead for fallout will arrive suddenly
as I say so, and though keep yourselves alive for the departure and arrival of the worst case
scenario descriptor I said.

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We read it on paper, we wrote it in the sky, we talked about it until we died. So next
time you come to pature never deny the Lord, His word, his statutes to never be like
Peter, denied, Judas betrayed, and Bill, like Clinton who sealed their fate by not trying
hard enough to star based aerodynamic advisory standards of obedience and of they
who had a say. The Partys understated to deplete oxygen supply molecules in the face
of an angry God here withal. So there.

DUCK AND COVER REMINDERS OF AN

IDF TREATY SERIES

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