CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY. Rule 15.06.

Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body.
Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the
latter's race, sex, creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
regarding the guilt of said person. principles of fairness.

Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an
appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of free
legal aid.
Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client
if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 15.08. - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently
with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a
lawyer or in another capacity.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
PROFESSION.

(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client
or between a present client and the prospective client.
Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional
fees shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his relations with
paying clients.
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENTS.
Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or
his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own
and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interest
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he
has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
client.

Rule 15.02.- A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND
matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED
IN HIM.
Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

Rule 15.04. - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as mediator,
conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.

Rule 15.05. - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on
the merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor
understating the prospects of the case.
BURBE vs. ATTY. MAGULTA
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and
client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not
a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary
action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the
Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:
xxxxxxxxx
That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime
in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero
Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me in a money
claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract;
That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand
letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch,
however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file
the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A,
the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999,
deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached
as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case filed immediately;
That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already
been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;
That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta
but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and
he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked;
and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not
yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice
Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City
Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he personally follows up
the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me
that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;
That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office
of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magultas complaint to personally verify the
progress of my case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as
Annex C;
That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the
excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the
certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the
money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to
reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts
of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached as Annexes D and E;
That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;
x x x x x x x x x.[1]
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline,[2] respondent filed his Answer[3] vehemently denying the allegations of complainant
for being totally outrageous and baseless. The latter had allegedly been introduced as
a kumpadre of one of the formers law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him
to draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never
paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this letter,
the latter requested that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted
by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant
asked the process server of the formers law office to deliver the letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting,
respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to
settle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant
to do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainants wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew
all the files pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter
instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had
never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal
fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost
P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondents secretary
and told her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment,
the lawyer immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to
pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told
that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the
filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime
the filing of the complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First
Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill
Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never arrived at any
agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing
the complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response,
complainant proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondents
acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of
the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own personal checks because their law
office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office personnel were not
reporting regularly. Respondents checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant,
and if anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.
The IBPs Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:
x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office
was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainants deposit of the filing fees
for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created
and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client, the
complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing
fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client,
which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest
conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent
reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees,
does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress
upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.[4]
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Commissions recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Clients Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-
filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the
money given for the filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill
complaint; hence, the formers failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges
that the amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for attorneys
fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the
prosecution or the defense of the clients cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and
candor not only protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do
honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for the legal
profession.[5] Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession.[6]
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed
between him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The
former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of
one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the formers business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally
on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with
a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established. [7]
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal
relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the formers
fees.[8] Hence, despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent,
and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to
the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and
had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the clients interest.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect
legal matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a
client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in them.[9]They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and the defense of the clients rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and
abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law
legally applied.[10]
 Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his
office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it
was quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to
issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering
the mistake -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct
the error. He should have lost no time in calling complainants attention to the matter
and should have issued another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law a Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business.[11] Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. [12] The gaining of a
livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. [13] Duty to public service and to
the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a
noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained
without making much money.[14]
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by
the receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers
must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional
capacity.[15] Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold
in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. [16] It may be true
that they have a lien upon the clients funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully
come into their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements
have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and
disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly
account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct.[17] In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their clients interest within
the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice
law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and
to the public.[18]Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the
filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact
that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from
the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as a penalty.[19]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be
furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a
copy in respondents file.
WILLIAM S. UY vs. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES A.C. No. 5280 March 30, 2004
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales
for violation of the confidentiality of their lawyer-client relationship. The complainant alleges:
Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a
petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the
circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared,
finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tayug,
Pangasinan. When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to his (complainants)
office at Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a certain amount from him other than what they
had previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that
said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition
for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint dated July 26,
1999 against him with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tayug, Pangasinan for
"Falsification of Public Documents."1 The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances
pertaining to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which
respondent was supposed to have filed. Portions of said letter-complaint read:
The undersigned complainant accuses WILLIAM S. UY, of legal age, Filipino, married and a
resident of 132-A Gilmore Street corner 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, Michael Angelo
T. UY, CRISTINA EARL T. UY, minors and residents of the aforesaid address, Luviminda G.
Tomagos, of legal age, married, Filipino and a resident of Carmay East, Rosales, Pangasinan,
and F. Madayag, with office address at A12, 2/F Vira Mall Shopping Complex, Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila, for ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS,
committed as follows:
That on March 15, 1996, William S. Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land consisting of
4.001 ha. for the amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, situated at Brgy. Gonzales,
Umingan, Pangasinan, from FERMIN C. GONZALES, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale
executed by the latter in favor of the former; that in the said date, William S. Uy received the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33122, covering the said land;
That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
33122, in the Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the same in his name, William
S. Uy executed a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer of the aforesaid land in favor of his
children, namely, Michael Angelo T. Uy and Cristina Earl T. Uy, wherein William S. Uy made
it appear that his said children are of legal age, and residents of Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan,
Pangasinan, when in fact and in truth, they are minors and residents of Metro Manila, to
qualify them as farmers/beneficiaries, thus placing the said property within the coverage of the
Land Reform Program;
That the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another procured the
falsified documents which they used as supporting papers so that they can secure from the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan, TCT No. T-5165 (Certificate of Land
Ownership Award No. 004 32930) in favor of his above-named children. Some of these
Falsified documents are purported Affidavit of Seller/Transferor and Affidavit of Non-
Tenancy, both dated August 20, 1996, without the signature of affiant, Fermin C. Gonzales,
and that on that said date, Fermin C. Gonzales was already dead ;
That on December 17, 1998, William S. Uy with deceit and evident intent to defraud
undersigned, still accepted the amount of P340,000.00, from Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales,
P300,000.00, in PNB Check No. 0000606, and P40,000.00, in cash, as full payment of the
redemption of TCT No. 33122knowing fully well that at that time the said TCT cannot be
redeemed anymore because the same was already transferred in the name of his children;
That William S. Uy has appropriated the amount covered by the aforesaid check, as evidenced
by the said check which was encashed by him;
That inspite of repeated demands, both oral and in writing, William S. Uy refused and continue
to refuse to deliver to him a TCT in the name of the undersigned or to return and repay the said
P340,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned.2
With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and grossly
disregarded his duty to preserve the secrets of his client. Respondent unceremoniously turned
against him just because he refused to grant respondents request for additional compensation.
Respondents act tarnished his reputation and social standing.3
In compliance with this Courts Resolution dated July 31, 2000,4 respondent filed his Comment
narrating his version, as follows:
On December 17, 1998, he offered to redeem from complainant a 4.9 hectare-property situated
in Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan covered by TCT No. T-33122 which the latter
acquired by purchase from his (respondents) son, the late Fermin C. Gonzales, Jr.. On the
same date, he paid complainant P340,000.00 and demanded the delivery of TCT No. T-33122
as well as the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Upon request, he gave complainant
additional time to locate said title or until after Christmas to deliver the same and execute the
Deed of Redemption. After the said period, he went to complainants office and demanded the
delivery of the title and the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Instead, complainant gave
him photocopies of TCT No. T-33122 and TCT No. T-5165. Complainant explained that he
had already transferred the title of the property, covered by TCT No.T-5165 to his children
Michael and Cristina Uy and that TCT No. T-5165 was misplaced and cannot be located
despite efforts to locate it. Wanting to protect his interest over the property coupled with his
desire to get hold of TCT No. T-5165 the earliest possible time, he offered his assistance pro
bono to prepare a petition for lost title provided that all necessary expenses incident thereto
including expenses for transportation and others, estimated at P20,000.00, will be shouldered
by complainant. To these, complainant agreed.
On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draft of the petition for the lost title ready for
signing and notarization. On April 14, 1999, he went to complainants office informing him
that the petition is ready for filing and needs funds for expenses. Complainant who was with a
client asked him to wait at the anteroom where he waited for almost two hours until he found
out that complainant had already left without leaving any instructions nor funds for the filing of
the petition. Complainants conduct infuriated him which prompted him to give a handwritten
letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant
should get another lawyer to file the petition.
Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant was
terminated when he gave the handwritten letter to complainant; that there was no longer any
professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for
falsification of public document; that the facts and allegations contained in the letter-complaint
for falsification were culled from public documents procured from the Office of the Register of
Deeds in Tayug, Pangasinan.5
In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.6
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to appear on April 2, 2003
before the IBP.7 On said date, complainant did not appear despite due notice. There was no
showing that respondent received the notice for that days hearing and so the hearing was reset
to May 28, 2003.8
On April 29, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala received a letter from one Atty. Augusto
M. Macam dated April 24, 2003, stating that his client, William S. Uy, had lost interest in
pursuing the complaint he filed against Atty. Gonzales and requesting that the case against
Atty. Gonzales be dismissed.9
On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and recommendation,
portions of which read as follows:
The facts and evidence presented show that when respondent agreed to handle the filing of the
Verified Petition for the loss of TCT No. T-5165, complainant had confided to respondent the
fact of the loss and the circumstances attendant thereto. When respondent filed the Letter-
Complaint to the Office of the Special Prosecutor in Tayug, Pangasinan, he violated Canon 21
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which expressly provides that "A lawyer shall
preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is
terminated." Respondent cannot argue that there was no lawyer-client relationship between
them when he filed the Letter-Complaint on 26 July 1999 considering that as early as 14 April
1999, or three (3) months after, respondent had already terminated complainants perceived
lawyer-client relationship between them. The duty to maintain inviolate the clients
confidences and secrets is not temporary but permanent. It is in effect perpetual for "it outlasts
the lawyers employment" (Canon 37, Code of Professional Responsibility) which means even
after the relationship has been terminated, the duty to preserve the clients confidences and
secrets remains effective. Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own
advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with the full knowledge of the
circumstances consents thereto."
On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated 24 April 2003 from Atty. Augusto
M. Macam, who claims to represent complainant, William S. Uy, alleging that complainant is
no longer interested in pursuing this case and requested that the same be dismissed. The
aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this nature cannot
be "interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of
Court). Moreover, in Boliver vs. Simbol, 16 SCRA 623, the Court ruled that "any person may
bring to this Courts attention the misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken
regardless of the interest or lack of interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so warrant."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales to have
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and it is hereby recommended that he
be SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS from receipt hereof, from the practice of
his profession as a lawyer and member of the Bar.10
On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued
Resolution No. XV-2003-365, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering that
respondent violated Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Fermin L. Gonzales is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.11
Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the manifestation of
complainant Uy expressing his desire to dismiss the administrative complaint he filed against
respondent, has no persuasive bearing in the present case.
Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that:
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute
the same.
This is because:
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney
is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have
in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the
respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges.12
Now to the merits of the complaint against the respondent.
Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience.13 While it is true that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court,14 complainant failed to prove any of the circumstances enumerated above that would
warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein respondent.
Notwithstanding respondents own perception on the matter, a scrutiny of the records reveals
that the relationship between complainant and respondent stemmed from a personal transaction
or dealings between them rather than the practice of law by respondent. Respondent dealt with
complainant only because he redeemed a property which complainant had earlier purchased
from his (complainants) son. It is not refuted that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00
and gave him ample time to produce its title and execute the Deed of Redemption. However,
despite the period given to him, complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because of
the alleged loss of the title which he had admitted to respondent as having prematurely
transferred to his children, thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance so as to secure the
issuance of a new title to the property, in lieu of the lost one, with complainant assuming the
expenses therefor.
As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or
acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any
kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not
essential that the client should have employed the attorney on any previous occasion or that
any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had,
for as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters
pertinent to his profession.15
Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply to the present case.
Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for "Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Documents" filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his
personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance
of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant. Respondents
immediate objective was to secure the title of the property that complainant had earlier bought
from his son. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and
complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to
their personal transaction.
Canon 21 A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS
CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01 A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
b) When required by law;
c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by
judicial action.
The alleged "secrets" of complainant were not specified by him in his affidavit-complaint.
Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in
his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased
son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant,
which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in
any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-
complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against
anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21, 2003 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the administrative case filed against Atty.
Fermin L. Gonzales, docketed as A.C. No. 5280, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent.
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo,
seeking his disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent
maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public document against her, a former
client, based on confidential information gained from their attorney-client relationship.
Let us first hearken to the facts.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division,
Office of Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED).[1]
Complainants husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C.
Francisco, for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and
executory on July 15, 1992.[2]
In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February 7,
1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for
complainant.[3]
On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel, [4] informing the
RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of
Atty. de Leon.
It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant
before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose
Dela Cruz F. Mercado, and docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for violation of Articles 171
and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised Penal Code.[5] Respondent alleged
that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children, Angelica
and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of
Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was
solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and
their marriage took place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using any other
name than Rosa F. Mercado. She also insisted that she has gotten married only once, on April
11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.
In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are pending
before or decided upon by other tribunals (1) libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Pasig City;[6] (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the
permission required by Civil Service rules and regulations, and violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, before the then Presidential Commission Against Graft and
Corruption;[7] (3) complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of
misconduct and meted out the penalty of one month suspension without pay;[8] and, (4) the
Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
before the Sandiganbayan.[9]
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public document
(I.S. No. PSG 99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil case
for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant
Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for
falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client
relationship, and should be disbarred.
Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he alleged that
the complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the
allegations leveled against him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies. Respondent claimed
that the pending cases against him are not grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to
be innocent until proven otherwise.[10] He also states that the decision of the Ombudsman
finding him guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one
month without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty,
only of simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith.[11]
In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of
live birth which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken
during the engagement of respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant
confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing
was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two
daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible
to anyone.[12]
In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [13]
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant failed to
appear in both. Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted respondents
motion to file his memorandum, and the case was submitted for resolution based on the
pleadings submitted by the parties.[14]
On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating
commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.
On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and
recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She stated that
after the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for those who have wronged
her.
At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various criminal and
administrative cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where these cases
are pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent.
We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or
desistance by the complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting
forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in disbarment proceedings.
We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document against
his former client.
A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client and the rule on
attorney-client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in order.
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and
confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The
relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and
public interest.[15] Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to
repose his confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal
advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. [16] Thus, the
preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems
to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of justice. [17] One rule
adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his
clients secrets or confidence and not to abuse them.[18] Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve
his clients secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client
relationship,[19] and continues even after the clients death.[20] It is the glory of the legal
profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a man may safely go to a
lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with absolute
assurance that the lawyers tongue is tied from ever disclosing it.[21] With full disclosure of the
facts of the case by the client to his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the
ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of the clients cause.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to
establish the existence of the privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5)
by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.[22]
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship,
and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter
declines the employment.[23] The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss
whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged
or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the
prospective client.[24]
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose
other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged. Instructive
is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca,[25] where the client and his wife leased to their attorney a
1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of ten years. In their contract, the parties agreed,
among others, that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to the client-lessors,
and the remainder would be delivered by counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors. The client
alleged that the list of creditors which he had confidentially supplied counsel for the purpose of
carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in
violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of the
client. As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid
lease contract between the parties, he furnished counsel with the confidential list of his
creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not
because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease
agreement. We then held that a violation of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of
that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing
from a lawyer to his client.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. [26] The
client must intend the communication to be confidential.[27]
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure
between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was
given.[28]
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement
prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing
party,[29] an offer and counter-offer for settlement,[30] or a document given by a client to his
counsel not in his professional capacity,[31] are not privileged communications, the element of
confidentiality not being present.[32]
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.[33]
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or
obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the
purpose of seeking legal advice.[34]
If the client seeks an accounting service,[35] or business or personal assistance,[36] and not legal
advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to
substantiate complainants allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the
alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in
general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on
privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of
public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for
annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will
determine the merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to
the existence of facts which the complainant must prove.
Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the
complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent
without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of
the rule on privileged communication. Such confidential information is a crucial link in
establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is
not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.[37] The burden of proving that the
privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege. [38]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
A.C. No. 620 March 21, 1974
JOSE ALCALA, vs. HONESTO DE VERA, respondent.
FACTS:
In a civil case for annulment of a sale of 2 lots filed by one Semenchuk against Sps. Alcala on
the ground that one of the lots cannot be located or did not exist, herein respondent represented
sps. Alcala. Trial Court rendered judgement rescinding the contract of sale on the ground that
Semenchuk was not able to take material possession of the lot in question and that it has been
occupied by one Ruperto Ludovice and his brothers for a number of years already.
On April 19, 1963, respondent Atty. de Vera received a copy of the decision but he failed to
inform his clients of the judgment against them. On July 17, 1963, a sheriff came to
complainants' house to serve a writ of executionissued in said case. Totally caught by surprise,
Jose Alcala immediately wrote to the trial court and inquired for the status of case 2478. The
deputy Clerk of Court, in his reply dated July 22, 1963, informed Alcala that the case was
decided on April 17, 1963, that a copy of the decision was received by respondent attorney on
April 19, 1963, and that since no appeal was taken, a writ of execution was issued by the trial
court on motion of the plaintiff Semenchuk.
Spouses Alcala instituted civil case 2723 for damages against Atty. Honesto de Vera for having
failed to inform them of the decision in case 2478 as a result of which they lost their right to
appeal from said decision. The court denied it for failure to show that they indeed suffered
damages.
Complainants instituted this complaint for disbarment against their former counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not disbarment is proper.
HELD: For indifference, loyalty and lack of interest of respondent in handling complainant's
defense.
The evidence proving existence of lot offered by sps. Alcala which respondent allegedly failed
to present was rendered unnecessary for the commissioner appointed already reported that the
lot existed but the same was in the possession of other persons. The fact that the plaintiff,
Semenchuk, was not awarded any damages, attorney's fees, and costs shows that respondent
attorney exerted his utmost to resist plaintiff's complaint.
For gross negligence and malpractice committed by respondent for failure to inform his clients
of the decision in the civil case.
Petitioners do not appear to have suffered any material or pecuniary damage by the failure of
respondent Atty. De Vera to notify them of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478 since the
decision rendered was fair and justified. It is no less true, however, that in failing to inform his
clients, the petitioners, of the decision in said civil case, respondent failed to exercise "such
skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such
matters of professional employment"
The correctness of the decision in the civil case is no ground for exonerating respondent of the
charge but at most will serve only to mitigate his liability. While there is no finding of malice,
deceit, or deliberate intent to cause damage to his clients, there is, nonetheless, proof of
negligence, inattention, and carelessness on the part of respondent in his failure to give timely
notice of the decision in question. Fortunately for respondent, his negligence did not result in
any material or pecuniary damage to the herein complainants and for this reason We are not
disposed to impose upon him what may be considered in a lawyer's career as the extreme
penalty of disbarment.
The disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a punishment, but is rather intended to protect
the administration of justice.
Act of respondent manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to their interest expected of
him under his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Respondent's inaction
merits a severe censure from the Court.
GUILTY only of simple negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer of
complainants, and We hereby SEVERELY CENSURE him
[A.C. No. 5303 June 15, 2006]
HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR vs. ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA, respondent.
NATURE:Disbarment against respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa
FACTS:
Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is a practicing lawyer and a member of the IBP. Lumot
A. Jalandoni who is the Chairman/President of PentaResorts Corporation (PRC) and
owns the biggest shares of stocks in the corporation, was sued whichinvolved the
possession of land where Alhambra hotel, the only property owned by PRC, is
situated.
The latter engaged the legal services of Atty. Villarosa.
o Atty. Villarosa, as a consequence of said Attorney-Client relationship,
represented Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the entire proceedings of said
case.
 o Utmost trust and confidence was reposed on said counsel, hence delicate
and confidential matters involving all the personal circumstances of his
client were entrusted to Atty. Villarosa.
o Later on, Atty. Villarosa, without due notice prior to a scheduled
hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, one day
before its scheduled hearing.
A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdrawas Counsel will conclusively show
that no copy thereof was furnished to Lumot A. Jalandoni, neither does it bear her
conformity.
o The grounds alleged by Atty. Villarosa for his withdrawal as counsel of
Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was that heis a retained counsel of Dennis G.
Jalbuena. This is an estafa case filed by the representatives of PRCitself
against spouses Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena
It is worthy to note that from the outset, respondentalready knew that Dennis G.
Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot A. Jalandoni being married to her
eldestdaughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena.
o Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing conflicting
interests, breach of attorney-clientconfidentiality and deliberate
withholding of records were committed by respondent.
o To effectivelyunravel the alleged conflict of interest, we must look into
the cases involved.Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing
conflicting interests, breach of attorney-clientconfidentiality was
committed by respondent.
ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Villarosa properly withdrew his services as counsel.
HELD: NO.
In his comment, respondent stated that it was he who was not notified of the
hiring of Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in that case and that he withdrew
from the case with the knowledge of Lumot A. Jalandoni and with leave of court.
The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be summarized as
follows:
o The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the client, by
thelawyer or by the court, or by reason of circumstances beyond the
control of the client or the lawyer. The termination of the attorney-
client relationship entails certain duties on the part of the client and
his lawyer.
Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or
terminate the relation other thanfor sufficient cause is considerably restricted.
Canon 22 of the CPR reads:
o A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon
notice appropriate in thecircumstances.
An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or
by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the
attorney should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case.
A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his
client must file a petition for withdrawal in court. He must serve a copy
of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three days before the
date set for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a "mere
scrap of paper ."
Respondent made no such move. He admitted that hewithdrew as counsel on
April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on
April28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty.
Villarosa because of theappearance of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly in his
place.A client may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and
thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance.
Thus, it has been held that a client is free to change hiscounsel in a pending case
and thereafter retain another lawyer to represent him. That manner of changinga
lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it
require approval of thecourt.The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not
even to substitute for respondent but to act as additionalcounsel. Mrs. Jalandonis
conformity to having an additional lawyer did not necessarily mean conformityto
respondents desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondents speculations on the
professional relationshipof Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in
the records of this case.
RULING: Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby found GUILTYof violating Canon 15 and
Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of
law for one (1) year.
PORMENTO V. PONTEVEDRA (A.C. No. 5128) 31 March 2005
The Case: Complaint against Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra with malpractice and misconduct with
prayer for disbarment
Facts: Respondent was the Pormento familys legal counsel between 1964 and 1994. The
familys relationship with the respondent extends beyond the mere lawyer-client relations.
The rift between complainant and respondent began when the complainants counterclaim in a
civil case filed with the RTC of Bacolod City was dismissed. Respondent failed to inform
complainant Pormento of the dismissal of his counterclaim which resulted to the latter being
deprived of his right to appeal. In order to recover his ownership over a parcel of land,
Pormento was forced to hire a new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute an action to
recover the subject property.
In a separate incident, In 1967, he bought a parcel of land located at Negros Occidental. The
Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and notarized by
respondent. Since there was another person who claims ownership of the property,
complainant alleges that he heeded respondents advice to build a small house on the property
and to allow his (complainants) nephew and his family to occupy the house in order for
complainant to establish his possession of the said property. Subsequently, complainants
nephew refused to vacate the property prompting the former to file an ejectment case with the
Municipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros Occidental. Respondent acted as the counsel of
complainants nephew
Held/Ruling: Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his
new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test to determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.
A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the
subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter
of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. Conversely, he may
properly act as counsel for a new client, with full disclosure to the latter, against a former client
in a matter wholly unrelated to that of the previous employment, there being in that instance no
conflict of interests. Where, however, the subject matter of the present suit between the
lawyers new client and his former client is in some way connected with that of the former
clients action, the lawyer may have to contend for his new client that which he previously
opposed as counsel for the former client or to use against the latter information confided to him
as his counsel.
MARITESS GARCIA, vs. ATTY. ILUMINADO M. MANUEL,
For our resolution is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Maritess
Garcia against respondent Atty. Iluminado M. Manuel for gross misconduct for ineffectively
handling her case and failing to return to her the money she gave him.
The facts, as culled from the records, are uncomplicated:
Sometime in February 1999, Maritess Garcia, divorced from husband Oscar Fauni, approached
respondent for legal advice concerning child support and her condominium unit in San Juan,
Metro Manila, which her erstwhile husband refused to vacate. Respondent agreed to handle her
case at a fee of P70,000. Finding respondent's fees reasonable, complainant entrusted to
respondent all pertinent papers for his study. An advance fee of P10,000 was then asked by
respondent from complainant.
On 17 February 1999, a retainer agreement was entered by complainant with respondent,
calling for the payment of (1) P35,000 payable in weekly installments of preferably P5,000 but
not less than P2,000; (2) P35,000 to come from the proceeds of the sale of her condominium
unit or from any amount that might be recovered from Mr. Fauni, except that pertaining to
child support; and (3) a contingent fee of 5% of any amount that might be recovered from Mr.
Fauni except that for child support. Incidental expenses, such as filing fees and postage fees,
were also made chargeable to the account of the complainant. 1 On the same occasion,
complainant gave respondent the advance fee of P10,000. 2 Thereafter, respondent informed
complainant that he needed P10,000 for the filing fees.
On 4 March 1999, complainant gave respondent P10,000 for the filing fees in the ejectment
case. 3 She, however, asked respondent as to why the fees cost so much. Respondent replied
that filing fees are based on a certain percentage of the price of the property and the amount of
child support prayed for. A demand letter to vacate the premises of the condominium dated 4
March 1999 was then prepared by respondent and mailed to Mr. Fauni on 8 March 1999. 4
In the interim, complainant made several follow-ups with respondent inquiring particularly as
to whether the ejectment case had already been filed. Through a telephone conversation with
respondent on 7 April 1999, complainant found out that the ejectment case had not been filed
yet by respondent. Agitated by the information, complainant immediately went to respondent's
residence. An altercation between respondent and complainant took place. After serious
exchange of words, respondent returned to complainant all of her documents. No amount of
money was, however, returned by respondent to complainant despite the latter's demand for its
return.
Aggrieved by respondent's actuations, complainant filed on 30 June 1999 with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline, the instant complaint for gross
misconduct against respondent. 5
In his Answer dated 24 September 1999, respondent denied having committed any malicious,
dishonest or anomalous acts against complainant. Respondent asserted that he did not file the
ejectment case because he had not yet received the registry return card evidencing the receipt
by Oscar Fauni of the demand letter he sent on 8 March 1999. It could not be said that he
misappropriated the P10,000 for the filing fees because complainant, who was then in arrears
with her installment payments for his fee, agreed that said P10,000 could be applied in the
meantime to her account. Finally, respondent averred that he never withdrew his services as
counsel of complainant; rather it was the complainant who explicitly discharged him when she
demanded for the return of the amounts she had paid him. 6
In his Report and Recommendation dated 7 May 2001, Investigating Commissioner Atty.
Caesar R. Dulay concluded that respondent was less than honest to his client and displayed
lack of candor and fidelity to her cause. He cited respondent's act of (1) making it appear to
complainant that as early a 17 February 1999, he already needed P10,000 for filing fees; (2)
failing to advise his client as to the real amount of the filing fees; 7 and (3) failing to render an
accounting of the monies received and intended as filing fees. Moreover, Commissioner Dulay
found respondent guilty of misleading the Commission by his claim of having received the
registry return card on 7 April 1999, the truth of the matter being that respondent already
received the registry return card on 24 March 1999. He then recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one month and be ordered to render an accounting of all
monies he received from the complainant.
In its Resolution No. XV-2002-239 of 29 June 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved and adopted Atty. Dulay's Report and Recommendation. It, however, increased the
recommended penalty of respondent from one month to six months of suspension from the
practice of law.
We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and adopted
by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that
renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility commands all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the
legal profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct.
There is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that
respondent committed dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him by the
complainant. Respondent Manuel fully knew that the jurisdictional requirement of demand to
vacate had to be complied with before an ejectment case could be filed, 8and yet he asked
complainant to raise the filing fee of P10,000 as early as 17 February 1999. 9 He likewise
cannot take refuge behind his claim that he did not file the ejectment case because he had not
yet received the registry return card. The records reveal that despite Atty. Manuel's receipt of
the registry return card on 24 March 1999, 10 he still did not file an ejectment case.
Finally, if indeed respondent was in good faith in dealing with complainant, he should have
informed or advised the complainant of the status of her case or, at the least, responded to her
inquiries. Canon 18, Rule 18.04 provides:
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within reasonable time to the client's request for information.
The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the
client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and should not be
left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his interests are being defended. It is only
thus that the trust and faith in the counsel may remain unimpaired. 11
Respondent also failed to comply with the norms embodied in Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
In the instant case, respondent received the amount of P10,000 specifically for filing fees in the
ejectment case. Thus, he was under the obligation to render an accounting of the same. The
highly fiduciary and confidential relation of attorney and client requires that the lawyer should
promptly account for all the funds received from, or held by him for, the client. 12
Moreover, a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his client in the
course of his professional employment shall deliver the same to his client (a) when they
become due or (b) upon demand. 13 In the instant case, respondent failed to account and return
the P10,000 for the filing fees despite complainant's repeated demands.
We find untenable respondent's claim that since complainant was already in arrears with his
fees, it was proper for him to apply the filing fees to his attorney's fees. It has been held that an
attorney's lien is not an excuse for a lawyer's non-rendition of accounting. 14 And while a
lawyer is allowed to apply so much of the client's funds as may be necessary to satisfy his
lawful fees and disbursements, the lawyer is however under the obligation to promptly
thereafter notify his client. 15 Nothing on record supports respondent's claim that complainant
was adequately notified as to the application of the P10,000 (for the filing fees) to her arrears.
Besides, the receipt dated 4 March 1999 states that:
In the event that whatever is left of the P10,000 after the filing of the ejectment case is
insufficient for the filing fee in the other collection case, the said balance shall be applied to the
installment due for the retainer agreement. 16
A close reading of the receipt reveals that while it authorizes respondent to apply whatever
would be left of the P10,000 (intended for the filing fees) to the retainer fee, it clearly
presupposes that the filing fee in the ejectment cases must have been paid already.
We find unwarranted respondent's claim that complainant impliedly terminated his services
when she asked for the return of all her documents. Complainant was upset by respondent's
non-filing of the ejectment case. She honestly believed that respondent would already file the
ejectment case after giving him the P10,000 for the filing fees. It was thus a spontaneous and
natural reaction for her to confront respondent of his inaction. Her belligerence arose from her
zealousness to have her former husband ejected from her condominium unit. Assuming that
complainant terminated respondent's services, respondent would not, nonetheless, be relieved
of his duty to render the necessary accounting for all the monies received by him from
complainant.
Respondent's actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension from the
practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is
meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. 17 While we will not hesitate to
remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls
for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end. 18 In this case, we find suspension to be sufficient sanction against respondent.
Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as punishment, but as a means to protect the
public and the legal profession. 19
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Iluminado M. Manuel is found GUILTY of gross misconduct
and is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective
immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. Further, respondent is ordered to render, within thirty (30) days from notice of this
Resolution, an accounting of all monies received by him from complainant.
Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondent's record as an attorney in this Court, and
notice thereof be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
Avito Yu v Tajanlangit
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Avito Yu
against respondent Atty. Cesar R. Tajanlangit for violation of Rules 18.03 and 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code).[1]
Complainant alleged that he had engaged the services of respondent as defense counsel in
Criminal Case No. 96-150393 that resulted in a judgment of conviction against him and a
sentence of thirty (30) years of imprisonment.[2] After the motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial was denied by the trial court, instead of filing an appeal, respondent filed a petition
for certiorari[3] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the trial courts part in denying the motion. This petition was subsequently denied
by the Court of Appeals. Due to respondents alleged error in the choice of remedy, the period
to appeal lapsed and complainant was made to suffer imprisonment resulting from his
conviction. In depriving complainant of his right to an appeal, respondent allegedly violated
Rule 18.03[4] of the Code. Moreover, complainant averred that respondent had violated Rule
16.01[5] of the Code for failing to return the bailbond to him in the amount P195,000.00 after
having withdrawn the same.[6] Further, complainant stated that respondent had failed to pay the
telephone bill he had incurred during his stay at complainants house. [7]
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred and be ordered to pay him the amount
of P211,106.97 plus interest.[8]
For his part, respondent clarified that his legal services were engaged only after the denial of
the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial and the supplement thereto. His legal services
were limited to filing the petition for certiorari. Complainant, at the time, had already been
convicted by the trial court. Respondent also explained that he had discussed with complainant
the merits of filing a petition for certiorari and that complainant gave his conformity to the
filing of the same.[9]
Moreover, respondent averred that complainant had authorized and instructed him to withdraw
the cash bond in order to apply the amount as payment for legal fees and reimbursement for
expenses. With regard to the unpaid telephone bill, respondent alleged that he was not
presented a copy of the billing statement despite his previous requests. He also contended that
he had been allowed to use the telephone to facilitate coordination between him and
complainant as he was then residing in Bacolod City.[10]
The Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by Resolution of 16
July 2003.[11]
In his Report and Recommendation dated 2 December 2004, Atty. Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.,
IBP Commissioner, made the following findings:
On the charge of violating Rule 18.03
xxx
x x x Considering that Respondent was only hired after the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial, Complainant is silent whether an appeal was still available
to him at that time. Complainant failed to state the material dates when his first lawyer, Atty.
Lacsamana received the Decision dated 6 February 1998, when she filed the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial, and when his second lawyer, Atty. Espiritu, received the
Order dated 23 April 1999
While all of the lawyers who protected Complainants cause were of the view that there was a
need to present additional evidence and/or hold trial anew, it is obvious that Complainant
singled out Respondent and blamed him solely for his conviction.
At any rate, Respondent exhaustively explained his legal basis for elevating the Order dated 23
April 1999 to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari. Considering that the
Order dated 23 April 1999, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial,
Respondents argument that the said order is not the proper subject of appeal is tenable. This is
supported by Section 1(a), Rule 43 and Section 9, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. For another, a
perusal of grounds Respondent raised in the Petition is acceptable grounds that warrant a new
trial. At least two of the grounds Respondent raised were: the negligence of former counsel in
failing to present evidence and new discovered evidence. It is well-settled that these grounds
usually warrant the re-opening of evidence. Thus, it cannot be said that Respondent acted
negligently in advocating Complainants cause
xxx
On the charge of violating Rule 16.01
x x x In the absence of evidence controverting Respondents claim that a verbal agreement
exists or an amount different from what was agreed upon, it is believable that indeed,
Complainant knew of the fee arrangement entered into with the Respondent, through Ms.
Javier, who acted in his behalf. It is also indisputable that Complainant executed a Special
Power of Attorney dated 23 March 1999 authorizing the Respondent to withdraw the cash
bonds in several criminal cases on his behalf. Thus, it was not all improper for Respondent to
withdraw the same.
While Respondent is entitled to be paid for the legal services he rendered and expenses he
incurred, it is still Respondents obligation to render an accounting of the money received.
Further, Respondent did not substantiate his claim that he had paid for or tendered payment for
the unpaid telephone bill. While he contends that he previously asked for the billing statement,
it was allegedly not shown to him. However, there is no showing that from the time the instant
disbarment complaint was filed, which in itself constitutes the demand for its payment, any
payment (was) made by the Respondent.[12]
Accordingly, the IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be directed to: (1) render
an accounting of the money he had received and to itemize the nature of the legal services he
had rendered, inclusive of the expenses he had incurred in compliance with Rule 16.01 of the
Code; and (2) to pay the amount of the unpaid telephone bill. It was further recommended that
respondent be sternly warned that a similar offense in the future would be dealt with more
severely.[13]
On 12 March 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-83 adopting
and approving the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner. [14]
The Court is in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Records show that respondent did not serve as complainants lawyer at the inception of or
during the trial of Criminal Case No. 96-150393 which resulted to the conviction of the latter.
In fact, respondent was only engaged as counsel after the withdrawal of appearance of
complainants lawyers and denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial and the
supplement thereto. At that time, complainant had already been incarcerated. Significantly,
complainant made no mention of the availability of the remedy of appeal at the time of
respondents employment.
More importantly, the Court finds adequate respondents justification for filing the petition for
certiorari instead of an appeal. Indeed, there is no showing that respondent was negligent in
handling the legal matter entrusted to him by complainant.
The Court also agrees with the IBP that it was not at all improper for respondent to have
withdrawn the cash bonds as there was evidence showing that complainant and respondent had
entered into a special fee arrangement. But, however justified respondent was in applying the
cash bonds to the payment of his services and reimbursement of the expenses he had incurred,
the Court agrees with
the IBP that he is not excused from rendering an accounting of the same. In Garcia v. Atty.
Manuel,[15] the Court held that (t)he highly fiduciary and confidential relation of attorney and
client requires that the lawyer should promptly account for all the funds received from, or held
by him for, the client.[16] The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorneys fees on the money in
his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt
accounting.[17]

Finally, the Court concurs with the IBP that while it is true that respondent was not presented a
copy of the unpaid telephone bill, the instant complaint itself constitutes the demand for its
payment. Considering that there is no manifestation to the effect that the same has been paid,
respondent should accordingly be required to settle it.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Cesar R. Tajanlangit is ordered to

render, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Resolution, an accounting of all monies he
received from complainant and to itemize the nature of the legal services he had rendered,
inclusive of the expenses he had incurred, in compliance with Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Respondent is further ADMONISHED that commission of the same or similar act in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.