Calalang vs.

Williams, 70 Phil 726

Facts: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal
Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in prohibition against respondent-public officers. Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules and regulations complained of
infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all people.

Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.

Held: Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity
of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."

Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as constituting self defense.

US vs. Ah Chong (Crim1)

The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant.

En Banc

Carson, March 19, 1910

Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact

Facts:

The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal Province
Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho
"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest building
No one slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch
running along the side of the building
o This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height
o The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room
He called out twice, "Who is there?"
He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room
The defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder (when he entered the room) who turned out to be his
roommate Pascual
Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded
Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next house and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds
Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day
The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the incident, and had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should
knock that the door and acquaint his companion with his identity
The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his pillow as personal protection because of repeated robberies in Fort McKinley
Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because he forced open the door of their
sleeping room, despite the defendant's warnings
Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating (mitigating) circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the
minimum penalty prescribed by law
Issue:

Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible

Holding:

No.

Ratio:

By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if
Pascual was actually a thief, he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be self-defense), but would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if
the actor had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was actually Pascual, he would be guilty of homicide/assassination)
The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith
"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"
o The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist
"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the
homicide
The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense
He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts

RTC's decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

Villavicencio vs Lukban - A case digest

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.
Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was
also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and
knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia
Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in
the city of Davao instead.The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ;
or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits
to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Held:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the
chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon
to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that
he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no
reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials
must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her
liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great
writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Gonzales Vs. Comelec Case Digest

Gonzales Vs. Comelec

27 SCRA 835
G.R. L-27833
April 18, 1969

Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was
challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act.
Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to
which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his
co-petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which
only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these
political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect.
Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and
press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for
national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in
government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions.
Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the clear and
present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to
the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words
uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence,
or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts
of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to
prevent.

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satis fy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation
under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Taada clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and
appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as
violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of
grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent.

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition
of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.