SCD2013 Political2010 2012

SURVEY OF 2010-2012 SC DECISIONS IN
POLITICAL LAW
Dean ED VINCENT S. ALBANO
ARTICLE II
Declaration of Principles and State Policies
Constitution mandates self-reliant economy, but does not

impose police of monopoly.
Q - Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of RA 8762 otherwise known as Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000
which expressly repealed RA 1180 which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade
business. The new law allows them to do so.
They mainly argued that R.A. 8762 violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. They invoked the provisions of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, that the State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure
the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate
social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all. Rule on the
contention. Explain.
Answer: The contention of the petitioners is not correct. As explained in Taada v. Angara, 358 Phil. 546 (1997), the
provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-
executing. There must be laws to implement the same. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause
of action in the courts. (Rep. Espina, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010).
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a
trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality
and reciprocity; and speaks of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the
protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the Constitution
mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business exchange
with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. (Rep. Espina, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., G.R. No. 143855,
September 21, 2010).
Q Does the Constitution prohibit the entry of foreign investments, etc., in the implementation of the constitutional
mandate to develop an independent and self-reliant economy? Explain.
Answer: No. The 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does
not encourage their unlimited entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The key, as in all economies in the
world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and services.
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to
Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest
requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It
can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino
citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead
of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy. (Rep. Espina, et al. v. Hon.
Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010).
Q What is the nature of the power of the State to control and regulate trade? Explain.
Answer: The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power
of the State. A persons right to property, whether he is a Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from him
without due process of law. In 1954, Congress enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act or R.A. 1180 that restricted the
retail business to Filipino citizens. In denying the petition assailing the validity of such Act for violation of the foreigners
right to substantive due process of law, the Supreme Court held that the law constituted a valid exercise of police power.
(Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957). The State had an interest in preventing alien control of the retail trade and
R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to that purpose. That law is not arbitrary.
To the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the foreigners right to
property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos
right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to
ABRC2013.politicallaw2010-2012/EVSA/crys 1
which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors. (Rep. Espina, et al. V. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr.,
supra.)
Q It was contended that RA 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade business. Is the contention
correct? Why?
Answer: No. First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to certain categories; Second, only nationals from,
or juridical entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage
in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain retailing activities
outside their accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-
to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing activities. (Rep. Espina, et al. V. Hon. Ronaldo
Zamora, Jr., supra.).
ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS
Due Process and Equal Protection
Q Mayor Atienza and others were expelled from the Liberal Party. They argued that their expulsion from the party is
not a simple issue of party membership or discipline; it involved a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to
due process of law. They claimed that they should have been summoned to a hearing before summarily expelling them
from the party. They contended that the proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative
proceedings and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940). Is the contention correct? Explain.
Answer: No. The requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties. The due
process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the state and through which certain
governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality "contemplates an authority to
which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function." (Luzon Development bank vs.
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employes, 319 Phil. 262 (1995). The constitutional limitations that generally apply
to the exercise of the states powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies. (Atienza, et.al. vs. COMELEC, et.al., G.R. No.
188920, February 16, 2010, Abad, J.)
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary between the state
and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does
not involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested
right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party
members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon
among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members whose rights under their
charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due
process issue against the government or any of its agencies. (Atienza, et.al. vs. COMELEC, et.al., G.R. No. 188920, February
16, 2010, Abad, J.)
Q In a case, the accused contended that his identification in the hospital should not have been given consideration
because the identification was not made in a police line-up and that the procedure adopted constituted suggestive
identification for he alone was brought infront of the victim. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. There is no law or police regulation requiring a police line-up for proper identification in every case. Even if
there was no police line-up, there could still be proper and reliable identification as long as such identification was not
suggested or instigated to the witness by the police. (People vs. Escote, Jr. 400 SCRA 603 (2003) What is crucial is for the
witness to positively declare during trial that the person charged was the malefactor. (People vs. Martin, 567 SCRA 42
(2008) 249 SCRA 54 (1995); People vs. Macapanas, G.R. No. 187049, May 4, 2010).
Q Explain the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such
identification.
Answer: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect
alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to
the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of
persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due process. (People v. Macapanas, G.R. No. 187049, May 4, 2010, citing People v.
Teehankee).
Q What measure is adopted in the admissibility of out-of-court identification of an accused? Explain.
Answer: In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the
totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. (People v.
Macapanas, G.R. No. 187049, May 4, 2010 citing, People v. Teehankee).
Q As a result of an audit report by the COA on Selected Transactions & Walis Tingting for the City of Paranaque, several
anomalies were discovered. The COA disallowed certain transactions, and accused was charged with violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Before arraignment, Mayor Joey Marquez filed a motion seeking referral of the
disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests to the NBI, but the SB denied it ruling that the
court can validly determine forgery from its own independent examination of the documentary evidence as he
interposed the defense forgery. Is the denial correct? Why?
Answer: No, as it deprived the accused of the right to due process. The accused bears the burden of submitting evidence to
prove the fact that his signatures were indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his burden, he must be afforded
reasonable opportunity to present evidence to support his allegation. This opportunity is the actual examination of the
signatures he is questioning by no less than the countrys premier investigative force the NBI. If he is denied such
opportunity, his only evidence on this matter is negative testimonial evidence which is generally considered as weak. And,
he cannot submit any other examination result because the signatures are on the original documents which are in the
control of either the prosecution or the graft court.
He should not be deprived of his right to present his own defense. How the prosecution, or even the court,
perceives his defense to be is irrelevant. To them, his defense may seem feeble and his strategy frivolous, but he should be
allowed to adduce evidence of his own choice. The court should not control how he will defend himself as long as the steps
to be taken will not be in violation of the rules. (Joey Marquez v. SB, et al., G. R. No. 187912-14, January 31, 2011).
Due process applies to the power to tax; equal protection

clause.
Q Petitioner assailed the validity of the imposition of minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on corporations and
creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified as ordinary assets. He argued that the MCIT
violates the due process clause because it levies income tax even if there is no realized gain. He asserted that the
enumerated provisions of the subject revenue regulations violate the due process clause because, like the MCIT, the
government collects income tax even when the net income has not yet been determined. Is the contention correct?
Why?
Answer: No, because the CWT is creditable against the tax due from the seller of the property at the end of the taxable
year. The seller will be able to claim a tax refund if its net income is less than the taxes withheld. Nothing is taken that is
not due so there is no confiscation of property repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of due process. More
importantly, the due process requirement applies to the power to tax. The CWT does not impose new taxes nor does it
increase taxes. It relates entirely to the method and time of payment. (Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association,
Inc. vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et. Al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010).
Q Petitioner claimed that the revenue regulations are violative of the equal protection clause because the CWT is being
levied only on real estate enterprises. Petitioner pointed out that manufacturing enterprises are not similarly imposed a
CWT on their sales, even if their manner of doing business is not much different from that of a real estate
enterprise. Like a manufacturing concern, a real estate business is involved in a continuous process of production and it
incurs costs and expenditures on a regular basis. The only difference is that goods produced by the real estate
business are house and lot units. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances. Stated differently, all persons belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. It follows that the guaranty
of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be
valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable classifications for purposes of taxation. Inequalities which
result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation. The real
estate industry is, by itself, a class and can be validly treated differently from other business enterprises. (Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders Association, Inc. vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et. Al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010).
Q The notice to an employee who was being terminated merely stated that he was being dropped from the rolls. It did
not specify the factual and legal reasons for terminating the services of the employee. Did the notice comply with due
process? Why?
Answer: No. This is a violation of due process since it strikes at its essence. The opportunity to be heard, or the opportunity
to adequately and intelligently mount a defense made against him was violated. He was completely left in the dark why his
services were being summarily terminated. LBP v. Paden, G.R. No. 157607, July 7, 2009).
Q What are the requirements of procedural due process in the suspension or dismissal of employee? Explain.
Answer: Procedural due process basically requires that suspension or dismissal comes only after notice and hearing. Thus,
the minimum requirements of due process are: (1) that the employees or officers must be informed of the charges
preferred against them, and the formal way by which the employees or officers are informed is by furnishing them with a
copy of the charges made against them; and (2) that they must have a reasonable opportunity to present their side of the
matter, that is to say, their defenses against the charges and to present evidence in support of their defenses. (LBP v.
Paden, G.R. No. 157607, July 7, 2009).
Q Substantive due process requires that the suspension or dismissal be for cause. Explain the concept of for cause
provided by law.
Answer: It means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient for removal, that is legal cause,
and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that
officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal or without cause. Moreover, the
cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial
nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public. (LBP v. Paden, G.R. No. 157607, July 7, 2009).
Every unfair discrimination offends the equal protection

clause.
Q Petitioners questioned E.O. No. 1 dated July 30, 2010, Creating the Philippine Truth Commission as violative of the
equal protection clause as it merely focused on the alleged corrupt acts of former Pres. Macapagal. It does not
encompass all acts of prior administrations where the same magnitude of controversies and anomalies were reported. It
merely singled the previous administration. The OSG contended that the previous administration is not the only initial
subject of the investigation. Even assuming that it will confine its proceedings to officials of the previous administration,
there is no violation of the equal protection clause for the segregation of the transactions of public officers during the
previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and
germane to the evils sought to be corrected. This is so because of the widespread reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the previous administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. The investigation
will deter others from committing the evils of the previous administration. Whose contention is correct? Why?
Answer: Petitioners contention is correct, since the E.O singles out the previous administration. The equal protection of
the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and
fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of
undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to
cut it down is the equal protection clause. (Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935; Lagman, et al. v. Executive
Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010, Mendoza, J).
Q What is the basic requirement of the equal protection clause? Explain.
Answer: Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under
the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences
that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. (Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935; Lagman, et
al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010, Mendoza, J).
Q What is the extent of the coverage of the equal protection clause? Explain.
Answer: The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions
cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of
a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. (Biraogo v. Phil. Truth
Commission, G.R. No. 192935; Lagman, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010, Mendoza, J)
Q Basically, the equal protection clause directs that all persons and things of the same class enjoy the same privilege.
Does the rule allow classification? Explain.
Answer: Yes. It does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification. (Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935; Lagman, et al. v. Executive
Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010, Mendoza, J; Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010).
Q The equal protection clause allows classification. When is classification valid? Explain.
Answer: For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who
naturally belong to the class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with
absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be
treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class
is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him. (Biraogo v. Phil. Truth
Commission, G.R. No. 192935; Lagman, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010).
Q Is the deemed resigned provision of appointive officials when they file the certificate of candidacy violative of the
equal protection clause? Why?
Answer: No. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that appointive officials, as officers and
employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any
election except to vote. Elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed
to take part in political and electoral activities. (Quinto, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010).
Q State the governmental interests that are served by the deemed resigned provision under the Election Law. Explain.
Answer: The deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil service faithful to
the government and the people rather than to party; (ii) avoidance of the appearance of political justice as to policy; (iii)
avoidance of the danger of a powerful political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their
merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity. These are interests that
are important enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive officials and employees to seek elective office.
(Quinto, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010).
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Arrest in flagrante delicto, no need for warrant; objects

searched are admissible in evidence.
Q When is the description of the place to be searched sufficient? Explain.
Answer: A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar, the address and description of the
place to be searched in the search warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located at the stated address,
which was the accusseds residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms. (People v.
Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010).
Q State the purpose of the requirement of particularity of the things to be seized. Explain.
Answer: The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the
warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those, and only those particularly described in the search warrant to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or
articles relating to a crime. Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specified in the search warrant should be
restored to appellant. (People vs. Raul Nuez, G.R. No. 177148, June 30, 2009).
Obscene language is an unprotected speech.
Q - An order suspending the program of Soriano was issued due to certain utterances he made in his television show,
Ang Dating Daan. He uttered the following: Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling. Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol
ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, (dito) kay Michael ang
gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra
ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. x x x He contended that the MTRCB denied him his right to the equal
protection of the law, arguing that, owing to the preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer the criticisms
coming from the INC ministers. Is his contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. His position does not persuade. The equal protection clause demands that all persons subject to legislation
should be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. It
guards against undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
(1957). Surely, he cannot, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative
complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offered no proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, used language
similar to that which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCBs disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the
preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable to answer his critics, this does not
become a deprivation of the equal protection guarantee. Such suspension is not an indication of oppressive inequality.
(Eliseo Soriano v. Laguardia, et al., G.R. No. 164785; Soriano v. MTRCB, et al., G.R. No. 165636, April 29, 2009).
Q He contended that what he uttered was religious speech, adding that words like putang babae were said in the
exercise of his religious freedom. Rule on the contention. Explain.
Answer: The argument has no merit. There is nothing in his statements expressing any particular religious belief, nothing
furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition
program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at
another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. He was only moved by anger and the need to seek
retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his
statements does not convert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. It cannot be accepted that petitioner
made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the
alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate that he had descended to the level of name-calling
and foul-language discourse. He could have chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.
(Soriano v. Laguardia, et al., supra.).
Q He contended that the 20-day suspension order, was an unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of speech and
expression and an impermissible prior restraint. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio, television and motion pictures come within the
broad protection of the free speech and expression clause. Each method though, because of its dissimilar presence in the
lives of people and accessibility to children, tends to present its own problems in the area of free speech protection, with
broadcast media, of all forms of communication, enjoying a lesser degree of protection. (Eastern Broadcasting Corp. vs.
Dans, Jr., 137 SCRA 628 (1985). Just as settled is the rule that restrictions, be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial
injunction against publication or threat of cancellation of license/franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in libel and
damage suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of expression. Prior
restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication
or dissemination. The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is, however, not
absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important public interests, some forms of speech not being
protected. As has been held, the limits of the freedom of expression are reached when the expression touches upon
matters of essentially private concern. (Lagunsad vs. Soto Vda. De Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476). In the oft-quoted expression of
Justice Holmes, the constitutional guarantee obviously was not intended to give immunity for every possible use of
language. (Trohwerk vs. U.S., 249 U.S. 204 (1919). From Lucas vs. Royo comes this line: The freedom to express ones
sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments
must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others. (344 SCRA 481 (2000); Soriano
v. Laguardia, et al., supra.).
Q - He asserted that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech. Is his contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. Unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or
misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting words, i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security.
His statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child. Hence, it is, in that context,
unprotected speech. (Soriano v. Laguardia, et al., supra.).
Q Is there a distinction between regulation or restriction of protected speech that is content-based and that which is
content-neutral?
Answer: Yes. A content-based restraint is aimed at the contents or idea of the expression, whereas a content-neutral
restraint intends to regulate the time, place, and manner of the expression under well-defined standards tailored to serve a
compelling state interest, without restraint on the message of the expression. Courts subject content-based restraint to
strict scrutiny. (Chavez vs. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008); Soriano v. Laguardia, et al., supra.).
Q Why is the suspension by the MTRCB a permissible restriction? Explain.
Answer: It is due to the following interplaying factors: First, the indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive
medium that to borrow from Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA 717 (1985) easily reaches every home where there is
a set and where children will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown; second, the broadcast was
aired at the time of the day when there was a reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and third, petitioner
uttered his speech on a G or for general patronage rated program. Under Sec. 2(a) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the
MTRCB, a show for general patronage is suitable for all ages, meaning that the material for television in the judgment of
the board, does not contain anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or
supervision. The words petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language is
categorized as indecent, as in petitioners utterances on a general patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed
as unprotected speech. (Soriano v. Laguardia, et al., supra.).
Q He asserted that his utterances must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil the
State has the right and duty to prevent and such danger must be grave and imminent. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. His invocation of the clear and present danger doctrine, arguably the most permissive of speech tests, would
not avail him any relief, for the application of said test is uncalled for under the premises. The doctrine, first formulated by
Justice Holmes, accords protection for utterances so that the printed or spoken words may not be subject to prior restraint
or subsequent punishment unless its expression creates a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantial evil
which the government has the power to prohibit. (16A AM. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law Sec. 493; Schenck vs. U.S. 249 U.S.
47). Under the doctrine, freedom of speech and of press is susceptible of restriction when and only when necessary to
prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the government may lawfully protect. As it were, said doctrine
evolved in the context of prosecutions for rebellion and other crimes involving the overthrow of government. It was
originally designed to determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action, or to
have serious and substantial deleterious consequences on the security and public order of the community. (Gonzales vs.
COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969). The clear and present danger rule has been applied to this jurisdiction. As a standard of
limitation on free speech and press, however, the clear and present danger test is not a magic incantation that wipes out all
problems and does away with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which
compels a court to release a defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of imminent
catastrophic disaster. (Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 170 SCRA 1 (1989). As observed in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation, the clear
and present danger test does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in
all forums. (137 SCRA 628 (1985); Soriano v. Laguardia, et al., supra.).
Q Is the clear and present danger the only test to restrain forms of speech? Explain.
Answer: No. The clear and present danger doctrine is not the only test which has been applied by the courts. Generally, said
doctrine is applied to cases involving the overthrow of the government and even other evils which do not clearly
undermine national security. Since not all evils can be measured in terms of proximity and degree the Court, however, in
several cases Ayer Productions vs. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861 (1988) and Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 28 SCRA 835 (1969)
applied the balancing of interests test. In Gonzales vs. COMELEC, it was said that where the legislation under constitutional
attack interferes with the freedom of speech and assembly in a more generalized way and where the effect of the speech
and assembly in terms of the probability of realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of impressionistic
calculation, then the balancing interests test can be applied. (Soriano v. Laguardia, et al., supra.).
Q State the basis of the balancing of interest test. Explain.
Answer: The balancing of interest test, to borrow from Professor Kauper, rests on the theory that it is the courts function
in a case before it when it finds public interests served by legislation, on the one hand, and the free expression clause
affected by it, on the other, to balance one against the other and arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be
placed. If, on balance, it appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such nature that it outweighs
the abridgment of freedom, then the court will find the legislated valid. In short, the balance-of-interests theory rests on
the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even those stated in the free speech and expression clause,
and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests. To the mind of the Court, the
balancing of interest doctrine is the more appropriate test to follow. (Soriano v. Laguardia, et al., supra.).
Q In this case, the assertion by petitioner of his enjoyment of his freedom of speech is ranged against the duty of the
government to protect and promote the development and welfare of the youth. Which will prevail? Explain.
Answer: The governments interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare of the children buttresses the
reasonable curtailment and valid restraint on the suspension of his program.
No doubt, one of the fundamental and most vital rights granted to citizens of a State is the freedom of speech or
expression, for without the enjoyment of such right, a free, stable, effective, and progressive democratic stated would be
difficult to attain. Arrayed against the freedom of speech is the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual, intellectual, and
social being which the State is constitutionally tasked to promote and protect. Moreover, the State is also mandated to
recognize and support the vital role of the youth in nation building as laid down in Sec. 13, Article II of the 1987
Constitution.
The Constitution has, therefore, imposed the sacred obligation and responsibility on the State to provide
protection to the youth against illegal or improper activities which may prejudice their general well-being.
The State has a compelling interest in extending social protection to minors against all forms of neglect,
exploitation, and immorality which may pollute innocent minds. It has a compelling interest in helping parents, through
regulatory mechanisms, protect their childrens minds from exposure to undesirable materials and corrupting experiences.
The Constitution, no less, in fact enjoins the State, to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and
social well-being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill their role in the field of nation-building. In the same way, the
State is mandated to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character. (Soriano v. Laguardia, et al., supra.).
Q Why should television broadcasts be regulated? Explain.
Answer: Television broadcasts should be subject to some form of regulation, considering the ease with which they can be
accessed, and violations of the regulations must be met with appropriate and proportional disciplinary action. The
suspension of a violating television program would be sufficient punishment and serve as a deterrent for those responsible.
The prevention of the broadcast of petitioners television program is justified, and does not constitute prohibited prior
restraint. It behooves the Court to respond to the needs of the changing times, and craft jurisprudence to reflect these
times. (Soriano v. Laguardia, et al., supra.).
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Privilege communication is within constitutionally-protected

freedom of the press.
Q - A libel suit was filed against Isagani Yambot and other Philippine Daily Inquirer by Judge Escolastico Cruz due to an
alleged malicious and false article published at PDI which stated:
According to Mendoza, Cruz still has a pending case of sexual harassment filed with the
Supreme Court by Fiscal Maria Lourdes Garcia, also of the Makati RTC.
This was carried by other newspapers. In his affidavit, he stated that he had no sexual harassment case. The
office of the City Prosecutor of Makati filed the information, hence, they filed a Petition for Review with the Department
of Justice which affirmed the resolution. They filed a Petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice which was affirmed by the CA. May the petition prosper? Why?
Answer: Yes. A newspaper should not be held to account to a point of suppression for honest mistakes, or imperfection in
the choice of words. (Lopez v. CA, 145 Phil. 219 (1970)). While, indeed, the allegation of inappropriate sexual advances in
an appeal of a contempt ruling does not turn such case into one for sexual harassment, the subject news articles author,
not having any legal training, cannot be expected to make the fine distinction between a sexual harassment suit and a suit
where there was an allegation of sexual harassment. In fact, three other newspapers reporting the same incident
committed the same mistake.
In Borjal v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 1(1999) it was held that [a] newspaper especially one national in reach and
coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum
fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper
respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community. (Villanueva v.
PDI, G.R. 164427, May 15, 2009, 588 SCRA 1). Like fair commentaries on matters of public interest, fair reports on the same
should thus be included under the protective mantle of privileged communications, and should not be subjected to
microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. The concept of privileged communication is implicit in the
constitutionally protected freedom of the press, (Borjal v. CA), which would be threatened when criminal suits are
unscrupulously leveled by persons wishing to silence the media on account of unfounded claims of inaccuracies in news
reports. (Isagani Yambot, et al. V. Hon. Tuquero & Escolastico Cruz, Jr., G.R. No. 169895, March 23, 2011).
Freedom of expression enjoys an exalted place in the hierarchy of constitutional rights. Free expression however,
is not absolute for it may be so regulated that [its exercise shall neither] be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. (Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1948)).
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free

speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted
Q Petitioners assailed for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism
under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to
measure the prohibited acts, hence, void for non-vagueness and overbreadth. Respondents, countered that the
doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only
to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech. Is the contention of the petitioners correct?
Answer: No, because the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application only to free speech cases. They
cannot be resorted to invalidate a penal statute. In Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, the Court stated that a facial
invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate. (Estrada vs. SB, 421 Phil. 290, 2001; Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al., G.R. No. 178552, October 10, 2010).
Q Do the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth operate on the same plane? Explain.
Answer: No. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. (People vs. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186 (1988).
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms. (Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712)
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand
what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected. (Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al., G.R. No. 178552, October 10, 2010).
Q Is facial challenge of a law the same as As-applied challenge? Explain.
Answer: No. A "facial" challenge is different from an "as-applied" challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial
invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual
operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3,
2006, 489 SCRA 160)
The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A
litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth
grounds. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al., G.R. No. 178552, October
10, 2010).
Justification for facial challenge in free speech; to

avert chilling effect on protected speech.
Q State the justification for facial challenge in free speech. Explain.
Answer: The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on
protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. This rationale is inapplicable to plain penal
statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even
forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights. (People vs. Siton, G.R. No. 109364, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 476;
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al., G.R. No. 178552, October 10,
2010).
Q Is an on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes allowed?
Answer: No. The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial
challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal
statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and
concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at
best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. The
allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If
warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere
showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as
applied to him. (Romualdez vs. Comelec, supra.; (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council, et al., G.R. No. 178552, October 10, 2010).
There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech

so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity.
Q In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contended that the
element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of
expression protected by the free speech clause. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. From the definition of the crime of terrorism in Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1)
the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the
enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government
to give in to an unlawful demand.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually
committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion
of the government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out
or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a
protected speech.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of
the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a
fortiori in the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion
perceptible. (Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., et al. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al., G.R. No. 178552,
October 10, 2010).
Effect if mayor modifies the place where demonstration

shall take place without notice
Q - There was an application for permit to hold a demonstration at the foot of Mendiola Bridge. When it was issued, it
was indicated therein that the venue would be Plaza Miranda. Mayor Atienza failed to indicate how he had arrived at
modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, is an indispensable
condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverted to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would
have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
Is the modification proper? Why?
Answer: No. In modifying the permit outright, Mayor Atienza gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately
inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the
permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
It is true that the licensing official, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be
granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what
may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially
so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held
there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place. (Reyes vs. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553; IBP vs. Atienza,
G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010).
Custodial Investigation
Q After the arrest of the accused in connection with the killing of Col. Rolanda Abadilla, the police investigators
conducted the investigation. They claimed that they were informed of the constitutional rights under investigation. The
following day, they were brought to the IBP and presented to Atty. Sansano, who asked if they understood their answers
to the questions of the officers. He did not however ask the date of their arrest or inspect their bodies for any sign of
physical torture. There was extrajudicial confession. Is the extrajudicial confession admissible in evidence? Why?
Answer: No, because at the time of the investigation, they were not assisted by a counsel. There was a violation of their
rights to remain silent and to counsel. While it can be waived, it can only be done in writing and with the assistance of
counsel. But there could have been no compliance with the rule since it was only the following day that they were brought
to the counsel.
The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police
officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture,
be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. The purpose of providing
counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting a confession that leads
appellant to make self-incriminating statements. (People v. Rapeza, G.R. No. 169431, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 520).
To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid
and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under custodial investigation.
(People v. Muleta, G.R. No. 130189, June 25, 1999, 309 SCRA 148; Lumanog, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 182555 and other
cases, September 7, 2010).
Q Was the accused provided with a counsel preferably of his choice since he did not object when the police brought
him to the lawyer at the IBP? Explain.
Answer: Yes, he was provided with a lawyer secured by the investigators. It cannot be said that his right to a counsel
preferably of his own choice was not complied with, particularly as he never objected to the lawyer when the latter was
presented to him to be his counsel for the taking down of his statement. The phrase preferably of his own choice does
not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation would be
solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a
lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. (People v. Mojello, G.R. No. 145566, March 9,
2004, 425 SCRA 11; People v. Barasina, 229 SCRA 450 (1994)). Thus, while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person
under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available is
naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him
and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise
any objection against the counsels appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.
Q Who is an independent and competent counsel? Explain.
Answer: An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until
the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily
and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in
relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to
remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent. (People v. Labtan, G.R. No. 127493, December 8, 1999, 320 SCRA
140).
Q State the basic purpose of the constitutional right to counsel. Explain.
Answer: The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and other undue
influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere
witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the
accused. The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel. (People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 145176, March
30, 2004, 426 SCRA 472). Where the prosecution failed to discharge the States burden of proving with clear and
convincing evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his guilt,
the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative value. (People v. Paule, G.R. Nos. 188168-70, September 11,
1996, 266 SCRA 649).
Spontaneous statements to the police, not part of

questioning; admissible in evidence.
Q The accused was charged with the crime of murder. He pleaded not guilty. At the trial, it was shown that he was the
last person seen with the victim immediately before and after the commission of the crime. It was proven further that he
and his cousin a prosecutor from Sorsogon went to the police and voluntarily told the police that the victim jumped out
of his jeep. He averred that the statements he made at the police station are not admissible in evidence considering that
he was technically under custodial investigation and that there was no waiver of his right to remain silent. Is the
contention correct? Why?
Answer: The constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable, as he was never held for questioning.
Custodial investigation refers to any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. This presupposes that he is suspected of
having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession from him. (People v.
Canton, 442 Phil. 743 (2002)). The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the
police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. The assailed statements
were spontaneously made by petitioner and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner,
together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the statement that the
victim jumped out of his vehicle. Thus, the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable. (Jesalva v.
People, G.R. No. 187725, January 19, 2011, Nachura, J).
A letter admitting shortage of dollars in the collection in a

bank is not an uncounselled confession.
Q - An accused in a case of Qualified Theft wrote a letter to the bank explaining the shortage of her dollar collections. She
said that she was threatened by a man that if she would not give money to him, something would happen to her kids.
The accused contended that the letter was inadmissible for being an uncounselled extrajudicial confession. Is the
Answer: No. The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its being executed with the
assistance of counsel and its being under oath, but a voluntary party admission under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court that was admissible against her. Such rule provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him. An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the reason that
it is fair to presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitters fault if the admission does not.
(US v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578). By virtue of its being made by the party himself, an admission is competent primary evidence
against the admitter.
The letter was not a confession due to its not expressly acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified theft.
Under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt for the
offense charged, or for any offense necessarily included therein.
There was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused when she wrote the letter because she
spontaneously made it while not under custodial investigation. Her insistence on the assistance of a counsel might be valid
and better appreciated had she made the letter while under arrest, or during custodial investigation, or under coercion by
the investigating authorities of the Government. The distinction of her situation from that of a person arrested or detained
and under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense derived from the clear intent of insulating the latter
from police coercion or intimidation underlying Section 12 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. (People v.
Cristobal, G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011, Bersamin, J).
Freedom of Religion
Sanction on program is not restraint on

freedom of religion.
Q In his Motion for Reconsideration on the decision of the SC dated April 29, 2006, imposing the penalty of three-
month suspension on the television show, Ang Dating Daan, the petitioner alleged as grounds, the following:
(1) the suspension thus meted out to the program constitutes prior restraint; (2) the Court erred in ruling that
his utterances did not constitute exercise of religion; (3) the Court erred in finding the language used as offensive and
obscene; (4) the Court should have applied its policy of non-interference in cases of conflict between religious groups.
Decide.
Answer: The motion is not impressed with merit. The sanction imposed on the TV program in question does not constitute
prior restraint, but partakes of the nature of subsequent punishment for past violation committed by petitioner in the
course of the broadcast. To be sure, petitioner has not contested the fact of his having made statements on the air that
were contextually violative of the programs "G" rating. To merit a "G" rating, the program must be "suitable for all ages,"
which, in turn, means that the "material for television does not contain anything unsuitable for children and minors, and
may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision." The vulgar language petitioner used on prime-time television can in
no way be characterized as suitable for all ages, and is wholly inappropriate for children. (Eliseo Soriano vs. Ma. Consoliza
Laguardia, et.al., G.R. No. 164785, and other cases, March 15, 2010)
Right of Information
Q A person took the CPA Examination but failed. Convinced that she passed the examination, she wrote the Chairman
of the Board of Acountancy and requested that her answer sheets be re-corrected. It was denied, hence, she filed a
petition for mandamus for the re-checking of her examination. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. Any claim for re-correction or revision of her examination cannot be compelled by mandamus. In Agustin-
Ramos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 84470, February 2, 1989, it was said that for a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must
have a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to
perform the required act must be equally clear.
The remedy of petitioner from the refusal of the Board to release the Examination Papers should have been
through an appeal to the PRC. (Antolin v. Domondon, G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010, Del Castillo,J).
Q She contended that she may compel access to the Examination Documents thru mandamus, invoking her right to be
informed. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. The contention is not correct. The right to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It is
limited to matters of public concern and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. There is a need to preserve
a measure of confidentiality on matters such as natonal security, trade secrets, banking transactions, criminal and
confidential matters. For this purpose, the CPA Board Examination is a matter of public concern. (Antolin v. Domondon,
G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010).
Right to Speedy Trial
Q Criminal cases were filed against the acused on April 10, 2010. They were arraigned on June 1, 2000 and May 18,
2001; with both accused pleading not guilty. Since then, there had been no other significant development in the cases
since the prosecution repeatedly requested for deferment or postponement of the scheduled hearings while awaiting
the result of the reinvestigation of the Office of the Ombudsman. Judge Nario verbally ordered the dismissal of said
cases during the hearing on August 20, 2001. The criminal cases had been pending for about a year and four months by
the time they were dismissed by Justice Nario. The accused had consistently asked that the criminal cases be dismissed
every time the prosecution moved for a deferment or postponement of the hearings. The prosecution attributed the
delay in the criminal proceedings to: 1) the 23 motions for reinvestigation or reconsideration filed by the accused, which
was granted by the Sandiganbayan in its April 17, 2000 Order; and 2) the failure of the Office of the Ombudsman to
terminate its reinvestigation and submit its report within the 60-day period fixed by the said graft court. Is the order of
dismissal proper? Why?
Answer: No, because it deprived the State of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude of
the Office of the Ombudsman. In Corpuz vs. SB, G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2000 442 SCRA 294, the SC warned against
the overzealous or precipitate dismissal of a case that may enable the defendant, who may be guilty, to go free without
having been tried, thereby infringing the societal interest in trying people accused of crimes rather than granting them
immunization because of legal error. Likewise in People v. Leviste, it was stressed that the State, like any other litigant, is
entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal such as the one in
question, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually increased the workload of the justice system as a whole and caused
uncalled-for delays in the final resolution of this and other cases. Unwittingly, the precipitate action of the respondent
court, instead of easing the burden of the accused, merely prolonged the litigation and ironically enough, unnecessarily
delayed the case in the process, causing the very evil it apparently sought to avoid. Such action does not inspire public
confidence in the administration of justice. (Monico Jacob, et.al. vs. SB, et.al., G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2000).
Q Accused contended that their right to speedy disposition of their case was violated because it took the CA eight (8)
years in the disposition of their appeal in violation of Article 14, paragraph 3(c) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1966)). It provides that in the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled, as among the minimum guarantees provided therein, to be tried without undue delay. Rule on their
contention? Explain.
Answer: The contention is not quite correct. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. This
protection extends to all citizens and covers the periods before, during and after trial, affording broader protection than
Section 14(2), which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. However, just like the constitutional guarantee of
speedy trial, speedy disposition of cases is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays, which render rights
nugatory.
BAIL
Q In a case, the court granted bail without hearing saying there was no need to conduct a hearing because the
prosecutor recommended bail even if the crime was punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. He further
explained that the accused did not file a petition for bail hence, he granted it. Was the act of the judge correct? Why?
Answer: No, the judge was not correct. It is axiomatic that bail cannot be allowed to a person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, without a hearing upon notice to the
prosecution.
Even where there is no petition for bail in a case, a hearing should still be held. This hearing is separate and distinct
from the initial hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge ascertains whether or not
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty of the crime. The prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a
violation of due process occurs. (Directo v. Bautista, 346 SCRA 223; Atty. Franklin Gacal v. Judge Jaime Infante, et al., A.M.
No. RTJ-04-1845, October 11, 2011, Bersamin, J).
Q In a case punishable by reclusion perpetua, the prosecutor recommended bail. What is the effect of such
recommendation? Explain.
Answer: The fact that the public prosecutor recommended bail did not warrant dispensing with the hearing. The public
prosecutors recommendation of bail was not material in deciding whether to conduct the mandatory hearing or not. For
one, the public prosecutors recommendation, did not necessarily bind the trial judge, (Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores, 334 SCRA
1 (2001)), in whom alone the discretion to determine whether to grant bail or not was vested. Whatever the public
prosecutor recommended, including the amount of bail, was non-binding. Nor did such recommendation constitute a
showing that the evidence of guilt was not strong. If it was otherwise, the trial judge could become unavoidably controlled
by the prosecution. (Atty. Franklin Gacal v. Judge Jaime Infante, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845, October 11, 2011, Bersamin,
J).
Q What are the duties of a judge when there is an application for bail?
Answer: The following duties of the judge once an application for bail is filed, to wit:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for
bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless or whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling
the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, id);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond (Section 19, ed);
otherwise, the petition should be denied. (Gacal v. Hon. Infante, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845, October 11, 2011).
The judge contended that a bail hearing was not necessary because the accused did not file an application for bail;
and because the public prosecutor had recommended bail.
Q What is the effect if the prosecutor does not oppose the application for bail? Explain.
Answer: That the prosecution did not oppose the grant of bail, as in fact it recommended bail, and that the prosecution did
not want to adduce evidence were irrelevant, and did not dispense with the bail hearing. The gravity of the charge made it
still mandatory for the judge to conduct a bail hearing in which he could have made on his own searching and clarificatory
questions from which to infer the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt. He should have not have readily and easily
gone along with the public prosecutors opinion that the evidence of guilt, being circumstantial, was not strong enough to
deny bail; else, he might be regarded as having abdicated from a responsibility that was his alone as the trial judge. (Gacal
v. Hon. Infante, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845, October 11, 2011).
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
Q - Accused was charged with the crime of rape. He complained that the prosecution presented evidence of subsequent
rapes hence, he contended that his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him was violated. Is the
Answer: No. While it is a basic constitutional precept that the accused in a criminal case should be informed of the nature
of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial, and that the accused be convicted only of an offense
alleged in the complaint or information, such principle finds no application to this case. Accused was being tried for the
rapes he committed subsequent to that alleged in the information. The prosecution does not seek that he be punished for
the rapes he perpetrated outside the date mentioned in the information. The said principle becomes relevant if he were
sought to be punished for the acts of rape he carried out other than the one stated in the information. The prosecution
adduced evidence that he raped the victim several times after the date in question, precisely to show that the pregnancy of
victim was authored by him and not to prove that he should be punished for such. (People vs. Rogelio Marcos, G.R. No.
185380, June 18, 2009).
Impairment of contract clause.
Q The constitutionality of the provision of Sec. 34, RA 9369 which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant
majority and dominant minority parties at P400.00 on election day was questioned on the ground that it violates the
freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair,
equitable and just. He added that this is a purely private contract using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.
Is the contention of petitioner correct? Why?
Answer: No. There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non- impairment clause is limited in application
to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the
parties. (Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009). There is impairment if a subsequent
law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or
withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. (Clemons v. Nolting, 42 Phil. 702 (1922).
Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. The constitutional guaranty of
non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. (Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009).
Q If the State recovers a forest land fraudulently covered by a TCT, is there no violation of the non-impairment of
contract clause? Explain.
Answer: No. The constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts may not be used to validate its interest over the
land as mortgagee. The States restraint upon the right to have an interest or ownership over forest lands does not violate
the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts. Said restraint is a valid exercise of the police power of the
State. In Director of Forestry v. Munoz, 132 Phil. 637 (1968), it was said that because of the importance of forests to the
nation, the States police power has been wielded to regulate the use and occupancy of forest and forest reserves.
Preservation of our forest lands could entail intrusion upon contractual rights as in this case but it is justified by
the Latin maxims Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of
individual interests to the benefit of the greater number. (Ynot v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987, 148 SCRA 659; LBP
v. Republic, G.R. No. 150824, February 4, 2008).
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
There is double jeopardy if a person is charged with the

same offense.
Q Following a vehicular collision Jason Ivler was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71
(MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the
death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail
for his temporary release in both cases. On 7 September 2004, he pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. Is the denial of the motion to quash correct?
Why?
Answer: No. The accused conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366 since
reckless imprudence is a single offense, its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the
penalty.
When the accused pleaded guilty to the offense of imprudence resulting in Physical Injuries, he cannot be charged
with the crime of imprudence resulting in homicide because the crime of reckless imprudence is a single offense, its
consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the penalty. Prior conviction or acquittal of reckless
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense.
The accuseds negative constitutional right not be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. The law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is merely taken into consideration in the imposition of the penalty. As the careless
act is single, the offense of criminal negligence remains one and the same and cannot be split into different crimes and
prosecutions. (Jason Ivler v. Hon. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172176, November 17, 2010).
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means
to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz, 94 Phil. 715 (1954)). There, a full Court, ordered the dismissal
of a case for damage to property thru reckless imprudence because a prior case against the same accused for reckless
driving, arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then,
whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both
charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative. (Jason Ivler v. Hon. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716,
November 17, 2010, Carpio, J; citing People v. Belga, 100 Phil. 996 (1957), Yap v. Lutero, 105 Phil 1307 (1959), People v.
Narvas, 107 phil. 737 (1960), People v. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 95).
Q The accused were charged with violation of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act, alleging that there was
overpricing in the purchase of equipment for the PNP. After trial, they were acquitted, by the Sandiganbayan. The
People filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The accused objected to the petition invoking
double jeopardy. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: Yes. A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. (People v. Terrado, G.R. No. 148226, July 14,
2008). It is also immediately executory and the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double
jeopardy. (People v. SB, 491 SCRA 185 (2006)). The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy and
thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the
accused has been confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal
is likewise barred because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal
defendants culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons
supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the
defendants already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the
same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the
powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be
allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendants guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that
had attended the first trial, all in a process where the governments power and resources are once again employed against
the defendants individual means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less
prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience. (People v. Cesar Nazareno, et al., G.R. no. 168982, August 5,
2009).
Q In a case, there was an oral order of dismissal of an information issued by a Justice of the Sandiganbayan due to
delay. Is the dismissal valid? Why?
Answer: No, because it was a void order. In Corpuz vs. SB, G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 294, it was said
that the dismissal made in open court by the Chairman, which was not reduced in writing, is not a valid dismissal or
termination of the cases. This is because the Chairman cannot unilaterally dismiss the same without the approval or
consent of the other members of the Division. The Sandiganbayan is a collegiate court and under its internal rules Section
1(b) of the 1984 Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan, which is now Section 1(b), Rule VIII of the 2002 Revised Internal Rules
of the Sandiganbayan, an order, resolution or judgment, in order to be valid or considered as an official action of the Court
itself - must bear the unanimous approval of the members of the division, or in case of lack thereof, by the majority vote of
the members of a special division of five.
Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandates that a judgment must be written in the
official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a
statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based. The rule applies to a final order dismissing a criminal case
grounded on the violation of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial. A verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a
violation of the provision; hence, such order is, in contemplation of law, not in esse, therefore, ineffective. (Monico Jacob,
et.al. vs. SB, et.al., G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010).
Void order, not basis of double jeopardy.
Q Considering that the verbal order of dismissal is void, can the accused invoke double jeopardy if he would be tried
again? Why?
Answer: No. Legal Jeopardy has not yet attached since there was no valid dismissal or termination of the criminal case
against the accused. To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated:
(1) first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment;
(d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused. (Monico Jacob, et.al. vs. SB, et.al., G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010).
CITIZENSHIP
Failure to register oath of citizenship and election of the

same does not mean that a person is undocumented citizen
Q Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who executed an affidavit
of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the government upon reaching the age of
majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered
foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration and
whether the omission negates their rights to Filipino citizenship as children of a Filipino mother, and erase the years
lived and spent as Filipinos? Explain.
Answer: No. Registration is a mere formality. The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose
mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.(Art.IV, Sec.1(4),
1935 Constitution)
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath
of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of
the oath with the nearest civil registry.(CA No. 625, Sec.1).
Registration is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. Registration is the confirmation of election as such
election. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625,
that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been
claimed.
ARTICLE VI
Legislative Department
Parliamentary Immunity; rationale for privilege.
Q A complaint for disbarment was filed against Senator Santiago based on her speech delivered in the Senate after she
was not considered in her application for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. She uttered the following:
I am not angry. I am irate. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only
that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position of
Chief Justice if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court
of idiots.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. He asked that
disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment, Senator Santiago, through counsel, explained that those statements were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the
open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. Is the contention correct?
Explain.
Answer: Yes. The immunity Senator Santiago claimed is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Explaining the import of parliamentary immunity, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, it was ruled that our Constitution enshrines
parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world.
As old as the English Parliament, its purpose is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success for it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech
and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty
may occasion offense. (Antero Pobre vs. Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009).
Q State the reason behind the legislative or parliamentary immunity. Explain.
Answer: This legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the
functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would
degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little
value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader,
or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives. (Antero Pobre vs. Sen.
Miriam Defensor Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009).
Grounds for delisting of Party-List
Q PGBI, a party-list organization failed to participate in one (1) election and failed to garner, the 2% threshold vote in
another. It was delisted based on the ruling in Phil. Mines Safety Environment Assn. (MINERO vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
177548, May 10, 2007, where it was ruled that if a party-list organization fails to participate in one election and fails to
garner 2% threshold vote in another, the Comelec is not duty bound to certify it or it can be delisted. Can it be delisted?
Why?
Answer: No. Under the law, there are two grounds for the delisting of a party-list organization; thus: (1) failure to
participate in two elections; or (2) failure to garner at least 2% if the votes cast under the party-list system in the last 2
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
The MINERO doctrine which is relied upon is an erroneous application of Sec. 6(8) of R.A. 7941.
The law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if
any of the two (2) grounds exists. The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one
thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a
disjunctive word. (The Heirs of George Poe vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. G.R. No, 156302, April 7, 2009.) Thus, the
plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a
strained application of the law in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers
of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law. (Phil. Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), et al. v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010).
250,000 population requirement is

necessary only in a city; not in a district.
Q - RA 9716 was enacted resulting in the reconfiguration of the second and first districts of Camarines Sur in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. Senator Aquino (now President) and Mayor Robredo filed a
petition to declare the law unconstitutional alleging that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative
district. The petitioners claimed that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000
or only 176,383. They relied on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard which states that each city with a population of at least 250,000 or each province, shall have at least
on representative. The petitioners posited that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the minimum
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district. The respondents contended that such provision has no
application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces. Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is
only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Is the contention of Aquino correct? Why?
Answer: No. The 250,000 minimum population is required of a city, but not for a district. This question has already been
resolved in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 312 Phil. 259 (1995) where issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7854, which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. Republic Act No. 7854
created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case
argued that the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the
resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population
of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district,
explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to
its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a
minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another
250,000 to be entitled to anadditional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should
not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not
required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional
district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population. (Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 2, 2010, Perez, J).
Q Is population an indispensable requirement in the creation of a province? Explain.
Answer: No. A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of
not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition
to the indispensable income requirement. (Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 2, 2010).
Investigation in aid of legislation; on-going judicial

proceedings cannot prevent investigation in aid of
legislation.
Q A Senate committee sought to inquire into the liability of President Ramos and others for the illegal investment of
the OWWA Funds into the Smokey Project causing loss to OWWA in the amount of P550 Million. It was intended
likewise to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to RA 8042, the Migrants Workers Act. Letters were
sent to the petitioners to appear before the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources
Development but they contended that since the investigation has been intended to ascertain their criminal liability for
plunder, it is not in aid of legislation and that it could violate their right against self-incrimination. Is the contention
correct? Explain.
Answer: No. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation. A legislative
investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings have different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or
like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising between adverse
litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as
tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; (Arnault vs. Nazareno,
87 Phil. 29 (1950); and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation,
(Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549
SCRA 77, 168; citing W. Keefe & M. Ogul, The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States, 20-23 (4th ed., 1977),
albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. (Reghis Romero II, et al. v. Sen. Jinggoy Estrada, et al., G.R. No.
174105, April 2, 2009).
Q Does the filing of criminal case preclude investigation in aid of legislation? Why?
Answer: The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended
inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the
exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be
made subordinate to a criminal or administrative investigation. A succinctly stated in Arnault vs. Nazareno, the power of
inquiry with process to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true, recourse must be had to others who possess it. (G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 456;
Reghis Romero II, et al. v. Sen. Jinggoy Estrada, et al., G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009).
Q The Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in connection with its
investigation of the aforementioned investments. State the basis of its authority to do so. Explain.
Answer: It is based on its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a
Senate Committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. (Senate Blue Ribbon Committee vs. Majaducon, 407 SCRA 356
(2003); Romero III v. Sen. Estrada, et al., G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009).
Q Can the persons subpoenad invoke the right against self-incrimination considering that incriminating questions are
expected to be asked? Why?
Answer: No. This right may be invoked when the incriminating question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing
in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them. That this right may possibly be violated or abused is
no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is
abused, such issue may be presented before the courts.
So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it is their
duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting
obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to
testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation. (Romero III v. Sen. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105,
April 2, 2009).
Q - There were two sets of nominees of BUHAY Party List. After the elections, the nominees by Robles as President of the
organization took their oath and assumed office as members of Congress, hence, Seeres filed a special Civil Action for
Certiorari with the SC alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
COMELEC in proclaiming the Robles nominees and there was no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Is the petition proper? Why?
Answer: No, because the HRET is the sole judge of all contents pertaining to the election returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Constitution).
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, it was said that the use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature
was characterized by Justice Malcolm as full, clear and complete. (168 SCRA 391 (1988); Rasul vs. COMELEC and Aquino-
Oreta, 313 SCRA 18 (1999); Seeres v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009).
Q When does the HRETs power commence? Explain.
Answer: The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals (HRET) sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives begins only after a candidate has
become a member of the House of Representatives. (Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976,
September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 300, 340-341; Domingo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999, 310 SCRA 547; Aquino
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 1202965, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 400). Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over elections
relating to the election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. (Aggabao vs. COMELEC,
449 SCRA 400 (2007); Seeres v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009).
Party List representative; effect of continued operation of

the 2% threshold vote.
Q Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full
Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution. It was denied by the COMELEC using as basis
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC which interpreted the clause in proportion to their total number of votes to be
in proportion to the votes of the first party. The petitioners contended that the second clause of Sec. 11(b) of RA 7941
provides the those garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes. They contended that there should be a proclamation of the others to complete the 20% representation
of the party list groups as provided by the Constitution. But to compute the allocation of additional seats using the
operation of the 2% threshold continuously would defeat the aim of the Constitution. Is the contention of BANAT, etc.
correct? Explain.
Answer: Yes. In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. The
two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats
when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
The 2% threshold should be striken down as unconstitutional only in relation to the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives. (Barangay
Association for National Advancement & Transparency (BANAT), G.R. No. 179271, June 24, 2009).
Q May the major political parties participate in the party-list system? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-
list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any
permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a
party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly
intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-
list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. The
Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the
party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law. (BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, June 24,
2009).
Q If there is a party-list organization of the urban poor, should the nominee wallow in poverty? Explain.
Answer: No. Under Sec. 9 of RA 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity as there is no financial status required by the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party or organization or coalition belongs to the marginalized and unrepresented sectors, that is, if the nominee represents
the fisherfolk, he or she must be fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior
citizen. (Barangay Association for National Advancement & Transparency (BANAT), G.R. No. 179271, and other cases, June
24, 2009).
Q State the nature of the 20% allocation of party-list representatives. Explain.
Answer: Under the Constitution, the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; it cannot be more than 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives. The continued existence of a provision which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled up cannot be allowed. The 3-seat capacity as a
limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy remains a valid statutory device that
prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. (Barangay Association for National Advancement &
Transparency (BANAT), G.R. No. 179271, and other cases, June 24, 2009).
Q A petition seeking to declare RA 9369, the Automation Law was filed alleging that the title of RA 9369 is misleading
because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election
returns. Petitioner also alleged that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the
subject matter of RA 9369. Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintained that the title of RA 9369 is broad enough to
encompass topics which deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to its purpose
encouraging a transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections. Rule on the contention. Explain.
Answer: The contention is not correct. The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof has always been given a practical rather than a
technical construction. The requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the
general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The title of a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will
suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. Moreover, a title
which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act
need not be further stated. (Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 177508, August 7, 2009).
Q It was argued that sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the powers of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). According to petitioner, under the amended provisions, Congress
as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of President and Vice President (Congress), and the COMELEC en
banc as the National Board of Canvassers (COMELEC en banc), for the election of senators may now entertain pre-
proclamation cases in the election of the President, Vice President, and Senators. Petitioner concluded that in
entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the Comelec en banc undermined the independence and encroached
upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: The contention is not correct. Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the
PET and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand,
and the PET and the SET, on the other, are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The SET is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of
the PET and the SET can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been
proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power
before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates. (Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009).
Q Danilo Ramon Fernandez filed his certificate of candidacy for representative of the First District of Laguna. In his
certificate of candidacy, he stated that he is a resident of Villa Toledo Subdivision, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
A petition to deny due course to his certificate of candidacy was filed before the COMELEC, Laguna alleging material
misrepresentation as in the past elections, he declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address. He likewise maintains a house
outside of the First District, particularly in Cabuyao, Laguna. He was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the
First District of Laguna. A petition for quo warranto was filed with the HRET praying that he be declared ineligible to hold
the position since he lacked the one-year residence requirement. At the hearing, witnesses were presented that he is not
from Sta. Rosa; that he was not oftenly seen in Villa Toledo Subdivision. He presented evidence, however, that he is a
resident of said places, testified to by some witnesses; a certification by the President of the Homeowners Association
and that he bought a property at Bel-Air Sta. Rosa, Laguna and presented a lease contract over a house being rented by
his family. The lessor was presented too, to testify that he is a resident of Sta. Rosa. The HRET declared him ineligible as
he lacked the required residence. Before the SC he contended that the COMELEC has already passed upon his
qualification, thus, the HRET should have dismissed the case. Is the contention correct? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Article VI, Section 17 provides that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon
the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of
these Tribunals, (Co v. HRET, G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 692), which is conferred upon the HRET and the
SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has
not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives. (Co v. HRET).
A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum
shopping even if the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the
qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate. (Rep. Danilo Ramon
Fernandez v. HRET, et al., G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009).
Q Is property ownership a requirement to run for public office? Explain.
Answer: No. The Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where he
seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day. To use ownership of property in
the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish
compliance with the residency requirement. The Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to
hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional. (Fernandez v. HRET, supra.).
This case must be distinguished from Aquino v. COMELEC and Domino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999,
310 SCRA 546, where the disqualified candidate was shown to be merely leasing a residence in the place where he sought
to run for office. In Aquino and Domino, there appeared to be no other material reason for the candidate to lease
residential property in the place where he filed his COC, except to fulfill the residency requirement under election laws.
Q What is the rationale behind the residence requirement for a candidate to a public office? Explain.
Answer: The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to
serve that community. This is to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations,
potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to
evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for. The residency requirement is a means to
prevent a stranger or newcomer from holding office on the assumption that such stranger or newcomer would be
insufficiently acquainted with the needs of his prospective constituents. (Fernandez v. HRET, supra.; citing Torayno v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 137329, August 9, 2000; 337 SCRA 574).
Q If a Senator is the head of the Philippine National Red Cross, is he violating the rule that he cannot occupy any
position in government or government-owned or controlled corporations? Explain.
Answer: No, because the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation, but a privately owned, privately
funded, and privately run charitable organization. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private
individuals including students. Under its charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are
entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. (Liban, et al. v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009).
Q In his petition, the petitioner relied on the SC decision where it was held that the PNRC is a GOCC. Is the contention
correct? Explain.
Answer: No. In such case, it was ruled that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. In ruling that the
PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation, the simple test used was whether the corporation was created by
its own special charter for the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the general corporation law. Since
the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is a government corporation. However, the
Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the definition of a government-owned or controlled corporation as provided under
Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provides that a government-owned
or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating
to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one
(51) percent of its capital stock.
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock
corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock
corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government officials holding such membership by
appointment or designation by the government. Under this criterion, the government does not own or control PNRC.
(Liban, et al. v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009).
ARTICLE VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Creation of Phil. Truth Commission not justified by power of

control.
Q - The petitioners questioned EO No. 1 creating the Phil. Truth Commission contending that it is a public office and not
merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he
must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. Such power cannot be
presumed since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a
truth commission. It was contended that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the
continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the
aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as reorganize, transfer, consolidate, merge, and abolish. Insofar as
it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of creating a public
office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be
deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof. Whose contention is correct? Explain.
Answer: The petitioners contention is correct. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the
President is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration of
an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment
of Executive Order No. 1.
The creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter
or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter. (The Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes, G. R. No. 155027,
February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 526, 564; DOTC v. Mabalot, 428 Phil. 154, 164-165 (2002); Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143
(1955)). Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in
the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully
execute the laws. (Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935; Lagman, et al. V. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No.
193036, December 7, 2010, Mendoza, J).
As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 142801-802, July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718).
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or
agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of
the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive
Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy
in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this
purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In
Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or
units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a
bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is
subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize.
Q - According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis
under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772. The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize
the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and
materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such
as Larin v. Executive Secretary. Is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a
public office? Explain.
Answer: None. P.D. No. 1416 is not a justification for the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale,
anachronistic and inoperable. It was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations
pursuant for purposes of flexibility in the organization of the national government as a means of transition towards
the parliamentary form of government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, became
functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution. (Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935; Lagman, et al. V. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No.
193036, December 7, 2010, Mendoza, J).
Q Did the President invalidly exercise emergency powers when she called out the AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress
all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City by deploying personnel of the AFP
and PNP as an aftermath of the Maguindanao Massacre? Why?
Answer: No. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same, as authorized
by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x (Citing Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, 466 Phil. 482 (2004);
Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011).
Q May the courts inquire into the factual bases for the exercise of the calling out power by the President? Explain.
Answer: As a rule, No. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the
above power, (Lacson v. Sec. Perez, 410 Phil. 78 (2001)), it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the
Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618 (2000) it is clearly to the President
that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress
lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will
accord respect to the Presidents judgment. (Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Puno, et al, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011).
Q What led the President to resort to the calling out provision of the Constitution? Explain.
Answer: The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to
ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also
indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two
clans. Thus, to pacify the peoples fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called
out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously
threatened the peace and security in the affected places. (Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259,
June 7, 2011).
Q PD 1416 is now stale, what is the basis of the power of the President to create the PTC? Explain.
Answer: While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by
P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
The allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive.
That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President
are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious
need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,
496 Phil. 886 (2005) the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative
committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the
anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be
doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees
faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the
same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President
is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative
bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa
Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive
power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed. (Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission,
G.R. No. 192935; Lagman, et al. V. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010, Mendoza, J).
As explained in the landmark case ofMarcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 688:
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and
restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among
three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the
laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in
such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It
also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his
power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on
the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative
nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.
Nature of the power to deport; Act of State; subject to

judicial review.
Q The respondent was sought to be deported for violation of Section 37(a)4 of CA No. 613 otherwise known as the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. It was alleged that he was convicted and/or sentenced for Uniform Controlled
Substance Act in connection with his being Drug Trafficker and/or Courier of prohibited drugs in the Senate of
Washington, United States of America, thus, making him an undesirable alien and/or a public burden in violation of
Section 37(4) [sic] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
The Board of Commissioners ordered his deportation after trial. The DOJ on appeal affirmed the order. By way
of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition he the CA which reversed the ruling of the DOJ holding that there was no valid
and legal ground for the deportation of respondent since there was no violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, because respondent was not convicted or sentenced for a violation of the law on
prohibited drugs since the U.S. Court dismissed the case for violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the
State of Washington, USA filed against respondent. Before the SC, it was contended that the Bureau of Immigration has
the exclusive authority to decide whether a foreigner may be deported and such proceedings are beyond judicial review.
Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged
alien, and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation proceedings. Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution has vested power of judicial review in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as established
by law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their
own judgment from that of Congress or of the President, (Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. No.
124360, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 330, 347; Ledesma vs. CA, G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 656, 681;
Taada vs. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997, 272 SCRA 18, 48-49), the Court may look into and resolve questions of
whether or not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive
department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. (Republic vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 167741, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 495, 502;
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004, 419
SCRA 141, 148; Domingo vs. Scheer, 466 Phil. 235 (2004); House of Sara Lee vs. Rey, 500 SCRA 419 (2006); Secretary of
Justice, et al. vs. Christopher Roruga, G.R. No. 166199, April 24, 2009).
Q Is the right to enter the Philippine a matter of right? Explain.
Answer: No. The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of grace;
such privilege is not absolute or permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or deported from the
Philippines only on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto.
Aliens seeking entry in the Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the simple
passage of time. When an alien, has already physically gained entry in the country, but such entry is later found unlawful or
devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it is found that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of
his entry. (Board of Commissioners vs. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991). Every sovereign power has the inherent power to
exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest. (Lao
Tan Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 (1948). The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority
of the sovereign power. (In Re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918). It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose
continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people.
(Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534 (1910); Secretary of Justice, et al. vs. Christopher Roruga, G.R. No. 166199, April 24,
2009).
CIVIL SERVICE LAW
Q What are the two kinds of suspension? Explain.
Answer: There are two kinds of preventive suspension of government employees charged with offenses punishable by
removal or suspension, viz: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation; and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal
if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is
exonerated. Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the
disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way
influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the
suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation, respondent is found
innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated. (CSC v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009).
President has only the power of supervision, not control.
Q The Province of Negros Occidental passed Resolution 720-A allocating health care and insurance benefits to its
employees. It was disallowed by the COA contending that it violated AO 103 as it was done without approval of the
President. Is the COA correct? Why?
Answer: No, because the requirement of prior approval by the President applies only to departments, bureaus, offices and
government-owned and controlled corporations under the Executive branch. Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the
Presidents general supervision (Sec. 4, Article X of the Constitution). The Presidents power of general supervision means
the power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law. (De Villa v. City of
Bacolod, G.R. no. 80744, September 20, 1990, 189 SCRA 736). This is distinguished from the Presidents power of control
which is the power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the President over that of the subordinate officer. (Bito-Onon v. Judge Fernandez, 403 Phil.
693 (2001)). The power of control gives the President the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate
officer involving the exercise of discretion. (Province of Negros Occidental v. The Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 182574,
Q Discuss the meaning of the power of supervision over the LGUs by the President.
Answer: Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the Presidents authority is
limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed. The President may only point out that rules
have not been followed but the President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or
replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the
present case does not need the approval of the President to be valid. (Province of Negross Occidental v. The Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010).
ARTICLE VIII Judiciary Department
Q What are the requisites of the judicial review? Explain.
Answer: They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. (Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006); Francisco v. House of
Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003); Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935; Lagman, et al. V. Executive
Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010).
Quoting Justice P. Laurel, it said:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. (Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936); Biraogo v. Phil. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935; Lagman, et al. V.
Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010).
Q - The SC in its July 5, 2009 decision declared RA 95 creating the PNRC unconstitutional. PNRC intervened and filed a
Motion for Reconsideration contending that in the original case, the issue of unconstitutionality of RA 95 was not raised,
hence, the SC should not have ruled on it. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: Yes. This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established
rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless
such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raise, if the record also presents some other ground upon which
the court rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until
such question will be unavoidable. (G.R. No. 162243, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 498 citing Sotto v. COMELEC, 76 Phil.
516 (1946); Alvarez v. PICOP resources, Inc.).
Q Atty. Romulo B. Makalintal questioned the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and
unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the SC, sitting en banc, shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose. He contended that the creation of the PET violates the Constitution as the SC
created a body separate and distinct from it. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the SC, although it has functions peculiar only to it. It was
constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VIII of the Constitution and it faithfully complies, not unlawfully defies
the constitutional directive. It is a legitimate progeny of the Constitutional provision composed of the members of the SC,
sitting en banc. The constitutional intent is to bestow independence to the SC as the PET to undertake the Herculean task of
deciding election protests involving presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The conferment of additional jurisdiction
to the SC, with the duty characterized as an awesome task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the
doctrine of necessary implication. The abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the SC, given the abundant
experience, is not unwarranted.
The Constitution grants of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. Although the method by which the
Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation
on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for
the purpose."
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon
the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous occasions. (Makalintal v. PET,
G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010 and June 7, 2011).
Q It was contended that the creation of the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution prohibiting the
designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. Is the
Answer: No, because the resolution of electoral contests is essentially an exercise of judicial power whether exercised by
the COMELE, HRET, SET or the MTC or RTC. In fact their decisions are subject to judicial review via a petition for certiorari
if there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the
power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law." Judicial power was
expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The power was expanded,
but it remained absolute.
If the contention of the petitioner were logical, then the SET and HRET members who are Justices of the SC would
violate the constitutional proscription because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-
C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides,
when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review - via a
petition for certiorari filed by the proper party - if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Makalintal v. PET, supra.).
Q What kind of power is exercised by the PET when it decides a presidential electoral protest? Explain.
Answer: When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is
essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case ofAngara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936), Justice Jose P.
Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition
of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of
judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with
latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial
power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but,
nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
The PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended
by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e.,
the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity."
The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional
Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the
petitioner's, should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power.
IMPEACHMENT
Power of the House of Representatives to promulgate rules

of impeachment.
Q On July 22, 2010, Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et al., filed an impeachment complaint against Ombudsman Merceditas
Gutierrez. Renato Reyes, Jr, et al., likewise filed an impeachment complaint against her on August 3, 2010. On August 11,
2010, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred the two complaints to the Committee on Justice which
found the complaints sufficient in form on September 1, 2010. On August 3, 2010, the House provisionally adopted the
Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and on September 2, 2010, the Rules on Impeachment Proceedings of the 15 th
Congress was published. On September 7, 2010, the Committee found both complaints of culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust to be sufficient in substance. She filed a petition for injunction with the SC
contending that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010
a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency in form of the complaints. She tacked her contention on Sec. 3(8),
Article XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section. The respondent contended that promulgation refers to publication of the rules in any
medium of information. As basis for her contention she invoked Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Officers
and Investigation, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77 and 564 SCRA 152 (2008) which held that the
Constitution categorically requires publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries. The respondent
contended that the Impeachment Rules is intended merely to enable Congress to effectively carry out the purposes of
Sec. 3(8) of Article XI of the Constitution. Rule on the contention. Explain.
Answer: The contention is not correct. The Constitution merely uses the word promulgate which means to publish or to
announce officially (Blacks Law Dictionary).
The Constitution does not restrict promulgation to publication, hence, the former should be understood to
have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision
means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make
known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On
grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Where no specific, operable norms
and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene. (Sen. Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil.
276 (1998)).
Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically
as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. (Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011).
Q Why cannot petitioner invoke the Neri principle? Explain.
Answer: Petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of
procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on
the 1987 Constitutions directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Taada v.
Tuvera. Taada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the
Constitutions intentions as expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making
known the issuances. (Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, February 15,
2011).
Q She contended that the filing of the second complaint violated Sec. 3(5) Article XI of the Constitution which provides
that No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year. She reckoned the 1-year ban from the filing of the first complaint on July 22, 2010 or before the opening of the
sessions on July 26, 2010. She contended that no impeachment complaint can be accepted and referred within that
period.
On the other hand, public respondent contended that the initiation starts with the filing of the impeachment
complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the
initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate. Is her contention correct? Explain.
Answer: No. The term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the filing
of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House
on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. (Francisco v. House of Representatives, et al.,
460 Phil. 830 (2003). What ends the initiation is the referral to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
(Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011).
ARTICLE IX
Constitutional Commissions/Elections
COMELEC retains power to cancel registration of party-list

organization even if elected.
Q There was a petition with the COMELEC for the cancellation of registration and accreditation of ABC on the ground
that it is a front of a religious organization known as Children of God International which is popularly known as Ang
Dating Daan, hence, it is disqualified to become a party-list group under Sec. 6(1) of RA 7941, otherwise known as the
Party-List System Act. In the meantime, the election was held and it was proclaimed as one of the winners. It contended
that the COMELEC has lost jurisdiction to decide the petition. It is now the HRET that has jurisdiction. Is the contention
correct? Why?
Answer: No, the COMELEC retains the power to decide the petition for cancellation of registration and accreditation. The
HRET has no jurisdiction, but the COMELEC has pursuant to Sec. 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that
the COMELEC shall exercise the power and function to register political parties, organizations or coalitions and cancellation
of their registration. (See also: Sec. 6, RA 7941; ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
193256, March 22, 2011).
Q Is the rule absolute? Why?
Answer: No, it allows an exception. The Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not
appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en
banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer
to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is
not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed. (Cagas v. COMELEC,
supra.)
Two (2) ways to question qualifications of a candidates.
Q What are the two (2) remedies available for questioning the qualifications of a candidate? Explain.
Answer: They are:
(a) Before election on the ground that a material representation in the certificate of candidacy. The petition may be
filed at anytime not later twenty-five (25) days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy (Sec. 78,
Omnibus Election Code). Pursuant to Salcedo II v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447, it is
essential that the false representation pertains to a material matter which may refer to qualifications for elective
office, like, citizenship, (Labo v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297); age (Loong v. COMELEC, 216 SCRA 760), and residence
(Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400). The false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to
deceive the electorate as to ones qualifications to public office. (Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300
(1995)).
(b) After election by filing a petition for quo warranto where any voter may question the election of a candidate on
the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic with the COMELEC within 10 days after the proclamation of
the results of the election. (Gonzales v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011, Villarama, J).
Q What is the effect if a winning Congressional candidate has been proclaimed prior to the finality of a disqualification
proceeding before the COMELEC? Explain.
Answer: The COMELEC would lose jurisdiction, instead, the HRET would now have jurisdiction. Once a winning candidate
has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins. (Guerrero v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 458 (2000); Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106 (1999)).
Under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. As the Court explained in Lazatin v. House
Electoral Tribunal, the use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred x x x. The
exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature x x x. Earlier, this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as full, clear and complete x x x. Under the amended 1935 Constitution,
the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal x x x and it remained as full, clear and complete as that
previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission x x x. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction
of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. (168 SCRA 391 (1988); Gonzales v. COMELEC, et al., supra.).
Q May the second placer be declared as the winner? Is the rule absolute? Explain.
Answer: No. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. The votes intended for the
disqualified candidate should not be considered null and void, as it would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in
whom sovereignty resides. (Albaa v. COMELEC, 435 SCRA 98 (2004)). The second placer is just that, a second placer he
lost in the elections and was repudiated by either the majority or plurality of voters. (Quizon v. COMELEC, 545 SCRA 642
(2008)).
The exception to the second placer rule is predicated on the concurrence of the following: (1) the one who
obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor
of the ineligible candidate. (Grego v. COMELEC, 274 SCRA 481; Gonzales v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8,
2011).
Q Is it possible for the COMELEC to retain jurisdiction over disqualification cases against candidates even if they have
won the elections, duly proclaimed and assumed office? Explain.
Answer: Yes, provided that the positions are local elective positions but not if filed against candidates for Congress. The
HRET has jurisdiction over such cases. (Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011).
Q After the Congressional candidate has already been proclaimed, and assumed office, a petition for quo warranto on
the ground of ineligibility was filed with the HRET. What is the effect if the petitioner has withdrawn the petition?
Explain.
Answer: The withdrawal is of no consequence, considering that citizenship is a continuing requirement for the holding of
office of Members of the House of Representatives. (Gonzales v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011).
Q The COMELEC in granting the petition for registration of the NP-NPC coalition ruled that since they have decided to
coalesce, the same was an operative fact that the COMELEC en banc could note and recognize implying that there is no
need for the coalition to register separately if the component parties are already registered. Is the ruling correct? Why?
Answer: Political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedures, if they are to be
recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a
different legal personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other similarly registered parties. If
they want to coalesce with one another without the formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the
exercise of their and their members democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot receive official recognition for their
coalition. Or they can choose to secure the registration of their coalition in order to be accorded the privileges accruing to
registered coalitions, including the right to be accredited as a dominant majority or minority party. There are no ifs and buts
about these constitutional terms. (Liberal Party vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010).
Q Asistio has been a member of Congress for four terms. He sought for the Mayorship in 2007 and has always voted in
Caloocan City. In fact, his family is a known political family in Caloocan City. He has always been a resident in Caloocan
City since birth or for more than 72 years. But the address indicated in his certificate of candidacy is non-existent. State
the effect of such statement in his COC. Explain.
Answer: The fact that a candidate indicated in his COC a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be physically
found in the address he indicated when he registered as a voter, should not exclude him as a voter. If at all, it is a basis for
him to be charged under the Omnibus Election Code or an action to deny due course to his COC. (Asistio v. Hon. Aguirre, et
al., G.R. No. 191124, April 24, 2010).
Q How should domicile be understood? Explain.
Answer: The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or
habituation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi). (Japzon vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009).
Q How is domicile of origin acquired? Explain.
Answer: A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and
continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla vs. COMELEC, 438
Phil. 861 (2002), the Court already acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish
residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must have
necessarily abandoned the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, as his domicile of origin; and
transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice. (Japzon vs. COMELEC).
Acquisition of land during period of election; not banned.
Q Is the acquisition of a parcel of land by a local government unit for a public cemetery during the period of the
election ban considered as public works in violation of Section 261(u) of the Omnibus Election Code? Explain.
Answer: No, because land cannot be considered as public works.
Infrastructure facilities, especially national highways, flood control and water resources development systems, and
other public works in accordance with national development objectives means that only the fixed public infrastructures
for use of the public are regarded as public works. This construction conforms to the rule of ejusdem generis. (Guzman v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 182380, August 28, 2009).
Premature campaigning; its nature.
Q Rosalinda Penera filed her certificate of candidacy but she was charged with premature campaigning since there was
a motorcade that immediately took place in the locality after the filing of her certificate of candidacy. No speeches were
however made, instead, there was only marching music in the background and a grandstanding for the purpose of raising
the hands of the candidates in the motorcade. Is she disqualified to run for mayor considering that she conducted
premature campaigning? Explain.
Answer: No, because at the time of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate. The mere filing of her certificate of
candidacy did not make her a candidate because she can only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which she filed her certificate of candidacy. (Sec. 13(3), RA 9369). The unlawful acts or omission applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period. (Sec. 13). Hence, the election offenses may
be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign period. Before the start of the campaign period, such
election offenses cannot be committed. (Rosalinda Penera v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009 citing
Lanot v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 114).
Q State the rationale for the principle. Explain.
Answer: It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is especially true
to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds involving clear, present and
imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is
lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political
partisan activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that any unlawful
act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The only
inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful. (Penera v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009 citing Lanot v. COMELEC, 507 SCRA 114 (2006)).
In laymans language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the
campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight any election offense that may be committed by a candidate
under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period.
Proclaimed candidate was the loser; remedy

is to annul proclamation.
Q Records show that petitioner was declared the 12th winning candidate based on SOVPs containing mathematical and
clerical errors, instead of private respondent. A petition for correction of manifest error and annulment of the
proclamation was filed. It was contended that protest is the appropriate remedy. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. As a rule, It is very clear that the proclaimed candidate was the loser, hence, the petition to amend and annul
was proper. The remedy of the losing party is an election protest after his opponent has already been proclaimed as
winning candidate, but such recourse is on the assumption, however, that there has been a valid proclamation. Where a
proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of
office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation. (Torres v. COMELEC,
337 Phil. 270 (1997); Duremdes v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 86362-63, October 27, 1989, 178 SCRA 746 and Aguam v. COMELEC,
132 Phil. 353 (1968); Taguiam v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 184801, July 30, 2009).
Cayat principle not applied.
Q Nardo Velasco, a Filipino citizen acquired American citizenship. Later on he became a dual citizen. He applied for
registration as a voter but his application was denied, hence, he filed his petition for inclusion as voter with the MTC
which granted the petition. The RTC on appeal reversed the order, hence, he appealed to the CA but the latter dismissed
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In the meantime, he filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor, hence, Panlaqui filed a
petition to deny due course to and/or cancel his COC based on gross misrepresentation as to his residency, hence,
disqualified to vote. He won in the elections and took his oath. Finding material misrepresentations, the COMELEC
nullified his proclamation hence, Panlaqui moved for proclamation. Can he, as second placer, be proclaimed as the
winner? Why?
Answer: No. Since the disqualification of Velasco had not yet become final and executory before the elections, the
COMELEC properly applied the rule on succession. Cayat v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163776, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23 does
not apply because Cayat was disqualified in a final and executory judgment before the elections. As the only candidate
Palileng, who numerically lost in the elections, he was not a second placer. On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only
placer, second to none. The doctrine in the rejection of the second placer which triggers the rule on succession does not
apply. (Panlaqui vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010).
Q What are the specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer?
Answer: The doctrine will apply if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on the candidates disqualification remained
pending on election day, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates; and (2) the decision on the disqualification
became final only after the elections. (Panlaqui v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010, Morales, J).
Q What is the rationale behind the rejection of the second placer? Explain.
Answer: To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our
judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated
by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field
which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under such circumstances.
To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate
is to disenfranchise them through no fault on their part, and to undermine the importance and the meaning of democracy
and the right of the people to elect officials of their choice.
Theoretically, the second placer could receive just one vote. In such a case, it would be absurd to proclaim the
totally repudiated candidate as the voters choice. (Panlaqui v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010, citing
Kare v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157526, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 264, Morales, J).
ARTICLE XII
General Provisions
Franchises cannot be exclusive, otherwise, void.
Q The dissenting opinion states two reasonable and legitimate grounds for the creation of exclusive franchise: (1)
protection of the governments investment, and (2) avoidance of a situation where ruinous competition could
compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and remote areas. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. There is no reasonable and legitimate ground to violate the Constitution. The Constitution should never be
violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the President, Congress, the Court, the BOD and the LWUA have no choice but to
follow the Constitution. Any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it violates the Constitution. This rule is basic.
In Social Justice Society, the Court held that, In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must
be observed. In Sabio, the Court held that, the Constitution is the highest law of the land.It is the basic and paramount
law to which x x x all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its
intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution. In Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992, 208 SCRA 133, the
Court held that, the three branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority
conferred by the Constitution. In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 146 Phil. 798 (1970), the Court held that, The three
departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to [the Constitutions] commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. (Tawag Multi-Purpose
Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, supra.).
POLICE POWER
Q What is the effect if a tenant-recipient of a parcel of land under PD 27 transfers the land to another? Explain.
Answer: The transfer is void because it is prohibited by law. Our law on agrarian reform is a legislate promise to emancipate
poor farm families from the bondage of the soil. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in the exact same spirit, with mechanisms
which hope to forestall a reversion to the antiquated and inequitable feudal system of land ownership. It aims to ensure
the continued possession, cultivation and enjoyment by the beneficiary of the land that he tills which would certainly not
be possible where the former owner is allowed to reacquire the land at any time following the award in contravention of
the government's objective to emancipate tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil. (Toralba v. Mercado, 478 Phil. 563
(2004)).
In order to ensure the tenant-farmer's continued enjoyment and possession of the property, the explicit terms of
P.D. No. 27 prohibit the transfer by the tenant of the ownership, rights or possession of a landholding to other persons, or
the surrender of the same to the former landowner. In other words, a tenant-farmer may not transfer his ownership or
possession of, or his rights to the property, except only in favor of the government or by hereditary succession in favor of
his successors. (Caliwag-Carmona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148157, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 723, 734; Torres v. Ventura,
G.R. No. 86044, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 97, 105; Corpuz v. Grospe, G.R. No. 135297, June 13, 2000, 333 SCRA 425, 436-
437). Any other transfer of the land grant is a violation of this proscription and is, therefore, null and void. (Vda. de Coronel
v. Tanjangco, Jr., G.R. No. 170693, August 9, 2010, Peralta, J.).
Q What is the nature of the States power to regulate rates imposed by public utilities? Explain.
Answer: It is beyond cavil that the State, in the exercise of police power, can regulate the rates imposed by a public
utility. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Manila Electric Company, it was said that the regulation of rates to be
charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and
regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected
with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the
common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the
property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation. (440 Phil. 389; Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(Suneco) v. ERC, G.R. No. 183623, October 4, 2010).
EMINENT DOMAIN
For compensation to be just it must not only be full, but it

should like be not delayed.
Q The government took a property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform program of the government but there
was no payment for twelve (12) years. State the effect of the delay in the payment? Explain.
Answer: There was no more just compensation. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution expresses the constitutional
rule on eminent domain Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. While confirming
the States inherent power and right to take private property for public use, this provision at the same time lays down the
limitation in the exercise of this power. When it takes property pursuant to its inherent right and power, the State has the
corresponding obligation to pay the owner just compensation for the property taken. For compensation to be considered
just, it must not only be full and fair equivalent of the property taken; it must also be paid to the landowner without
delay.
Inevitably, if the government falters or is seen to be faltering through lack of good faith in implementing the
needed reforms, including any hesitation in paying the landowners just compensation, this reform program and its
objectives would suffer major setbacks. That the governments agrarian reform program and its success are matters of
public interest, to our mind, cannot be disputed as the program seeks to remedy long existing ad widespread social justice
and economic problems. (Apo Fruits Corp. v. LBP, et al., G.R. No. 164195, April 5, 2011, Brion, J.).
Q Land Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for determination of just compensation in an expropriation proceedings.
Davao Fruits Corp. (DFC) contended that in filing the petition for determination of just compensation, it acted as the
expropriator and the dispenser of police power which are the sovereign powers of the State. It argued that the LBP has
no authority to file an action for determination of just compensation much less for the purpose of invalidating the
finding of the DAR tasked to determine the initial valuation of lands covered by land reform. Is the contention correct?
Why?
Answer: No. The LBP is an agency created primarily to provide financial support in all phases of agrarian reform pursuant to
Section 74 of RA 3844 or the Agricultural Reform Code and Section 64 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988.
In Heirs of Roque F. Tabuena v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180557, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 557,
it was said that once an expropriation proceeding for the acquisition of private agricultural lands is commenced by the
DAR, the indispensable role of LBP begins. In Heirs of Lorenzo and Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
166461, April 30, 2010, 619 SCRA 609, it was ruled that LBP is not merely a nominal party in the determination of just
compensation, but an indispensable participant in such proceedings. As such, LBP possessed the legal personality to
institute a petition for determination of just compensation in the Special Agrarian Court (SAC), hence, it has personality to
institute the petition. (Apo Fruits Corp. v. LBP, et al., G.R. No. 164195, April 5, 2011, Brion, J.).
Q State the nature of determination of just compensation in expropriation cases? Explain.
Answer: The determination of the amount of just compensation is a judicial function that cannot be usurped by
administrative agencies. In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 537, it
was ruled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the RTC
acting as Special Agrarian Court. The same cannot be lodged with administrative agencies and may not be usurped by any
other branch or official of the government. (LBP v. Heirs of Severino Listana, G.R. No. 182758, May 30, 2011). The LBPs
authority is only preliminary and if the landowner disagrees, the court will decide. (LBP v. Livioco, G.R. No. 170685,
What to pay when former owner buys back his property

expropriated.
Q During the negotiations for the acquisition of land to construct the Lahug Airport, the government assured the
landowners that they could repurchase their properties if the airport project is not pushed through. The project was
abandoned. If the owners would repurchase their properties, how much should they pay? Explain.
Answer: They should return or pay what they receive as just compensation for the expropriation of their properties plus
legal interest computed from default. They must likewise pay the necessary expenses the State might have incurred in
sustaining their respective lots and the monetary value of its services in managing the lots in question to the extent that
they, as private owners were benefited thereby. (Anunciacion Vda. de Ouano, et al. v. Republic, G.R. No. 168770; Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority v. Inocian, et al., G.R. No. 168812, February 9, 2011).
Q Give the reason for the rule that if the condemned property for public use is not used for that purpose should be
returned by the State to the owner? Explain.
Answer: Private property shall not be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. The twin elements of just
compensation and public purpose are, by themselves, direct limitations to the exercise of eminent domain, arguing, in a
way, against the notion of fee simple title.
In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to
defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property
against his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state must
show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically
alleged or least reasonably deducible from the complaint.
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation,
failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in
any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of
fair play. (Vda. de Ouano, et al. v. Rep., G.R. No. 168770; Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Inocian, et al., G.R.
No. 168812, February 9, 2011).
Q In a case, the lower court used the potential use of the property as basis in the determination of the value. The lower
court fixed the value based on its residential use, not on its agricultural use despite the fact that there was no official
conversion of the same from agricultural to residential. Is the ruling of the court correct? Why?
Answer: No. For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its
character and its price at the time of taking. (Heirs of Francisco Tantoco, Sr. v. CA, G.R. No. 149621, May 5, 2006, 489 SCRA
590). There are three important concepts in this definition the character of the property, its price, and the time of actual
taking. The lower courts erred in treating the land as residential and accepting the change in the character of the property,
without any proof that authorized land conversion had taken place.
In expropriation cases (including cases involving lands for agrarian reform), the propertys character refers to its
actual uses at the time of taking, not its potential uses. (Curata v. PPA, G.R. No. 154211-12, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 214).
The property was agricultural at the time he offered it for sale to DAR in 1998. It is the DAR that is mandated by law to
evaluate and to approve land use conversions so as to prevent fraudulent evasions from agrarian reform coverage. Even
reclassification and plans for expropriation by local government units (LGUs) will not ipso facto convert an agricultural
property to residential, industrial or commercial. Thus, in the absence of any DAR approval for the conversion of
respondents property or an actual expropriation by an LGU, it cannot be said that the character or use of said property
changed from agricultural to residential. The property remains agricultural and should be valued as such, hence, the lower
courts had no legal basis for considering the subject propertys value as residential. (LBP v. Livioco, G.R. No. 170685,
Q May the potential use of the property be the basis of just compensation? Explain.
Answer: No. While the potential use of an expropriated property is sometimes considered in cases where there is a great
improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated property, (NPC v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Dev. Corp., 480 Phil.
470 (2004)), it should never control the determination of just compensation. The potential use of a property should not be
the principal criterion for determining just compensation for this will be contrary to the well-settled doctrine that the fair
market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, not its potential
uses. If at all, the potential use of the property or its adaptability for conversion in the future is a factor, not the ultimate
in determining just compensation. (Curata v. PPA, G.R. No. 154211-12, June 12, 2009, 590 SCRA 214).
Q When is just compensation determined?
Answer: Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking. The time of taking (Eusebio v. Luis, 603 SCRA 576;
Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., 188 SCRA 300), is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property
such as when title was transferred to the Republic. (LBP v. Livioco, G.R. No. 170685, September 22, 2010).
Q State the effect if the NPC puts up transmission lines which prevent the use of the property of another? Explain.
Answer: It has the effect of putting up an easement of right of way which falls within the purview of the power of eminent
domain. In installing the transmission lines which traversed respondents lands, a permanent limitation is imposed by
petitioner against the use of the lands for an indefinite period. This deprived respondent of the normal use of the lands. In
fact, not only are the affected areas of the lands traversed by petitioners transmission lines but a portion is used as the site
of its transmission tower. Because of the danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath the high-tension live wires,
the landowner will not be able to use the lands for farming or any agricultural purposes. Hence, the owner has the right to
be paid the full value of his property. (NPC v. Villamor, G.R. No. 160080, June 19, 2009).
Q RA No. 8874 otherwise known as An Act to Facilitate Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Project
and for Other Purposes provides for guidelines for expropriation proceedings. To attain the objective of the government
to facilitate infrastructure projects, what are the requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation
proceedings involving real property? Explain.
Answer: The requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real property are: (1) the
filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to the defendant; (3) payment of an
amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR including
payment of the value of the improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of
utmost urgency, the payment of the proffered value of the property to be seized; and (4) presentation to the court of a
certificate of availability of funds from the proper officials.
Upon compliance with the requirements, a complainant in an expropriation case is entitled to a writ of possession
as a matter of right, and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the writ of possession. No
hearing is required, and the court exercises neither its discretion nor its judgment in determining the amount of the
provisional value of the properties to be expropriated, as the legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 8974. (Rep. v. Far East Ent. Inc., et al., G.R. No. 176487, August 25, 2009 citing Capitol Steel Corp. v. PHIVIDEC
Industrial Authority, G.R. No. 169453, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 590).
Q What are the double purposes of the requirement of payment of 100% of the value of the property sought to be
taken under RA 8974? Explain.
Answer: As the preliminary or provisional determination of the value of the property equivalent to 100% of the value of the
property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, said amount serves a double purpose of pre-payment if
the property is fully expropriated, and of indemnity for damages if the proceedings are dismissed. Said provisional value
must be paid to the owner of the land before a writ of possession may be issued. The issuance of a certificate of availability
of funds will not suffice for the purpose of issuance of a writ of possession. (Rep v. Far East Ent. Inc., et al., G.R. No. 176487,
August 25, 2009).
Q Is it proper to allow the landowner whose property has been covered by the CARP to withdraw the compensation for
his land although it is protested? Explain.
Answer: Yes. it is but just and proper to allow, with becoming dispatch, withdrawal of the revised compensation amount,
albeit protested. The concept of just compensation contemplates of just and timely payment; it embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking. (Apo Fruits Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 164195, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 537). Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot, as Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118712, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 404,
instructs, be considered just, for the owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land
while being made to wait for years before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. (Land Bank of the
Phils. v. DAR Adjudication Board, et al., G.R. No. 183279, January 25, 2010, Velasco, J).
Q May it be argued that by allowing withdrawal of the incremental amount, the government may be placed at a losing
end, citing the possibility that the recomputed amount may be more than the just compensable value? Why?
Answer: No. For one, as an exercise of police power to complement eminent domain, the forced taking of private property
under the CARP puts the landowners, and not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against
them. One thing going for the landowners, though, is that they cannot, as a matter of law, be compelled to accept the
LBPs valuation of their expropriated land and/or accept DARs offer by way of compensation.
And for another, the stated risk which the DAR or the government will allegedly be exposed to if immediate
withdrawal of the rejected compensation is allowed is at the moment pure speculation. (Land Bank of the Phils. v. DAR
Adjudication Board, et al., G.R. No. 183279, January 25, 2010).
Q State the rationale for allowing immediate withdrawal of the compensation. Explain.
Answer: To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as
compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DARs valuation, and notwithstanding that they have
already been deprived of the possession of such properties is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible
expropriation of properties was painful enough. The landowner would be rubbed all the more by withholding that which
rightfully belongs to him in exchange for the taking. This is misery twice bestowed on the owner.
Hence, there is no distinction between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation
under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both
situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and
immediately compensated. (LBP vs. CA, G.R. No. 118712, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 149; Land Bank v. DAR Adjudication
Board, et al., G.R. No. 183279, January 25, 2010).
TAXATION
Q Cooperatives, under RA 6938 as amended by RA 9520 enjoy preferential tax treatment. Does the tax preferential
treatment include the members? Explain.
Answer: Yes. Under Article 2 of RA 6938, as amended by RA 9520, it is a declared policy of the State to foster the creation
and growth of cooperatives as a practical vehicle for promoting self-reliance and harnessing people power towards the
attainment of economic development and social justice. Thus, to encourage the formation of cooperatives and to create an
atmosphere conducive to their growth and development, the State extends all forms of assistance to them, one of which is
providing cooperatives a preferential tax treatment.
Cooperatives, including their members, deserve a preferential tax treatment because of the vital role they play in
the attainment of economic development and social justice. Thus, although taxes are the lifeblood of the government, the
States power to tax must give way to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives. To borrow the words of Justice
Isagani A. Cruz: The power of taxation, while indispensable, is not absolute and may be subordinated to the demands of
social justice. (Dumaguete Credit Cooperative v. Com. Of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 182722, January 22, 2010; Rep. v.
Judge Peralta, 234 Phil. 40 (1987).
PUBLIC OFFICERS
Q What is the effect if an employee in government is temporarily transferred or reassigned? Explain.
Answer: It depends. While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee's
prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him away
from his permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a
transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.
(Rep. V. Pacheco, G.R. No. 178021, January 3, 2012, Mendoza, J., citing Bentain v. CA, 209 SCRA 644, G.R. No. 89452, June 9,
1992).
Q Give the concept of constructive dismissal? Explain.
Answer: Section 6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, defines constructive dismissal as a situation
when an employee quits his work because of the agency heads unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations which
render continued work impossible. Hence, the employee is deemed to have been illegally dismissed. This may occur
although there is no diminution or reduction of salary of the employee. It may be a transfer from one position of dignity to
a more servile or menial job. (Rep. V. Pacheco, G.R. No. 178021, January 3, 2012, Mendoza, J., citing Bentain v. CA, 209
SCRA 644, G.R. No. 89452, June 9, 1992).
Administrative liability despite dismissal of criminal case.
Q Calixto Cataquiz, then General Manager of the Laguna Lake Development Authority was charged with violation of the
Anti-Graft Law. The case was dismissed. He contended that because of the dismissal of the criminal case, there was no
more basis to hold him administratively liable. Is his contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of
their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the
same act. (Tecson v. SB, 376 Phil. 191 (1999)). Obviously, administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil
liability. (Veloso v. SB, 187 SCRA 504, (1990)).
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be attributed to the following: first, the
difference in the quantum of evidence required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed; and
second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the
same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability. (People v. SB, G.R. No. 164577, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA
147, citing People v. Paredes, G.R. No. 169534, July 30, 2007, 528 SCRA 577; Office of the President v. Calixto Cataquiz, G.R.
No. 183445, September 14, 2011).
Q State the effect of the dismissal of the criminal case on the administrative action. Explain.
Answer: The dismissal of the criminal case by the Ombudsman does not foreclose administrative action against Cataquiz.
(Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1 (1993)). His absolution from criminal liability is not conclusive
upon the OP, which subsequently found him to be administratively liable. The pronouncement made by the Ombudsman
cannot serve to protect the respondent from further administrative prosecution. A contrary ruling would be unsettling as it
would undermine the very purpose of administrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public service and uphold the
time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. (Ferrer v. SB, G.R. No. 161067, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 460;
Valencia v. SB, G.R. No. 141336, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 88; Office of the Pres. V. Calixto Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445,
Q He contended that he has already been removed, hence, the accessory penalty of disqualification against re-
employment cannot be imposed anymore. Is he correct? Why?
Answer: No. Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. Despite his removal from
his position, he can still be held administratively liable for acts committed during his service and he can be made to suffer
the corresponding penalties. The subsequent finding by the OP that Cataquiz is guilty of the charges against him with the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal and its corresponding accessory penalties is valid. (Office of the Pres. V. Cataquiz,
supra.).
Q He argued that his removal has rendered the imposition of the principal penalty of dismissal
impossible. Consequently, citing the rule that the accessory follows the principal, he insisted that the accessory
penalties may no longer be imposed on him. Is his contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. In the case of In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico, 685
SCRA 186, despite the resignation from government service by the employee found guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful
and immoral conduct and violation of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, thereby making the imposition of the
penalty of dismissal impossible, the accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch or instrumentality of government were still imposed. It is not moot and academic. (Office of the Pres. v. Cataquiz,
supra., citing Pagano v. Navarro, Jr., 533 SCRA 622 (2007)).
Q Petitioner was appointed to a position comparable to the one she previously occupied. There was even an increase
in her rank and salary. Was there a demotion? Why?
Answer: None. There is demotion when an employee is appointed to a position resulting to a diminution in duties,
responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not involve a reduction in salary. Where an employee is appointed to a
position with the same duties and responsibilities but a rank and salary higher than those enjoyed in his previous position,
there is no demotion and the appointment is valid. (Bautista v. CSC, G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010).
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Doctrine of condonation does not apply to

appointive.
Q Petitioners sought to expand the doctrine of condonation to coterminous appointive officials who were
administratively charged along with re-elected official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed during
their preceding term. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. Election expresses the sovereign will of the people. Under the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-
election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-
appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed
respondent Sojor to the post of university president. (Atty. Vicente Salumbides, et al. v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al.,
G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010 citing CSC v. Sojor, 554 SCRA 160 (2008)).
Q Is not the non-application of the doctrine of condonation to appointed officials violative of the equal protection
clause? Why?
Answer: No. The non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to equal
protection of the law. The electorates condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the re-elected official
cannot be extended to that of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold
the will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor
disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees.
It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing authority, that could
extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the
electorate. The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and
every probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latters actual reelection.
The unwarranted expansion of the doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, provide civil servants,
particularly local government employees, with blanket immunity from administrative liability that would spawn and breed
abuse in the bureaucracy. (Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010).
3-term limit.
Q Marino Morales was elected Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007 local elections. He
was, however disqualified in the 2004 elections because of the 3-term limit. While his proclamation in the 1998-2001
election was declared void, it was done after serving the term or on July 4, 2001. On May 7, 2007, the SC promulgated a
decision disqualifying him. He vacated the position, the next day, the Vice-Mayor assumed office from May 17, 2007 to
June 30, 2007. It was contended that he was not qualified to run in the 2007 local elections, otherwise, he would be
serving a 5th term. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. It is true that he occupied the position of mayor in the following periods: 1995-1998; 1998-2001; 2001-2004;
2004-2007 but because of his disqualification he was not duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales
hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-
2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales occupancy of the position of
mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-
term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales first term for purposes of the three-term limit
rule. (Dizon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009).
Q It was alleged that Morales was able to serve his fourth term as mayor through lengthy litigations. In other words,
he was violating the rule on three-term limit with impunity by the sheer length of litigation and profit from it even more
by raising the technicalities arising therefrom. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then opponent
which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioners incumbency in an office to which he was
not lawfully elected. Such delay cannot be imputed to the him because there was no proof that the delay was due to any
political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant, was not without legal recourse to
move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion
for the execution of the regional trial courts decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor
to assume office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not shown to have been
intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to
serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral election. (Dizon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 182088,
January 30, 2009).
Q What is the effect of the disqualification of Morales in the 2004 elections? Explain.
Answer: He cannot be considered a candidate at all. The votes cast for him were considered as stray votes.
Q What are the tests in determining whether a candidate is disqualified because of the 3-term limit? Explain.
Answer: For purposes of determining the resulting disqualification brought about by the three-term limit, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times. (Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, 356 Phil. 467 (1998). There should be a concurrence of two
conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Dizon v. COMELEC, et
al., G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009 citing Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 370 Phil. 625 (1999); Mayor Abelardo Abundo, Jr. v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013, Brion, J).
Q He was disqualified in the 2004-2007 term. State the effect of such disqualification where he was unseated. Explain.
Answer: It can be considered as involuntary severance from office. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The decision in the Rivera case
unseating him was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice
mayors office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The
assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem interrupted Morales continuity
of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (Dizon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R.
No. 182088, January 30, 2009).
Q Nicasio Bolos ran for Punong Barangay in Dauis, Bohol in the 1994, 1997 and 2002 barangay elections and won.
Petitioner contended that he is qualified to run for the position of Punong Barangay in the October 29, 2007 Barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections since he did not serve continuously three consecutive terms. He admitted that in
the 1994, 1997 and 2002 Barangay elections, while serving his third term as Punong Barangay, he ran as Municipal
Councilor of Dauis, Bohol, and won. On July 1, 2004, he assumed office and, consequently, left his post as Punong
Barangay by operation of law. He averred that he served the full term as member of the Sangguniang Bayan until June 30,
2007. On October 29, 2007, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay and won. The COMELEC issued an
order disqualifying him as a candidate for Punong Barangay since he did not complete his third term by operation of law.
He contended that he is qualified. Is his contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
It is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms, satisfying the first
condition for disqualification.
Petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon
winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as Punong
Barangay which is deemed to be voluntary renunciation of said office.
Q The 3-term limit has two (2) parts. Explain.
Answer: The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear
intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary
severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.
(Socrates v. COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457 (2002)).
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, 311 SCRA 602 (1999) the Court stated that the second part of the rule on
the three-term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-
term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term. The Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: (1)
that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same government post; and (2) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms.
Q Petitioner argued that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he left his post as Punong
Barangay by operation of law; hence, he did not fully serve his third term as Punong Barangay. Is his contention correct?
Why?
Answer: No. The term operation of law is defined as a term describing the fact that rights may be acquired or lost by the
effect of a legal rule without any act of the person affected. Black's Law Dictionary also defines it as a term that expresses
the manner in which rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person by the mere application to the particular
transaction of the established rules of law, without the act or cooperation of the party himself.
An interruption in the service of a term of office, by operation of law, is exemplified in Montebon v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 180444, April 9, 2008, 551 SCRA 50). The respondent therein, Sesinando F. Potencioso, Jr., was elected
and served three consecutive terms as Municipal Councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007.
However, during his second term, he succeeded as Vice-Mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of the Vice-Mayor
pursuant to Section 44 of R.A. No. 7160. Potenciosos assumption of office as Vice-Mayor was considered an involuntary
severance from his office as Municipal Councilor, resulting in an interruption in his second term of service. The Court held
that it could not be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law. Hence,
Potencioso was qualified to run as candidate for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu in the May 14,
2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. (See also: Borja v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998).
In this case, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He instead relinquished his office
as Punong Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol,
which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay.
Criterion in creating a local government unit.
Q In the February 10, 2010 decision of the SC, it declared RA 9355 creating the province of Dinagat unconstitutional for
failure to comply with the requirements of population and land area. It further declared as void Article 9(2) of the LGC-
IRR stating that the land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more
islands. Under the law, a province must comprise of at least 2,000 square kilometres, but the province does not meet the
requirement, hence, a motion for reconsideration seeking the exemptions application was filed with the SC. Is the MR
proper? Why?
Answer: Yes. When the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land
area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be
created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites
for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that
islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or
municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for
provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to
correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be
in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. (Navarro, et al. V. Executive Secretary Ermita,
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011).
Q What is the reason for the above interpretation of the law? Explain.
Answer: The interpretation has to be so because of the basic policy consideration underpinning the principle of local
autonomy.
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy,
contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in
order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd,
awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which,
in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the
minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be
made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This
would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over
one composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress,
and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and burdensome
if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as
compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
A very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of
local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read
together with territorial contiguity. (Navarro, et al. v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011).
Zoning power of LGUs is intended to increase local autonomy.
Q Resolution No. 29-A of the Municipality of Dasmarias dated July 9, 1972 approved the subdivision of certain
properties for residential purposes from agricultural. Petitioners Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. and the
DAR sought to include the same under the coverage of the CARP Law contending that the LGU has no power to reclassify
the land; only the national legislature can do it. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No, because a parcel of land reclassified for non-agricultural uses prior to June 15, 1988 shall no longer be
considered agricultural land under the CARP.
When city and municipal boards and councils approved an ordinance delineating an area or district in their cities or
municipalities as residential, commercial or industrial zone, pursuant to the power granted to them under the law, they
were, at the same time, reclassifying any agricultural lands within the zone for non-agricultural use; hence, ensuring the
implementation of and compliance with their zoning ordinances. The logic and practicality behind such a presumption is
more evident when considering the approval by local legislative bodies of subdivision ordinances and regulations. The
approval by city and municipal boards and councils of an application for subdivision through an ordinance should already be
understood to include approval of the reclassification of the land, covered by said application, from agricultural to the
intended non-agricultural use. Otherwise, the approval of the subdivision application would serve no practical effect; for as
long as the property covered by the application remains classified as agricultural, it could not be subdivided and developed
for non-agricultural use.
A liberal interpretation of the zoning power of city and municipal boards and councils, as to include the power to
accordingly reclassify the lands within the zones, would be in accord with the avowed legislative intent behind the Local
Autonomy Act of 1959, which was to increase the autonomy of local governments. (Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing
Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos, Inc., G.R. No. 131481; DAR v. E.M. Ramos, Inc., G.R. No. 131624, March 16, 2011).
Q Discuss the nature of the power of LGUs in the determination of land use in their respective territorial jurisdictions?
Explain.
Answer: The regulation by local legislatures of land use in their respective territorial jurisdiction through zoning and
reclassification is an exercise of police power. In Binay v. Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991, 201 SCRA 508, the
Court recognized that police power need not always be expressly delegated, it may also be inferred:
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with
civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et alienum non laedas"
and "Salus populi est suprema lex" Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and
convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del
Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid
delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A
valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of
the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise
police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give
effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been
construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the
safety of the people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers of such corporations are as
much delegated powers as arc those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation
growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the
corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers. (Crawfordsville
vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such
measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The
power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus, not only does the State
effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v.
Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102; Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos, Inc., G.R. No.
131481; DAR v. E.M. Ramos, Inc., G.R. No. 131624, March 16, 2011).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Q A school refused to release the transcript of records of a student. The school contended that the student failed to
enroll during the second semester of the school year 2000-2001, hence, the school contended that the complaint failed
to state a cause of no action, hence, a motion to dismiss was filed. It was further contended that there was failure to
exhaust administrative remedy to CHED. Rule on the contention.
Answer: The contention is not correct as the action essentially is one for mandamus and damages. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, the
administrative agency concerned must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is
brought before the courts. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for dismissal of the action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is where the
issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioners liability if any for damages will have
to be decided by the courts, since any judgment inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil
Code. As such, exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with. As held in Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of
Science and Technology:
x x x exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of

the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; x x x
neither are they part of the judicial system, or deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not
have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the
Commission. (485 Phil. 446 (2004); UST, et al. v. Danes Sanchez, G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010).
WRIT OF AMPARO
Q A petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Motion for Production & Inspection was filed alleging that the
husbands of the petitioners were taken into custody of the military in Tarlac. They contented that the victims life, liberty
and security had been and continued to be violated on account of their enforced disappearances, hence, they prayed for
a Writ of Amparo and the inspection of certain camps of the military, issuance of temporary protection order and the
rendition of judgment under Rule 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The return of the military in general showed that the victims are not in their custody. In fact, it was contended
that the remedy should be a petition for Habeas Corpus as they were allegedly abducted and illegally detained and that
the petition was deficient and incomplete as it failed to indicate the matters required by paragraphs c, d & e of Section 5
of the Rule. It also failed to allege any action or inaction attributable to the military with respect to their duties and that
they failed to allege any action that they undertook to look for the victims and verify whether a witness saw them at the
camp or not.
In opposing the request for issuance of inspection and production orders, the military officers posited that apart
from compromising national security should entry into these military camps/bases be allowed, these orders partook of
the nature of a search warrant, such that the requisites for the issuance thereof must be complied with prior to their
issuance.
The military officers were absolved by the CA ruling that petitioners have not adequately and convincingly
established any direct or indirect link on the disappearances of the victims, but the CA granted the prayer for Inspection
Order and ordered the military to conduct thorough and impartial investigation pertaining to the disappearances of the
victims. Is the ruling of the CA correct? Why?
Answer: No. The provisional reliefs provided for by the rule on amparo are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a
judicious determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to still order the inspection of the military camps
and order the army units to conduct an investigation into the disappearance of the alleged victims after it absolved
petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding that
petitioners could not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims. (Gen. Alexander Yano, et al. v. Cleofas
Sanchez, et al., G.R. No. 186640, February 11, 2010).
INTERNATIONAL LAW
UNCLOS baselines law allows internationally-recognized

delimitation of the breadth of Phil. Maritime zone and
continental shelf.
Q In 1961, RA 3046 was enacted demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. It
followed the framing of the Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying the
sovereign right of States parties over their territorial sea, the breadth of which remained undetermined. In 2009, RA
9522 was enacted to make RA 3046 comply with the terms of the UNCLOS III which prescribed the water-land ratio,
length and contour of baselines of archipelagic States and set the guidelines for the filing of application for the extended
continental shelf. It shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine
archipelago and classified adjacent territories like Kalayaan Islands Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Schoal as regimes
of islands which generate their own maritime zones.
Petitioners questioned the validity of RA 9522 on two (2) grounds: (1) it reduces Philippine maritime territory,
and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article I of the 1987 Constitution,
embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) it opens the countrys waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy and damaging marine resources. They further contended that the
treatment of KIG as regime of islands resulted in the loss of large maritime area which prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.
Respondents contended that RA9522 preserves Philippine territory over KIG and the Scarborough Shoal. It does
not undermine the countrys security, environment and economic interests nor relinquish the Philippines claim over
Sabah.
Petitioners contended that RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national territory because it discards
the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively
encoded in the definition of national territory in the Constitution. They contended that this constitutional definition
trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial
sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. They argued that
from the Treaty of Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of
nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. Is the
Answer: No. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating,
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines],
contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]),
and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among
United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas,
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along
their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific
basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States
provides that the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Prof. Merlin Magallona, et al. v.
Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011).
Q What is the nature of baselines laws? Explain.
Answer: Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the
extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. It gives notice to the rest of the international community of the
scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the
exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77). (Prof. Merlin Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo
Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011).
Q How do States acquire or lose territories?
Answer: Under traditional international law, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to
comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are
outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. (Prof. Merlin Magallona, et al. v.
Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., supra.).
Q Petitioners contended that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to
measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, weakened our territorial claim over that area. They
added that the KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of
about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters, prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. Is the
Answer: The contention that 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters under RA 9522 was lost is not correct. RA
9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal waters,
territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles.
The reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by
the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of
opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.
Q It was argued that with RA 9522, the KIG now lies outside the Philippine territory because it does not enclose the
KIG, hence, the Philippines lost its claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG and Scarborough Shoal. Is the
Answer: No. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III.
First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that the length of the
baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can
reach up to 125 nautical miles.
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several
decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably depart to an
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs limits. The need to shorten this
baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative. (Prof. Merlin
Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., supra.).
Q Did the Philippines surrender its claim over KIG and Scarborough Shoal when it classified them as regime of islands?
Why?
Answer: No. decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta
sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of regime of
islands, whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. (Prof. Merlin Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo
Ermita, et al., supra.).
Q It was contended that the RA 9522 is invalid for its failure to textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North
Borneo. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah
since the law provides that the definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in
this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated
in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Sec. 2; Prof. Merlin
Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., supra.).
Q It was contended that RA 9522 is not valid because it unconstitutionally converted internal waters into archipelagic
waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including
overflight. It would expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the
Constitution. Is the contention correct? Why?
Answer: No. Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution or as archipelagic
waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of
their bed and subsoil.
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by

the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic
waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as
well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects
affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic
State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained
therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining
unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation.
Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional
powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant
innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for
their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically
incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid
innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures
from the international community. (Prof. Merlin Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., supra.).
Q Does it mean that if archipelagic States are subjected to innocent passage, it would place them in lesser footing with
continental coastal States? Explain.
Answer: No. The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage
and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their
territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition
of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange
for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as
archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States
archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as
separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands
separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of
other States under UNCLOS III.
Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies) must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides,
which, absent enabling legislation, do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x. Article II provisions
serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of
the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of
Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The
other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2) and
subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7), are not violated by RA 9522. (Prof. Merlin Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo
Ermita, et al., supra.).
Q Why is the demarcation of the baselines important? Explain.
Answer: The demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to
the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds
the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is
contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space
the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to
exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves the
traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
(Prof. Merlin Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., supra.).

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SURVEY OF 2010-2012 SC DECISIONS IN

Constitution mandates self-reliant economy, but does not

Q What measure is adopted in the admissibility of out-of-court identification of an accused? Explain.

Due process applies to the power to tax; equal protection

Every unfair discrimination offends the equal protection

Q What is the basic requirement of the equal protection clause? Explain.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

Arrest in flagrante delicto, no need for warrant; objects

Q When is the description of the place to be searched sufficient? Explain.

Q Why is the suspension by the MTRCB a permissible restriction? Explain.

Q State the basis of the balancing of interest test. Explain.

Q Why should television broadcasts be regulated? Explain.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Privilege communication is within constitutionally-protected

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free

Q Is facial challenge of a law the same as As-applied challenge? Explain.

Answer: No. A "facial" challenge is different from an "as-applied" challenge.

Justification for facial challenge in free speech; to

Q State the justification for facial challenge in free speech. Explain.

Q Is an on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes allowed?

There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech

Effect if mayor modifies the place where demonstration

Q Who is an independent and competent counsel? Explain.

Q State the basic purpose of the constitutional right to counsel. Explain.

Spontaneous statements to the police, not part of

A letter admitting shortage of dollars in the collection in a

Sanction on program is not restraint on

Right to Speedy Trial

Impairment of contract clause.

There is double jeopardy if a person is charged with the

Void order, not basis of double jeopardy.

Failure to register oath of citizenship and election of the

Parliamentary Immunity; rationale for privilege.

Grounds for delisting of Party-List

250,000 population requirement is

Q Is population an indispensable requirement in the creation of a province? Explain.

Investigation in aid of legislation; on-going judicial

Q When does the HRETs power commence? Explain.

Party List representative; effect of continued operation of

Q State the nature of the 20% allocation of party-list representatives. Explain.

Q Is property ownership a requirement to run for public office? Explain.

ARTICLE VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Creation of Phil. Truth Commission not justified by power of

Nature of the power to deport; Act of State; subject to

Q Is the right to enter the Philippine a matter of right? Explain.

CIVIL SERVICE LAW

Q What are the two kinds of suspension? Explain.

President has only the power of supervision, not control.

ARTICLE VIII Judiciary Department

Q What are the requisites of the judicial review? Explain.

Quoting Justice P. Laurel, it said:

Power of the House of Representatives to promulgate rules

Q Why cannot petitioner invoke the Neri principle? Explain.

COMELEC retains power to cancel registration of party-list

Q Is the rule absolute? Why?

Two (2) ways to question qualifications of a candidates.

Answer: They are:

Q How should domicile be understood? Explain.

Q How is domicile of origin acquired? Explain.

Acquisition of land during period of election; not banned.

Answer: No, because land cannot be considered as public works.

Q State the rationale for the principle. Explain.

Proclaimed candidate was the loser; remedy