Society at A Glance 2016

Society at aGlance 2016
OECD Social Indicators
A spotlight on youth
Society at a Glance
2016
OECD SOCIAL INDICATORS

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Please cite this publication as:

OECD (2016), Society at a Glance 2016: OECD Social Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris.
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Series: Society at a Glance

ISSN 1995-3984 (print)
ISSN 1999-1290 (online)
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use
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OECD 2016
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FOREWORD
Foreword
T his is the eighth edition of Society at a Glance, the OECDs biennial overview of social indicators.
As with its predecessors, this report addresses the growing demand for quantitative evidence on
social well-being and its trends across OECD countries. It updates some indicators included in the
previous seven editions and introduces several new ones. Data on Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia,
Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Lithuania, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and South Africa are
included separately where available.
The Great Recession caused sweeping job losses across the OECD, and young people were hit
particularly hard. So far, the recovery has been too weak to bring young people and notably the
low-skilled back into employment. Eight years after the beginning of the crisis, still about 40 million
young people are neither employed nor in education or training (NEET). But the roots of the problem
go deeper: many lack the qualifications to find a job, while others struggle with personal or social
problems. In the long term, joblessness and inactivity can generate isolation and withdrawal from
society and endanger social cohesion. The great challenge for governments in the years to come is
therefore to devise policies which equip young people with the professional skills they need and help
disengaged youth overcome obstacles to education and employment.
This edition of Society at a Glance portrays at-risk youth and surveys policies designed to promote
a smooth transition from school to work. Chapter 1 presents and discusses the most recent data on the
situation of youth in OECD countries. It also presents evidence on education, training, employment and
social policies which can support NEETs. Chapter 2 provides a guide to help readers understand the
structure of OECD social indicators. Chapters 3 to 7 then consider these indicators in more detail.
Additional information on indicators can be found on the OECD web pages (http://oe.cd/sag).
This report was prepared by Stphane Carcillo (project leader), Pauline Fron, Raphaela Hyee,
Claire Keane, Sebastian Knigs and Maxime Ladaique. Nelly Biondi, Chris Clarke, Rodrigo Fernandez,
Michael Frster, Gatan Lafortune, Marlne Mohier all made valuable contributions. Monika Queisser,
Head of the OECD Social Policy Division, supervised the report.
SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2016: OECD SOCIAL INDICATORS OECD 2016 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of contents
Acronyms and conventional signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Chapter 1. The NEET challenge: What can be done for jobless and disengaged youth? 13
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Youth employment in the aftermath of the Great Recession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2. Who are the NEETs? A profile of jobless youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3. Safety nets for low-income youth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4. Policies to promote self-sufficiency among young people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Annex 1.A1. Data and methodology of the longitudinal analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Annex 1.A2. Overview of income support benefits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Chapter 2. Interpreting OECD social indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

The purpose of Society at a Glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
The selection and description of indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
What can be found in this publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Chapter 3. General context indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Household income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Demographic trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Chapter 4. Self-sufficiency indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Education spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Labour market entry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Chapter 5. Equity indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Income inequality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Living on benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Social spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Recipients of out-of-work benefits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 6. Health indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Life expectancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Perceived health status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Suicide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Health spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Tobacco and alcohol consumption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Chapter 7. Social cohesion indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Life satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Crime and prisoners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Social networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
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6 SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2016: OECD SOCIAL INDICATORS OECD 2016

ACRONYMS AND CONVENTIONAL SIGNS
Acronyms and conventional signs

OECD country ISO codes
Australia AUS Korea KOR

Austria AUT Latvia LVA
Belgium BEL Luxembourg LUX
Canada CAN Mexico MEX
Chile CHL Netherlands NLD
Czech Republic CZE New Zealand NZL
Denmark DNK Norway NOR
Estonia EST Poland POL
Finland FIN Portugal PRT
France FRA Slovak Republic SVK
Germany DEU Slovenia SVN
Greece GRC Spain ESP
Hungary HUN Sweden SWE
Iceland ISL Switzerland CHE
Ireland IRL Turkey TUR
Israel ISR United Kingdom GBR
Italy ITA United States USA
Japan JPN
Other major economy and G20 country ISO codes
Argentina ARG Indonesia IDN

China CHN Lithuania LTU
Colombia COL Russian Federation RUS
Costa Rica CRI Saudi Arabia SAU
India IND South Africa ZAF
Other acronyms and abbreviations
NEET Youth not in employment, education or training

VET Vocational education and training
Conventional signs
.. Not available
In figures, OECD refers to unweighted averages of OECD countries for which data are
available.
() in the legend relates to the variable for which countries are ranked from left to right in
decreasing order.
() in the legend relates to the variable for which countries are ranked from left to right in
increasing order.

Society at a Glance 2016
OECD 2016
Executive summary
F ifteen percent of the OECD youth population were not in employment, education or
training (NEET) in 2015 about 40 million young people. More than two-thirds of them were
not actively looking for work. The total gross income that could have been generated by
NEETs in 2014 is estimated to have been between USD 360-605 billion, or 0.9-1.5% of
OECD-wide GDP. Job and income uncertainty can keep young people from reaching other
traditional markers of adulthood, leaving them disenchanted and discouraged. It can also
have serious long-term effects on health, fertility and crime, and eventually endanger
social cohesion. Helping young people transition into further education or employment is
therefore at the top of the policy agenda in the OECD as evidenced by the G20 target of
reducing the number of youth who are low-skilled, NEET or working in the informal sector
by 15% until 2025.
One in ten jobs have been destroyed since 2007

Almost one out of every ten jobs held by workers under 30 were destroyed between 2007
and 2014. In Spain, Greece and Ireland, the number of employed youth halved. Young
people who had left school at lower-secondary level bore the brunt of these job losses. And
while some countries have managed to restore youth employment to pre-crisis levels, the
recovery has been too weak to significantly improve young peoples prospects in many
countries.
Lower skills make young people particularly vulnerable

Young people with no more than lower-secondary education account for over 30% of
NEETs, and they are three times more likely to be NEET than those with a university-level
degree. However, poor educational attainment is not only about formal qualifications; young
people with weak literacy and numeracy skills are more likely to be NEET, which points to the
importance of high-quality alternative education and training paths for early school leavers.
Young women are often NEET because of care-giving responsibilities

Being a woman adds to the risk of becoming NEET particularly on a long-term basis.
Many young women care for children and other family members at home. Consequently,
women are 1.4 times more likely to be NEET than young men. Single parents find it
particularly hard to combine caring for children with employment or further education.
The availability of affordable childcare is thus crucial to improving young womens job
prospects.
9
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Some NEETs suffer from additional forms of disadvantage

Young people who are already disadvantaged in other ways often also face a high risk
of becoming NEETs. Those born abroad are 1.5 times more likely to be NEET than
native-born youth, particularly if they cannot speak the local language and are low-skilled.
Young people whose parents have low educational attainment or do not work are also
more likely to experience unemployment or inactivity. This indicates intergenerational
transmission of disadvantage. Young people who suffer from ill health are also
over-represented among NEETs.
Most young people are never NEET, but one-fifth are long-term NEETs
Across a selection of countries analysed, more than half of young people were never
NEET over a four-year period. For others, short NEET periods were part of a successful
transition from education to work. One-fifth of all young people, however, spent more than
one year as NEETs for them disengagement from work and education is not a transient
experience, but a lasting state. Countries hit hard by the crisis have a higher share of
long-term NEETs; women, the low-educated and youth with ill health are also at greater
risk of becoming long-term NEETs.
NEETs have lower levels of happiness, trust and political interest

Being NEET is likely to influence young peoples happiness, may make them feel
disenfranchised, and can affect social cohesion. NEET youth have lower levels of life
satisfaction and trust in others compared to non-NEET youth. They also show less interest
in politics and are more likely to feel that it is the governments responsibility to provide for
citizens.
Safety nets tend to be weaker for young people

School leavers and young people with patchy employment records often fail to qualify
for insurance-based income support. Only around 30% of all unemployed young people
receive unemployment benefits, while over 40% of all jobseekers aged 30 and over are
covered. Consequently, social safety nets are less effective in fighting poverty among young
people: 40% of young people who would have incomes below the poverty line are kept out
of poverty by public transfers, compared to 50% of adults aged 30 and over. Roughly every
eighth young person lives in poverty, and youth poverty rates are higher than those of the
elderly.
Fighting early school leaving is essential

The share of young people who leave school without an upper-secondary qualification
has declined in OECD countries over the past decade. Nevertheless, one in six
25-to-34 year-olds still do not have an upper-secondary qualification, particularly young
men. To ensure that all young people complete their upper-secondary schooling,
comprehensive support is needed: monitoring school attendance to spot warning signs of
drop-out; addressing pupils social or health problems; and offering after-school
programmes to engage pupils and strengthen their motivation.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Quality vocational education and training can help smooth the school-to-work
transition
Vocational education and training (VET) is a valuable alternative to academic
schooling. It prepares young people for the labour market with a view to responding to
employers skills needs. The practical training component of VET should be work-based,
ideally in the form of apprenticeships matching young people with employers at an early
stage. Such programmes may be particularly attractive and beneficial for youth tired of
school. Pre-apprenticeship programmes can prepare those who lack the necessary literacy,
numeracy or social skills to function in the workplace.
Carefully targeted programmes are needed to re-engage NEETs

Public services need to reach out to NEETs to prevent long-term inactivity. Employment
services, social services and non-governmental actors can play a central role in engaging
disconnected youth. Once a young person is registered, extensive profiling can help make
support adequate to purpose and can save costs by ensuring that interventions target the
right youth. Many NEETs may require only a little assistance to find employment, while
successful programmes for young people with severe or multiple barriers tend to be
intensive and expensive. The most promising programmes combine schooling and
practical training with counselling, psychological support and housing. Some have been
shown to be cost-effective, by raising earnings potential and reducing criminal behaviour.

OECD 2016
Chapter 1
The NEET challenge: What can be done

for jobless and disengaged youth?
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli
authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights,
East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
13
1. THE NEET CHALLENGE: WHAT CAN BE DONE FOR JOBLESS AND DISENGAGED YOUTH?
Introduction
Young people today struggle in the labour market in spite of being the most highly
educated generation in history. Unemployment is generally higher among young people
than prime age adults, and those who do work tend to have poorer-quality jobs and are
much more likely to be on temporary contracts or to earn low wages than older workers.
The Great Recession hit young people particularly hard and, as the recovery has been
jobless in many countries, many young people have not seen their situation improve since.
This chapter adopts a wide definition of youth, including all 15-29 year-olds, to allow for
the fact that young people remain in education for longer, and to include the beginning of
family formation. The number of 15-to-29 year-olds not in employment, education or
training (NEETs) remains higher than before the onset of the crisis in nearly all
OECD countries 40.0 million in 2015.1 The most vulnerable those with a poor education,
ill health or social problems, and/or a migrant background are most likely to find
themselves without work, quality education or training opportunities. Over two-thirds of
all NEETs (28 million young people across the OECD) are inactive, i.e. not even looking for
work.
This situation has significant social, political and economic consequences. In the
absence of adequate public support, declining household incomes increase the risk of
poverty. They may force young people and their families to cut down on essential
expenditure on food, housing and health care, so damaging their well-being and health.
Periods of inactivity and unemployment in early adulthood have also been shown to have
lasting negative effects on future employment prospects and earnings (OECD, 2015a). The
growing uncertainty with which young people grapple at the outset of their careers can also
keep them from reaching traditional markers of adulthood securing a steady job is often
associated with the decision to leave the parental home and is typically a prerequisite for
starting a family. In the long term, inactivity and unemployment can generate isolation and
disengagement from society, with adverse consequences for social outcomes such as health,
fertility and trust, and can eventually lead to crime (Carcillo et al., 2015).
The social and labour market integration of young people is therefore a policy priority
for OECD governments. This chapter takes stock of the current labour market situation of
young people, profiles those who are out of employment, education or training, and
reviews approaches and policies that OECD countries have adopted to improve youth
employment and educational outcomes. It addresses the following sets of questions:
How have young people fared during the Great Recession, and which young people
were most affected by the large-scale destruction of jobs? To answer these questions,
the first section of this chapter looks at how youth employment rates have evolved
across the OECD and at the educational attainment of those who have lost their jobs.
Many young people go to school or study and do not participate in the labour market,
which makes employment and unemployment rates incomplete measures of the labour
market situation of young people. The analysis therefore specifically focuses on NEETs
and how their numbers evolved throughout the economic crisis.

Who are the NEETs, and for how long do they typically remain out of employment,
education and training? Young people who are unemployed or inactive differ greatly in
personal characteristics, family background, and the barriers to their securing a place in
education or work. Identifying NEETs has important implications for the type of support
they need if they are to (re)gain self-sufficiency. The second section profiles NEETs from
country to country in order to identify principal risk factors as well as obstacles to
re-integration:
What share of NEETs are early school leavers, and what proportion lack the literacy or
numeracy skills required for work or training?
Is there an important gender gap in unemployment or inactivity, and what are its
likely drivers?
And to what extent are youth from more disadvantaged families at a greater risk of
being NEET?
The negative long-term consequences of joblessness are likely to be greatest for young
people who remain NEET for long periods. The third section therefore also studies for how
long young people remain out of education, employment and training and seeks to
identify factors that put them at risk of being long-term NEETs.
What forms of income support are available to low-income young people, and how
successful are they at preventing youth poverty? A consequence of the difficult labour
market situation for young people is that a growing share of them struggle to be
self-sufficient. Although income support can help absorb severe earnings losses and
ensure a decent standard of living, it is often less generous and more difficult to access
for young people. The third section looks at income support for young people:
What proportion of young people receive unemployment or disability benefits, social
assistance, or other types of cash benefits, and how have their numbers developed
over the crisis and its aftermath?
What share of unemployed young people are covered by some form of income support?
What are the implications for the incomes of young people and the incidence of
youth poverty?
What policies and programmes can rise to the NEET challenge? Cross-country analysis
of NEETs reveals various barriers to their entering education or employment. Because low
educational attainment is such an important risk factor, the final section examines what
governments can do to ensure that all young people complete their upper-secondary
education:
What measures heighten the chances of spotting students at risk of dropping out of
school and giving them support they need?
How can attractive vocational education and training pathways particularly quality
apprenticeships contribute to providing young people with the skills and work
experience required in the labour market?
What interventions can help NEETs back into education or employment? Which ones
work best and for whom? What are the challenges of implementation? Under what
conditions can youth guarantees make a difference?
1. Youth employment in the aftermath of the Great Recession

Youth employment is an important factor for social cohesion. From a macro-economic
perspective, persistently high rates of unemployment or inactivity are a substantial loss of
economic opportunity and income. They undermine trust in political institutions and

policies while, from an individual viewpoint, under-employment can inflict scars on youth
that last for many years. Indeed, there is ample evidence that even short spells of inactivity
and unemployment at the outset of a career can have lasting effects. Young people who
experience a period of early unemployment are more prone to unemployment later in their
careers (Schmillen and Umkehrer, 2013; Mller and Umkehrer, 2014) and have been shown
to earn less (Umkehrer, 2015).2
This section examines to what extent the labour market situation of young people
differs from one country to another and how it has evolved since the onset of the Great
Recession (see also Indicator 4 on Labour market entry).
Youth were hit hard by the economic crisis

The sweeping job losses in the wake of the 2007-8 financial crisis hit young people
disproportionately hard. They are more likely to work in temporary and atypical contracts
that are easier to terminate in other words, they are what the concept of labour market
duality describes as outsiders. Moreover, in times of weak labour demand, young people
with little or no work experience struggle to find a job. The slow recovery in many countries
since the crisis has failed to reverse trends in youth employment and restore it to pre-crisis
levels. OECD-wide, the number of employed young people, aged 15 to 29 years, fell by 8%
between 2007 and 2015, while overall employment increased slightly (Figure 1.1). The most
catastrophic job losses over the period occurred in the countries worst hit by the recession:
Spain, Ireland and Greece saw youth employment cut in half. And in Portugal, Slovenia,
Italy and Latvia, between one-quarter and one-third of all jobs held by young people were
destroyed.
In some countries, such as France and the United States, youth employment fell more
moderately, while a handful of countries not only avoided significant job losses, but even
saw an increase in employment among young people particularly Luxembourg (+38%)
and Chile (+20%) (Figure 1.1). In both countries youth employment rates, especially among
young women, were in fact low at the onset of the crisis, and the rise was attributable
chiefly to more young women taking up work.
The recovery has been too weak to help young people back into employment
While many countries have experienced bouts of recovery, they have generally been
too weak to drive up youth employment rates significantly. Indeed, the Southern European
countries that have been severely affected by the crisis such as Spain, Italy and Greece
experienced a second recession in 2011-12, and the share of employed youth is only just
levelling out. Other countries such as Estonia, Hungary and Iceland have already
recovered, or are on their way to recovering, their pre-crisis levels of youth employment.
The average share of youth in employment OECD-wide has stagnated since 2010
(Figure 1.2).
Low-educated youth were particularly vulnerable to job losses

Young people with low levels of educational attainment (below upper-secondary) were
most vulnerable during the economic crisis and have continued to be during the slow
recovery. They are also at the highest risk of long-term scarring effects. The number of
employed youth who had gone no further than lower-secondary education dropped in
almost all countries between 2007 and 2014 including in those where youth employment
grew over this period, such as Mexico, Australia and Norway. Indeed, in those seven years,
the young people who bore the brunt of job losses across the OECD were those educated to

Figure 1.1. Almost one in ten jobs held by young people were destroyed since the beginning
of the crisis
Youth ( ) Working age
Panel A. Employment rate of young people

(15-29 years old) and the working-age population, Panel B. Changes in number of jobs,
15 to 64 years old, 2015 2007-15, percentages
Iceland
Switzerland
Netherlands
Australia
Canada
United Kingdom
Austria
Denmark
New Zealand
Norway
United States
Germany
Sweden
Japan
Estonia
Israel1
Finland
Latvia
Mexico
Luxembourg
Czech Republic
Slovenia
Poland
Ireland
France
Hungary
Turkey
Slovak Republic
Chile
Korea
Belgium
Portugal
Spain
Italy
Greece
OECD
100 80 60 40 20 0 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60
1. Data relate to 2011.
Source: OECD Employment Database, www.oecd.org/employment/database.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404800
Figure 1.2. Youth employment rates have been slow to recover

Changes in youth employment rates in selected OECD countries (in %), 2007 to 2015 where 2007 = 100%
OECD Germany Hungary Ireland United States Greece

110
105
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404813
low and medium levels (see explanatory note to Figure 1.3 on levels of education). By
contrast, employment among university graduates rose OECD-wide, save in those countries
hardest hit by the crisis. In the Czech Republic, for instance, overall youth employment
dropped by 17%, while among young people with higher education it increased by 7%.

Figure 1.3. Poorly educated young people were hit hardest by the recession
Percentage change in numbers of employed 15-to-29 year-olds, between 2007 and 2014, by level of education
High education Medium education Low education All education levels ( )

40
30
20
10
- 10
- 20
- 30
- 40
- 50
-60
ov l
Gr n d
Ir e i n
Po ec e
ia
e c ep y
Re li c
E s li c
Po i a
Ja d
Fr r y
Hu a n
K e
nm a
Ic r k
Fi d
B e and
Un her m
d ds
i te Au es
ng a
Ne a m
Ze a
d
rm e
M ny
Sw Tur o
No nd
i t z ke y
Au ay
Lu S w ia
m n
g
CD
Sl g a
Ki ri
w nad
G e il
C z R t al
c
D e or e
n
an
an
xe e d e
ic
ur
en
l
a
t iu
do
a
a
at
rw
an
h ub
Ch
ra
i te lan
p
a
la
la
la
d st
OE
r tu
to
Sp
ex
ng
bo
e
pu
ak I
el
nl
al
Ne lg
St
er
st
C
ov
Un
Sl
Note: The figure depicts the absolute change in employed individuals by educational attainment as a percentage of the total change in
employed persons.
For Japan, the age bracket is 15 to 24 years old. Data for Chile relate to 2006-13, for Korea to 2008-13, and for Germany, Japan, New Zealand
and Turkey to 2007-13.
Education levels are defined as follows: Low education denotes a level no higher than lower-secondary education (up to ISCED Level 3C
short), medium education denotes upper-secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary levels (ISCED Levels 3C long to Level 4), high
education denotes tertiary level (ISCED Levels 4 and 5).
The education levels medium and high cannot be distinguished for Mexico and New Zealand, and there is no information on the level of
education of employed young people in Japan and Korea, so there is no breakdown by level of for the OECD average. Because of a break
in the time series in Israel in 2011, 2007-14 comparisons cannot be made for Israel.
Due to missing information on educational attainment for some individuals, there are disparities between the total change in the
number of employed youth (diamonds) and the variation aggregated across levels of education for Denmark, Ireland, Korea and Sweden.
Source: OECD calculations based on national labour force surveys and the OECD Education Database (Australia, Germany, Japan and Korea).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404823
The stark contrast between skilled and unskilled youth certainly reflects rising levels
of educational attainment young people now are generally better educated than they
were in 2007 as well as, in some countries a declining youth population.3 It also indicates
a growing demand for skills. Many of the jobs destroyed during the crisis are gone for good.
It is therefore essential to ensure that all young people who enter the labour market be well
qualified. The current climate of relatively weak labour demand is actually a good time to
invest in the skills of the most vulnerable young people. (Section 4 discusses policies and
programmes that can help upskill poorly qualified NEETs so they are fully prepared when
labour demand does pick up.)
Youth employment tends to be higher where many young people combine work
and study
As a consequence of the divergent effects of the Great Recession, the OECD-wide
youth employment situation has become more unequal. In 2015, over two-thirds of young
people were employed in the best-performing countries, such as Iceland, Switzerland and
the Netherlands and Australia. In the Southern European countries worst affected by the
crisis, by contrast, only one-quarter to one-third of all youth were in work (Figure 1.1).
The disparities in youth employment rates are also linked to a more structural factor
the share of young people who combine studies and work (Figure 1.4). In Iceland,
Switzerland and the Netherlands, more than half of all students are also employed, while
in Greece, Italy, Hungary, Portugal, Spain or the Slovak Republic, only about one in twenty

Figure 1.4. In the best-performing countries, many young people combine work with education
Labour market status of young people, percentages, 2014
Employed (not in education) Employed (in education) In education (non-employed) Unemployed NEET Inactive NEET
Iceland
Switzerland
Netherlands
Australia
Canada
Austria
Norway
Denmark
United Kingdom
Germany
Israel
Sweden
United States
Japan
Finland
Estonia
Latvia
Mexico
Czech Republic
Poland
France
Ireland
Luxembourg
Slovenia
Belgium
Turkey
Hungary
New Zealand
Chile
Korea
Slovak Republic
Portugal
Spain
Italy
Greece
OECD
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Note: Countries are ranked, from top to bottom, in order of youth employment rates. Data for Chile, Korea, New Zealand and Turkey relate to 2013.
Source: OECD calculations based on national Labour Force Surveys and the OECD Education Database (Australia, Germany, Israel and
New Zealand).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404835
is. Working a moderate number of hours (below 15 a week) has been shown to lower the
risk of early school leaving, possibly because it fosters important life skills such as
conscientiousness and motivation, and can steer students towards a career path. There are
also benefits for university students, especially if they work moderate hours i.e. less than
half-time in a job related to their field of study. Accordingly, some countries have
encouraged the employment of students by introducing or stepping up the work-based
components of school and university courses (Quintini and Martin, 2014).
Many NEETs are not looking for work

The number of NEETs rose in most OECD countries as a result of sweeping job losses in
the wake of the economic crisis. In 2015, the number of NEETs OECD-wide stood at
40.0 million, over two-thirds of whom were not actively looking for work so called inactive
NEETs. Averaged across OECD countries, 14.6% of all youth were NEETs in 2015; weighted by
the size of countries youth populations, this rate rises to 17%.4 This share was strikingly high
in the countries hit hardest by the recession between one-quarter and one-fifth of all young
people were out of work and not in education in Greece, Italy, and Spain.5
A breakdown of NEETs into those actively seeking a job the unemployed NEETs and
those who are not, the inactive NEETs, shows that in most countries, the majority of NEETs
are not even looking for work. The share of inactive NEETs is highest in Turkey and Mexico,
but also significant in Italy, Korea and Chile (Figure 1.5, Panel A). Section 2, Who are the
NEETs? A profile of jobless youth, shows that inactive NEETs are not actively seeking work
for a variety of reasons e.g. care obligations, health problems, substance abuse problems
as well as the belief that any job search would be unsuccessful. In some countries such as

A corrigendum has been issued for this page. See: http://www.oecd.org/about/publishing/Corrigendum-Society-at-a-Glance-2016.pdf
Figure 1.5. Rising NEET rates mostly reflect higher unemployment among young people
Inactive NEETs Unemployed NEETs
Panel A. The share of NEETs Panel B. Percentage-point change in the rates

as percentages of all young people of inactive and unemployed NEETs, 2007-15
Turkey
Italy
Greece
Spain
Mexico
Chile
Korea
Slovak Republic
Ireland
France
Hungary
Belgium
Portugal
Poland
Latvia
United States
Israel
Finland
United Kingdom
New Zealand
Slovenia
Estonia
Canada
Czech Republic
Australia
Austria
Denmark
Japan
Sweden
Germany
Norway
Switzerland
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Iceland
OECD
40 30 20 10 0 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
Note: Countries are arranged, from top to bottom, in order of overall NEET rates.
Data on Israel are not comparable before and after 2011, so the percentage point change is not presented for Israel. Data for Chile refer
to 2006-13, for Korea to 2008-13, and to 2014 for Israel.
Source: OECD calculations based on national labour force surveys and OECD National Educational Attainment Classification (NEAC)
Database 2015, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=EAG_NEAC# (Australia, Israel, Korea and New Zealand).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404842
Turkey, Mexico, and Chile low female participation in the labour market leads to high
inactive NEET rates among young people. However, since inactive NEETs are not
necessarily registered with the public employment or welfare services, they can be
particularly hard to reach. Section 4, Policies to promote self-sufficiency among young
people discusses programmes designed to attract and engage inactive NEETS.
The share of young people who are unemployed is significant in some countries,
notably those badly hit by the crisis 18% in Greece and 15% in Spain. By contrast, only 2%
of all young people are unemployed and looking for work in Iceland and 3% Norway,
the Netherlands, Korea, Germany, Japan and Mexico.
The rise in NEET rates since the beginning of the crisis has been driven wholly by an
increase in the share of unemployed NEETs, while the share of inactives has been steady or
even declined (Figure 1.5, Panel B). In Greece, for instance, the rise in NEET rates was due
solely to the increase in numbers of unemployed NEETs, while the share of inactive NEETs
actually fell.
The rise in NEET rates does not exactly match up with the fall in employment rates.
This is because the share of young people who do not work but are in education also
increased during the crisis period in most countries on the OECD average, it rose by 3
percentage points between 2007 and 2014 (not shown). This increase was significant in
some countries that experienced extreme job losses, such as Spain (+15 percentage points)
or Ireland (+12 percentage points), but also Turkey (+9 percentage points) and Denmark
(+8 percentage points).

The NEET problem is structural, but has been exacerbated by the crisis
How much of the NEET problem is directly caused by the fall in labour demand during
and after the great recession, and how much is structural? That is, are NEET rates expected
to fall as labour demand picks up again, or are there obstacles to the employment of NEETs
that go beyond business cycles e.g. a mismatch between the skills of young people and
the requirements of employers? Figure 1.6 shows the inactive and unemployed NEET rates
on the OECD average since the late 1990s. The rate of inactive youth who are not in
employment shows a slight but steady downward trend that continued throughout the
crisis years over the last 17 years, it fell by 2 percentage points. The unemployed NEET
rate, however, clearly fluctuates with the business cycle. During the great recession, it
increased significantly more than during previous downturns, reaching a maximum of
7.5% in 2013, significantly higher than any value observed during this time period.
Figure 1.6. NEET inactivity has not been influenced by the crisis
Unemployed, inactive and overall NEET rate, OECD average, 1997-2014
Unemployed NEET rate Inactive NEET rate NEET rate

18
16
14
12
10
0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Note: The OECD average is based on 25 countries for which data for a sufficient number of years is available.
Source: OECD Education Database.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404855
This suggests that, while young people suffered severe job losses during the crisis, the
average NEET rate across the OECD is not likely to fall more than 2 or 3 percentage points
as the economy recovers. The structural component of the NEET problem therefore
requires targeted policies that help young people overcome the barriers to employment
they face, some of which are discussed in Section 4.
The high number of NEETs represents a significant cost to OECD economies

The high number of NEETs generates significant opportunity costs for OECD
economies, as young peoples time and skills go unused. The fact that the NEET problem is
partly structural and therefore unlikely to disappear after OECD economies have fully
recovered to the crisis, further adds to the importance of this recurring cost. This section
provides a rough estimate of these costs to OECD countries.
NEET costs are defined as the gross labour income NEETs could command if they were
employed, measured as the gross labour cost (including social security contributions).6 This
cost can be considered as a proxy of the forgone productivity of NEETs. This section presents
three estimates: upper and lower bound estimates, as well as a point estimate. The point
estimate accounts for the fact that jobless young people may have a lower earnings potential

Box 1.1. Measuring youth unemployment

One of the indicators most widely used to assess labour markets is the unemployment rate the ratio
between the unemployed and people who participate in the labour market (be they unemployed or in work).
Such a measure can be a misleading when applied to young people, as many are not in the labour market,
either because they are students or inactive NEETs.
The proportions of young people participating in the labour market differs widely from one country to
another ranging from a 43% participation rate in Italy to 83% in Iceland (Figure 1.4). Such variations stem not
only from different national economic climates, but are influenced by the architecture of a countrys education
system: Youth labour market attachment tends to be higher in countries with apprenticeship systems
vocational upper-secondary pathways that combine on-the-job training and classroom instruction. Even if the
share of the youth population that is unemployed is the same in two countries, the one with the greater labour
force participation will have a lower unemployment rate, as the denominator comprises more young people.
One measure of youth unemployment not influenced by the number of non-working students is the
unemployment ratio the number of the unemployed as a share of the entire youth population. If all young
people are either working or seeking work (a labour force participation rate of 100%), the unemployment
rate and ratio coincide. At a youth participation rate of around 50%, as in Greece and Spain, the
unemployment rate will be about twice as high as the corresponding unemployment ratio (Figure 1.7).
This conceptual issue has a direct impact on youth unemployment rates in the countries worst affected
by the crisis, often described as dramatic. Greeces 45% youth unemployment rate translates into a 22%
ratio, and Spains 40% rate into a 23% ratio (Figure 1.7).
Figure 1.7. Unemployment rates are always higher than unemployment ratios
Unemployment rates and ratios as percentages, 2015
Unemployment rate ( ) Unemployment ratio

45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
It a l
rm n
M nd
o
rw l
Au ay
er e a
Ch y
n s
st rk
i te C a li a
N e in g ad a
Lu Zea m
m nd
ng g
L a il e
Po v i a
S w and
B e den
Tu m
ov y
CD
S w Ic e y
er d
ec E s tr ia
Un Re ni a
d li c
Ne K tes
Ir e i a
ov F and
Re and
Fr li c
Po nc e
Sp l y
Gr a in
ce
ga
No ae
an
De and
Sl r ke
ar
Ge apa
i t z an
ic
H u o ur
en
iu
w do
Au ma
ee
t h or
b
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la
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r
OE
h to
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d an
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Is
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St
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J
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Cz
Un
Sl

1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404865
than young people in employment e.g. NEETs tend to have a lower educational background
than other youth, and are more likely to have care responsibilities (see Chapter 3).7 The upper
bound estimate assumes that if employed, NEETs would on average receive the same wages
and would choose to work the same hours as employed youth of the same gender and age. The
lower point estimate assumes that NEETs could only command a low-wage, defined as
two-thirds of the median wage among youth of the same gender and age-group.8 Hence, both
the upper and lower bounds ignore differences in other characteristics, such as education.

This exercise estimates the gross labour cost that could have been generated by NEETs
in the OECD in 2014 between USD 360 billion and USD 605 billion, with the point estimate
at USD 560 billion. This corresponds to between 0.9 and 1.5% of the OECD GDP. Figure 1.8
depicts the lower bound estimate for each country as a share of GDP.9
Figure 1.8. NEET costs are significant in many OECD countries

Annual NEET rate and estimation of the cost of NEETs as a percentage of GDP, 2014
NEET rates
35
30
TUR
ITA GRC
25
MEX
ESP
20 SVK
IRL HUN
CHL
POL LTV
15 USA
EST PRT BEL
CAN OECD GBR
FRA
NDL GER
FIN SLN CZEAUS
10 SWE
CHE AUT
NOR DNK
5 ISL LUX
0
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
NEET costs, in percentage of GDP
Source: OECD calculations based on the EU-SILC, HILDA (Australia), SLID (Canada), CASEN (Chile), SOEP (Germany), ENIGH (Mexico), SILC
(Turkey) and the CPS (United States). Data are for 2014 except for Chile and Switzerland (2013), Turkey (2012) and Canada (2011). GDP data
from OECD.Stat, http://stats.oecd.org. 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404877
The total costs of NEETs are a function of both NEET rates and wage levels. Countries
with the highest NEET rates suffer the highest costs Turkey at 3.4% of GDP, and Greece at
2%. However, relatively high wage levels can cause significant costs for countries with
moderate NEET rates: Belgium, which has a mid-table position with regard to NEET rates
(see Figure 1.5), has a similar relative NEET cost as Italy where the NEET rate is nearly twice
as high. The countries with the lowest relative NEET costs are Northern European countries
with low NEET rates, such as Norway, Sweden or Denmark.
These estimates only provide a proxy for the actual net social cost of the NEET
phenomenon, since it disregards that some NEETs might prefer not to work, and their
families and wider communities might also benefit from them not working. On the other
hand, high NEET rates might affect individuals and the community negatively, e.g. through
deteriorated health or more crime. It also ignores the out-of-work benefits paid to some of
these NEETs. A further complication is that wages and prices could change if all NEETs were
to suddenly take up employment, especially in countries with high shares of NEET youth.
2. Who are the NEETs? A profile of jobless youth

Policies to prevent and curb youth unemployment and inactivity require an
understanding of the obstacles that keep NEETs out of employment or education. Only
then can they be effectively designed and tailored to needs. NEETs are a diverse group, as
are the challenges they face within and between countries. Some young people struggle to
secure employment because they left school early, while others particularly women
have caring obligations. Those affected by illness or disability may face practical difficulties
in engaging in education or employment, while migrants may face language barriers.
This section seeks to draw an in-depth profile of NEETs, looks at how long young people
stay inactive or unemployed, and identifies the risk factors for being a long-term NEET.

Low levels of education and skills heighten the risk of becoming NEET
As the labour market demands ever higher levels of educational attainment and skills,
low education levels are decisive factors in becoming NEET. On average, NEET rates in the
OECD are three times higher among young people educated to lower-secondary level and
1.5 times greater at medium level (upper-secondary) than among their highly educated
peers with university-level (or tertiary) degrees. Because too many young people fail to
complete upper-secondary school 17% of young adults (25-34) had a maximum of
lower-secondary education in 2014 this means that a large share of NEETs is not fully
educated. Actually, just under one-third of all NEETs have only reached lower-secondary
school (Figure 1.9, Panel A), while 43% have gone no further than upper-secondary school.
Only one quarter of NEETs have higher education qualifications.
The educational gap in NEET rates varies significantly from country to country. As the
educational attainment levels of young people rise over time, the absence of qualifications
becomes an ever more important impediment to employment. Poorly educated youth in
Germany are, for instance, almost 7 times more likely to become NEET than the highly
educated (Figure 1.9, Panel B). And in Chile, NEET rates are 2.4 times higher among young
people educated to medium level than among the highly educated. In a word, a good
education helps protect young people from becoming NEETs, while leaving school early
puts them at considerable risk especially when most other young people attain upper
secondary or higher education.
Basic skills are also an important determinant of NEET status. The OECD Programme
for International Student Assessment (PISA) also finds a strong link between pre-primary
education attendance and better performance in reading, writing and maths later in life.
Figure 1.9. NEET rates are substantially higher among young people with low education
Panel A. Breakdown Panel B. NEET rate as percentages, 25 to 29 year-olds, by level of education, 2013-14
of NEETs (15-29)
by level of education, All ( ) Low education Medium education High education
as percentages, 2013-14 80
Low education
70
Medium education
High education 60
50
26 40
31
30
43 20
10
0
Po gal
ng d
Ch y
Fr il e
Gr ke y
CD
er g
S w l and
Ic d en
Ne o and
er ay
A nds
n ia
rm rk
a c
i te elg d
Ir e n c e
ak K nd
pu a
M bli c
Sp c o
ain
Tu ly
ce
F i any
C a and
d s tr a
ng li a
E s om
h Is i a
w pub l
d ium
ov s
L ia
r tu ia
N e Re r a e
i te u nad
Z e li
Sl t a te
Re or e
ar
Hu l an
Un B l a n
i t z o ur
en
Po a t v
It a
De us tr
Ge ma
th r w
ee
Ki a
i
la
OE
to
ex
d
r
a
e
la
el
nl
S w mb
S
N
A
xe
Lu
ec
ov
Cz
Un
Sl
Note: Data in Panel B refer to 2014, except for Australia, Chile, Germany, Israel, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand and Turkey (2013). No data
were available for Japan.
Low-education denotes lower-secondary school and lower (Levels 0-2 in the International Standard Classification of Education [ISCED]);
medium education refers to upper- or post-secondary education (ISCED Levels 3-4); and high education means higher, or tertiary,
education (ISCED Levels 5-6).
Source: OECD calculations based on the European Labour Force Survey and national labour force surveys; for Australia, Germany, Israel,
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand and Turkey, OECD Education Database https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=EAG_TRANS.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404887

Education begets skills, and skills beget educational attainment. It follows, therefore, that
leaving school early may result in low levels of literacy and numeracy, while students who
have struggled from an early age with basic literacy and numeracy may also be more likely
to drop out as they fall behind their peers. And poor literacy and numeracy also make it
more difficult to find a job. Policies should seek to help young people master basic skills to
reduce the risk of becoming NEET. Across the OECD, young people with low and medium
levels of literacy and numeracy are four times more prone to becoming NEETs than their
highly skilled peers (Figure 1.10, Panels A and B).
Figure 1.10. Poor literacy or numeracy skills also greatly increase young peoples risk of being NEET
Low skilled( ) Medium skilled High skilled
Panel A. NEET rates as percentages by literacy, 2012
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ic
ly
li a
nd
ce
a in
nd
ic
CD
n
da
en
a
es
ay
ria
s
nd
an
ni
re
ar
an
pa
bl
bl
It a
iu
do
at
rw
an
ra
ed
na
la
la
st
OE
to
Sp
Ko
nm
rm
pu
pu
la
nl
Ja
lg
St
Po
Ir e
st
ng
Au
Fr
Sw
Ca
No
Es
er
Fi
Be
Re
Re
Au
De
Ge
d
Ki
th
i te
ak
Ne
d
ec
Un
i te
ov
Cz
Un
Sl
Panel B. NEET rates as percentages by numeracy, 2012
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ay
ria
es
a
s
en
da
li a
nd
CD
ly
ic
nd
a
ce
ain
ic
nd
an
ar
re
ni
pa
an
bl
bl
It a
iu
do
rw
at
an
ra
ed
na
la
la
st
OE
to
Sp
Ko
nm
rm
pu
pu
la
Ja
nl
lg
St
Po
Ir e
st
ng
Au
Fr
Sw
Ca
No
Es
er
Fi
Be
Re
Re
Au
De
Ge
d
Ki
th
i te
ak
Ne
d
ec
Un
i te
ov
Cz
Un
Sl
Note: Literacy and numeracy are rated in accordance with the skills levels in the OECDs Programme for the International Assessment of
Adult Competencies (PIAAC): Low-skilled Level 1 or below, Medium skilled Levels 2 and 3; and High skilled Levels 4 and 5. Low
literacy skills, as measured by PIAAC, indicate that and individual can only undertake tasks of limited complexity and is less able to
integrate information from multiple sources; low numeracy skills indicate that an individual is less capable of performing complex
mathematical tasks and uses fewer problem-solving strategies.
Source: OECD (2015), OECD Skills Outlook 2015: Youth, Skills and Employability, OECD Publishing, Paris (based on the Survey of Adult Skills,
PIAAC 2012).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404890

Non-cognitive skills, too, have been shown to be highly predictive of educational and
labour market outcomes (Heckman et al., 2006). Traits such as conscientiousness, emotional
stability or openness to new experience are factors that can be as important as IQ in
completing school and higher education, finding a job and earning wages (see Box 1.2). They
also have a strong impact on health, law-abiding behaviour and other social outcomes.
Similarly, it has also been found that non-cognitive skills are more malleable than cognitive
abilities in adolescence, and many successful youth programmes emphasise them. In the
United States, learning self-discipline, the ability to work in groups and the self-regulation of
emotions are, for instance, at the centre of many approaches, including two important
national programmes: Head Start for children in kindergarten and the Jobs Corps, a
second-chance programme for teenagers and young adults (see Box 1.6).
Box 1.2. Non-cognitive skills, education and labour market outcomes

While the effect of years of schooling and cognitive abilities (such as attention, memory,
and problem-solving as measured by IQ and other ability tests) on income and health has
been recognised for many years, the role of personality traits, or non-cognitive skills, is less
well known.
A growing body of research finds that non-cognitive skills are associated with
educational attainment and outcomes like early school leaving. Of the big five personality
traits conscientiousness, openness to experience, extraversion, agreeableness and
neuroticism (also referred to as emotional stability) the first two best predict overall
educational achievement (Goldberg et al., 1998 for the United States; Bron and
Cobb-Clark, 2010 for Australia; and Van Eijck and De Graaf, 2004; Almlund et al., 2011; and
Brunello and Schlotter, 2011 for European countries). Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2006)
find that personality traits like conscientiousness affect earnings beyond their influence
on education, particularly among individuals in lower-skilled jobs. Conscientiousness is
also as closely associated with good grades as intelligence is (Poropat, 2009), while a
number of studies have found that emotional stability is also often a good predictor of high
levels of attainment in school.
Non-cognitive skills can be seen as internal assets that will eventually improve
academic, family, social and employment outcomes (Almlund et al., 2011; Cunha and
Heckman, 2007) Job and academic performance share a number of determinants. For
example, both require completing work on time and involve intelligence to varying degrees.
It is not surprising, therefore, that non-cognitive skills are also associated with labour
market performance. The importance of intelligence increases with the complexity of an
occupation, while conscientiousness may be demanded in jobs that range from skilled to
semi-skilled and unskilled labour. The principal finding to emerge from the literature is that
non-cognitive skills are just as predictive as cognitive ability of education, labour market and
other social outcomes, even after controlling for family background and cognition.
Studies show that at least half of non-cognitive abilities stem from childrens home and
school environments, with the rest attributable to hereditary factors. Personality traits can,
therefore, be changed by experience and specialised interventions, while cognitive abilities
form early in life and are more difficult to shape. Many successful interventions for
disadvantaged students seek to improve non-cognitive traits, often together with
measures to enhance cognitive skills. Such approaches open new directions for social,
employment and education policy (Carcillo et al., 2015). Innovative school programmes,
after-school support, mentoring, apprenticeship schemes, work experience and
second-chance programmes can thus all help to influence non-cognitive skills.

NEET rates are higher among women, mainly due to family responsibilities
While the lack of education is the foremost factor leading to non-employment among
young people, being a woman worsens the risks. Women are indeed more likely to become
NEET than men 1.4 times more OECD-wide (Figure 1.11). Behind that average figure, there
are variations from country to country. In some, particularly the Nordics, the gap is
negligible. By contrast, in Mexico or Turkey, for example, women are at three to four times
more risk of becoming NEETs than men. One reason may be the traditional gender-related
assignment of roles, with women doing most of the unpaid domestic work and caring for
children. However, some higher-income countries like New Zealand and the
Czech Republic also have wide gender gaps in their NEET rates, with female rates twice
those of men.
Figure 1.11. Young women are more likely to be NEET than young men
NEET rates for women and men as percentages of the 15-to-29 year-old population, 2014
Women Men
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
er d
Fr al
a k Ko y
Ic r g
ng a
Es m
C a ni a
Un B e d a
d m
CD
S w or d
i t z way
rm s
Ja y
nm n
S w ar k
st c
N e F in li a
ec Au en
Re r i a
Ze d
i te lo d
La s
Po i a
Po land
Hu c e
Re r e a
Ir e l i c
nd
M il e
Sp o
Gr in
Tu ly
ey
ce
Ge nd
an
Au bli
K i ni
ar
th l an
an
w lan
Un S a l a n
De a
ic
g
tv
It a
a
i t e l giu
do
u
rk
at
an
ee
b
Ch
ra
ed
na
p
la
h st
OE
d ve
to
r tu
ex
ng
bo
pu
pu
la
el
St
N e er
m
N
xe
Lu
ov
Cz
Sl
Note: Age group for Japan is 15 to 24 years old, and the United States 16 to 24 years old. For Chile and Turkey, data apply to 2013. In all
other countries, the data relate to 2014.
Countries are sorted, from left to right, in ascending order of the overall NEET rate.
Source: OECD calculations based on the European Labour Force Survey (EU LFS), Canadas Labour Force Survey, Chiles National
Socio-Economic Characterisation Survey (CASEN), Mexicos National Occupation and Employment Survey (ENOE), the US Current
Population Survey (CPS), the Japanese Labour Force Survey and the OECD Education Database (for Australia, Germany, Korea and
New Zealand https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=EAG_TRANS).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404903
Cultural differences aside, the main reason for inactivity among women most often
relates to childcare responsibilities, while poor health is the single most widespread cause
among males. More than half of women ascribe their inactivity to care-giving and family
responsibilities (Figure 1.12, Panel B), which probably means looking after small children,
as employment rates are generally low among mothers of very young children only about
half of those with children under 3 years of age are in employment in OECD countries
(Figure 1.13). Only small minorities of inactive women attribute not working to poor health
or other reasons, contrary to men. Some might simply prefer caring for children at home
while they are young more mothers take up employment as children get older
(Figure 1.13). Others, however, have no choice because they cannot access or afford
childcare for their small children. There is typically a greater, more affordable provision for

Figure 1.12. NEET rates are particularly high for women in their late 20s,
often because of caring responsibilities
Panel A. NEET unemployment and inactivity among young women and men, 15-29, 2014
Inactive NEETs Unemployed NEETs
All Men Women
30 30 30
25 25 25
20 20 20
18
15 15 15
12
9 7 12
6
10 10 10
5 5 5 4 9 5 5
8 8 9
7 8
3 3 2
0 0 0
15-19 20-24 25-29 15-19 20-24 25-29 15-19 20-24 25-29
Panel B. Top three reasons for inactivity among male and female inactive NEETs, as percentage, 2014
Men Women
35 60
30 50
25
40
20
30
15
20
10
5 10
0 0
Other reasons Ill or disabled Discouraged Caring/family Other reasons Ill or disabled
worker responsibilities
Source: OECD calculations based on the European Labour Force Survey (EU LFS), Canadas Labour Force Survey, Chiles National
Socio-Economic Characterisation Survey (CASEN), Mexicos National Occupation and Employment Survey (ENOE), the US Current
Population Survey (CPS), the Japanese Labour Force Survey and the OECD Education Database (for Australia, Germany, Korea and
New Zealand https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=EAG_TRANS). Australia, Germany, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico and New Zealand
excluded from Panel B due to a lack of information.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404916
older children. Indeed, affordable childcare and child-friendly employment arrangements

are key requirements for greater labour market participation among young mothers
(Box 1.3).
Because young people in older age brackets are more likely to have children, the
gender gap in NEET rates is more visible here. Male and female NEET rates are the same in
the younger 15-to-19 age group, when most young people are still at school (Figure 1.12,
Panel A). Later, though, driven by female inactivity rates which are double those of males,
a 3 percentage point gap opens up among 20-to-24 year-olds. As for the 25-to-29 age group,
female NEET rates stand at 26% 11 percentage points higher than mens. And within that
percentage, the share of inactive NEETs is more than three times higher than among men.

Figure 1.13. Employment rates are low among mothers of young children
Maternal employment rates by age of youngest child, 2013
Youngest child aged 0-2 Youngest child aged 3-5 Youngest child aged 6-14
Employment rate %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
l
CD
es
Au ni a
C z Z e li a
Re d
Ir e c
d
Hu a l y
Re in
ic
Gr y
M e
il e
k
th ni a
Au s
Ca ia
Fi a
Po d
Be rg
m
ia
Un Ge el
K i any
d
ga
c
nd
xe n c
ar
ar
i te lan
n
an
h lan
ic
bl
bl
ra
tv
r
ak Sp a
iu
do
u
at
ee
Ch
w a
na
la
st
It
OE
to
Ne ove
r tu
ex
nm
ng
bo
Ne tr
i te rm
Lu r a
pu
pu
nl
la
La
Is
lg
St
Un Po
a
ng
Es
s
er
F
m
De
Sl
d
d
ec
ov
Sl
Note: Data for Australia refer to 2011 and for Denmark and Finland to 2012.
No data are available for Sweden, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Norway, Switzerland or Turkey.
Countries are sorted, from left to right, in descending order of the employment rate of mothers whose youngest child is aged 0 to 14 years
old.
Source: OECD Family Database, www.oecd.org/social/family/database.htm.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404921
Box 1.3. High childcare costs: An obstacle to paid work for mothers
OECD-wide, childcare costs claim an average of 15% of the net family income of an employed single
parent or a dual-earner couple (Figure 1.14). Costs vary across the OECD, however, particularly for single
parents. In the United States, childcare costs for a lone parent account for over half of net income, while in
Ireland the figure is 42%. Couples in New Zealand and the United Kingdom spend around one-third of their
income on childcare costs. Such high costs are a strong deterrent to employment. It may not be financially
worthwhile for both partners to work, especially in families with several children, and it is usually the
mother who stays at home. Resuming employment after some years out of the workforce is difficult, and
women often face wage penalties upon their return to work (Budig and England, 2001).
In order to help NEETs with children, particularly females, into employment or facilitate a return to
education and training, it is therefore essential that childcare costs are kept to an affordable level, and that
childcare, including after-school care, is easy to access. The provision of childcare services may also have
an equity role to play high-quality, formal childcare, particularly at an early age, has been shown to have
a positive effect on social development and child cognition and these effects have been found to be stronger
for children from lower socio-economic backgrounds (Heckman, 2008). As is shown throughout this
chapter, NEETs are not only more likely to have lower educational attainment and skills, but are also more
likely themselves to have parents with low educational attainment and parents who are out of work.
Ensuring access to high quality childcare can, therefore, help to break the cycle of disadvantage from one
generation to the next.
Several OECD countries offer good examples: Denmark operates a system whereby municipalities are
obliged to offer all children older than six months a place in publicly-subsidised childcare. In Sweden,
municipalities must provide at least 15 hours of childcare per week to children over one. This obligation
rises to full-time hours in cases where both parents are employed or in education. Other countries provide
additional support for single parents with Iceland (specifically Reykjavik) providing reduced childcare fees
and Belgium (Flanders region) providing priority access to childcare services for lone parents.

Box 1.3. High childcare costs: An obstacle to paid work for mothers (cont.)
Figure 1.14. Childcare costs are around 15% of net family income across the OECD
Single parent, 67% of AW Couple, 100% + 67% of AW ( )
Cost in % of family net income, 2012
60
45
30
15
0
S w gal
St d
CD
Au e a
ov m d
N e epu g
er i c
C ds
Un i t z e a
N e Ir e s
i te Zea d
K i and
m
Gr r i a
Hu e c e
Po ar y
E s en
Ic i a
Po d
nd
rm n
Fr y
Sl c e
De ni a
No ar k
ec I y
pu l
B e li c
m
Au pan
li a
Re e
an
e
i te rlan
an
Ge ai
Sl xe a n
an
R ur
h sr a
t h bl
n
iu
do
rw
at
an
r
ra
ed
n
S w ana
la
st
OE
r tu
to
e
Sp
Ko
nm
ng
ak bo
e
L u inl
la
l
el
Ja
l
lg
ov
st
ng
F
w
d
Cz
Un
Note: Data relate to i) out-of-pocket childcare costs for full-time care at a typical childcare centre for a single parent with full-time earnings
of 67% of average earnings and ii) for a couple with full-time earnings of 100+67% of average earnings. AW stands for average wage.
The OECD average is unweighted.
Source: Tax and Benefit System: OECD Indicators, www.oecd.org/social/benefits-and-wages.htm.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404933
Source: European Commission/EACEA/Eurydice/Eurostat (2014), Key Data on Early Childhood Education and Care in Europe. 2014 Edition.
Eurydice and Eurostat Report, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg; Eurydice (2016), Description of National
Education Systems, Eurydice, Brussels, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/index.php/Countries; OECD (2016), Tax and
Benefit Systems: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages.htm.
Young people with poor health are four times more likely to be NEET
A relatively small proportion of NEETs 7% on average across the OECD report being in
poor health while a larger proportion, just over one fifth, report limitations in their daily
activity due to health. But even if a minority of NEETs report poor health, at the individual level
illness or disability is a strong predictor of the NEET status, especially among males. Physical
or psychological problems often represent serious obstacles to finding employment and
accruing work experience. NEET youth are over five times more likely on average to complain
of poor health than their non-NEET peers (Figure 1.15, Panel A) and more than twice as likely
to report limitations in their daily activity due to their health (Panel B, Figure 1.15). Indeed, a
substantial proportion of male and, to a lesser extent, female inactive NEETs state that
ill-health or disability is the prime reason for not working (Figure 1.12, Panel B).
Some NEETs may be permanently unable to work, some able to do only certain types
of jobs or a certain number of hours, while others may require special workplace
adjustments. They may also have to contend with practical difficulties such as physical
restrictions or a lack of flexible working arrangements. Illness and disability may also make
going to school or university more difficult if they affect attendance and performance.
As for mental disorders, they are widespread among young people about one in four
15-to-24 year-olds are affected (OECD, 2012a). Onset often occurs well before any labour
market transition before 14 years old in half of all mental illnesses. Mentally unwell
young people are more prone to dropping out of school (OECD, 2015c). A fifth of those with

Figure 1.15. NEETs are more likely to suffer from poor health
Panel A. Ratio of NEET to non-NEET youth, 15 to 29 years old, who report poor health, 2014
18
16
14
12
10
0
i t e Ir e l
Au y
CD
Gr d
ce
No ia
De ay
Be rk
m
th nd
s
d
Es a
a
Ge le
m y
A u ur g
S w li a
en
ly
Re s
Po li c
K i nd
Tu a
ey
ov Fr n
Re c e
Hu li c
m
ga
nd
xe a n
i
ni
ar
n
ai
an
i
en
i te It a
tv
iu
do
a
rk
rw
t
ee
ak an
Ch
b
b
ra
ed
la
Ne c ela
la
st
OE
to
r tu
Sp
ec S t a
nm
ng
bo
Lu rm
pu
pu
la
nl
La
lg
ov
Po
st
ng
er
Fi
Sl
I
Cz d
h
d
Un
Un
Sl
Panel B. Ratio of NEET to non-NEET youth, 15 to 29 years old, who report daily limitations due to health, 2014
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
o
m a
it z rg
nd
ly
ov E s l e
Re al
CD
Re ni a
F i ic
Tu d
C z Po ey
Au ic
La a
Ge ia
Ir e y
Gr d
Fr e
ce
A u in
Po ia
No d
Un H w ay
Ki r y
Ic m
Be nd
D e um
Un er l k
St s
Sw es
en
xe eni
an
ri
i te and
c
th ar
ic
an
n
i
bl
h ug
bl
l
It a
do
d ga
S w bou
rk
at
Ch
an
ee
ra
ed
la
la
la
a
st
OE
t
ak to
Sp
ex
N e nm
i
rm
pu
pu
nl
el
lg
r
Lu ov
ec r t
er
st
ng
i te un
M
Sl
d
Sl
Note: Data are for 2014 except for Chile (2013) and Turkey (2012).
Source: OECD calculations based on the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), Germanys Socio-economic
Panel (SOEP), Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, Chiles National Socio-Economic Characterisation
Survey (CASEN) and the US Current Population Survey (CPS).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404947
moderate mental health issues and a quarter of sufferers with severe conditions do so,
compared with only 14% of pupils and students with no such issues. Given the link
identified above between early school leaving and drifting into unemployment or
inactivity, it is essential that policy measures support mentally unwell young people and
keep them fully engaged in education (Section 4).
Migrant youth are more at risk of being NEET

Similarly, a relatively small proportion of NEETs 13% on average across the OECD are
foreign-born youth. Nevertheless individually foreign-born young people are significantly
more exposed to the risk of being NEETs than the native-born. In most OECD countries,
youth born outside their country of residence are 1.5 times more likely to be NEET than
native youth. Foreign-born young people are more at risk of becoming NEETs because they

might not be sufficiently proficient in the host countrys language, have lower levels of
educational attainment, or suffer from discrimination. Indeed, a poor command of language
can lead to low educational attainment and thus feed a vicious circle of disadvantage.
The relative risk of becoming NEET is relatively higher in a number of countries with low
NEET rates like Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Norway, where foreign-born young
people are around 2-2.5 times more prone to be NEET than their native-born peers
(Figure 1.16, Panel A). In countries such as Poland or the United Kingdom, there is scarcely
any gap at all, while in Israel, Ireland and Chile, foreign-born youth are actually less likely to
be NEET. This disparity is likely to depend on the country of origin and the reason for
migrating. Young people who head abroad to pursue education or employment opportunities
are necessarily less likely to be NEET than those who arrive as refugees. And those from
countries with high levels of educational attainment are more likely to come equipped with
the skills necessary to find a job. Speaking the host country language is also an advantage.
as are young people with poorly educated or unemployed parents

Many of the disadvantages leading to unemployment or inactivity reviewed so far
e.g. low education, poor skills, health problems such as mental disorders or early
pregnancy are often transferred from parents to children. Parents socio-economic status
is thus a strong predictor of their childrens (Clark, 2014). NEETs are 80% more likely than
other young people to have parents with no upper-secondary schooling and twice as likely
to have parents who do not work (Figure 1.16, Panel B).10
For this reason, at the aggregate level, a significant share of unemployed or inactive
youth have a disadvantaged background. About a third of NEETs have parents with at most
lower secondary education or jobless parents (twice the rates of non-NEET youth).11
Figure 1.16. NEETs are more likely to have been born abroad and to come
from disadvantaged backgrounds
Panel B. Comparison between the parental
backgrounds of NEETs and non-NEETs
Panel A. NEET rates among native and foreign-born youth, 2014 (OECD average), 2014
Native born ( ) Foreign born NEETs are more likely than other youth to...
45 2.3
40
35 2.0
30
1.8
25
20
1.5
15
10 1.3
5
0 1.0
have been have parents have parents
Re g a l
Ge rla g
rm nd
th r w y
la y
Ic nds
Au land
pu r y
De ed a
n en
h an k
A u ub a
s t li c
F i r ali a
Un Slo and
d lg ia
n m
ite st m
St ia
Is e s
l l
F and
ov H r tu e
Ir e b l i c
Ch d
Sp il e
Gr ain
I e
Tu t aly
ey
CD
a k un g a
Po r ae
Ne No an
er a
p d
S w s tr i
c
ec C mar
n
e r
i te B ven
d on
K i iu
Un E gdo
i t z ou
rk
at
Po r an
ee
Re a
la
OE
born abroad with low who do not work

nl
e
S w mb
e
xe
education
Lu
Cz
Sl
Note: In Panel A, countries are arranged, from left to right, by ascending order of overall NEET rate. The OECD average is unweighted.
Panel B depicts, for each attribute, the ratio of NEETs to all young people who share that attribute. Information on parental education and
employment status are available only for young people living with their parents.
No information on country of birth is available from Japan, Korea, Mexico and New Zealand. Family background information is not
available from Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Switzerland and Turkey.
Source: OECD calculations based on national labour force surveys (Panel A); OECD calculations based on national household surveys (Panel B).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404959

A number of factors drive the replication of socio-economic disadvantage. Parents low

educational attainment might directly affect the level of schooling their children attain, for
example, if they are less inclined to encourage their pursuit of higher education or less able
to help them with schoolwork. Similarly, jobless parents might not have the professional
(or other) connections that would help further their childrens career opportunities, which
could increase the risk that they become NEET.
Parents may not have passed on to their children desirable social skills, either. Recent
research shows that such skills are a key component in matching workers with firms and that
the young and poorly educated are at a particular disadvantage (Pellizzari, 2010; Kramarz and
Skans, 2013). It often takes intensive, closely targeted programmes with specific methods from
a very early age to overcome disadvantage. For instance, some early childhood interventions
among poor children in the United States such as the Perry School Project12 and, more
recently, Head Start have been found to have significant, durable effects on personality
traits and social outcomes (Lee, 2008; Heckman et al., 2009). As Section 4 argues, there is also
evidence that specialised interventions for adolescents from underprivileged backgrounds can
improve skills and social and economic outcomes (also see Kautz et al., 2015).
NEETs are generally less likely to live with their parents

Beyond the risk factors reviewed so far, living arrangements are important in
understanding the situation of young NEETs. Living with their parents may help relieve
young people of possible financial strains, but might also relieve them of the need to work.
NEET status itself may, of course, influence household formation, as low incomes make it
more difficult to move out. On the other hand, in countries where a high proportion of
NEETs do not live with their parents, they may be at a higher risk of poverty, particularly if
they live alone or in a household where nobody earns an income.
On average, though, young unemployed and inactive NEETs are less likely to live with
their parents than non-NEETs (Figure 1.17, Panel A). About half of all NEETs live with their
parents, while the figure for non-NEET youth is almost two-thirds. The latter include
students, however, who may be more likely to live in the parental home. A substantial
proportion of NEETs, 26%, live with a partner and at least one child compared to just 9% of
non-NEET youth. This may be an important factor in not being in employment nor
education. The link between NEET status and parenthood has been shown above if one
partner is working the other, usually the mother, may be more likely to stay at home with
the child, particularly where childcare costs are high.
Some single young people living with children may have no choice other than
inactivity. Lone parenthood amongst NEETs is five times higher than for non-NEET youth
5% versus 1%. The lone parent rate amongst NEETs is highest in the United Kingdom
where 15% of NEETs are lone parents. They may choose to stay at home to take care of their
children rather than seek employment. They might well find it harder to organise childcare
than couples who can co-ordinate their work hours and have wider extended families to
help them. And, of course, they may well struggle to afford childcare. In addition, many
countries run minimum-income support programmes for single parents with young
children on very low incomes. Such schemes have little or no activity requirements at all.
One example is the Income Support Benefit in the United Kingdom, which is payable to
lone parents who care for a child under five years and has no activity requirement.
Most people are not NEET in their youth, although 20% of young people
are long-term NEETs
So far, this chapter has sought to profile young NEETs and their attributes without
considering how long young people might actually remain NEET. Being NEET for a short

Figure 1.17. NEETs are less likely to live with their parents, although the practice varies
from country to country
With parents Partnered, with kids Partnered, no kids Single parent With other youth/adults Alone
Panel A. Living arrangements of NEETs and non-NEETs, aged 16 to 29, OECD average percentages, 2014
NEET 49 26 9 5 4 7
Non-NEET 62 9 13 1 5 10
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
%
Panel B. Living arrangements of NEETs, aged 16 to 29, by country, 2014

OECD
Greece
Italy
Portugal
Spain
Ireland
Slovenia
Poland
Slovak Republic
United States
Hungary
Luxembourg
Czech Republic
Sweden
Belgium
Switzerland
France
Chile
Australia
Turkey
Latvia
Netherlands
Germany
United Kingdom
Estonia
Austria
Norway
Mexico
Denmark
Canada
Finland
Iceland
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
%
Note: In Panel B, countries are sorted, from top to bottom, in descending order of the share of NEETs living with their parents.
In Panel B alone denotes a young person living on their own; with other youth/adults denotes a young person living with at least one
other young person or adult over 30 who is not their partner (and possibly with children); single parent means that the young person
lives with at least one dependent child and no partner; partnered, no kids indicates that the young person lives with a spouse/partner
but no children; partnered, kids indicates that the young person lives with a spouse/partner and at least one child; with parents
indicates that the young person lives in the same household as their parent(s).
It was only possible to identify lone parents or couples with children in Canada if they were not living with others, e.g. their own parents or
sharing with other adults. The single parent rate and rate of NEETs living with their partners and children may therefore be underestimated.
Data for Chile and Switzerland relate to 2013, data for Turkey relate to 2012 and for Canada to 2011.
Source: OECD calculations based on the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), Germanys Socio-economic
Panel (SOEP), Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, Canadas Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
(SLID), Chiles National Socio-Economic Characterisation Survey (CASEN), Mexicos Household Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH),
and the US Current Population Survey (CPS).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404963
time may not in itself be a negative outcome at all a young person may take time out to
care for children or travel, for example. Moreover, many young people go through short
bouts of inactivity or unemployment after completing their education, as it takes time to
find work and jobs tend to be more unstable at the outset of a career. Longer stretches out
of employment or education are, however, more problematic and may even have scarring

effects, negatively affecting future employment opportunities and income. This section
looks at the duration of NEET periods in 16 countries for which the necessary information
is available.13
On average, nearly half of all young people experience spent time outside of
employment, education or training either long or short over a four-year period
(Figure 1.18, Panel A). The picture ranges, however, widely from Norway, where nearly
three-quarters (73%) of young people were never NEETs between 2009 and 2012, to Greece,
where only a minority, 41%, spent no time as NEETs.
Figure 1.18. Half of all young people become NEETs at some point in time,
and a substantial minority remains NEET for a year or longer
Panel A. Total length of time as NEETs, six-month periods, percentages of all youth
No NEET months 1-6 NEET months 7-12 NEET months More than 12 NEET months( )
OECD
Greece
Italy
Spain
Hungary
Austria
Czech Republic
Estonia
France
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Belgium
Luxembourg
Australia
Slovenia
Norway
Iceland
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Panel B. Representation of three vulnerable groups among NEETs as a percentage, by length of NEET period
Women Low education Poor health
70 35 40
60 30 35
30
50 25
25
40 20
20
30 15
15
20 10
10
10 5 5
0 0 0
No Up to 12 More All No Up to 12 More All No Up to 12 More All
NEET NEET than 12 youth NEET NEET than 12 youth NEET NEET than 12 youth
spell months NEET spell months NEET spell months NEET
months months months
Note: The necessary data to measure long-term NEET status is not available for all OECD countries. In Panel A, countries are arranged,
from top to bottom, in descending order of the percentage young people with over 12 months as NEETs in the four-year period.
Censored NEET periods are included in the calculations with their observed lengths. The OECD average is based on the countries where
data are available and is unweighted.
Sample groups were young people aged 15 to 29 years-old in January 2009. They were observed for 48 consecutive months until
December 2012. In Estonia, the observation period was January 2008 to December 2011.
Source: OECD calculations based on the longitudinal 2012 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and the
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, 2009-12.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404979

Among NEETs, many remain out of employment, education or training for longer.
About one-third (31%) of all NEETs across OECD countries are unemployed or inactive for at
most six months over the four-year period. Nearly half (47%) remain out of education or
work for more than a year. This corresponds to one-fifth of all young people. Youth in the
countries affected worst by the crisis are most at risk, with more than 30% of youth in
Greece, Italy and Spain spending a year or more as a NEET.
In most cases, times of unemployment or inactivity for young people take the form of
one single, uninterrupted NEET spell. Only a very small proportion of youth (5%) cycle in
and out of being a NEET, i.e. become NEET for a time, resume employment or education,
and then become NEET again (not shown).
Young women are especially vulnerable (Figure 1.18, Panel B). The inference may be
that, in some OECD countries at least, women may be more prone to long-term NEET status
when they have children and little opportunity to resume or take up employment later on.
Young people with low levels of education (who did not complete upper-secondary school)
are also more likely to be long-term NEETs. The poorly educated account for 17% of the
youth population, but 30% of those who spend more than 12 months as a NEET. Young
people with poor health are also overrepresented.
NEETs have lower levels of happiness and trust and are less interested in politics
The views on society and the values of NEETs may differ from other youth and this
may have long-term consequences on social cohesion. Interestingly, even though they are
deprived from employment, NEETs value work as much as other youth. They are just as
likely as non-NEETs to think that work would be very important in their life (Figure 1.19).
Besides, NEETs are actually less likely than non-NEET youth to think that leisure time is
very important, likely due to the fact that those youth in employment or education have
less time available for leisure activities due to work or study. Therefore, the lack of a job is
likely to have an impact on life satisfaction. NEETs are indeed more likely to report higher
levels of dissatisfaction with their lives 22% of NEETs report low levels of life satisfaction
compared to just 14% of non-NEETs. This suggests that for a majority of youth
unemployment or inactivity is not a choice and that they would be willing to integrate into
the labour market if they could.
Long periods of involuntary inactivity or unemployment do not only have individual
consequences but also create a challenge for social cohesion. Over time being a NEET can
lead to isolation, a lack of interest in society and a feeling of distrust. Indeed, only 18% of
NEET youth report that they feel others can be trusted compared to 29% of non-NEET
youth. NEET youth are also less likely to display an interest in politics with just under
one-third reporting they are somewhat or very interested in politics compared to 40% of
non-NEET youth. Despite this lower interest in politics, NEET youth are more likely to think
that it is the governments responsibility to provide for everyone in the country as opposed
to it being the responsibility of individuals themselves only 26% of non-NEET youth feel
the government should take this responsibility compared to 37% of NEETs. This difference
in opinion is likely influenced by the higher reliance of NEETs on the benefit system for
financial support compared to young people in employment or education.

Figure 1.19. NEETs have less trust in others, lower life satisfaction, less interest in politics
and are more likely to feel it is the governments responsibility to provide for citizens
Average of positive answers for 18 selected countries
Non-NEET NEET
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Importance Importance Trust Interest in politics Govt. Low life
of work of leisure time responsibility satisfaction
The graph shows differences in views of NEET and non-NEET youth in 18 OECD countries. Any country with less than 30 NEETs present
in the values surveys used has been excluded from the analysis. The countries excluded are: Australia, Austria, Chile, Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Sweden and Switzerland.
NEET/non-NEET differences in importance of leisure time, trust; interest in politics, government responsibility and low life
satisfaction are statistically significant at the 95% level.
All measures shown are binary the importance of work and leisure show the proportion reporting they are very important; the trust
measure shows the proportion reporting that most people can be trusted; the interest in politics measure shows the proportion reporting
they are very or somewhat interested in politics; the government responsibility measure was answered on a scale of 1 (people should take
more responsibility) to 10 (the government should take more responsibility) in the analysis here the measure has been divided into
those replying at the most extreme end of the scale i.e. the top 25% which equals those responding 8-10; the low life satisfaction measure
shows the proportion reporting their life satisfaction is at the lower end (5 or less) on a scale of 1 (dissatisfied) to 10 (satisfied).
Source: Wave 6 (2010-13) of the World Values Survey for Australia, Chile, Estonia, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Poland, Slovenia, Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United States; Wave 5 (2005-09) for Canada; Wave 4 (1999-04) for Israel. Wave 4 of the
European Values Survey (2008-10) for Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Switzerland.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404985
3. Safety nets for low-income youth

While the long-term goal of public policies is to help young people on the path to
self-sufficiency, those on low incomes, especially the NEETs, may require support to avoid
poverty. One way to achieve both objectives is to tie income support payments to young
peoples efforts to find a job or upskill. Benefits should allow young people to meet their
basic needs so they stay healthy and do not withdraw from society. In that regard, income
support programmes have played an important role to protect the most vulnerable groups
in the recent crisis and its aftermath.
This section looks at the principal types of benefits available to young people in
OECD countries, and how the share of young people in receipt of benefits has evolved since
the onset of the crisis. It also discusses the adequacy of income support.
Out-of-work benefits may be less accessible to young people

Only few OECD countries operate income support benefits that exclusively target
young people. Instead, young people in most of the OECD have access to the principal
income support programmes for working-age individuals:14
Young jobseekers with a previous work and contribution history are typically entitled to
unemployment benefits, the primary safety net for unemployed jobseekers.15 Since
benefit eligibility is usually, however, tied to a minimum contribution period often

12 months, sometimes longer (Figure 1.20) school leavers and young people with
patchy employment records often fail to qualify. Moreover, unemployment benefits for
young people tend to be available for shorter times, because the duration of benefit
payments generally depends on the length of contribution period.
Unemployed youth who lack a sufficient employment history, those who have
exhausted their time-limited unemployment benefits, and those living in low-income
households are often entitled to social assistance or housing benefits. Such benefits are
usually means-tested at household level, so the incomes of the young persons parents
and spouse or partner are taken into account. Social assistance and housing benefits
tend to be less generous than unemployment benefits, but are available for unlimited
periods in most countries. In eight countries, young people with no employment record
can also receive unemployment benefits (Annex Table 1.A2.1).
Young people who live with their parents often receive family benefits, paid up to the age
of 16 in the OECD on average. In most countries, family benefits last longer if the young
person is in education (Annex Figure 1.A2.1). Young people with children may also be
entitled to child allowances or maternity/paternity benefits.
Youth with permanently reduced work capacity can typically draw disability benefits. In
a number of countries, including Austria, Canada and Sweden, invalidity pensions do,
however, require a minimum contribution period youth with limited work capacity
who do not fulfil that requirement may receive means-tested disability assistance.
Figure 1.20. Twelve months of work experience nearly always bring entitlements
to unemployment insurance benefits, but the duration of benefit payments is often short
Minimum employment/contribution period in months and maximum duration, in months,
of unemployment insurance benefits for a 20-year-old with one year of previous employment, 2014
Maximum benefit duration ( ) Minimum employment / contribution period

Months
42
36
30
24
18
12
0
B e hil e
Tu m
Ja a
Un S a n
Po bli c
d in
CD
o v Ir e y
Re nd
el
er a
Sl nds
Hu bli c
ec Au s
Re i a
Es al
i t e er m i a
K i any
m
it z t al y
La d
Lu C an ia
m a
Fr r g
Gr c e
Po c e
S w nd
F i en
No nd
De ay
d
Ic r k
i
xe a d
th re
ar
an
ra
en
Un G ton
g
h s tr
tv
i te pa
iu
do
a
u
rk
at
rw
an
ee
ed
p
la
la
a
ak ela
OE
r tu
N e Ko
nm
ng
bo
C
pu
pu
Sw I
nl
la
el
Is
lg
ov
St
er
ng
d
Cz
Sl
Note: 20-year-olds with a contribution record of one year do not qualify for unemployment insurance benefits in Belgium, Ireland,
the Slovak Republic and Turkey. Norway has a minimum earnings requirement instead of a minimum contribution period. In
Luxembourg, reduced benefits are paid to school graduates without employment record after a waiting period. No maximum benefit
duration applies in Chile.
No unemployment insurance benefit programmes exist in Australia and New Zealand.
For the United States, results are for the State of Michigan.
Source: OECD Tax-Benefit models, www.oecd.org/social/benefits-and-wages.htm.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933404991

Actual income support benefit receipt among youth tends to be low

Unemployment benefits played an essential role in cushioning young people from the
blow of the crisis. In response to rising NEET rates, the share of the young in receipt of
unemployment benefits rose by 60% between 2008 and 2010 across the OECD (Figure 1.21,
Panel A), reflecting increases in receipt rates in essentially all OECD countries.
Furthermore, as a result of the weak recovery, especially in many European countries,
receipt rates declined only slightly from their crisis-related peak, and appear to have
plateaued at a higher post-crisis level since 2012.
The widespread destruction of youth employment has not, by contrast, prompted any
particular increase in disability benefit receipt. This is unlike in previous crises, when
long-term unemployed youth were moved in large numbers to disability benefits once their
unemployment benefit entitlements had expired. Discouraged jobseekers might welcome
such a move, as disability benefit programmes usually come with much less rigorous
activity requirements and payments are more generous than means-tested social
assistance benefits. Public employment services, which may struggle with lack of capacity
and few suitable programme options in times of high unemployment, might also wish to
see the long-term unemployed youth removed from their records. The approach is
dangerous, however, because experience shows that it is extremely difficult to bring young
people back into the labour market once they have been on health-related benefits for a
while (OECD, 2010, 2012a). Stable receipt rates since the start of the crisis indicate improved
gatekeeping mechanisms across OECD countries, which have made progress in restricting
access to disability benefits to claimants who are indeed unfit for work.
Figure 1.21. Proportions of young people (16-29) in receipt of unemployment and disability
benefits are generally low
Panel A. Shares of young people
as a percentage of the total youth
population, OECD averages, 2007-14 Panel B. Shares of young people by country, 2014
Unemployment benefits Disability benefits

12 30
10 25
8 20
6 15
4 10
2 5
0 0
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
St o
h o al
C s
ak Tu hile
xe pu y
Ge bou c
rm rg
G any
Po ven e
r ia
t h ub d
i te S lan c
er r y
d we ds
ng en
S w Hun om
L a nd
r a
Ic w ay
C a and
E s ada
s ia
D e l giu a
nm m
Sp r k
Fr ain
I e
Au t al y
F i tr ia
Ir e a n d
nd
CD
e
m bli
L u Re r ke
er li
Sl r e e c
No t v i
c
Ne ep lan
d x ic
ec P tug
Au ton
B e tr al
a
it z ga
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
at
an
Ki d
la
la
OE
d
s
n
el
nl
i te Me
R
Un
ov
Cz
Un
Sl
Note: Results are for 16-to-29 year-olds except for Germany (17-29 years) and the United States (16-24 years).
Panel B: Results are for 2014 except for Chile and Switzerland (2013) Denmark and Turkey (2012) and Canada (2011).
Source: OECD calculations based on European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), Household, Income and
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, Canadas Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID), Chiles National Socio-Economic
Characterisation Survey (CASEN), the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), Mexicos Household Income and Expenditure Survey
(ENIGH), and the US Current Population Survey (CPS).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405006

The share of young people in receipt of unemployment and disability benefits is

relatively low in most OECD countries in spite of the recent surge in unemployment benefit
receipt rates (Figure 1.21, Panel B):
On average, fewer than one in ten young people received either unemployment or
disability benefits in 2013 across the OECD. The proportion was 33% lower than that
observed among the general working-age population (aged 15 to 64), and the pattern was
consistent across all countries (not shown in Figure 1.21).
Most young recipients receive unemployment benefits. Receipt rates are highest in
countries where young people were hit hardest by the crisis such as Italy, Ireland and
Spain. They have also risen, however, in Finland, where youth employment deteriorated
more recently, and in Austria and France, where low contribution requirements make
benefits more accessible. Receipt is lowest in the Americas in Chile, Mexico and
the United States, though not Canada and in Turkey.
Few young people receive disability benefits. High receipt rates in some Northern
European countries (such as Estonia, Finland and Norway) and in Ireland, however, may
be cause for concern.
The rise in receipt rates with the advent of the crisis has been more gradual for
means-tested income-support benefits (Figure 1.22):
Rates of social assistance benefit receipt rose during the crisis but have declined since
back to their pre-crisis levels. These benefits play an important role, particularly in
Switzerland as well as in the United States, where few young people are in receipt of
Figure 1.22. Many young people live in households receiving social assistance or housing benefits
Panel A. Percentages of young
people in receipt of social
assistance and housing benefits
as a percentage of the total youth Panel B. Percentages of young people in receipt of social assistance and housing
population, OECD averages, 2007-14 benefits as a percentage of the total youth population, by country, 2014
Social assistance only Housing benefits only Both benefits

20 50
40
15
30
10
20
5
10
0 0
CD
L a gal
Un I m a g
d un d
g y
De bou s
i te ce r k
St d
F i l and
S w Fr a tes
er c e
d
Ch i a
It a e
Gr l y
lg e
Sp m
ain
h st o
Po bli c
pu i a
Tu and
r y
r tu a
a
Ge ven n
rm ia
Ir e a n y
L u t h e dom
ak Au way
pu i a
C a bli c
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
m nd
Po nad
il
No r ke
Sw t vi
Be eec
N e K in g ar
d lan
an
Sl e de
i te H lan
n r
e c E ex i c
l
Re on
Re s tr
iu
i t z an
ra
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
OE
nl
l
xe r l a
st
o
M
Au
ov
Cz
Un
Sl
Note: Young people are considered benefit recipients if they received social assistance or housing benefits in the previous year or if they
live in a household where any member received such benefits.
Results are for 16-to-29 year-olds except for Germany (17-29 years) and the United States (16-24 years).
Panel B: Results are for 2014 except for Australia, Chile and Switzerland (2013) Denmark and Turkey (2012) and Canada (2011).
Source: OECD calculations based on European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), Household, Income and
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405014

unemployment benefits and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP,

formerly known as Food Stamps) as well as the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) afford support to low-income youth.
The share of young people living in households that receive housing benefits has been
trending upwards, but dropped substantially in 2014. This reflects primarily a notable
fall in the share of young beneficiaries in Iceland, Ireland and Spain, where many young
people live in households receiving housing benefits. Receipt is widespread also in other
Northern European countries (Denmark and Finland) and in France, where households
with low earnings may receive housing benefits.
More than one-third of all young people are recipients of some type of family allowance
(Annex Figure 1.A2.2).
Young people are less well covered by out-of-work benefits

As a result of relatively low receipt of unemployment benefits among young people,
benefit coverage i.e. the share of unemployed youth who receive benefits is low as well
(Figure 1.23). Less than 30% of all young jobseekers receive unemployment benefits,
compared to a share of 43% among older jobseekers. Once disability benefits and social
assistance are accounted for, the share of unemployed youth in receipt of benefits rises to
around 45%, still lower than the 50% rate among jobless adults aged 30 and above.
Figure 1.23. The share of unemployed people covered by benefits is lower among young people
than prime-age adults
Percentages of youth and non-youth working-age unemployed in receipt of unemployment benefits or unemployment benefits,
disability benefits or social assistance and the unemployed as a percentage of the population in the same age groups,
OECD averages, 2007-14
Unemployment benefits, disability benefits or social assistance (left axis) Unemployment benefits (left axis)
Unemployment/population ratio (right axis)
Youth (15-29 years) Non-youth working age (30-64 years)
60 12 60 12
50 10 50 10
40 8 40 8
30 6 30 6
20 4 20 4
10 2 10 2
0 0 0 0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Reading note: In 2014, the unemployed accounted for 10% of all youth (grey bars) on average in the OECD. The share of unemployed youth
in receipt of unemployment benefits (dashed line) was 28%. The proportion of unemployed youth in receipt of unemployment benefits,
disability benefits or social assistance (solid line) was 46%.
Note: People in formal education are not counted as unemployed.
Source: OECD calculations based on the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) Survey, Household, Income
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, Chiles National Socio-Economic Characterisation Survey (CASEN), the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and the US Current Population Survey (CPS).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405029

Benefit adequacy tends to be lower for youth

The effectiveness of a benefit system cannot be evaluated based on coverage alone
benefit amounts are crucial for household resources. One way to look at a benefit systems
success in fighting poverty is to ask how many households it shields from poverty. How
many households are not poor thanks to benefits?
Across the OECD, 22% of working-age adults under 30, and 18% of those over 30, would
be poor if they did not receive benefits. Figure 1.24 illustrates how many of these
individuals receive benefits that are high enough to lift their income above the poverty
line.16 An average of 49% of working-age adults over 30 who would be poor if they did not
receive benefits, receive benefits that are high enough to keep them out of poverty. At 41%,
this share is significantly lower for young people. The countries most successful in fighting
working-age poverty show the widest differences between the over- and under-30s rescued
from poverty. In Norway and Denmark, for example, public transfers keep over three
quarters of working-age adults over 30 who are at risk of slipping below the poverty line
above it. The proportion is less than one-third for young people. Only in Estonia and Latvia,
and to a smaller extent in Slovenia and the United Kingdom, proportionately more
under-30s than over-30s are kept out of poverty by public assistance.
Figure 1.24. Income support is less effective in keeping youth out of poverty
Shares, in percentages, of individuals with pre-transfer incomes below the poverty line who are above the poverty line
after receiving public transfers, young people (16-29 years old) and non-youth working age (30-64 years old), 2014
Youth ( ) Non-youth working age

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
i te Fr y
m d
H u ur g
Ki ce
Ic m
Ge and
Ir e y
nd
CD
E s al
d ey
er a
Po s
Sl D and
Re ar k
S w li c
ec Au n
Re i a
i t z bli c
Sl and
Au eni a
B e li a
m
M es
Gr o
ce
il e
Ca ly
No da
ay
Po in
an
nd
ni
th t vi
ar
e
xe a n
ic
h s tr
It a
iu
do
i t e ur k
at
rw
d an
ee
Ch
ra
ed
na
la
OE
Sp
r tu
to
ex
ak m
ng
bo
rm
pu
S w pu
la
el
l
l
Ne L a
lg
ov
St
L u F in
er
st
ng
ov en
Un T
Cz
Un
Note: United States youth data relate to 16-24 year-olds.

Data for Canada relate to 2011, for Turkey to 2012, and for Chile and Switzerland to 2013.
Individuals are poor if they live in a household with an equivalised household income (i.e. adjusted for the number of household
members) that is less than 50% of the median income.
The figure shows the percentage of youth and non-youth working-age individuals who were poor before public transfers and who are no
longer poor after public transfers.
Public transfers include family allowances, disability benefits, unemployment benefits and social assistance. They exclude public
pensions only.
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, Chiles National Socio-Economic Characterisation Survey (CASEN), and the US Current
Population Survey (CPS).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405033

Young people face a greater risk of poverty than older age groups
Young people are now more likely to be poor than seniors (Figure 1.25). With the
exception of Australia, where many retirees draw their pensions as a lump sum instead of
receiving monthly payments,17 the youth poverty rates are higher than seniors rates in most
OECD countries.
Roughly every eighth young person lives in poverty OECD-wide. Youth poverty rates
are particularly high in the Nordic countries, where the young tend to move out, so no
longer benefit from their parents income, earlier than in other countries. They are high in
the United States, too, although the population is somewhat younger (see figure note on
the age bracket of young people in the United States). The Czech Republic, Iceland and
Switzerland enjoy the lowest incidence of youth poverty at around 5%.
Figure 1.25. Young people are now more likely to be poor than the elderly
in most OECD countries
Poverty rates among young people (16-29), non-youth working-age individuals (30-64) and senior citizens (65 and over),
in percentages, 2014
Youth ( ) Non-youth working age Seniors

30
25
20
15
10
0
C a al
Hu a li a
La y
Po ia
E s nd
Ir e i a
Fi d
M d
o
er y
s
il e
Po t al y
Sw da
Gr n
ce
No in
Un en y
d rk
es
p.
i t z nd
Ge and
i te Fr i a
ak y
S l e p.
m ia
A u ur g
Ki ce
B e om
Au m
CD
D wa
nd
ov an
t h ke
ar
e
n
an
ic
g
n
xe en
tv
a
Re
iu
i te a
at
d an
ee
Ch
ed
na
la
la
S w ela
st
OE
to
r tu
Sp
R
ex
m
d
ng
bo
Ne Tur
r
Sl m
I
nl
la
l
lg
r
Lu ov
St
er
st
ng
h
Ic
r
ec
Cz
Un
Note: Individuals are defined as poor if they live in a household with an equivalised household income (household income adjusted by
the number of household members) below 50% of the median income.
United States youth data relate to 16-24 year-olds.
Data for Canada relate to 2011, for Turkey to 2012, and for Chile and Switzerland to 2013.
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, Chiles National Socio-Economic Characterisation Survey (CASEN), and the US Current
Population Survey (CPS).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405046
4. Policies to promote self-sufficiency among young people

While income support is essential in the fight against youth poverty by itself, it is seldom
enough to put young people back on the path to self-sufficiency. The best way to achieve
lasting financial security is to secure stable employment. A lack of affordable childcare is the
chief obstacle to labour market participation for many young women (see Box 1.3). Many
others, however, lack the skills to find a job, as Section 2 shows. The situation is especially
difficult in the lingering aftermath of the crisis, with high numbers of young people requiring
new skills to match employers needs in sectors where they have never worked before. Public
support must therefore seek to ensure that all young people get the qualifications they need
to succeed in the labour market. To that end, policy must provide intensive, targeted social
support to prevent at-risk young people from slipping through the cracks.

This section discusses policies that look to address the NEET problem and to promote
self-sufficiency among young people. It presents strategies to avert early school leaving
and facilitate successful school-to-work transitions through high-quality vocational
education. It then looks at outreach programmes for disengaged youth and schemes to
bring NEETs back into employment or education. The discussion draws on evidence from
research into youth programmes and findings from the ongoing series of OECD Investing in
Youth country reviews.
Fighting early school leaving is essential for tackling the NEET challenge
To tackle the NEET challenge effectively, governments must ensure that all young
people obtain at least an upper-secondary degree that entitles them to pursue their studies
or gives them the vocational skills to succeed in the labour market. OECD countries have
made considerable progress over the past decade in reducing rates of early school leaving,
i.e. the shares of young people who fail to complete upper-secondary schooling
(Figure 1.26). Yet, around one in six 25-to-34 year-olds still do not have an upper-secondary
qualification, and the rate is substantially higher in Southern European countries such as
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.
Figure 1.26. Early school leaving has declined but remains high, especially
in Southern Europe
Panel B. Percentages of 25 to 34
year-olds below upper-
Panel A. Percentages of 25 to 34 year-olds with below upper-secondary education secondary education by gender,
by gender in OECD countries, 2014 OECD averages, 2000-14
Women Men
70 70
60 60
50 50
40 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
M r ke l
pu e a
ov S Pol li c
Re en d
Is n d
p ia
Un a n a li c
i t F in d a
it z t at d
er e s
l
st d
ria
Lu S tonl e
xe w e i a
Hubou n
Ge ngarg
Aurma r y
L ia
Ne tr al y
la ia
d Fr nds
De gdoce
n m
Be r w k
Ne Glgiu y
w re m
a e
el d
It a d
Po Sp a l y
r t u in
ex y
o
CD
00
20 5
20 6
20 7
20 8
20 9
20 0
20 1
20 2
20 3
14
Tu ga
Ir e r a e
a
s n
Ze ec
Nomar
ak lo an
Swed S lan
Au lan
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an
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Un t h er a t v
0
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1
1
1
1
K i an
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la
20
20
OE
C
v
n
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Cz
Sl
1. Below upper-secondary education denotes a level no higher than Level 3C short of the International Standard Classification of
Education (ISCED). The ISCED classification has a structural break in 2014.
2. There are no data for Japan. In Panel B, the OECD average excludes Australia, Chile, Israel, Korea, Mexico and New Zealand for the
years 2000-14 and Austria, Iceland and Norway for 2000.
Source: OECD calculations based on the EU-LFS and national labour force surveys, OECD National Educational Attainment Classification
(NEAC) Database 2015, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=EAG_NEAC#.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405058
To further reduce the number of young people who leave school without an
upper-secondary qualification, policies need to ensure that signs of disengagement are
detected early, and that young people at risk of dropping out of school receive the support
they need to complete their education.

Systematic monitoring of school attendance helps identify atrisk youth

Strategies for keeping at-risk students in education yield the most promising results
when they address barriers to educational participation at an early stage. Dropping out is
generally not a sudden, unexpected event, but rather the consequence of a longer process
of gradual disengagement (Lyche, 2010). It can be driven by a range of different factors
learning difficulties, mental health issues, problems in the family, parents attitudes
towards education or the school experience which tend to interact and build up over time
(OECD, 2012b). To prevent a young person from dropping out, these challenges need to be
addressed as soon as they arise.
Schools should systematically monitor student attendance and keep key stakeholders
notably parents and social services informed to ensure that troubled pupils are detected
and receive the attention they need. In Latvia, for instance, most secondary schools use
privately-provided web-based platforms to collect information on students timetables,
class attendance, performance and any homework due. Teachers enter the information in
the system, but it can be accessed by the students and their parents, teachers and the
school administration. While the monitoring and reporting of attendance is standard
during the years of compulsory school in most countries, such practice is, however, less
common in non-compulsory upper-secondary education. A good practice can be found in
Sweden, where upper-secondary schools are legally bound to report early school leavers
under 20 and students with high absenteeism to the local authorities as part of their
so-called activity responsibility. The municipalities then try to establish contact with the
student, find out about their situation, and offer them activities to help return to
upper-secondary education.
Requirements to report attendance to the national education authorities can ensure
that teachers, schools and municipalities take non-attendance seriously. At times, schools
can, indeed, be slow to react to a students poor attendance, either because of a lack of
resources or because a difficult students non-attendance may be perceived as beneficial
to the classroom environment. In Sweden, municipalities are required to report to the
national education authorities on the situation of the young people identified as being at
risk, and on how they have intervened, every six months. In Norway, primary and
lower-secondary schools have to transmit attendance figures to the national authorities
three times per year, and have to indicate whether they have managed to follow up on
students who miss classes. At the national level, such non-attendance data can be a
valuable resource to policy makers, for instance for evaluating the quality of educational
programmes and the adequacy of student support. One challenge to the reliability of
regular attendance information collection can be that schools may not have an incentive to
report drop-out promptly, in particular if their funding depends on student enrolment.
Atrisk students and their families require comprehensive support

If poor school performance and absenteeism are caused, or aggravated, by
non-educational factors such as problems in the family, health concerns, or substance
abuse they need to be addressed if there is to be a sustainable improvement in educational
outcomes.
Specialised support staff in schools is key to quickly identifying and addressing the
challenges that a troubled young person may face. Trained psychologists or social workers
can be an important first point of contact for students, parents and teachers when
problems arise. Where schools lack the resources for such specialised staff, designated
teaching staff who have received the appropriate training can provide important support.

In Norway, for instance, schools have the freedom to exempt teachers from some of their
teaching duties so that they can attend to troubled students and absentees. Such teachers
might take students who have concentration or behavioural problems out of the classroom
for an hour, or drive out to a students home in the morning to pick up a pupil who has
failed to show up.
Support networks outside of schools e.g. social and health services, public
employment services and, possibly, NGOs play an important role in addressing more
severe or long-lasting problems that schools are incapable of dealing with on their own.
Depending on young persons needs, social workers or other support staff might help
address family problems, resolve a difficult housing situation, put a young person in touch
with health services, or act as a mediator between the young person and the police or
courts. Social services sometimes have previous working relationships with a young
persons family, for instance because their parents are benefit recipients. In Portugal, the
Educational Territories of Priority Intervention (TEIP) programme, creates partnerships
between priority schools in certain underprivileged areas and public and private entities
like health centres, voluntary associations, and different support agencies. The aim is to
provide pupils at risk of dropping out with vocational courses and alternatives to
traditional schooling. The Ministry of Education regularly monitors principal outcomes
such as improvements in academic achievement, attendance, behaviour and the risk of
drop-out. School non-completion rates in priority areas steadily declined after TEIP was
introduced, and by 2010, four years after the second version was rolled out, they had
converged with national rates (Dias and Tomas, 2012).
External expert support is especially important for helping students with mental
health issues. A significant proportion of young people in OECD countries report feeling
stressed on a regular basis (OECD, 2013), and the prevalence of conditions like eating
disorders, anxieties or depression is high and rising, especially among young women
(OECD, 2012a). Identifying mental health problems, however, is not straightforward, as
parents and teachers are often not sufficiently familiar with the symptoms. Young people
themselves may, moreover, be reluctant to seek help from a person they know out of a sense
of embarrassment or shame. Psychological services in schools have a vital role to play in
recognising mental health issues when they arise and in providing information and support
to teachers, students and parents. External health centres, like those run by the Australian
National Youth Mental Health Foundation headspace, are an innovative approach to spotting
and treating mental health issues among youth. At headspace centres, young people can
confidentially seek help outside their immediate social and educational environment.
headspace also provides sex education and contraception to young people (see Box 1.4).
Flexible schooling environments can benefit more disadvantaged youth

Most countries seek to curb the marginalisation of young people with mental and
physical disabilities by keeping them in the regular school system and giving specialised
support (OECD, 2007). Students with learning difficulties generally benefit from attending
mainstream schooling, where they mix with other young people, all the way through to
upper-secondary level (OECD, 2012c). Policies should therefore, as far as possible, foster a
learning environment that is flexible and supportive enough to cater for at-risk students in
standard schools, and keep the share of young people taught in separate special-education
programmes to a minimum. But creating such an integrative learning environment is
difficult and costly, and mainstream schools may often not have the resources to lend
disadvantaged students the support they need.

Box 1.4. Headspace: Mental health support for youth in Australia

The National Youth Mental Health Foundation headspace was established by the
Australian Government in 2006 to respond to a deficit in access to primary-care mental
health services for young people. It provides integrated early-intervention services for
12-to-25 year-olds with, or at risk of, mild to moderate mental illness. Its aim is to promote
and facilitate improvements in health, social well-being and economic participation.
There are currently 95 headspace centres across the country (as of July 2016), where young
people receive help from professionals such as psychologists, social workers, alcohol and
other drug workers and GPs, as well as career counsellors, vocational officers and youth
workers. Support is provided in four core areas: mental health, physical health, alcohol
and other drug use, and work and study support.
The service is designed to be youth-friendly and to provide easy, low-threshold access to
health counselling and treatment. Headspace centres tend to be conveniently located, and
practice an open-door policy that allows any young people and their families to drop in and
receive anonymous help. Services are provided largely free of charge, or at a low cost, and
ensure high confidentiality. Online and telephone counselling is provided through
eheadspace for young people who live in an area with no local headspace centre or for those
who hesitate to go in and seek help.
Headspace has been successful at reaching out to its target population. An independent
evaluation considered the frequent referrals to headspace from health, education and
community services and concluded that headspace had been effective at creating
community awareness (SPRC, 2009). An OECD review team formed the same impression
during a fact-finding mission perceiving headspace services to be well-integrated with their
local communities. Recent data show that headspace is strongly accessed by youth from
marginalised and at-risk groups, including homeless, Indigenous, or lesbian, gay,
bi-sexual, transgender or inter-sex youth (SPRC, 2015). Most young people (72.7%) come to
headspace with mental health or behavioural issues, primarily anxiety or depressive
symptoms, situational problems like bullying, and relationship concerns (13.4%). The vast
majority received some form of mental health support, in particular cognitive behaviour
therapy and counselling (Rickwood et al., 2015a,b).
There is unfortunately limited evidence at this stage on the impact of headspace services.
A recent study into the first 30 centres showed that few measured the effectiveness of their
co-ordinated, integrated services or carried out clinical audits (Rickwood et al., 2015c).
The Australian Government has committed a substantial AUD 411.7 million of funding
to the programme over the five years from 2013-14. The number of headspace offices is
scheduled to increase to 100 in 2016.
Source: OECD (2015), Mental Health and Work: Australia, OECD Publishing, Paris; OECD (2016), Investing in Youth
Australia, OECD Publishing, Paris.
A number of avenues have been explored in efforts to improve support for disadvantaged
students in mainstream schooling environments:
Smaller class sizes can help the most disadvantaged, though younger children tend to
benefit more than adolescents. An experiment carried out in the state of Tennessee in
the United States showed that putting very young pupils (from kindergarten to third
grade) into smaller classes is associated with positive personality changes and higher
later-life earnings measured up to the age of 27 years.18 The observed improvement was,
moreover, twice as high among children from minorities than for their peers from
majority populations (Dee and West, 2008; Chetty et al., 2011). A key factor seems to have

been that the higher teacher-to-student ratios helped improve such non-cognitive skills
as concentration, diligence or initiative. Piketty and Valdenaire (2006) found similar
results in France, as did Angrist and Lavy (1999) in elementary schools in Israel.
Adapting teaching methods and programme contents to the needs of disadvantaged
students can also help improve achievement. In the United States, so-called charter
schools are public schools that enjoy greater leeway to manage staff, adapt curricula
and organise teaching time. They are also set pre-defined outcome targets and are
required to report on a range of performance indicators. Charter schools often target
students from disadvantaged backgrounds who may not have access to quality public
schools in their neighbourhoods or who struggle with traditional curricula. They usually
provide better resources (as reflected in smaller class sizes and/or more hours of
teaching), complementary services, and better trained teachers for at-risk youth. A
substantial body of research finds that charter schools can exert a significant, lasting
impact on educational attainment and later employment (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2009;
Angrist et al., 2016; Dobbie et al., 2011).
To what extent the lessons learned from such approaches can be applied on a general
scale remains an open question. Every school has its unique features, and charter schools
are especially diverse in their methods. Angrist et al. (2012) for instance report a wide range
of estimated charter effects in a sample of Massachusetts schools, and experience also
suggests that certain teaching methods can significantly improve the performance of the
most disadvantaged students. Which particular aspects of those successful practices show
the greatest promise for helping disadvantaged students to narrow the educational
achievement gap remains to be identified.
Afterschool programmes are particularly valuable for disadvantaged young people

Well-designed after-school programmes can make a considerable contribution to the
educational and social development of young people. Attractive opportunities for young
people to engage in sports, learn a musical instrument or get involved in handicraft and
other practical activities can help build social and professional skills, while countering the
risk of isolation. Empirical evidence confirms the positive effects of extracurricular
activities on schooling outcomes and career prospects (OECD, 2012b,d; Carcillo et al., 2015) ,
and these effects tend to be largest for youth from deprived backgrounds (Heckman, 2008).
As participation in private after-school schemes is often at the parents initiative, however,
the young people who take part in such activities tend to come overwhelmingly from
well-off backgrounds (OECD, 2011).
Ideally, after-school activities should be offered to all young people, regardless of
background, to ensure that the more disadvantaged participate, while averting the possible
stigma that attaches to schemes specially for young people from deprived backgrounds.
Linking after-school programmes to school establishments can make them easier to
access. In Latvia, for instance, municipalities provide an extensive system of
extra-curricular interest education, in many cases offered on school premises. Activities
are voluntary, but since they are attractive and often free of charge, most young people sign
up. Where activities are not public like in Latvia, but offered by private organisations such
as sports clubs or music schools, schools and private providers can co-ordinate to help
channel pupils into the activities that will benefit them most. Municipalities may need to
subsidise some activities to enable young people from lower-income groups to pay for fees
and any material or equipment needed.

Smaller programmes tailored specifically to the needs of more disadvantaged youth

can sometimes be very beneficial, however. Attractive afternoon programmes in
problematic neighbourhoods can help get young people off the streets and engage them
in meaningful activities. Such programmes may also provide assistance with homework
and specialised health or psychological support.
A range of successful schemes combine after-school activities for underprivileged
youth with a mentoring component. The concept behind them is to provide guidance and
propose positive role models to young people who may distrust their teachers and lack
authority figures at home. One of the oldest and largest such programmes is Big Brothers
Big Sisters of America (BBBS), founded in the United States in the early 1900s. The
programme operates to a tightly monitored template. Mentors and young participants are
selected through an elaborate screening process, then matched by their common interests.
Specialised staff keep close track of the mentor-mentee relationships and advise mentors
on how to improve their communication, diversify activities, promote child development
and address any difficulties that arise. An evaluation demonstrated that adolescents in
mentoring relationships that lasted a year or longer reduced their violent behaviour and
substance abuse and though their school performance did not improve, their attendance
did (Grossman and Rhodes, 2002).19 BBBS has expanded to 14 other countries, including
Australia, Austria, Canada, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Poland.20
A number of recent initiatives use sports as a vehicle for reaching out to young people,
with educators not only teaching sports, but acting as trained mentors. A pilot intervention
in the United States, for instance, called Becoming a Man (BAM), gives disadvantaged
young people with behavioural problems non-academic support during the school year.
BAM combines social skills training that draws on cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and
sports. It has proved cost-effective by reducing crime and improving schooling outcomes
(Heller et al., 2015). In Australia, the Sporting Chance Programme, founded in 2006,
encourages Indigenous youth to transfer the competitive spirit, discipline and positive
mindset of rugby to other areas of life, in particular to schooling. Participants are assigned
a personal mentor with an Indigenous background and, together, they develop a plan that
commits the young person to a step-by-step improvement in school behaviour and
performance using explicitly specified targets and termly evaluations. The impact of the
programme is currently being evaluated.
Support for atrisk youth is often difficult to coordinate

Comprehensive support for young people with multiple barriers often requires various
different actors to work together. For a 360-degree view of a young persons individual,
social and educational attributes and circumstances, all the parties involved should share
their knowledge and expertise. To that end, the social services need to co-ordinate with the
young persons parents and school and, if need be, with the police, representatives of the
judicial system and even with providers of extracurricular activities.
Managing collaborative work that brings together a large number of actors can be
difficult (OECD, 2015e). Responsibilities for youth policies are typically spread across a
range of branch ministries, while policy implementation may be located at different tiers
of government (local, regional and national). As a result, policies are often poorly
co-ordinated and cross-communication is found wanting. Common databases with client
information accessible to all government services at all levels can help. They are often
unavailable, however, out of privacy concerns or for political reasons. Information
therefore has to be shared ad hoc, on a case-by-case basis, and often requires the explicit
consent either of the young person concerned or of their parents.

Effective institutional structures can greatly contribute to rapid information exchange

and close co-operation between actors. The Australian Commonwealth Government
responded to the need to better co-ordinate support policies for young people by placing
so-called partnership brokers into over a hundred regions.21 The partnership brokers were
commissioned to facilitate and strengthen local connections between schools, businesses,
community groups and families in order to promote educational attainment, social
participation and successful school-to-work transitions of young people. Some of their main
tasks were, depending on the local circumstances, to help disadvantaged young people access
and navigate local support systems, to improve the collaboration of various actors involved in
delivering youth support services, and to identify and help bridge gaps in service delivery. In
Norway, a range of different social and employments services were integrated under the
umbrella of the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) established by the
so-called NAV Reform rolled out from 2006 to 2010. NAVs state-level arm pays insurance
benefits and provides employment services to registered jobseekers, including active labour
market policies (ALMPs) for unemployed youth. NAVs municipal arm pays means-tested
social assistance benefits and delivers social services to persons above the age of 18 years.
Quality vocational education and training can help smooth school-to-work transitions
Quality vocational education and training (VET) plays an essential dual role: it
prepares young people for the workplace and responds to the skills needs of the labour
market. VET enables the young to develop a mix of general and job-specific skills, so
helping them to acquire the knowledge and tools that they need to enter employment.
Moreover, the combination of classroom learning and practical training is an attractive
learning pathway that helps smooth the transition from school to work. To ensure quality
and relevance, the practical training component of VET should ideally be in the workplace.
On average, slightly less than half of upper-secondary students in the OECD follow a VET
course, though proportions vary considerably from country to country (Figure 1.27).
Figure 1.27. There are wide differences between countries in rates of participation
in vocational education and training courses
Percentages of upper-secondary students enrolled in general vs. vocational programmes, 2013
General Vocational ( )
100
80
60
40
20
0
S w gal
Sl e t h l and
y
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Ja a
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Note: There are no results for Canada, Greece and the United States.
Source: OECD (2015), Education at a Glance 2015: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2015-en.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405064

Apprenticeships are an ideal way of providing relevant practical training

Apprenticeship courses, which match students with private- or public-sector
employers early on in the programme, typically for a period of several years, are often
regarded as best practice. The combination of on-the-job training and classroom learning,
together with the involvement of social partners in drawing up curricula, help ensure that
training meets employers needs while affording apprentices important initial work
experience. Ideally, successful apprentice-employer relationships convert into regular
employment. Indeed, empirical research suggests that apprenticeships yield positive
returns in the shape of good wages and steady jobs (Carcillo et al., 2015). Apprenticeships
may also be effective against early school leaving: they appeal to more practically-minded
young people who may lack the motivation for much additional classroom-based learning,
and reduce incentives to leave school for paid work.
The positive results produced by apprenticeship programmes in particular favourable
youth labour market outcomes in countries with a tradition of strong apprenticeship
systems like Austria, Germany and Switzerland have revived interest in apprenticeship
training. Many governments had long shifted their focus away from VET towards academic
education as the preferred path to quality employment. Vocational education programmes
in many countries consequently lack appeal (European Commission, 2011) and are viewed
as the fall-back choice for young people who fail to succeed in an academic setting.
Participation in apprenticeship training tends to be weak in all but a few countries
(Figure 1.28). The trend is changing, however, with governments being increasingly
concerned with promoting the attractiveness and relevance of VET programmes to boost
participation. A number of European countries, such as Italy and Spain, are working closely
with Germany to reform their VET systems, and Korea introduced an apprenticeship
system inspired by the German, British and Australian systems in 2014. The most
Figure 1.28. Participation in apprenticeship programmes is low in all but a few countries
Percentage of young people aged 16 to 29 years who were apprentices in 2012 in selected OECD countries
Total ( ) Men Women
16
14
12
10
0
ic
ic
es
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Note: Estimates shown in light blue are based on less than 30 observations for the total and less than 15 observations by gender. These
estimates should be interpreted with caution.
The results for Belgium and the United Kingdom refer to Flanders and England plus Northern Ireland, respectively.
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC), 2012.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405075

disadvantaged young people may, however, struggle to be admitted to apprenticeships

because they lack the educational qualifications or basic skills, employers may be reluctant
to take them on, or they have to compete with more highly skilled peers.
Strong employer commitment is crucial to allow apprenticeship systems expand into
a recognised pathway for the transition from school to work. In many countries, the main
challenge does not necessarily lie in the provision of quality training facilities, but in the
insufficient number of apprenticeship places offered by firms. The financial burden in
terms of wage and non-wage costs deters some companies from taking on apprentices.
Accordingly, a number of OECD countries have introduced financial incentives to make it
more attractive for employers to create apprenticeship places (Box 1.5).
Preapprenticeships can prepare young people who are not yet ready
Pre-apprenticeship programmes can prepare more disadvantaged young people for
VET programmes, by helping them to brush up on patchy literacy or numeracy skills, build
motivation, familiarise them with the work routine, and even give them short spells of
work experience.
In Germany, young people who cannot find an apprenticeship because of their poor
school results, learning difficulties or other disadvantages can apply for pre-vocational
training. Such programmes last up to one year, introduce trainees to various occupational
fields, and place them in companies for subsidised internships. They teach the curriculum
of the first year of vocational training. Pre-vocational courses are also open to young people
without a lower-secondary qualification, who can attend school part-time during the
pre-apprenticeship to obtain their school-leaving certificate. The goal is to help
participants to transition into regular apprenticeships after they have completed the
programme (OECD, 2012e). Employment outcomes of the German pre-vocational training
have been good, albeit not among the most disadvantaged students (Caliendo et al., 2011).
Pre-apprenticeships are also an important feature of Australias VET system. They
focus on particular occupations or a range of fields, and typically involve classroom-based
VET courses and work placements. Students who are still at school can participate
part-time. Australias pre-apprenticeships seek to introduce young people to a trade,
strengthen their motivation before they commit to an apprenticeship, build their basic
skills, and increase their technical knowledge and, thereby, their chances of securing an
apprenticeship place.22
Apprenticeship-style programmes can also be built into standard secondary school
curricula to give disadvantaged pupils a better chance of being admitted to VET programmes.
In the United States, a wide network of Career Academies, located in about 5 000 high
schools, seek to keep students engaged in school and prepare them for the transition to
post-secondary education and employment. They combine academic and technical
training related to a career theme, and form partnerships with local employers to build
students career awareness and afford them work-based learning opportunities. Career
Academies operate as small learning communities of around 150 to 200 students from
Grades 9 or 10 through Grade 12 in a larger school. Research suggests that Career Academy
graduates benefit from an earnings increment of around USD 2 000 per year over the eight
years of follow-up. The programme has also been shown to positively affect a range of
social outcomes, such as the likelihood of living independently with children and a partner
or spouse. Educational attainment does not benefit, however (Kemple, 2008).

Box 1.5. Providing employers with incentive to offering apprenticeships

Direct subsidies
Several countries subsidise employers directly to take on apprentices. In the
United Kingdom, the National Apprenticeship Service offers apprenticeship grants of
GBP 1 500 to employers with up to 1 000 employees who recruit 16-to-24 year-olds. Eligible
employers are those who have never before employed an apprentice and those who have
not recruited one in the previous 12 months. Up to 10 grants can be made to any
1 employer. In Austria, companies are financially rewarded for every additional apprentice
they take above the number hired in the previous year. They also receive a grant if they
resume hiring apprentices after a break.
Under the Australian Apprenticeships Incentives Programme, companies are eligible for
incentive payments when their apprentices start and complete the programme up to
AUD 4 000 in total. Employers of apprentices and trainees who have faced particular barriers
to training and employment can receive additional support. An evaluation found that these
subsidies had a significant effect on commencements, although more needed to be done to
retain apprentices and prevent them from dropping out (Deloitte Access Economics, 2012).
Tax credits and social security rebates

Another way to subsidise the provision of apprenticeship places is to grant tax credits
and/or social security rebates. The French government grants certain firms receive a tax
credit of EUR 1 600 per apprentice, which increases to EUR 2 200 if the apprentice has a
disability or is considered disadvantaged. Firms may are also exempted from social
security contributions for the apprentices they take on. On top of the tax credits, each
region offers additional subsidies for hiring apprentices. In Canada, employers can claim
up to CAD 2 000 per year for each eligible apprentice under Apprenticeship Job Creation
Tax Credit scheme.
Minimum wage
The cost of hiring apprentices can also be lowered by agreeing a special sub-minimum
wage. Several countries make use of the practice. In France, the minimum wage for
apprentices depends on their age and the year of training they are in, starting at 25% of
the national minimum wage for 18-year-olds in their first year and rising to 93% for the
over-2s in their fourth year. In Germany, a training allowance is agreed upon by the
social partners, which also varies according to the apprentices age and experience with
the firm.
Levy financing
An interesting indirect mechanism for incentivising companies to offer apprenticeships
is to require them to contribute to a special training fund, from which only firms who take
on apprentices benefit. All companies in Denmark pay a yearly contribution of nearly
EUR 400 per employee into the Employers Refunds for Apprentices Fund (AER). The AER
then compensates companies every 24 months for each apprentice hired. In France,
workplace training is funded through an apprentice tax paid by all businesses. It is set at
0.05% of the payroll for firms with fewer than 250 employees and 0.06% for firms with more
than 250 employees. Companies may be exempted from the tax if they train a certain
number of apprentices.
Source: OECD (2014), Investing in Youth: Brazil, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264208988-en.

Internships can give students early insights into the labour market
Summer internship programmes can be opportunities for young people to try out
trades in which they are interested, to get first work experience, and build links with local
employers. They can be of particular benefit to disadvantaged young people, who are more
likely than their well-off peers to spend their summer holidays idle. By involving young
people in meaningful work experience, internships can help to offset the knowledge lost
during school holidays and prevent young people from engaging in illicit activities. Finding
a quality internship is not easy, however, especially for young people whose parents lack
connections. Available internships may not have a strong enough training component to be
valuable, or they are unpaid and hence difficult to afford for low-income youth.
Targeted public programmes are sometimes the solution. New York City has been
subsidising summer jobs for disadvantaged students since the 1960s through its Summer
Youth Employment Program, the largest of its kind in the United States. It offers a
combination of work experience and training geared to equipping youth with the skills
necessary for academic success or regular employment. It is open to 14-to-24 year-olds
from low-income families or living in poor areas. In 2015, there were 130 000 applicants, of
whom 54 000 were placed in a job. The scheme has been shown to be cost-effective
poverty, crime and mortality were lower among participants than among unsuccessful
applicants (Gelber et al., 2016).23 Spurred by the positive results of the programme and
similar initiatives, the United States Department of Labor is currently developing a
Summer Opportunity Project in conjunction with the business community that will
provide disadvantaged youth with employment opportunities and class-based training.
Career guidance helps ensure that students make the right choices
Quality career guidance can boost education and training completion rates by
improving the match between young people and their chosen path. It can strengthen social
mobility by informing young people of career paths that their family and social networks
may not suggest, and encouraging them to choose paths more likely to lead to stable
employment. Career guidance is of special importance to young people who consider VET
programmes including apprenticeships as they affect students career prospects more
directly than general secondary programmes.
Young peoples participation in career guidance is easiest to ensure in the case of
school-based career counselling. One downside to it is that counsellors within school tend
to show a pro-academic bias emphasising general education programmes at the expense
of VET (OECD, 2014a) or to show a preference for programmes offered by the same school
over external alternatives (Watts, 2009). The involvement of employers or outside
specialists in career guidance helps make information more comprehensive and truer to
the realities of the labour market (Sweet, 2009).
In Denmark, the Ministry of Education operates regional guidance centres and
services such as the national guidance portal and call centre. Guidance centres work with
stakeholders including the social partners in industry and commerce and local
municipalities to offer a range of activities in various settings in and out of school
(workshops, seminars, career fairs, one-to-one counselling, etc.). The centres
collaboration with educational and labour market institutions makes their guidance
relevant to stakeholders in the education system and the labour market (Field et al., 2012),
and student participation in career guidance is high (Figure 1.29).

Figure 1.29. Most young people benefit from some form of career guidance
Percentages of 15-year-olds who report having accessed different types of career guidance, selected OECD countries, 2012
Career advisor outside school Career advisor at school Worksite visit Internship
250
200
150
100
50
0
y
l
m
ly
ia
da
nd
ic
ia
ria
li a
CD
ga
re
ar
ar
an
an
ur
bl
en
It a
tv
iu
ra
na
la
st
OE
r tu
Ko
nm
ng
bo
pu
nl
al
La
lg
ov
Ir e
st
Au
Ca
Ze
Fi
Be
Hu
Po
Re
Au
De
Sl
xe
w
ak
Ne
Lu
ov
Sl
Note: Countries are sorted in ascending order of the share of students who accessed all four forms of career guidance.
Source: OECD PISA 2012, www.oecd.org/pisa/pisaproducts/pisa2012database-downloadabledata.htm.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405084
Comprehensive programmes such as youth guarantees are needed to re-engage

NEETs in employment, education or training
Given the negative consequences of early-life unemployment and inactivity on young
peoples career prospects, it is important that all NEETs who have trouble finding
employment or a suitable educational option participate in active programmes that
address their educational and non-educational barriers. Many countries have committed
themselves through so-called youth guarantees to providing all young NEETs with a
suitable offer, the most prominent case being the European Unions Youth Guarantee
scheme, introduced in 2013.24 It is meant to ensure that all young people under the age of
25 years whether registered with employment services or not receive a good-quality
offer of employment, continued education, an apprenticeship or a traineeship within four
months of leaving formal education or becoming unemployed. Such initiatives can be a
valuable tool to help improve young jobseekers employment prospects. Their success
relies, however, on effective outreach to inactive and disconnected youth. The quality of
options offered, moreover, is important, and solutions must be tailored to young
jobseekers individual needs.
Reaching out to NEETs not registered as jobseekers is challenging

Reaching out to NEETs as early as possible is critical if they are not to slip into
long-term inactivity. For many jobless young people, the availability of benefits be it cash
payments or in-kind support like housing and health care is an incentive to seek contact
with social or employment services and register as unemployed. Some of them may
hesitate, however, to claim benefit from government agencies, trying instead to get by on
their own for a while or to seek help from family or friends. Opportunities for reaching out
to these young people can vanish quickly, as disengagement from school or work may
coincide with them moving out of their parents home and some even ending up sleeping
rough. In some cases, disaffected young people may also lose access to a mobile phone or

Internet for a while. Re-engaging young people in education or work becomes increasingly
difficult after long periods of inactivity, as they slip out of their routine and no longer get
up early or take part in structured activities.
Collaboration between schools and public employment services (PES) is often an
important component of successful outreach strategies. Together with school
management and class teachers, the PES can give early career advice, raise young peoples
awareness of the services available through the PES, and spot at-risk youth early enough to
provide timely support and lessen the risk of inactivity after school leaving. While in many
OECD countries, the PES and schools are only weakly integrated, Japan and Norway operate
models of close collaboration that hold promise:
The Japanese PES Hello Work reaches out to students at high schools and universities
through specialised youth services (Hello Work for New Graduates) to offer
counselling, job-search assistance (e.g. interview training and preparation, seminars and
student job fairs) and placement. It also informs schools of vacancies, offers regular
on-site counselling in schools, and supports school career guidance counsellors. The
collaboration between schools and the PES has been extremely successful: virtually all
Japanese students who choose not to pursue tertiary education and would like to work
have a job offer when graduating from senior high school.
Norway currently runs a pilot project which places youth specialists from the national
welfare and employment agency, NAV, into upper-secondary schools for four days a
week. The aim of the project is to prevent and reduce school drop-out by providing career
guidance, helping students to find work experience opportunities, and supporting the
school-to-work transition. A further focus is early detection of and support for young
people with multiple barriers.
In many countries, non-governmental actors also play a central role in reaching out to
disaffected young people. While their former teachers, municipal youth workers and other
public authorities may struggle to track them down and get them to re-engage, disengaged
young people may still go to the local youth centre or sports club. A tight network of
non-governmental youth activity providers can therefore be helpful in preventing young
people who do not regularly engage in education or work from disconnecting entirely. If
such actors are aware of the social and educational situations of the young people they
deal with, they can work towards putting them in touch with the social services
(OECD-LEED, 2014).
A number of countries run active outreach strategies which draw on the services of
non-governmental institutions. As part of the former Youth Connections programme, the
Commonwealth of Australia paid private providers many of whom were not-for-profits
to support young people at risk of disengaging from education or training and failing to
make the transition into employment. 25 Youth Connections used a one-to-one case
management approach to provide services such as counselling and mentoring. Providers
also performed street outreach, visiting locations frequented by young people to engage
with them and bring the disaffected into their programmes. In Japan, outreach to hikikomori
youth, i.e. socially withdrawn young people, who sometimes do not leave the family home
for months, or even years, is organised through non-governmental Community Hikikomori
Support Centres funded by the prefectures.
A very promising, though costly, approach is to explicitly devolve outreach to a single
actor who screens all young people to detect those at risk of disengagement. In Norway,
county-level Follow-up Services are responsible for contacting all under-21-year-olds who
leave school (with or without a qualification) to assess their activity status. Those whom

they can track down and who are not in education or employment are either offered
counselling or training, or they are put in touch with social support services or the local
employment office. As part of their activity responsibility, Swedish municipalities are
required to establish contact with early school leavers under the age of 20 to determine
what they are currently doing and help them back into upper-secondary school. A
challenge for follow-up services is that information on the reasons for a student leaving
school early is often unavailable. They may therefore spend much of their time chasing
students who merely failed to de-register with their municipality when moving to a
different city and who do not require any support.
Profiling NEETs is needed for adequate support, and it can save costs
Once young jobseekers register with the public employment service, they should be
extensively profiled to ensure that they receive the type and intensity of support they need.
Profiling helps caseworkers to determine young jobseekers work readiness and assess
their skills and training needs. It is also an opportunity for identifying any material
barriers such as lack of housing or restricted mobility, social issues and physical or
mental health problems that might be obstacles to taking part in a programme or working.
In Australia, all benefit claimants are assessed for their level of disadvantage and
anticipated difficulty in finding and keeping employment. This procedure may include
screening by a health professional, typically a psychologist or nurse. Jobseekers are then
allocated to one of three different-intensity support streams, according to the results of
the assessment. Similarly, NAV, the Norwegian public employment and welfare service,
assigns all clients to one of four jobseeker categories, depending on the expected level of
support needed.
Careful profiling should also be considered part of cost control, helping to effectively
target expensive interventions at jobseekers who need them and are likely to benefit the
most. In Australia, the resources made available to non-governmental employment service
providers vary substantially according to stream, with providers receiving more for placing
more disadvantaged clients into employment. In Norway, assistance through NAV is
primarily directed at jobseekers in the two acutest-needs categories, for whom programme
participation can start as soon as they have registered at the public employment office.
Jobseekers in the two lower-intensity categories typically simply attend a short job search
seminar and are then expected to find work with little or no assistance for the first two or
three months. Such strict guidelines also lessen the risk of caseworkers cherry-picking
young jobseekers for programme participation, focusing their attention and resources on
the least disadvantaged who, although highly motivated, might not necessitate expensive
intervention to find employment.
Successful programmes for NEETs have to be targeted tightly

The impact of the many different interventions to improve NEETs educational and
employment outcomes in OECD countries depends heavily on how well they are designed
and targeted. Empirical studies show that sustainable improvements in labour market and
social outcomes are difficult to achieve, especially for the most disadvantaged youth, and
that effective programmes tend to be very costly. Given the limited financial resources, the
capacity constraints that weigh on public employment and welfare services, and the fact
that successful programmes are often not easily expanded or replicated, it is vital that
existing programmes target those most likely to benefit.

The type of intervention best suited to a young jobseeker depends on the educational
and non-educational barriers:
Education first is the approach of many countries to early school leavers who have
little chance of finding quality employment. The social services or public employment
services work with the educational authorities to re-integrate them in mainstream
schooling. Some countries even tie eligibility for income support benefits to a return to
education. Examples are Australia, through its learn or earn requirements, and
Denmark.
Comprehensive, full-time, second-chance educational programmes can be a suitable
alternative for early school leavers who are unable or unwilling to return to a standard
school, possibly because they have been out of school for too long or face additional
hurdles, such as family issues or mental health problems. These programmes combine
catch-up courses in foundation skills with vocational classes, counselling and career
guidance, and often enable participants to obtain their upper-secondary qualification
(Box 1.6). Second-chance programmes may be suitable also for young people who have
an upper-secondary qualification, but lack the basic skills required to participate in
training or find employment.
Work experience programmes or short training courses with a strong practical
component may be attractive to NEETs who cannot or will not go back to school because
they are frustrated by their previous schooling experience or, possibly, struggling with
social and health issues. They can help disadvantaged young people regain self-esteem
and build a working routine. And they can prepare them for later participation in
education or training programmes.
Work experience measures should, however, always target the most disadvantaged youth.
There is now plenty of international evidence that short public-sector employment
programmes do not generally improve jobseekers prospects of employment in the
regular labour market (Card et al., 2010, 2015; Kluve, 2010). Likely reasons are that many
schemes have, at best, a weak training component and that private-sector employers
think little of the experience gained from these programmes. Some programmes have
even been shown to have detrimental effects, as participants eased up on their job
seeking during training the so-called lock-in effects. There is also a risk of regular
employees being replaced, or crowded out, by programme participants who work
without pay or for a subsidised wage.
Subsidies for private businesses that hire jobseekers have proven an effective tool for
brightening jobseekers employment prospects, particularly the programme participants
are young. Subsidies should, however, target only low-skilled jobseekers and the
long-term unemployed to lessen the risk of employers pocketing the subsidy to recruit
jobseekers whom they would have hired anyhow the deadweight effect (Cahuc et al.,
2014).
Low-cost, low-intensity interventions like job search assistance, counselling and short
training courses (in CV writing and interview techniques) can be sufficient for clients
with low barriers to labour market entry. They may also be useful for testing a young
persons readiness for participation in more intensive activity.
Active programme participation should ideally begin as soon as a young person has
registered as jobseeker. One way of securing their continued commitment is by adopting a
mutual obligation approach, which links regular income support to a jobseekers efforts to
find suitable education or work or to their active programme participation.26

Box 1.6. Second-chance learning options for early school leavers:

Opportunities and challenges
Early school leavers typically find it very hard to return to school, as the educational,
social or personal factors that caused the initial drop-out often persist and remain an
obstacle. Depending on their level of schooling and how long it is since they dropped out,
young people may also lack the elementary literacy and numeracy skills required to
continue schooling or follow a professional training programme.
Second-chance programmes offer a flexible learning environment often with a
residential component that is well adapted to early school leavers needs and designed to
help them back into education. They typically combine catch-up classes in literacy and
numeracy skills with vocational classes, intensive counselling, health support and career
guidance. Simple work experience or community work components in catering or elderly
care, for example can help them re-gain their work rhythm.
Probably the largest and best-known second-chance programme is the US Job Corps,
which has been operating since 1964. It targets disadvantaged 16-to-24 year-olds, giving
them academic tuition, vocational training, counselling, and social skills training. It also
provides health care and organises job placements. Another important programme and
one which has expanded internationally from the United States is YouthBuild, which
provides skills and work experience in the construction sector. Both schemes rely on
strong ties with local employers. And both contain a strong non-cognitive training
component aimed at strengthening motivation, building conscientiousness, and coaching
young people in interpersonal skills. For some young people, the US Job Corps and
YouthBuild function as comprehensive pre-apprenticeships, while for others they are
stepping stones to higher education. In France, the cole de la Deuxime Chance offers similar
curricula. The Swedish Folk High Schools provide young people aged 18 and over with a
mixture of intensive counselling, coaching in social and life skills, and formal education.
They use their own grading system that measures not only academic performance but also
social skills, and public universities set aside quotas for Folk High School graduates. In
Australia and the United Kingdom, smaller-scale second-chance programmes are offered
in so-called youth foyers, which offer training, accommodation and social and
psychological support to homeless young people, and which are often located close to the
vocational training facilities.
An obstacle to the large-scale roll-out of second-chance learning programmes is that
they are very costly. To be successful, they require well-trained and highly motivated staff
able to provide intensive support and supervision. Infrastructure requirements are
moreover substantial, because facilities for training, housing, leisure activities and even
health care need to be provided in the same place. Despite their high immediate costs,
second-chance programmes have proven cost-effective for specific groups in the medium
and long run, permanently reducing benefit dependency and criminal activity and raising
earnings among former participants (Schochet et al., 2008; Cohen and Piquero, 2010, 2015).
Given the currently limited capacity of second-chance programmes, they need to be
carefully targeted at young people who are motivated and suited to participation in such
intensive programmes.

Notes
1. Unless stated otherwise, youth or young people denotes 15- or 16-to-29 year-olds.
2. Contributory factors in the scarring effect are human capital depreciation and the loss of
professional networks during out-of-work periods. Employers might also see early periods of
unemployment as a sign that a young person is less productive or motivated. Scarring might even
negatively impact young peoples preference for work (Heckman and Borjas, 1980; Ellwood, 1982).
3. The youth population shrunk markedly between 2007 and 2014 in several OECD countries, notably
Ireland (-22%), Latvia (-20%), Spain (-19%), and the Czech Republic and Slovenia (both -16%).
4. This weighted average gives countries with a large youth population, such as Turkey and Mexico,
a bigger weight, while the OECD average calculates the NEET rate for each country, and then takes
a simple average.
5. NEETs are defined as youth who are
not in employment: youth who indicate that they are either unemployed or inactive / not in
the labour force;
not in education or training: youth who are not enrolled in a course of formal education or
training, such as school, university, or an apprenticeship programme. Youth who are in informal
education only are not counted as being in education or training according to this definition.
Eurostat does define youth who are in informal education as non-NEETs, which leads to a
significant drop in the NEET rate in some countries, e.g., in 2013, Spain (down by 5 percentage
points), Denmark (down 4), and Sweden (down by 3). This report restricts the definition of
education to formal education because the labour market connection of informal education is not
clear as these could be hobby courses, and information on informal education is not available for
non-European countries, which would distort cross-OECD comparisons.
6. The estimation disregards possible general equilibrium effects of an increase in youth employment
rates especially in countries with high NEET rates, bringing a substantial share of NEETs into
employment would significantly increase overall labour supply, which could depress wages. But
increasing youth employment would also stimulate demand, and affect aggregate prices and wages.
7. This estimate imputes wages for NEETs given their observable characteristics, such as education, age,
work experience, gender and household characteristics, taking into account that youth who are
offered higher wages are more likely to work. Wages are imputed using the Heckman correction which
corrects for selection effects into employment. Wages are only observed for youth who are employed,
and employed youth are likely to have a higher earnings potential and / or lower costs of working than
non-working youth. Therefore, predictions of wages for non-working youth based on data on working
youth can be biased. The Heckman correction remedies this by directly estimating the probability of
working for each youth, and using this probability to adjust the estimates of the wage equation. The
model estimates the hourly wages of NEETs using micro-data from the EU-SILC, HILDA (Australia),
SLID (Canada), CASEN (Chile), SOEP (Germany), ENIGH (Mexico), SILC (Turkey) and the CPS (United
States). For some countries, data from several years are pooled to increase the sample size. Explanatory
variables are education (below upper secondary, upper secondary and post-upper secondary
non-tertiary, and tertiary education) potential work experience (and a quadratic term), gender, region,
whether the young person has a spouse or live-in partner, and a year control were applicable. For
countries were information on potential work experience is not available or of poor quality, it uses age
and its quadratic term. The selection equation controls for a variety of household characteristics:
having a child under the age of five, living with parents, and income received by other persons in the
household. The effect of having a child and having a spouse or live-in partner is also allowed to vary
between men and women. Suffering from poor health is also allowed to influence the selection into
employment. The model is estimated separately for each country. The imputed wages and costs only
pertain to employment income, except for Turkey, where information on months worked during the
year is only available for employment and self-employment. Data are for 2014 except for Chile and
Switzerland (2013), Turkey (2012) and Canada (2011), however, these values are uprated to 2014 USD.
The necessary data for this estimation was not available for Israel, Japan, Korea and New Zealand.
8. Average annual wage costs (i.e. mean gross annual employment income plus employers social
security contributions) are computed for each country for the age groups 15-19, 20-24, and 25-29,
separately by gender. Multiplication with the number of NEETs of each gender and age-group
yields the upper bound estimate. For the lower bound estimate, the number of NEETs in each
age-group-gender cell is instead assigned a wage of 67% of the median wage in his or her group.
9. These estimates are in line with a recent estimate for EU countries in 2011 (Eurofound, 2012).
10. An important limitation of these statistical calculations is that parental education is observed only
for young people who are living in their parents home. Results may therefore be unreliable if the
decision to leave the parents home is related to the parents level of education (e.g. because
parental education influences income) and if it differs between NEETs and non-NEETs.

11. Intergenerational transmission has been examined extensively in educational attainment and
poverty and a wide range of other beliefs and behaviour, e.g. Diekman and Schmidheiny (2008) on
the intergenerational transmission of divorce and Min et al. (2012) on the intergenerational
transmission of values.
12. The Perry Preschool Program, which ran between 1962 and 67, was targeted at low-income black
children with initial IQs below 85 at the age of 3. Preschool was provided each weekday morning in
2.5-hour sessions. The average child-teacher ratio was 6:1. The curriculum emphasised social
skills and active learning, in which the children engaged in activities that i) involved decision
making and problem solving, ii) were planned, carried out, and reviewed by the children
themselves, with support from adults and iii) involved working with others when problems arose.
In addition, there were home visits to promote parent-child interaction. The programme ended
after two years of enrolment. Participants in the program were followed for over 40 years.
13. The analysis follows 15-to-29 year-olds over a four-year period, 2009 to 2012. Young people are
tracked and their activity status examined each month over the four years (see the annex to this
chapter for more information on the data and analysis). The data necessary for the analysis were
available only for 16 OECD countries.
14. One exception is Australias Youth Allowance, the main income support benefit for young jobseekers
aged 16 to 21.
15. Unemployment benefits include unemployment insurance benefits as well as the less generous
unemployment assistance available in some countries.
16. Public pensions (and, therefore, seniors) are excluded from this analysis, because pensions would
just tautologically lift a large share of seniors out of poverty and would make a comparison
between countries with public and capital-based pension systems difficult.
17. As poverty rates are based on monthly income, retirees drawing on their retirement funds appear
poor in these statistics, because they do not receive regular income.
18. As part of the so-called project STAR (Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio), pupils were randomly
assigned to classes with sizes ranging from 15 to 22 students on average. The experiment was
implemented across 79 schools in Tennessee between 1985 and 1989, and the outcomes of young
participants could be tracked to the age of 27 years.
19. Older adolescents and those who had suffered from emotional, sexual or physical abuse were most
likely to be in relationships that terminated early.
20. The success of mentoring programmes depends crucially on the participation of charismatic and
credible mentors. Mentors should have a background that the young person can relate to, and they
need to be given the time to invest in their relationship with the mentee to build up trust for the
programme to have an impact (DuBois et al., 2002; Rhodes, 2008). Accordingly, the main bottleneck
to the expansion of mentoring programmes is the recruitment of suitable volunteer mentors. One
promising approach has been to find mentors through partnerships with private companies.
Meetings with the mentees can take place directly on-site, so saving the mentors commuting time.
Partnerships with schools are an alternative approach: BIG Futures, a new initiative in Australia,
will try to bring BBBS mentoring directly into Australian schools. The Australian iTrack programme
provides high school students with mentors for an 18-week period to motivate them to complete
school and provide them with career guidance.
21. The former School Business Community Partnership Broker programme was one component of the
National Partnership for Youth Attainment and Transitions, a set of initiatives agreed upon in 2009
by the Commonwealth and State/Territory governments with the aim of improving educational
outcomes and school to work transitions. The National Partnership expired in 2013, the
Partnership Brokers programme was extended by another year before ending in 2014.
22. In 2010, an estimated 28% of all apprentices had completed a pre-apprenticeship.
23. This is true even though not all employment possibilities were in the private sector, which probably
reduced the programmes impact.
24. Youth guarantees were first developed in the Nordic countries in the late 1980s.
25. Youth Connections, like the School Business Community Partnership Broker programme, was part
of the National Partnership for Youth Attainment and Transitions, which expired in 2014. In
principle, support for school-age youth is the responsibility of Australian States and Territories.
26. In fact, the concept of mutual obligations was initially introduced in Australia for employable
young jobseekers only, requiring them to undertake an activity like part-time work, voluntary
work or training in exchange for income support (OECD, 2012f).

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ANNEX 1.A1
Data and methodology of the longitudinal analysis

An analysis of the dynamics of the NEET status comes with substantial data
requirements. Identifying young peoples NEET trajectories needs to be based on
individual-level longitudinal data determining educational status and labour market
participation over a long time horizon and on a monthly basis throughout each year. Since
the focus of the analysis is specifically on periods of unemployment or inactivity, the
number of individuals in the sample moreover had to be large to identify a sufficient
number of NEETs.
The data used in this analysis come from two different sources:
the 2012 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey of
a selection of European countries;
the 2009-12 waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA)
survey.
Both surveys supply monthly information on activity statuses including any periods
of unemployment and inactivity over the 48-month period from January 2009 to
December 2012. The sample was restricted to people aged 15 to 29 years at the beginning
of the observation period, irrespective of their initial activity status. Persons with missing
information on labour market activity for one or several of the 48 months were dropped. A
country was included in the analysis as long as no more than 10% of all observed
trajectories were incomplete. While HILDA has been observing households since 2001 on
an annual basis, the EU-SILC spanned only four years. The analysis was therefore
restricted to four years.
The NEET spells studied were defined as consecutive months in which the young
respondent reported having been out of employment, education or training. Two periods of
NEET status that are interrupted by a single month in education or employment were
defined as separate spells. No distinction was made between NEET inactivity and
unemployment due to the small sample size.

ANNEX 1.A2
Overview of income support benefits

Table 1.A2.1. Means-tested benefits are available almost everywhere
to unemployed youth without employment record
Benefits available to a 20-year-old without employment record, 2014
Unemployment benefits (UB) Minimum-income benefits Additional child-contingent benefits
UI UA SA HB FB LP
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Latvia
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Note: UI = Unemployment insurance benefits; UA = Unemployment assistance benefits; SA = Social assistance

benefits; HB = Housing benefits; FB = Family benefits; LP = Lone parent benefits.
Source: OECD Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/social/benefits-and-wages.htm.

Figure 1.A2.1. Family benefits are typically available to households with children up to the age
of 16 or 17 years, except if children are in education
Upper age limits for family cash benefits or non-wastable (i.e. refundable) tax credits for youth and youth in education living
with their parents, 2014
All children ( ) Children in education

Age limit (in year)
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
ce
C a al
Ja .
Ir e n
E s nd
i te L ia
ng ia
Au om
S ry
Hu a li a
a n
i t z e p.
Fi d
Po nd
De ada
Ne I l
No ds
Ic r k
er y
ay
ain
Gr d
Au ce
ria
B e il e
G e ium
Lu lov y
N e mb o a
Ze g
Fr d
CD
e
p
S an
i
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ov e
n
pa
an
an
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xe en
d at v
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a
a
an
rw
ee
Ch
Sl we d
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la
la
st
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to
r tu
Sp
Sw k R
nm
d
ng
r
rm
nl
el
la
al
Is
lg
Po
er
st
h
ec
Ki
Cz
Un
Note: For Canada: Province of Ontario; for Switzerland: Zurich.

Source: OECD Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/social/benefits-and-wages.htm.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405096
Figure 1.A2.2. More than one-third of all youth receive family benefits
Panel A. Percentages of young people
(16 to 29 years old) in receipt
of family allowances, Panel B. Percentages of young people (16 to 29 years old) in receipt of family allowances,
OECD averages, 2007-14 by country, 2014
100 100
75 75
50 50
25 25
0 0
s t al
xe L a r y
ov B r el a i a
ak el nd
nd
Sp c o
pu e y
Es nce
ng ia
bo a
A u ur g
m
S w er bli c
er y
h Tur ain
Gr b li c
Po olan e
Au tug d
ed a
It a n
Ch l y
De inl a e
nm n d
th na k
i te Sl lan a
d ov ds
Un N gdo a
i t e or m
St y
Ic a t e s
Fr and
CD
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
d wa
i t z an
F il
S w r a li
er d
n i
m t vi
P ec
Ne C a ar
e
K i en
Hu ton
I tr
Re giu
a
Re k
i
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
la
OE
ex
s
e
m
a
G pu
el
r
M
Lu
ec
Cz
Un
Sl
Note: Young people are defined as benefit recipients if they live in a household that received benefits in the previous year.
Results are for 16-to-29 year-olds except for Germany (17-29 years) and the United States (16-24 years).
In Panel B, results relate to 2014, except for Chile and Switzerland (2013) Turkey (2012) and Canada (2011). Countries are sorted, from left
to right, in ascending order of the benefit receipt rate.
Source: OECD calculations based on the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), Household, Income and
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405104

OECD 2016
Chapter 2
Interpreting OECD social indicators
69
2. INTERPRETING OECD SOCIAL INDICATORS
The purpose of Society at a Glance

Society at a Glance 2016 aims to address the growing demand for quantitative evidence
on the social situation, its trends, and its possible drivers across OECD countries. One
objective is to assess and compare social outcomes that are currently the focus of policy
debates. Another is to provide an overview of societal responses, and how effective policy
actions have been in furthering social development. This edition of Society at a Glance
discusses policy actions in response to the situation of youth Neither in Employment,
Education, nor Training (NEET). Indicators on youth are therefore a particular focus.
The indicators are based on a variant of the Pressure-State-Response framework
that has also been used in other policy areas [United Nations (1997), Glossary of Environment
Statistics, Studies in Methods, Series F, No. 67, New York]. This groups indicators into three
areas:
Social context: refers to general indicators that, while not usually direct policy targets
are relevant information for understanding the social landscape. An example is the
proportion of elderly people to working-age people.
Social status: describes the social outcomes that policies try to influence. Ideally, the
selected indicators can be easily and unambiguously interpreted. As an example all
countries would rather have low poverty rates than high ones.
Societal response: provides information about measures and activities to affect social
status indicators. Examples are governmental policies, but also activities of NGOs,
families and broader civil society.
In addition, the framework used in Society at a Glance groups social status and societal
response indicators according to the broad policy fields they cover:
self-sufficiency
equity
health status and
social cohesion.
A related OECD publication, Hows Life Measuring Well-being, presents a large set of
well-being indicators, with an aim to give an accurate picture of societal well-being and
progress. Compared with Society at a Glance, Hows Life uses a broader set of outcome
measures but excludes indicators of policy responses. In addition, the special chapter in
Society at a Glance provides policy analysis and recommendations.

OECD countries differ substantially in their collection and publication of social

indicators. In selection of indicators for this report, the following questions were
considered.
What is the degree of indicator comparability across countries? This report strives to present
the best comparative information for each of the areas covered. However the indicators
presented are not confined to those for which there is absolute comparability. Readers
are, however, alerted as to the nature of the data used and the limits to comparability.
What is the minimum number of countries for which the data must be available? This report
includes only primary indicators that are available for two thirds of OECD countries.
What breakdowns should be used at a country level? Social indicators can often be decomposed
at a national level into outcomes by social sub-categories, such as peoples age, gender
and family type. Pragmatism governs here: the breakdowns presented vary according to
the indicator considered, and are determined by what is readily available.
Chapters 3 to 7 describe the key evidence. Some of these indicators are published by
the OECD on a regular basis (e.g. Social Expenditure Database and OECD Health Statistics).
Others have been collected on an ad hoc basis. Yet others involve some transformation of
existing indicators.
The selection and description of indicators

General social context indicators
When comparing social status and societal response indicators, it is easy to suggest that
one country is doing badly relative to others, or that another is spending a lot of money in
a particular area compared with others. It is important to put such statements into a
broader context. General context indicators including household income, fertility, migration,
family and the demographic trends, provide the general background for other indicators in
this report (see Chapter 3).
Table 2.1. List of general context indicators

Household income
Fertility
Migration
Family
Demographic trends
Self-sufficiency indicators
Self-sufficiency is an underlying social policy objective. Self-sufficiency is promoted by
ensuring active social and economic participation by people, and their autonomy in
activities of daily life. A selection of indicators is shown in Chapter 4.

For many people, paid employment provides income, identity and social interaction.
Social security systems are also funded by taxes levied on those in paid employment. Thus
promoting higher paid employment is a priority for all OECD countries. To be unemployed
means that supporting oneself and ones family is not always possible. Skills also play a
central role in ensuring people find and keep employment, particularly important for
young people. Finding a job is especially difficult for recent labour market entrants.
Experience shows, moreover, that the bad luck of entering the labour market in recession
years has long-lasting consequences for young peoples employment and earnings
prospects. Hence a major societal response to enable people to become self-sufficient is
public and private spending in education.
The table below lists the chosen indicators for assessing whether OECD countries have
been successful in meeting goals for assuring the self-sufficiency of people and their families.
Table 2.2. List of self-sufficiency indicators

Social status Societal responses
Employment
Unemployment Education spending
Skills
Labour market entry
Equity indicators
Equity is another common social policy objective. Equitable outcomes are measured
mainly in terms of access by people to resources.
Equity has many dimensions (Chapter 5). It includes the ability to access social
services and economic opportunities, as well as equity in outcomes. Opinions vary as to
what exactly entails a fair distribution of opportunities or outcomes. Additionally, as it is
hard to obtain information on all equity dimensions, the social status equity indicators
presented here are limited to inequality in financial resources.
Income inequality is a natural starting point for considering equity across the whole of
society. Often however, policy concerns are more strongly focussed on those at the bottom
end of the income distribution. Hence the use of poverty measures, in addition to overall
inequality. Consideration of guaranteed minimum income benefits shows financial
support and obtainable living standard for low-income families. This indicator of living on
benefits complements the more general measures of income inequality and poverty. All
OECD countries have social protection systems that redistribute resources and insure
people against various contingencies. These interventions are summarised by public social
spending. Equity indicators are clearly related to self-sufficiency indicators. Taken together,
they reveal how national social protection systems address the challenge of balancing
adequate provision with system sustainability and promotion of citizens self-sufficiency.
In periods with high unemployment, cash transfers for working-age people are a major
income safety net (recipients of out-of-work benefits).

Table 2.3. List of equity indicators

Income inequality Social spending

Poverty
Living on benefits
Recipients of out-of-work benefits
Health indicators
Health status is a fundamental objective of health care systems, but improving health
status also requires a wider focus on its social determinants, making health a central
objective of social policy (Chapter 6).
The links between social and health conditions are well-established. Indeed,
educational gains, public health measures, better access to health care and continuing
progress in medical technology, have contributed to significant improvements in health
status, as measured by life expectancy. Often the health focus is on objective health
indicators. More subjective population-based indicators of health, such as perceived health
status can be important to assess overall well-being. Suicide rates give additional
information about health and societal challenges, since there are a complex set of reasons
why some people commit suicide. Health spending is a more general and key part of the
policy response of health care systems to concerns about health conditions. Another
health indicator for total population and youth is Tobacco and alcohol consumption, both
associated with numerous harmful health and social consequences.
Nevertheless, health problems can sometimes have origins in interrelated social
conditions such as unemployment, poverty, and inadequate housing beyond the reach
of health policies. Moreover, more than spending levels per se, the effectiveness of health
interventions often depends on other characteristics of the health care system, such as low
coverage of medical insurance or co-payments, which may act as barriers to seeking
medical help. A much broader range of indicators on health conditions and interventions
is provided in OECD Heath Statistics and in Health at a Glance.
Table 2.4. List of health indicators

Life expectancy Health spending

Perceived health status
Suicide
Tobacco and alcohol consumption
Social cohesion indicators

Social cohesion is often identified as an over-arching objective of countries social
policies. While little agreement exists on what it means, a range of symptoms are
informative about lack of social cohesion. Social cohesion is positively evident in the extent
to which people participate in their communities or trust each other (Chapter 7).

Life satisfaction is determined not only by economic development, but also by the
diverse experiences and living conditions. The extent of trust that citizens have in the
political institutions of their community and participation in voting are two important
dimensions of the extent to which individuals are well integrated and taking part in social
life. A general measure on crime and prisoners may indicate the degree to which economic
and social exchange is facilitated, enhancing well-being and facilitating socially beneficial
collective action. Social networks is another important element of social cohesion indicator,
through relatives and friends, online connectedness or voluntary work.
It is difficult to identify directly relevant and comparable response indicators at a
country level on social cohesion issues. Policies that are relevant to other dimensions of
social policy (self-sufficiency, equity and health) may also influence social cohesion.
Table 2.5. List of social cohesion indicators

Life satisfaction
Trust
Voting
Crime and prisoners
Social networks
What can be found in this publication

In each of the five domains covered in Chapters 3 to 7 of this report, each of the five
indicators chosen provides a page of text and a page of charts. Both charts and text
generally follow a standardised pattern. Most indicators integrate a youth focus. The
choice of the time period over which change is considered is partly determined by data
constraints. However, ideally changes are examined 1) over the last generation, to compare
how society is evolving in the longer term, or 2) over the period since the last economic
crisis (typically between 2007-08), so the extent to which recent economic fluctuations are
influencing social indicators can be studied.
Finally, a box on Definition and measurement provides the definitions of data used
and a discussion of potential measurement issues.
The data underlying each indicator are available on the OECD website (http://oe.cd/sag),
or by typing or clicking for electronic books on the StatLink at bottom right of each
indicator (where data for more countries are also available).

Further reading
OECD (2015), Hows Life 2015: Measuring Well-being, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
how_life-2015-en.
United Nations (1997), Glossary of Environment Statistics, Studies in Methods, Series F, No. 67, New York.

3. GENERAL CONTEXT INDICATORS
Household income
Fertility
Migration
Family
Demographic trends

Household income
Disposable household income provides an indication of the

goods and services families can purchase on the market. It Definition and measurement
is thus an objective indication of material quality of life,
Data on annual median equivalised household
and it is used to measure poverty and inequality.
disposable income come from the OECD Income
In 2013 half of the population in Mexico had incomes of Distribution Database. Disposable income is market
less than USD PPP 4 800, whereas half of the people in income (income from work and capital) after taking into
Luxembourg had incomes eight times higher (Figure 3.1). account public cash transfers received and direct taxes
Countries with low median household income included and social security contributions paid. It excludes
countries in Southern Europe, Turkey and much of Eastern i n - k i n d s e r v i c e s p rov i d e d t o h o u s e h o l d s by
Europe, as well as two Latin American countries Chile and governments and private entities, consumption taxes,
Mexico. Those with higher household incomes included and imputed income flows due to home ownership.
Luxembourg, Norway and Switzerland. People were attributed the income of their household.
On average, between 2007 and 2013, OECD real median After subtracting taxes and adding cash transfers,
household disposable income remained stable, thanks to household income provides an indication of the goods
the effect of public cash transfers and personal income and services families can purchase on the market.
taxes (Figure 3.2). Real median disposable income fell most Household income is adjusted for differences in the
in Greece by 8% per year, but also in Ireland and Spain by needs of households of different sizes with an
more than 3%. By contrast, disposable income increased equivalence scale that divides household income by the
significantly in Chile as well as to a lower extent in Israel square root of household size. The adjusted income is
and Poland. then attributed to every person in the household.
Figure 3.2 focuses on the top and bottom 10% of the For cross-country comparison, national currency
population. While on average across OECD countries real measures of income were converted into US dollars
median household disposable income and the average (USD) using purchasing power parity (PPP) for private
income of the top 10% remained almost stable, the income consumption exchange rates. These PPPs reflect the
of the bottom 10% fell by almost 1% per year over the amount of a national currency required in each
period 2007 to 2013. Out of the 34 countries where data are country to buy the same basket of goods and services
available, the top 10% has done better than the poorest 10% as a dollar does in the United States. Both income and
in 21 countries (see also the Income inequality indicator in PPP estimates are affected by statistical errors, so
Chapter 5). This pattern was particularly strong in some of differences between countries of 5% or less are not
the countries where household income decreased the most. considered significant.
Incomes of poorer households fell by more than 5% annually
in Italy and Spain, and by more than 10% in Greece.
Household income data are also available by age group.
Between 2007 and 2013, young people (18 to 25) suffered
the most severe income losses, while elderly people Further reading
(over 65) were largely shielded from the worse income
effects of the crisis (Figure 3.3). Across OECD countries, OECD Income Distribution Database, http://oe.cd/idd.
average household disposable income fell in real terms by OECD (2015), In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All,
around 0.6% per year among youth. Meanwhile, income OECD Publishing, Paris, http://oe.cd/init2015.
was stable among the elderly (over 65). Large income losses
among the youth took place particularly in Greece, but also
in Ireland and Spain. Some gains were experienced in Chile
Figure notes
and Sweden. Overall, young people were better off than Figures 3.2 and 3.3: Data were adjusted for a break in series due to a
elderly in only seven countries (Canada, Germany, Iceland, change in the standard methodology of household income as
Mexico, Norway and Sweden) by less than 1%. from 2012; no change available for Switzerland.

4
-2
0
2
4
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
6
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
6
8
Gr Gr
35 000
0
5 000
40 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
30 000
ee ee M
c c ex
ic
Ir e e
la
Ir e e
la o
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Sp Sp il e
Tu
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el el La y
an an tv
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ng
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M ly M ly Es r y
to
ex ex n
Sl ic o Sl ic o Po i a
ov ov la
Un P eni a Un P eni a
Sl
ov o nd P
i te or t i te or t a rt
d u d u C z k R uga
K ga K ga e c ep l
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Median( )
Median( )
L u in gd l L u in gd l Re li c
xe om xe om pu
Un mb Un mb bl
i t e ou i t e ou ic
d rg d rg Is
ra
St
a
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a e
De tes De tes Un Sp l
nm nm i te Slo ain
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Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (http://oe.cd/idd).

Fr k Fr k Ki n
an an ng ia
SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2016: OECD SOCIAL INDICATORS OECD 2016

c c do
Cz
ec O e
Cz
ec O e m
h EC h EC It a
Re D Re D ly
N e pu N e pu OE
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Top 10%
Au r y Au r y al
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Youth (18-25 y.o)

Es ia
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B ia n B ia n Ge nc e
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Sl Sl la
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a k nl a a k nl a Sw ds
Re nd Re nd ed
pu pu B e en
b b lg
C a li c C a li c D e ium
na na nm
Au da Au da a
st
ra
st
ra Ic r k
el
li a li a an
Ko Ko Au d
Annual median equivalised disposable incomes, in 2013, USD at PPP rates
re re st
a a Un C a r i a
Ja Ja
p p i te na
3.1. Median income varies by a factor of 8 from USD 4 800 and USD 38 500
Sw an Sw an d da
St
3.3. Disposable income has fallen most among youth between 2007 and 2013
ed ed
e e
Bottom 10%
3.2. Poorer households tended to lose more or gain less between 2007 and 2013
Au ates
Annual percentage changes in real disposable income between 2007 and 2013, by age group
Tu n Tu n st
rk rk ra
No ey No ey No li a
Sw r w
Elderly (Over 65 y.o)

rw rw i a
a a
Annual percentage changes in real household disposable income between 2007 and 2013, by income group
Po y Po y L u t z er y
la la xe l a n
nd nd m d
bo
Is Is ur
ra ra g
el el
Ch Ch Li
th
il e il e ua
ni
a
79
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405130
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405123
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405112
Household income
Fertility
The total fertility rate indicates the number of children an (Figure 3.6). Between 1995 and 2014, the average mean
average woman would have if she were to experience the age at first birth has risen by almost three years, from
exact age-specific fertility throughout her life. Allowing for 26.1 to 28.7 years old. In 2014 mean ages at first birth were
some mortality during infancy and childhood, the lowest at 27 or under in the United States and in some
population is replaced at a total fertility rate of a little over Eastern European countries (Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Slovak
two. Republic), whereas they were highest at 30 or above in
Over the last decades, fertility declined dramatically some Asian (Japan, Korea), continental European
a c ro s s O E C D c o u n t r i e s , f a l l i n g o n ave ra g e f ro m (Luxembourg, Switzerland) and Mediterranean countries
2.7 children per woman of childbearing age in 1970 to 1.7 (Italy, Spain).
in 2014 (Figure 3.4). Falls were especially pronounced by
at least four children per woman on average in Korea,
Mexico and Turkey. Before the recent crisis, there was a
moderate recovery in average fertility rates between 2000 Definition and measurement
and 2008. This rebound stalled in many OECD countries
in 2009, probably as a consequence of the crisis. The total fertility rate is the expected number of
children born to each woman at the end of the
In 2014, fertility was well below the replacement level in
childbearing years (i.e. if the likelihood of her giving
most countries, averaging 1.7 across the OECD (Figure 3.4,
birth to children at each age was the current
bars). The highest rate was recorded in Israel at 3.1, where
prevailing age specific fertility rates). It is computed by
women had almost one child more than women in Mexico
summing up the age-specific fertility rates defined
and Turkey, the countries with the second and third highest
over five year intervals. Assuming there is no net
rates, respectively. These three countries were the only
migration and mortality remains unchanged, the total
OECD countries with a level above the replacement fertility
fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman (replacement)
rate (2.1 children per woman). Anglophone and Nordic
ensures broad population stability.
countries were typically at the higher end. France has the
highest fertility rate in Europe (and the 4th highest rate in The age-specific fertility rates are the number of
the OECD) while the lowest fertility rates are found in Japan births per 1000 women of a given age in a given year.
and South Europe. Fertility rates were notably low in Korea They are presented here per five year age group.
and Portugal, with two parents replacing themselves in the Fertility data typically come from civil population
next generation by little more than one child, on average. registers or other administrative records. These are
Fertility rates are generally higher in key partner harmonised according to United Nations and Eurostat
economies than in OECD countries; rates are above recommendations.
replacement levels in Argentina, India, Indonesia, Saudi Mean ages of women at first birth are from OECD
Arabia and South Africa. While fertility increased in Family Database, based from Eurostat demographic
the Russian Federation by four decimals between 1995 statistics and national statistical institutes.
and 2014, fertility decreased in other key partner economies.
Rising female education and employment, a need to
secure a job and income, growing housing problems and
in some cases insufficient support for families juggling
Further reading
work and children, have all played a role in declining
fertility. Family formation postponement is reflected in OECD (2016), SF2.1 Fertility rates, OECD Family Database,
recent trends in OECD age-specific fertility rates (births per www.oecd.org/social/family/database.htm.
1000 women) in Figure 3.5. Since 2000 fertility rates have
OECD (2016), SF2.3 Age of mothers and age-specific
been declining for under 30s whereas at the same time they
fertility, OECD Family Database, www.oecd.org/social/
been on the rise for over 30s. In the last few years, the
family/database.htm.
average OECD fertility rate of 30-34s exceeded the fertility
rate of 25-29s, and so did the rate of 35-39s compared to
20-24s. Also the 40-44 fertility rate is about to surpass the Figure notes
adolescent fertility rate. The adolescent fertility rate has
fallen to low levels at under five births per 1 000 adolescents Figure 3.4: 2012 instead of 2013 and 2014 for Canada, 2013 instead
in Denmark, Japan, Korea, Slovenia and Switzerland, but it of 2014 for Chile and non-EU non OECD countries.
still remains high at above 50 in Chile and Mexico. Figure 3.6: Data for the United Kingdom refer to England & Wales only;
2011 for Canada instead of 2014; 1998 for France and Sweden, 1999
Family formation postponement is also reflected in the for the Slovak Republic instead of 1995; no data available
increase in the mean age of women at first child birth, in around 1995 for Germany; no data available for both years for
all 26 OECD countries for which data are available Australia, Chile, Mexico, New Zealand and Turkey.

Fertility
3.4. Fertility rates across the OECD are typically below replacement level
Number of children per woman aged 15 to 49, in 1970, 1995 and 2014 (or nearest year)
2014( ) 1995 1970 Replacement level of 2.1
6.7 7.3
6
1.68
2.34
2.20
2.39
2.48
3.08
2.82
1.54
1.54
1.84
2.47
1.29
1.23
1.35
1.53
1.30
1.50
1.58
1.86
1.80
1.88
1.63
1.93
1.80
1.46
1.65
1.92
1.92
1.21
1.95
1.98
1.32
1.37
1.69
1.67
1.42
1.81
1.61
1.47
1.72
1.79
1.76
1.41
1.71
1.71
1.71
2.17
0
r tu a
Po gal
Gr a n d
ak S ce
pu in
Ja r y
ic
ng l y
Au pan
pu g
S w E s bli c
e ia
ov d
C z u xe r m i a
h bo y
C a eni a
L a da
ia
nm D
N e F in ar k
er nd
lg s
N o ium
ay
d s tr le
i te gd ia
d om
w ed s
Ze en
Ic a n d
Ir e a n d
Fr nd
Tu ce
M ke y
Is o
el
F e Ch i a
ra a
C o Br on
C o a Ri il
A r om a
So ge bia
h in a
I I a
S a n do n di a
i A si a
a
ec m an
Be and
P o or e
Ne S w ate
de in
bi
l c
ric
st a z
Sl r l an
R e ur
ic
De OEC
bl
i t e u hi
i t z ton
Un K in a l
ra
an
Hu I t a
L Ge tr
tv
Re p a
rw
ee
an
na
ti
th la
la
ud ne
ut nt
ra
ex
s
r
C
l
el
al
Af
u
St
K
th
Li
A
n
ov
ia
Un
Sl
ss
Ru
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405149
3.5. Decline in fertility rates for under 30s and increase for over 30s
Births per 1 000 women by five-year age group, 2000 to 2014, OECD average
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49

120
100
80
60
40
20
0
2000 2005 2008 2010 2014
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405155
3.6. The average mean age of women at first birth has risen by almost three years in the last two decades
Mean age of women at first birth, 1995 and 2014 (or nearest year)
2014( ) 1995
32
31
30
29
28
27
26
25
24
23
22
es
Es ia
ov Po a
Re nd
Ic i c
Fr c
d
C z Hu e l
Re ar y
Ca e
Be a
m
S w al
d
K i ni a
m
CD
No ia
De ay
Po ar k
Ge en
th ny
Ir e s
nd
m e
g
nd
it z n
ly
a
i
nd
ni
d
c
ni
xe e c
re
an
an
i
pa
ur
bl
bl
ra
g
tv
It a
S w Sp a
iu
do
at
rw
an
na
ed
Ne rma
ak la
la
la
st
OE
to
r tu
ua
Ko
nm
ec ng
bo
L u Gr e
pu
pu
el
nl
la
Ja
La
Is
lg
i te lov
St
er
ng
Au
th
er
Fi
d
Un S
Li
i te
d
Un
Sl
Source: OECD Family Database (Indicator SF2.3), based on Eurostat demographic statistics (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-
migration-projections/population-data/database) and national statistical institutes.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405161

Migration
Europe recorded in 2015 an unprecedented number of

asylum seekers and refugees with up to 1.2 million Definition and measurement
asylum applications (Figure 3.7) ; an estimated 250 000 to
The terms asylum-seeker and refugee are often
350 000 people could be granted refugee or similar status,
confused: an asylum-seeker is someone who applies
more than in any previous European refugee crisis since
for international protection, but whose claim has not
World War II. As during previous refugee crises in the 1990s
yet been definitively evaluated. National asylum
the impact is concentrated in a few countries. In the OECD,
systems are there to decide which asylum seekers
Turkey is the most affected, currently hosting as many as
actually qualify for international protection. Those
1.9 million Syrians as well as a large number of people from
judged through proper procedures not to be refugees,
Iraq. Within the European Union, Italy, Greece and Hungary
nor to be in need of any other form of international
are on the front line but the main destination countries are
protection, can be sent back to their home countries.
Germany, in absolute terms, and Sweden and Austria,
Data on asylum seekers are from the United Nations
relative to their population.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
More than in previous crises, asylum seekers are very
Immigrants are, in the first instance, defined as those
diverse in terms of country of origin, profile and
who are foreign-born, whatever their citizenship at
motivation. Recent refugees from the Syrian Arab
birth. In general, the foreign-born population is
Republic (Syria) are more skilled than other groups and
substantially larger than the share of foreign nationals.
those who came, for example, during the Yugoslav wars in
Immigrants offspring include different categories of
the 1990s. There are more unaccompanied minors (children
people: ie. they can either be born in their parents
without a responsible adult to care for them) arriving now
host country to two foreign-born parents, or to mixed
than previously. Refugee flows tend to concentrate in
parentage (one foreign-born parent), be foreign-born
countries with the most favourable economic conditions. A
and arrived as children or be foreign-born and arrived
strong jobs market seems to be the most important
as adults.
determinant of flows for main refugee groups.
On average in the OECD, 13% of the population was
foreign-born in 2014. The share of foreign-born within the
population was highest in Australia, Canada, Israel,
Luxembourg, New Zealand and Switzerland, where at least
one in five people were foreign-born (Figure 3.8). Nearly
two-thirds of the OECD countries had an immigrant Further reading
population exceeding one in ten of the population, whereas
the share of immigrants is under 5% in seven countries. OECD (2016), OECD International Migration Outlook, OECD
This ratio increased in most OECD countries over the last Publishing, Paris.
decade where on average the immigrant population OECD (2015), OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015,
constituted around 9.5% of the population around 2000s. Settling In, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
9789264234024-en.
Immigrant offspring account for more than 1 in 4 in the
population aged 15-34, a sizeable share of the young in OECD (2015), Is this Humanitarian Migration Crisis Different?,
OECD countries. In the 22 OECD countries for which recent Migration Policy Debates, No. 7, OECD, Paris, September,
data are available, in 2013, nearly one in five 15-34 year-olds https://www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-
different.pdf.
was the child of an immigrant or had immigrated as a child.
A further 9% arrived in the host country as adults
(Figure 3.9). The United States, Germany and France host
the largest numbers of native-born offspring with two Figure notes
foreign-born parents. However, in relative terms, the
highest shares of immigrant offspring are to be found in Figure 3.8: Data are not available for Greece. Data refer to 2000 or to the
European countries whose total populations have closest year with available data and to 2014 or most recent available
year. OECD average refers to the average of countries presented. Data
substantial proportions of immigrants (Luxembourg, Israel
refers to foreign instead of foreign-born population for Japan and
and Switzerland) and in countries with a significant Korea.
population growth through migration like in Australia and
Figure 3.9: The full split according to the categories of immigrants and
Canada. In the more recent migration destinations of immigrant offspring among 15-34 year-olds is not available for
southern Europe as well as in Finland, by contrast, less New Zealand. Data on foreign-born as a percentage of the total
than 1% of young people were born in the host country to population are not available for Greece. OECD and EU averages refer
foreign-born parents. to population weighted averages.

Migration
3.7. Unprecedented number of asylum seekers recorded in Europe

Number of new asylum seekers since 1980 in the OECD, the EU and Germany
OECD EU Germany
Thousands
1 500
1 000
500
0
0
1
2
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
8
8
8
20
20
20
20
20
20
19
19
20
19
19
20
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
19
19
19
20
19
20
20
20
19
19
19
19
20
19
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405170
3.8. On average in the OECD, 13% of the population is foreign-born

Foreign-born as a percentage of the total population, 2000 and 2014, percentages
2014 ( ) 2000
40
30
20
10
0
it z rg
Au and
Ze a
d
Ca l
Au a
Sw ria
Sl en
Ir e i a
B e nd
m
Ic s
Re g al
Un in g y
d m
Ge tes
y
a in
CD
er e
Es d
a
De l y
Re r y
C z Po r k
Fi ic
ov Hun d
ic
il e
Tu a
Po y
nd
M n
o
e
nd
w a li
wa
an
ni
e
c
re
an
an
pa
ic
ra
bl
bl
en
It a
iu
i t e do
ak ga
S w bou
rk
Ne r an
Ch
na
ed
la
la
st
OE
to
Sp
ec r tu
a
ex
nm
Ko
Ne s tr
rm
pu
pu
la
l
al
el
nl
Ja
Is
lg
i t e N or
ov
St
er
F
m
th
K
xe
h
d
Lu
Un
Sl
Source: OECD (2016), International Migration Outlook 2016 and OECD International Migration Database.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405181
3.9. One in four young people has a migrant background

Categories of immigrants and immigrant offspring among 15-34 year-olds, 2013, percentage of the population aged 15 to 34
% of native-born offspring of foreign-born % of native-born with a mixed background

% of foreign-born who arrived as children % of foreign-born who arrived as adults
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
l
s
15
ce
d
g
nd
ay
ce
nd
CD
es
ain
li a
el
da
en
ria
ga
ly
an
nd
ar
an
an
ur
ra
iu
do
rw
at
an
ee
ra
ed
na
EU
la
la
st
It a
OE
r tu
Sp
nm
bo
rm
nl
la
al
Is
lg
St
Ir e
er
st
ng
Au
Gr
Fr
Sw
Ca
No
Ze
er
Fi
Be
m
Po
Au
it z
Ge
De
d
Ki
th
xe
i te
w
Sw
Ne
d
Ne
Lu
Un
i te
Un
Source: OECD (2015), OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015, Settling In, OECD Publishing, Paris and the OECD International Migration Database.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405197

Family
The living arrangements of youth are important for a with the OECD average standing at 4.6 (Figure 3.12). But
variety of reasons. Moving out of the parental home is an rates are very low in Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and
important step on the way to adulthood as is cohabitation, Slovenia at 3.5 or fewer marriages per 1 000 people, while
marriage or having children. The living arrangements of rates are almost twice that at 6 per 1 000 or above in Israel,
youth can also influence their welfare and poverty rates Korea, Turkey and the United States. In contrast, in 1990
those living with their parents may have a lower risk of most OECD countries had a marriage rate of around five to
poverty as they can depend more on their parents seven marriages per 1 000 people. Only Sweden and Turkey
financially and may face little or no costs for housing, food experienced an increase in marriage rates between 1990
or other daily expenses. and 2014. Crude divorce rates also vary across countries,
Large variation in the living arrangements of youth exists from as low as 0.1 divorces per 1 000 people in Chile to
across the OECD. In countries such as Italy, Slovenia and above 3 per 1 000 in Denmark and the United States
Greece over three quarters of 15-29 year-olds live with their in 2014. Between 1990 and 2014, the picture was mixed:
parents (Figure 3.10, Panel A). In others, notably Canada they increased in 21 OECD countries but decreased in
and the Nordic countries, a small proportion live with their 14 others. Decline was most pronounced in the
p a r e n t s a n d yo u t h a r e m u ch m o r e l i k e l y t o l i v e United States, from 4.8 divorces per 1 000 in 1992 to 3.2
independently, particularly on their own. On average, in 2014.
around a quarter of young people live with a partner
ranging from 11% in Italy to 41% in Finland.
The recession appears to have had a small overall impact
on the living arrangements of youth across the OECD but Definition and measurement
the average change masks larger changes in some
countries (Figure 3.10, Panel B). For example, in France Household types are defined as follows: alone
there was a 12.5 percentage point rise in the share of youth describes a young person living on their own; single
living with their parents. Countries hit strongly by the parent means that the young person lives with at
crisis, such as Greece and Italy saw smaller increases but least one dependent child and no partner; "partnered
these countries already had some of the highest shares of describes a young person living with a spouse or
youth living in their family home before the crisis hit. cohabiting partner (and potentially with children in
Overall across the OECD there was an increase of the same household); with other youth/adults
0.7 percentage point in the proportion of youth living with describes a young person living with at least one
their parents and a 1 percentage point decline in the other young person or adult (aged 30 years or older)
proportion of youth living with partners or spouses. This and potentially with children in the same household;
seems to suggest that the recession may have lengthened with parents means that the young person lives in a
the time young people live at home and delayed their household with at least one of their parents.
transition to forming their own families. The mean age at first marriage is defined as the mean
Across the OECD the average age of those getting married average age in years of marrying persons at the time
has significantly increased (Figure 3.11). At the start of of first marriage. This measure is disaggregated by
the 1990s the average age at first marriage across sex with separate averages for men and women.
OECD countries was 24.9 for women and 27.4 for men. The crude marriage rate is defined as the number of
By 2014, this average age had increased from 28 years old to legal civil unions or marriag es each year per
31 for women and from 31 years old to 34 for men. Despite 1 000 people. The crude divorce rate (CDR), defined as
common declining trends in increasing ages at first the number of legal civil unions or marriages that are
marriage, there remain notable differences between dissolved each year per 1 000 people.
countries. The average age is very high in the Nordic
countries. In Israel and in Turkey, by contrast, the average
age of women at first marriage is below 25 and of men is
less than 28. The difference between countries points to a
variety of transition paths towards the formation of Figure notes
long-term partnerships: cohabitation has become an
important form of long-term partnership in, for example, Figure 3.10: Data for 2014 refer to 2013 for Switzerland, 2012 for Turkey
the Nordic countries, postponing and frequently replacing and 2011 for Canada; data for 2007 refer to 2006 for Chile and 2008
for Switzerland and Mexico. No data for Israel, Japan, Korea and
marriage as the partnership standard.
New Zealand.
Higher ages of marriage were accompanied by declining Figure 3.11: Median age at first marriage for Australia, Israel,
marriage rates and stabilising divorce rates. In 2014, crude New Zealand and United States; civil unions are included in
marriage rates were between 4 and 5.5 marriages per 1 000, New Zealand; data refer to all marriages for Mexico.

Family
3.10. Most youth live with their parents and patterns have changed since the recession
With parents ( ) Alone Single parent Partnered With other youth/adults
Panel B. Percentage point change
Panel A. Composition of household types amongst 15-29s in 2014, percentage between 2007 and 2014
Italy
Slovenia
Greece
Slovak Republic
Portugal
Spain
Hungary
Czech Republic
Poland
Luxembourg
Ireland
United States
Switzerland
Latvia
Belgium
Chile
Turkey
Austria
OECD
Germany
Estonia
Australia
Mexico
France
United Kingdom
Iceland
Netherlands
Norway
Finland
Sweden
Denmark
Canada
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
Source: OECD calculations based on EU-SILC, HILDA (Australia), SLID (Canada), CASEN (Chile), HLFS (New Zealand) and CPS (United States).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405203
3.11. Increase in mean age at first marriage for both women and men of 4.6 years on average since 1990
Mean age at first marriage, by gender, 1990 and 2014 (or nearest years)
2014 women ( ) 1990 women 2014 men 1990 men
40
35
30
25
20
L
E
L
P
K
R
A
A
T
U
N
CD
D
R
E
R
C
X
N
L
N
T
N
N
T
L
L
E
S
A
K
A
EX
L
R
R
U
IS
IR
BE
CH
CH
PO
PR
SW
ES
NZ
IT
AU
CZ
LV
ES
DN
GR
AU
LU
US
SV
FR
FI
NO
DE
GB
IS
KO
TU
HU
NL
JP
SV
CA
LT
M
OE
Source: OECD Family Database (Indicator SF3.1) based on national statistical offices and Eurostat.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405210
3.12. Decline in marriage rates and stabilisation of divorce rates on average since 1990
Crude marriage and divorce rates, per 1 000 people, 1990 and 2014 (or nearest years)
2014 marriage ( ) 1990 marriage 2014 divorce 1990 divorce
10
0
R
A
R
R
A
E
S
N
CD
K
E
EX
C
R
L
K
N
U
OE L
L
R
L
N
T
T
E
L
D
A
N
L
P
A
X
T
N
N
S
U
I
G
CR
IS
CH
BE
PO
IR
CH
PR
NZ
SW
ES
CZ
AU
LV
IT
GR
AU
DN
ES
RU
US
LU
SV
FR
TU
IS
FI
KO
NO
DE
GB
HU
AR
JP
CH
NL
CA
LT
SV
M
Source: OECD Family Database (Indicator SF3.1) based on national statistical offices and Eurostat.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405228

Demographic trends
Age-dependency ratios are a measure of the age structure of

the population. They provide information about the Definition and measurement
demographic shifts that have characterised OECD countries
Ag e-dependency ratios relate the number of
in the past and that are expected in the future.
individuals that are likely to be dependent on the
OECD populations became older and will continue to support of others for their daily living elderly or
become older. In 2015, there were on average across youths to the number of those individuals who are
OECD countries 28 persons aged 65 and over for every capable of providing such support.
100 persons aged 20 to 64, an average level up from 18
The old-age dependency ratio relates the number of
in 1970 (Figure 3.13). Cross country differences are large,
individuals aged 65 and over in percentage of the
varying in 2015 from less than 15% in Mexico and Turkey, to
population aged 20 to 64. The youth dependency
over 35% in Finland, Italy and Greece and to over 45% in
relates the number of individuals aged less than 20 in
Japan. By 2060, this average ratio is projected to almost
percentage of the population aged 20 to 64. An
double in the OECD area (to 57%) and to quadruple in
additional ratio is also shown here: the share of youth
Korea. By 2060, the old-age dependency ratio will almost
aged 15-29 in percentage of the total population.
reach 80% in Korea and Japan while remaining below 45%
in Israel, Mexico and Turkey. This increase will contribute Estimates prior to 2015 and projections from 2015 are
to higher public spending in health, long-term care and drawn from the United Nations, World Population
pensions. Prospects 2015 Revision. Projections used here are
based on the most recent medium fertility variant
Conversely, the youth-dependency ratio declined
population projections, which for each country
between 1970 and 2015. In 2015, there were on average
corresponds to the median of several thousand
across OECD countries 38 persons aged below 20 for every
projected trajectories of each demographic component.
100 persons aged 20 to 64, an average level down from 69%
in 1970 (Figure 3.14). In 2015, the youth-dependency ratio Note that these forecasts do not take into account
ranged between 29% in Germany and 65% or more in Israel the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe from Syria. It may
and Mexico. In most OECD countries, this ratio will stop have an impact in the population structures of
declining, reaching an average level of 40% in 2060, except countries which integrated many migrants, like
in Israel, Mexico and Turkey. Lower youth dependency Germany, Turkey and some Eastern and Nordic
means lower public spending in education and towards European countries.
families. But overall, the declines are not large enough to
offset higher spending towards the elderly.
In emerging economies, old-age dependency ratios are in
general lower than in OECD countries, particularly in
India, Indonesia and South Africa. By contrast youth
dependency ratios are higher.
Figure 3.15 also presents the past, current and future
shares of youths aged 15 to 29 those in age to enter the
labour market in percentage of the total population. On
average it declined from 23% in 1970 to 19% in 2015, with Further reading
strongest declines in those ageing countries Japan,
Finland, Italy and Spain. The average ratio is forecast to OECD (2015), Pensions at a Glance 2015 OECD and G20
decline even further to 16% of the total population by 2060, Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/
with highest declines in countries which will particularly 10.1787/pension_glance-2015-en.
become older in the next decades like Chile, Mexico, Korea United Nations (2015), World Population Prospects 2015
and Turkey. Revision, Washington DC, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp.

M M
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
ex Is ex
Tu ico M r ael Tu ico
rk e rk
e
e Ne T x ico Sl
Ch y w ur ov Ch y
Is l e i Z e ke a k K il e
al y Re or e
Ic r a e
e l Ir e a n d pu a
Un A u l a n l Lu bl
i te s tr d Ic a nd xe Isr i c
el m ae
N e d S a li an bo l
w ta a Ch d
Ze te Un Ir e u r g
al s
a i t e Fr a il e l
d nc Ic a nd
Ko n d S e e
N r Au t ate Un P l a n
Sl o ea Un s s i te ol d
ov C r w i te N tr a li d an
ak a ay d or a St d
R na Ki w Ne Aus ates
Un L u x epu d a n ay w tr a
i te em bl De gdo Z e li
d bo ic nm m al a
Ki u
n rg S w ar Ca and
De gdo ed k n
nm m No ada
O E en rw
Po ar k Fi CD
nl O ay
S w land Hu E C
ed Ne B el and Cz n D
t g e c Slo g ar
O E en L u h er ium h ve y
xe l a n R n
S w Au CD m d
2015( )
2015( )
Un S w epu i a
s
2015( )
bo s i te i t z bli

Ne i t ze tr ia C a ur g d er l c
th rla
er nd n K i an
ng d
la E s ada
to do
F i nds
n S w Gr n i a Sp m
Be lan it z eec N e A u a in
lg d
iu e e th st
Po r l an er r i a
La m r tu d l
Hu t v Be and
ng ia Au gal lg s
st
E s ar y r E s ium
to S ia to
Hu p a n
Fr ni a L ia
1970
1970
1970
an ng in De a t v
c a nm i a
C z G Ir e l e Ja r y
e c er a nd
P pa
h m Fr ar k
Source: Calculations from United Nations, World Populations Prospects 2015 Revisions.
Re a n Sl
ov ol n a
p y an Sw nc
e
Sl ub l C z ak R I d Po ede
ov i c ec e t al r tu n
Po en h pu y Ge g
Re bl r m al
r tu ia pu i c
Gr g a l b F i any
ee K li c nl
Ja ce S l or e Gr a n d
ov a ee
pa en c
n L ia
2060
2060
It a
2060
Ge at v It a e
Sp l y rm ia Ja l y
So ain an Sa pa
ut
So y ud n
h ut
Af h iA
ric Af In r a b
ric S o do i a
C o In d a I I a ut ne
3.15. Decline of the share of youth in total population in most countries

S a n do n di h si a
Co lom i a ud ne a Af
s t bi ric
In a R a
i si a
Number of young people (15-29) in total population, percentages, in 1970, 2015 and 2060
do i c Ar Ara a C o In d
g bi lo ia
ne a m
Sa s Co en ti a
lo na b
Number of young people (under 20) per 100 people of working age (20-64), in 1970, 2015 and 2060
ud Br i a m Br i a
i A a zi b C C
az
Number of people of retirement age (65+) per 100 people of working age (20-64), in 1970, 2015 and 2060
Ru Ar ra l C o Br i a Ru o s hi il
3.14. The youth dependency ratio will not decline in the next 45 years in most OECD countries
ss ge bia st a z t a na
ia nt a ss
A
3.13. The old-age dependency ratio will double in the next 45 years on average in OECD countries
n i Ru Ri il
c
i a r Ri
n ge c a
F e Ch n a ss Fe n
d e in i a L i Chi a d e t in
n th na
Li r ati a F e ua Li r ati a
t h on d e ni t h on
ua ra a ua
ni tio ni
a n a
87
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405255
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405240
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405231
Demographic trends
4. SELF-SUFFICIENCY INDICATORS
Employment
Unemployment
Skills
Education spending
Labour market entry

Employment
Employment is a key factor in self-sufficiency. On average, Looking at young migrants, aged 15-29, the gap in
two out of three working-age adults in the OECD area are employment rates reverses they are 1 percentage point
employed (Figure 4.1.A). In Iceland and Switzerland, more more likely to work than their native peers. Young migrants
than eight out of ten are employed, compared to about one are less likely to be in education than their native peers,
out of two in Greece and Turkey. and therefore enter the labour market at younger ages, and
Eight years after the start of the financial crisis, employment while they are more likely to be working than their native
rates across the OECD are slowly rebounding. On average, peers, they are also more likely to be neither in work nor in
the employment rate reached its pre-crisis level in 2015, education (see Figure 1.16 in Chapter 1).
and employment has been rising above its pre-crisis level
in half of all countries (Figure 4.1). Much like the crisis
itself, however, the recovery has been highly unequal
across countries. Of the countries hit hardest by the Definitions and measurement
recession, some have already reached, or even surpassed,
A person is employed if working for pay, profit or
their pre-crisis level of employment. Estonia and Latvia
family gain for at least one hour per week, even if
have seen impressive and steady employment growth
temporarily absent from work because of illness,
since 2010, and also Iceland has returned to its 2007 level of
holidays or industrial disputes. The data from labour
employment. Spain, Ireland and Portugal are roughly at the
force surveys of OECD countries rely on this work
half-way point to full recovery, while employment growth
definition during a survey reference week. The basic
in Greece only started to pick up in the last two years.
indicator for employment is the proportion of the
A number of countries with comparatively low employment population aged 15-64 who are employed. These
rates at the outset of the crisis experienced substantial employment rates are presented by gender and
increases over recent years: employment in Hungary grew migrant status. Migrants are defined as those who
by 10 percentage points, in Turkey by 7 and in Chile and were born outside their country of residence,
the Czech Republic by 6. These increases were to a large regardless of their citizenship status, or how long
extent driven by rising female employment rates. they have lived in the country.
Youth employment rates followed these broad trends, Involuntary part-time workers are part-timers (working
although employment losses for youth were generally more less than 30 usual hours per week) because they could
pronounced during the crisis than for the entire working-age not find a full-time job.
population. As a result, OECD-wide the number of employed
National definitions broadly conform to this generic
yo u ng peopl e, ag ed 15 to 29 yea rs old , f ell by 8 %
definition, but may vary depending on national
between 2007 and 2015 (see Chapter 1, and Figure 1.1).
circumstances. For more information www.oecd.org/
While employment has been increasing overall, many do employment/database.
not find the full-time job they are seeking. In Italy, Spain
and Ireland, around every tenth employee is an involuntary
part-time worker (Figure 4.2). For youth, these rates are
twice as high. Especially young women are likely to work
shorter hours than they want to: around a quarter of young
Further reading
women aged 15-29 in Spain and Italy, but also in Australia. OECD (2016), OECD Employment Outlook 2016, OECD
At around 15%, these rates are lower for young men, yet Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/empl_outlook-
still considerable. 2016-en.
On the OECD average, immigrants are almost as likely to be OECD and EU (2015), Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015:
employed as their native peers: in 2014, the employment Settling In, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/
rate of the foreign-born population of working age was 66%, 10.1787/9789264234024-en.
compared to 67% for their native born peers. This average,
however, masks pronounced differences across countries:
in traditional Northern and Western European destination Figure notes
countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium,
but also France and Germany, natives are 6-15 percentage Figure 4.1: Q1-2016 for Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Japan,
Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United States;
points more likely to be employed than those born abroad
Q4-2015 otherwise. Q2-2007 for Switzerland and Q1-2008 for South
(Figure 4.3). This is mainly driven by differences in female Africa.
employment rates (OECD, 2015). In contrast, in Chile, Israel, Figure 4.2: 2015, 25-64 and 16-24 for Australia, Germany, Israel, Japan,
Luxembourg and Hungary, female employment rates are New Zealand, Slovenia; 2013 for Chile. No data for Korea, Mexico and
actually higher among immigrants. Because seeking Turkey.
employment tends to be an important reason to migrate to Figure 4.3: No data on Japan and Korea. No data for youth for Australia,
these countries, as well as to the United States, also Germany, Mexico and New Zealand. OECD average excludes those
immigrant men tend to have higher employment rates six countries. Data for Chile is for 2013, for Israel for 2015. For Israel,
than native men. youth data refers to 15-24 years old.

Employment
4.1. The labour market impact of the crisis and recovery has been highly uneven across countries
Employment rate, percentage of the working-age population (aged 15-64), Q4 2007-Q1 2016
Q1 2016 ( ) Trough Q4 2007
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
rm s
S w we d
a
i t z den
Ic nd
d
lo a
ng l
m ia
Ko g
OE a
CD
F i el
Un L nd
ec S a
Au li c
Re e s
Es ria
Au oni a
i te C a li a
ng a
De dom
Ne Ja k
er n
Ne No y
Ze ay
Gr e y
ce
Sp y
M in
Be ico
m
Re hil e
Po li c
Ir e n d
Fr d
Po c e
Lu lov r y
Hu g a
bi
Ge nd
an
Ki d
C z ed vi
re
ar
Co fric
l
an
th pa
S n
n
ur
ra
xe en
It a
iu
S a
w rw
rk
h t at
an
ee
b
b
ra
d na
la
a
la
la
a
st
t
m
r tu
ex
nm
bo
pu
ak C
pu
la
el
nl
al
a
Is
lg
t
Tu
er
st
A
h
ut
t
So
i
ov
Un
Sl
Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD Short-term Labour Market Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00046-en.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405261
4.2. Involuntary part-time work is increasingly prevalent in some countries

Incidence of involuntary part-time employment, percentage of total employment, people of working age and youth, by gender,
2015 (or nearest year)
Women 15-64 ( ) Men 15-64 Women 15-29 Men 15-29
30
25
20
15
10
0
th gal
Fi s
Au en
Un t e d um
Z e il e
li a
ain
ly
Ir e d
nd
Fr d
Gr e
Sw ce
el
Re ni a
ic
Sl Ge i a
Re ny
Sl li c
Hu ni a
Ic y
i t z nd
Au d
ria
m d
No g
De ay
B rk
K i es
n
CD
Po da
nd
c
ar
an
an
pa
ur
bl
ra
It a
tv
do
a
rw
at
an
ee
Ch
b
ra
ed
na
ak ma
la
S w ela
la
a
st
OE
Sp
Ne r tu
to
nm
i
ng
bo
pu
pu
Lu Pol
la
nl
al
Ja
La
Is
Un el g
ov
i te S t
er
st
ng
Ca
Es
er
r
xe
w
h
Ne
i
ec
ov
Cz
Source: OECD calculations based on national labour force surveys and OECD Employment Database.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405277
4.3. Migrants are still less likely to be employed in some countries

Difference in percentage points in employment rates between native and foreign-born, people of working age and youth, 2014 (or nearest year)
15-64 ( ) 15-29
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
l
Fi d
S m
th en
s
il e
el
Hu r g
Re r y
Po li c
Re t e s
Po c
nd
Ir e e
nd
a
d
CD
ng a
Au om
Ze a
d
ain
i t z ay
d
Ge ni a
M y
Au o
Fr a
De c e
Be rk
ga
nd
an
i
ri
c
ni
i
d
w a li
i te It al
n
an
an
an
ic
bl
ra
tv
iu
a
ak nga
u
S w or w
an
ee
Ch
Ne wed
a
la
la
la
st
OE
to
r tu
Sp
e
ec S t a
ex
nm
d
bo
Ne s tr
i te C an
rm
pu
pu
la
nl
el
al
La
Is
lg
ov
er
Gr
Es
Ic
er
m
Sl
Cz d
Ki
xe
d
Lu
Un
ov
Un
Sl
Source: OECD calculations from national labour force surveys.

1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405284

Unemployment
In addition to putting a strain on household and public in 2014, whereas only 20% of all young people aged 15-24
finances, unemployment can have a demoralising effect on had been unemployed for this long (Figure 4.6). Long-term
individuals and diminish their career prospects. This is unemployment was especially high in countries with high
especially true for young people at the beginning of their overall unemployment, such as Greece (56% of youth aged
working lives. 15-24, and 85% of unemployed aged 55+) and Italy (56% of
The great recession led to record unemployment rates youth and 65% of those aged 55 and over).
across the OECD. Even though the situation has improved
since the peak of the crisis, still 8% of the active working-age
population on average was unemployed in early 2016 across
the OECD, and the average unemployment rate is projected Definitions and measurement
to still be above pre-crisis levels by the end of 2017 (OECD,
The unemployment rate is the ratio of people out of
2016) (Figure 4.4). Countries present a diverse picture.
work and actively seeking it to the population of
Iceland and Japan exhibit rates as low as 3%, while many
working age either in work or actively seeking it (aged
countries including the United States, the United Kingdom
15 or over). The data are gathered through labour
and Germany, cluster around 5%. On the other hand,
force surveys of member countries. According to the
unemployment is still strikingly high in the southern
standardised ILO definition used in these surveys, the
European countries hit hardest by the crisis, such as Greece
unemployed are those who did not work for at least
(24%), Spain (20%) and Portugal and Italy (12%).
one hour in the reference week of the survey, but who
S o m e c o u n t r i e s h av e s e e n i m p re s s iv e f a l l s i n are currently available for work and who have taken
unemployment since the crisis peak, particularly Estonia specific steps to seek employment in the four weeks
and Latvia, where the unemployment rate halved. The fall preceding the survey. Thus, for example, people who
has also been also substantial in Spain, Portugal and cannot work because of physical impairment, or who
Hungary with decreases of around 5 percentage points, as are not actively seeking a job because they have little
in the United States. h o p e o f f i n d i n g wo r k a re n o t c o n s i d e re d a s
The unemployment rate of youth (aged 15-24) is twice as unemployed. These unemployment rates are presented
high as adult unemployment (25 years+) in most by broad age group.
countries (Figure 4.5). It is nearly 4 times as high in Italy, Long-term unemployment is defined here as lasting
New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Young for one year or more.
people were more severely affected by the sweeping job
For more information, see www.oecd.org/employment/
losses during the great recession (Chapter 1), as they were
database.
more likely to hold temporary jobs that were easy to
terminate, or entered the labour market when firms were
not hiring. A lack of work experience also makes young
people vulnerable during times of high unemployment.
However, the fact that many 15-24 year-olds are still in Further reading
full-time education and therefore not active on the labour
OECD (2016), OECD Employment Outlook 2016, OECD
market, also tends to inflate the rate of youth
Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/empl_outlook-
unemployment (Box 1.1 in Chapter 1). Greeces youth
2016-en.
unemployment rate of 50% does not mean that 50% of all
young people aged 15-24 are out of work. Instead, half of all
young people who are active on the labour market 28% of Figure note
all young Greeks of this age group are unemployed. This
corresponds to nearly 15% of all 15-24 year-olds, still a high Figure 4.4: Q1-2016 for Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Japan,
number. Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Russian Federation
and the United States; Q4-2015 otherwise. Q2-2007 for Switzerland
Unemployment is a transient phenomenon for most and Q1-2008 for South Africa.
unemployed, but in some countries, it is persistent, Figure 4.5: Q4-2015 for Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Switzerland,
especially for prime age and older workers. Across the Turkey and United Kingdom. Data for Iceland, Luxembourg and
OECD, on average around 40% of all unemployed aged 55 Norway are based on small sample sizes. No data for Chile, Latvia
and over had been unemployed for at least a year or longer and Switzerland.

Unemployment
4.4. Unemployment is on the decline, albeit slowly in some countries

Unemployment rate, percentage of the labour force (aged 15+), in Q4 2997, peak since Q4 2007 and Q1 2016 (or Q4 2015)
Q1 2016 ( ) Peak since Q4 2007 Q4 2007
30
25
20
15
10
0
Ja d
Ko n
ec M ea
Re i c o
rm c
S w N or y
U i t z ay
i te d S nd
ng s
Ne I m
Ze el
nm d
L u un i a
m ry
Ne C rg
st k
Au li a
Es ria
er l e
Po ds
S w nd
C a en
O a
Sl E C D
Sp l
B e eni a
Ir e m
F i nd
La d
ov F t v i a
pu e
Tu lic
ey
r tu y
Gr in
ce
S o lom il
h ia
B n
a
ga
G e ub li
an
K i te
d
Au ar
Re n c
Po It al
ric
Co r a z
an
pa
De lan
an
tio
w sr a
t h hi
ut b
a
do
iu
xe g a
u
w
rk
r
ee
ra
b
n
ed
na
Un ni t e er l a
la
la
st
to
d ta
h ex
bo
ak r a
el
la
nl
lg
Af
ra
ov
a
p
Ic
de
H
Fe
n
ia
Cz
Sl
ss
Ru
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405293
4.5. Youth unemployment is twice as high as adult unemployment in most OECD countries
Youth (15-24) and adult (25+) unemployment rates, Q1 2016
Adult unemployment rate (25+)
25 =
GRC
x2
20
ESP
15
x4
PRT ITA
10 SVK
TUR FRA
DNK NLDAUT CAN HUN SVN IRL FIN BEL
NOR OECD POL
5 ISR EST LUX
CZE
DEU USA AUS SWE
JPN CHL
ISL MEX CHE KOR GBR NZL
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Youth unemployment rate (15-24)
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405302
4.6. Incidence of long-term unemployment increases with age

Incidence of long-term unemployment (12 months and over) as a percentage of total unemployment by age group, 2015
Youth 15-24 ( ) Prime age (25-54) Older population (55+)
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Ic c o
No d
S w ay
en
Ne a el
Ze a
Fi nd
L u e nm d
Au ia
Un mb r k
d rg
Tu es
Es ey
Ne s tr a
er a
i te O ds
K i ECD
Ge dom
Fr r y
Sp l
Ja y
La n
Hu t v i a
ec Po c e
Re nd
Po bli c
B e a in
Sl ium
o v Ir n i a
Re and
ic
Gr y
ce
s t ia
ia ith c a
S o er a i a
Af n
a
ga
w nad
Au s tr i
th a li
an
ric
an
D an
u t tio
pa
ra
bl
C o omb
F e uan
It a
xe a
a
i te ou
rk
rw
at
an
ee
s s L Ri
ed
n
i
h la
a
to
r tu
e
ex
ng
rm
pu
pu
el
la
nl
al
ak el
Is
lg
ov
St
ng
a
M
h
Co
d
d
n
Cz
Un
Sl
Ru
Source: OECD (2016, OECD Employment Outlook 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/empl_outlook-2016-en.

1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405311

Skills
Skills play a central role in ensuring people find and keep

employment. They are particularly important for young Definition and measurement
people as general education levels have increased in most
The OECD Programme for the International Assessment
OECD countries over the last few decades. Young people
of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) assesses skill levels of
who lack basic literacy and numeracy skills will find it
adults aged 16-65 in literacy, numeracy and problem
particularly difficult to make the transition from school to
solving in technology-rich environments. The latter,
the workplace and may be left behind as countries skills
also known as information-processing skills, is
demands continue to increase. Chapter 1 displayed the
defined as the ability to use digital technology,
large gaps in NEET rates between those with low and high
communication tools and networks to acquire and
literacy and numeracy skills. In todays digital economy
evaluate information, communicate with others and
technological skills have also become much more
perform practical tasks. PIAAC is carried out in more
important for a range of employment opportunities than
than 40 countries and is designed to be comparable
was the case in the past. Skill levels are related more
cross-culturally and cross-nationally.
broadly to educational attainment. Those who leave school
before completing upper secondary are twice as likely to Literacy and numeracy proficiency are split into five
have a low level of numeracy skills (OECD, 2015). Skill levels levels while problem-solving in technology rich
are not fully determined by educational attainment environments is split into three. The graphs presented
however, the quality of education systems is of importance here show the proportion of youth with low skills.
in ensuring that students reach a minimum proficiency For literacy this is defined as those who can, at best,
level. Skill levels can vary considerably among individuals read relatively short texts to locate a single piece of
with similar educational qualifications (OECD, 2013). information that is identical to the information given
in the question or directive or to understand basic
On average across the OECD about one person aged
vocabulary. Those with low numeracy skills can, at
between 30 and 54 years in six has either low literacy, low
best, perform one-step or simple mathematical
numeracy or low problem solving skills. Skill levels differ
processes involving counting, sorting, basic arithmetic
substantially across OECD countries (Figures 4.7 and 4.8). In
operations, understanding simple percentages, and
countries such as Japan and Finland only a small proportion
locating and identifying elements of simple or
of individuals have low literacy, numeracy and technological
common graphical or spatial representations. Low
skills. Spain, Italy and France have the highest proportions of
achievers at problem-solving in technology rich
30-to-54 year-olds with low literacy skills, and Spain, Italy and
environments can, at best, use widely available and
the United States have the highest proportion of this group
familiar applications such as email or a web browser
with low numeracy skills. These countries, as well as
where little or no navigation is required to access
the United Kingdom, also tend to show relatively high shares
information or solve a problem.
of low numeracy and literacy skills among youth, while Japan,
Finland, as well as Korea have the lowest shares.
In recent decades, skill levels have improved in most
OECD countries for younger generations in line with more
general increases in educational attainment by young
people compared to their older counterparts. As a result,
there is a higher share of 30-54 year-olds with lows skills
than among 16-29 year-olds. The generational divide is Further reading
particularly striking for problem solving in technology-righ
environments (Figure 4.9). Japan stands out across the OECD OECD (2015), OECD Skills Outlook 2015: Youth, Skills and
in having little change in literacy and numeracy levels Employability, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/
between younger and older persons but this is due to the 10.1787/9789264234178-en.
fact that a large proportion of those aged 30-54 already had OECD (2013) OECD Skills Outlook 2013: First Results from the
high levels of performance, while Korea has made Survey of Adult Skill, OECD Publishing, Paris, www.oecd-
substantial improvements between generations. On the i l i b ra r y. o rg / e d u c a t i o n / o e c d - s k i l l s - o u t l o o k - 2 0 1 3 _
o t h e r h a n d , a f ew c o u n t r i e s h ave e x p e r i e n c e d a 9789264204256-en.
deterioration in literacy and numeracy performance
b e t we e n t h e o l d e r a n d yo u n g e r p o p u l a t i o n . T h e
United Kingdom and Norway have higher rates of youth Figure notes
with low literacy and numeracy levels compared to those
Figure 4.3: Results present the share of 16-29 year-olds and of
aged 30-54 while the proportion with low numeracy skills in
30-54 year-olds failing to reach Proficiency Level 2 in literacy and
the United States is high and performance levels have nu m e ra cy a n d P ro f i c i e n cy L eve l 1 i n p ro bl e m s o l v i n g i n
stagnated between the older and younger groups. technology-rich environment.

Skills
4.7. A substantial proportion of youth in the OECD have poor literacy skills
Percentage of individuals with low literacy skills, by age group, in 2012
16-29 ( ) 30-54
30
25
20
15
10
0
n
ec giums
)
ly
ic
en
li a
ic
ria
CD
da
a
ay
ce
nd
es
(U /
K)
ain
nd d
nd
an
ni
re
ar
el er
an
an
pa
bl
bl
It a
la lan
rw
at
an
ra
ed
na
la
st
OE
to
Sp
Ko
( B and
nm
rm
pu
pu
la
ol
nl
Ja
St
Ir e
st
Au
Fr
Sw
Ca
No
Es
Ir e E n g
er
Fi
Re
Re
Au
De
Ge
Fl
d
th
i te
h
ak
Ne
Un
ov
N.
Cz
Sl
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405321
4.8. An even higher proportion of youth have poor numeracy skills

Percentage of individuals with low numeracy skills, by age group, 2012
16-29 ( ) 30-54
30
25
20
15
10
0
a
e c giu s
)
ic
ria
en
ic
CD
ay
nd
li a
da
ce
nd
(U /
ain
K)
ly
es
nd d
m
nd
an
ni
re
ar
el er
an
pa
bl
bl
ta
la lan
rw
at
an
ra
ed
na
la
la
st
OE
to
Sp
Ko
( B nd
nm
rm
pu
pu
I
nl
la
Ja
St
Po
Ir e
st
Au
Fr
Sw
Ca
No
Es
Ir e E n g
er
Fi
Re
Re
Au
De
Ge
Fl
d
th
i te
h
ak
Ne
Un
ov
N.
Cz
Sl
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405330
4.9. When it comes to technology youth tend to perform better than their older counterparts
Percentage of individuals with low problem-solving skills in technology-rich environments, by age group, 2012
16-29 ( ) 30-54
30
25
20
15
10
0
a
gi s
)
da
(U /
nd
nd
d
en
ria
ay
CD
ic
li a
ic
K)
es
nd d
um
nd
an
ni
re
ar
el er
an
pa
bl
bl
la lan
rw
at
ra
ed
na
la
la
st
OE
to
Ko
nm
( B and
rm
pu
pu
nl
la
Ja
St
Po
Ir e
st
Au
Sw
Ca
No
Es
Ir e E n g
er
Fi
Re
Re
Au
De
Ge
Fl
d
th
i te
h
ak
Ne
ec
Un
ov
N.
Cz
Sl
Source: OECD (2015), OECD Skills Outlook 2015: Youth, Skills and Employability, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264234178-en.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405341

Education spending
On average, OECD countries spent USD 10 000 per child per enrolments in dual-system apprenticeship programmes at
year from primary through tertiary education in 2012 the upper secondary level (e.g. Finland, Germany and
(Figure 4.10). Spending was highest in Luxembourg with the Netherlands) tend to have higher expenditure per
just over USD 22 000 per child, followed by Switzerland, student in vocational programmes than in general
Norway and the United States. On the opposite end, programmes by 20% to 30% more. The underestimation of
spending was at around USD 3 500 in Mexico and Turkey. the expenditure made by private enterprises on dual
Spending was also relatively low (between USD 4 000 and vocational programmes can partly explain some of the
8 000) in several Eastern European countries. differences across countries.
All emerging economies for which data are available had
education spending comparable to the low-spending
OECD countries, except Indonesia at the lowest level of Definition and measurement
USD 1 400.
Data on education spending is calculated using total
The crisis has halted the long-term trend of increasing annual spending from primary to tertiary education
spending in education. While public spending as a (including research and development activities).
percentage of GDP for all levels of education increased by 6% Figures are for public and private spending combined,
between 2008 and 2010 on average across OECD countries, it and are reported in US dollars based on purchasing
fell by 3% between 2010 and 2012 (Figure 4.11). Public power parities for the respective years.
expenditures on educational institutions as a percentage of
The trends in expenditure on educational institutions
GDP decreased in three-quarters of those OECD countries
in percentage of GDP refer to the spending originating
for which data are available, most likely as a consequence
in, or generated by, the public sector.
of fiscal consolidation policies. Drops of more than 8% were
seen in Australia, Estonia, Hungary, Norway, Portugal and Levels of education are based on the International
Spain. In Australia, the drop related to a stimulus spending Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 2011),
programme on infrastructure that stopped in 2012. which distinguishes six levels of education, classified
here into four groups: early childhood (ISCED-0),
On average across the OECD countries, less investment is
primary (ISCED-1), lower secondary (ISCED-2), upper
put into early education as compared to later years, with
secondary (ISCED-3),post-secondary non-tertiary
spending per child ranging from USD 7 900 at the early
(ISCED-4), short cycle tertiary (ISCED-5), and Bachelor,
childhood level to USD 15 100 at the bachelor, master or
Master or Doctoral or equivalent (ISCED 6-7-8).
doctoral tertiary level (Figure 4.12). These averages mask a
broad range of expenditure per student by educational level
across the OECD countries. The ratio of the top spending to
the bottom spending country varies from 3 at the tertiary Further reading
level to 9 at secondary level.
Investing in vocational education can be key to smooth OECD (2015), Education at a Glance 2015: OECD Indicators,
school-to-work transitions, notably for vulnerable youth. OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-
Also on average, only USD 330 more per student is spent in 2015-en.
vocational than in general programmes at upper secondary
and post-secondary non-tertiary education. Exceptions to
Figure notes
this pattern are Australia, Belgium, Chile, Hungary,
Slovenia, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, where Figure 4.10: Data refer to 2013 for Chile, Colombia and Indonesia. Data
expenditure per student enrolled in a general programme are not available for Canada, Denmark and Greece.
is higher than expenditure per student in a vocational Figure 4.11: Data are not available for Austria, Denmark, Greece, Latvia,
programme. On the other hand, some countries with large Luxembourg, New Zealand and United Kingdom.

Education spending
4.10. Variation in per student education spending across the OECD

Annual expenditure per student from primary through tertiary education, in USD at current prices and current PPPs in 2012
(rounded at nearest 100)
25 000
22 500
17 500
20 000
15 500
15 500
13 200
12 700
12 200
12 100
12 100
15 000
11 700
11 400
11 000
10 700
10 500
10 300
10 300
10 000
9 600
9 400
9 000
9 000
8 700
8 000
7 900
7 700
10 000
7 400
6 900
6 200
6 100
5 600
5 200
4 000
3 600
3 500
3 500
3 400
3 300
5 000
1 400
0
i t z ur g
Un No nd
d ay
i te B el ds
Au es
Ne we ia
er n
Ki m
rm n
F i ny
Ir e d
Fr d
st e
Ic li a
OE d
Ne K D
Ze ea
Sp d
Sl ain
ec I al
ia
Po l y
pu l
Po li c
ov E nd
Re ni a
y
Hu bli c
L a le
Tu ia
M ey
o
Af n
B a
lo il
do i a
a
Re e
Au c
si
ric
Co r a z
ar
th de
an
an
Ge pa
an
u t tio
ic
C
en
g
h sr a
In m b
S r
It a
tv
d giu
do
i te r w
at
rk
an
w or
ra
Ch
n
a
la
la
la
st
ne
r tu
a k s to
ex
ng
S w bo
pu
la
nl
Ja
el
al
So r a
ov
St
er
ng
m
de
h
xe
Fe
Lu
n
ia
Cz
Un
Sl
ss
Ru
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405357
4.11. Decline in public education spending in percentage of GDP between 2010 and 2012
Index of change in public expenditure on educational institutions in percentage of GDP, for all levels of education
Between 2010 and 2012 (2010 = 100) ( ) Between 2008 and 2010 (2008 = 100)
125
120
115
110
105
100
95
90
85
Be a
C z t ze m
Re d
ic
Tu l
ey
il e
l
a
d
y
Au ain
No ia
Ca y
da
Re d
ic
Ge c e
Sl ny
ia
CD
M d
Sw o
Ic n
th an
Fi s
d
il
n
ga
e
nd
a
e
ni
re
i te It al
ar
h lan
ak lan
e
an
an
ic
az
tio
bl
ra
l
bl
en
S w l giu
rk
rw
at
an
Ch
ra
ed
na
Ne Jap
la
OE
to
r tu
Sp
ex
Ko
ng
Br
rm
pu
pu
el
la
nl
Is
ra
ov
St
ov Po
Ir e
r
st
Fr
Es
er
Hu
Po
de
d
Fe
ec
Un
n
ia
Sl
ss
Ru
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405368
4.12. Spending per child tends to increase with the level of education
Annual expenditure per student by level of education, in USD at current prices and current PPPs in 2012
OECD average Minimum Maximum
25 000 LUX (34 700)
LUX
LUX LUX
20 000 LUX
CZE
15 000 SWE
10 000 EST
5 000 TUR TUR HUN

MEX TUR MEX
0
Early Primary Lower Upper sec. Upper sec. Short- Bachelor's,
childhood secondary (general) (vocational) cycle master's
tertiary or doctoral
Source: OECD (2015), Education at a Glance 2015: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2015-en.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405374

Labour market entry
Finding a stable job after leaving school or university can

be a lengthy process involving bumps and false starts. Definition and measurement
Labour market entrants face a much greater risk of
In Figures 4.13 to 4.15, labour market entrants are
unemployment than young people who have been out of
defined as 15-to-29-year-olds who are not enrolled in
education for a while (Figure 4.13). Their unemployment
formal education in the reference year but who were in
rate is more than twice as high as that of all youth out of
education the year before. Figure 4.13 gives the share
education (33 vs. 16% across OECD countries). Young
of unemployed out of all active young people for labour
people who recently left education have particular
market entrants and for all youth not in education.
difficulties finding work in countries where youth
unemployment remains high in the aftermath of the crisis Figures 4.14 and 4.15 show the shares of young people
in Italy and Greece, over 60% of labour market entrants in (part-time or full-time) employment and the
are looking for work. development of real monthly earnings for the 2004
(pre-crisis) cohort and the 2009 (crisis) cohort of
Starting a career is especially hard during recessions,
labour market entrants for the first four years after
when fewer jobs are available and competition is intense.
labour market entry. Real earnings are expressed in
Young people who transitioned from education to the
relation to the earnings in the initial year after labour
labour market in 2009 had substantially lower employment
market entry (2004 or 2009, respectively). No earnings
rates over the next four years than a comparable cohort
data are available for Estonia in 2008, Hungary in 2005
who entered the labour market before the crisis in 2004
and 2006, Iceland in 2012, Mexico in 2008 and Spain
(left-hand panel of Figure 4.14). Even four years into their
in 2013. Therefore, the earnings development was
careers in 2008 and 2013, respectively the crisis cohort
interpolated for Hungary between 2004 and 2007 and
had substantially lower employment rates than their
for Iceland between 2011 and 2013, and extrapolated
pre-crisis peers the difference was 5 percentage points for
for Estonia and Mexico in 2008 and Spain in 2013 (end
young men and 10 percentage points for young women.
of the cohort tracking periods).
Experience from previous recessions shows, moreover,
that even those who manage to secure employment have
fewer opportunities for promotion and training and
therefore tend to suffer from persistently depressed
earnings (e.g. Oreopoulous et al., 2012). Also the 2009 Further reading
cohort of labour market entrants suffered from a much
more meagre earnings growth than their pre-crisis peers Carcillo, S. et al. (2015), NEET Youth in the Aftermath of the
(right-hand panel of Figure 4.14): for women, earnings rose Crisis Challenges and Policies, OECD Social, Employment
by a modest 3% per year over the first four years. For men, and Migration Working Papers, No. 164, OECD Publishing,
earnings plummeted by 11% in the year after labour market Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js6363503f6-en.
entry, and only barely recovered over the following three Oreopoulos, P., T. von Wachter and A. Heisz (2012), The
years. The pre-crisis cohort, by contrast, enjoyed solid Short- and Long-Term Career Effects of Graduating in a
earnings growth of around 6-7% per year for both women Recession, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
and men during the initial years after labour market entry. Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 1-29, http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.4.1.1.
Earnings have grown more slowly for the 2009 cohort of Quintini, G. and S. Martin (2014), Same Same but Different:
labour market entrants in nearly all countries studied School-to-work Transitions in Emerging and Advanced
(Figure 4.15). In the Netherlands, for example, a country Economies, OECD Social, Employment and Migration
with one of the highest youth employment rates (see Working Papers, No. 154, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://
Chapter 1), youth who left education in 2008 saw their real dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jzbb2t1rcwc-en.
earnings shrink by 2% over five years, compared to a 29%
earnings increase for those who graduated in 2003. The
drop in earnings growth is particularly large again,
Figure notes
however, in the countries hit hardest by the crisis: Spain Figure 4.13: 2013 for Germany and Turkey. Data are missing for Australia,
(-56 percentage points), Estonia (-47 percentage points) and Canada, Chile, Israel, Japan, Korea and New Zealand.
Ireland (-42 percentage points). Figures 4.14 and 4.15: OECD averages shown are for all countries with
available data: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico,
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia
Spain and the United Kingdom.

Labour market entry
4.13. Labour market entrants have much greater difficulties to find work than other young people
Unemployment rate in percent among labour market entrants and all youth not in education, 2014
Labour market entrants All youth ( )
80
60
40
20
0
ay
nd
es
ria
ic
l
g
en
ia
y
CD
nd
ce
ic
ia
ly
ain
ce
ga
an
nd
ni
ke
ar
ar
an
an
ic
ur
bl
bl
en
tv
It a
iu
do
rw
at
an
ee
ed
la
la
st
OE
to
r tu
Sp
ex
nm
ng
bo
r
rm
pu
pu
la
el
nl
La
lg
ov
St
Tu
Po
er
ng
Au
Gr
Fr
Sw
No
Es
M
Ic
er
Fi
Be
Hu
m
Po
Re
Re
it z
Ge
De
Sl
d
Ki
th
xe
i te
Sw
ak
Ne
d
Lu
ec
Un
i te
ov
Cz
Un
Sl
Source: Calculations from EU-LFS and national labour force surveys for the Mexico, the United States and Turkey.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405381
4.14. Young people who entered the labour market during the crisis had lower employment and earnings growth
Employment rates (in percent) and relative earnings (initial earnings=100) over a four-year period for the 2004 and 2009 cohorts
of labour market entrants, OECD average, by gender
Women 2004 labour market entrants Women 2009 labour market entrants
Men 2004 labour market entrants Men 2009 labour market entrants
Percentage of employed youth Earnings development
90 140
130
80 120
110
70 100
90
60 80
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
Source: Calculations from EU-SILC and the Mexican National Occupation and Employment Survey (ENOE).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405393
4.15. The drop in earnings growth for labour market entrants was largest in economies hit hard by the crisis
Four year earnings increase for the 2004 and 2009 cohorts of labour market entrants, in percent of the starting wage, by country
2004 labour market entrants ( ) 2009 labour market entrants
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
y
ly
l
ce
nd
ia
ce
ic
o
ic
ria
ain
nd
CD
ga
nd
ni
ar
an
ic
ur
bl
en
bl
It a
do
iu
an
ee
la
la
st
OE
to
r tu
Sp
ex
ng
bo
pu
pu
la
el
lg
ov
Ir e
Po
ng
Au
Gr
Fr
Es
M
Ic
er
Be
Hu
m
Po
Re
Re
Sl
Ki
th
xe
h
ak
Ne
d
Lu
ec
i te
ov
Cz
Un
Sl
Source: Calculations from EU-SILC and the Mexican National Occupation and Employment Survey (ENOE).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405407

5. EQUITY INDICATORS
Income inequality
Poverty
Living on benefits
Social spending

Income inequality
Income inequality is an indicator of how material

resources are distributed across society. Some people Definition and measurement
consider that high levels of income inequality are morally
The main indicator of income distribution used is the
undesirable; others regard income inequality as harmful
Gini coefficient. Values of the Gini coefficient range
for social cohesion. Beyond its impact on social cohesion,
from 0 in the case of perfect equality (each person
growing inequality can also be harmful for long-term
receives the same income) and 1 in the case of perfect
growth and harms opportunities. Often the policy concern
inequality (all income goes to the person with the
is focussed more on the direction of change of inequality,
highest income). Measures of income inequality can be
rather than its level.
based on peoples household disposable income
Income inequality varied considerably across the post-taxes and social transfers or on peoples
OECD countries in 2014 (or nearest year available) household market income pre-taxes and transfers
(Figure 5.1). The Gini coefficient ranges from around 0.25 in (for more details, see Definition and measurement in
Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Slovenia to almost twice the indicator on Household income in Chapter 3).
that value in Chile and Mexico. The Nordic and central Gini coefficients are based on equivalised incomes for
European countries have the lowest inequality levels of OECD and EU countries, Colombia, Lithuania and
disposable income while inequality is high in Chile, Israel, the Russian Federation i.e. adjusted for differences in
Mexico, Turkey and the United States. Alternative the needs of households of different sizes with an
indicators of income inequality suggest similar rankings. equivalence scale that divides household income by
The gap between the average income of the richest and the the square root of household size, on per capita
poorest 10% of the population was 9.4 to 1 on average incomes for all key partners (dark bar) except India and
across OECD countries in 2014, ranging from 5 to 1 in Indonesia for which per capita consumption was used
Denmark to more than four times larger (21 to 1) in Chile (light bar) typically showing lower inequality
and Mexico. Keeping measurement-related differences in measures.
mind, emerging countries have higher levels of income
An alternative indicator is the S90/S10 income decile
inequality than most OECD countries, particularly in Brazil,
share, corresponding to the gap between the average
Colombia and South Africa.
incomes of the richest and the poorest 10% of the
The distribution of income from work and capital (market population, also based on equivalised disposable
income, pre-taxes and transfers) widened during the crisis. income. Income data are from the OECD Income
Between 2007 and 2014, market income inequality rose Distribution Database available at www.oecd.org/social/
by 1.6% on average (bars in Figure 5.2). The increase was income-distribution-database.htm.
particularly large in Estonia, Greece, Ireland and Spain. On
Wealth data refers to net private household wealth,
the other hand, market income inequality fell in Israel and
that is the value of all assets owned by a household
Turkey, and to a smaller extent in Chile and Poland. The
less the value of all its liabilities at a particular point
distribution of income that households take home
in time, around 2012 here. Data are from the OECD
(disposable income, post-taxes and transfers) remained
Wealth Distribution database at http://stats.oecd.org/
unchanged on average, due to the effect of cash public
Index.aspx?DataSetCode=WEALTH.
transfers and direct taxes. Between 2007 and 2014, the Gini
coefficient for disposable income remained broadly stable
in most OECD countries (markers in Figure 5.2). It fell the
most in Iceland, Latvia and Portugal, and increased the
most in Estonia, Slovak Republic and Sweden. Further reading
Household wealth is much more unequally distributed
than income. On average, households in the top 10% of OECD (2015), In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All,
the wealth distribution own half of all total household OECD Publishing, Paris, http://oe.cd/init2015.
wealth, and as much as 76% in the United States. In
comparison, the richest 10% of income earners get on Figure notes
average around a quarter of all cash income, ranging from
28% in the United States to 20% in Norway (Figure 5.3). But Figures 5.1 and 5.2: Data refer to 2014 for Australia, Finland, Hungary,
countries with lower income inequality levels are not Israel, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United States and China;
necessarily those with low wealth concentration, as to 2012 for Japan and New Zealand, Argentina, Colombia and
South Africa; 2011 f or Brazil; 2010 f or Indonesia and the
witnessed by the examples of Austria, Germany and
Russian Federation; and to 2013 for all other countries. Data shown
the Netherlands. for 2007 refer to 2008 for Australia, France, Germany, Israel, Mexico,
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States; to 2006 for
Japan; and to 2009 for Chile. No change available for Switzerland.

Income inequality
5.1. Large differences in levels of income inequality

Gini coefficient of household disposable income and gap between richest and poorest 10%, in 2014 (or nearest year)
Gini coefficient ( , left axis) S90/S10 income decile share (right axis)
0.70 21
0.60 18
0.50 15
0.40 12
0.30 9
0.20 6
0.10 3
0 0
No land
n ay
ov k
h inl a
p d
a k el g li c
pu m
Au bli c
xe e a
s
N e mb d en
er r g
rm r y
S w Fr any
er e
Po and
Ko n d
Ir e r e a
OE nd
Ca CD
Gr g a l
It a a
w Jap l y
a n
st d
r tu ia
Sp c e
d L a in
ng ia
E s om
Is i a
ite Tur el
St y
M tes
Ch o
il e
n th ia
In r a t a
Ar ne n
ge si a
Ch n a
C B a
ut m l
h bia
a
So olo r a zi
Hu a n d
e c F eni
Lu S w s tr i
d
i t z anc
d ke
in
Sl mar
de ni
ric
Re a n
Au lan
Ze a
do io
ic
Po r al
n
ra
i a L i In d
Ki t v
a
Re iu
Ge nga
t h ou
De r w
ee
ov B ub
na
i
la
la
to
nt
F e ua
a
ex
d
l
Af
e
l
Ic
Ne
Un
i te
Cz
Un
Sl
ss
Ru
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405418
5.2. Market income inequality rose between 2007 and 2014

Percentage point changes in the Gini coefficient of household market and disposable incomes between 2007 and 2014
Market income inequality ( ) Disposable income inequality
8
-2
-4
-6
Sl g al
s
m n
D e ur g
ia
Hu il e
Ic a
k
n
Po al y
Ir e i a
Es d
Gr i a
ce
ain
Tu l
ey
nd
i te ea a
Sl d K i a n d
Re m
Au ic
Un er l a
Re t e s
Au bli c
Ge a li a
y
CD
M y
Fr o
Be ce
Fi m
S nd
e
i te and
an
a
ad
th tr i
re
ar
ar
xe d e
n
pa
an
ic
bl
en
n
ra
tv
iu
a k do
rk
rw
an
ee
Ch
la
la
It
OE
r tu
to
Sp
a
ex
Ko
nm
ng
Ne s
bo
r
rm
Ne C an
pu
pu
Lu we
nl
el
Ja
l
La
Is
lg
ov
ec S t
Po
st
ov ng
No
Z
Cz d
w
h
Un
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405420
5.3. Wealth is more concentrated at the top than income

Share of top 10% of household disposable income and top 10% of household net wealth, 2012 (or nearest year)
Top 10% income share ( ) Top wealth share 10%
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
l
ria
ic
ay
es
li a
ce
ce
da
ly
ain
CD
ga
nd
an
an
ur
bl
It a
iu
do
rw
at
ee
an
ra
na
st
OE
r tu
Sp
bo
rm
pu
la
nl
lg
St
st
ng
Au
Gr
Fr
Ca
No
er
Fi
Be
m
Po
Re
Au
Ge
d
Ki
th
xe
i te
ak
Ne
d
Lu
Un
i te
ov
Un
Sl
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (http://oe.cd/odd) and OECD Wealth Distribution Database.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405431

Poverty
Income Poverty rates measure the share of people at the

bottom end of the income distribution. Often a societys Definition and measurement
equity concerns are greater for the relatively disadvantaged.
As with income inequality, the starting point for
Thus poverty measures often receive more attention than
poverty measurement is the concept of equivalised
income inequality measures, with greater concerns for
household disposable income (see Definition and
certain groups like older people and children, who have no
measurement of the Household income or Income
or limited options for working their way out of poverty.
inequality indicators).
The average OECD relative poverty rate in 2014 was 11%
The poverty rate is a headcount of how many people
for the OECD (Figure 5.4). Poverty rates were highest at
fall below the poverty line. People are classified as
around 18% in Israel and the United States, while poverty
poor when their equivalised disposable household
in Iceland and Denmark affected only about one in 20
income is less than 50% of the median prevailing in
people. Mediterranean countries and Chile, Japan, Korea
each country. The use of a relative income threshold
and the United States have relatively high poverty rates.
means that richer countries have the higher poverty
The crisis had a limited impact on relative income poverty thresholds. Higher poverty thresholds in richer
(i.e. the share of people living with less than half the countries capture the notion that avoiding poverty
median disposable income in their country annually). means an ability to access to the goods and services
Between 2007 and 2014, poverty increased by more than 2 that are regarded as customary or the norm in any
percentage point only in Estonia and Hungary (Bars in g iven county. Poverty rates by ag e group are
Figure 5.5). Over the same period, it fell in Australia, computed based on the median income for the entire
Iceland, Latvia and the United Kingdom, while changes population.
were below 2 percentage point in the other OECD countries.
Changes in relative poverty referring to the current
By using an indicator which measures poverty against a median income can be difficult to interpret during
benchmark anchored to half the median real incomes recessions. In a situation where the incomes of all
observed in 2005 (i.e. keeping constant the value of households fall, but they fall by less at the bottom
the 2005 poverty line), recent increases in income poverty than at the middle, relative poverty will decline.
are much higher than suggested by relative income Therefore, more absolute poverty indices, linked to
poverty. This is particularly the case in Greece, Ireland, Italy past living standards, are needed to complement the
and Spain (symbols in Figure 5.5). While relative poverty picture provided by relative income poverty.
did not increase much or even fell in these countries, Therefore changes in poverty are also presented in
anchored poverty increased by 4 percentage points or Figure 5.5 using an indicator which measures poverty
more between 2007 and 2014, reflecting disposable against a benchmark anchored to half the median
income losses of poorer households in those countries. real incomes observed in 2005.
Only in Chile and Korea anchored poverty fell.
Data are from the OECD Income Distribution Database
There has been a gradual shift in the age profile of poverty available at www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution
over the last decades, with young people replacing the database.htm.
elderly as the group most at risk of poverty (OECD, 2015).
With an average poverty rate of almost 14% in 2014, youth
have a higher poverty risk than any other group.
(Figure 5.6). Poverty rates amongst youth were particularly
high in Denmark, Netherlands and Norway, countries Further reading
where youth leave parents home early and become
economically independent (Figure 1.25). But rates were also OECD (2015), In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All,
high in Greece and to a lesser extent in Spain where youth OECD Publishing, Paris, http://oe.cd/init2015.
unemployment rates ballooned during the crisis.
Rates for the elderly were below those observed for youth Figure notes
in two-thirds of countries and even below the rates for the
26-65 in half of the countries. Very high poverty rates Data refer to 2014 for Australia, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Korea, Mexico,
among elderly are observed in a few countries, which is the Netherlands and the United States; to 2012 for Japan and
New Zealand; and to 2013 for all other countries.
often related to their pension systems. For instance, poverty
rates were highest in Korea, where the recent pension Figure 5.5: 2007 refer to 2008 for Australia, France, Germany, Israel,
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States;
system has not fully matured, as well as in Australia and
to 2006 for Japan; and to 2009 for Chile. No change available for
Switzerland partly due to the fact that many pensioners Switzerland. OECD average is based on 25 OECD countries for which
have taken their accumulated pensions as lump sums data are available for both poverty definitions. Poverty rates are
(which are not counted as current income) rather than anchored in 2006 for Chile, Japan, Korea and Turkey; and 2007 for
annuitising them to provide income streams. Austria and Spain.

Poverty
5.4. Large differences in levels of relative poverty

Percentage of persons living with less than 50% of median equivalised disposable income, in 2014 (or nearest year)
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
La l
o
Un Tu ile
d ey
it z nds
S w nd
es
el
a
F i li c
Ze ia
Be nd
Un H ium
Ki r y
Po m
nd
CD
Au ada
li a
Po l y
Ko a
Gr a
Sp e
ain
Es an
M ia
De land
Lu epu e
Ne bo c
e g
Ir e e n
Au nd
Ge tr ia
N e lov y
Re ar k
No d
ov F ay
ga
S an
ni
m i
c
re
R nc
an
ic
t h ur
ra
xe bl
n
w en
It a
tv
do
d ga
i te r k
at
rw
ee
Ch
b
ra
ed
p
la
la
la
a
OE
r tu
to
ua
ex
e c nm
s
rm
n
ak r a
pu
Ja
nl
Sw rla
al
Is
lg
St
e
er
st
ng
i t e un
Ca
th
Ic
Li
h
Cz
Sl
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405446
5.5. The evolution of poverty differs if the threshold is anchored at the time of the crisis
Percentage point changes in relative and anchored poverty rates between 2007 and 2014
Relative poverty threshold ( ) Poverty threshold anchored in 2005
14
24
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
Lu Po l
Ki t via
Tu y
Ja y
Ca n
Fr a
Sw ce
C z B den
Re ium
Po bli c
m d
g
el
Re a l y
Sl bli c
ia
Gr s
Ic m
Au and
Ne e a
Ze o
Fi nd
d
A u il e
Ir e i a
De l and
k
a
CD
d ay
Ge ates
er n
Es ce
Hu ni a
a
ga
an
nd
e
ni
li
re
ar
ar
xe l a n
th ai
an
pa
w x ic
ur
ra
en
r
do
rk
i te r w
an
ee
Ch
ra
na
a
st
ak It
OE
r tu
to
Ne Sp
ua
Ko
nm
ng
bo
rm
pu
pu
e
la
el
nl
al
La
Is
ec elg
ov
St
st
ng
Un o
M
th
N
Li
h
d
i te
ov
Un
Sl
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405454
5.6. In 2014, poverty was highest among youth and children and lowest among adults and elderly
Percentage of persons living with less than 50% of median equivalised income, by age group, in 2014 (or nearest year)
Young (18-25) ( ) Child (under 18) Adult (26-65) Elderly (over 65)
35
49
30
25
20
15
10
0
p.
i t z and
Sl and
Au eni a
Lu ak ia
m p.
La g
Ne K ia
Ze a
i te Au nd
K i ria
B e om
Hu ium
M ry
Po co
Fr d
Es ce
Ge oni a
OE y
Tu D
ey
il e
Ir e l y
Is l
S w nd
C a en
Po ada
Un J el
d an
Sp s
ain
De land
er e
No ds
N e Gr e k
ay
a
ga
an
w or e
th ec
ni
ar
n
ur
C
ov al
ra
tv
It a
Re
xe Re
rk
at
rw
an
Ch
ed
i
i te ap
n
la
a
la
d st
r tu
ua
ex
nm
d
ng
bo
Sl s tr
rm
n
S w Ic el
al
la
lg
ov
St
t
n
er
ng
h
th
Fi
ec
Li
Cz
Un
Source: Provisional data from OECD Income Distribution Database (http://oe.cd/idd).

1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405464

Living on benefits
Most OECD countries operate transfer programmes that

aim at preventing extreme hardship and use a low-income Definition and measurement (cont.)
criterion as the central entitlement condition. These
income sources and no entitlements to primary benefits
guaranteed minimum-income benefits (GMI) provide
such as unemployment insurance. They are net of any
financial support for low-income families to ensure an
income taxes and social contributions. Median
acceptable standard of living. As such, they play a crucial
disposable incomes (before housing costs) come from
role as last-resort safety nets, especially during prolonged
the OECD Income Distribution Database (www.oecd.org/
economic downturns when long-term unemployment rises
social/income-distribution-database.htm). They are for a
and increasing numbers of people exhaust their entitlements
year around 2014 expressed in 2014 prices and are
for unemployment benefits.
adjusted for family size using the square root of
GMI benefits are particularly important for youth who live household size equivalence scale. Similarly, net
on their own. When out of work, many youth are not minimum cash benefits are converted to 2014 prices.
eligible for unemployment insurance schemes because
The net replacement rate (NRR) measures the fraction
they do not have enough contribution records. In most
of net income in work that is maintained when
countries young individuals and couples are entitled to the
unemployed. It is defined as the ratio of net income
same benefits than adults, but some countries restrict
while out of work divided by net income while in work.
access to GMI programmes to youth (France, Luxembourg)
The NRR presented here corresponds to a 40 years-old
while others provide lower amounts for single youth
single person without children who earns 100% of the
(Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Switzerland,
average wage. Initial phase of unemployment refers to
Australia, New Zealand and Israel).
the first month of benefit following any waiting period,
In a large majority of OECD countries, incomes for the and long-term unemployment refers to the 60th month
long-term unemployed are much lower than for the of benefit receipt.
recently unemployed (Figure 5.7). Making GMI benefits
Family incomes are simulated using the OECD
more accessible is key to maintaining a degree of income
Tax-Benefit Model (methodology available in Benefits
security for the long-term unemployed. In addition, high
and Wages 2007 and on-line: www.oecd.org/els/social/
numbers of people who have neither a job nor an
w o rk i n c e n t i v e s ) . T h e a m o u n t s c a l c u l a t e d f o r
unemployment benefit means that the generosity of GMI
m e a n s - t e s t e d b e n e f i t s s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e re d
benefits is likely to receive more public attention.
upper-bound estimates. While housing benefits
Benefits of last resort are sometimes significantly lower frequently provide the largest part of benefit income,
than commonly used poverty thresholds (Figure 5.8). they are computed for rental expenses equal to 20% of
Poverty avoidance or alleviation are primary objectives of average worker earnings or the applicable ceiling of
GMI programmes. When comparing benefit generosity allowable rental expenses, whichever is lower. This
across countries, a useful starting point is to look at benefit may well exceed actual housing costs, particularly for
levels relative to commonly used poverty thresholds. low-income households. No data are available for
The gap between benefit levels and poverty thresholds is Mexico.
very large in some countries (Figure 5.8). In a few countries
there is no generally applicable GMI benefit (Greece, Italy and
Turkey). For GMI couples living in rented accommodation,
Further reading
housing-related benefits like rent allowances can provide
significant further income assistance, bringing overall Immervoll, H., S.P. Jenkins and S. Knigs (2015), Are
incomes close to or somewhat above the poverty line Recipients of Social Assistance Benefit Dependent?
(Iceland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland). Family Concepts, Measurement and Results for Selected
incomes in these cases depend strongly on the type of Countries, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working
housing and on family arrangements. In all countries, Papers, No. 162, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/
income from sources other than public transfers is needed 10.1787/5jxrcmgpc6mn-en.
to avoid substantial poverty risks.
OECD (2015), Minimum Wages After the Crisis: Making
Them Pay, Directorate for Employment, Labour and
Social Affairs, OECD, Paris, May 2015, www.oecd.org/
Definition and measurement social/Focus-on-Minimum-Wages-after-the-crisis-2015.pdf
One way of looking at how countries social protection
systems perform is to show how the level of net
minimum cash income benefits (including housing
Figure notes
assistance) compares to relative poverty thresholds of Figure 5.7: No data for Mexico.
50% or 60% of median household incomes. These Figure 5.8: No data for Mexico; the standard indicator corresponds to a
income levels account for all cash benefit entitlements 40 years-old individual, youth is a 20 years-old individual; countries
of a family with a working-age head, with no other a re ra n k e d f ro m l e f t t o r i g h t by i n c re a s i n g l eve l o f c a s h
minimum-income benefit including housing benefit.

0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Gr Gr Au
ee ee st
ra
ce ce li
It a It a N e Gr a
Un w e e c
Tu ly Tu ly i te e a eZ
rk
ey
rk
ey d
Un Un K i land
ng
i t e Ch i t e Ch do
d il e
St
d il e
St m
a a Ko
re
Hu te s
ng
Hu te s
ng Un w a S
Po ar y a i te ed
Ca r y d en
r tu St
g Po da
na a
C a al Hu te s
r tu
Minimum income benefit

na ng
Sl
ov da ga a
a k Sp Ko l Po r y
re la
Re a in Sl
ov a n
pu a k Isr Ir e d
bl la
Po ic
Re ae n
pu l Tu d
la bl rk
E s nd Po ic Es ey
to la to
Sl ni a nd ni
ov Sp Ja a
en
ia Sl in a pa
Ko ov Au n
Housing benefit
re en st
i ria
La a La a

tv tv Ch
ia Es a i il e
OE to Sp
CD Au ni a ain
Is st O
Initial phase of unemployment ( )
ra ra
li Ge ECD
Fr el Ne O a rm
an w EC a
Be ce Ze D Ic n y
lg al el
iu an an
m d
Source: OECD Tax-Benefit Models, www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits-and-wages.htm.

Ja Fr d
Au pan
an I
No c e De t al y
st rw nm
ra a
li B e ay Sl
ov C a r k
Ne Au a lg
iu ak na
Poverty level (50%)

w s tr
Panel B. Couple, no children

Ze ia Au m Re d a
al st pu
an b
Panel A. Single person, no children

Cz Ge r ia
e c N or d Sw rm No li c
h i t an
rw
Re w ay B e ay
pu L u z er y
b l lg
iu
S li c C z xem a n d
ec b
in percentage of median household income, 2014
S w we h ou Fr m
Un i t de Re r g an
i te ze n pu Sl c e
ov
d rla
K i nd b en
ng F i li c Cz F
d nl e c in i a
Ge om a h lan
S w nd Re d
Lu rm ed S w pu
Youth at 20 (MIB + HB)
xe a n
m y
Un e i t bli c
i t e Ic e n
bo d
Long-term unemployment
N e z er l
u K i land th an
Fi rg ng er d
nl
an d la
De om
d nm Po nds
N e Ic el Lu r t
th an ar xe u g
er d Ja k m al
la bo
Net income while out of work in percentage of net income in work (NRR), 40 years-old single, 2014
pa
De nds n ur
nm N e Ir e l La g
Net income level provided by cash minimum-income benefit (MIB), with and without housing benefit (HB),
a th an tv
er d ia
5.8. Minimum-income benefits alone cannot typically prevent income poverty, notably for youth
Ir e r k la
la nd Is
nd s ra
el
5.7. In most countries, benefit incomes decline significantly for people with long unemployment spells
Li Li Li
th th th
ua ua ua
Poverty level (60%)
ni ni
a a ni
a
107
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405488
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405479
Living on benefits
Social spending
In 2016, public social spending average an estimated 21%
of GDP across the 35 OECD countries (Figure 5.9). Public Definition and measurement
social spending-to-GDP ratios are highest in France, at 32%
Social expenditure is classified as public when general
of GDP, followed by Finland, at over 30% of GDP. Belgium,
government controls the financial flows. Sickness
Italy, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, and Greece devote more
benefits financed by compulsory contributions to
than a quarter of their GDP to public social spending. At the
social insurance funds are considered public,
other end of the spectrum are non-European countries
whereas sickness benefits paid directly by employers
such as Latvia, Turkey, Korea, Chile and Mexico which
to their employees are classified as private. The
spend less than 15% of GDP on social support. Social
spending shown in Figure 5.9 is recorded before
spending in the emerging economies in the early 2010s was
deduction of direct and indirect tax payments levied
lower than the OECD average, ranging from around 2% of
on these benefits and before addition of tax
GDP in India to about 17% in Brazil.
expenditures provided for social purposes. Data after
While in most OECD countries social spending has not fallen considering the impact of private social spending as
much in recent years, in some countries there has been a well as the tax system (Total Net social) are presented
significant decline since spending peaked in 2009-10. in Figure 5.10. Spending by lower tiers of government
Spending-to-GDP ratios declined by 3 percentage points in may be underestimated in some federal countries.
Hungary and Luxembourg and by 4 and 6 percentage points
Public social spending totals reflect detailed social
of GDP in Latvia and Ireland respectively.
expenditure data for 1980-2013/14. Consistent with
When comparing current social spending levels with these historical series, public social expenditure totals
pre-crisis levels in 2007, public social-spending-to-GDP were calculated for 2014, 2015 and estimated for 2016.
ratios are about more than 5 percentage points higher
The OECD countrys age-spending profile maps public
in 2016 in Finland, Greece, Norway, Estonia, Japan (2013).
social and education expenditure by year of age for
On average in the OECD, pensions and health services the first 28 years of life and the pre-natal period of
account for two-third of the total expenditures. In a nine months. Expenditure is allocated by benefit
majority of OECD countries, pensions are the largest rules, population data by age, and reported receipt by
expenditure area (Figure 5.10). In Anglophone countries age, where this data is available. Detailed childhood
and most other countries outside Europe, health makes the age-spending profiles for each individual age are
bulk of public social expenditure. In a few countries, such available online via the OECD Family Database,
as Denmark and Ireland, the largest share is devoted to www.oecd.org/social/family/database.htm.
income support of the working-age population.
Accounting for the impact of taxation and private social
benefits (Figure 5.10) leads to some convergence of
Further reading
spending-to-GDP ratios across countries. Net total social
spending is 21-28% of GDP in about half of countries. It is Adema, W., P. Fron and M. Ladaique (2011), Is the European
even higher for the United States at 29% of GDP, where the Welfare State Really More Expensive? Indicators on Social
amount of private social spending and tax incentives is Spending, 1980-2012 and a Manual to the OECD Social
much larger than in other countries. It remains highest in Expenditure Database (SOCX), OECD Social, Employment
France at 31% of GDP. and Migration Working Papers, No. 124, OECD Publishing,
I nve s t i n g o n e a r ly a g e s i s i m p o r t a n t f o r f u t u re Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg2d2d4pbf0-en.
development and capacities of young people. Public OECD (2015), Integrating Social Services for Vulnerable Groups,
spending on family benefits and education varies OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
according to the age of the child (Figure 5.11). Social 9789264233775-en.
expenditure during early childhood is focused mainly on
OECD (2011), Doing Better for Families, OECD Publishing,
cash benefits/tax breaks and childcare, while spending on
Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264098732-en.
older children is dominated by public investment in
education. On average public spending on education is OECD Family Database, www.oecd.org/social/family/database.htm.
dominant when children are aged 12-17. Most children are
in secondary education at this stage of childhood, and
Figure notes
consequently education spending forms a large part of
total spending. Figure 5.9: Data for Mexico refer to 2012, 2013 for Japan, 2014 for Turkey
and 2015 for Canada, Chile and New Zealand.
Figure 5.10: Countries are ranked by decreasing order of public social
expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Spending on Active Labour
Market Programs (ALMPs) cannot be split into cash and service
spending. Income support to the working-age population refers to
spending on the following SOCX categories: Incapacity benefits,
Family cash benefits, Unemployment and Other social policy areas.
Total net social expenditure data are not available for Latvia.

Social spending
5.9. Public social spending is worth 22% of GDP on average across the OECD
Public social expenditure as a percent of GDP, 2007, peak level after 2007, and 2016
2016 ( ) Peak level after 2007 2007

35
30
25
20
15
10
0
Ja al
i te m ds
d li c
ov u e s
Ic nd
h z il
pu a
E s li c
C a ni a
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Ir e a e l
La d
Tu ia
ey
il e
M rea
o
a
do n a
a
a
Fi ce
B e and
m
nm y
Au ar k
S w tr ia
Gr e n
rm e
No any
Sl pan
L u h er l ni a
Sp y
Po ain
ng g
m
Hu C D
S w Po r y
N e d
ec Ze d
Un Rep a n d
a
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Re a li
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De It al
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an
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K i ur
g
tv
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Sl A t a t
an
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i t e ub
In C h i
ed
Un xe a n
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In
to
r tu
t e
ex
Ko
ng
s
d bo
ak s tr
el
nl
h al
lg
Af
Ne ov
Fr
So
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405490
5.10. Most spending goes to pensions and health

Public social spending by broad policy area and total net social spending, 2013/14, in percentage of GDP
Other social services Health Income support to the working age population
Pensions (old age and survivors) Total net social (OECD)
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
Ge gal
ce
d
m
ly
Au e
ria
en
Po n
Sl ny
m a
g
an
Ki r y
d
es
Un H ds
ay
Re D
I ic
Ze d
it z d
nd
Re i a
Ca c
da
Es l
a
ia
ey
il e
M a
o
e
c
ni
ar
re
an
ai
ite an
n
Sw alan
an
ur
ic
C
Lu ven
bl
ak tr al
bl
ra
It a
tv
iu
do
ga
rk
rw
at
an
ee
Ch
ed
n
Ne Jap
na
la
Ne rela
st
ec OE
to
Sp
r tu
ex
nm
Ko
bo
rm
pu
pu
nl
la
ol
el
La
lg
Is
St
Tu
er
ng
i te un
Gr
Fr
Sw
No
s
o
Ic
er
Fi
P
Be
Sl Au
De
d
th
xe
w
h
d
Un
ov
Cz
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405505
5.11. Public spending on family benefits and education varies according to the age of the child
Average social expenditure (including education) by intervention in OECD countries, in PPP per child and age in early 2010s (USD),
OECD average
Cash benefits and tax breaks Childcare Other benefits in kind+Active labour market programmes Education
14 000
12 000
10 000
8 000
6 000
4 000
2 000
0
+
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
n
tio
ep
nc
Co
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database, www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm.

1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405515

Cash transfers for working-age people provide a major Figure 1.23). Consequently, social safety nets are less
income safety net in periods of high unemployment. In effective in fighting poverty among young people than
most countries two different layers of support can be among other adults.
distinguished: a primary out-of-work benefit (generally
unemployment insurance benefits); and a secondary
benefit (unemployment assistance or minimum-income
benefits such as social assistance) for those who are not or Definition and measurement
no longer entitled to insurance benefits.
Primary out-of-work benefits are those that are typically
In 2012, the shares of working-age individuals receiving
received during an initial phase of unemployment
primary out-of-work benefits were highest in Belgium,
(unemployment insurance in most countries). Some
France, Finland, Spain, Portugal and Australia, with rates
countries that have no unemployment insurance
above 4% (Figure 5.12). At the other end of the spectrum, in
instead operate means-tested unemployment
Turkey, the United Kingdom, Japan, Hungary and Korea,
assistance as the primary benefit. Eligibility for primary
less than 1% received unemployment insurance payments.
benefits typically requires previous employment or
On average, 2.3% of the working-age population received
insurance contributions. Exceptions are assistance
primary out-of-work benefits in the OECD. There is no
benefits in Australia and New Zealand, which are not
nation-wide unemployment insurance programme in
conditional on earlier employment. All primary
Mexico.
out-of-work benefits are subject to active job search and
The large variation in the numbers in part reflects labour related requirements, although implementation and
market conditions and partly the design of social benefit enforcement differs across countries and programmes.
systems. Low participation in unemployment insurance
Where unemployment insurance is the primary
programmes reduces coverage among the unemployed. An
benefit, unemployment assistance or social assistance
example is Chile, where unemployment insurance is
provide secondary income support. In addition, many
organised as an individual saving scheme and take-up is
countries operate targeted benefits for specific groups,
voluntary. In Sweden, where unemployment insurance
such as lone parents.
membership is voluntary, recipient numbers dropped
despite rising unemployment. Between 2007 and 2012, In-work benefits (like partial unemployment insurance
benefit receipt increased most in Spain, Portugal, Finland, or social assistance for individuals who are working)
the United States and Slovenia (Figure 5.12), all countries are not included.
where unemployment soared during the economic crisis. Statistics are based on the OECD Social Benefit Recipients
Receipt of secondary out-of-work benefits also increased Database (SOCR), which covers all main income
between 2007 and 2012 (Figure 5.13, Panel B). Rising replacement benefits in 40 EU and OECD countries.
long-term unemployment and increasing joblessness among Depending on the data made available by countries,
people without access to insurance benefits led to a SOCR includes caseloads, flows and average amounts
substantial rise in Lithuania, Ireland, Latvia, the United States of benefits, and currently covers four years (2007-12).
(Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, SNAP) and The charts show number of recipients as shares of
Spain. Receipt rates dropped somewhat in the Czech Republic working-age individuals. Benefits that are awarded at
(due to stricter conditions in access to minimum income family level (e.g. social assistance) are only counted
benefit) and in Germany (due to more favourable once per family.
labour-market developments).
By 2012, on average about 4% of the working-age population
received secondary out-of-work benefits. Receipt rates were
highest in Ireland, the United States, Lithuania and Finland
Further reading
(Figure 5.13, Panel A) and lowest in Chile, Belgium, Korea
and Japan. The composition of these safety nets differs Immervoll, H., S.P. Jenkins and S. Knigs (2015), Are
across countries. Social assistance dominates in Mexico Recipients of Social Assistance Benefit Dependent?:
(Prospera) and the United States (SNAP and Temporary Concepts, Measurement and Results for Selected
Assistance for Needy Families, TANF). Unemployment Countries, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working
assistance is important in Ireland, Germany, Spain and the Papers, No. 162, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/
United Kingdom. Australia, Iceland and New Zealand also 10.1787/5jxrcmgpc6mn-en.
provide targeted income support to a large number of lone
parents. In Chile, Turkey and Italy, there is no nation-wide
minimum income benefit. Figure notes
Out of work benefit are often less accessible to young Figures 5.12 and 5.13: Data are missing or incomplete for Greece, Iceland
people. Only around 30% of all unemployed young people and Poland. For comparability reasons, Canada and Switzerland
receive unemployment benefits, while over 40% of all were also excluded. Countries are ranked from left to right in
jobseekers aged 30 and over are covered (see Chapter 1 and increasing order of all benefits covered.

5.12. Increase in recipients of primary out-of-work benefits in most OECD countries since 2007
Number of recipients of primary cash transfers as a percentage of the working-age population, 2012 and percentage point change
between 2007 and 2012
Unemployment insurance Unemployment assistance Change 2007-12
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
o
K i ey
Hu n
y
Re e a
ic
il e
E s el
Re ni a
No ic
Ge ay
y
xe a n d
Sw rg
en
Au a
ria
Sl CD
Ir e a
nd
ly
De ds
l
th tes
Au ar k
Po li a
ain
Be ce
m
a
ga
w an
ni
ar
an
ic
pa
bl
ra
bl
en
tv
i te It a
iu
do
u
rk
rw
an
a k or
Ch
ra
ed
n
la
st
OE
o
r tu
Sp
ua
Ne S t a
ex
nm
ng
bo
Ne rm
pu
pu
la
Ja
nl
Lu eal
La
Is
lg
ov
t
Tu
st
K
ng
Fr
M
th
er
Fi
m
Z
Li
h
d
ec
Un
i te
ov
Cz
Un
Sl
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405527
5.13. Increase in recipients of secondary out-of-work benefits (safety net) in most OECD countries since 2007
Unemployment assistance Minimum income benefits (social assistance, lone parent benefit)
Panel A. Recipients of secondary cash transfers as a percentage of the working-age population, 2012
14
12
10
0
De gal
m s
Sl K i ar y
ly
B e il e
Re e a
Au li c
m
li a
Es el
No ia
Po ay
Sl r k
th ni a
Sw rg
Au n
ria
ce
Un H C D
Z e li c
d
Ge ain
M a
o
Ir e s
nd
a
xe n d
an
ke
ni
e
pa
i te lan
an
ic
ra
n
It a
tv
iu
a k do
a
u
rw
at
an
Ch
r
b
b
ra
ed
la
st
OE
to
r tu
Ne ove
Sp
ua
ex
e c Ko
nm
i t e ung
bo
r
rm
pu
N e epu
Lu r la
Ja
al
La
Is
lg
St
Tu
Un F in
st
ov ng
Fr
th
e
d
R
Li
w
h
d
Cz
Panel B. Recipients of secondary cash transfers as a percentage of the working-age population, percentage point change between 2007 and 2012
10
-2
-4
De gal
ly
B e il e
Re e a
Au li c
m s
Sl K i ar y
m
li a
Es el
No ia
Po ay
Sl r k
th ni a
Sw rg
Au n
ria
ce
Un H C D
Z e li c
d
Ge ain
M a
o
Ir e s
nd
a
xe n d
an
ke
ni
e
pa
i te lan
an
ic
ra
n
It a
tv
iu
a k do
a
u
rw
at
an
Ch
r
b
b
ra
ed
la
st
OE
to
r tu
Ne ove
Sp
ua
ex
e c Ko
nm
i t e ung
bo
r
rm
pu
N e epu
Lu r la
Ja
al
La
Is
lg
St
Tu
Un F in
st
ov ng
Fr
th
e
d
R
Li
w
h
d
Cz
Source: OECD Benefit Recipients Database (SOCR), www.oecd.org/social/recipients.htm.

1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405535

6. HEALTH INDICATORS
Life expectancy
Suicide
Health spending

Life expectancy
Life expectancy at birth continues to increase steadily in Central and Eastern European countries (Czech Republic,
OECD countries, going up on average by three to Estonia, Hungary and Poland), where the life expectancy
four months every year. These gains in longevity can be gap between higher and lower educated men reaches more
attributed to a number of factors, including improved than ten years. Differences are less pronounced in Italy,
lifestyle, better working conditions and education, as well Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and Portugal.
as progress in health care. Higher health spending per capita is generally associated
In 2014, life expectancy at birth on average across with higher life expectancy at birth, although this
OECD countries reached 80.6 years, an increase of more relationship tends to be less pronounced in countries
than ten years since 1970 (Figure 6.1). Japan, Spain and with the highest spending per capita (Figure 6.3). Japan,
Switzerland lead a large group of almost three-quarters of Italy and Spain stand out as having relatively high life
OECD countries in which life expectancy at birth now expectancies while the Russian Federation and the
exceeds 80 years. A second group, including Chile, United States have relatively low life expectancies, given
the United States, and a number of Central and Eastern their levels of health spending.
European countries, have a life expectancy between 75 and
80 years.
Among OECD countries, life expectancy was lowest in
Latvia and Mexico in 2014, still slightly below 75 years.
Since 2000, life expectancy in Mexico has increased more
Definition and measurement
slowly than in other OECD countries, with a gain of just Life expectancy at birth measures how long, on average,
over a year compared with an average gain of more than people would live based on a given set of age-specific
three years across OECD countries. In the United States, death rates. However, the actual age-specific death
the gains in life expectancy since 1970 have also been rates of any particular birth cohort cannot be known
much more modest than in most other OECD countries. in advance. If age-specific death rates are falling over
Possible explanations include: 1) the highly fragmented time (as has been the case over the past decades),
nature of the US health system, with relatively few actual life spans will be higher than life expectancy
resources devoted to public health and primary care, and a calculated with current death rates. The methodology
large share of the population uninsured; 2) health-related used to calculate life expectancy can vary slightly
behaviours, including higher calorie consumption per between countries. This can change a countrys
capita and obesity rates, higher consumption of prescription estimates by a fraction of a year.
and illegal drugs, higher deaths from road traffic accidents
Life expectancy at birth for the total population is
and higher homicide rates; and 3) adverse socioeconomic
calculated for all OECD countries using the unweighted
conditions affecting a large segment of the US population,
average of life expectancy of men and women. To
with higher rates of poverty and income inequality than in
calculate life expectancies by education level,
most other OECD countries, which can have adverse effects
detailed data on deaths by sex, age and education
on health-related behaviours and access to treatment.
level are needed. However, not all countries have
Emerging countries such as Brazil, China, Indonesia and information on education as part of their deaths data.
India have also achieved large gains in longevity over the
For Health spending per capita, see indicator Health
past decades, with life expectancy in these countries
spending.
converging rapidly towards the OECD average. There has
been much less progress in South Africa (due mainly to the
epidemic of HIV/AIDS) and the Russian Federation (due
mainly to the impact of the economic transition in the 1990s
and the rise in risky behaviours among men).
Further reading
Life expectancy varies by gender, and also by socio-economic
status as measured for instance by education level OECD (2015), Health at a Glance 2015 OECD Indicators, OECD
(Figure 6.2). Higher education levels not only provide the Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health_glance-
means to improve the socioeconomic conditions in which 2015-en.
people live and work, but may also promote the adoption of
more healthy lifestyles and facilitate access to appropriate
health care. On average among 15 OECD countries for Figure notes
which data are available, people with the highest level of
Figures 6.1 and 6.3: 2014 data refers to 2011 for Canada and 2013 for
education can expect to live six years more than people Brazil, China, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Russian Federation and
with the lowest level of education at age 30 (53 years versus South Africa; 1970 refers to 1971 for Canada, Israel, Italy,
47 years). These differences in life expectancy by education Luxembourg; no data for 1970 for Colombia.
level are particularly pronounced for men, with a gap of Figure 6.2: 2013 data refers to 2012 for Israel, Mexico and the
almost eight years on average. They are particularly large in Netherlands.

Life expectancy
6.1. Life expectancy has increased remarkably in OECD countries

Life expectancy at birth, in years, 1970 and 2014 (or nearest years)
2014 ( ) 1970
83.3
83.3
83.7
83.2
82.8
82.9
82.4
82.3
82.3
82.2
82.2
82.2
81.8
85
81.6
81.6
81.5
81.5
81.3
81.4
81.2
81.2
81.4
81.4
81.2
80.8
80.6
80.0
79.0
78.9
78.8
78.0
77.7
77.2
76.9
80
75.9
75.4
75.3
75.0
74.8
74.7
74.3
75
70.9
70.7
70
66.5
65
56.8
60
55
50
45
a
o y
ak st d
p ia
M ar y
ng c
L a co
ia
a
lo na
s s I u z il
n o ia
ra a
n
h ia
a
r m al
nm D
F i ium
r d
ov y
O ia
h C k
i t e pu e
St c
Tu tes
nd
Sw S an
m en
Ne o el
Ze ds
Au and
C a tr ia
Gr d a
d r el e
ng d
B e dom
er n
Ic t a l y
Fr nd
st e
L u S w a li a
Ko r g
Is a
N e h er w a y
bi
de si
Sl an
Un Re hil
d bli
Hu ubli
i te I eec
ar
ic
ric
Au anc
re
tio
ov E l an
it z pai
K i an
Po lan
De EC
u t In d
Re on
ia nd an
Ge tug
en
ra
tv
u
L i Br a
rk
C o Chi
i
xe e d
w lan
na
p
la
F e ne
aR
m
a
ex
s
bo
r
I
el
Ja
al
lg
Af
t r
h
P
st
N
t
Co
So
ec
Cz
Un
Sl
Ru
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health-data-en.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405548
6.2. People with highest level of education can expect to live six years more than people with lowest level of education
Gap in life expectancy at age 30 between the tertiary and below upper secondary level of education, by sex, 2013 (or nearest year)
Men ( ) Women
15
10
0
p.
y
p.
nd
l
ia
CD
el
s
k
ay
ly
en
ga
ni
nd
ar
ar
an
ic
en
ra
It a
Re
Re
rw
ed
la
OE
to
r tu
ex
nm
ng
nl
la
Is
ov
Po
Sw
No
Es
ak
er
Fi
Hu
Po
De
ec
Sl
ov
th
Cz
Ne
Sl
Source: Eurostat database complemented with national data for Israel, Mexico and the Netherlands.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405552
6.3. Higher health spending per capita is generally associated with higher life expectancy at birth, 2014 (or nearest year)
Life expectancy in years
85
ESP ITA JPN CHE R = 0.53
ISL AUSFRA
ISR KOR LUX SWE NOR
GRC PRT NZL FIN
GBR CAN AUTIRL NLD
SVN OECD BEL DNK DEU
80 CRI
CHL CZE USA
TUR POL
EST SVK
CHN COL HUN
75 MEX BRA
LVA LTU
IDN RUS
70
IND
65
0 1 000 2 000 3 000 4 000 5 000 6 000 7 000 8 000 9 000
Health spending per capita (USD PPP)

1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405561

In almost all OECD countries, a majority of the adult

population reports their health as good or better than Definition and measurement
good (Figure 6.4). Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the
Perceived health status reflects peoples overall
United States are the four leading countries, with almost
perception of their health, including both physical
nine out of ten people reporting to be in good health.
and psychological dimensions. Typically ascertained
However, the response categories offered to survey
through health interview surveys, respondents are
respondents in these three countries are different from those
asked a question such as: How is your health in
used in European countries and Asian OECD countries: they
general? Is it very good, good, fair, poor, very poor?.
offer one more option on the positive side of the scale
OECD Health Statistics provides figures related to the
(excellent) and one less option on the negative side (very
proportion of people rating their health to be good/
poor). This introduces an upward bias in the results. On the
very good combined.
other hand, less than half of the adults in Japan, Korea and
Portugal rate their health as good or very good. The Caution is required in making cross-country
proportion is also relatively low in Chile, Estonia, Hungary, comparisons of perceived health status, for at least
Latvia and Poland, where less than 60% of adults consider two reasons. First, peoples assessment of their health
themselves to be in good health. Such differences in is subjective and can be affected by factors such as
self-assessed health status could in part stem from cultural cultural background and national traits. Second, there
biases. are variations in the question and answer categories
used to measure perceived health across surveys and
In all OECD countries except in Australia and New Zealand,
countries. In particular, the response scale used in
men are more likely than women to report being in good
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States
health. The gender gap is especially large in Chile, Portugal,
is asymmetric (skewed on the positive side), including
the Slovak Republic and Turkey.
the following response categories: excellent, very
There are also large disparities in self-reported health good, good, fair, poor. The data in OECD Health
across different socio-economic groups, as measured for Statistics refer to respondents answering one of the
instance by income or education level. Figure 6.5 (Panel A) three positive responses (excellent, very good or
shows that, in all countries, people with a lower level of good). By contrast, in most other OECD countries, the
income tend to report poorer health than people with a response scale is symmetric, with response categories
higher income, although the gap varies. On average across being: very good, good, fair, poor, very poor. The data
OECD countries, nearly 80% of people in the highest reported from these countries refer only to the first two
income quintile reports being in good health, compared categories (very good, good). Such a difference in
with just over 60% for people in the lowest income group. response categories biases upward the results from
These disparities may be explained by differences in living those countries that are using an asymmetric scale.
and working conditions, as well as differences in
Self-reported health by income level is reported for
health-related lifestyles (e.g. smoking, harmful alcohol
the first quintile (lowest 20% of income group) and the
drinking, physical inactivity and obesity problems). In
fifth quintile (highest 20%). Depending on the
addition, people in low-income households may have more
surveys, the income may relate either to the
limited access to certain health services, for financial or
individual or the household (in which case the
non-financial reasons. It is also possible that the causal
income is equivalised to take into account the number
link goes the other way around, with poor health status in
of people in the household).
the first place leading to lower employment and lower
income.
Self-reported health across different socio-economic
groups is also available for the youth population aged 16-29
for European countries (Figure 6.5, Panel B). Unsurprisingly Further reading
youth report higher levels of health status. Again youth
with a lower level of income tend to report poorer health OECD (2015), Health at a Glance 2015 OECD Indicators, OECD
than youth with a higher income but the gap tend to be Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health_glance-
smaller than the one measure than for the population as 2015-en.
a whole. However, the socio-economic gap is particularly
important with 12 to 14 percentage points in Estonia, Figure notes
Germany and Portugal.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5: Results for Australia, Canada, Chile, Israel,
New Zealand and the United States are not directly comparable with
those for other countries, due to methodological differences in the
survey questionnaire resulting in an upward bias. Data refer to 2009
for Chile and 2013 for Japan instead of 2014. No data for Mexico nor
for youth aged 16-29 for non-European countries. Countries are
ranked from left to right in decreasing order as in Figure 6.4.

6.4. A majority of the adult population reports their health as good

Percentage of adults aged 15 and over reporting to be in good or better than good health, by gender, 2014 (or nearest year)
Total ( ) Women Men
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Un C a d
d da
Au ates
li a
Ir e e l
S w nd
i t z den
No nd
er y
Ic d s
B e nd
m
m e
g
i te en n
Ki rk
Au m
Fi ia
d
Tu D
Fr y
ic
il e
La l
ce
Ge t al y
ov Slo ny
C z k Re eni a
Re bli c
Hu a nd
Es r y
Po ni a
Ja a
n
a
a
ga
th wa
e
xe e c
ni
re
Un D a i
an
an
ur
pa
C
ra
bl
r
tv
iu
do
d ma
a
rk
an
Ch
ra
i te na
a
la
la
st
OE
to
Sp
r tu
ua
Ko
ng
bo
L u Gr e
rm
e c pu
pu
Sw e
I
al
la
el
nl
l
Is
lg
Ne r
v
St
Po
er
st
ng
th
Ze
Li
w
h
Ne
a
Sl
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405577
6.5. People in the highest income quintile report being in better health than people in the lowest income group
Percentage of people reporting to be in good or better than good health, by income level, in percentage, 2014 (or nearest year)
Highest income, age 15+ Lowest income, age 15+
Panel A. Adults aged 15 and over
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Un C a d
d da
Au ates
li a
Ir e e l
S w nd
i t z den
No nd
er y
Ic d s
B e nd
m
m e
g
i te en n
Ki rk
Au m
La l
Fi ia
d
Tu D
Fr y
ce
Ge t al y
ov Slo ny
C z Re ni a
Re bli c
ic
il e
Hu and
Es r y
Po ni a
Ja a
n
a
a
ga
th wa
e
xe e c
ni
re
Un D a i
an
an
ur
pa
C
ra
bl
r
tv
iu
do
d ma
a
rk
an
Ch
ra
i te na
a
la
la
st
OE
Sp
a k ve
to
r tu
ua
Ko
ng
bo
L u Gr e
rm
pu
e c pu
Sw e
I
la
el
al
nl
l
Is
lg
Ne r
St
Po
er
st
ng
th
Ze
Li
w
h
Ne
Sl
Highest income, age 16-29 Lowest income, age 16-29

Panel B. Youth aged 16 to 29
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
ly
l
nd
ia
a
nd
en
nd
ay
ce
g
a in
ria
d
CD
ce
ia
ic
ic
ga
an
nd
ni
ni
ar
ar
an
an
ur
bl
bl
en
It a
tv
iu
do
rw
an
ee
ed
la
la
la
st
OE
to
r tu
Sp
ua
nm
ng
bo
rm
pu
pu
nl
la
el
La
lg
ov
Po
Ir e
er
ng
Au
Gr
Fr
Sw
No
Es
th
Ic
er
Fi
Be
Hu
m
Po
Re
Re
it z
De
Ge
Sl
Ki
Li
th
xe
Sw
ak
h
Ne
d
Lu
ec
i te
ov
Cz
Un
Sl
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health-data-en and EU-SILC for European countries.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405588

Suicide
S u i c i d e i s a s i g n i f i c a n t c a u s e o f d e a t h i n m a ny pattern may reflect higher social isolation, possibly

OECD countries, and accounted for over 150 000 deaths following ending of a long term partnership by dissolution
in 2014, or 12 suicides per 100 000 people. There are a or death, of older men compared to older women. It could
complex set of reasons why some people choose to attempt also come from higher incidence of diseases among men
or commit suicide, with multiple risk factors that can leading to suicides.
predispose a person to attempt to take their own life. Except in a few countries, youth are much less likely to
In 2014 suicide rates were lowest in Turkey, Greece, Mexico, commit suicide with only 9young people aged between 15
and but also in South Africa and Colombia, at five or fewer and 29 years out of 100 000. However, in a minority of
deaths per 100 000 population (Figure 6.6). In Hungary, OECD countries like Ireland, New Zealand and Norway,
Slovenia, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania and the young people are more likely to take their own lives than
Russian Federation, on the other hand, more than older people. Suicide rates among under 30s are highest in
18 deaths per 100 000 population were caused by suicide. Finland, Japan, Korea and New Zealand, with 15 or more
There is a eleven-fold difference between Turkey and s u i c i d e s p e r 1 0 0 0 0 0 y o u t h . T h ey a r e l o w e s t i n
Korea, the two countries with respectively the lowest and Mediterranean European countries and Luxembourg.
highest suicide rates. However, the number of suicides in
certain countries may be under-reported because of the
stigma that is associated with the act, or because of data
issues associated with reporting criteria. Definition and measurement
Suicide rates increased in the 1970s and peaked in the
The World Health Organization defines suicide as an
early 1980s (Figure 6.7). Since the mid-1980s, suicide rates
act deliberately initiated and performed by a person
have decreased by around 30% across OECD countries,
in the full knowledge or expectation of its fatal
with pronounced declines of over 50% in Hungary for
outcome. Comparability of data between countries is
example. On the other hand, death rates from suicides
affected by a number of reporting criteria, including
have increased in countries such as Japan and Korea. In
how a persons intention of killing themselves is
Japan, there was a sharp rise in the mid- to late 1990s,
ascertained, who is responsible for completing the
coinciding with the Asian financial crisis, but rates have
death certificate, whether a forensic investigation is
started to decline in recent years. Suicide rates also rose
carried out, and the provisions for confidentiality of
sharply at the same time in Korea until 2011.
the cause of death. Caution is required therefore in
Previous studies have shown a strong link between adverse interpreting variations across countries.
economic conditions and higher levels of suicide (Van Gool
Mortality rates are based on numbers of deaths
and Pearson, 2014). Suicide rates rose slightly at the start
registered in a country in a year divided by the size of
of the economic crisis in a number of countries, but more
the corresponding population. The rates have been
recent data suggests that this trend did not persist. In
d i r e c t l y a g e - s t a n d a rd i s e d t o t h e 2 0 1 0 O E C D
Greece and Spain, overall suicide rates were stable in 2009
population to remove variations arising from
and 2010, but have increased since 2011 from very low
differences in age structures across countries and
levels. This underlines that countries need to closely
over time. The source is the WHO Mortality Database.
monitor high-risk populations such as the unemployed and
Deaths from suicide are classified to ICD-10 codes
those with psychiatric disorders.
X60-X84.
Death rates from suicide are three-to-four times greater
f o r m e n t h a n f o r wo m e n a c ro s s O E C D c o u n t r i e s
(Figure 6.6). In Poland and Slovak Republic, men are at least
six times more likely to commit suicide than women. While
the gender gap is smaller in Netherlands and Sweden, male Further reading
suicide rates are still at least twice as high as those of
females. OECD (2015), Health at a Glance 2015 OECD Indicators, OECD
Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health_glance-
On average, older people are more likely to take their own
2015-en.
lives, with 20 people aged 70 years or more per 100 000
(Figure 6.8), but this pattern is not general across the OECD. Van Gool, K. and M. Pearson (2014), Health, Austerity and
Austria, France, Germany, Hungary and Korea are examples Economic Crisis: Assessing the Short-term Impact in OECD
where older people take their own lives more often than Countries, OECD Health Working Papers, No. 76, OECD
young people. The largest increasing age gradient is found Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jxx71lt1zg6-en.
in Korea, where rates amongst the eldest group are almost
15 times higher than those of teenagers. Differences in
Figure notes
suicide rates between men and women become
particularly important from 75 years old, where suicide Figures 6.7 and 6.8: See Statlink for precise latest years ranging
rates are six times greater for men than for women. This from 2009 and 2014.

Suicide

6.6. Eleven-fold difference between countries with lowest and highest suicide rates
Age-standardised suicide rate per 100 000 persons, by gender, 2014 (or nearest year)
Total ( ) Women Men
51
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
a
Ch l
ec S nd
Au li c
rm s
N e mb n d
pu s
F i tr ia
Fr nd
Po c e
La d
Be t via
E s um
n a
ov y
Ja ia
Ko n
lo a
s s C o Br i a
n t a il
de ic a
th n
a
Gr e y
M ce
Is o
It a l
ly
ov in a in
Re om
r tu c
N e C a il e
er a
Ir e n y
No nd
nm y
S w ar k
Ic en
O d
Sw st D
L u i t z e li a
U n Z e ur g
ga
e
Ge and
De r wa
Re t e
Po bli
th nad
Hu ni
re
ni
Co ric
ia s a z
Sl g ar
n
L i a tio
an
pa
ic
Au EC
b
en
ra
rk
an
ee
b
ra
ed
a
xe r l a
la
la
C z i ted ala
Fe R
m
to
Sl d K p
ua
h ta
ex
i
ak gd
s
w o
pu
el
nl
lg
Af
Tu
r
h
ut
So
i te
Un
Ru
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405598
6.7. Falling suicide rates in most countries since the mid-1980s, and slight increase for countries hit by the crisis
Trends in age-standardised suicide rate per 100 000 persons, selected OECD countries, 1970-2014
Greece Hungary Japan Korea United States OECD
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405605
6.8. Suicide rates increase with age, except in the first years of retirement
Suicide rate per 100 000 persons by age group and gender, OECD average, 2013 (or nearest year)
Total Women Men
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85+
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health-data-en and OECD Secretariat calculations form WHO Mortality Database.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405611

Health spending
How much countries spend on health and the rate at which cases at a reduced pace. Since 2009, the pre-crisis increases
such expenditure grows from one year to the next reflects a in spending have been reversed in Greece (4.5% annual
wide array of market and social factors, as well as growth rate over the 2005-09 period vs. -6.6% after 2009)
countries diverse financing and organisational structures and in Ireland (6.9% vs. -0.3%). The pace of spending has
of their health systems. slowed down in the vast majority of OECD countries.
In 2015, the United States continued to outspend all other Outside Europe, health spending growth also slowed down
OECD countries by a wide margin, with the equivalent of significantly between 2009 and 2015, notably in Canada
USD 9 450 per person (Figure 6.9). This level of health (0.5%) and New Zealand (0.8%). Only five countries Chile,
spending is two-and-a-half times the average of all Hungary, Israel, Luxembourg and Switzerland recorded
OECD countries (USD 4 010) and nearly 40% higher than higher growth rates after the crisis than before.
Switzerland the next biggest spending country. Around
half of countries fall within a per capita spending of
between USD 3 000 and USD 6 000. Countries spending
below USD 3 000 include most of the southern and central Definition and measurement
European members of the OECD, together with Chile, Israel
and Korea. The lowest per capita spenders on health were Heath expenditure measures the final consumption
Mexico and Turkey with levels of just above 1 000 USD per of health goods and services. This includes spending
person. by both public and private sources on medical
services and goods, public health and prevention
Among the key emerging economies, China, Indonesia and
programmes and administration, but excludes
India spent 18%, 8% and 7% respectively of the OECD
spending on capital formation (investments).
average on health in per capita terms in 2015.
To compare spending levels across countries, per
Figure 6.9 also shows the breakdown of per capita spending
capita health expenditures are converted to a
on health into public and private sources. The ranking
common currency (US dollar) and adjusted to take
according to per capita public expenditure remains broadly
account of the different purchasing power of the
comparable to that of total spending. On average, private
national currencies. Economy-wide (GDP) Purchasing
spending represents 27% of total spending. However,
Power Parities (PPPs) are used to that effect.
private source represents around half of total outlays in
Mexico and the United States. Even if the private sector in For the calculation of growth rates in real terms,
the United States continues to play the dominant role in economy-wide GDP deflators are used. In some
financing, public spending on health per capita is still countries (e.g. France and Norway) health-specific
greater than that in all other OECD countries, with the deflators exist, based on national methodologies, but
exception of the Norway and Switzerland. these are not used due to limited comparability.
Since 2009, health spending has slowed markedly in
several countries after years of continuous growth. However,
health spending patterns across the 35 OECD countries have
been affected to varying degrees. On average, per capita Further reading
health spending over the period 2005-09 is estimated to
have grown, in real terms, by 3.4% annually (Figure 6.10). In OECD (2015), Health at a Glance 2015 OECD Indicators, OECD
contrast, over the subsequent six years (2009-15), average Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health_glance-
health spending across the OECD grew at only 1.1% per year 2015-en.
as the effects of the economic crisis took hold.
The extent of the slowdown has varied considerably across
Figure notes
the OECD. While a number of European countries have
experienced drastic cuts in spending, in the context of Figure 6.9: Data for Brazil, Colombia, China, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia,
fiscal consolidation, other countries outside Europe have Latvia, Russian Federation and South Africa refers to 2013 and
continued to see health spending grow, albeit in many includes investments.

Un
i te
-7.5
-5.0
-2.5
0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
9 000
10 000
Gr Sw d S
ee
Po c it z t ate
er s 9 450
r tu e la
ga Ne No nd
l th r w 6 930
I er a y
De t al y Ge land 6 570
nm rm s
a 5 340
Ir e r k Lu S w any
la xe e d 5 270
nd m en
Sp bo 5 230
S ai Ir e u r g
5 160
Lu lov n l
e Au and
5 110
C z xem ni a De s tr
ec bo
h nm i a 4 990
R e ur g C a ar k
pu n 4 940
b Be ad
Ic li c l a 4 610
el A u giu
a n 4 610
Un st m
i te C a d ra
d na Un Fr li a 4 420
K i da an
Ne ng i te c
w dom d Ja e 4 420
K i pa
Ze ng n
al d 4 150
an Ic om
Fr d el 4 020
an F i and
nl 4 010

Be ce an
lg Ne
iu w OE d 3 980
Public
2009-2013 ( )
Au m Ze CD
st al 3 740
ria an
d 3 590
Ne OE It a
3 270
th CD Sp l y
er

la Sl ai
Hu n d s
ov n 3 150
ng Po en
a r tu ia 2 640
Fi r y g
nl Cz Is a l 2 630
an ec ra
Sw d h Ko e l 2 530
ed Re r e
Sl Sl pu a 2 490
ov M en
a k ex ov b
R ic
a k Gr li c 2 470
Un ep o Re e e c
i te ub p e 2 250
d li c Hu ubli
St ng c 2 060
at E s ar y
es
to 1 840
Is ni
ra 1 820
Private
Po el Ch a
la Po il e 1 750
n la
2005-2009
La d L a nd 1 680
Ge ia t v M t via
6.9. Large differences in health spending across the OECD
rm ex 1 370
a Tu ico 1 070
Health expenditure per capita, in USD PPPs, 2015 or latest year available
No ny rk
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health-data-en; WHO Global Health Expenditure Database.
rw ey
a 1 060
Tu y Ru Li
rk s s C t hu
e ia os an
n t a ia
Ja y Fe R 1 850
1 390
Au pan S o d er i c a
S w s tr ut ati
h on 1 370
i t z a li a Af
er ric
la a 1 150
E s nd Co Br a
to lo z il
m 1 020
Annual average growth rate in per capita health expenditure, real terms, 2005-09 and 2009-15 (or nearest years)
ni
a bi
a 960
Ko In C h i
re do n a 730
a ne
6.10. Since 2009, health spending has slowed markedly in several countries after years of continuous growth
Ch si
il e 300
In a
di 270
a
121
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405637
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405623
Health spending
Tobacco and alcohol are major risk factors for at least two of the only country where girls (from England and Wales, not
the leading causes of premature mortality cardiovascular Scotland) report significant higher prevalence than boys.
diseases and cancer.
On average, in 2014 about 19% of the adult population
smoked daily, but this proportion varies greatly across the
OECD (Figure 6.11). Rates were lowest in Mexico and
Definition and measurement
Sweden (less than 12%). On the other hand, smoking rates
remain high in Latvia at 36%. Smoking prevalence is also The proportion of daily smokers is defined as the
generally higher among men than among women in all percentage of the population aged 15 years and over
OECD countries except in Sweden and Iceland. Smoking who report smoking every day. International
rates across most OECD countries have shown a marked c o m p a rab i l i t y i s l i m i t e d d u e t o t h e l a ck o f
decline. On average, smoking rates have decreased by about standardisation in the measurement of smoking habits
one fourth since 2000, from 26% in 2000 to 19% in 2014. Large in health interview surveys across OECD countries.
reductions occurred in Denmark, Luxembourg and Norway. Variations remain in the age groups surveyed, the
S m o k i n g ra t e s o n l y i n c r e a s e d i n L a t v i a a n d t h e wording of questions, response categories and survey
Slovak Republic. Smoking rates were also low at 12% or less methodologies (e.g. in a number of countries,
in Brazil and Colombia, and they were high at above one respondents are asked if they smoke regularly, rather
third in Indonesia. than daily). Self-reports of behaviours may also suffer
Alcohol consumption, as measured by recorded data on from social desirability bias that may potentially limit
annual sales, stands at 8.9 litres per adult, on average, cross-country comparisons.
across OECD countries, based on the most recent data Alcohol consumption is defined as annual sales of pure
available (Figure 6.12). Austria, Estonia, France and the alcohol in liters per person aged 15 years and over. The
Czech Republic reported the highest consumption of methodology to convert alcoholic drinks to pure alcohol
alcohol with 11.5 litres or more per adult per year. Low may differ across countries. Official statistics do not
alcohol consumption was recorded in Turkey and Israel, as include unrecorded alcohol consumption, such as
well as in emerging economies Indonesia and India, where home production.
religious and cultural traditions restrict the use of alcohol Tobacco and alcohol consumption rates for 15 years
in some population groups. Although average alcohol old by gender are from the 2013/14 Health Behaviour
consumption has gradually fallen in many OECD countries in School-aged Children (HBSC) study, which collects
since 2000 by about two-thirds of liters per adult , it has information on many socio-economic factors that
risen by one liter or more in Chile, Latvia, Poland and affect health behaviour among children for 26
Sweden, as well as in key partner countries China, OECD countries. Indicators shown here by gender are
Lithuania and the Russian Federation. OECD analysis based the percentage of 15-year-olds who smoke at least
on individual- level data show that men of low socioeconomic once a week and those who have been drunk on two
status are more likely to drink heavily than those of a or more occasions.
higher socioeconomic status, while the opposite is
observed in women (OECD, 2015).
Adolescent smoking and drinking often have adverse
c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r p hy s i c a l a n d m e n t a l h e a l t h .
Adolescents establish addictions more quickly than adults Further reading
and regular drinking is associated with poorer
psychological, social and physical health outcomes, as well HBSC (2016), Health Behaviour in School-aged Children Study:
as poorer educational outcomes, violence, injuries, International Report from the 2013/2014 Survey, www.hbsc.org/
smoking, drug use and risky sexual behaviour (OECD, publications/international.
2015a). On average, one in eight 15-years-old reported OECD (2015a), Tackling Harmful Alcohol Use Economics and
smoking at least once a week. Adolescent smoking rates Public Health Policy, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/
ranged from less than 5% in Canada, Iceland and Norway to 10.1787/9789264181069-en.
around 20% in France, Hungary and Italy (Figure 6.13). Boys OECD (2015b), Health at a Glance 2015 OECD Indicators, OECD
reported significant higher prevalence in Finland, Israel, Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health_glance-
Lithuania and Russian Federation, while the opposite 2015-en.
pattern prevailed in the Czech Republic and Luxembourg.
As for drunkenness at 15-years-old, on average one in five
adolescent old reported have been drunk at least twice in Figure notes
their life. Rates ranged from 10% in Israel to above 35% in Figures 6.11 and 6.12: See Statlink for precise years.
Denmark, Hungary and Lithuania (Figure 6.14). Boys are
Figures 6.13 and 6.14: Data for Belgium were computed using population
more likely to report higher prevalence than girls shares for Flemish (60%) and French (40%); data for
particularly in Austria, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the United Kingdom were computed using population shares for
Russian Federation and Switzerland. The United Kingdom is England (85%), Scotland (9%) and Wales (5%).

6.11. Marked decline in smoking rates among adults in most OECD countries
Percentage of population 15 years and over smoking daily, in 2000 and 2014 (or nearest year)
2014 ( ) 2000
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
il
s s ou m a
F e Afr a
r a
a
do n a
a
th n
Un S w x i c o
d en
st s
No a li a
Ic a y
nm a l
Lu C a nd
m da
N e F i ur g
Ze nd
r tu d
Is k
lg l
i t e Ir i u m
N e in g nd
er m
OE s
Ja D
n
Ko l y
S w Fr e a
er e
rm d
ec Es any
p a
ak o c
pu d
Sp i c
Tu ain
Au ke y
Gr a r y
ng a
Ch e
L a il e
ia
ia th bi
i
ni
si
de ic
az
L i a tio
Be r ae
C o In d
Au t ate
nd
ov P ub li
ar
i t z anc
Re ni
Hu s tr i
c
Po lan
Ge l an
pa
Re l an
In C h i
C
De g
bl
It a
tv
ne
th do
ua
rw
ee
i te ed
xe n a
Br
a
w nl a
K a
h to
bo
r
r
el
d el
la
e
o
a
S
M
S l
n
Cz
Un
Sl
Ru
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405648
6.12. Gradual decline in alcohol consumption among adults in most OECD countries
Liters of pure alcohol per person aged 15 years and over, 2000 and 2014 (or nearest year)
2014 ( ) 2000
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Is y
M r ael
o
No t al y
Po gal
Ic a y
Ja d
Sw an
Gr e n
Ch e
N e C a il e
er d a
F i nds
i te OE d
d CD
w Ko s
Ze rea
d nm d
st d
lg a
ak S m
r tu ia
n d
ov y
S w ing ar k
i t z dom
pu in
L a li c
rm ia
L u Ir a n y
m nd
Fr r g
ec Es nce
pu i a
Au bli c
ria
C o In i a
a a
lo c a
Ch i a
s s ou B n a
F e A f il
a
th n
a
e
B e r a li
s t di
ni
de r ic
z
Sl g ar
Au r l an
an
an
i te De l an
Hu l an
ic
L i r a tio
Ge en
Re n
b
Po t v
Re p a
iu
ia th r a
rk
rw
at
ee
Co Ri
ed
th na
i
p
xe e l a
st
ne
h to
ua
ex
bo
a
I
el
la
nl
St
Tu
do
K
In
Ne
Un
Ru S
n
ov
Cz
Un
Sl
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405654
6.13. On average one in eight 15 years old reported 6.14. On average one in five 15 years-old reported
smoking at least once a week have been drunk at least twice in their life
Percentage of 15-year-olds who smoke at least once a week, Percentage of 15-year-olds who have been drunk
by gender; in 2013/14 on two or more occasions, by gender, 2013/14
Girls Girls
25 45
ITA 40
FRA HUN DNK
20
LUX SVK 35 HUN
GBR LTU
CZE
15 DEU POL 30 EST CZE
AUT SVN
LVA GRC POL SVK LVAFIN
OECD SVN LTU 25
NLD CAN DEU
10 ESP BEL PRTEST FIN
RUS ESPGRCOECD
GBR CHE 20 AUT
DNK IRL SWE FRANOR BEL
SWE IRLNLD PRT
ISR 15 LUX
5 CAN ITA
CHE RUS
ISL NOR 10
R = 0.55 ISR R = 0.82
0 5
0 5 10 15 20 25 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Boys Boys
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405662 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405675
Source: HBSC (2016), Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) Study: International Report from the 2013/2014 Survey, www.hbsc.org/publications/
international.

7. SOCIAL COHESION INDICATORS
Life satisfaction
Trust
Voting
Crime and prisoners
Social networks

Life satisfaction
Life satisfaction is determined not only by economic

development, but also by peoples diverse experiences and Definition and measurement
living conditions. People in Switzerland and Denmark are
The Gallup World Poll asked respondents to: Imagine
most satisfied with their lives (Figure 7.1). The measured
a n e l eve n - r u n g l a d d e r w h e re t h e b o t t o m ( 0 )
level in these countries was 2.5 steps higher than in Greece
represents the worst possible life for you and the
or Portugal, the countries at the bottom of the 11-step
top (10) represents the best possible life for you. On
ladder in 2014/15. Indeed life satisfaction deteriorated
which step of the ladder do you feel you personally
during the crisis, particularly in European Mediterranean
stand at the present time?. The main indicator used
countries. Countries which experienced the greatest
in this section is the average country score. The
deterioration in incomes and labour-market prospects are
Gallup World Poll is conducted in more than
more likely to have low levels of subjective well-being.
150 countries around the world based on a common
There are broad regional or cultural country groupings of questionnaire. With few exceptions, all samples are
life satisfaction. Four of the top five countries are Nordic. probability based and nationally representative of the
Continental Western, Eastern European and Asian OECD resident population aged 15 years and over in the
members are less satisfied with their lives, with the notable entire country. While this ensures a high degree of
exceptions of Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, Austria comparability across countries, results may be
a n d t h e N e t h e r l a n d s . P re d o m i n a n t ly A n g l o p h o n e affected by sampling and non-sampling errors, and
OECD countries are all in the top half of the list when variation in response rates; for example, data,
measuring life satisfaction, and follow in a tight group after especially for youth, should be interpreted carefully.
the predominately Nordic top cluster. As for emerging
Data on life satisfaction among children are taken
economies, life satisfaction also varies between them, from
from the Health Behaviour in School-aged Children
above 6 in Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia and
survey. Children aged 11 to 15 years are asked to
Saudi Arabia, to below 5 in India and South Africa.
report on the quality of their current life based on the
Young people are happier that older groups, as the level of Cantril life satisfaction scale of 0 to 10 (Cantril, 1965),
life satisfaction tends to decrease with age. Youth from with 0 representing the worst possible life and
Switzerland, Israel and Norway are the most satisfied with 10 representing the best possible life. A child is said to
their lives in OECD, whereas in Hungary, Turkey and be satisfied with his or her own life if they report a
Estonia, they report the lowest levels. However, life score in the top half of the scale 6 or above (Currie
satisfaction is u-shaped in some countries, increasing et al., 2012). Thus, life satisfaction is presented as the
from about the age of 55. proportion of children reporting a score of 6 or above.
Teenage boys usually report higher life satisfaction than Data on the relationship between life satisfaction and
girls. Figure 7.2 presents the data on the proportion of work-life balance are based on the European Quality
teenagers aged 15 years old that reported levels of life of Life (EQLS) survey. To measure life satisfaction, the
satisfaction in the top half of the scale (6 or above). On survey asks persons aged 15 and over to rate the level
average the proportion of teenagers reporting high levels of of satisfaction with their life overall based on the
life satisfaction is almost 10 percentage points higher questions All things considered, how satisfied would
among boys compared to girls. The gap is even larger in you say you are with your life these days? on a scale
Poland and France (i.e. 15 percentage points). Overall of 1 to 10, where 1 means very dissatisfied and
highest levels of life satisfaction were reported in 10 means very satisfied. Life satisfaction is presented
the Netherlands and Denmark where about 90% of as the average score among adults. Dissatisfaction
teenagers were satisfied with their life. with work-family life balance is based on a person
Life satisfaction is higher among people who are satisfied reporting home and work conflict.
with their work-life balance. The difference is largest in
Austria where people who are satisfied with their work-life
balance report an average life satisfaction score more than
1.7 point greater than people who are dissatisfied with
Further reading
their work-life balance (Figure 7.3). Policies aiming at
enhancing the combination of work and private life are OECD (2015), Hows Life? Measuring Well-being, OECD
important factors of quality of life. Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/how_life-2015-en.
Figure notes
Figure 7.1: Data for Iceland refer to 2013. Data for age 15-29 are not
available for Iceland and Japan.
Figure 7.2: Data for Belgium were computed using population shares for
Flemish (60%) and French (40%); data for the United Kingdom were
computed using population shares for England (85%), Scotland (9%)
and Wales (5%).

Life satisfaction
7.1. Young people generally report higher levels of life satisfaction

Average points of life satisfaction on an 11-step ladder from 0-10 by age group, 2014/15
Total 15+ ( ) 15-29 30-49 50+
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
Gr ar y
l
Fr li c
It a c
Ja l y
Po pan
Ko n d
L ea
ov i a
Tu nia
ng y
r tu e
A r Br a a
g e z il
s s au l o n a
n A ia
Li r ati a
In u a n n
do i a
u t Ch a
Af a
In a
a
nm d
rm ia
d C rg
gd il e
M nce
ak S ico
pu in
E s eni a
Ic ar k
No land
F i way
w Isr d
Au alan l
st d
N e C a a li a
er d a
i te we s
St n
A tes
lg y
L u Ir i u m
m nd
h OE m
pu D
ga
Ze ae
i
Un S a n d
Hu r ke
Be an
Po e e c
de bi
h in
si
di
ic
ric
th o
De r l an
an
d de
Re C
bl
i a di mb
Sl a t v
Ge us tr
Re p a
o
u
r
Ki h
Ru S C o n t i
th na
la
xe e l a
ne
aR
to
Fe ra
a
ex
bo
r
a
nl
r
e
l
e
st
it z
Co
Sw
So
Ne
ec
i te
ov
Cz
Un
Sl
Source: Gallup World Poll (www.gallup.com).
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405682
7.2. Teenage boys usually report higher life satisfaction than girls
Proportion of teenagers aged 15 years old reporting a life satisfaction score of 6 or above, on a scale of 0 to 10, 2014
Boys (%) ( ) Girls (%)
100
80
60
40
20
0 y
l
s
nd
el
ia
ce
ly
nd
ic
en
ic
k
ria
ia
ay
y
CD
da
nd
ce
ga
nd
an
ni
ni
ar
ar
ai
an
an
ur
bl
ra
bl
en
tv
It a
iu
do
rw
an
ee
na
ed
la
la
la
st
OE
to
r tu
Sp
ua
nm
ng
bo
rm
pu
pu
la
nl
el
La
Is
lg
ov
Po
Ir e
er
ng
Au
Gr
Fr
Sw
Ca
No
Es
th
Ic
er
Fi
Be
Hu
m
Po
Re
Re
it z
De
Ge
Sl
Ki
Li
th
xe
Sw
ak
Ne
Lu
ec
i te
ov
Cz
Un
Source: Health Behaviour in School-aged Children survey (HBSC 2013/14) www.hbsc.org/. Sl

1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405690
7.3. People satisfied with work-life balance are more happy

Life satisfaction by satisfaction in work-life balance, 2012
Satisfied with work-life balance ( ) Dissatisfied with work-life balance
2
l
y
k
en
a in
ly
ia
ce
s
ria
ce
nd
nd
ia
ic
ic
ga
nd
an
ni
ar
ar
an
ur
bl
bl
en
It a
tv
iu
do
an
ee
ed
la
la
st
r tu
to
Sp
nm
ng
bo
rm
pu
pu
la
nl
La
lg
ov
Ir e
Po
ng
Au
Gr
Fr
Sw
Es
er
Fi
Be
Hu
m
Po
Re
Re
De
Ge
Sl
Ki
th
xe
ak
Ne
d
Lu
ec
i te
ov
Cz
Un
Sl
Source: European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS), www.eurofound.europa.eu/surveys/european-quality-of-life-surveys.

1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405707

Trust
A cohesive society is one where citizens have confidence in

others and public institutions. Trust may affect economic Definition and measurement (cont.)
performance and policies can affect trust and well-being
Data on confidence in national government comes
(Algan and Cahuc, 2013)
from the Gallup World Poll where the question asked
The share of people expressing trust in others varies greatly is In this country, do you have confidence in each of
across countries (Figure 7.4). In OECD countries, about 36% the following, or not? In the national government?.
of interviewees expressed interpersonal trust. In Nordic With few exceptions, samples are probability-based
countries over 60% of interviewees trust each other compared and nationally representative of the resident
to less than 13% in Chile, Mexico and Turkey. Among the key population aged 15 years and. While this ensures a
partner economies, levels of trust are usually lower than in high degree of comparability across countries, results
OECD countries ranging from 4% of the population in may be affected by sampling and non-sampling error,
Columbia expressing trust in others to 33% in India. and variation in response rates; for example, data,
Confidence in the national government is comparable, especially for youth, should be interpreted carefully.
with about 42% of people. People in Switzerland, Data on worries about losing or not finding a job
Luxembourg, Norway and New Zealand express higher comes from the World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-14.
confidence in their governments, while rates are lower in The World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org)
Slovenia, Portugal, Poland and Spain with large differences is a global network of social scientists studying
across countries (Figure 7.5). Among the key partner changing values and their impact on social and
economies, confidence in national governments is highest political life. The WVS consists of nationally
in India and Indonesia and lowest in Colombia. representative and comparable surveys conducted in
On average youth levels of confidence in others and in almost 100 countries which contain almost 90% of the
national government are similar to those of the total worlds population. It is the largest non-commercial,
population. However in Belg ium, Estonia and the cross-national, time series investigation of human
United States, young people tend to have more confidence in beliefs and values ever executed, currently including
government than the overall population whereas in Chile, almost 400 000 respondents. The WVS seeks to help
Korea and Greece, this is the opposite. Among young people, scientists and policy makers understand changes in
NEETs are half as likely to report that they feel others can be the beliefs, values and motivations of people
trusted compared to other youth (see Chapter 1 and worldwide.
Figure 1.19). Over time being a NEET can lead to isolation, a
lack of interest in society and a feeling of distrust.
Worries about finding or keeping a job are usually higher
for youth than for the whole population. This gap is
highest in Sweden, the United States, New Zealand and
Spain. In Mexico, Korea, Japan, Estonia and Spain, over 65 %
of people reported worrying very much about losing, or not
finding, a job , whereas in Sweden and the Netherlands less Further reading
than one in four do (Figure 7.6).
Algan, Y. and P. Cahuc (2013), Trust, Well-Being and
Growth: New Evidence and Policy Implications, IZA
Discussion Paper, No. 7464, Bonn.
Definition and measurement OECD (2015), Government at a Glance, OECD Publishing, Paris,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/gov_glance-2015-en.
Data on trust in others is based on the question:
Generally speaking would you say that most people
can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in Figure notes
dealing with people?. The response is 1 most people
Figure 7.4: Data refer to wave 6 (2010-13) of the World Values Survey for
can be trusted or 2 need to be very careful. Data come
Australia, Chile, Estonia, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands,
from two surveys: the World Values Survey (wave 6) for New Zealand, Poland, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
all countries present in wave 6, wave 5 for Canada, wave United States; Wave 5 (2005-09) for Canada; Wave 4 (1999-04) for
4 for Israel and the European Values Survey (wave 4) for Israel. Wave 4 of the European Values Survey (2008-10) for other
European countries not in the WVS, wave 6. Data countries.
comparability across countries may be affected by Figure 7.5: Average 2014/2015 except for Switzerland, New Zealand,
sample sizes and response rates. Rates refer to people Canada, Australia, Israel, Chile, Japan, United States, Korea and
Brazil where the data refer to 2014. Due to small sample size, data for
reporting that most people can be trusted. Note that
Iceland are not available.
the overall figures for trust amongst youth does not
Figure 7.6: 2014 for Brazil, India; 2013 for Argentina, Germany; 2012 for
match Figure 1.19 as it only includes OECD countries Australia, Colombia, China, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland; 2011 for
with a large enough sample size of NEETs. Chile, Estonia, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain,
Turkey, United States; 2010 for Japan, Korea.

Trust
7.4. Nordic countries tend to report higher levels of trust

Percentage of people reporting trust in others, 2014
Total ( ) 15-29
%
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Ch l
Sw nds
st d
d um
Lu Au tes
m ria
h It g
pu y
Fr li c
Ko e
La a
Is i a
Po el
ng d
Gr r y
ov e
S ia
r tu n
M il e
ak Tu o
pu y
ic
S o i a n di a
h d.
ge c a
a
lo z il
a
Ne No r k
er y
N e F i en
Sw Zea d
er d
Ic a li a
rm d
C a any
E s ada
Ja ia
i t e Ir p a n
ng d
OE m
Un B e C D
ga
th r wa
Re r ke
in
bi
c
re
Sl e e c
Re a l
Au l an
Hu l a n
Po p ai
n
i t z lan
Ge lan
Ki n
ic
ur
bl
n
ra
en
tv
ut F e
do
a
Co r a
an
Ar Afri
b
ed
d ela
w nl a
xe s t
m
to
s s In
nt
a
ex
nm
i t e l gi
bo
r
n
la
St
B
e
De
Ru
ec
ov
Cz
Un
Sl
Source: World Value Survey (wave 6: 2010-14) for countries present in wave 6, WVS wave 5 (2005-09) for Canada and WVS Wave 4 (1999-2004) for Israel.
European Values Survey (EVS) (2008-10 wave 4) for all other countries.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405711
7.5. Confidence in national government varies across countries

Percentage of people reporting confidence in national government by age, average 2014/2015
Total ( ) 15-29
%
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ak e y
ov l
pu o
ic
Ko l y
L a ea
Sp i a
Po a in
rt d
ia
Ru n d o d i a
S o i an si a
Ar Afri .
St a
Gr t e s
Fr c e
n e
ge c a
a
a
t h z il
s t ni a
d Is m
ng el
Au om
OE ia
CD
pu l e
J a li c
Un E p a n
lo c a
m nd
N e N o ur g
Ze ay
N e er m n d
Sw nds
nm a
Ir e n d
er n y
Tu en
C a ke y
F i ar k
st d
lg a
Sl ug a
h d
bi
in
d ni
De nad
B e r a li
Hu an c
ov M g ar
Po lan
Au lan
Re x i c
bl
Re hi
en
Ki ra
It a
tv
r
ut F e
iu
L i Br a
w rw
ee
Co Ri
b
ed
th a
xe r l a
a
G ala
st
ss ne
m
I In
i te s to
nt
Co ua
a
d
bo
h C
nl
la
a
Lu it ze
Sw
ec
i te
Cz
Un
Sl
Source: Gallup World Poll (www.gallup.com) extracted at January 2016.

1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405726
7.6. Worries in the labour market is higher for young people

Percentage of people reporting to worry very much or to a great deal about losing their job or not finding one, by age, around 2010-14
Total ( ) 15-29
%
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
li a
a
d
ia
en
il
a
o
il e
nd
es
ain
an
nd
bi
ke
in
di
in
ni
re
ric
az
tio
pa
an
ic
en
at
Ch
ra
ed
la
Ch
In
to
nt
Sp
ex
Ko
Br
r
rm
la
Ja
al
Af
ra
ov
St
Tu
Po
st
Sw
lo
Es
ge
M
er
Ze
de
Au
Ge
h
Sl
Co
d
th
Ar
ut
i te
Fe
w
Ne
So
Ne
Un
n
ia
ss
Ru
Source: World Values Survey (wave 6: 2010-14).

1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405731

Voting
Voter turnout rates vary substantially across the OECD. A
high voter turnout is a sign that a countrys political system Definition and measurement (cont.)
enjoys a strong degree of participation or that voting is
Cross-national comparisons for voter turnout data
mandatory. Voting-age turnout rates in parliamentary
can be affected by a variety of factors including, the
elections are above 80% in Australia, Belgium, Denmark
legal voting age, the voting registration system
and Turkey where voting is mandatory, as well as in
(automatic or requiring action by the potential voter)
Iceland, Korea and Sweden. They are below 50% in
and whether voting is compulsory or not. In most
Switzerland (Figure 7.7). Low turnout not only reflects
OECD and European countries, the legal voting age in
limited participation by registered voters, but possibly also
the national elections is 18 years old, but young
that many potential voters do not register. Among
people can vote from age 16 in Austria and from
non-OECD countries, voter turnout is highest in Indonesia
age 17 in Korea.
(83%) and lowest in Colombia (52%).
Different types of elections occur in different countries
In general, younger voters are less likely to cast their vote
according to their institutional structure and different
than the electorate in general: voter turnout among 18 to
geographical jurisdictions. For some countries, it
24 year-olds is, on average, 16 percentage points lower than
should be noted, turnout for presidential elections and
f o r a d u l t s ag e d 2 5 t o 5 0 i n c l u s ive ( Fi g u re 7 . 8 ) . I n
regional elections may be higher than for national
the United Kingdom, Slovak Republic and Israel, young
parliamentary elections, perhaps because those
people are much less likely to vote than prime-age
elected through these ballots are constitutionally more
individuals. Only in Korea are younger voters more likely to
important for how those countries are run. Data about
cast their vote than prime-age individuals. On average
voter turnout are extracted from the international
there is no significant difference in voter turnout between
database managed by the Institute for Democratic and
men and women.
Electoral Assistance (IDEA).
Overall interest in politics is an important factor for social
However, IDEA does not involve a disaggregation of
cohesion. This constitutes a key challenge for politicians to
voters by age and gender. For information on younger
ensure that most citizens feel concerned by politics and
voters and by gender, surveys had to be relied upon.
participate as actors into the political life of the society. On
Data have been taken from both the Comparative
average one in four young people reports to be not at all
Study of Electoral Systems (CSES module 4: 2011-16),
interested in politics compared to one in five for the total
and the European Social Surveys (ESS). The ESS has
population in OECD (Figure 7.9). Chile and Portugal report
data on participation in the last national election
the highest level of disinterest in politics among the total
(parliamentary or presidential). However, sample
population whereas Denmark, Germany, Japan and Norway
sizes are small, and for that reason CSES data has
report the lowest levels. Among young people aged 15 to 29,
been used where available.
disinterest in politics is high in Chile, the Czech Republic
and Hungary. In Brazil and Colombia, more than 40% Data on interest in politics, are from the European
reported to be not at all interested in politics. Social Surveys (ESS) and the Word Value Survey Wave
6: 2010-14 (WVS). The questions in both surveys ask
about How interested in politics and the respondent to
choose between four categories: very interested, quite
interested, hardly interested and not at all interested.
Data refer to the rate of people answering to be not at
Definition and measurement all interested in politics.
Voting in national parliamentary elections is one
i n d i c a t o r o f p e o p l e s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e i r
communitys national life. The indicator used here to Figure notes
measure the participation of individuals in the
electoral process is the Voting age population Figure 7.7: Data refer to parliamentary elections, with the exceptions of
turnout, i.e. the percentage of the voting age Colombia, France, Korea, Mexico, Poland, the Russian Federation and
the United States, where presidential elections are considered due to
population (VAP) that actually voted as available
higher participation rates. Instead of 2015: 2014: Belgium, Hungary,
from administrative records of member countries. Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, Slovenia, Sweden; 2013: Australia, Austria,
The VAP is an estimate as it is difficult to accurately Chile, Czech Republic, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg; 2012:
account for people who are of voting age but who are France, Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, Russian Federation,
not registered voters, whatever the reason. In Slovak Republic, United States; 2011: Canada, Ireland, Spain, and
Switzerland. Data for Norway are not available. Data for Norway are not
countries where registration is compulsory and/or
available.
automatic (e.g. based on the civil register), as, for
Figure 7.8: Data for Chile, Latvia, Luxembourg and Turkey are not
example in Scandinavian countries, the number of
available.
registered voters will be close to the VAP.
Figure 7.9: Data for Canada, Greece, Latvia and Luxembourg are not
available.

Voting
7.7. Large variation in electoral participation in OECD countries

Voter turnout in latest parliamentary election, percentage of the voting age population, 2015 (or nearest year)
Turnout, %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
S w ium
Tu en
st y
K ia
nm a
Ne Fr nd
S y
Sl ch gd l
Ic ar k
Is d
Ne F i el
Au ce
ria
rm ly
Ze nd
er c e
Gr d s
OE y
M CD
Ir e i c o
ng d
i te Po p ain
ov Re om
pu c
L u E s bli c
m ia
C a ur g
ov a
Po ni a
i te C d
d hil e
nd
Br i a
Ja es
Sw L a an
er a
s s C o In i l
n ta a
r a
S o i t hu ion
h ia
a
lo a
e in a
an
Au r ke
Re bli
Sl n ad
D e or e
it z t vi
i a s di
bi
de ic
Co fric
az
ar
an
Hu l an
an
l
ra
C z d K r tug
xe ton
ut an
Ge It a
at
th an
ee
ra
ed
p
w nl a
la
a
st
ne
Fe R
e
m
ex
L at
bo
a k pu
el
l
la
al
lg
St
A
do
Be
In
Un
Un
Ru
Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) voter turnout database.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405740
7.8. Young people tend to vote less

Voter turnout ratios for different population groups, around 2012/13
People aged 18-24 relative to people aged 25-50 ( ) Women relative to men
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
a
i t z al
A u um
Po a
nd
ly
Au k
Po r ia
Sl nd
Ze ia
Ca d
da
Fi e
d
ain
ce
Sw s
y
es
th nd
Hu en
Es n
No ia
Un Re a y
Sl K in li c
Re m
ic
el
i te an
nd
re
li
c
ar
ar
an
ic
an
an
pa
C
S w ug
bl
ra
It a
a k gdo
at
w
an
ee
ra
b
na
ed
la
la
Ne r ela
st
OE
N e ve
Sp
to
ex
Ko
nm
i
ng
Un er m
i t e pu
pu
el
nl
la
al
Ja
lg
Is
r
St
t
er
st
Gr
Fr
r
o
M
Ic
er
Be
I
De
d
G
w
d
ec
ov
Cz
Source: Module 4 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES 2011-16) and European Social Survey (ESS) for other countries.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405752
7.9. One in four young people in OECD not at all interested in politics
Share of people reporting to be not at all interested in politics, by age group, around 2012-14
Total ( ) 15-29 years old
%
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
F i nd
No nd
J y
rm n
de ic a
nm y
k
B ia
th il
ge ia
Hu hil e
ec M r y
Re i c o
Sp c
Ir e i n
nd
ng l
Sl om
B e ni a
m
OE a
ak ra D
pu e
Po li c
st d
Tu lia
ey
Es ly
Un A u ni a
d ria
S w tes
N e Ic e n
Ne rl d
Sw ea s
i t z land
a
i a t h di a
Ch n
a
C l
ga
K i ae
Re nc
a
Z d
De an
in
in
i
re
ar
Li r a z
e
tio
Au lan
th lan
Ge apa
C
Ar uan
bl
It a
a
iu
a
rk
rw
b
ra
ed
w an
la
a
la
i te s t
rtu
lom
d Isr
F e fr
to
s s o u In
e
nt
a
h ex
Ko
d
ng
pu
nl
lg
ra
ov
St
er
A
F
Po
Co
i te
Ru S
n
ov
Cz
Un
Sl
Source: European Social Survey ESS6-2012, ESS7-2014 and World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-14.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405767

Crime and prisoners
On average in 2013, 2 100 persons per 100 000 were brought

into formal contact with the police and/or criminal justice Definition and measurement
system. Crime rates among total population declined
Data on crime rates are based on the United Nations
slightly on average (by almost 3%) from 2008 to 2013
Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) Database, based
(Figure 7.10). The declines were highest in Japan,
on administrative data. UNODC collects data on crime
Netherlands and the United States by more than 20%,
and the operation of criminal justice systems in order
while the increase was strongest in Luxembourg and
to make policy-relevant information and analysis
Turkey. During the same period, crimes among juveniles
available in a timely manner to the international
declined even further, by almost 20% on average. The
community. The index is based on the total number
d e c l i n e s we re h i g h e s t i n t h e C z e ch R ep u bl i c a n d
of persons and juveniles aged under 18 brought
the Netherlands by more than 50%, while the increase was
into formal contact with the police and/or criminal
strongest in Turkey by almost 50%, and in Australia as well
j u s t i c e s y s t e m , a l l c r i m e s t a k e n t o g e t h e r,
among youth.
per 100 000 population. Data may include persons
Prison population stood at 147 per 100 000 people in the suspected, or arrested or cautioned. Any cross-
mid-2010s on average in the OECD. There are large national comparison should be conducted with
variations across countries (Figure 7.11). For instance, caution because of the differences that exist between
the United States reports the highest rate at almost 700 per the legal definitions of offences in countries, or the
100 000 population in 2013 down from a peak at 755 different methods of offence counting and recording.
in 2008. This is three times higher than second highest
Crime causes great suffering to victims and their
country (Israel). The prison population rate is also high in
families, but the costs associated with imprisonment
key partner countries, except in China, India and Indonesia
can also be considerable. These costs are normally
where it is below the OECD average.
justified by the need to inflict retribution to offenders,
Youths (aged under 18) represent only 1.3% of the prison to deter others from behaving in a similar way, and to
population (Figure 7.12). They account for less than 1% in p reve n t re - o f f e n d i n g . T h e s i z e o f t h e p r i s o n
22 OECD countries, but almost 3% in Germany, 4% in population depends on the level of crime, the
Canada and up to 14% in Mexico. This may reflect the legislative measures and the efficiency of the
specific forms of correction applied to minors in different enforcement measures. The basic indicator of the size
OECD countries i.e forms which may fall outside the of the prison population is each country is the
scope of the statistics used here. These youth are typically number of persons in prison (including pre-trial
not included in statistics on NEETs since they are not detainees and remand prisoners) per 100 000 of
covered by surveys. national population. Data on the prison population
Most OECD countries have seen their prison population c a n a l s o b e b ro k e n d ow n a c c o rd i n g t o t h e i r
rates rise in the 1990s and the 2000s followed by a slight demographic characteristics and legal status,
decrease in the early 2010s. On average across the including the share of juveniles under age 18. It
35 OECD countries, this rate increased from 117 persons should be noted that not everyone in prison has been
per 100 000 in the early 1990s to 156 persons in 2010; it then found guilty of a crime, due to the inclusion of those
declined slightly to 147 in the mid-2010s (Figure 7.11). awaiting trial or adjudication. The occupancy level
Since 1992, the prison population rate has more than refers to the prison population as a percentage of the
doubled in Mexico and Turkey, while it has declined only in official capacity. The indicators shown here are
Canada, Estonia, Korea, Latvia and three Nordic countries gathered in the World Prison Brief by the Institute for
Denmark, Finland and Sweden. Since 2010, the prison Criminal Policy Research (www.prisonstudies.org).
population rate has decreased in two-thirds of the
OECD countries, including in the United States.
In several countries, the rise in the prison population has
stretched beyond the receptive capacity of existing Figure notes
institutions (Figure 7.12). Occupancy levels are above 100%
in almost half of OECD countries, and above 120% in Figure 7.10: 2012 in Chile, New Zealand and Turkey; 2011 in Estonia,
Belgium, Hungary and Mexico. Occupancy rates are also Greece and Luxembourg instead of 2013.
generally high in non-European key partner countries. Figures 7.11 and 7.12: Instead of 2016: 2015 for Australia, Austria, Chile,
Such overcrowding feeds violence and rebellion against Japan, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, China, Indonesia,
institutions.
Lithuania, and South Africa; 2014 for Belgium, Canada, Iceland,
Netherlands, Switzerland, Brazil, Costa Rica, India and Latvia; 2013
for United States. 2000 instead of 1992 for China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, India, Latvia and Lithuania.
Figure 7.12: No youth data for Brazil and Colombia; no occupancy level
for China.

Crime and prisoners
7.10. Downward trends in crimes in most OECD countries between 2008 and 2013, particularly among youths
Rate of persons brought into formal contact with the police and/or criminal justice system per 100 000,
in 2013 (or nearest year), all crimes taken together, index 100 in 2008
Total population ( ) Youth, aged under 18
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
l
Re ar y
s
Po an
Ge c e
B e li c
m
CD
li a
m e
es
nd
Ca d
Sw da
en
Fi ia
d
C z Hu ny
ay
il e
ov Slov n
Re i a
Au c
ria
Es ly
Au ni a
g
ey
C o e d.
a
L i di a
a
ga
i te nd
xe e c
bi
ni
i
an
an
ur
bl
en
tv
It a
a
iu
rk
rw
at
an
Ch
b
ra
ed
na
a
p
st
OE
m
r tu
to
In
Sp
ua
F
ec ng
bo
Lu re
rm
pu
pu
Un er l a
Ne Pol
nl
Ja
al
La
lg
St
Tu
st
Fr
n
No
lo
th
Ze
ia
d
th
ss
w
ak
Ne
Ru
Sl
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) Database (www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime.html) accessed on
15 March 2016.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405777
7.11. Prison population rates increased till 2010 then slightly decreased
Prison population per 100 000 population, in 1992, 2010 and 2016 (or nearest year)
2016 or nearest ( ) 2010 1992
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Ja d
Sw pan
F i den
Ne n d
er r k
No nds
o y
rm ia
S w Ir e n y
er d
nd
Gr l y
Au ece
ng al
Fr r ia
lg e
C a ium
Lu K ada
m rea
S rg
d r tu n
C z ew ola y
O m
ak st D
p ia
ng c
ec Ze nd
pu d
M bli c
Es ico
Tu nia
L a ey
Ch a
i t e Is l e
St l
es
do i a
a
lo na
So ith bi a
h ia
C o Br a
ss R l
ia ic a
d.
Ru s t a a z i
d r ae
Sl r w a
B e anc
Hu ubli
si
ric
N P ar
an
De nl a n
it z lan
i te Po p ai
Re a n
ov Au E C
Ge ven
Ki g
Re r a l
In In d
ut uan
It a
tv
Fe
do
th ma
rk
at
a
Co Chi
la
st
ne
to
m
ex
xe o
bo
e
n
e
la
el
h al
Af
n
Ic
L
Un
Un
Sl
Source: World Prison Brief, Institute for Criminal Policy Research, World Prison Brief (www.prisonstudies.org) accessed on 15 March 2016.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405783
7.12. Variation in share of youth in prisons and prison occupancy rates

Percentage of youth (under 18) in the prison population and share of prison population in percentage of official capacity,
in 2016 (or nearest year)
Youths, aged under 18 ( , left axis) Occupancy level (right axis)
5 14 175
4 150
3 125
2 100
1 75
0 50
C z S w i love al
Ja in
No pan
s t ay
a
i t e inl n
St d
p d
Sl w el g li c
Un v a k Z e a m
es
nm il e
r d
d pu d
Ir e a n d
Po ar k
h rl a
ng li c
E s om
a
xe a t y
bo a
Ko r g
Fr r e a
Au nc e
Is i a
OE el
Ic C D
Ne Tu and
ng s
er e y
G ar y
rm ce
C a any
M ada
o
ss Afr a
n a
L i Chi .
C o hu a n a
a a
Co nes a
lo ia
Br i a
il
d
Hu a n d
S w r a li
e c t ze ni
ni
m vi
Ru t h n d i
s t ni
Lu L It al
ia ic
In R i c
az
Un F e d e
d n
Po lan
Re a n
i te Re l an
ic
S tug
ra
b
r
a
iu
Fe
u
th r k
Au r w
at
Ge ree
De Ch
B ub
Ki b
a
st
Sp
to
m
ex
d
n
a
el
l
u I
l
o
t
So
N e
o
Source: World Prison Brief, Institute for Criminal Policy Research (www.prisonstudies.org) accessed on 15 March 2016.
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405797

Social networks
Social networks consist of a group of individuals interacting

with each other, be it in person or virtually. Social networks Definition and measurement
and connectedness have been shown to be important for a
Data on social support and volunteering in an
variety of outcomes. Loneliness has been shown to be more
organisation comes from the Gallup World Poll where
prevalent amongst those on the edge of social networks
the questions asked to respondents are respectively: If
and has been shown to be detrimental to health and
you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friends you
increase mortality rates, particularly for older people
can count on to help you? and Have you done any of
(Cacioppo et al., 2011).
the following in the past month? How about
Young people tend to have a higher level of social support volunteered your time to an organisation?. The Gallup
than older age groups. On average across the OECD 93% of World Poll is conducted in more than 150 countries
15-29 year-olds report having a relative or friend they can around the world based on a common questionnaire.
count on to help them if they were in trouble (Figure 7.13). With few exceptions, all samples are probability-based
This compares to 89% of those aged 30-49 and 87% of those and nationally representative of the resident population
over 50. In most OECD countries at least 90% of youth aged 15 years and over in the entire country, including
report having family or friends to turn to, just Turkey and rural areas. While this ensures a high degree of
Mexico fall below this level (83 and 84% respectively). comparability across countries, results may be affected
Turkey and Korea both experience relatively low levels of by sampling and non-sampling error, and variation in
social support for older age groups with only 61% of Korean response rates; for example, data, especially for youth,
and 68% of Turkish persons over 50 reporting having should be interpreted carefully. Rates refer to people
someone to turn to in times of need. Iceland, Ireland and who answered yes and include Dont know and
Denmark have some of the highest rates of social supports Refused in the denominator.
across the different age groups.
Data on online activities among Internet users are
This higher level of social support amongst young people from the OECD Information and communication
may, in part, be due to their higher level of online technology (ICT) database. The part for ICT Access
connectedness. Online social networking by young people and Usage by Households and Individuals is based on
has been show to allow them to explore interests outside of Eurostat Statistics on Households and Individuals for
their physical social network and teach them about social the OECD countries that are part of the European
norms (Mizuko et al., 2009). 16-24 year-olds are 1.4 times Statistical system. Otherwise for non EU countries the
more likely to engage in online social networking than the information is based on an OECD data collection
overall (16-74) population (Figure 7.14). On average across where the data originate from National Statistical
the OECD 89% of youth use online social networks, ranging Offices official surveys.
from 53% in Mexico to 97% in Iceland. Online social
connectedness is, of course, linked to internet access and
the owning of a smartphone. 35% of individuals in Mexico
report owning a smartphone compared to over 90% in Further reading
countries like the United States the United Kingdom and
Cacioppo, J. et al. (2011), Social isolation, Annals of the
Canada (PEW, 2016). Only 26% of households in Mexico
New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 1231, pp. 17-22.
report having access to the internet compared to 95% of
households in Iceland (OECD, 2016). Mizuko, I. et al. (2009), Living and Learning with New
Media: Summary of Findings from the Digital Youth
Volunteering, as well as providing a contribution to society,
Project, MacArthur Foundation Reports.
has been shown to increase the wellbeing of volunteers
themselves (Meier and Stutzer, 2007). Just over one-fifth of OECD (2016), Internet access (indicator), http://dx.doi.org/
young people across the OECD report volunteering in the 10.1787/69c2b997-en (accessed 24 May 2016).
past month (Figure 7.15). This is slightly lower than for OECD (2015), OECD Science, Technology and Industry
those aged 30 and over. Participation in volunteer activities Scoreboard 2015: Innovation for Growth and Society, OECD
varies greatly across the OECD. Countries like Greece, Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/sti_scoreboard-
Turkey and Hungary tend to have low volunteering rates 2015-en.
with 10% or less of adults volunteering their time. At the
Pew Research Center (2016) Smartphone Ownership and
other end of the spectrum a large proportion (in excess of
Internet Usage Continues to Climb in Emerging
one-third) of adults in New Zealand, the United States and
E c o n o m i e s , w w w. p e w g l o b a l . o rg / f i l e s / 2 0 1 6 / 0 2 /
Ireland volunteered in the last month.
pew_research_center_global_technology_report_final_februar
y_22__2016.pdf.
Figure notes
Fi g u re 7 . 1 4 : N o d a t a avai l abl e f o r t h e Un i t e d S t a t e s a n d f o r
16-24 year-olds in Canada and Japan. Data refer to 2014 except for
Australia and Israel: 2013 and Canada and New Zealand: 2012.

0
10
20
30
40
50
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
50
60
70
80
90
100
Tu
r M Tu
ex rk
Gr k e y ic M ey
Hu e e c o
ex
Sl
ov ng e S w Fr an i
it z ce Gr c o
a k Po ar y er ee
Re l an la
n
Cz c
pu d ec I e
Gr d h sr a
S w bli ee Re e
ed c c pu l
e Po e bl
Ch n la ic
nd Ch
Cz L a il e Ko il e
ec Po t v i re Ko
h r tu a
Re g a Sl
pu al It a ov E s r e a
b ly a k to
Sp li c Is Re ni a
ra pu
M a in bl
ex Au el i
ic st Ja c
o ria pa
I n
Ic t a l y Lu
De l an e Ch
A u il e xe I t a
nm d st m ly
ra bo
a li H u ur g
Ja r k
p Tu a
rk ng
Sw Es an a
i t z ton Be ey Un O r y
lg
15-29 ( )
er i a i te EC
l Sl iu
m d
15-29 ( )
F i and ov St D
nl
a ak OE a
C

Re D Po tes
OE nd r tu
C pu g
16-24 ( )
Is D Ge bli c Po al
ra
K e rm la
n
G e or l an Fr d
rm ea y an
a Ne S
p c
Source: Gallup World Poll, www.gallup.com/services/170945/world-poll.aspx.

Fr ny Ne Au e
a C z w Z ain w s tr
No nc e ec ea Ze ia
r h lan
R al
Un Au way d a
L u epu Ca nd
i te Be s tr xe b li na
d lg ia m c Un
bo
30-49
L u K in ium i te B el da
u
30-49
xe g d d giu
N e mb om Es rg Ki m
to ng
o do
Source: OECD ICT Database; Eurostat, Information Society Statistics Database, March 2016.
ni
N e t h er ur g a No m
w lan
Ze d N Ir e rw
s Un e th l and a
Au alan i te er l N e Ir e l y
st d d and th an
ra Ki er d
Ir e l i a ng s la
l d Au nds
C a and Sl om
16-74
ov st
7.13. Social support is highest amongst youth
7.15. Young people are less likely to volunteer

Un Sl n ad en ra
i te ve ao S w li a
d ni Fi ia ed
St a nl De en
an
at d
50+
es S w nm
50+
La i t z ar k
C De t v i a er
nm
Proportion of each age category engaging in social networking online, 2014
S a L i t h hin Ge l and
ud u a a a rm
No r k
7.14. Young people are more likely to engage in online social networks
i A ni a rw an
ra
b Po ay Sp y
Source: OECD (2015), Hows Life 2015 Measuring Well-being, Gallup World Poll, www.gallup.com/services/170945/world-poll.aspx.
Ru Br i a r tu Sl a in
ss az ov
i a A r In d i l Hu g al en
n ge ia ng Fi ia
Fe n a nl
a
d e t in Sw r y
C ra a ed Ru Ic n d
e ss el
S o olo tion an
Percentage of people who report having relatives or friends they can count on, by age, pooled results 2006-14
Ic n ia d
ut m
h b el
an n
Fe
Proportion of each age category who volunteered time to an organisation in the past month, pooled results 2006-15
Co Af ia de
st ric Ca d
na ra
In a R a da tio
do i c n
ne a Ja Br
si pa az
a n il
135
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405829
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405818
1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933405801
Social networks
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The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic,
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(81 2016 13 1 P) ISBN 978-92-64-26146-4 2016
Society at aGlance 2016
This is the eighth edition of Society at a Glance, the biennial OECD overview of social indicators. This report
addresses the growing demand for quantitative evidence on social well-being and its trends. It updates some
indicators included in the previous editions published since 2001 and introduces several new ones, with
25 indicators in total. It includes data for the 35 OECD member countries and where available data for key
partners (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa); other G20 countries (Argentina and Saudi
Arabia) are also included. The report features a special chapter on the NEET challenge and what can be done
for jobless and disengaged youth. It also provides a guide to help readers in understanding the structure of
OECD social indicators. All indicators are available as a web book and an e-book on the OECD iLibrary.
Contents
Chapter 1. The NEET challenge: What can be done for jobless and disengaged youth?
Chapter 2. Interpreting OECD social indicators
Chapter 3. General context indicators
Chapter 4. Self-sufficiency indicators
Chapter 5. Equity indicators
Chapter 6. Health indicators
Chapter 7. Social cohesion indicators
http://oe.cd/sag
Consult this publication on line at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264261488-en.

This work is published on the OECD iLibrary, which gathers all OECD books, periodicals and statistical databases.
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SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2016: OECD SOCIAL INDICATORS OECD 2016 3

Chapter 2. Interpreting OECD social indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Chapter 3. General context indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Chapter 4. Self-sufficiency indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Chapter 5. Equity indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2016: OECD SOCIAL INDICATORS OECD 2016 5

Chapter 6. Health indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Chapter 7. Social cohesion indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

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6 SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2016: OECD SOCIAL INDICATORS OECD 2016

Acronyms and conventional signs

Australia AUS Korea KOR

Other major economy and G20 country ISO codes

Argentina ARG Indonesia IDN

Other acronyms and abbreviations

NEET Youth not in employment, education or training

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One in ten jobs have been destroyed since 2007

Lower skills make young people particularly vulnerable

Young women are often NEET because of care-giving responsibilities

Some NEETs suffer from additional forms of disadvantage

NEETs have lower levels of happiness, trust and political interest

Safety nets tend to be weaker for young people

Fighting early school leaving is essential

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Carefully targeted programmes are needed to re-engage NEETs

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The NEET challenge: What can be done

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1. Youth employment in the aftermath of the Great Recession

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Youth were hit hard by the economic crisis

Low-educated youth were particularly vulnerable to job losses

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Panel A. Employment rate of young people

Figure 1.2. Youth employment rates have been slow to recover

OECD Germany Hungary Ireland United States Greece

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High education Medium education Low education All education levels ( )

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Many NEETs are not looking for work

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Panel A. The share of NEETs Panel B. Percentage-point change in the rates

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Unemployed NEET rate Inactive NEET rate NEET rate

The high number of NEETs represents a significant cost to OECD economies

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Box 1.1. Measuring youth unemployment

Unemployment rate ( ) Unemployment ratio

Source: OECD Employment Database, www.oecd.org/employment/database.

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Figure 1.8. NEET costs are significant in many OECD countries

2. Who are the NEETs? A profile of jobless youth

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