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Transformational frames
Interpretative consequences of frame shifts
and frame embeddings

Titus Ensink

. Introduction

As Tannen (1993b: 1521) and Lee (1997) have pointed out, the notion of
frame is used in a variety of disciplines in order to describe and explain in-
terpretative phenomena, especially phenomena related to the influence of ac-
tivated knowledge (i.e. expectations). Tannen and Wallat (1993: 5962) use the
notion of frame on two levels: the interactive level, and the cognitive level. A
cognitive frame contains prototypical general knowledge concerning a multi-
tude of objects and events. Interactive frames enable language users to identify
the context of language activity, and to produce and recognise coherent se-
quences of (language) activities. Tannen and Wallat elaborate the notion of in-
teractive frame on the basis of the work of Erving Goffman, notably his Frame
analysis and Forms of talk. The term footing which Goffman used is crucial
here. However, in Frame analysis Goffman used yet another term, namely key,
to describe transformations across materials already meaningful in accordance
with a schema of interpretation. Through the use of a key, an interpretative
layer is added to already operative layers. Thus, a sudden contextual shift oc-
curs. Normally, such a shift is cued. (The term key may coincide with a change
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in footing, but not necessarily so.)

In this paper I will argue that the notion of key as used by Goffman, needs
to be elaborated in order to distinguish a mechanism that indicates contex-
tual shifts in discourse. In some circumstances, however, such shifts may occur
rather veiled, either because one trusts the observer to have sufficient knowl-
edge, or for exploiting effects. Whenever someone misses this shift in the inter-
pretation, a fundamental misunderstanding occurs. It appears that especially
 Titus Ensink
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media messages make use of keys; in that sense the frequency and range of the
use of keys seem to be a modern development. In this paper, I will present some
analytic tools in order to describe the operation of keys. I will demonstrate my
argument on the basis of the comparison of several examples of language use,
in part from natural settings, in part from media discourse.

. Three types of frames

In different fields of research it has since long been recognised that perception
is an active process. How we perceive does not merely depend on what is per-
ceived: it depends as much on the perceiver (How do we see a face in a smiley
:-) ? The face is not just out there in the three graphic symbols.) Thus, in
pragmatics we find the notion that the formal characteristics of an utterance
hopelessly underdetermine its interpretation. Similarly, in his review of read-
ing models Rumelhart (1985) noted that bottom up models of reading (which
try to explain the reading process as determined by the letters read, then by the
words read, then by the sentences read) fail empirically. Many aspects of the
reading process thus are not captured, such as:
The perception of letters often depend on the surrounding letters (Rumel-
hart 1985: 726), e.g. we often fail to notice a misspelling of an otherwise
completely understandable word, or a clumsily handwritten word xxent
is read either as went or as event dependent on which word fits best our
overall interpretation.
The perception of words depends on their syntactic (730) or semantic
(731) environment.
Similarly, the perception of strings of words containing syntactic informa-
tion depends on the semantic context in which the strings occur (732), e.g.
the syntactic structures of the similar strings I saw the Grand Canyon fly-
ing to New York and I saw the cattle grazing in the field are analysed quite
differently despite their superficial similarity, dependent on what we know
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to be a normal meaning.
The interpretation of meaning depends on the general context of what we
read (734).

Rumelhart proposes an interactive model of reading in which there is interac-

tion between the low and high levels in which a text presents itself to the reader.
Activity of a high level means that on the higher level expectations are generated
which influence the perception of the lower level.
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Perception processes thus are driven by expectations. Tannen (1993b)

presents a nice review of literature dealing with this starting point. In her
introduction, she notes:
The notion of expectation is at the root of a wave of theories and studies in
a broad range of fields, including linguistics. It is this notion, I believe, which
underlies talk about frames, scripts, and schemata in the fields of linguistics,
artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, social psychology, sociology, and
anthropology at least (and I would not be surprised if similar terms were used
in other disciplines I do not happen to know about1 ). (Tannen 1993b: 15)

We find a direct link between expectations and the notion of frame (and similar
notions as scripts and schemata) in this quotation. The notion of frame has
been used in order to answer two questions: where do these expectations come
from? And what determines the nature of the expectations? In the literature, we
find an abundant use of the notion of frame. Ensink and Sauer (this volume)
have presented an overview of these uses. Both Lee (1997: 340) and Tannen
and Wallat (1993: 5962) have tried to reduce the uses of the term to two basic
meanings, cognitive and interactional.
The various uses of frame and related terms fall into two categories. One is in-
teractive frames of interpretation which characterize the work of anthropol-
ogists and sociologists. We refer to these as frames, following Bateson (1972),
who introduced the term, as well as most of those who have built on this
work, including scholars in the fields of anthropology (Frake 1977), sociology
(Goffman 1974) and linguistic anthropology (Gumperz 1982; Hymes 1974).
The other category is knowledge structures, which we refer to as schemas,
but which have been variously labeled in work in artificial intelligence (Min-
sky 1975; Schank & Abelson 1977), cognitive psychology (Rumelhart 1975),
and linguistic semantics (Chafe 1977; Fillmore 1975, 1976).
(Tannen & Wallat 1993: 59)

(...) it is clear already that one salient difference between cognitive frames and
interactional frames is that, whereas the sociolinguistic tradition tends to be
concerned with the interpretation of UTTERANCES and their location in sur-
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rounding discursive practices, the cognitivists are more concerned with the
conceptual structures invoked by WORDS and the concepts they denote. On
the other hand, there is certainly a strong sociocultural dimension to cognitive
frames (...). (Lee 1997: 340; capitals in original)

As noted before, the various notions have one thing in common: the fact that
frames generate expectations that function as aides in interpretation processes.
Expectations thus have both cognitive and social effects. The cognitive effect is
 Titus Ensink
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that perceptions do not need to be built up completely, but that perceptions

partly may be filled by expected perceptions. And since people expect each
other to interpret that way, they may mutually suppose when engaged in
interaction that their interactional contributions will be fitted in some frame
so as to make fully explicit behaviour unnecessary.
I agree with both Tannen and Lee that it is sensible, fruitful and maybe
even necessary to distinguish the two senses as described: cognitive and interac-
tional. But I will argue that they miss one important distinction, which makes
it necessary to distinguish yet a third type of frame. The necessity shows in a
complication, which we come across when we elaborate the notion of frame in
the interactive sense. The complication appears in the following quotations.

The interactive notion of frame refers to a definition of what is going on in in-

teraction, without which no utterance (or movement of gesture) could be in-
terpreted. To use Batesons classic example, a monkey needs to know whether a
bite from another monkey is intended within the frame of play or the frame of
fighting. People are continually confronted with the same interpretative task.
In order to comprehend any utterance, a listener (and a speaker) must know
within which frame it is intended: for example, is this joking? Is it fighting?
Something intended as a joke but interpreted as an insult (it could of course
be both) can trigger a fight. (Tannen & Wallat 1993: 5960)2

Similarly, Lee (1997) writes:

In the ethnography of speaking ... the concept [frame] applies primarily to the
type of activity being engaged in: joking, imitating, chatting, lecturing, etc.
(...). (Lee 1997: 340)

Lees formulation suggests that joking, imitating, chatting, lecturing are ac-
tivities on the same level. But they are not. Similarly, Tannen and Wallats
formulation suggests that playing and fighting are alternatives on the same
level, either this or that. But they are not. Consider the following asymmetries
(* indicates that the utterance is odd or even impossible):
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(1) a. the monkeys play that they are fighting

b. *the monkeys fight that they are playing
(2) a. the professor was lecturing (about what? / not: what?)
b. the professor was imitating (what? / not: about what?)
(3) a. she was imitating the professors lecturing
b. *she was lecturing the professors imitating
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If we compare (1a) and (1b), it appears that fighting is an activity in its own
right which cannot contain another activity, whereas playing behaves the
other way around. It is an activity which calls for another activity which is play-
fully executed. Similarly, sentence (2a) is self-contained, whereas (2b) is not
complete: (2b) calls for an answer to the question what the professor was im-
itating; (2a) may only invoke the question what he was lecturing about. Per-
haps superfluously, (3a) and (3b) show once again the asymmetry in the type
of activity.
These considerations suggest that we have to divide the category interac-
tional frames into two subtypes: interactional frames proper (such as fight-
ing and lecturing) which indicate the activity plainly, per se, and transforma-
tions of interactional frames (such as playing and imitating), in which inter-
actional frames proper are modified. The latter type I will refer to as transfor-
mational frames. The nature and effect of these frames are the central concern
of this paper: how do these frames appear in discourse, and which are their
interpretative effects?
Throughout this paper I will use square brackets in order to indicate a
frame. The notation
[ face ]

indicates that some perception occurs under the influence of the frame for a
face. Similarly, the notation
[ lecture ]

means that we perceive some activities (a person talking to some other persons,
in a room with a certain configuration of chairs) as being a lecture. This way, it
is easy to give short and clear notations of transformational frames.3 Thus, we
may write down some of the examples above as follows:
In the quotation of Tannen and Wallat it is suggested that monkeys have to
choose from:
[ play ] [ fight ], whereas the choice is, however, between:
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[ fight ] [ play [ fight ] ]

The following frame constellations are impossible:
*[ fight [ play ] ], or *[ play ]
There is an asymmetrical relationship between transformational frames
and proper interactional frames or knowledge frames:
[ lecturing ], or [ imitating [ lecturing ] ],
 Titus Ensink
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are possible constellations, but not possible is:

*[ lecturing [ imitating ] ]

It is easy to see that whenever single brackets occur, we have a knowledge frame
or a proper interactional frame. Whenever such a frame is embedded within
another frame, this other frame is transformational. Transformational frames
thus always embed some other frame.4

. A framework for the description of transformational frames:

Erving Goffmans system of frame analysis

More than once, Erving Goffman (1974: 1981) has been mentioned as an ex-
ample of a theorist elaborating the notion of interactive frame (Brown & Yule
1983; Tannen & Wallat 1993; Lee 1997). This may be true for Goffmans con-
cept of footing (1981). However, in his Frame analysis (1974), Goffman is al-
most exclusively concerned with what I have termed transformational frames.
In this seminal work, he distinguished three types of frames, viz. primary
frames, keys and fabrications.5

. Primary frames

Primary frames have a content of their own. They answer the basic question
what we are perceiving now.
(...) a primary framework is one that is seen as rendering what would other-
wise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful.
(...) each primary framework allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and
label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms.
(Goffman 1974: 21)

Roughly, these may be considered to be equivalent with knowledge frames as

discerned in this paper.
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. Keys

Goffman describes the second type of frames, keys, as frames which must
contain other frames-with-content:
 Transformational frames
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(a). A systematic transformation is involved across materials already mean-

ingful in accordance with a schema of interpretation, and without which the
keying would be meaningless.
(b). Participants in the activity are meant to know and to openly acknowl-
edge that a systematic alteration is involved, one that will radically reconstitute
what it is for them that is going on.
(c). Cues will be available for establishing when the transformation is to
begin and when it is to end, namely, brackets in time, within which and to
which the transformation is to be restricted. (...) (Goffman 1974: 45)

Evidently, keys are identical with transformational frames as described in this

paper.6 As in the notation above, Goffman uses the idea of brackets in order
to indicate the scope of a frame. Thus, we may describe the perception of a
certain event or object per se as occurring under the influence of their respective
primary frames:
[ event ] or [ object ]

However, whenever this event (or object) is perceived under the operation of a
key as well, we have framing constellations such as:
[ description [ event ] ]
[ mimicry [ event ] ]
[ rehearsal [ event ] ]
[ photography [ event ] ]
[ playing [ event ] ]
[ fantasising [ event ] ]
[ dreaming [ event ] ]

Of course, multiple embeddings are possible. When a person (an actor) re-
hearses the way in which he should play some event, this may be described as:
[ rehearsing [ playing [ event ] ] ]

But an actor can also play to be someone who is rehearsing. We then have this
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constellation:
[ playing [ rehearsing [ playing [ event ] ] ] ]

It is clear that the outermost frame determines what is actually going on.
Goffman presents many similar examples.
 Titus Ensink
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. Fabrications

Fabrications are similar to keys, but differ in one respect. The knowledge of
their application is confined to only one person or party, whereas the other
person is unaware of its operation. Fabrications thus ask for a double descrip-
tion. One description from the point of view of the container (the person who
knows that the fabrication-frame is in operation), the other from the point
of view of the contained (the dope). Practical jokes, con tricks, secret exper-
iments, etc., are cases in point. Goffman makes two further distinctions. He
distinguishes benign (e.g. practical jokes) from exploiting (e.g. fraud) fabrica-
tions, and self-induced (e.g. dreams) from other-induced (e.g. practical jokes)
fabrications.

. Summary

In sum, four principles are particularly important:

1. a basic frame (a primary frame) is contained within the transforming frame
(key or fabrication)
2. frames (both primary, and keys) are supposed to be mutually known, but
fabrications are not
3. brackets indicate border-lines between frames
4. the outside frame determines what will be seen as the status of the per-
ceived event in reality.

These principles will be demonstrated in the next section in which I will analyse
a number of cases in which the functions and effects of frame shifts and frame
embeddings are shown.

. How transformational frames influence interpretation:

Analysis of illustrative cases
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. Frame shifts

We have seen already that a normal precondition for social interaction is

an agreement about the operation of primary frames, viz. which knowledge
frames apply. Whenever there is equivocation here, people are in need of clari-
fication. Clarification may follow after a debate, a protest, or after questioning
ones interpretative grounds. Here is an example.
 Transformational frames
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(4) Sudden death is a German specialty

The noun phrase sudden death has different meanings, depending on which
knowledge frame is activated by the context, such as some medical context, or
the context of an undecided sports contest (whoever scores the next point wins
the game), or the context of a discussion about capital punishment. Accord-
ing to a news message (on August 15th, 1996) in several Dutch newspapers,
the utterance in example (4) was used as a slogan by the German chemical
corporation BAYER in its Guatemalan advertising campaign for an insecticide.
Apparently, the slogan is meant to invoke two knowledge frames. First, a frame
related to sport events: one is supposed to remember the at that time recent
fact that the German soccer team became world champion in the 1996 tour-
nament after the German team won a drawn game according to the sudden
death rule. Second, a frame related to everyday life biology: irritating insects
may be got rid of by using a poisonous spray. To many people, however, an
unintended third frame was most dominant, viz. a frame related to historical
knowledge about the Holocaust. The juxtaposition of the third frame yields a
highly cynical meaning. According to the newspaper message, BAYER decided
to stop its campaign for that reason.
The concept of frame (both in the sense of a knowledge frame and an in-
teractive frame) thus is useful in order to describe and explain cases of frame-
conflicts:7 people initially do not agree on which frame is the appropriate one.
The solution ordinarily is a frame shift. One frame is in operation. One chooses
to release that frame and to agree instead on a different one.
Hence, the operation is shifted from one frame to another one. The struc-
ture of a frame shift is in formal notation:
[ A ] [ B ].

. Frame embeddings and de-embeddings

The concept of frame in the sense of transformational frame is needed in order

U.S. or applicable copyright law.

to describe and explain cases where problems arise which call for either frame
embeddings or frame de-embeddings.
In the case of a frame embedding, a transformational frame is added to the
frame already in operation. The frame which was in operation already is not re-
leased (as is the case in a frame shift). Its interpretation is brought under the in-
fluence of the now added transformational frame. A paradigmatic case is when
a person perceives an activity as a serious, real, activity, whereas it is meant
 Titus Ensink
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to be a played activity. The embedding occurs at the moment in which that

person realises that he has to perceive the situation as being played. First, the
person has perceived the situation in a downkeyed way; in order to restore the
intended interpretation, one has to do a form of upkeying, to use Goffmans
terminology. The structure of a frame embedding is in formal notation:
[ A ] [ B [ A ] ].

In the case of a frame de-embedding the opposite process takes place. The per-
ception process takes place under the influence of a knowledge frame and a (at
least one) transformational frame. The transformational frame is, however, not
intended. In order to restore the intended interpretation, the transformational
frame has to be put out of operation. (The formerly upkeyed perception has
to be downkeyed.) A paradigmatic case is when a person perceives an activity
as a non-serious, played, activity, whereas it is meant to be a serious, genuine,
activity. The structure of a frame de-embedding is in formal notation:
[ B [ A ] ] [ A ].

For transformational frames to be effective it is of course necessary that people

know which frames might operate at all. There are several reasons why this is
not always the case.
People need to learn different (types of) transformational frames and the
way they are cued in the course of their childhood. For example, young
children need to differentiate between the fictional, transformed world of
stories and the real world.
New technological inventions may add new framing possibilities. In gen-
eral, the possibility of mediation entails a form of transformational fram-
ing. As a result, people need to learn in which way new forms of medi-
ation add transformational frames. Consider as an example stories told
about the consternation caused by the first movies at the end of the
nineteenth century.
In different cultures different framing practices may exist which may cause
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difficulties in the understanding of the way in which frames are used in

other cultures. As an example, consider the story Averroes search (Borges
1972: 8491) about the Islam philosopher Averroes trying to translate the
work of Aristotle, who could not find a proper translation of the words
tragedy and comedy because of being unfamiliar with a theatrical culture
and its framing practices.
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Nevertheless, even when such differences do not exist, there may still occur
problems regarding the way transformational frames operate. In most cases,
a cue indicating a transformational frame is missed, or ambiguous, and a
downkeyed perception takes place. In order to restore the intended interpre-
tation, an embedding process is called for. (The opposite process takes place
rather less frequently.)

. Examples of misunderstandings and their analysis

Consider the following examples of these processes.

(5) A father and his daughter are watching an Olympic Games contest on TV.
A young female athlete did not perform very well. After her performance,
she is approached by her trainer.
F This evening you are going to bed without any food!
D [flabbergasted] Me!?

Although simple, the example is paradigmatic. The father, watching the badly
performing athlete, is imitating or mimicking the way the athlete might be
spoken to by her trainer. The daughter, however, is simply understanding her
father as speaking as her father to herself. The situation can be described as a
frame conflict (symbolised by the double arrow):
[ austern father ] [ mimicry [ austern trainer ] ]

In this case, the situation is solved when the daughter reinterprets her initial
understanding by adding the mimicry-frame.
(6) On December 28, 1994, I am doing some shopping in a (Dutch) super-
market. The store has speakers in its ceiling. From these I hear a radio
programme. A reporter is speaking with a slightly excited voice [recon-
struction]:
Because of the tensions within the government most people who watch
the political developments in The Hague are pessimistic. It is expected that
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the coalition parties will split and thus the government will fall. One party
leader I spoke to just a minute ago expects the Prime Minister to deliver
his letter of resignation to the Queen before the evening.
I am surprised to hear this report. I had not heard of any political prob-
lems during the last few days. After a few seconds, I realise that it is the
end of the year. I remember that earlier that year there had been political
problems which led the government to resign and to organise new elec-
 Titus Ensink
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tions. I do not listen to a news report, but to the years survey which makes
use of the archive of news reports.

In this case, there is a re-interpretation which adds again a transformational

frame:
[ report [ political activities ] ]
[ a years survey [ report [ political activities ] ] ]

The re-interpretation is not caused by an interactional problem (there is no

direct interaction in this case). The re-interpretation is triggered by two facts.
First, the realisation of inconsistency with recent information about Dutch pol-
itics (which makes the report-interpretation less likely). Second, the awareness
of the date, which offers a plausible new transformed interpretation. This
example sheds light on the principle that Cues will be available for establish-
ing when the transformation is to begin and when it is to end, namely, brack-
ets in time, within which and to which the transformation is to be restricted
(Goffman 1974: 45). In normal cases, a person will perceive and be aware of
those cues. In this case, the cues must have been available previously, when the
radio programme was initiated and undoubtedly announced as a survey (and
not as an actual report). In case these cues are missed, interpretative prob-
lems may occur. But the effects of cues (or of missing cues in ones perception)
are not fully deterministic. Missed cues may be reconstructed on the basis of
plausibility.

. Transformational frames as descriptions

The concept transformational frame is not only relevant for the analysis of
misunderstandings. The concept has pure descriptive value as well, as is shown
in examples (7) and (8).
(7) In a research project on story telling, the researcher uses different elicita-
tion techniques in order to stimulate children to story telling. The follow-
U.S. or applicable copyright law.

ing story is told by a 10-year old girl, in Dutch (Heesters 2000). (B: adult
researcher/interviewer eliciting stories; A: girl)

B heb je zelf ook wel eens zoiets B did you ever dream something
gedroomd? like that?
A (1.0) nee [niet dat ik over moest A (1.0) no, [ not that I had to throw
geven up
B [ (...) B [()
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[ oh [ oh
A [ weleens dat ik moest plassen in A [ but once that I had to pee in bed
bed
B ja? wat was er gebeurd dan? B yes? what happened?
A nou ik droomde dat eh dat ik A well, I dreamed that uh that I
door een grot liep, en eh ik walked through a cave, and uh I
moest alsmaar heel nodig had to pee all the time, but uh
plassen, maar ik eh ik kon daar there was no place where I could
nergens plassen, toen ben ik pee, I then sat down, then I peed,
gaan zitten, toen heb ik geplast, then I peed in my bed
toen heb ik in mijn bed geplast
B ja. ja dat hoor je wel vaker B yes, you hear that more often
A werd ik niet wakker A didnt wake up
B hm B uhuh
The girl tells a story (a transformational frame) about a dream. Now dream-
ing is an event for which we have a knowledge frame (dreaming occurs dur-
ing our sleep, normally when in bed, dreaming does not occur at free will, et
cetera). On the other hand, a dream may contain events, hence functions as
another transformational frame. In this case, about walking while having an
urge to pee (an event interpretable within a knowledge frame). The overall
structure thus is:
[ story [ dream [ walking while having an urge to pee ] ] ]

It is remarkable that the girl uses a repetition in her story as follows: toen heb
ik geplast, toen heb ik in mijn bed geplast (then I peed, then I peed in my bed).
The repetition is interpretable within the constellation of frames: then I peed
fits into the overall frame of a story about a dream about some event. But then
I peed in my bed shifts one frame back. The girl continues her story, but now
about the dream as an event in itself, about the circumstances in which the
dreaming occurred. Consider how one would interpret the story without the
repetition.
U.S. or applicable copyright law.

(8) During a courtroom interrogation in a Dutch Court of Law between a

Judge (J) and a Witness (W) the following interaction took place (for easy
reference, numbers have been added to phrases):

J (1) terwijl ze zo zat vroegen we
(2) en dan eigenlijk nog een
keer h (3) wat er nou gebeurd
was (4) en dan antwoordt ze
nog steeds niet
J (1) while she was sitting like that
we asked (2) and then once again
wasnt it (3) what really had
happened (4) and then she still
does not answer
 Titus Ensink
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W (5) nee
J (6) zegt niks (7) maar zakt ze
een beetje met haar hoofd naar
voren (8) zo naar dr knien toe
(9) ik dacht zegt u dan (10) goh
die kan niet zitten
W (11) ja
J (12) ik heb haar nog tegen haar
schouder iets teruggeduwd
zodat ze meer rechtop kwam
(13) en dan komt dat verhaal
dat u denkt aan drankgebruik
(14) geen dranklucht geroken
vond u vreemd (15) ze was
totaal niet aanspreekbaar (16)
terwijl ik dus met mijn collega
stond te overleggen (17) kwam
ze overend en toen ging ze staan
W (18) [onverstaanbaar]
J (19) toen nog steeds niets
zeggende (20) maar als ze dan
staat dan zegt ze (21) mag ik
een sigaret
W (22) dat klopt (G)
J (23) dan zegt u nog een keer
(24) ja ze maakte de indruk van
iemand die net net wakker werd
(25) die net wakker was
geworden (26) en dan zegt u
tegen dr (27) dat krijg je zo dat
dat mag zo wel (28) maar vertel
nu eerst eens even h wat er
gebeurd is (29) weer geen
antwoord h (30) komt er niet
uit (31) en dan vraagt ze (32)
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laat me eens even een beetje
water drinken (33) h woorden
van die strekking
W (34) nou ze heeft woordelijk
gevraagd
J (35) ja
W (5) no
J (6) doesnt say anything (7) but
she sank her head a little bit (8)
in the direction of her knees (9) I
thought thats what you then say
(10) gee she cant even sit
W (11) yes
J (12) I even pushed her back
against her shoulder so as to
make her sit upright again (13)
and then there is that story that
you think of alcohol abuse (14)
no smell of alcohol surprised you
(15) she was absolutely not
approachable (16) so while I was
deliberating with my colleague
(17) she rose and stood on her
feet
W (18) [incomprehensible]
J (19) at that moment still saying
nothing (20) but then as she
stands then she says (21) can I
have a cigarette
W (22) thats correct
J (23) then you say once again
(24) well she made the
impression of someone just
waking up (25) whod just woken
up (26) and then you say to her
(27) youll get it you may have it
in a moment (28) but first tell
me what happened (29) again no
answer isnt it (30) she utters
nothing (31) and then she asks
(32) let me have a little bit of
water (33) right words of that
purport
W (34) well she asked literally
J (35) yes
 Transformational frames
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W (36) mag ik wat water drinken
in de keuken om te kalmeren
(37) dat heeft ze woordelijk
gevraagd
J (38) mag ik wat water drinken
in de keuken (39) om te
kalmeren dat zei ze er ook bij
W (40) dat heeft ze woordelijk
gezegd
W (36) can I have some water in the
kitchen for calming down (37)
she asked that literally
J (38) can I have some water in the
kitchen (39) for calming down
she said that too
W (40) she said that literally

The background of the interrogation is this. Two police officers had been called
by neighbours to look after an apparently nervously wrecked woman who
made turmoil. When both officers entered her house and talked to her, she
took a small knife in her hands. One officer felt threatened and shot her, as a
result of which the woman died. However, the Public Prosecutor investigated
this incident in order to determine whether the officer used unnecessary vi-
olence. During this investigation the officer has been interrogated, which in-
terrogations have been written down in a protocol. The officer who shot the
woman now stands trial on the charge of using excessive violence.
On the basis of this knowledge we may describe the courtroom interroga-
tion as follows:
[ courtroom interrogation [ protocol [ police interrogation [ visit of two
police officers to confused woman ] ] ] ]

Knowledge of this frame-constellation is necessary to make sense of the court-

room interrogation, to give it coherence and comprehensibility. Local refer-
ences may be found to each of these frames. The overall coherence is depen-
dent on the constellation as such. The aim of the courtroom session is to find
the truth about the real event: what happened during the visit of the two police
officers to the confused woman. About this event there is a protocol contain-
ing the statements made by the officer during the earlier police interrogation.
The judge makes reference to this protocol in order to find confirmation or
disconfirmation about the correctness of the protocol. Consider the following
U.S. or applicable copyright law.

examples (referred to by sentence numbers):

the personal pronoun you refers to the Police-officer-as-witness, within
the outermost frame of the courtroom interrogation, and said by the
Judge-as-Judge (I said by and referring to the Judge does not occur in
this fragment), as in: (9) I thought thats what you then say, or similarly
you in (23) and (26)
 Titus Ensink
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the outermost frame of the courtroom interrogation consists itself of a

Q-A-Q-A-pattern, in which the judge asks questions about the protocol
(e.g. in (2): wasnt it, or in (39) for calming down she said that too?)
and in which the officer provides confirming/disconfirming, or elaborating
answers (e.g. in (5), (22) or (34)(37))
several references are made to the organisation of the protocol, e.g. (9) I
thought thats what you then say, (13) and then there is that story that you
think of alcohol abuse, and (23)
several references are made to the content of the protocol, viz. a report
about the event, e.g. (1) while she was sitting like that we asked we
refers to the two officers; she refers to the woman; I refers to the reporting
police officer
several formulations are from within the event itself, such as the direct
quotations of the woman (21; 32) or of the acting police officer (27)(28).

In examples (7) and (8) the organisation of frames is known to and restricted
to direct participants. The researcher and the girl in (7), the judge, the witness,
prosecutor and solicitor, and some other people present in (8).

. Framed public discourse

In public discourse participants are many, often millions of people. Public dis-
course relies on mediation. Without media a mass audience cannot be reached.
Media constitute transformational frames by their very nature, and apart from
that, they make use of them. Examples (9) and (10) show some peculiarities of
framed public discourse.
(9) Did not Hitler realise what Wilhelm II only promised, namely lead the
Germans into glorious times? Wasnt he really elected by Providence, a
leader such as is given to a people only once in a thousand years? (...)
And as for the Jews: didnt they in the past (...) take on a role which didnt
belong to them? Wasnt it due time for them to accept restrictions? Didnt
U.S. or applicable copyright law.

they even deserve it to be put in their places? And above all: did not the
propaganda apart from some wild, unserious exaggerations essentially
match the own conjectures and convictions?

On November 10, 1988, the then President of the Bundestag (the German Par-
liament), Philipp Jenninger, addressed the Bundestag in order to commemorate
to 50th anniversary of the nazi-organised pogrom known as the Kristallnacht.
Excerpt (9) contains two fragments of this speech. The fragments were largely
 Transformational frames
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understood e.g. by the newspapers as expressing admiration of Hitler and

condoning his political actions. Jenningers address led to a scandal due to
which he had to resign. The meaning of the fragments in excerpt (9), how-
ever, may be seen differently framed when we consider their function in the
whole text. Jenninger began his address thus:

Meine Damen und Herren, Ladies and gentlemen,

die Juden in Deutschland und in
aller Welt gedenken heute der
Ereignisse vor fnfzig Jahren. Auch
wir Deutschen erinnern uns an das,
was sich vor einem halben
Jahrhundert in unserem Land
zutrug, und es ist gut, dass wir dies
in beiden Staaten auf deutschem
Boden tun, denn unsere Geschichte
lsst sich nicht aufspalten in Gutes
und Bses, und die Verantwortung
fr das Vergangene kann nicht
verteilt werden nach den
geographischen Willkrlichkeiten
der Nachkriegsordnung.
Ich begre zu dieser
Gedenkveranstaltung im deutschen
Bundestag den Herrn
Bundesprsidenten, den Herrn
Botschafter des Staates Israel, mein
besonderer Gru gilt an diesen Tag
allen jdischen Mitbrgerinnen
und Mitbrgern in Deutschland,
vor allem denen, die als unsere
Ehrengste an dieser Gedenkstunde
teilnehmen: dem Vorsitzenden und
den Mitgliedern des Direktoriums
U.S. or applicable copyright law.
the Jews in Germany and in the
whole world commemorate today
what happened fifty years ago. We
Germans remember as well what
happened half a century ago in our
country. It is good to do this in both
states on German soil, because our
history cannot be split up in good
and evil, and the responsibility for
what has happened cannot be
divided according to the accidental
geographic order that came into
being after the war.
I salute (welcome) on this
extraordinary meeting of
Parliament: Mr. President of the
Federation, Mr. Ambassador of the
State of Israel, my special salutation
on this day is to all Jewish fellow
[male and female] citizens in
Germany, especially those who
participate as our guests of honour in
this Memorial Event: the Chairman
and the members of the Directorate
of the Central Council of Jews in

des Zentralrates der Juden in Germany, and representatives of the

Deutschland und den Vertretern
der Christlichen Kirchen. Mein
herzlicher Gru und mein Dank
gilt auch Ihnen, sehr verehrte Frau
Professor Ehre.
Christian Churches. My salutation
and gratitude are also directed to
you, Mrs. Professor Ida Ehre.
 Titus Ensink
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Viele von uns haben gestern auf
Einladung des Zentralrates der
Juden in Deutschland an der
Gedenkveranstaltung in der
Synagoge in Frankfurt am Main
teilgenommen. Heute nun haben
wir uns hier im deutschen
Bundestag zusammengefunden,
um hier im Parlament der Pogrome
vom 9. und 10. November 1938 zu
gedenken, weil nicht die Opfer,
sondern wir, in deren Mitte die
Verbrechen geschahen, erinnern
und Rechenschaft ablegen mssen,
weil wir Deutschen uns klar werden
wollen ber das Verstndnis
unserer Geschichte und ber
Lehren fr die politische
Gestaltung unserer Gegenwart und
Zukunft.
[start of interruption by
Bundestag-member Jutta
Oesterle-Schwerin]
Die Opfer... [interruption]
Bitte lassen Sie diese wrdige
Stunde in dieser Form ... ablaufen
[interruption goes on]
Ich bitte Sie um Verstndnis dafr,
dass ich Sie herzlich bitte, jetzt
aah sich ruhig zu verhalten.
Die Opfer, die Juden berall auf der
Welt, wissen nur zu genau, was der
November 1938 fr ihren knftigen
Leidensweg zu bedeuten hatte.
U.S. or applicable copyright law.
Many among us have participated
yesterday in the Memorial Event at
the Synagogue in Frankfurt am
Main, invited by the Central Council
of Jews in Germany. Today, however,
we have gathered in the German
Bundestag in order to commemorate
the pogroms of November 9th and
10th, 1938. Because not the victims,
but we, in the midst of whom the
crimes were committed, have to
remember and account for them. We
Germans should have a clear
understanding about our past, and
learn from it for the political
formation of our present and future.
[start of interruption by
Bundestag-member Jutta
Oesterle-Schwerin]
The victims ... [interruption]
Please let this solemn hour in this
form ... proceed
[interruption goes on]
I ask you to understand that I
request you kindly now aah, to
behave quietly.
The victims, the Jews all over the
world, know all too well the meaning
of November 1938 for their
approaching suffering.

Wissen wir es auch? Do we know as well?

If one looks at these first two minutes of Jenningers speech, it is difficult to
imagine that he was accused of admiring and condoning Hitler. Jenninger
clearly states: ... not the victims, but we, in the midst of whom the crimes
were committed, have to remember and account for them [the pogroms] and
The victims, the Jews all over the world, know all too well the meaning of
November 1938 for their approaching suffering. Do we know as well? In this
 Transformational frames
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last question, Jenninger clearly means: Do we Germans know as well? From

this beginning, Jenninger proceeds as follows. I will quote the most important
parts of his speech up to the two fragments which were given as example (9),
and which caused the strongest outrage. The two fragments are italicised.
What happened today fifty years ago in the midst of Germany, did not occur
in any civilised country since the middle ages. And worse: the excesses were
not as one might think an expression of a however motivated spontaneous
anger of the people, but they were devised, initiated and supported by the
states leadership.
The ruling party had in the person of its highest representative suspended
justice and law. The state itself became the organiser of crime. Now, open
terror came instead of the purposeful rules and laws by means of which the
insidious illegalisation of the Jews was executed. A minority of hundreds of
thousands was declared outlaw, their possessions rendered to the soaring rage
of an organised mob.
About 200 synagogues were set on fire or demolished, Jewish cemeteries de-
stroyed, thousands of shops and homes ruined and looted. About 100 Jews
were killed, about 30,000 deported into concentration camps. Many of them
never returned. Not quantifiable were the human pain, abuse, humiliations.
(...)
In hindsight it becomes clear that between 1933 and 1938 in Germany a rev-
olution took place a revolution in which the lawful state changed into an
illegal and criminal state (...). At the end of this revolution, a lot more of the
peoples sense of justice was destroyed than might be recognised from the out-
side. (...) Even more fateful than Hitlers crimes were his successes (...) To the
Germans who had experienced the Weimar Republic as a series of political
humiliations all this [viz. Hitlers initial political successes] seemed a miracle.
And even more. Mass unemployment became full employment. Mass poverty
became prosperity for broad layers of the population. Instead of despair, now
optimism and self-confidence prevailed. Did not Hitler realise what Wilhelm
II only promised, namely lead the Germans into glorious times? Wasnt he really
elected by Providence, a leader such as is given to a people only once in a thousand
years? (...)
U.S. or applicable copyright law.

Many Germans did not even ask themselves anymore the question which sys-
tem were to be preferred. In some realms of society one enjoyed less individual
freedom. But personally, one had more prosperity than ever before. The Em-
pire was undoubtedly great again, even greater and more powerful than ever.
Didnt only recently the leaders of Great Britain, France and Italy pay their re-
spect to Hitler in Munich, and didnt they offer him one more of these seem-
ingly impossible successes?
And as for the Jews: didnt they in the past so one said at that time take on
 Titus Ensink
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a role which didnt belong to them? Wasnt it due time for them to accept restric-
tions? Didnt they even deserve it to be put in their places? And above all: did not
the propaganda apart from some wild, unserious exaggerations essentially
match the own conjectures and convictions?

The beginning of the address establishes an interactional frame which we may

describe as a ceremony, and invoking expectations belonging to that frame.
Ladies and gentlemen, the Jews in Germany and in the whole world com-
memorate today what happened fifty years ago. We Germans remember as well
what happened half a century ago in our country. The basic expectation be-
longing to such a ceremony is: let us together think back to the horrible events
which occurred a round number of years ago, and let us try to derive a new
moral meaning from it for us today by assuring ourselves that we are distant
and want to keep distance. A speaker on such an occasion does not so much
interact with his audience, but rather is the person who precedes the audi-
ence in his words towards the expected shared moral meaning. In our formal
notation we might describe the expected structure thus:
[ ceremony [ thinking back to [ nazi past ] ] ]

Maybe this formal description is not quite right. First, it might be better to say
that thinking back to is a way of realising the ceremony, rather than a frame
which is embedded within the ceremony. The description then changes into:
[ ceremony thinking back to [ nazi past ] ]

Second, there should be added a specific way of how to think back, namely in
a morally justified and hence distancing way.
However, at the end of the introduction Jenninger deviates from these ex-
pectations in two ways. First, when he says: ... not the victims, but we, in the
midst of whom the crimes were committed, have to remember and account
for them [i.e., the pogroms] he shifts from a perspective in which the focus of
attention is on the victims to one in which the focus is on the perpetrators. Sec-
ond, when he says The victims, the Jews all over the world, know all too well
U.S. or applicable copyright law.

the meaning of November 1938 for their approaching suffering. Do we know

as well? he implies: We Germans are not sufficiently aware of what happened,
hence in my address I will pay attention to what happened.
Jenninger thus conceives the ceremonial task as one in which one has to
pay full attention to what happened in the past, from the perspective of (the
heirs of) the perpetrators. In order to pay full attention to the past, he offers
a painfully precise description of what happened in the Kristallnacht, and who
 Transformational frames
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was responsible for it. He then describes the general political situation and at-
titude of the average German during the years 1933 through 1938. Only then,
and in that context, Jenninger formulates the two passages which were quoted
as example (9). The two passages function as a demonstration of how the av-
erage German felt and reasoned at that time. There are two strong indications
in favour of this interpretation. The first indication is this:

Many Germans did not even ask themselves anymore the question which sys-
tem were to be preferred. In some realms of society one enjoyed less individ-
ual freedom. But personally, one had more prosperity than ever before. The
Empire was undoubtedly great again, even greater and more powerful than
ever. Didnt only recently the leaders of Great Britain, France and Italy pay
their respect to Hitler in Munich, and didnt they offer him one more of these
seemingly impossible successes?

In this passage, Jenninger shifts from a pure description (Many Germans did
not even ask themselves ...) toward speaking from within the events of Novem-
ber 1938: only recently refers to August 1938. Speaking from within has a
dramatising and enlivening effect. But it does not imply for a speaker to ex-
press his own standpoint. The second indication is the fact that Jenninger
added so hie es damals (so one said at that time) to the questions in which
he expressed the general attitude toward the fate of the Jews.
In formal notation we may say that Jenninger intended his speech as a shift
from an expected frame toward an intended frame:
[ ceremony focussing on victims ]
[ ceremony focussing on perpetrators]

whereas the intended ceremony has been realised as:

[ ceremony [ analysis [ quotation [ nazi past ] ] ] ]

Jenninger only quoted as part of the analysis, and embedded within the anal-
ysis. Among his audience a different perception prevailed. In the worst cases,
the perceived structure was:
U.S. or applicable copyright law.

[ ceremony [ quotation [ nazi past ] ] ]

Thus, a headline in a Dutch newspaper about Jenningers speech ran: Presi-

dent Bundestag in jeopardy after eulogy of Hitler. But in most cases, there was
an uncertainty among the audience about the way in which the speech had to
be understood. This led to reproaches that a speaker is not allowed to leave his
 Titus Ensink
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audience uncertain in such a delicate and sensitive matter. Hence, the perceived
structure in most cases was:
[ ceremony [ analysis? or apology? [ quotation? or standpoint? [ nazi
past ] ]? ]? ]

The following example consists of the use of a documentary frame embedded

within a fiction frame.
(10) Columbia Broadcasting System, October 31, 1938
ANNOUNCER:
The Columbia Broadcasting System and its affiliated stations present Orson
Welles and the Mercury Theatre on the Air in War of the Worlds by H. G. Wells.
[theme] Ladies and gentlemen: the director of the Mercury Theatre and star of
these broadcasts, Orson Welles...
WELLES:
We know now that in the early days of the twentieth century this world was be-
ing watched closely by intelligences greater than mans and yet as mortal as his
own. We know now that as human beings busied themselves about their vari-
ous concerns they were scrutinized and studied, perhaps almost as narrowly as
a man with a microscope might scrutinize the transient creatures that swarm
and multiply in a drop of water. With infinite complacence people went to and
fro over the earth about their little affairs, serene in the assurance of their do-
minion over this small spinning fragment of solar driftwood which by chance
or design man has inherited out of the dark mystery of Time and Space. Yet
across an immense ethereal gulf, minds that are to our minds as ours are to
the beasts of the jungle, intellects vast, cool and unsympathetic regarded this
earth with envious eyes and slowly and surely drew their plans against us. In
the thirty-ninth year of the twentieth century came the great disillusionment.
It was near the end of October. Business was better. The war scare was over.
More men were back at work. Sales were picking up. On this particular
evening, October 30, the Crossley service estimated that thirty-two million
people were listening in on radios.
ANNOUNCER 1:
... for the next twenty-four hours not much change in temperature. A slight at-
U.S. or applicable copyright law.

mospheric disturbance of undetermined origin is reported over Nova Scotia,

causing a low pressure area to move down rather rapidly over the northeast-
ern states, bringing a forecast of rain, accompanied by winds of light gale force.
Maximum temperature 66; minimum 48. This weather report comes to you
from the Government Weather Bureau.
... We now take you to the Meridian Room in the Hotel Park Plaza in down-
town New York, where you will be entertained by the music of Ramon Raque-
llo and his orchestra. [spanish theme song ... fades]
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ANNOUNCER 3:
Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. From the Meridian Room in the Park
Plaza in New York City, we bring you the music of Ramon Raquello and his or-
chestra. With a touch of Spanish, Ramon Raquello leads of with La Cumpar-
sita [music]
ANNOUNCER 2:
Ladies and gentlemen, we interrupt our program of dance music to bring you
a special bulletin from the Intercontinental Radio News. At twenty minutes
before eight, central time, Professor Farrell of the Mount Jennings Observa-
tory, Chicago, Illinois, reports observing several explosions of incandescent
gas, occurring at regular intervals on the planet of Mars. The spectroscope in-
dicates the gas to be hydrogen and moving towards the earth with enormous
velocity. Professor Pierson of the observatory at Princeton confirms Farrells
observation, and describes the phenomenon as quote like a jet of blue
flame hot from a gun. unquote We now return you to the music of Ramon
Raquello playing for you in the Meridian Room of the Park Plaza Hotel, sit-
uated in downtown New York. [music until piece ends; applause] Now a tune
that never loses favor, the ever popular Star Dust. Ramon Raquello and his
orchestra ... [music] Ladies and gentlemen, following on the news given in our
bulletin a moment ago, the Government Meteorological Bureau has requested
the large observatories of the country to keep an astronomical watch on any
further disturbances on the planet Mars. Due to the unusual nature of this
occurrence, we have arranged an interview with the noted astronomer, Pro-
fessor Pierson, who will give you his views on this event. In a few moments
we will take you to the Princeton Observatory at Princeton, New Jersey. We
return you until then to the music of Ramon Raquello and his orchestra. [mu-
sic] We are ready now to take you to the Princeton Observatory at Princeton
where Carl Phillips, our commentator, will interview Professor Pierson, fa-
mous astronomer. (Radio broadcast War of the Worlds, October 31, 1938;
script quoted from Cantril 1966)

Example (10) is well known. The broadcast itself and its effects are well docu-
mented in Cantril (1940 = 1966). The broadcast of the radio play in 1938 lasted
one hour. In (10) a protocol of the first minutes is presented. From this protocol
U.S. or applicable copyright law.

it appears that the nature of the play (following the immediately preceding pro-
gramme which is not presented here) is announced explicitly and unequivo-
cally by the CBS-announcer. Orson Welles then starts the play in a dramaturgic
way: his words form a sort of prologue, similar to the way in which some the-
atre plays (e.g. Shakespeares King Henry V) are preceded by a prologue which
is outside of the action of the play itself, functioning as a motto or an indication
of the theme or moral of the play to come. What happens after the prologue,
however, is highly equivocal. In fact, the play begins. But the play is disguised,
 Titus Ensink
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so to speak, as a normal radio programme with weather forecasts and con-

certos. This quasi-normal ongoing radio-programme then is interrupted by
report-like messages about extraordinary events on the planet Mars. Within
minutes, these reports will become dramatical eye witness reports about outer
space invaders. In formal notation, the structure is as follows:
[ radio programme] [ dramaturgic play [ normal radio programmes such
as weather reports and concertos [ report [ extraordinary events ] ] ] ]

Note that the beginning of the play follows the immediately preceding pro-
gramme. When the play begins, the quasi-normal radio programmes (weather
report, concerto) are embedded within the play. This is done, however, in such
a way as to invoke a perception the structure of which is:
[ radio programme [ report [extraordinary events] ] ]

The play succeeded in invoking this structure of perception in many cases. Ac-
cording to Cantril (1966), a conservative estimation is that 6,000,000 people
listened to the programme. Of these people, about 1,700,000 heard the pro-
gramme as a news bulletin, hence as a genuine report. About 1,200,000 people
became frightened and excited; some of them panicked (Cantril 1966: 5558).
Interestingly, there is a significant effect on the interpretation of tuning in late
to the ongoing programme (compare example (6) in which this effect took
place spontaneously.) From a CBS-survey a few days after the broadcast (based
on a sample, N = 460), it appears that those who listened from the beginning
(hence could have heard the explicit announcement of the play) 20% assessed
the play as being genuine news, whereas 63% of those who tuned in later did
so (quoted in Cantril 1966: 78).
Although example (10) is by far the most well known, it is easy to find
similar cases.8 In these cases it appears that the use of a documentary frame
embedded within a fiction frame is both a powerful and an equivocal tool.

. Concluding remarks
U.S. or applicable copyright law.

In this paper I have argued, first, that it is necessary to distinguish transfor-

mational frames from interactive frames proper, and second, that a notation
using brackets is useful for describing the general structure of the relation be-
tween frames. One important aspect of the way discourse works thus may be
captured. This paper has fulfilled its purpose if the reader is willing to accept
this point.
 Transformational frames
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I conclude this paper by making three short and speculative remarks.

Although the possibility of transposing must be very old, the last two cen-
turies have added many technical possibilities for transforming, especially in
the form of introducing many new media. Media do not only offer new ways
of representing (and thus transforming) behaviours. Media also invite peo-
ple to create new forms and patterns of behaviour. The possibility of trans-
formational frames thus has an effect on the embedded behaviour. (As recent
examples, consider talk shows and reality soaps.)
The coherence of texts or discourse on the level of the sequence of the
utterances of the discourse has been the subject of many discourse analysts
(Halliday & Hasan 1976; Mann & Thompson 1986; Clark & Haviland 1977;
Sanders, Spooren & Noordman 1992). Many of these approaches have tried to
establish a taxonomy for describing possible coherence relations. It seems to be
necessary to add one coherence relation to those distinguished, viz. the relation
of embedding transformations as described in subsequent utterances of a text.
Consider the coherence of these sentences:

The actors approach one another slowly in an idyllic natural setting, then fall
into an ecstatic embrace to the sounds of a lush romantic score. The cam-
era circles the impassioned couple, focusing on their enraptured caresses and
their glistening, intertwined bodies. Sound like another tired Hollywood pro-
duction luring audiences with glimpses of graphic sex? Guess again. The film
is French and the actors are snails.
(opening sentences of a film review, Time, February 17, 1997)

Finally, the analysis of transformational frames is important in relation to the

principled nature of communication. The working of transformational frames
is another argument against the conduit metaphor of communication, accord-
ing to which a message is packed, transmitted, and then unpacked. Rather,
communication is a joint endeavour, in which all involved parties make calcu-
lations of ones own and other peoples knowledge, and on the basis of those
calculations make attempts at influencing other peoples perceptions. In order
to make those attempts, people use knowledge of reproduction techniques, and
U.S. or applicable copyright law.

knowledge of the functions of the use of reproduction techniques.

Notes

. Tannen is right. We may add at least pastoral counselling: see Capps (1990).
 Titus Ensink
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. As for the reference to Bateson: It is interesting to see that Batesons moment of Eureka
sometimes is described as when he witnessed monkeys playing, sometimes as otters playing.
The source of this confusion is this. In Bateson (1972: 179) we find:

I saw two monkeys playing, i.e., engaged in an interactive sequence of which the unit
actions or signals were similar to but not the same as combat. (...) Now, this phe-
nomenon, play, could only occur if the participant organisms were capable of some de-
gree of metacommunication, i.e., of exchanging signals which would carry the message
this is play.

In Goffman (1974: 40) we find:

During visits to the Fleishacker Zoo beginning in 1952, Gregory Bateson observed that
otters not only fight with each other but also play at fighting.

. Bronzwaer (1977) used this notation for the description of embedding relations within
(literary) narratives. A similar way of describing embedding relations in stories is used by
Bruce (1981). Clark (1996: 355) thinks the term embedding rather inadequate, because
embedding suggests that what is embedded necessarily forms part of the embedding struc-
ture. Clark prefers the term layering instead. Nevertheless, I stick to the term embedding
because it is a rather established expression, and because of the notational ease.
. Transformational frames are not identical with, but closely related to phenomena de-
scribed by Goffman (1981) under the heading of footing. Consider this quotation: The
question of footing is systematically complicated by the possibility of embedding. For ex-
ample, a speaker can quote himself or another directly or indirectly, thereby setting into an
utterance with one production format another utterance with its own production format,
albeit now merely an embedded one. (Goffman 1981: 227)
. Denzin and Keller (1981: 54) provide a nice and complete schematic overview of all
distinctions made by Goffman in his voluminous essay.
. Goffman (1974: 44) indicates that a musical analogy is intended in his use of the term
key. It is a pity that he did not immediately choose the more appropriate term transposi-
tion for a change in key in stead of transformation.
. Frame conflicts occur often in public discourse (see Entman 1991; Pan & Kosicki 1993;
Bing & Lombardo 1997, quoted in Ensink & Sauer, this volume).
. A Portuguese remake of Orson Welles play caused consternation in 1988. In 1997, a
Dutch TV-programme about a nuclear catastrophe caused panic although all the time a
banner constructed situation was in sight.
U.S. or applicable copyright law.

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