50th AIAA/ASME/ASCE/AHS/ASC Structures, Structural Dynamics, and Materials Conference<br>17th AIAA 2009-2401

4 - 7 May 2009, Palm Springs, California

Unmanned Aerial System Survivability

David H. Hall 1
SURVICE Engineering Company, Ridgecrest, CA, 93555

Ronald M. Dexter 2
SURVICE Engineering Company, Dayton, Ohio, 45431

and

Michael S. Ray 3
SURVICE Engineering Company, Huntsville, AL, 35806

SURVICE Engineering Company has performed survivability assessments and testing

in support of a number of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), including Predator, Mobius,
BAMS, and others. This paper will discuss the methods used, some typical results, and
lessons learned in conducting testing and analysis for UAS survivability. Specific techniques
include digital mapping technology for generating geometric models of UAV, ballistic test
facilities and methods, and analysis models and simulations. Lessons learned will discuss
general results of UAS assessments and the application of survivability technologies to UAS.

Nomenclature
Pk/h = probability of kill given a hit
UAS = Unmanned Aerial System
UAV = Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

I. Introduction

S urvivability is composed of two components: susceptibility and vulnerability. Susceptibility is the inability of
the aircraft to avoid the elements that make up the hostile man-made environment, and vulnerability is the
inability of the aircraft to withstand the hostile man-made environment. That is, vulnerability has to do with the
ability of the aircraft structure and critical components to survive a hit by a threat weapon, and susceptibility has to
do with the ability of the aircraft to avoid being hit in the first place.
In discussing unmanned system survivability we consider all of the factors that affect the ability of a vehicle to
successfully operate in its tactical environment. This includes not only designed-in features of the air vehicle and its
on-board systems, but it also includes those off-board assets that support its survivability. These off-board assets
include suppression and defeat of enemy aircraft defenses, off-board jamming assets, information networks, etc. An
assessment of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) survivability should include the relative contributions of this wide
variety of survivability elements, including signatures, countermeasures, and vulnerabilities to various types of
threat weapons systems. The assessment should be accomplished not only for a single threat engagement, but to be
truly meaningful it must be accomplished as part of an overall assessment of mission performance. These are the
same elements for unmanned and manned aircraft: only the crew protection element is different for unmanned
systems.

II. UAS Survivability Issues

Up until now, survivability has not been a significant design driver of unmanned air systems. Partly because
current inventory UAS were originally advanced technology demonstrators and/or not acquisition programs of
record, other considerations such as performance have dominated the design issues for the system. Currently, issues
such as airspace coordination, command and control, and reliability are driving use and design of these systems.

1
Chief Analyst, 900E N. Heritage Drive Suite 1, AIAA Member.
2
Manager, Dayton Area Operation, 4141 Col Glenn Hwy, Suite 209, AIAA Member.
3
Manager, Huntsville Area Operation, 6703 Odyssey Dr, Suite 102, AIAA Member.
1
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Copyright 2009 by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. All rights reserved.
However, based on our experience with manned aircraft, history shows us that sooner rather than later survivability
will become a driver for UAS utility. UAS survivability is no longer a nice-to-have feature, especially for larger,
longer-duration systems and armed UAS, because battlefield commanders are depending on them more and more for
mission accomplishment. In addition, UAS costs are climbing, with ever increasing capabilities in sensor packages
and weapons employment, which means that the loss of UAS can be detrimental to the ability of battlefield
commanders to prosecute their missions.
The threats to UAS are much the same as the threats to manned aircraft, including both IR and RF guided
missiles, air defense artillery systems, and directed energy systems. Lower and slower flying UAV are more
susceptible to small arms fire, RPG, and anti-helicopter mines. In addition, UAS have susceptibilities in their
uplink/downlink communications systems, and those relying on GPS capabilities are susceptible to GPS jamming.
Fig. 1 illustrates the effects of attrition rate on the percentage of UAS remaining as a function of the number of
missions or sorties flown. For example, with as little as 0.2% attrition, only half of the force would be remaining
after 350 missions; with 0.4% attrition, half the force is left after only 175 missions.

100

90

80
Percent Assets Remaining

70
0.2
60
0.25
50 0.4
0.5
40
1
30

20

10

0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Sorties

Figure 1. Effects of Attrition.

It is difficult to estimate attrition rates for unmanned systems based on historical data, since they have been in
use for only a relatively short time. Some suggestive data are available for fixed-wing aircraft in Vietnam before
survivability features were an institutional factor in aircraft design. Between April 1965 and March 1973 the hit rate
for US Navy aircraft was 5.23 hits per 1000 sorties and the kill rate was 1.05 aircraft lost per 1000 sorties 4 . The
equivalent figures for US Marine Corps aircraft were 6.32 hits and 0.54 aircraft lost per 1000 sorties. So the attrition
rates were approximately 0.1%, and the hit rates were on the order of 0.5%. These rates are averaged over all
missions conducted during that period, ranging from benign environments to high threat environments. Considering
that current day UAV have not implemented vulnerability reduction features in their design, we should expect that
their attrition rates will be on the order of their hit rates. A UAV attrition rate of 0.4% would not be inconsistent
with the fixed-wing aircraft experience in South East Asia.
So what does that mean for UAS survivability? If we turn figure 1 upside down, and consider what the effect
would be of halving the assumed attrition rate of 0.4%, we get the data illustrated in Fig. 2. This figure shows what
percentage of assets would be saved as a function of the number of missions flown if we somehow were able to
reduce the attrition rate from 0.4% to 0.2%. As can be seen from the figure, the percentage of assets saved
approaches 25% by halving the attrition rate. As it turns out, this is true regardless of the beginning attrition rate:
percent of assets saved approaches 25% for halving any attrition rate that value is just reached at different numbers

4
U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force Fixed Wing Aircraft Losses and Damage in Southeast Asia (1962-1973), Center for
Naval Analyses, Aug 1976

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of sorties for different starting rates. In the case of halving 0.4% attrition, that value is reached at around 350
missions flown. In terms of breaking even, cost vs. benefit, that means that a UAS program could afford to spend up
to 25% of its system cost on survivability enhancement features, if that would result in halving the attrition rate over
the life of the system.

0.4%to 0.2%

% Assets Saved by Survivability Features

30.00

25.00 25%
Percent Assets Saved

20.00
For Attrition
Rate
15.00 0.4%to 0.2%
Reduction:
0.4% to 0.2%
10.00

5.00

0.00
1 12 23 34 45 56 67 78 89 100 111 122 133 144 155 166 177 188 199 210 221 232 243 254 265 276 287 298 309 320 331 342 353 364

Sor t i e s

Figure 2. Survivability as Force Multiplier.

There are relatively simple things that can be done for little cost to the program, such as fuel line and electrical
system placement, redundancy, low infra-red (IR) paint, etc. And the survivability program for any UAS should
take a balanced approach to survivability design, rather than have the design depend on enhancing only one element
of survivability (i.e. susceptibility or vulnerability reduction). Different designs will be required for different UAS,
depending on overall system cost, intended mission, and value to the battlefield commander.
There are some unique survivability issues for unmanned air systems. Current vehicles do not generally have
built-in redundancy for critical components, (e.g. only one engine), which makes them vulnerable to a hit by a single
projectile. The long mission duration for many UAV makes the effects of even small fuel leaks much more critical
than for tactical aircraft, which have considerably shorter duration flights; the weight and volume constraints of most
UAV make it more difficult to design in fire and explosion suppression systems. Because there is no operator in the
cockpit, the system operator (where there is one) has no direct feedback of damage events, and the software
controlling most UAV does not have the ability to react to damage. The acoustic signature of small UAV can be a
problem, and the size and weight of countermeasures systems currently make them problematic for all but the
largest UAV.
However, almost all manned aircraft survivability technologies are applicable to UAS 5 . Vulnerability reduction
technologies include active and passive fire protection systems (when properly sized for UAV), fuel system
management and fuel tank ullage protection, damage adaptive flight controls, and critical component separation and
redundancy. Susceptibility reduction technologies include radio frequency (RF), IR and visual signature reduction,
advanced antenna developments, and the use of networked assets for improved situational awareness. Specific UAS
survivability technology developments are ongoing under the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program (JASP) for
miniaturized countermeasures systems and acoustic signature reduction. And there are efforts ongoing to make
flight software adapt to damaged control surfaces. Because of their weight and volume constraints it is important to
include survivability features for UAS early in their design.

III. Survivability Assessment

There is an established process for assessing the survivability of air systems, documented most recently in a report
describing Integrated Survivability Assessment (ISA) as envisioned by the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program

5
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Roadmap 2005-2030, Appendix K, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4 August 2005
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(JASP) 6 . This process combines the use of models and simulations with test and evaluation results to provide
assessments of system survivability for requirements development, systems design, testing and evaluation. The
process builds up from the basic vulnerability and susceptibility features of the system to an assessment of its
survivability while performing its mission in a multi-threat environment.
The first element of the analysis process is illustrated in Fig. 3, where the vulnerability of the UAV is assessed.
Typical metrics for vulnerability are probability of kill given a hit (Pk/h) by various threat types, and vulnerable
area, which is defined as presented area multiplied by Pk/h. The vulnerability of the system is evaluated over a
number of penetrator striking directions (as shown in the lower left hand figure), and averaged to produce a
representative vulnerable area (or Pk/h) as shown in the bar chart. The vulnerability analysis can provide valuable
information about the relative merits of various technologies, without conducting a full-up mission assessment.
Other measures of merit include the vulnagram shown in the lower right of the figure; the color scheme provides a
visual representation of vulnerable hot spots on the vehicle as illustration (we didnt have a releasable vulnagram
of the Predator, so we substituted a tank to illustrate the process).

Flight Controls & Dry Bay

Fuel Leakage Mitigation

Vulnerability Dry Bay Protection

Reduction
Technology Flight Controls

Ullage Protection

Baseline

0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Vulnerable Area ~ Probability of kill given a hit

NOTE: EXAMPLE ONLY

Figure 3. Vulnerability Assessment.

Typical results of the susceptibility analysis process are illustrated in Fig. 4. This figure shows an intercept
envelope for a representative surface-to-air missile system, located in the center of the grid. The envelope
represents locations where the missile system can effectively intercept the UAV as it passes by on parallel straight
and level flight paths over and near the threat. The color scheme within the envelope can be used to show high and
low areas of probability of killing the UAV. The figure on the left represents the dry case, where there are no
electronic countermeasures (ECM) available to the UAS, and the figure on the right shows the wet case where an
ECM system is assumed to be employed. If these were actual results we could see the obvious value of the ECM
system in terms of its performance against the particular threat missile system.
Fig. 5 illustrates a different sort of metric for IR guided missile systems. In that figure the picture on the left
represents the apparent IR contrast between a small aircraft and the sky background when the aircraft is painted with
typical high-gloss commercial paint. The aircraft stands out fairly clearly against the background. The picture on
the right shows the apparent contrast when the aircraft is painted with a military low-IR paint scheme. As is
apparent, the contrast between the aircraft and the sky background in the IR band is much less in that case; the
implication is that it would be harder for an IR guided threat system to detect and track the air vehicle with low-IR
coatings than with the commercial paint.

6
Hall, David H., Integrated Survivability Assessment (ISA) for Survivability Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) and Live
Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E), SURVICE Engineering Company for the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Office,
JASPO 03-M-006, China Lake, CA, October 2003
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American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
 UA Flight Paths High PK UA Flight Paths
Region
75 75

70 70

65 65

60 60

55 55

50 50

45 45

40 40

35 35

30 30

25 25

20 20

15 15

10 10

5 5

0 0

-5 -5

-1 0 -1 0

-1 5 -1 5

-20 -20

-25 -25

-30 -30

-35 -35

-40 -40

-45 -45

No ECM -50

-55
With ECM -50

-55

-60 -60

-65 -65

-70 -70

-75 -75

75 70 65 6 0 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 - 15 -20 -25 -30 - 35 -40 -45 -50 -5 5 -60 -65 -70 -7 5 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 1 5 10 5 0 - 5 -10 -15 - 20 -2 5 -30 -35 - 40 -45 -50 -55 - 60 -65 -70 -75

NOTE: EXAMPLE ONLY

Figure 4. RF Susceptibility Assessment.

The true value of survivability enhancement features for UAS cannot really be assessed without putting these
effects into the context of the missions that it will be expected to execute and the threats that it is likely to encounter.
Fig. 6 shows some example overall results of evaluating the effects of various IR jamming systems on the cost-
effectiveness of the UAS over a variety of missions and scenarios. These results are representative only, but they
illustrate the process. In the figure it shows that a hypothetical directed energy countermeasure results in the
fewest UAS losses, but it has the highest unit cost. As a result, the advanced conventional jammer, even though it
results in higher losses, ends up having the lowest life cycle cost even after considering the cost of more lost
vehicles.

Commercial Paint Scheme Military Paint Scheme

High Contrast Low Contrast

NOTE: EXAMPLE ONLY

Figure 5. IR Susceptibility Assessment.

As survivability features are added to the system, the overall life-cycle cost is reduced because they save more
assets than they cost (recall the 25% rule for halving attrition). However, at some point adding more survivability
features increases life-cycle cost, even though they save more vehicles, because they are not recovering the cost of
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the survivability technologies added at that point. The task before the UAS program manager is to find that knee in
the curve where the optimum survivability design can be identified.

The Ultimate survivability metric is

Mission Accomplishment

60 6 630 Fewest losses,

highest unit cost

LIFE CYCLE COST $M

UNIT COST $M

40 4
LOSSES

615

20 2

600
NONE ALQ-144 ADVANCED DIRECTED
NOTE: EXAMPLE ONLY CONVENTIONAL ENERGY
JAMMERS CM
Lowest Life
Cycle Cost

Figure 6. Mission Survivability Assessment and Life Cycle Cost.

IV. Survivability Testing

Testing is an important part of the survivability program for any system, including unmanned air vehicles.
Ballistic test facilities are employed by all of the military services to evaluate the effectiveness of vulnerability
reduction technologies under simulated flight conditions. Open air range facilities are used to assess the
effectiveness of signature reduction and countermeasures systems; hardware-in-the-loop facilities can supplement
open air range testing with more controlled assessments of system effectiveness against various threat systems. The
approach taken for survivability testing is a model-test-model process, whereby modeling and simulation results
support test plan development and help to explain in some instances why test results came out the way they did. The
test results are used to support model validation and improvement, and the validated model is then used to support
follow-on testing throughout the design and operational testing of the system.
SURVICE Engineering has implemented a unique approach to field test data collection on both manned and
unmanned systems to support vulnerability testing and analysis. As illustrated in Fig. 7, the system makes use of
advanced metrology equipment in the field to collect (x, y, z) data points from the UAV under consideration. That
data cloud is then post-processed to develop geometric models of the skin, structure and components of the UAV.
These geometric models are used primarily for vulnerability assessment, but they can also be used for signature
modeling and for antenna location optimization. The metrology system is also used to develop detailed computer
representations of damage to system components after the tests are conducted. These detailed models are integrated
with vulnerability assessment codes to evaluate ballistic vulnerability; the results are then used to support design
trade studies to minimize the identified vulnerabilities.
This process was exercised during the Joint Live Fire (JLF) program on the Predator, in support of the Air Forces
780th Test Squadron. JLF is a program funded by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to conduct vulnerability
assessments of fielded aircraft systems, and for lethality assessments of weapon systems. A geometric model of
Predator was developed from field measurements and used to support pre-test predictions and to develop detailed
test plans for JLF. The vulnerability codes were updated to evaluate various vulnerability reduction technologies,
and the model predictions were correlated to the test results.
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 Figure 7. UAS Data Collection and Modeling.

V. Survivability Lessons Learned

Experience with manned aircraft programs indicates that some survivability features must be applied early in the
design process if they are to be implemented in a cost-effective manner. RF signature reduction and ballistic
vulnerability reduction are two examples of those kinds of features. In the aircraft design world, RF signature
reduction tends to get a lot of attention, but vulnerability reduction is too often forgotten until it is too late in the
programs development to be most effective.
UAV can be protected against many ballistic threats through a variety of means. High priority items include fire
and explosion protection systems (for dry bays adjacent to fuel cells, and for the fuel cells themselves). Some
structures can be designed to withstand single threat impacts by designing in multiple load paths, without unduly
increasing cost or weight.
Susceptibility reduction does not have to be overly high cost. Simple items such as low-IR paint can be important
and effective against a variety of IR threat systems. Composite structures and small size may be effective against
some RF threats. And survivability can be enhanced simply by making effective use of the information available
from a network of systems.
The ability to develop detailed information on fielded systems using the SURVICE Engineering advanced
metrology system has shown to be of value for survivability assessment and testing. The availability of data in the
absence of detailed CAD models promotes the model-test-model paradigm for survivability testing.

VI. Summary
Survivability issues apply equally to manned and unmanned aircraft. UAS can leverage manned aircraft
technologies and experience in defeating the threat kill chain: detection, tracking, launch, intercept and kill. UAS
should especially be effective at making use of available networked assets for improved situational awareness.
There are unique UAS survivability requirements related to long mission durations and system size and cost.
Smaller, cheaper UAS may be expendable, while larger more expensive UAS will require survivability cost-benefit
trades in their design.
Survivability of UAS must be a balanced design between vulnerability and susceptibility reduction features,
balanced with other design considerations (performance, payload, reliability, etc.). But survivability can help to
enhance some of those other design elements, such as reliability and system safety. Survivability is most effective
when considered early in the systems design.

7
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