November 19, 2013

G.R. No. 208566

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR.

JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN
PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR.
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m
his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE,
JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

Ponente: Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

History of Congressional Pork Barrel

The term pork barrel, a political parlance of American-English
1
origin , refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for
localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representatives district.

The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section

2
3 of Act 3044, otherwise known as the Public Works Act of 1922.
Under this provision, release of funds and realignment of unexpended
portions of an item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a
joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of
Representatives.

In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being

representatives of the people, also became involved in project
1 "Pork barrel spending, a term that traces its origins back to the era of slavery before the U.S.
Civil War, when slave owners occasionally would present a barrel of salt pork as a gift to their
slaves. In the modern usage, the term refers to congressmen scrambling to set aside money for
pet projects in their districts." (Drudge, Michael W. "Pork Barrel Spending Emerging as
Presidential Campaign Issue," August 1, 2008
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2008/08/20080801181504lcnirellep
0.1261713.html#axzz2iQrI8mHM> [visited October 17, 2013].)
2 Sec. 3. The sums appropriated in paragraphs (c), (g), (l), and (s) of this Act shall be available for
immediate expenditure by the Director of Public Works, but those appropriated in the other
paragraphs shall be distributed in the discretion of the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the
House of Representatives. The committee from each House may authorize one of its members to
approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, who with the
approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof may, for the purposes of
said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation. (Emphases supplied)
identification. The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued
when martial law was declared.

It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General

Appropriations Act (GAA) called Support for Local Development
Projects (SLDP). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations
to individual legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only
public works project or hard projects but also covered soft projects
such as those which would fall under education, health and livelihood.

After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of

democracy, the pork barrel was revived through the Mindanao
Development Fund and the Visayas Development Fund. In 1990,
the pork barrel was renamed Countrywide Development Fund
(CDF). The CDF was meant to cover small local infrastructure and
other priority community projects.

CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released

directly to implementing agencies subject to the submission of the
required list of projects and activities. Senators and congressmen
could identify any kind of project from hard projects such as roads,
buildings and bridges to soft projects such as textbooks, medicines,
and scholarships.

In 19933, the CDF was further modified such that the release of
funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and
activities identified by individual legislators. This was also the first
time when the Vice-President was given an allocation.

The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996

except that the Department of Budget and Management was required
to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made from the
funds.

Congressional insertions (CIs) were another form of

congressional pork barrel aside from the CDF. Examples of the CIs
include the DepEd School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative
Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among others.

3Special Provision 1, Article XXXVIII, RA 7645 (1993 CDF Article) provides:

Special Provision
1. Use and Release of Funds.
The amount herein appropriated shall be used for infrastructure and other priority projects and
activities as proposed and identified by officials concerned according to the following allocations:
Representatives, P12,500,000 each; Senators P18,000,000 each; Vice-President, P20,000,000.
The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by way of Advice of Allotment and Notice of
Cash Allocation directly to the assigned implementing agency not later than five (5) days after the
beginning of each quarter upon submission of the list of projects and activities by the officials
concerned. (Emphases supplied)
 The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon
prior consultation with the representative of the legislative district
concerned and the legislators had the power to direct how, where and
when these appropriations were to be spent.

In 19994, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three
separate forms of CIs: (i) Food Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap
Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development
Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision
requiring prior consultation with members of Congress for the release
of funds.

In 20005, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)

appeared in the GAA. PDAF required prior consultation with the
representative of the district before the release of funds. PDAF also
allowed realignment of funds to any expense category except
personal services and other personnel benefits.

In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is

essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies
from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by
the identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-
2010.

It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal

participation of non-governmental organizations in the implementation
of PDAF projects was introduced. The PDAF articles from 2002-2010
were silent with respect to specific amounts for individual legislators.

In 20116, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express

statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators
4 RA 8745 entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED NINETY NINE, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES."
5 Special Provision 1, Article XLIX, RA 8760 (2000 PDAF Article) provides:

Special Provision
1. Use and release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority
programs and projects as indicated under Purpose 1: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be
released directly to the implementing agency concerned upon prior consultation with the
respective Representative of the District: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the herein allocation may
be realigned as necessary to any expense category: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That no amount shall
be used to fund personal services and other personal benefits. (Emphases supplied)

6 Special Provision 2, Article XLIV, RA 10147 (2011 PDAF Article) provides:

2. Allocation of Funds. The total projects to be identified by legislators and the Vice-President
shall not exceed the following amounts:
a. Total of Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000) broken down into Forty Million Pesos
(P40,000,000) for Infrastructure Projects and Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft projects
of Congressional Districts or Party List Representatives;
b. Total of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000) broken down into One Hundred Million
Pesos (P100,000,000) for Infrastructure Projects and One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000)
for soft projects of Senators and the Vice President.
and the Vice-President. It also contained a provision on realignment
of funds but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.
The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as
implementing agencies. Legislators were also allowed identify
programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of
funds and release of funds were required to be favorably endorsed by
the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee
on Finance, as the case may be.

Malampaya Funds and Presidential Social Fund

The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include
certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Fund and the
Presidential Social Fund (PSF). The Malampaya Fund was created
as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
9107 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.

The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV8 of PD No.
1869,9 or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is
managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff
and is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate
gross earnings of PAGCOR.

Controversies in the Philippines - Pork Barrel Misuse

In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo
revealed that huge sums of money regularly went into the pockets of
legislators in the form of kickbacks.

7 Entitled "CREATING AN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT BOARD, DEFINING ITS POWERS AND

FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS, THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
8 Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax,

the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the
Corporation from this Franchise shall be immediately set aside and allocated to fund the following
infrastructure and socio-civil projects within the Metropolitan Manila Area:
(a) Flood Control
(b) Sewerage and Sewage
(c) Nutritional Control
(d) Population Control
(e) Tulungan ng Bayan Centers
(f) Beautification
(g) Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) projects; provided, that should the aggregate gross
earning be less than P150,000,000.00, the amount to be allocated to fund the above-mentioned
project shall be equivalent to sixty (60%) percent of the aggregate gross earning.
In addition to the priority infrastructure and socio-civic projects with the Metropolitan Manila
specifically enumerated above, the share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings
derived by the Corporate from this Franchise may also be appropriated and allocated to fund and
finance infrastructure and/or socio-civic projects throughout the Philippines as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.

9Entitled "CONSOLIDATING AND AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NOS. 1067-A, 1067-B,

1067-C, 1399 AND 1632, RELATIVE TO THE FRANCHISE AND POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)."
 In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of
the PDAF but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of
evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks.

In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the

allegation that a syndicate defrauded the government of P10 billion
using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects.10

In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results

of a three-year audit investigation11 detailing the irregularities in the
release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.

Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the

Malampaya Funds had gone into a dummy NGO.12

Proceedings:

On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara

(Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for
Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued
permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano
S. Belmonte, Jr., from further taking any steps to enact legislation
appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System.13

On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B.

Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San
Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an
Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork
Barrel System.

Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M.

Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012

10 Carvajal, Nancy, " NBI probes P10-B scam," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 12, 2013
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/443297/nbi-probes-p10-b-scam> (visited October 21, 2013).
11 Pursuant to Office Order No. 2010-309 dated May 13, 2010.

12Carvajal, Nancy, Malampaya fund lost P900M in JLN racket, Philippine Daily Inquirer, July
16, 2013 <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/445585/malampaya-fund-lost-p900m-in-jln-racket> (visited
October 21, 2013.)

13 SJS v. Drilon, G.R. No. 208493, November 19, 2013

(Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared
unconstitutional.

On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even

date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public respondents to
comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO enjoining
the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the
persons acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining
PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013,
and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8
of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government under the same provision; and (d) setting the
consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.

On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were

conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until
October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.

ISSUES:

Procedural issues
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated
petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy, (b) the issues
raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial
review, (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue, (d) previous
decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of the constitutionality of
the Pork Barrel system.

Substantive issues
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional for violating the
constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers, (b) non-
delegability of legislative power, (c) checks and
balances, (d) accountability, (e) political dynasties, (f) local autonomy.

Whether or not the phrases (a) Section 8 of PD 910,14 relating

to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as
amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.

14Entitled "CREATING AN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT BOARD, DEFINING ITS POWERS AND

FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS, THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."
 RULINGS:

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

There is an actual and justiciable controversy

There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is satisfied by the
antagonistic positions of the parties regarding the constitutionality of
the pork barrel system.

The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and
the laws allowing for their utilization are currently existing and
operational and thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners.

The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF

and the abolition thereof does not actually terminate the controversy
on the matter. The President does not have constitutional authority to
nullify or annul the legal existence of the PDAF.

The moot and academic principle cannot stop the Court from
deciding the case considering that: (a) petitioners allege grave
violation of the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel
system presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter
of paramount public interest, (c) there is a practical need for a
definitive ruling on the systems constitutionality to guide the bench,
the bar and the public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the
national budget is an annual occurrence.

Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable

The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System is not
an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of the
government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon.

The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power

such that the Supreme Court has the power to determine whether
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part
of the government.

Petitioners have legal standing to sue

Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and
citizens of the Philippines.

As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional

usage of public funds.
 As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest.

The Petition is not barred by previous cases

The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply in this case. The
present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez
because the Philconsa case was a limited response to a separation
of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-
enactment identification authority to Members of Congress.

On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic

examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and the PDAF
Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-relation of post-enactment
measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article,
including not only those related to the area of project identification but
also to the areas of fund release and realignment.

Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent

constitutional inconsistencies considering that the authority to identify
projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation
is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This power
cannot be exercised by individual members of Congress and the
authority to appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA has
already been passed.

The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs.

Secretary of Budget and Management does not also bar judgment on
the present case because it was dismissed on a procedural
technicality and hence no controlling doctrine was rendered.

The res judicata principle cannot apply in this case. The

required identity is not present since Philconsa and LAMP,
respectively, involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF
Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a
broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire Pork Barrel System. Also,
the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural
technicality and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

The separation of powers between the Executive and the

Legislative Departments has been violated.
The post-enactment measures including project identification,
fund release, and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution, which belongs to the executive department.

Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to

participate in the various operational aspects of budgeting, including
the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities
and the regulation and release of funds in violation of the
separation of powers principle.

Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its

members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.

That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely

recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor
since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law.

Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators

is only recommendatory in nature. They even admitted that the
identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement
before the PDAF can be tapped as a funding source.

The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been

violated
The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of
non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which as settled
in Philconsa is lodged in Congress.

That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through

legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

The legislators are individually exercising the power of

appropriation because each of them determines (a) how much of their
PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific project or beneficiary that
they themselves also determine.

Checks and balances

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only
appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would
be further divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is
passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own
discretion.

This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification

budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto.

It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the

entire PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the
legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national
agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects.

In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification

feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed
since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum
appropriation. This is because the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination
and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may
be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.

The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability

as Congress is incapable of checking itself or its members.
The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment
roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to
become disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or
monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.

The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators,

who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be
checking on activities in which they themselves participate.

The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section

14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits members of
Congress to intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government, because it renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same

post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislators control of
his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office.

The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which

must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case
basis.
The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties
is not self-executing.
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides
that the state shall prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by
law, is not a self-executing provision.

Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes

the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer
from ruling on this issue.

The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles

on local autonomy
The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional
principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives,
who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing
public funds for local development.

The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely

on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests
and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.

The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine

parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators
have been taken into consideration.

This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF

conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils
(LDCs) which are already legally mandated toassist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and
social development, and coordinating development efforts within its
territorial jurisdiction.

Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions

are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs,
policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by
individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-
making authority except only when acting as a body.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid

appropriation laws.
For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law, it is enough that (a) the provision of law
sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and
(b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.

Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set

apart a determinable amount: a Special Fund comprised of all
fees, revenues, and receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from
any and all sources.

It also specified a public purpose: energy resource

development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President.

Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law

because it set apart a determinable amount: [a]fter deducting five
(5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,]
if the aggregate gross earnings be less thanP150,000,000.00.

It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure

development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.

Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869

constitutes undue delegation of legislation powers.
The phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down
a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used.

This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the

Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect,
allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview
of the law.

This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of

Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds
to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government, remains legally effective and
subsisting.

Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of

legislative powers because it lies independently unfettered by any
sufficient standard of the delegating law.
 The law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure
development projects and hence, leaves the President without any
guideline to construe the same.

The delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too

broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind
of facility.

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

Remedial Law
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle
states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if,
between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. On the other hand,
the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle,
entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule
that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.

Constitutional Law
The Courts pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a)
the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other
Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the
phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be
treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.

The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain
legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and
thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly
enforced and complied with.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION:

Justice Brion
Justice Brion agrees with the majoritys view on the
unconstitutionality of the PDAF, but hold that the first part of Section 8
of P.D. No. 910 relating to funds used for energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects is
constitutionally infirm for being a discretionary lump sum
appropriation whose purpose lacks specificity for the projects or
undertakings contemplated, and that denies Congress of its
constitutional prerogative to participate in laying down national policy
on energy matters.

A. Constitutionality of Section 12 of P.D. No. 1869, as amended

P.D. No. 1869 does not identify and state with particularity. This
deficiency is rendered worse by the absence of defined legislative
parameters, assuming that legislative purpose can be supplied
through parameters. In fact, neither does P.D. No. 1869s whereas
clauses sufficiently disclose the decrees legislative purpose to save
the objectionable portion of this law.

The presidential exercise of discretion approaches the level of

insignificance; the President only has to undertake a fact-finding to
operationalize the expenditure of the funds at his disposal. Nor can
the appropriation be objected to for being a lump sum amount. In the
sense everybody can understand, rather than a whole lump sum, the
President is effectively given an advance or standby fund to be spent
when calamities occur. This can in no way be understood as an
objectionable discretionary lump sum.

B. Constitutionality of Section 8 of P.D. No. 910

Justice Brion voted to strike down the "energy" component of
Section 8, P.D. No. 910 as it is a discretionary lump sum fund that is
not saved at all by its energy development and exploitation purpose.
It is a pure and simple pork barrel granted to the President under a
martial law regime decree that could have escaped invalidity then
under the 1973 Constitution and the prevailing unusual times, but
should be struck down now for being out of step with the
requirements of the 1987 Constitution.

CONCURRING OPINION:

Chief Justice Sereno

Chief Justice Sereno fully support the following
pronouncements:

First, that the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) is

unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers, and;

Second, that the PDAF is unconstitutional for being an undue

delegation of legislative functions. However, I believe that the
discussions on lump-sum appropriations, line-item appropriations,
and item-veto power are premature.

Justice Carpio
Justice Carpio concur to declare Priority Development
Assistance Fund, of Republic Act No. 10352 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
for violating the separation of powers, negating the President's
constitutional line-item veto power, violating the constitutional duty of
Congress to enact a line-item General Appropriations Act, and
violating the requirement of line-item appropriations in the General
Appropriations Act as prescribed in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Further, the last phrase of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910,
authorizing the use of the Malampaya Fund for such other purposes
as may hereafter be directed by the President, and the phrase in
Section 12, Title IV of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended,
authorizing the President to use the government's share in
PAGCOR's gross earnings to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects as the President may determine, are likewise
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being undue delegations of
legislative power.

Justice Leonen
The phrase for such other purposes as may hereafter directed
by the President" has, thus, been read as all the infinite possibilities
of any project or program. Since it prescribes all, it prescribes none.
Justice Leonen concurs with the ponencia in treating this portion of
Section 8, Presidential Decree No. 910, which allows the
expenditures of that special fund "for other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President," as null and void.

He agrees that "priority infrastructure projects" may be too

broad so as to actually encompass everything else. The questions
that readily come to mind are which kinds of infrastructure projects
are not covered and what kinds of parameters will be used to
determine the priorities. These are not textually discoverable, and
therefore, allow an incumbent to have broad leeway. This amounts to
an unconstitutional delegation of the determination of the purpose for
which the special levies resulting in the creation of the special fund.
This certainly was not contemplated by Article VI, Section 29(3) of the
Constitution.
July 1, 2014

G.R. No. 209287

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG

ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN; JUDY M. TAGUIWALO,
PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-
CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CONCERNED
CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE,
BAY AN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M.
REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K.
DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI
E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR
VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209135

AUGUSTO L. SY JUCO JR., Ph.D., Petitioner,
vs.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY
OF DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; AND HON.
FRANKLIN MAGTUNAO DRILON, IN HIS CAP A CITY AS THE
SENATE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209136

MANUELITO R. LUNA, Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT; AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO
OCHOA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ALTER EGO OF THE
PRESIDENT, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209155

ATTY. JOSE MALV AR VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR.; AND THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209164

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
REPRESENTED BY DEAN FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, BENJAMIN
E. DIOKNO AND LEONOR M. BRIONES, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND/OR HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209260

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM),Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209442

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA; BISHOP REUBEN
MABANTE AND REV. JOSE L. GONZALEZ,Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON; THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.; THE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE, REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.; THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY
FLORENCIO ABAD; THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY CESAR V. PURISIMA; AND THE
BUREAU OF TREASURY, REPRESENTED BY ROSALIA V. DE
LEON, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209517

CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADV AN
CEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE),
REPRESENTED BY ITS 1ST VICE PRESIDENT, SANTIAGO
DASMARINAS, JR.; ROSALINDA NARTATES, FOR HERSELF
AND AS NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE CONSOLIDATED
UNION OF EMPLOYEES NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
(CUENHA); MANUEL BACLAGON, FOR HIMSELF AND AS
PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT CENTRAL OFFICE (SWEAP-
DSWD CO); ANTONIA PASCUAL, FOR HERSELF AND AS
NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DAREA); ALBERT
MAGALANG, FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF THE
ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT BUREAU EMPLOYEES
UNION (EMBEU); AND MARCIAL ARABA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS
PRESIDENT OF THE KAPISANAN PARA SA KAGALINGAN NG
MGA KAW ANI NG MMDA (KKKMMDA), Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO Ill, PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO OCHOA, JR.,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209569

VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (VACC),
REPRESENTED BY DANTE L. JIMENEZ,Petitioner,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

Ponente: Justice Lucas Bersamin

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The controversy on the constitutionality of the Disbursement

Acceleration Program was triggered on September 25, 2013, when
Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including
himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as
"incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona.

As a response to Sen. Estradas revelation, Secretary Florencio

Abad of the DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases
to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program, explaining that
the funds released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a
program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate
economic expansion.

Secretary Abad clarified that the funds had been released to

the Senators based on their letters of request for funding; and that it
was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been made
because the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to ramp up
spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the
gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down. He explained that the
funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased
appropriations under Personnel Services; (2) unprogrammed funds;
(3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and
(4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned
to support faster-disbursing projects.

Thereafter the DBM posted on its website that the DAP

releases had been sourced from savings generated by the
Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings
had been derived from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations,
like unreleased Personnel Services appropriations that would lapse at
the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow-moving
projects and discontinued projects per zero based budgeting
findings; and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for
slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier released to
the agencies of the National Government. The DBM listed on its
website the legal bases15 for the DAPs use of savings.

The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad

and the DBM brought the DAP to the consciousness of the Nation for
the first time, and made this present controversy inevitable. That the
issues against the DAP came at a time when the Nation was still
seething in anger over Congressional pork barrel "an appropriation
of government spending meant for localized projects and secured
solely or primarily to bring money to a representatives district"
excited the Nation as heatedly as the pork barrel controversy.

15 1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the
authority to augment an item for his office in the general appropriations law; (2) Section 49
(Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure
Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their
provisions on the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in
the use of savings.
 PROCEEDINGS:

Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the

issuances relating to the DAP were filed within days of each other, as
follows:

1. G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco), on October 7, 2013;

2. G.R. No. 209136 (Luna), on October 7, 2013;
3. G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas), on October 16, 2013;
4. G.R. No. 209164 (PHILCONSA), on October 8, 2013;
5. G.R. No. 209260 (IBP), on October 16, 2013;
6. G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), on October 17, 2013;
7. G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica), on October 29, 2013;
8. G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE), on November 6, 2013; and
G.R. No. 209569 (VACC), on November 8, 2013.

In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), the petitioners brought to the

Courts attention NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency
Measure Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of
June 30, 2012), alleging that NBC No. 541, which was issued to
implement the DAP, directed the withdrawal of unobligated allotments
as of June 30, 2012 of government agencies and offices with low
levels of obligations, both for continuing and current allotments.

Thereafter respondents filed their Consolidated Comment

through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the

significant issues raised and joined.

A decision was promulgated by the Court on these consolidated

petitions.

ISSUES:

The issues in this case are:

A. Procedural Issue

1. Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper

remedies to assail the constitutionality and validity of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular
(NBC) No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly
implementing the DAP. Subsumed in this issue are whether there is a
controversy ripe for judicial determination, and the standing of
petitioners.
B. Substantive Issues

1. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law;"
2. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive
issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI
of the 1987 Constitution insofar as:

(a)They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated

allotments withdrawn from government agencies as "savings" as the
term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the GAAs of
2011, 2012 and 2013;
(b)They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs
not provided in the GAAs for the Executive Department; and
(c)They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in the
GAAs;

3. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause,
(2) the system of checks and balances, and (3) the principle of public
accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it
authorizes the release of funds upon the request of legislators;

4. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP

was in accord with the GAAs; and

5. Whether the doctrine of operative fact is applicable.

RULINGS:

Procedural Issue:

a) The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies

All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and
include applications for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory
injunction or temporary restraining orders. More specifically, the
nature of the petitions is individually set forth hereunder, to wit:
Certiorari, Prohibition and
G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco)
Mandamus
G.R. No. 209136 (Luna) Certiorari and Prohibition
G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas) Certiorari and Prohibition
G.R. No. 209164 Certiorari and Prohibition
 (PHILCONSA)
G.R. No. 209260 (IBP) Prohibition
G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) Certiorari and Prohibition
G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) Certiorari
G.R. No. 209517
Certiorari and Prohibition
(COURAGE)
G.R. No. 209569 (VACC) Certiorari and Prohibition

The Court held that the respondents arguments and

submissions on the procedural issue are bereft of merit: that there is
no actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication in the absence of
adverse claims between the parties; that the petitioners lacked legal
standing to sue because no allegations were made to the effect that
they had suffered any injury as a result of the adoption of the DAP
and issuance of NBC No. 541; that their being taxpayers did not
immediately confer upon the petitioners the legal standing to sue
considering that the adoption and implementation of the DAP and the
issuance of NBC No. 541 were not in the exercise of the taxing or
spending power of Congress; and that even if the petitioners had
suffered injury, there were plain, speedy and adequate remedies in
the ordinary course of law available to them, like assailing the
regularity of the DAP and related issuances before the Commission
on Audit (COA) or in the trial courts.

It was further held that the special civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition are the proper actions for directly assailing the
constitutionality and validity of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and the other
executive issuances implementing the DAP, contrary to the
contentions of the respondents.

Substantive Issues:

The Court declared the following acts and practices under the
Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No.
541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being
in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:

(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing

agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated
allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end
of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of
savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts;

(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to

augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive;
and

(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not
covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.

It further declared that the use of unprogrammed funds despite

the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the
revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance
with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations
Acts is void.

Issue No. 1
It was held that the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is
not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing
government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional
provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no
additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which
were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.

Issue No. 2
There is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment
of funds refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend
appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever
reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there
will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which
did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case
at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

The transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is

true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of
the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment
of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made
within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this
was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the
Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-
Executive agencies.

Further, transfers within their respective offices also

contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA.
Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is
concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-
existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the
GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is
without legal basis.

The DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being
declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the
GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an
excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally
discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to
savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since
the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the
DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should
only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP,
funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle
of the year and then being declared as savings by the Executive
particularly by the DBM.

Issue No. 3
There is no violation of equal protection. Petitioners claim that
the Executive discriminated against some legislators on the ground
alone of their receiving less than the others could not of itself warrant
a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial
of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by
parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties
would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated
against in the releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for the
requirement is that only such affected legislators could properly and
fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal protection
occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their situation. The
requirement was not met here.

Issue No. 4
Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money
source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be
used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect
that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In
this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed
funds were used.

Issue No. 5
The Court held that the doctrine of operative fact is applicable
in this case. Such doctrine recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an
operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be
erased, ignored or disregarded. It nullifies the void law or executive
act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general
rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use
must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot
be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is
resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to
cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the
extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that
will permit its application.

The doctrine of operative fact is applicable to the adoption and

implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from
equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and
its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be
undone. The Court further cleared that the doctrine extends to a void
or unconstitutional executive act. The term executive act is broad
enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including those
that are quasi legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE - This recognizes the existence

of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences
that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. It nullifies the
void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an
exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law
produces no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny
and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an
unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a
matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where
extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary
circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its
application.

The operative fact doctrine applies to the implementation of the

DAP. To declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional
without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an
operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well as
juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical
and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the
disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients
could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in
good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be enormously
burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.
POLITICAL LAW

POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

- The Legislature is assigned with the task and the power to make
and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is true with regard to
the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within
the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may
declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case
ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision,
this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes
and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination
of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the
Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent
and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the
Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor desirable,
besides being clearly violative of the fundamental, principles of our
constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the
separation of powers.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ACCUMULATION AND UTILIZATION OF SAVINGS - The

Court emphasized that the exercise of the power to augment shall be
strictly construed by virtue of its being an exception to the general
rule that the funding of Presidential Acceleration Programs shall be
limited to the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose. The
utilization and management of savings will also be strictly construed
against expanding the scope of the power to augment. Strict
interpretation is essential in limiting the Executive and other budget
implementors within their prerogatives during budget execution, and
to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress power of the
purse. Hence, regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the
DAP, and regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an effective
tool of stimulating the national economy, the acts and practices under
the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the
Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the
funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced
from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA,
as well as the limitation on the power to augment under Section
25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws,
even the best intentions must come within the parameters defined
and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must be
carried out through legal methods.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

POWER TO AUGMENT CANNOT BE USED TO FUND NON-

EXISTENT PROVISION IN THE GAA - The Court clarified that there
must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of
expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be
transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as
there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a
specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto
for augmentation purposes. This interpretation is consistent not only
with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of
flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget execution in
responding to unforeseeable contingencies.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

DAP AS AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE - The DAP is not

an appropriation measure and does not contravene Section 29(1),
Article VI. The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute
the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the
budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys economic
situation. He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He
could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the
DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the
identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve
appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been
already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through
the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power
vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution,
that, no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.

DISSENTING OPINION:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

According to Justice del Castillo, the theories presented in the
instant case have not adequately and accurately taken into
consideration the paramount State interests. Such theories, if
adopted by the Court, will affect not only the present administration
but future administrations as well. They have serious implications on
the very workability of our system of government.

He emphasized that the case must be decided beyond the prevailing

climate of public distrust on the expenditure of huge public funds
generated by the PDAF scandal. It must be decided based on the
Constitution, not public opinion. It must be decided based on reason,
not fear or passion. It must, ultimately, be decided based on faith in
the moral strength, courage and resolve of our people and nation.

He summarized his vote to limit the declaration of

unconstitutionality to the afore-discussed for the following reasons, as
quoted:

First, I am of the view that the Court should not make a broad and
sweeping declaration of unconstitutionality relative to acts or
practices that were not actually proven in this case. Hence, I limit the
declaration of unconstitutionality to the three admitted cross-border
transfers of savings. To rule otherwise would transgress the actual
case and controversy requirement necessary to validly exercise the
power of judicial review.

Second, I find it improper to declare the DAP unconstitutional without

specifying the provisions of the implementing issuances which
transgressed the Constitution. The acts or practices declared
unconstitutional by the majority relative to the DAP are a restatement
of existing constitutional and statutory provisions on the power to
augment and the definition of savings. These do not identify the
provisions in the implementing issuances of the DAP which allegedly
violated the Constitution and pertinent laws. Again, it transgresses
the actual case and controversy requirement.

Third, I do not subscribe to the view of the majority relative to the

interpretation and application of Section 38 of the Administrative
Code, and the GAA provisions on savings, impoundment, the two-
year availability for release of appropriations and the unprogrammed
fund, for reasons already extensively discussed. While I find the
wording of these laws to be highly susceptible to abuse and even
unwise and imprudent, the Court has no recourse but to interpret and
apply them based on their plain meaning, and not to accord them an
interpretation that lead to absurd results or render them inoperative.

Last, I find that the remedy in this case is not solely judicial but largely
legislative in that imperative reforms are needed in, among others,
the limits of Section 38, the definition of savings, the transparency of
the exercise of the power to augment, the safeguards and limitations
on this power, and so on. How this is to be done belongs to Congress
which must balance the State interests in curbing abuse vis--vis
flexibility in fiscal management.

Ultimately, however, the remedy resides in the people: to press for

needed reforms in the laws that currently govern the enactment and
execution of the national budget and to be vigilant in the prosecution
of those who may have fraudulently abused or misused public funds.
In fine, I am of the considered view that the abuse or misuse of the
 power to augment will persist if the needed reforms in the subject
laws are not promptly instituted. Hence, the necessity of calling upon
the moral strength, courage and resolve of our people and nation to
address these weaknesses in our laws which have, to a large extent,
precipitated the present controversy.

SEPARATE OPINION:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Justice Carpio viewed that while the Disbursement Acceleration
Program to have a noble end: "to fasttrack public spending and push
economic growth" by funding "high-impact budgetary programs and
projects," its constitutionality is often sacrificed to in pursuit of good
intentions. The pooling funds under NBC 541 do not qualify as
savings, and hence, the pooled funds could not validly be realigned.
The unobligated allotments of agencies with low-level of obligations
as of June 30, 2012 are certainly not savings as defined in the GAAs,
with the exception of MOOE from January to June 2012, excluding
Mandatory Expenditures and Expenditures for Business-type
Activities. The realignment of these funds to augment items in the
GAAs patently contravenes Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution. Thus, such realignment under the DAP, NBC 541 and
other Executive issuances related to DAP is clearly unconstitutional.

He further averred that the DAP also violates the prohibition on cross-
border transfers enshrined in Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution. No less than the DBM Secretary has admitted that the
Executive transferred funds to the COA and the House of
Representatives. The OSG has also expressly admitted in its
Memorandum of March 10, 2014 that the Executive transferred
appropriations to the COA, the House of Representatives and the
COMELEC. The Executive transferred DAP funds to augment the
PDAF, or the unconstitutional Congressional Pork Barrel, making the
augmentation also unconstitutional.

Justice Carpio reiterated in his opinion that the following acts

and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program and the
National Budget Circular No. 541 dated July 18, 2012 are
unconstitutional for violating Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution:

1. Transfers of appropriations from the Executive to the Legislature the

Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit;
2. Disbursements of unobligated allotments for MOOE as savings and
their realignment to other items in the GAAs, where the MOOE that
are the sources of savings are appropriations for months still to lapse;
3. Disbursements of unobligated allotments for Capital Outlay as
savings and their realignment to other items in the GAA, prior to the
last two months of the fiscal year if the period to obligate is one year,
or prior to the last two months of the second year if the period to
obligate is two years; and
4. Disbursements of unobligated allotments as savings and their
realignment to items or projects not found in the GAA.
The use of the Unprogrammed Fund without the certification by
the National Treasurer that the revenue collections for the fiscal year
exceeded the revenue target for that year was also declared VOID for
being contrary to the express condition for the use of the
Unprogrammed Fund under the GAAs.
December 13, 2011

G.R. No. 199034

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Leila M. De Lima,

in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice and
Ricardo A. David, Jr., in his capacity as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Immigration, Respondents,

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 199046

Jose Miguel T. Arroyo vs. Hon. Leila M. De Lima, in her capacity

as Secretary, Department of Justice, Ricardo V. Paras III, in his
capacity as Chief State Counsel, Department of Justice and
Ricardo A. David, Jr., in his capacity as Commissioner, Bureau
of Immigration,16

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

On November 15, 2011, the Supreme issued an immediately

executory Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the
implementation of DOJ Department Circular No. 41 and Watchlist
Order and thereby allowing the petitioners Arroyo spouses to leave
the Philippines after complying with the conditions in the Resolution.
The respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lime however
prevented the Arroyos from leaving.

The government, through the Office of the Solicitor General,

immediately filed a Consolidated Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
and/or to Lift Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo also filed an Urgent Motion for Respondents to
Cease and Desist from Preventing Petitioner GMA from Leaving the
Country. She also moved to cite the Respondent Secretary of
Justice in contempt for failure to comply with the TRO.

Petitioners executed a SPA dated 15 November 2011 in favor

of Atty. Ferdinand Topacio, appointing him to produce summons or
receive documentary evidence.

The TRO was subject to three conditions, namely: (i) The

petitioners shall post a cash bond of Two Million Pesos

16http://www.gov.ph/2011/11/15/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199034jose-

miguel-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199046/ last visited: March 8, 2017

(P2,000,000.00) payable to this Court within five (5) days from notice
hereof. Failure to post the bond within the aforesaid period will result
in the automatic lifting of the temporary restraining order; (ii) The
petitioners shall appoint a legal representative common to both of
them who will receive subpoena, orders and other legal processes on
their behalf during their absence. The petitioners shall submit the
name of the legal representative, also within five (5) days from notice
hereof; and (iii) If there is a Philippine embassy or consulate in the
place where they will be traveling, the petitioners shall inform said
embassy or consulate by personal appearance or by phone of their
whereabouts at all times.

On November 18, 2011, the Court conducted a special en banc

session to tackle the pending incidents of the consolidated cases. In
relation to this case, six issues that arose in the interim after the TRO
was issued. The second issue was whether the SPA submitted by
petitioners in favor of Atty. Topacio complied with the conditions
imposed by the Court for the issuance of the TRO.

Justice Carpio explained that the TRO issued by the Clerk of

Court pursuant to the 15 November 2011 Resolution should be
recalled, since there was a failure to comply with one of the
Resolutions conditions. He compared the wording of the second
condition imposed by the said Resolution with the provisions of the
SPA submitted by petitioners. Obviously, the authority of an agent to
receive subpoena, orders and other legal processes as required by
the Courts Resolution is the opposite of an agency to produce
summons, which was given by petitioners to Atty. Topacio.

One justice argued that there was substantial compliance with

the conditions for the issuance of the TRO notwithstanding the
language of the Arroyos-to-Topacio SPA, but strong objections to this
proposition were immediately raised. A justice countered that there
could be no substantial compliance when no person has been
designated by petitioners to receive summons. He reasoned that
the failure to comply with the second condition was as defective as if
no cash bond were filed.

Another argued that, anyway, the SPA had a provision that

designated Atty. Topacio to do all things necessary.4 This general
clause would thus suffice for purposes of complying with the second
condition. In response, another justice countered that the general
clause could not be considered as sufficient if the Court itself
specifically required a Special, and not a General, Power of Attorney.

The justice who shifted his vote from the first majority to the
second majority agreed with the observations of Justice Carpio with
respect to the defect of the SPA and noted that it was a jurisdictional
defect. The pivotal justice who shifted his vote, added that, anyway,
the defect could easily be remedied by petitioners who in 10 minutes
could simply amend the SPA to reflect condition (ii).

After the discussion, the Court, voting 7-6, ruled that petitioners
had failed to comply with the second condition imposed by the 15
November 2011 Resolution for the issuance of a TRO.

The Court then proceeded to discuss the legal effects of this

non-compliance. Justice Carpio argued for the recall of the TRO,
considering the defective SPA. However, several justices objected to
the recall of the TRO and said that it was unnecessary. It was
proposed instead that the TRO be deemed suspended pending
compliance with the second condition.

Justice Carpio agreed to the proposed amendment of his

motion. He proceeded to reformulate the issue to be voted upon:
namely, whether the TRO was suspended pending compliance with
condition (ii).

Instead of accepting Justice Carpios reformulated motion, the

pivotal justice pointed out that there was no need for the Court to
expressly declare that the TRO was suspended pending compliance.
He thus effectively put forth a motion for the Resolution to just remain
silent on the matter. But Justice Carpio insisted on his motion that the
Court explicitly declare that the TRO was suspended. The justice
concerned opposed the proposal, saying that the Resolution need not
expressly declare the TRO suspended pending compliance, since the
legal effect of non-compliance was common sense anyway. He
quipped that every lawyer knows that a TRO does not become
effective until the conditions for its issuance are complied with.

The Court voted in favor of the pivotal justices proposal and

ruled by a vote of 7-6 that it was not necessary for the Resolution to
express that the TRO was deemed suspended pending compliance.

PROCEEDINGS:

Acting on the Special Civil Actions for Certiorari and Prohibition

with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and mindful of the underlying issues in
the cases the right to life (which is the highest right under the
Constitution) and its supporting rights, including the right to travel
 ISSUES:

Among the more important issues resolved by the Court during

the special en banc session were as follows:

1. Should the Resolution granting the prayer for a TRO be

reconsidered?

2. Was there compliance with the 2nd condition of the TRO? If there is
none, should the TRO be suspended in the meantime?

RULINGS:

On issue no. 1, YES, the Resolution granting the petitioners

prayer for a TRO should be reconsidered.

The Justices maintained their 8-5 vote on the issuance of the

TRO. The majority thus require[d] Secretary De Lima to
IMMEDIATELY COMPLY with the said temporary restraining order
by allowing petitioners to leave the country.

This Court cannot ignore a basic constitutional precept: the

presumption of validity of official actions. Especially when the practice
of issuing watch list orders, has been practiced for decades by the
Department of Justice, and many other analogous practices has been
observed as well by many other governmental agencies, including
this court, through analogous restrictive practices. This Court cannot
turn to a blind eye what is involved in running a government. xxx.
What this all means is that a full hearing must be conducted before
this Court decides to grant a TRO to petitioners, none of whom, by
their very own documents, are under any life-threatening, emergency,
medical situation.

While in the end we may ultimately strike down the issuance of

Watch List Orders by the Department of Justice or uphold such
orders and additionally provide standards before the power to restrict
travel of persons under preliminary investigation can be exercised,
what is at stake this very day is a fundamental question of whether
we should presume that officials can perform the functions they have
been performing for ages in order that we maintain order in the
running of a country. Therefore, with all due respect, it is completely
wrong for this Court to bend over backwards to accommodate the
request of petitioners for a TRO to be issued ex parte without hearing
the side of the government.
 When out of the countrys jurisdiction, by being corporeally
absent therefrom, public respondents legal remedies against
petitioners will be subject to the jurisdiction and the pleasure of the
various countries where they will flee. Out of the countries that had
been mentioned by petitioners to be subject of her medical tour, only
two (2) of the countries cited have extradition treaties with the
Philippines. It still needs verification whether the extradition with
Spain has already been rendered effective through concurrence to
the same by the Senate.

The moment she flies out of Philippine air space, our countrys
ability to enforce its laws will now be subject to the wishes of a foreign
government. A PhP2 Million Peso bond is crumbs for one who, if
proven, has actually obtained multiples more from the countrys
coffers. Neither will the appointment of a substitute replace the
effective justice that can be enforced only when a State has physical
custody of a person who has been proven guilty of violation of the
state laws. A conviction against her may lie as a formal judgment, but
there may effectively be no service of sentence. That is of course, all
premised on the theory that petitioners may ultimately be convicted
for one of the crimes for which they are charged. That result can only
add to the very long saga of our peoples desperate attempts to try to
redeem its self-respect by showing to the world that contrary to the
common observation of outsiders, impunity is not allowed to reign in
this country. Should the Court contribute to such possible despair by
not waiting for the oral argument on 22 November 2011 before
issuing a TRO?

The principal physician of former President Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo, Dr. Juliet Gopez-Cervantes, and her surgeon, Dr. Mario Ver,
have all certified to her continuing recovery and her positive
prognosis, especially after 6 to 8 months. There has been no
allegation in her pleadings that those certifications are false, nor that
her doctors are incompetent. They should then be believed by this
Court that there is no medical emergency warranting an immediate
flight. What is waiting four (4) more days from today, when oral
arguments are conducted, compared with the possibility that there is
genuine, and not just publicly-imagined intention, on the part of the
petitioners to evade legal processes. This Court can afford to wait
until 22 November 2011, without prejudicing any of the constitutional
rights of the petitioner, considering the potentials that loom in the
distance and the fears that weigh on the minds of our people - that
justice will be again be frustrated if the simple operation of bringing
back an accused person from abroad, will prove to be impossible to
effect, even by this Court.

Considering that petitioners herein are not under any medical

emergency, as certified by petitioner Gloria Arroyos own doctors, can
this Court not just wait for the Comment and the oral arguments to be
shortly conducted?

On Issue No. 2, NO, there was no compliance with the 2nd

condition of the TRO; hence, YES, the TRO should be suspended in
the meantime.

The Court voted 76 (1) that there was no compliance with the
2nd condition of the TRO. But it nonetheless voted by the same 7-6
margin (2) that there was no need to explicitly state the legal effect on
the TRO of the noncompliance by petitioners with the 2ndcondition.

The November 18, 2011 Resolution instead noted the SPA

executed by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, appointing Atty. Ferdinand
Topacio as her legal, and merely stated that she shall commit to the
Court that she shall instruct her legal representative to amend par.
(iii) of par. (b) above to state: to receive summons or documentary
evidence and forthwith submit this compliance with the Court;

The majority, by a 7-6 voting [sic], denied the minoritys

proposition that a resolution be issued including a phrase that the
TRO is suspended pending compliance with the second condition of
the 15 November 2011 Resolution. The majority argued that such a
clarification is unnecessary, because it is clear that the TRO is
conditional, and cannot be made use of until compliance has been
done. It was therefore the sense of the majority that, as an offshoot of
the winning vote that there was failure by petitioners to comply with
Condition Number 2, the TRO is implicitly deemed suspended until
there is compliance with such condition. Everyone believed that it
would be clear to all that a conditional TRO is what it is, conditional.

Below is the relevant excerpt from the Special Power of

Attorney dated 15 November 2011, the failed compliance of
petitioners with Condition Number 2 in our Resolution dated 15
November 2011:

That I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, of legal age, married,

Filipino with residence at 14 Badjao Street, Pansol, Quezon City, do
hereby name, constitute and appoint ATTY. FERDINAND TOPACIO,
likewise of legal age, Filipino, with office address at Ground floor,
Skyway Twin Towers, H. Javier St., Ortigas Center, Pasig, Metro
Manila, as my legal representative in the Philippines and to be my
true and lawful attorney-in-fact, for my name, place and stead, to do
and perform the following acts and things, to wit:
1. To sign, verify, and file a written statement;
2. To make and present to the court an application in
connection with any proceedings in the suit;
3. To produce summons or receive documentary evidence;
 4. To make and file compromise or a confession of judgment
and to refer the case to arbitration;
5. To deposit and withdraw any money for the purpose of
any proceeding;
6. To obtain copies of documents and papers; and
7. Generally to do all other lawful acts necessary for the
conduct of the said case. (Emphasis supplied.)

While this opinion was being written, Court Administrator and

Acting Chief of the Public Information Office (PIO) Atty. Midas
Marquez informed the press that the Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) was effective, i.e., in full force and effect. Contrary to this
interpretation, as stated, it was the understanding of a majority that
the TRO is suspended pending compliance with our earlier
Resolution. The operational ineffectivity of the TRO is implied for it
is a basic principle that the failure of petitioners to comply with one of
the conditions in the Resolution dated 15 November 2011 is a
jurisdictional defect that suspends, at the least, the effectivity of the
TRO. Therefore, the TRO, until faithful compliance with the terms
thereof, is legally ineffective. It was a human mistake, understandable
on the part of the Clerk of Court, considering the way the TRO was
rushed, to have issued the same despite non-compliance by
petitioners with one of the strict conditions imposed by the Court.
Nevertheless, good faith and all, the legal effect of such non-
compliance is the same petitioners cannot make use thereof for
failure to comply faithfully with a condition imposed by this Court for
its issuance. The Court Administrator cum Acting Chief of the PIO is
hereby advised to be careful not to go beyond his role in such offices,
and that he has no authority to interpret any of our judicial
issuances, including the present Resolution, a function he never had
from the beginning.

Furthermore, it is hereby clarified that it is mandatory for the

Clerk of Court to ensure that there is faithful compliance with all the
conditions imposed in our 15 November 2011 resolution, including
our second condition, before issuing any certification that the
compliance with the TRO has been made, and only then can the TRO
become effective.

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

The Petitioner is contending on her right to life as described

under Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws. And Article III Section 6,
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.

While the Court will not hesitate to protect former President

Arroyo from the adverse effect of her own act whose validity she
now denounces in order to protect her constitutional right, the
minimum requirement of fairness demands that the government must
be heard on the matter for two important reasons.

First, by adopting Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 41,

the Arroyo Government must be presumed to have believed in and
implicitly represented that it is valid and constitutional. An explanation
from her must be heard on oral argument on why this no longer
seems to be the case. Such disclosure will reveal whether she is
dealing in truth and good faith with this Court in respect of her
allegations in her Petition, a fundamental requirement for her Petition
to be given credence.

Second, it will reveal whether in fact her administration then

believed that there was statutory basis for such issuance, which is
important to resolving the question of the existence of a basis,
including policy or operational imperatives, for the administrative
issuance that is DOJ Circular No. 41.

Petitioner Arroyo comes before this Court assailing the

constitutionality of the said Circular, which was issued by Alberto
Agra, the Justice Secretary appointed by petitioner during her
incumbency as president. This Circular thus bears the stamp of
petitioner as President ordering the consolidation of the rules
governing Watchlist Orders. Under the doctrine of qualified political
agency, the acts and issuances of Agra are acts of the President and
herein petitioner herself.

The Presidents act of delegating authority to the Secretary of

Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the
purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been
established in our jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, which primarily
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department; the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act
in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Thus, the acts which petitioner claims to have violated her

constitutional rights are the acts of her alter ego, and consequently,
her own.

DISSENTING OPINION:

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio, November 15,

201117

I vote to defer action on petitioners prayer for a temporary

restraining order until after the Government files its Comment and
after oral arguments are heard on the matter. This should take not
more than five working days, which is brief enough so as not to
prejudice petitioners in any way. While the right to travel is a
constitutional right that may be impaired only in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided
by law, there are recognized exceptions other than those created by
law. Foremost is the restriction on the right to travel of persons
charged of crimes before the courts. Another is the restriction on
persons subpoenaed or ordered arrested by the Senate or House of
Representatives pursuant to their power of legislative inquiry.

There are also restrictions on the right to travel imposed on

government officials and employees. For example, Office of the Court
Administrator Circular No. 49-2003(B) requires judges and court
personnel to secure a travel authority from the Office of the Court
Administrator before they can travel abroad even during their
approved leave of absence or free time. This restriction to travel
abroad is imposed even in the absence of a law.

In the present case, petitioners are already undergoing

preliminary investigation in several criminal cases, and charges may
be filed before the courts while petitioners are abroad. In fairness to
the Government which is tasked with the prosecution of crimes, this
Court must hear first the Government in oral argument before
deciding on the temporary restraining order which if issued could
frustrate the Governments right to prosecute. The Government must
be heard on how the charges against petitioners could proceed while
petitioners are abroad.

17 http://www.gov.ph/2011/11/15/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199034jose-
miguel-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199046/
 Accordingly, I vote to (1) defer action on petitioners prayer for a
temporary restraining order, (2) require respondents to file their
Comments on or before 21 November 2011, (3) hold oral arguments
on 22 November 2011 at 2 oclock in the afternoon, and (4) decide
whether to issue a temporary restraining order immediately upon the
conclusion of the oral arguments.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, November

15, 201118

I DISAGREE with the majoritys decision to issue a Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO) against the enforcement of the Department
of Justices (DOJ) Department Circular No. 411, Watchlist Order2
dated August 9, 2011, Amended Order3 dated September 6, 2011,
and Watchlist Order4 dated October 27, 2011.

It is well-settled, to the point of being axiomatic, that any

injunctive relief will not be issued if it will result to a premature
disposition or a prejudgment of the case on its merits. Also, any
application for the restraint on the performance of an act will not be
given due course if it will presume the validity of petitioners claims,
relieving them of the burden of proving the same.

The assailed Department Circular No. 41 and the Watchlist

Orders issued thereunder enjoy such presumption of constitutionality
and regularity; the Watchlist Orders were in accordance with the
provisions of Department Circular No. 41 which, itself, was issued in
the performance of the DOJs mandate under Section 3, Chapter I,
Title III and Section 1, Chapter I, Title III of Book IV of Executive
Order 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 to
administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the
accepted processes thereof. (See Department Circular Nos. 17 and
18, the predecessors of Department Circular No. 41). It is incumbent
upon the petitioners to prove that the assailed issuances are
unconstitutional: that Department Circular No. 41 was issued outside
the confines of the Administrative Code, or the Administrative Code
does not authorize the DOJ to issue such a Circular, or that the
performance of its functions under the Administrative Code does not
justify the imposition of such a restraint. Regrettably, by issuing the
TRO, thus, restraining the enforcement of the assailed issuances, this
Court had effectively given credence to the petitioners claims against
their validity, which, at this stage of the proceedings, are mere
allegations and no other.

18 http://www.gov.ph/2011/11/15/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199034jose-
miguel-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199046/
 This, to me, is an unequivocal testimony to the presumption of
validity accorded to Department Circular No. 41 and the Watchlist
Order issued pursuant to its provisions, considering that the TRO was
issued not because of the supposed infringement on Mr. Arroyos
right to travel but because of the DOJs clear deviation from the
provisions of Department Circular No. 41. Under Section 2 of the
Circular, it is only in the following instances that a Watchlist Order can
be issued against any person: (a) there is a criminal case pending
against him before any court within this jurisdiction; (b) there is a
criminal case against him pending preliminary investigation, petition
for review or motion for reconsideration before the DOJ or any of its
prosecution offices; and (c) the Secretary of Justice deems it proper
motu proprio or upon the request submitted by any government
agency, commission, task force or similar offices created by the
Office of the President under Republic Act No. 9208 in connection
with an investigation it is conducting and/or in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health. Evidently, that there was a
restraint on Mr. Arroyos right to travel per se is insufficient to
overcome the presumption of constitutionality against the Circular
such that what moved the Court to rule in Mr. Arroyos favor was the
dubiety of whether an investigation conducted by the Senate may be
a ground to issue a Watchlist Order.

It appears that the medical attention being received by GMA is

adequate as she is out of danger and her condition is continuously
improving. Her claim of urgency and life-threatening conditions is, at
the very least, debatable and this should have militated against the
issuance of a TRO. Prudence and to avoid prejudging the case on its
merits, giving the Government an opportunity to be heard is definitely
not much too ask.

On the other hand, if it was the petitioners right to life and the
threat posed thereto by the assailed issuances that was foremost in
the majoritys mind when they decided to issue the TRO, there would
have been no basis to issue a TRO in Mr. Arroyos favor as there is
nothing in his Petition where it was alleged that his right to life was
being threatened or endangered. In his earlier Petition, Mr. Arroyo
was invoking for his right to travel in his earlier Petition. It is no
different in this present Petition; only that, the Watchlist Order he is
now attacking as unconstitutional is based on his being preliminarily
investigated by the DOJ-COMELEC Fact Finding Committee.
However, the issuance of a Watchlist Order on this ground is allowed
under the Circular; thus, the basis for the Courts issuance of a TRO
in Mr. Arroyos first Petition does not exist in this case. If the
infringement of his right to travel was not enough for this Court to
issue a TRO in Mr. Arroyos first Petition, it is certainly confounding
as to why it is different in this case.
 It is well to emphasize that the grant or denial of a writ of
preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound discretion
of the court taking cognizance thereof. In the present case, however,
where it is the Government which is being enjoined from
implementing an issuance which enjoys the presumption of validity,
such discretion must be exercised with utmost caution.

The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does

not of itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce
it, unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other
unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The on its
face invalidation of statutes has been described as manifestly
strong medicine, to be employed sparingly and only as a last
resort, and is generally disfavored.

I believe that this Court should have exercised the same

circumspection and caution. It may be argued that the
constitutionality of the assailed issuances had not been prematurely
determined by the majoritys decision to issue the TRO. However,
common sense dictates that granting the TRO and granting this
Petition lead to the same result: the petitioners may leave the country
anytime they wish and a cloud is cast over the constitutionality and
validity of the assailed issuances.

In conclusion, and in view of the foregoing, it is my position that

it is best to require the respondents to file a comment on the petitions,
and hear them out in oral argument, instead of issuing a TRO ex
parte.

IN VIEW THEREOF, I vote to: (a) defer action on the prayer for
a TRO; (b) order the public respondents to Comment on the
consolidated Petitions on or before November 21, 2011; and (c) set
the case for oral arguments on November 22, 2011 at 2:00 p.m.; and
(d) immediately after the conduct and conclusion of the oral
arguments, resolve the issue of whether or not a temporary
restraining order may be issued.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno,

November 15, 201119

When this matter was called this morning, it was clear that not
one among the members of this Court was suggesting that petitioners
have no constitutional rights that this Court must vigilantly protect. No

19 http://www.gov.ph/2011/11/15/gloria-macapagal-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199034jose-
miguel-arroyo-v-de-lima-et-al-g-r-no-199046/
one was saying that petitioners should not be granted any remedy.
The bone of contention before the Court was, simply, whether to
allow public respondents their right to due process by giving them the
right to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of five
(5) days immediately after which oral arguments were to be heard
and the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) immediately
decided, as suggested by the minority, or, to deny respondents such
right by presuming fully the correctness of all the allegations of the
petitions, and thus grant the prayer for TRO. On this matter, the vote
of this Court was 8-5 denying the right of public respondents to be
heard before the grant of petitioners prayer for a TRO.

Justice Sereno talks of the right of the state to be heard versus

the right claimed by petitioners.

The requirement of truthful allegations in pleadings filed before

the Court that many adverse inferences and disciplinary measures
can be imposed against a person lying before the Court. This
requirement of truthfullness is especially important when a provisional
remedy, and more so when the remedy is sought to be granted ex-
parte, is under consideration by the Court. When on its face, the
material averments of a pleading contain self-contradictions, the least
that the Court should do, is consider the other side of the claim.

This is the situation with the Petition of former President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo. It appears that she has given inconsistent, and
probably untruthful statements before this Court. However, her own
attachments belie the immediate threat to life she claims.

Petitioners travel itinerary abroad, for which the instant

provisional remedy is being sought, appears not solely for medical
reasons as claimed. There are clear showing of petitioners
inconsistencies on her travel purpose as it contains also non-medical
purpose of her visit in other countries. Contrary to her assertions of
urgency and life-threatening health conditions, petitioner had
expressed her intention to participate in two conferences abroad
during her supposed medical tour. It seems incongruous for petitioner
who has asked the Department of Justice and this Court to look with
humanitarian concern on her precarious state of health, to commit
herself to attend these meetings and conferences at the risk of
worsening her physical condition.

If she has been shown to be prone to submitting to this Court

documents belying her own allegations, this Court must pause, and at
the very least, listen to the side of the Government. Indeed,
petitioners applications for authority to travel with the House of
Representatives and the Endorsement of the Speaker of the House
are crucial documentary evidence that should have been included
and considered in the course of granting an ex-parte temporary
restraining order, but these were unfortunately, not made available in
their entirety by the petitioner in her Petition. That is why a twosided
hearing before the Court, and not a mere ex-parte proceeding should
have occurred before the majority granted the TRO.

According to Justice Sereno, petitioner former President Arroyo

must explain why she is claiming that her constitutional right is being
violated, when the claimed violation is being caused by her own
administration. First, by adopting Department of Justice (DOJ)
Circular No. 41, the Arroyo Government must be presumed to have
believed in and implicitly represented that it is valid and constitutional.
Second, it will reveal whether in fact her administration then believed
that there was statutory basis for such issuance, which is important to
resolving the question of the existence of a basis, including policy or
operational imperatives, for the administrative issuance that is DOJ
Circular No. 41.

The court must face the risk of flight for it cannot evade the
question that is uppermost in the minds of many if the request for
TRO by petitioner is her desire to evade the investigatory and judicial
process regarding their liability for certain alleged criminal acts. If the
risk of flight is high, then this Court must adopt either of the following
approaches: (1) deny the right to travel, or (2) allow travel subject to
certain restrictions.

It appears that the Court, by its own administrative actions, has

acknowledged the states limited power to abridge the right to travel.
At the very least therefore, the State must be heard on the extent of
this limited power to regulate the right to travel. The majority cites the
right to life as an underlying value that its Resolution is trying to
protect. Petitioner Arroyos own documentary submissions however,
belie the existence of any threat to such life. It also cites petitioners
right to travel as a primordial constitutional right that must be so
zealously protected.

The majority is completely bereft, however, of any explanation

on why it will protect those rights through a premature TRO in the
face of untruthful statements in the Petitions herein and when its own
practice in its backyard is one of curtailment of judicial employees
own rights to travel. The only proposition that the minority has posed
in todays session is that the State first be heard before any decision
to grant a TRO is reached. Surely, that is fully conformable with the
requirements of the Rules of Court before a TRO can be issued.

Considering there is absolutely no medical emergency that is

evidenced by any of the documents submitted by petitioner Arroyo,
the allegations on the matter remain but mere allegations, and do not
satisfy the evidentiary requirements for a TRO than can be issued ex-
parte.

IN VIEW THEREOF, I vote to: (a) defer action on the prayer for
a Temporary Restraining Order; (b) order the public respondents to
Comment on the consolidated Petitions no later than 21 November
2011; and (c) conduct oral arguments on 22 November 2011 at 2:00
p.m. Immediately thereafter, the prayer for a temporary restraining
order will be decided.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

Separate Opinion of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., December

13, 201120

The separate opinion of Jusitce Velasco is in response to the

Dissenting Opinions of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes
P.A. Sereno in relation to the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
issued by the Court on November l5, 2011 pursuant to its Resolution
of even date. He mentioned that the unpromulgated dissenting
opinion of Justice Sereno filed late and in contravention of Section 2,
Rule 10 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC). The TRO
authorized by the November l5, 20ll Resolution is immediately
executory upon compliance with the posting of the P2M bond. It is his
view that petitioners are required only to post the bond of P2M to
pave the way for the issuance of the TRO. This is clear from the 2nd
sentence of condition (i) that the failure to post the bond within 5 days
will result in the automatic lifting of the TRO.

While The Court ruled later in its November 22, 2011

Resolution that the special power of attorney submitted by Atty.
Topacio on November 15, 2011 was insufficient, the TRO however
remained effective by virtue of the submission of the requisite P2M
bond. It should be made abundantly clear that the qualification
respecting the automatic lifting of the TRO obtaining in condition (i)
was not made to apply to condition (ii), implying that non-compliance
with the requirement on the appointment of the legal representative
will not result in the lifting of the TRO. The matter of whether or not
condition (ii) constitutes a condition precedent or a subsequent
condition, is now really of little moment. The important consideration
is that non-compliance with condition (ii) would not, under the very
terms of the enabling Resolution or the TRO itself, result in the
automatic lifting of the restraining order thus granted.

20 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/resolutions/2011/december20 11/199034_velasco.htm
 At any rate, on November 15, 2011, petitioners complied with
conditions (i) and (ii) and, as a result, the Office of the Clerk of Court
issued the TRO pursuant to the November 15, 2011 Resolution. The
presumptive validity of the TRO must be recognized, albeit the
original special power of attorney accorded Atty. Topacio was
determined later to be non-compliant.

Respondent De Lima chose to ignore the TRO and so, on

November 18, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution requiring her to
show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for her failure
to comply with the TRO and further require her to immediately comply
thereto. Justice Carpio questioned the accuracy and completeness of
this Resolution. Thus, the Resolution in question was discussed
during the November 22, 2011 session. By a vote of 7-6, the Court
found that there was no sufficient compliance with the required
appointment of the legal representative of petitioners. Thereafter,
there was a long discussion on whether or not the TRO was
suspended pending compliance with the second condition. He
distinctly remember moving that a vote be made on the issue of the
suspension or non-suspension of the TRO pending satisfaction of the
second condition. Thus, the majority vote of 7 held that the TRO was
not suspended pending compliance with the appointment of the legal
representative of petitioners. As a matter of fact, on November 18,
2011, petitioners already submitted a special power of attorney
appointing Atty. Topacio as their legal representative to receive
summons, subpoenas, orders and other legal processes. Thus, by
November 18, 2011, the issue of whether or not the TRO was
suspended pending compliance with such requirement has already
become moot and academic and there is actually no necessity to
clarify said issue. However, to set the record straight, I certify that
the draft directive on the non-suspension of the TRO is correct and
accurate.

On November 29, 2011, the Court En Banc voted anew on the

same issue of the non-suspension of the TRO pending compliance
with the second condition and again, by a vote of 7 against 6, the
Court held that the TRO was not suspended. The majority sustained
the correctness and validity of the November 22, 2011 Resolution.
This should put the issue to rest.

Separate Opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion, December 13,

201121

The separate opinion of Justice Brion is to reflect his view and

explain his vote on the deliberation of the Court En Banc n November
18 ans 22, 2011 on the issue of non compliance with the GMA TRO.

21 https://www.scribd.com/document/77632912/Brion-Separate-Opinion
 On November 15, 2011, the Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) in favor of the petitioners. In the special En
Banc meeting of November 18, 2011, Justice Antonio T. Carpio
brought to the attention of the Court the petitioners failure to comply
with the second condition, specifically with the appointment of a legal
representative with full authority to receive summons and other court
process during their absence. The legal representative was merely
capacitated to produce, not receive summons. As a result of the
observation, the Court issued another Resolution stating that

The Court further resolved to:

xxxx

(g) NOTE the Special Power of Attorney dated November 15,

2011 executed by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, appointing Atty.
Ferdinand Topacio as her legal representative in compliance with the
resolution of November 15, 2011. She shall commit to the Court that
she shall instruct her legal representative to amend [the Special
Power of Attorney] to state: to receive summons or documentary
evidence and forthwith submit this compliance with the Court.

On the same day, November 18, 2011, Atty. Topacio complied

with the above Resolution by filing a Supplemental Compliance.

Despite the compliance, the Court still faced two questions

relating to the petitioners failure to comply.

The first was the question of whether indeed there had been
failure to comply. The second was the effect of this failure if there had
been such a failure.

I voted in the negative on the first question in light of the terms

of the TRO. While the compliance with the second condition might
have been lacking on November 18, 2011, to conclude that total
failure had taken place was premature; the TRO imposed on the
petitioners a period of five (5) days from notice within which to comply
and the period had not lapsed on November 18, 2011 since service of
the TRO was only on November 15, 2011. Indeed on the same day
November 18, 2011 the petitioners made good on this lapse. Thus, to
me, a negative vote in the November 18, 2011 meeting was the
necessary conclusion because of the prematurity of determining
whether complete failure to comply had taken place.

The answer to the second question flows from the first and also
from the express terms of the TRO. By its express terms, the TRO
was immediately executory, subject to automatic lifting if failure at
compliance takes place. In other words, the TRO was to be
immediately effective particularly during the five-day period of the
petitioners compliance with the conditions. My vote, therefore, had
likewise to be in the negative, subject to the failure to comply with the
condition within the five-day compliance period.

In these lights, I see no problem in the full effect of the TRO

without need of suspending its effects because of the petitioners
initial, but immediately remedied, lapse.

Submitted for the En Bancs consideration.

Separate Concurring Opinion, Justice Roberto A. Abad,

December 13, 201122

Having read the separate dissenting opinions, especially that

of Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, I am compelled to dwell on two
points.

One. It is not true that the Court or the Chief Justice has
declined to promulgate Justice Serenos dissenting opinion, following
the vote taken in the case on November 29, 2011. She agreed to
submit her dissent not later than December 1. But she did not.
Neither did she ask the Chief Justice and the other members of the
Court for additional time to submit her dissenting opinion.
Consequently, the Court promulgated its November 29 Resolution in
the case without Justice Serenos promised dissenting opinion. The
Court did not deny her the right to have her opinion promulgated
together with the main Resolution. She broke agreement by not
submitting it on the date set for it.

Subsequently, Justice Sereno wanted her belated dissenting

opinion promulgated on December 2, 2011. But, since her demand
for late and separate promulgation departs from established
procedure, the author of the main Resolution asked that such opinion
be calendared for En Banc consideration. She, however, sees this as
a suppression of her right to submit a dissenting opinion. Ultimately,
the En Banc decided to break precedents and allow the late
promulgation of her dissent together with the concurring opinions of
the rest of the members of the Court, like this one, to fairly present a
fair picture of the problem that Justice Sereno has created by her
failure to abide by simple agreement and the rules.

Two. Section 2, Rule 10, of The Internal Rules of the Supreme

Court provides for confidentiality of its deliberations.
22 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/resolutions/2011/december 2011/199034_abad.htm
 Justice Sereno has breached this rule, narrating in her
dissenting opinion her recollection of the En Bancs deliberation in
executive session on the effect of the petitioners failure to comply
with the second condition of the temporary restraining order (TRO)
that the Court issued in the case.

Relying on their personal recollection of the En Banc

discussions on the effects of petitioners failure to fully comply with the
second condition of the TRO, Justices Carpio and Sereno claim that
the Justices voted 7-6 on a proposition I submitted that there was no
need to state that the TRO had been suspended since that was the
effect of the non-compliance with its conditions.

I may have suggested the point sometime during the debate but
I recall withdrawing it when I realized that the TRO did not subject its
issuance and effectivity to petitioners prior or immediate compliance
with such conditions. Indeed, the collective recollection of the majority
of the Justices who did not join Justices Carpio and Serenos dissents
is that the vote was taken to conclude categorically that the non-
compliance did not suspend the force and effect of the TRO.

When the proceedings in any collegial meeting is intended to

be preserved and cited as a memorial of what had taken place in
such a meeting, the proceedings are recorded. This is true of
Congress of the Philippines and of the Constitutional Convention. But
when what is important in a collegial meeting are the actions or the
resolutions that the body passed by votes, only such actions or
resolutions constitute a faithful recording of the bodys will. This is true
of the sessions of the Supreme Court, past or present.

The main purpose of En Banc or Division sessions is to

deliberate on and decide the disputes between contending parties in
the cases before it. And its decisions are, by Constitutional mandate,
written by a member upon authority of the Court. The Courts
deliberations are not evidence of what it voted on. That vote is
restricted within the confines of the written order, resolution, or
decision that it issues.

The Courts deliberations are confidential simply because the

Court realizes that only by making it so can the Justices freely
discuss the issues before it. Broadcasting such discussions to the
public would have a chilling effect on those who take part in it. One
would be careful not to take unpopular positions or make comments
that border on the ridiculous, which often is a way of seeing the
issues in a different perspective. Personally, I often take temporary
positions on issues, weighing each one as the discussion goes. I
could take the role of a devils advocate before settling on the
opposite view. The danger, as what has happened here, is that
Justice Carpio and Sereno may have taken something I said out of
context or before I made up my mind when the voting took place.

If our deliberations cannot remain confidential, we might as well

close down business.
August 19, 2015

G.R. No. 205722

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
Petitioners, v. LEGAL HEIRS OF JOSE L. AFRICA, Respondents.

Ponente: Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the

Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) filed a
Complaint23 for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
damages before the Sandiganbayan (SB) against spouses Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos, and their alleged cronies, among them is
defendants father, Jose Africa. The PCGG alleged that the
defendants, in collaboration with each other, siphoned funds from the
national treasury to unjustly enrich themselves and the Marcoses.
With respect to Jose Africa (Africa), the PCGG alleged that he
collaborated with several other defendants in acting as conduits of
the pilfered funds by laundering the same using the banking facilities
of Traders Royal Bank (TRB), of which Africa was the Chairman of
the Board of Directors, before remitting them to the Marcoses.

On August 20, 1987, the PCGG amended its complaint to

implead Roman Cruz, Jr. as defendant. In a Compromise Agreement
entered into by the PCGG, through Chairman David M. Castro with
Robert Benedicto (Benedicto). On November 3, 1990, Benedicto
ceded to the government the identified ill-gotten properties listed in
the Complaint24 and transferred to the government whatever rights he
may have in the assets of the corporations listed also in the
Complaint25.

The PCGG lifted sequestration Orders over the properties listed

in the Compromise Agreement, and other assets such as the other
sequestered assets that belonged to Benedicto and/or his
corporations/nominees which were not listed in Annex 'A' of the

23 The Presidential Commission on Good Governance vs Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, Roberto
S. Benedicto, Hector T. Rivera, Julita Benedicto, Lourdes Rivera, Miguel V. Gonzalez, Pag-Asa
San Agustin, Bennet Thelmo, Exequiel B. Africa, Rocio R. Torres, Marciano Benedicto, Romulo
Benedicto, Zacarias Amante, Francisca C. Benedicto, Jose Montalvo, Jesus Martinez, Nestor
Mata, Alberto Velez, Richard de Leon, Zapiro Tanpinco, Leopoldo Vergara, Dominador
Pangilinan, Rodolfo Arambulo, Rafael Sison, Placido Mapa, Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea, Don M. Ferry,
Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Ramon Monzon, Generosa C. Olazo, Cynthia Cheong, Ma. Luisa E.
Nograles, and Jose Africa docketed as Civil Case No. 0034
24 Ibid.
25 Id.
Complaint as ceded, or to be ceded to the government. It also agreed
to extend absolute immunity to Benedicto, members of his family, and
the officers and employees of the listed corporations such that no
criminal investigation or prosecution would be undertaken against
them for acts or omissions prior to February 25, 1986.

The Compromise Agreement covered the remaining claims and

cases of the Philippine Government against Benedicto, including his
associates and nominees, namely: Julita C. Benedicto, Hector T.
Rivera, Lourdes V. Rivera, Miguel V. Gonzales, Pag-Asa San Agustin
(Deceased), Rocio B. Torres, Marciano Benedicto (Deceased),
Romulo Benedicto, Francisca C. Benedicto, Richard de Leon, Jose
Montalvo, Jesus Martinez, Nestor Mata, Alberto Velez, Zafiro
Tanpinco, Dominador Pangilinan (Deceased), Mariano del Mundo
and Zacarias Amante. However, Africa and some other defendants in
the Complaint were excluded therein.

On November 22, 1990, the PCGG and Benedicto filed a Joint

Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement, which was opposed by
the Solicitor General and the plaintiff-intervenors, ABS-CBN, CBNI,
and MBS, on the ground that the same was against the interest of the
Filipinos.

The SB, in a Resolution26 approved the Compromise

Agreement and rendered judgment in accordance with its terms. On
September 10, 1993, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
Compromise Agreement and ordered the parties to comply strictly
with the terms thereof.

On February 23, 1996, the heirs of Jose Africa filed a motion

seeking the dismissal of the case against their father, who had since
died. His heirs asserted that Africa, who was then merely the
Chairman of TRB, should be exonerated since his supposed
conspirators had been exonerated by virtue of the Compromise
Agreement.

PROCEEDINGS:

The SB, in a Resolution27 granted respondents' motion and

dismissed the case against Africa and his heirs reasoning that the
acts complained of constituted a quasi-delict or tort and the solidary

26Sandiganbayan Resolution promulgated on October 2, 1992

27Sandiganbayan Resolution dated March 21, 1997, penned by Associate Justice and Chairman
Jose S. Balajadia with Associate Justices Roberto M. Lagman and Edilberto G. Sandoval
concurring.
obligation therefor had been extinguished when the Compromise
Agreement was executed.

The PCGG moved for Reconsideration, which was granted by

the SB in a Resolution28, which stated that there was no stipulation in
the Compromise Agreement that clearly and deliberately conferred
benefits to Africa, unlike the other defendants who were specifically
named therein. It reasoned that the action is not only for the recovery
of wealth illegally acquired by Benedicto, but also for the
reconveyance of unexplained wealth of the other defendants,
including Africa. Thus, the first resolution dated March 21, 1997 was
set aside and the case against Africa was reinstated.

The heirs of Africa filed a motion for reconsideration seeking

the reinstatement of the March 21, 1997 Resolution. On February 4,
2013, the SB granted the motion and dropped Africa and his heirs, ,
as defendants in the case.

Hence, the PCGG instituted before the Supreme Court a

Petition for review on certiorari assailing the SB Resolution dated
February 4, 2013 which dropped Africa Africa and his heirs as
defendants in the Complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution, and damages filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Africa and his heirs may benefit from the
Compromise Agreement entered into between PCGG and Benedicto
being co-defendants of the latter.

RULING:

The PCGGs petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated

February 4, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0034 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is ordered
to REINSTATE Jose L. Africa and/or respondents Legal Heirs of Jose
L. Africa as defendants in Civil Case No. 0034.

Africa should not benefit from the Compromise Agreement

merely because other defendants who were similarly alleged to be

28 Sandiganbayan Resolution dated July 14, 1999, penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L.
Legaspi with Associate Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval and (retired Supreme Court Justice) Minita
V. Chico-Nazario concurring.
officers of TRB benefited from it. The Supreme Court conveyed that
the absence of Africa's name from the list of the added beneficiaries
could only mean that he was deliberately excluded from it.

Perusing through the Compromise Agreement, the Supreme

Court found no stipulation that would even resemble a provision in
favor of Africa or his heirs. The second whereas clause in the
Compromise Agreement specifically identified the other defendants,
who would be additional beneficiaries. Clearly, the said Agreement
deliberately excluded Africa and his heirs from the benefiting from it.

Other related provisions in the Compromise Agreement further

negate the existence of a stipulation pour autrui in Africa's favor. As
earlier adverted to, Item II (b) of the Compromise Agreement shows
that the absolute immunity extends only to the officers and
employees of the Benedicto corporations who were explicitly named
in the said Compromise Agreement.

Considering that Africa was neither a party nor one of the

intended beneficiaries of the Compromise Agreement, and absent
any stipulations pour autrui in his favor, the rule on relativity of
contracts, i.e., that only the parties thereto and their privies acquire
rights and assume obligations thereunder, prevails. No rule is more
settled than that the parties' intent is "embodied in the writing itself,
and when the words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be
discovered only from the express language of the agreement."

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

Obligations and Contracts

A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already
commenced. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts such
as compromise agreements is that "if the terms of a contract are clear
and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulations shall control."

For a stipulation pour autrui to be appreciated, it is

indispensable that there be a stipulation deliberately conferring a
benefit or favor to a third person. Article 1311 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties,

their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights
and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation, or by
 provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of
the property he received from the decedent.

If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third

person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his
acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental
benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties
must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third
person.
September 4, 2012

G.R. No. 196231

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting
through and represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, Officer in Charge, Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY. RONALDO
A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY.
CARLITOD. CATAYONG, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. 196232

WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F.
ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D.SULAY and ATTY. FROILAN
MONTALBAN, .JR., in their capacities as CHAIRMAN and
MEMBERS of the OFFICE OF MALACAANG LEGAL AFFAIRS,
Respondents.29

Ponente: Justice Arturo Brion

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Facts of G.R. 196231: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct

(robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries) was
filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector
(P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private complainant,
Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a
similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the
Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned
over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication.
Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was lodged against P/S
Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in the Office of
the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the
city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material
29 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/september2012/196231.pdf
allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by
any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the
offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP
issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without prejudice of
the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of
the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite
due notice. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner
Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his
fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the
Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for
final approval, in whose office it remained pending for final review and
action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign
tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt
to have himself reinstated in the police service.

In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in

the tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of
seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public
outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the
creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It
was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the
conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable
negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by
allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more
than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the
Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration
in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from
submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition
thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to
hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence the
petition.

Facts of G.R. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the

Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia,
his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo
Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons with
Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail
holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of
bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special
Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and sought the Sandiganbayan's approval
of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the
accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change
of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential
guidelines.
 Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General
Garcia to get off the hook with nothing but a slap on the hand
notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his
culpability for serious public offenses, the House of Representatives'
Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA.
At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice
passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3, recommending to
the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the
service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and
Assistants before the appropriate government office for having
committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of
the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations
under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for
removal from office under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.

PROCEEDINGS:

The first case, docketed as G.R. No. 196231, is a Petition for

Certiorari (with application for issuance of temporary restraining order
or status quo order) which assails on jurisdictional grounds the
Decision1 dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the Office of the
President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 dismissing petitioner Emilio A.
Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices (MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on the
administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave
Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition
primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy
Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The second case, docketed as G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition

for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for issuance of a
temporary restraining order or status quo order) seeking to annul,
reverse and set aside (1) the undated Order2 requiring petitioner
Wendell Barreras-Sulit to submit a written explanation with respect to
alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in
relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into
with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the April 7, 2011 Notice
of Preliminary Investigation,3 both issued by the Office of the
President in OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003, the administrative case
initiated against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The petition likewise seeks to declare as
unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 giving the President
the power to dismiss a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
 ISSUES:

In these two petitions, the primordial question is whether the

Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the
Ombudsman.

RULINGS:

YES. The Ombudsman's administrativedisciplinary power over

a DeputyOmbudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive.

While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively

is extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive
or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by
impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such
authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they
should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of
the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's
disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on
the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.

A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting

provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that
Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to
exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the
manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2)
and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an
external authority, through the person of the President, that would
exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing
the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all
government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply
a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the
lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his
Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

By granting express statutorypower to the President to

removea Deputy Ombudsman and aSpecial Prosecutor,
Congressmerely filled an obvious gap inthe law. While the
removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in
the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the
same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly
dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a
Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A.
6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of
any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the
Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide
for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to
impeachment.

The Power of the President toRemove a Deputy

Ombudsmanand a Special Prosecutor isImplied from his
Power toAppoint. In giving the President the power to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid
down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the
President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in
the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and effectiveness of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking
into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and
professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in
relation to the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore,
to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the
Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement
offices.

Granting the President the Powerto Remove a Deputy

Ombudsmandoes not Diminish theIndependence of the Office
of theOmbudsman. he claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770
granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman
from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The
independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was
intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its
constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the
Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially,
political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms
of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons
under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of
politicians."

Petitioner Gonzales may not beremoved from office where

thequestioned acts, falling short ofconstitutional standards,
do notconstitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of
directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the
Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be
considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that
would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking
cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or
private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the
Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The
factual circumstances that the case was turned over to the Office of
the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability
was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private
complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision
was immediately implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration
thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot be
simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case
considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or
business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have
impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of
any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable
motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability
against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding
penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings
of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal
of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with
authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and
serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.

The Office of the President is vestedwith statutory

authority to proceedadministratively against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit to determine theexistence of any of the grounds
forher removal from office as providedfor under the
Constitution and theOmbudsman Act.

DISSENTING OPINION:

Dissenting opinions of Justice Roberto A. Abad ad Justice

Brion, September 4, 201230

In their dissenting opinion, they stated that the independence of

the Office of the Ombudsman is of such a fundamental and
unequivocal nature. This independence is essential to carry out the
functions and duties of the Office of the Ombudsman. I agree with

30 sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/september2012/196231
their position that since those in the executive branch are also subject
to the disciplinary authority of the Office of the Ombudsman,
providing the Office of the President with the power to remove would
be an impediment to the fundamental independence of the
Ombudsman.

The circumvention of the separation of powers cannot be

allowed by construing Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution as
delegating plenary and unbounded power to Congress. The exclusive
power of the Ombudsman to discipline her own ranks is fundamental
to the independence of her office.

The Constitutions intention to make the independence of the

Office of the Ombudsman greater than any other office can also be
inferred from the authority and the process of appointment of the
officers constituting that office.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

Concurring opinion of Justice Carpio, September 4, 201231

Justice Carpio presents the view that the independence of the

Office of the Ombudsman does not mean that it is insulated from all
governmental scrutiny. According to Justice Carpio, Congress has
the power to legislate the officials that may be subject to dismissal
and disciplinary action, if the Constitution allows. He cites the records
of the Constitutional Commissions, particularly that of Commissioner
Regalado, who sought the amendment to include the sentence, "ALL
OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES MAY BE
REMOVED FROM OFFICE AS PROVIDED BY LAW BUT NOT BY
IMPEACHMENT," under Article XI, Section 2. Thus, Congress has
the plenary power to provide for the officials that may be removed
and the manner by which they are to be removed as well.

Concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Estela M. Perlas-

Bernabe, September 4, 201232

Justice Bernabe concur with the ponencia in finding the

Decision dated March 31, 2011 of the Office of the President of the
Philippines (OP) to be patently erroneous considering that the acts
therein attributed to petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III (Gonzales), in
his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman, do not constitute betrayal of
public trust. In the Court's Decision dated September 4, 2012, it was
31 sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/september2012/196231
32 http://nlpdl.nlp.gov.ph:81/SC01/2014jan/196231_bernabe.pdf
explained that the phrase "betrayal of public trust" refers to acts
which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross
faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power,
inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of
discretionary powers. In other words, acts that should constitute
betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal from office may be less
than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity
and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment. The OP,
however, dismissed Gonzales based on acts which, as thoroughly
detailed and discussed in the ponencia, do not fit the foregoing legal
description. Accordingly, its (OP) decision was tainted with patent
error. Nevertheless, since the majority voted to declare the
jurisdictional basis for the OP's authority to discipline the Deputy
Ombudsmen under Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. (RA) 67704 as
unconstitutional.

In her dissent, Section 8(2) of RA 6770, which confers the OP

with jurisdiction to discipline not only the Special Prosecutor but also
the Deputy Ombudsmen, is wholly constitutional. To this end, she
joined the majority in upholding the provisions constitutionality insofar
as the Special Prosecutor is concerned, but register my dissent
against declaring the provision unconstitutional insofar as the Deputy
Ombudsmen are concerned.

Concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Marvin Leonen,

September 4, 201233

According to Justice Leonen, By clear constitutional design, the

Tanodbayan or the Office of the Special Prosecutor is separate from
the Office of the Ombudsman. Section 7 is explicit on this point, in
that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is allowed to exercise its
powers, except for those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman.
While the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not automatically a part
of the Office of the Ombudsman, there is, however, no reason that
Congress and the President may, by law and in their political wisdom,
attach the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the Office of the
Ombudsman. There is also no constitutional prohibition for the Office
of the Special Prosecutor to be functionally separate from the Office
of the Ombudsman. This is a matter to be addressed by the political
departments. This may also be viewed as a check of both Congress
and the President on the powers of the Ombudsman.

By clear provision of the Constitution, it is only the Office of the

Ombudsman, which includes her Deputies, that is endowed with
constitutional independence. The inclusion of the Office of the Special
33 http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jan2014/gr_196231_so_2014.html#leonen
Prosecutor with the Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 6770 does not ipso facto mean that the Office of the
Special Prosecutor must be afforded the same levels of constitutional
independence as that of the Ombudsman and the Deputy
Ombudsman. The law simply defines how the Office of the Special
Prosecutor is attached and, therefore, coordinated with the Office of
the Ombudsman.

Thus, the provision of Section 8, Paragraph (2) of Republic Act

No. 6770 which provides for the power of the President to remove the
Special Prosecutor is valid and constitutional.

This opinion should not be seen as a sweeping dismissal or

acquittal of the liability of petitioner Gonzales due to the
unconstitutionality of Section 8, Paragraph (2) of the Ombudsman Act
as far as the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman is concerned.
Petitioner Gonzales must still be held accountable for his actions. His
actions as described in the report and in the decision of the Office of
the President are troubling. There is need to continue the
investigation so that the public may finally find closure concerning
these incidents.

Understandably, the Office of the President wanted to act with

due and deliberate dispatch on this case based on a provision of law
which it interpreted to be valid and constitutional. It acted with the
best of motives. But grand intentions cannot replace constitutional
design. Even "daang matuwid'' requires that the right course of action
must be effectively and efficiently done in the right way.
He voted to declare that Section 8, Paragraph (2) of the
Ombudsman Act, insofar as the Deputy Ombudsman is subjected to
the disciplinary power of the Office of the President, is
unconstitutional. Petitioner Gonzales may, however, still be subject to
investigation and discipline by the Ombudsman herself. I also vote
that, given the facts, there was substantial evidence of betrayal of
public trust on the part of petitioner Gonzales.
December 7, 2010

G.R. No. 192935

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO,

Petitioner,
- versus -
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,
Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 193036

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,

REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.,
Petitioners,
- versus -
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Respondents.

Ponente: Justice Jose Mendoza

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The genesis of the consolidated cases can be traced to the

events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator
Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of
graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang
mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his
ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to
the presidency.

At the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30,

2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is

violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not
apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of
singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the
PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." Thus, in order to be
accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of
graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of
former President Arroyo.

PROCEEDINGS:

This is a consolidation of two cases both of which essentially

assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1,
dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010.

The first case is G.R. No. 192935 a special civil action for
prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his
capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order
No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution34 as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and
to appropriate funds therefor.

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman,
Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua,
Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of
Representatives.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file

their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of

separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of

the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal

protection clause.

34Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.
 RULINGS:

1. Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The Court finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers
matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the
petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues
are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the
public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for
the guidance of all. Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than
interested to know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring
about a promised change to the country. The Court takes
cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political
undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but
because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional
duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to
society.

2. Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating

Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted
full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents
belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive
officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298
as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such
validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the
PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the
offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

3. Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to

adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on
Human Rights.59 Thus:

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o

follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or
track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing.
2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for
the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or
matters."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of

judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in
its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to
decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. xx. Implies a
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the

findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its
predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission
and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be
recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the
DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to
reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not
deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the
reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft
laws.

4. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not
just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments
of the government including the political and executive departments,
and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the
laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should

be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and
find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration"only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the
questioned executive order.

Hence, Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared

UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

Constitutional Law Equal Protection Rule

 One of the basic principles on which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is
embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply

requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
states duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.

DISSENTING OPINION:

Justice Carpio
The President can create the Truth Commission as a public
office in his Office pursuant to his power to reorganize the Office of
the President Proper.8 In such a case, the President is exercising his
delegated power to create a public office within the Office of the
President Proper. There is no dispute that the President possesses
this delegated power.

In the alternative, the President can also create the Truth

Commission as an ad hoc body to conduct a fact-finding investigation
pursuant to the Presidents inherent power to find facts as basis to
execute faithfully the law. The creation of such ad hoc fact-finding
body is indisputably necessary and proper for the President to
execute faithfully the law.

Under EO 1, the Truth Commission primarily investigates

reports of graft and corruption and recommends the appropriate
actions to be taken. Thus, Section 2 of EO 1 states that the Truth
Commission is "primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption and thereafter
submit its findings and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman." The President, Congress and the
Ombudsman are not bound by the findings and recommendations of
the Truth Commission. Neither are the parties subject of the fact-
finding investigation bound by the findings and recommendations of
the Truth Commission.

Clearly, the function of the Truth Commission is

merely investigative and recommendatory in nature. The Truth
Commission has no power to adjudicate the rights and obligations of
the persons who come before it. Nothing whatsoever in EO 1 gives
the Truth Commission quasi-judicial power, expressly or impliedly.

This Court, in striking down EO 1 creating the Truth

Commission, overrules the manifest will of the Filipino people to start
the difficult task of putting an end to graft and corruption in
government, denies the President his basic constitutional power to
determine the facts in his faithful execution of the law, and
suppresses whatever truth may come out in the purely fact-finding
investigation of the Truth Commission. This Court, in invoking the
equal protection clause to strike down a purely fact-finding
investigation, grants immunity to those who violate anti-corruption
laws and other penal laws, renders meaningless the constitutional
principle that public office is a public trust, and makes public officials
unaccountable to the people at any time.

Justice Carpio Morales

According to the ponencia, the objective of E.O. No. 1 is the
stamping out [of] acts of graft and corruption.

I differ.

The purpose of E.O. No. 1 is the gathering of needed

information to aid the President in the implementation of public
accountability laws. Briefly stated, E.O. No. 1 aims to provide data for
the President.

The purpose of E.O. No. 1 is to produce a report which, insofar

as the Truth Commission is concerned, is the end in itself.
The purpose of the report is another matter which is already outside
the control of E.O. No. 1.

Once the report containing the needed information is

completed, the Truth Commission is dissolved functus officio. At that
point, the endeavor of data-gathering is accomplished, and E.O No. 1
has served its purpose. It cannot be said, however, that it already
eradicated graft and corruption. The report would still be passed upon
by government agencies. Insofar as the Executive Department is
concerned, the report assimilates into a broader database that
advises and guides the President in law enforcement.

SEPARATE OPINION:

Chief Justice Corona

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. This principle is one of the cornerstones of
our constitutional democracy and it cannot be eroded without
endangering our government.

The power under scrutiny in this case is the creation of a public

office. It is settled that, except for the offices created by the
Constitution, the creation of a public office is primarily a legislative
function. The legislature decides what offices are suitable, necessary
or convenient for the administration of government

Considering that the President was exercising a delegated

power, his actions should have conformed to the standards set by the
law, that is, that the reorganization be in the interest of "simplicity,
economy and efficiency." Were such objectives met? They were not.
The Truth Commission clearly duplicates and supplants the functions
and powers of the Office of the Ombudsman and/or the Department
of Justice. How can the creation of a new commission with the same
duplicative functions as those of already existing offices result in
economy or a more efficient bureaucracy? Such a creation becomes
even more questionable considering that the 1987 Constitution itself
mandates the Ombudsman to investigate graft and corruption cases.

Justice Brion
Two inter-related features of the EO primarily contribute to the
resulting violations. The first is the use of the title Truth Commission,
which, as used in the EO, is fraught with hidden and prejudicial
implications beyond the seemingly simple truth that purportedly
characterizes the Commission. The second relates to the truth-telling
function of the Truth Commission under the terms of the EO.

In the simplest due process terms, the EO as a governmental

action must have a reasonable objective and must use equally
reasonable means to achieve this objective. When the EO viewed
from the prism of its title and its truth-telling function is considered a
means of achieving the objective of fighting graft and corruption, it
would be invalid if it unreasonably or oppressively affects parties,
whether they be government or private.
 The respondent's dismissive argument, to be sure, would have
been meritorious if only the name Truth Commission had not been
supported by the Commissions truth-telling function; or, if the name
"Truth Commission" were a uniquely Filipino appellation that does not
carry an established meaning under international practice and usage.
Even if it were to be claimed that the EOs use of the name is unique
because the Philippines version of the Truth Commission addresses
past graft and corruption and not violence and human rights violations
as in other countries, the name Truth Commission, however, cannot
simply be dissociated from its international usage. The term connotes
abuses of untold proportions in the past by a repressive undemocratic
regime a connotation that may be applicable to the allegations of
graft and corruption, but is incongruous when it did not arise from a
seriously troubled regime; even the present administration cannot
dispute that it assumed office in a peaceful transition of power after
relatively clean and peaceful elections.

The "Who Fears the Truth?" arguments, on the other hand,

completely miss the point of this Separate Opinion. This Opinion does
not dispute that past graft and corruption must investigated and fully
exposed; any statement to the contrary in the Dissent are unfounded
rhetoric written solely for its own partisan audience. What this Opinion
clearly posits as legally objectionable is the governments manner of
"telling;" any such action by government must be made according to
the norms and limits of the Constitution to which all departments of
government including the Executive are subject. Specifically, the
Executive cannot be left unchecked when its methods grossly violate
the Constitution. This matter is discussed in full below

Justice Bersamin
I find that the Truth Commission replicates and usurps the
duties and functions of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutionally-created quasi-
judicial body established to investigate and prosecute illegal acts and
omissions of those who serve in the Government.

A comparison between the objectives of the Office of the

Ombudsman and the Truth Commission quickly reveals that the Truth
Commission is superfluous, because it replicates or imitates the work
of the Office of the Ombudsman. The result is that the Truth
Commission can even usurp the functions, duties, and responsibilities
of the Office of the Ombudsman. That usurpation is not a desirable
result, considering that the public faith and trust in the Office of the
Ombudsman, as a constitutionally-created office imbued with specific
powers and duties to investigate and prosecute graft and corruption,
may be eroded.
Justice Perez
The Philippine Truth Commission is a defiance of the
constitutional wisdom that established the politically independent
Ombudsman for one of its reasons for being is the very campaign
battlecry of the President "kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." Not
that there is anything wrong with the political slogan. What is wrong is
the pursuit of the pledge outside the limits of the Constitution. What is
wrong is the creation by the President himself of an Ombudsman-like
body while there stands established an Ombudsman, constitutionally
created especially because of unsuccessful presidential antecedents,
and thus made independent from presidential prerogative.

If Executive Order No. 1 is allowed, there will be a violation of

Section 7 of Article XI, the essence of which is that the function and
powers (enumerated in Section 13 of Article XI) conferred on the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution cannot be removed
or transferred by law.
April 21, 2015

G.R. No. 216098

BISHOP BRODERICK S. PABILLO, DD, PABLO R. MANALAST

AS, JR., PhD, MARIA CORAZON AKOL, CONCEPCION B.
REGALADO, HECTOR A. BARRIOS, LEO Y. QUERUBIN,
AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, FELIX P. MUGA, II, PhD, ATTY.
GREGORIO T. FABROS, EVITA L. JIMENEZ, and JAIME DL
CARO, PhD, Petitioners,
- versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, EN BANC, represented
by Acting Chairperson CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and
SMARTMATIC-TIM CORPORATION, represented by Smartmatic
Asia-Pacific President CESAR FLORES, Respondents.
x----------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 216562
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
- versus
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by its acting
Chairperson ROBERT S. LIM, and SMARTMATIC-TIM
CORPORATION, Respondents.

Ponente: Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 8436, which
authorized the COMELEC "to use AES. The COMELEC published a
Request for Proposal (RFP) for the public bidding of the lease with
option to purchase of an AES. COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM
executed the Contract for the Provision of an Automated Election
System.
The COMELEC En Banc, in Resolution No. 8608, 18 resolved
to approve the report/recommendation of the COMELEC Special Bids
and Awards Committee (SBAC) dated June 3, 2009, confirming
Smartmatic-TIM - a joint venture company formed by Smartmatic
International Corporation (Smartmatic) and Total Information
Management Corporation (TIM) - as "the bidder with the 'Lowest
Calculated Responsive Bid' [LCRB] and to award the contract for the
automation of the elections on May 10, 2010 to the said joint venture.
 The COMELEC was able to implement for the first time the
AES on a nationwide scale during the May 10, 2010 Synchronized
National and Local Elections.
The COMELEC partially exercised the OTP when it purchased
920 units of PCOS machines with the corresponding
canvassing/consolidation system (CCS) for the special elections in
certain areas in Basilan, Lanao del Sur, and Bulacan. the COMELEC
received from SmartmaticTIM a proposal letter to "extend the
warranty" of the PCOS machines for three (3) years.The COMELEC's
Law Department issued a memorandum, with subject heading
"Review of the Draft Contract for the 2014 Extension to the Warranty
(Program 1)

Prior to the scheduled May 13, 2013 Synchronized National

and Local Elections, petitioners in the consolidated cases of Capalla
v. COMELEC34 (Capalla) challenged the validity and constitutionality
of Resolution No. 9376. They further prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the implementation of
the 2012 Deed of Sale, which the Court granted in a Resolution dated
April 24, 2012. Nevertheless, the Court, in a Decision dated June 13,
2012, ruled in favor of the COMELEC, finding that the latter properly
exercised its OTP, despite the extended period therefor, and,
accordingly, declared the 2012 Deed of Sale legal and valid.

The COMELEC received from SmartmaticTIM a proposal letter

to "extend the warranty" of the PCOS machines for three (3) years.
In its Resolution No. 2014-00240 dated August 13, 2014, the
COMELEC Advisory Council (CAC) recommended, among others,
the reuse of the existing technology for the upcoming 2016 Elections.
The CAC also recommended that the COMELEC seriously consider
the use of multiple or mixed technologies to promote interoperability
and encourage innovative solutions, as well as engaging one or more
secondary technologies, which shall be likewise selected through
open public bidding.

After negotiations by the parties, the contract amount was

reduced to P240,000,000.00, exclusive of VAT, and the scope of
work expanded to include all major repairs and replacement of
irreparable units, up to four percent (4%) of all inventoried PCOS
machines.

The COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM entered into the Extended

Warranty Contract (Program 1),whereby Smartmatic-TIM undertook
the following during a five (5)-month period: (a) accomplish a physical
inventory count of all the 81,896 PCOS machines with the authorized
COMELEC representatives ensuring, among others, that the serial
numbers are properly recorded and annotated in the Inventory List of
the COMELEC; ( b) complete a full diagnostic of every PCOS
machine in accordance with the Diagnostic Program; ( c) examine
each PCOS machine to determine the required refurbishment to bring
them back to working condition; (d) perform a full Preventive
Maintenance Program of every PCOS machine; ( e) perform all
repairs and replacements of the defective components; and (j)
provide replacement units for those PCOS machines that are
irreparable, up to a maximum of four percent (4%) of the total number
of PCOS machines after the inventory count by both parties. The
following were, however, excluded from the scope of work: (a) those
PCOS machines that are unavailable during the five ( 5) month period
of the Program or those units beyond the four percent (4%) cap; (b)
those cosmetic changes or refinishing of the machines or furnishing
of the machines or furnishing supplies for such purposes, or making
specification changes; and ( c) those PCOS machines, where
persons or entities other than Smartmatic TIM authorized
representative, performed maintenance or repair services, as a result
of which, further repair or maintenance is required to be done by a
Smartmatic-TIM authorized representative to restore the machines to
good working condition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
issuing Resolution No. 9922 and in subsequently entering into the
Extended Warranty Contract (Program 1) with Smartmatic-TIM.

RULING:
The court GRANTED the Petition. Accordingly, COMELEC
Resolution No. 9922 and the Extended Warranty Contract (Program
I) are hereby declared NULL and VOID.

The Manual of Procedures for the Procurement of Goods and

Services of the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB
Manual) explains that the GPRA allows the use of alternative
methods of procurement in some exceptional instances, provided: (a)
there is prior approval of the Head of the Procuring Entity on the use
of alternative methods of procurement, as recommended by the BAC;
and (b) the conditions required by law for the use of alternative
methods are present. As additional requisites, (c) the Procuring Entity
must ensure that the method chosen promotes economy and
efficiency, and (d) that the most advantageous price for the
government is obtained.
 The Extended Warranty Contract (Program 1) cannot be
validated by the mere expedient of characterizing the same as a part
of the 2009 AES Contract. The services of repair and refurbishment
cannot be procured from Smartmatic-TIM through an "extended
warranty" mode, unless this Court assents to a blatant circumvention
of the procurement law.
There are no qualms about the task of having the PCOS
machines repaired and refurbished. However, there are serious and
unignorable legal flaws about how the COMELEC intends to pursue
this undertaking. Bluntly, the COMELEC has failed to justify its
reasons for directly contracting with Smartmatic-TIM: it had not
shown that any of the conditions under Section 50, Article XVI of the
GPRA exists; its claims of impracticality were not supported by
independently verified and competent data; and lastly, its perceived
warranty extension is, in reality, just a circumvention of the
procurement law. For all these counts, the conclusion thus reached is
that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.210 As a result, its
Resolution No. 9922 and the Extended Warranty Contract (Program
1) should be stricken down, and necessarily, all amounts paid to
Smartmatic-TIM pursuant to the said contract, if any, being public
funds sourced from taxpayers money, should be returned to the
government in accordance with the procedures contained in existing
rules and regulations. Note that the disposition of these cases does
not prohibit the COMELEC from resorting to direct contracting anew
or other alternative method of procurement with any service
contractor, subject to compliance with the conditions provided in the
GPRA and all the pertinent rules and procedures.

While this Court recognizes that the COMELEC should be

given sufficient leeway in exercising its constitutional mandate to
enforce and administer all election laws, it demands equal recognition
that it is the Courts constitutional duty to see to it that all
governmental actions are legally permissible. In so doing, the Court
decides not only with pragmatism in mind, but pragmatism within the
fair bounds of law. Such is the case in examining the COMELECs
apprehensions under the lens of the procurement law, with
heightened considerations of public accountability and transparency
put to the fore. With due deference to the COMELEC, it should be
made to understand that this Court does not stand to thwart the
conduct of automated elections; but only steps in to preserve its
sanctity. After all, in a democracy, nothing is more vital than an
unimpaired vote.
 JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

"Procurement of electoral services and goods constitutes a

major part of the organization of elections in terms of planning,
costs and implementation (purchasing and distribution). Integrity and
transparency is thus essential; lack of integrity in the
purchasing system may put the legitimacy of the whole electoral
exercise at risk ."

The COMELEC's Law Department issued a memorandum, with

subject heading "Review of the Draft Contract for the 2014 Extension
to the Warranty (Program 1)
July 23, 2013

G.R. No. 199082

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, .JR., in his
capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and
the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
COMMITTEE and FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 199085

BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON.
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as COMELEC
Chairperson; RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO V. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN
ROBERT S. LIM AND AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, in their capacity as
COMELEC COMMISSIONERS; CLARO A. ARELLANO, GEORGE
C. DEE, JACINTO G. ANG, ROMEO B. FORTES AND MICHAEL D.
VILLARET, in their capacity as CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS,
RESPECTIVELY, OF THE JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE ON THE 2004 AND 2007
ELECTION FRAUD, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 199118

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairperson
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, represented
by Secretary Leila M. De Lima, JOINT DOJ-COMELEC
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, SENATOR
AQUILINO M. PIMENTEL III, and DOJ-COMELEC FACT FINDING
TEAM, Respondents.

Ponente: Justice Diosdado Peralta

 STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the

creation of a joint committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ),
which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election
offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007
elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011
creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team
on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the
Comelec. The Joint Committee and the Fact-Finding Team are
composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. Section 2 of
the Joint Order lays down the mandate of the Joint Committee.35
In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that
manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in
the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were
indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that
herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.36
After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc
adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of
electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges
against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.

PROCEEDINGS:

On October 24, 2011, the Joint Committee issued two

subpoenas against petitioners in DOJ-Comelec Case Nos. 001-2011
and 002-2011. Petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.37

35 Section 2. Mandate. The Committee shall conduct the necessary preliminary investigation on
the basis of the evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team
created and referred to in Section 4 hereof. Resolutions finding probable cause for election
offenses, defined and penalized under the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws shall
be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. For other
offenses, or those not covered by the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, the
corresponding criminal information may be filed directly with the appropriate courts.
36 Arroyo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.199118, September 18, 2012
37 Refers to the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team.
 On November 14, 2011, petitioner Mike Arroyo filed a Motion to
Defer Proceedings24 before the Joint Committee, in view of the
pendency of his petition before the Court. Petitioner Abalos, for his
part, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings (Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam),38 in view of the pendency of his petition brought before
the Court.

In an Order29 dated November 15, 2011, the Joint Committee

denied the aforesaid motions of petitioners. GMA subsequently filed a
motion for reconsideration.

On November 16, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated a

Joint Resolution which was later indorsed to the Comelec. On
November 18, 2011, after conducting a special session, the Comelec
en banc issued a Resolution approving and adopting the Joint
Resolution subject to modifications.

On even date, pursuant to the above Resolution, the Comelecs

Law Department filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasay
City, an Information against petitioner GMA, Governor Andal
Ampatuan, Sr., and Atty. Lintang H. Bedol.

On November 18, 2011, petitioner GMA filed with the RTC an

Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam. She, likewise, filed with the
Comelec a Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam.37 The RTC nonetheless
issued a warrant for her arrest which was duly served. GMA
thereafter filed a Motion for Bail which was granted.

Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of

COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before
the Supreme Court. On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the
assailed Decision,39 hence, these motions for reconsideration.

38 Abalos v. De Lima, G.R. No. 199805, September 18, 2012

39WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions and supplemental petitions are DISMISSED.
Comelec Resolution No. 9266 dated August 2, 2011, Joint Order No. 001-2011 dated August 15,
2011, and the Fact- Finding Teams Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID.
However, the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged
Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of
publication.
In view of the constitutionality of the Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in
accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.
Let the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, where the criminal
cases for electoral sabotage against petitioners GMA and Abalos are pending, proceed with
dispatch.
 ISSUES:

Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the

decisional independence of the Comelec.

RULINGS:

I. Jurisdiction of Election Offenses

The Comelecs exclusive power to investigate and prosecute
cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election
Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative
enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369.
Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting
arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent
jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of
"concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law. The
doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal
with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the
petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power
between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation
where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one
office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was
immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially
the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ).

II. Validity of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Joint

Committee.
The procedure in conducting the preliminary investigation is
governed by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure40
and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure41. Under both
Rules the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his
witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his

40Section 3 (c), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits
and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and
other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. x x x

41 Section 6 (a), Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, on the other hand, provides:
(a) If on the basis of the complaint, affidavits and the supporting evidence, the investigating officer
finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint
and shall follow the procedure prescribed in Section 8 (c) of this Rule. Otherwise, he shall issue a
subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other
supporting documents giving said respondent ten (10) days from receipt within which to submit
counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. The respondent shall have the right to
examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
defense, within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena, with the
complaint and supporting affidavits and documents.

GMA was not furnished those documents because they were

not submitted to the Joint Committee. Logically, she has no right to
examine said documents. We cannot, therefore, fault the Joint
Committee in consequently denying her motion for extension to file
counter-affidavit as there was no compelling justification for the non-
observance of the period she was earlier required to follow.

Taking into account the constitutional right to speedy

disposition of cases and following the procedures set forth in the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and the Comelec Rules of Procedure,
the Joint Committee finally reached its conclusion and referred the
case to the Comelec. The latter, in turn, performed its task and filed
the information in court. Indeed, petitioners were given the
opportunity to be heard.

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

Constitutional Law
While recognizing the Comelecs exclusive power to investigate
and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the
Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the
1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus
a legislative enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43
of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other
prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise
concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election
offenses.

Statutory Construction
The Rules use the term "shall" in requiring the respondent to
submit counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence within ten
(10) days from receipt of the subpoena. It is settled that the use of the
word "shall" which is a word of command, underscores the mandatory
character of the rule.42

42 Tan v. Link, G.R. No. 172849, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 479, 490.
October 18, 2011

G.R. No. 196271

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA,

in his personal capacity, and in representation of
MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN
ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI,
MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE
ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH SAUPI,
Petitioners,
- versus -
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, thru
SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,
PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of the President Executive
Secretary, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary of Budget, and
ROBERTO TAN, Treasurer of the Philippines,
Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 196305

BASARI D. MAPUPUNO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, PACQUITO OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as
Senate President, and FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 197221

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,

Petitioner,
- versus -
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive
Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 197280

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU

CASAN CONDING CANA, and PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO
PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN),
Petitioners,
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman,
SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity
as Treasurer of the Philippines,
Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 197282

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL,
Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 197392

LUIS BAROK BIRAOGO,

Petitioner,
- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 197454

JACINTO V. PARAS,
Petitioner,
- versus -
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------x

MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC.,

Respondents-Intervenor.

Ponente: Justice Arturo Brion

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA)
No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and refined the
basic ARMM structure. It also reset the regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.

RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to

November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No.
9054, which was successfully held on August 14, 2001. RA No.
9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the
2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections

should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next
ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular
national and local elections of the country.

RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as

House Bill No. 4146, which the House passed on March 22, 2011
with 191 (of the 285) Members voting in its favor. The Senate
adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756, on June 6, 2011. 13
(of the 23) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7,
2011, the House of Representative concurred with the Senate
amendments and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.
10153 into law.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme

Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
 PROCEEDINGS:

The consolidated cases are (a) the motion for reconsideration

filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al. in G.R. No. 196271;
(b) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel
Lagman in G.R. No. 197221; (c) the ex abundante ad cautelam
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in
G.R. No. 196305; (d) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R. No. 197282; (e) the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan
Conding Cana and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in
G.R. No. 197280; (f) the manifestation and motion filed by petitioners
Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R. No. 197280; and (g) the very
urgent motion to issue clarificatory resolution that the temporary
restraining order (TRO) is still existing and effective.

These motions assail the Court's Decision dated October 18,

2011, upholding the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No.
10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the
second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013
and recognized the Presidents power to appoint officers-in-charge
(OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of
the terms of the elected officials.

ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections?

2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate Section 26(2), Article VI of

the 1987 Constitution?

3. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 require a supermajority vote [at

least 2/3 of all members of Congress] and a plebiscite?

a. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections

constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA
No. 9054?
b. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for
amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Sections 1
and 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
corollary doctrine [prohibiting] irrepealable laws?
c. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the
creation of autonomous regions under Section 18(2), Article
X of the 1987 Constitution?
4. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs
constitutional?

RULINGS:

1. Yes, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization

of elections.

The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the

provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as
patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized
national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May,
1992 and for all the following elections.

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should

be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local
election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

2. No, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate

Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution because the
President certified on the urgency of [the enactment of] RA No.
10153.

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not

only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The
phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two
stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has
passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in
its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following
Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.

3. NO, the passage of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 DOES

NOT require a supermajority vote and a plebiscite

A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are NOT amendments to RA

No. 9054
 Neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No.
9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only
provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix
the date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for the
Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections.

B. Supermajority voting requirement [under RA No. 9054] VIOLATES

Section 16(2), Article VI for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an
irrepealable law. This 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the
Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain
the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws
it had passed.

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a

limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage
of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly
constricts the future legislators room for action and flexibility.

C. Plebiscite requirement only applies to the creation of autonomous

regions; Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 905443 unconstitutional for
excessively enlarging the plebiscite requirement in Section 18, Article
X of the Constitution.

Only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act

constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e.,
those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which
Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification
through a plebiscite.

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the
matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to
provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the
supermajority votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any
change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a substantial
amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with
these requirements.

4. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs
is constitutional

A. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional

43 Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 provides: "Any amendment to or revision of this Organic
Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days
after the approval of such amendment or revision."
 The rule of holdover can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it
cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that
it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed
under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision.

B. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in

nature.

Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the

scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13,
2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential,
congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself
has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom
that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the

Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead
at the call of the COMELEC.

Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from

RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the
President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear
constitutional basis

RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the
organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of
structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is
to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on
the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013
elections.

The legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No.
9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of
elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile
prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the
manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial
terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply
an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.

Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen

leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs
as this requirement is really a function of the appointment process;
only the elective aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of
OICs.

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

Passage of bills three-reading requirement rule

Article VI, Section 26(2) provides:

No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
September 2, 2014

G.R. No. 205357

GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT. SENATOR ALAN PETER
COMPAERO S. CAYETANO, Petitioner-Intervenor.

x----------------------------------------------x

G.R. NO. 205374

ABC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x----------------------------------------------x

G.R. NO. 205592

MANILA BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC. AND NEWSOUNDS
BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x----------------------------------------------x

G.R. NO. 205852

KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS (KBP) AND
ABS-CBN CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x----------------------------------------------x

G.R. NO. 206360

RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

Ponente: Justice Diosdado Peralta

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and
political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of
one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180)
minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation
on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs
the peoples right to suffrage as well as their right to information
relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the
forthcoming elections
 Section 9 (a) provides for an aggregate total airtime instead of
the previous per station airtime for political campaigns or
advertisements, and also required prior
COMELEC approval for candidates television and radio guestings
and appearances.

PROCEEDINGS:

Petitioners ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN), ABC

Development Corporation (ABC), GMA Network, Incorporated (
GMA), Manila Broadcasting Company, Inc. (MBC), Newsounds
Broadcasting Network, Inc. (NBN), and Radio Mindanao Network,
Inc. (RMN) are owners/operators of radio and television networks in
the Philippines, while petitioner
KapisananngmgaBrodkasterngPilipinas (KBP) is the national
organization of broadcasting companies in the Philippines
representing operators of radio and television stations and said
stations themselves. They sent their respective letters to the
COMELEC questioning the provisions of the aforementioned
Resolution, thus, the COMELEC held public hearings. Thereafter, on
February 1, 2013, respondent issued Resolution No. 9631 amending
provisions of Resolution No. 9615. Nevertheless, petitioners still
found the provisions objectionable and oppressive, hence, the
present petitions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615

44
on airtime limits violates freedom of expression, of speech and of
the press.

44 SECTION 9. Requirements and/or Limitations on the Use of Election Propaganda through

Mass Media. - All parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and
space for their election propaganda during the campaign period subject to the following
requirements and/or limitations:
a. Broadcast Election Propaganda the duration of air time that a candidate, or party may use for
their broadcast advertisements or election propaganda shall be, as follows:
For Candidates/
Registered Political
parties for a
National Elective
Position
Not more than a aggregate total of one hundred (120) minutes of television advertising, whether
appearing on national, regional, or local, free or cable television, and one hundred eighty (180)
minutes of radio advertising, whether airing on national, regional, or local radio, whether by
purchase or donation.
For Candidates/
Registered Political
parties for a Local
Elective Position
 RULING:

YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on aggregate-

based airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly
restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties
to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted
reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits leveling
the playing field does not constitute a compelling state interest
which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom
of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is
specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of
such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the

aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that
the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are
also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens
across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really
reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also
be necessary that he conveys his message through his
advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more
readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in
different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to
express himself a form of suppression of his political speech.

Not more than an aggregate total of sixty (60) minutes of television advertising, whether
appearing on national, regional, or local, free or cable television, and ninety (90) minutes of radio
advertising, whether airing on national, regional, or local radio, whether by purchase or donation.
In cases where two or more candidates or parties whose names, initials, images, brands, logos,
insignias, color motifs, symbols, or forms of graphical representations are displayed, exhibited,
used, or mentioned together in the broadcast election propaganda or advertisements, the length
of time during which they appear or are being mentioned or promoted will be counted against the
airtime limits allotted for the said candidates or parties and the cost of the said advertisement will
likewise be considered as their expenditures, regardless of whoever paid for the advertisements
or to whom the said advertisements were donated.
Appearance or guesting by a candidate on any bona fide newscast, bona fide news interview,
bona fide news documentary, if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presentation
of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary, or on-the-spot coverage of bona
fide news events, including but not limited to events sanctioned by the Commission on Elections,
political conventions, and similar activities, shall not be deemed to be broadcast election
propaganda within the meaning of this provision. To determine whether the appearance or
guesting in a program is bona fide, the broadcast stations or entities must show that: (I) prior
approval of the Commission was secured; and (2) candidates and paiiies were afforded equal
opportunities to promote their candidacy. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as
relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news
documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon
them under Sections 10 and 14 of these Rules.
Provided, further, that a copy of the broadcast advertisement contract be furnish to the
Commission thru the Education and Information Department, within five (5) days from contract
signing.
x xxx
 JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.
(Art. III, Sec. 4, CONSTITUTION)
August 19, 2014

G.R. No. 213181

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner, vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA

LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents

Ponente: Justice Jose Mendoza

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Francis Jardeleza, the incumbent Solicitor General at the time,

was included in the list of candidates for the available position as
Associate Justice following Justice Abads retirement.

However, he was informed by some Justices that Chief Justice

Maria Lourdes Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or
the unanimity rule against him. Generally, the rule is that an
applicant is included in the shortlist when he obtains the vote of at
least a majority of all the members of the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC). But when Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 is invoked because
an applicants integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is
required. Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available on
June 30, 2014 before the JBC during which he would be informed of
the objections to his integrity.

Jardeleza wrote a petition asking the Supreme Court to direct

the JBC to give Jardeleza a written notice and sworn written
statements of his oppositors or any documents in the JBC hearings,
and to disallow the Chief Justice from participating in the voting
process for nominees.

During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio
appeared and disclosed a confidential information which made the
Chief Justice characterize Jardelezas integrity as dubious.

Jardelezas integrity was put into question due to the chosen

manner of framing the governments position in a case and how this
could have been detrimental to the national interest, as well as his
past extra-marital affair and alleged acts of insider trading.
 PROCEEDINGS:

Jardeleza demanded that the Chief Justice execute a sworn

statement specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right
to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He also requested
deferment of the JBC proceedings, as the Supreme Court has yet to
decide in his petition.

However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to

vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist. The JBC
released the shortlist of four nominees, although there were actually
five nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one nominee
could not be included because of the invocation of the unanimity
rule.

Jardeleza filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under

Rule 65 with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order to compel the
JBC to include him in the list of nominees on the grounds that the
JBC and the Chief Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion in
excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes
to qualify for the position.

ISSUES:

The issue in the case bar are whether or not:

(1) the court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the
subject petition for certiorari and mandamus
(2) the issues raised against Jardeleza befit questions or
challenges on integrity as contemplated under Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009;
(3) the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in
JBC proceedings; and
(4) Jardeleza may be included in the shortlist of nominees.

RULING:

The Supreme Court granted the petition.

In the first issue, the Court held that it can assume jurisdiction
and give due course over the case. Under Section 8, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution, it states that:
 Section 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice
as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative
of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector.

As expressly stated above, the Supreme Court has supervisory

authority over the JBC, wherein it can oversee whether the rules and
procedures are followed by the latter.

The Court agrees with JBC that a writ of mandamus is not

available it cannot compel the latter for the performance of a
discretionary duty.

However, petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question

the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even
if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.45

As to the second issue, the Court ruled that the issue regarding
the stand that Jardeleza took in a legal dispute do not befit questions
or challenges on integrity as contemplated under Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009. The Chief Justices disagreement with the legal stand of
Jardeleza is not an integrity issue since there was no proven
treacherous intent to defeat the countrys interests or to betray the
Constitution. However, the alleged extra-marital affair and insider
trading posed serious problem as these question the morality of the
petitioner. As the Court has held: immorality has not been confined to
sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is
willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to
opinions of respectable members of the communityand an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.46

In the third issue, while it is true that the JBC proceedings are
sui generis and impressed with discretion, it does not mean that an
applicants access to the rights afforded under the due process
clause may be brushed aside.

The Court recognizes the unique and special nature of JBC

proceedings, nevertheless, the right to be heard and to explain ones
self is still availing. In cases where an objection to an applicants

45Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014

46Judge Florencia D. Sealana-Abbu v. Doreza Laurenciana-Hurao and Pauleen Subido, 558
Phil. 24 (2007)
qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither
contradicts the fulfillment of the JBCs duty to recommend. This does
not tantamount to an encroachment on its discretion in the
nomination process but, actually, an adherence to the precepts of
due process that support and enrich the exercise of its discretion.
When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the
objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented
with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding
the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of
information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply
the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an
applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged
complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an
exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

Jardeleza was merely asked to attend the meeting without any

notification that he would be subjected to the inquiries regarding the
allegations. He was caught by surprise and such manner clearly did
not afford him reasonable sufficient time to intelligently defend himself
although he was given opportunity to be heard as he was physically
present to answer.

Lastly, the Court was compelled to rule that Jardeleza should

have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the
vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose
not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, but
from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the
basic tenets of due process.

Although Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, this

does not warrant failure to observe the minimum requirements of due
process.

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

Judicial Review
The Supreme Court has the power to review whether or not the
JBC committed grave abuse of discretion under its expanded
jurisdiction as provided in the 1987 Constitution.

Due Process
Due process is available, thus, demandable as a matter of right
in the JBC proceedings. The sui generis character of such
proceeding is not a blanket authority to do away with due process.
 DISSENTING OPINION:

Justice Leonen
Justice Leonen voted to deny the petition. In his dissent, he
pointed that the supervisory power of this court over the Judicial and
Bar Council is mainly administrative. The Court cannot dictate how
such body would decide in the performance of its function.

The remedy of certiorari does not lie in non-judicial or non-

quasi-judicial functions. The JBC is neither a judicial nor a quasi-
judicial in nature. It is a constitutional body that screens and
recommends to the President those who are fit to be appointed as
members of the Supreme Court. He, however, agrees that remedy of
mandamus does not lie to compel a discretionary act.

He opined that due process clause may only be invoked if the

petitioner has proved that the government actuations affect, without a
doubt, a vested right protected by the Constitution. Verily, Jardeleza
has no vested right to be nominated to a judicial position. The
essence of procedural due process is simply the right to be heard and
Jardeleza was given the opportunity to do so, but refused to answer
the allegations since these are not in writing.

SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Peralta
Justice Peralta, like Justice Leonardo-De Castro and Justice
Brion,concurred that the Jardelezas right to due process was violated
as he was not given reasonable opportunity to intelligently answer the
allegations against him.

Justice Leonardo-De Castro

Justice Leonardo-De Castro affirmed that Jardelezas right to
due process was violated as he was not given reasonable opportunity
to be heard. It is not enough that one was heard, but one must be
given with sufficient time to be notified of the allegations and to
answer such objections. She also stated that the allegations made
must be supported by evidence and not by mere hearsay.

Justice Brion
Justice Brion supported the Courts decision that it can exercise
its power of supervision over the JBC and it is also its duty to
determine grave abuse of discretion under the expanded jurisdiction
as provided in the 1987 Constitution. He also affirmed that there was
a violation of due process as found in the main decision and other
separate concurring opinions as he was not given a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. He opined that the JBC cannot conduct its
proceedings to the extent that it ignores and violates the fundamental
rights of an individual.
January 21, 2015

G.R. No. 205728

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST

REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF
IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY,
ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents

Ponente: Justice Marvic Leonen

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The Diocese of Bacolod posted two tarpaulins on the front walls

of the San Sebastian Cathedral within public view. Each tarpaulin
was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size.

The first tarpaulin contained the message IBASURA RH Law

referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No.
10354. The second tarpaulin, the subject of this case, contained the
heading Conscience Vote and classified the electoral candidates
into two, namely: Team Patay for those who voted for the passing of
Republic Act No. 10354 or RH Law, and Team Buhay for those who
voted against it.

The Election Officer of Bacolod notified the petitioners that the

second tarpaulin should be removed as it purported to be an election
propaganda. Consequently, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) issued an order prompting for the removal of the
tarpaulin for being oversized.

The Diocese assailed the said order of the COMELEC since it

is in violation of their constitutional right to freedom of expression and
of the separation of the state and the church.

PROCEEDINGS:

The petitioners initiated this case through petition for certiorari

and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order.

They question the respondents notice dated February 22, 2013

and letter issued on February 27, 2013, and pray that:

(1) the petition be given due course;

(2) a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining respondents from further proceeding
in enforcing their orders for the removal of the Team Patay tarpaulin;
and
(3) after notice and hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the
questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void, and
permanently restraining respondents from enforcing them or any
other similar order.

The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining

respondents from enforcing the notice and letter, and set the
schedule for the oral arguments.

The respondents filed their comment and argued that:

(1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court filed before this court is not the proper remedy to question
the notice and letter of the respondents; and

(2) the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to regulation by

COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of
the Constitution. The assailed issuances are valid and constitutional.

ISSUES:

The issues in this case are whether or not:

(1) the COMELEC has the power to regulate the expression made by
the Diocese of Bacolod.

(2) the petitioners right to freedom of speech and expression were

violated.

(3) the regulation applied by the COMELEC is a content-neutral one.

RULING:

The Supreme Court granted the petition.

It was ruled that the COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate

expressions made by private citizens. The COMELEC considered the
tarpaulin as a campaign material in their issuances. However, the
provisions under the Constitution, the Fair Election Act, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 regulating the posting of campaign
materials only apply to candidates and political parties, and
petitioners are neither of the two. There was no allegation that the
Diocese coordinated with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin
regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted the
tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law.

The tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named

candidates and political parties, but it does not necessarily mean it is
an election propaganda, since it was not paid for or specifically
posted for the benefit of any candidate or political party.

As to the second issue, the Court ruled that the regulation is a

violation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech.

The tarpaulins primarily advocate a stand on a social issue. The

election or non-election of a candidate is a cause that is only
incidental to such advocacy. The tarpaulins consisted a satire of
political parties and might be exaggerated, however, these pertained
to an opinion expressed by the Diocese, a kind of expression
protected by our Constitution. It is an expression designed to invite
attention, cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It might be
motivated by the interpretation of Diocese of their ecclesiastical duty,
but their parishioners actions would have very real secular
consequence.

The third issue is answered in the negative. The regulation is

content-based restraint.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions

based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech; while
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of
the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the size limitations during elections hit at a
core part of expression as the content of the tarpaulin is not easily
divorced from the size of its medium.

Applying the test for content-neutral regulation of the

questioned acts of COMELEC must fail as it will not pass the three
requirements for evaluating such restraints on freedom of speech. A
content-neutral government regulation is sufficiently justified:

(1) if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;

(2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;

(3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free

expression; and
(4) if the incident restriction on alleged freedom of speech &
expression is no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.

On the first requisite, it is not within the constitutional powers of

the COMELEC to regulate the tarpaulin since it is a protected speech
by the petitioners who are non-candidates. On the second
requirement, not only must the governmental interest be important or
substantial, it must also be compelling as to justify the restrictions
made. The third requisite is likewise lacking as the size regulation is
not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the maximum
size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective the Dioceses message
and violate their right to exercise freedom of expression. As to the
fourth requirement, the restriction in this case is a strong deterrent to
further the speech by the people. Given the stature of petitioners and
their message, there are indicators that this will cause a "chilling
effect" on robust discussion during elections.

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

Freedom of Expression
A political opinion voiced through posters or other similar
means by a private individual or entity enjoys a high degree of
protection. It is not under the definition of election propaganda,
unless it is a sponsored one. Imposing a fixed-size requirement upon
such expression is a content-based restraint that bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity.

DISSENTING OPINION:
Justice Brion
In the dissent of Justice Brion, he opined that the subject poster
falls squarely in the definition of the generic term election
propaganda as stated in Section 3 of RA 9006 and Section 6 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, and it is well within the regulated
election propaganda in RA 9006 and COMELEC Resolution No. 9615
since it was posted during the campaign period in front of the
Cathedral within public view, wherein the subject poster contained the
heading "conscience vote" and two lists of senators and members of
the House of Representatives. The first list contained names of
legislators who voted against the passage of the Reproductive Health
Law, denominated as Team Buhay. The second list contained names
of legislators who voted for the RH Laws passage, denominated as
"Team Patay." The "Team Buhay" list contained a check mark, while
the Team Patay list an X mark. All the legislators named in both lists
were candidates during the 2013 national elections and it did not
appear to have been sponsored or paid for by any candidate.
 To his mind, the limitations on the size involve a content-neutral
regulation and passed the test on such restriction since the Court has
long settled that the time, place, and manner of speech may be
subject to Government regulation. Since the size of a poster involves
a time, place and manner regulation, then it may be the proper
subject of a government regulation.

SEPARATE OPINION:

Justice Carpio
Justice Carpio concurred in the main decision, however, his
opinion was grounded on the fact that the notices, and the
administrative and statutory provisions on which these are based are
content-neutral regulations of general applicability repugnant to the
Free Speech Clause. He opined that it was apt to strike down not
only the COMELEC notices but also Section 6(c) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615, dated 15 January 2013 (Resolution 9615), the
regulatory basis for the COMELEC notices, and Section 3.3 of
Republic Act No. 9006 (RA 9006), the statutory basis for Resolution
9615, as content-neutral regulations may also fail the constitutionality
test if the incidental restriction on freedom is greater than is essential
to the furtherance of the preferred government interest.

He opined that Section 3.3 of RA 9006 and Section 6(c) of

Resolution 9615 are classic example of content-neutral regulations
that violate the freedom of speech by restricting the manner by which
the speech is relayed although the content is not. The consequent
effect of limiting the size of the materials is that the placing of the
posters become difficult as it might tend to become illegible, and such
restriction on campaign speech appears to be "greater than is
essential" to advance the important government interests of
minimizing election spending and ensuring orderly elections

Justice Perlas-Bernabe
Justice Perlas-Bernabe concurred with the decision, but
expressed disagreement that the restriction is a content-based one.
Like Justice Carpio, she opined that the restriction is a content-
neutral one and, thus, the proper test to be applied is whether a
substantial government interest is required for its validity.

In her view, the COMELEC issuances do not advance an

important or substantial governmental interest so as to warrant the
restriction of free speech. The materials cannot be classified as the
usual election propaganda directly endorsing a particular campaign.
More so, although these materials were open to the publics view,
these were posted in a private property by the Diocese.
October 23, 2012

G.R. No. 201112

ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA, OMAR SOLITARIO ALI
and MARY ANNE L. SUSANO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 201121

SOLIDARITY FOR SOVEREIGNITY (S4S) represented by Ma.
Linda Olaguer; RAMON PEDROSA, BENJAMIN PAULINO SR.,
EVELYN CORONEL, MA. LINDA OLAGUER MONTAYRE, and
NELSON T. MONTAYRE, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman,
Commissioner SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 201127

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, BISHOP BRODERICK S. PABILLO,
SOLITA COLLAS MONSOD, MARIA CORAZON MENDOZA ACOL,
FR. JOSE DIZON, NELSON JAVA CELIS, PABLO R.
MANALASTAS, GEORGINA R. ENCANTO and ANNA LEAH E.
COLINA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SMARTMATIC TIM
CORPORATION, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 201413

TANGGULANG DEMOKRASYA (TAN DEM), INC., EVELYN L.
KILA YKO, TERESITA D. BALTAZAR, PILAR L. CALDERON and
ELITA T. MONTILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SMARTMATIC-TIM
CORPORATION, Respondents.

Ponente: Justice Diosdado Peralta

 STATEMENT OF FACTS:

On July 10, 2009, the COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM entered

into a Contract for the Provision of an Automated Election System for
the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections,(AES
Contract). The contract between the COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM
was one of lease of the AES with option to purchase (OTP) the
goods listed in the contract. In said contract, the COMELEC was
given until December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the option. In
September 2010, the COMELEC partially exercised its OTP 920 units
of PCOS machines with corresponding canvassing/consolidation
system (CCS) for the special elections in certain areas in the
provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Bulacan. In a letter dated
December 18, 2010, Smartmatic-TIM, through its Chairman Flores,
proposed a temporary extension of the option period on the
remaining PCOS machines until March 31, 2011, waiving the storage
costs and covering the maintenance costs. The COMELEC did not
exercise the option within the extended period. Several extensions
were given for the COMELEC to exercise the OTP until its final
extension on March 31, 2012.

On March 29, 2012, the COMELEC issued a Resolution

resolving to accept Smartmatic-TIMs offer to extend the period to
exercise the OTP until March 31, 2012 and to authorize Chairman
Brillantes to sign for and on behalf of the COMELEC the Agreement
on the Extension of the OTP Under the AES Contract (Extension
Agreement). COMELEC again issued a Resolution resolving to
approve the Deed of Sale between the COMELEC and Smartmatic-
TIM to purchase the latters PCOS machines to be used in the
upcoming May 2013 elections and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to
sign the Deed of Sale for and on behalf of the COMELEC. The Deed
of Sale was forthwith executed.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the COMELEC

Resolutions on the grounds that the option period provided for in the
AES contract had already lapsed; that the extension of the option
period and the exercise of the option without competitive public
bidding contravene the provisions of RA 9184; and that the
COMELEC purchased the machines in contravention of the
standards laid down in RA 9369. On the other hand, respondents
argue on the validity of the subject transaction based on the grounds
that there is no prohibition either in the contract or provision of law for
it to extend the option period; that the OTP is not an independent
contract in itself, but is a provision contained in the valid and existing
AES contract that had already satisfied the public bidding
requirements of RA 9184; and that exercising the option was the
most advantageous option of the COMELEC.
 ISSUE:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC in
issuing the assailed Resolutions and in executing the assailed
Extension Agreement and Deed.

RULING:

NO. There was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the
assailed Resolutions and in executing the assailed Extension
Agreement and Deed.
.
A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would
show that the parties are given the right to amend the contract which
may include the period within which to exercise the option. There is,
likewise, no prohibition on the extension of the period, provided that
the contract is still effective. The COMELEC still retains P50M of the
amount due Smartmatic-TIM as performance security, which
indicates that the AES contract is still effective and not yet
terminated. Consequently, pursuant to Article 19 of the contract, the
provisions thereof may still be amended by mutual agreement of the
parties provided said amendment is in writing and signed by the
parties. Considering, however, that the AES contract is not an
ordinary contract as it involves procurement by a government agency,
the rights and obligations of the parties are governed not only by the
Civil Code but also by RA 9184. A winning bidder is not precluded
from modifying or amending certain provisions of the contract bidded
upon. However, such changes must not constitute substantial or
material amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the
contract and would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the
opportunity to bid on the same terms.

The conclusions held by the Court in Power Sector Assets and

Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) v. Pozzolanic
Philippines Incorporated and Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc., (PIATCO) cannot be applied in the present case.
First, Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right that was not
previously available to the other bidders. The bidders were apprised
that aside from the lease of goods and purchase of services, their
proposals should include an OTP the subject goods. Second, the
amendment of the AES contract is not substantial. The approved
budget for the contract was P11,223,618,400.00 charged against the
supplemental appropriations for election modernization. Bids were,
therefore, accepted provided that they did not exceed said amount.
The competitive public bidding conducted for the AES contract was
sufficient. A new public bidding would be a superfluity. Lastly, the
amendment of the AES contract is more advantageous to the
COMELEC and the public because the P7,191,484,739.48 rentals
paid for the lease of goods and purchase of services under the AES
contract was considered part of the purchase price. For the
COMELEC to own the subject goods, it was required to pay only
P2,130,635,048.15. If the COMELEC did not exercise the option, the
rentals already paid would just be one of the government expenses
for the past election and would be of no use to future elections.

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:
A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending
certain provisions of the contract bidded upon. However, such
changes must not constitute substantial or material amendments that
would alter the basic parameters of the contract and would constitute
a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same
terms.
G.R. No. 221697

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221698-700

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS
AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.

Ponente: Justice Jose Perez

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

On September 3, 1968, Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) found the

petitioner abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of
Jaro, Iloilo. Thereafter, Edgardo passed on to his relative, Emiliano
Militar (Emiliano), the parental care and custody over the petitioner.

On September 6, 1968, Emiliano reported and registered

petitioner as a foundling at the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City. Petitioner was then named as Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar47, as also appearing in her Foundling Certificate and Certificate
of Live Birth.

In 1973, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.

Fernando Poe, Jr.; Poe for brevity) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a.
Susan Roces; Roces for brevity) adopted the petitioner, and changed
the latters name to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe48, upon the
orders of the court.

In 1988, petitioner left for the United States of America (U.S.) to

pursue her studies. In 1991, she graduated from Boston College in
Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts
degree in Political Studies. In the same year, petitioner married
Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a holder of
both Philippine and American citizenships, in San Juan City, Metro

47 Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700, pp. 15-16; COMELEC First Division Resolution
dated 11 December 2015 in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139
(DC), p. 2.
48 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1 at 22.
Manila. The couple flew back to the U.S. two days after their wedding
to settle there.

On October 18, 2001, petitioner became a naturalized

American citizen.

On April 8, 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines to

support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections and returned to the U.S. thereafter or on July 2004.

On December 13, 2004, petitioner flew back to the Philippines

due to her father who went into a coma and eventually died. The
untimely demise of her father became the compelling reason for her
and her family in deciding to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines.

On May 24, 2005, petitioner came home to the Philippines for

good. Her three (3) children immediately followed while her husband
was left in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to
arrange the sale of their family home there.

On July 7, 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
922549 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
She filed a sworn petition with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three minor children and these were
eventually granted. Subsequently, petitioner also executed an
Affidavit of

Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and

Renunciation of American Citizenship.

On October 6, 2010, petitioner was appointed as Chairperson

of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB) by former President Benigno S. Aquino III.

On July 12, 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice

Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the United States." On that day, she

49 Section 5, R.A. No. 9225 states:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xx xx
3. Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office:
Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
xx xx
accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul
wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB
Chairperson on October 21, 2010 with the intent, among others, of
relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire,
the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S.,
specifically in the Philippines, from September 3, 1968 to July 29,
1991 and from May 2005 to present.

On December 9, 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to

petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States"
effective October 21, 2010.

On October 2, 2012, the petitioner filed with the Commission on

Elections (COMELEC) her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6
months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before
May 13, 2013." Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and
was proclaimed Senator on May 16, 2013.

On October 15, 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the

Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. The petitioner attached to
her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship"
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on
October 14, 2015. This triggered the filing of several cases against
her before the COMELEC contending the facts stated in her COC, to
wit:

1. that the petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen; and

2. that the petitioners residence in the Philippines up to the

day before the May 9, 2016 elections would be ten years
and eleven months.

PROCEEDINGS:

For the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697

On October 16, 2015, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a

petition to deny due course or cancel the petitioners COC before the
COMELEC which was raffled to its Second Division. Elamparo
contended the presence of material misrepresentation when
petitioner stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016
Elections.
 On December 1, 2015, the COMELEC Second Division
promulgated a Resolution*** finding that petitioner's COC contained
material representations which are false, granting the petition filed by
Elamparo and ordering the cancellation of the petitioners COC.

On December 23, 2015, the COMELEC En Banc denied the

Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner as regards the
December 1, 2015 Resolution.

For the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700

Three separate petitions were filed before the COMELEC by

Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras), and
Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner, which were
consolidated and raffled to the COMELEC First Division.

The petition filed by Tatad aimed at the petitioners

disqualification under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure50, as candidate for the 2016 Presidential Elections. Tatad
alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to
qualify her for the Presidency.

The petition filed by Valdez aimed to deny due course or cancel

the COC of petitioner, and alleged that petitioners repatriation under
R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born
citizen. He advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who
are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine
citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-born
citizens.

The petition51 filed by Contreras limited the attack to the

residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President
should be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-
year period of residency required for said candidacy and that she

50Section 1 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, states:

Rule 25 - Disqualification of Candidates
Section 1. Grounds. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party, is
declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a
combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.

51 Contreras' petition is a petition for cancellation of Grace Poe's COC under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code which states that:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal
resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
by May 9, 2016. Contreras contended that the reckoning period for
computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from
July 18, 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship was approved by the Bureau of Immigration.

On December 11, 2015, the COMELEC First Division

promulgated a Resolution52, ruling that petitioner is not a natural-born
citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency
requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in
her COC when she declared therein that she has been a resident of
the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
as of the day of the elections on May 9, 2016. The COMELEC First
Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal

of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On December 23, 2015,
the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner instituted the petitions for certiorari seeking the

issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo
ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

On December 28, 2015, temporary restraining orders were

issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives
from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further
orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of
the two petitions filed by petitioner in its of January 12, 2016
Resolution. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.

ISSUES:

The issues in this case are:

1. Whether or not the petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen;

2. Whether or not the petitioner committed false material

representation in her COC;

52The 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division was concurred in by
Commissioners Louie Tito F. Guia and Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon. Presiding
Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim issued a Separate Dissenting Opinion.
 3. Whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due
course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made
in the certificate a false material representation; and
4. Whether or not the COMELEC can decide the qualification
or lack thereof of petitioner as a presidential candidate

RULINGS:

COMELEC

Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697

On December 1, 2015, the COMELEC Second Division
promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed for the
purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the Philippines
in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections, contained material
representations which are false thus, ordering the cancellation of the
COC.

The COMELEC subsequently denied the Motion for

Reconsideration filed by petitioner relating to the said Resolution.

Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700

On December 11, 2015, the COMELEC First Division held that
petitioner is not qualified for the elective position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines. It ruled that petitioner is not a natural-
born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency
requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in
her COC when she declared therein that she has been a resident of
the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
as of the day of the elections on May 9, 2016.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal

of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution which the COMELEC En
Banc eventually denied.

SUPREME COURT

The Court granted the petitions for certiorari filed by the

petitioner and ordered to annul and set aside the previous COMELEC
Resolutions, to wit:

1. Resolution dated December 1, 2015 rendered through its Second

Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares;
2. Resolution dated December 11, 2015, rendered through its First
Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent;

3. Resolution dated December 23, 2015 of the Commission En Banc,

upholding the December 1, 2015 Resolution of the Second Division;
and

4. Resolution dated December 23, 2015 of the Commission En Banc,

upholding the December 11, 2015 Resolution of the First Division.

The Court held that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction with the latters procedure
and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions
emanated from. The Court declared that petitioner is a qualified
candidate for President in the May 9, 2016 National Elections.

Issue on citizenship

The Court held that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino based on three

foundations:
1. circumstantial evidence
2. legislation; and
3. generally accepted principles of International Law

Circumstantial Evidence

It further declared that petitioner's blood relationship with a

Filipino citizen is demonstrable and that there is more than sufficient
evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a
natural-born Filipino.

One proof of circumstantial evidence is the fact that the Solicitor

General offered official Statistics from the Philippine Statistics office
that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the
Philippines was 15,985. While the Filipinos born in the country were
more than 10 Million. On this basis, there is a 99% chance that the
child born in the Philippines would be a Filipino which in turn, would
indicate more than ample probability that Poes parents are Filipinos.

The facts also state that petitioner was abandoned in a Roman

Catholic Church in Jaro, Iloilo a municipality with Filipinos
comprising the great majority of its population. Thus, there is an
overwhelming possibility that the parents of the petitioner are
Filipinos, and so is she.

The petitioners physical attributes also prove that she has typical
Filipino features: as to her height, nasal bridge, eyes, shape of her
face, and color of her hair.

Legislation

Foundlings are, as a class, natural-born citizens. While the

1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language that would definitely exclude foundlings either.
There was no intent or language that would permit discrimination
against foundlings. Moreover, previous and present Constitutions
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that

foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption
confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a
Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws
is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to
family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are
binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have
jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino.

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the
"Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino
Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the
"Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and
include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.

Presumptions on the paternity and filiation53 are based on the

provisions in the Family Code of the Philippines. Having such
presumptions, the burden of proof was on private respondents to
show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents
should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her
admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her
because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents
were Filipinos.

53Article 163 to 182, Title VI of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of
the Philippines, which took effect on August 4, 1988.
Generally accepted principles of International Law

Foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born

citizenship supported by treaties and the general principles of
international law. The Philippines may not be a signatory to some of
the treaties but it adheres to the customary rule to presume
foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is
found.

The Court also interpreted the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights ("UDHR") as part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State. Article 15 thereof states:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the

right to change his nationality.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the

Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the
following obligations on our country:

Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have
the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as
far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her
parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in

accordance with their national law and their obligations under the
relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the
child would otherwise be stateless.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof
provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race,
colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or
birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required by his
status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall

have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate
the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child
is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and
it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present
naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and
R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least
eighteen (18) years old.

Issue on residence

The Court held that petitioner's claim that she will have been a
resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day before
the 2016 elections, is true.

When taken altogether, the evidence of petitioner is

overwhelming and leads to no other conclusion that she decided to
permanently abandon her U.S. residence. This was manifested
through the acts of selling the house, taking the children from U.S.
schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S.
Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating
excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S.
employment right after selling the U.S. house, and permanently
relocating to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence
here on 24 May 2005. Petitioner even secured her T.I.N and enrolled
her children in Philippine schools. Petitioner bought property here,
constructed their residence, and after settling all projects and affairs
abroad, her husband got employed here. With her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when
petitioner returned on May 24, 2005 it was for good.

Issue on false material representation

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten

(10) years and eleven (11) months by May 9, 2016 in her 2015 COC
was false because she put six (6) years and six ( 6) months as
"period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for
Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a
Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the
COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012
COC and the 2015 COC as false.

In her verified pleadings, petitioner claimed to have

misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of
residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She
reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when
the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines.
 In 2015, she was advised by her lawyers that residence could be
counted from May 25, 2005.

The COMELEC admittedly disregarded the evidence that

petitioner actually and physically returned here on May 24, 2005 not
because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position
that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation
under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the
fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here
to stay permanently, on May 24, 2005. When she claimed to have
been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could
do so in good faith.

It was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let

the case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to
consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC
for Senator. This contention of false representation was definitely
negated by the overwhelming evidence presented by the petitioner
which the COMELEC evidently ignored since it focused merely on the
declaration of petitioner in her COC. The Court held that such should
not be the case.

Issue on COMELECs discretion

The issue before the COMELEC of whether or not the COC of

petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive
ground" that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the
discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue
of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this
case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper
authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation
case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

The Court cited the provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2 of the

1987 Constitution that state the powers and functions of COMELEC
and that, not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the
exactitude of the following:

a. provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that
the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members; and
b. the provisions of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which
provides that the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
 of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose.

The Court emphasized that while the said tribunals which have
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the
Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives was made clear by the Constitution, there is no such
provision for candidates for these positions.

Thus, there is an absence of an authorized proceeding for

determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that,
as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a
declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the
candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law
or the Constitution.

It was further stressed that Rule 25 and Rule 23 do not

allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the
COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of
qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding
before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior
determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or
by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.

Thus, if a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior

finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification "provided by
law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be
cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations
regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding
that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the
necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be
found.

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

1. Foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. There is no

restrictive language in the Constitution which would definitely exclude
foundlings as citizens.

In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court held that:

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the

fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.

There was no intent or language that would permit

discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all
three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of
the laws. Likewise, domestic laws on adoption support the principle
that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption
confers citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the adoptee must be
Filipino in the first place to be adopted. Recent legislation all
expressly refer to Filipino children and include foundlings as among
Filipino children who may be adopted.

2. Poes repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born

citizenship.

A natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine nationality

will be restored to his former status as natural born Filipino after
repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc).

3. The overwhelming evidence presented by the petitioner must be

given more weight and importance than the facts stated in her COC
since the former evidently overrule the latter. It is erroneous on the
part of COMELEC to merely rely on the facts submitted in petitioners
COC without considering the substantial evidence presented by
petitioner as regards her residence.

DISSENTING OPINION:

Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio

While Justice Carpio agrees that there is no dispute that

petitioner is a Filipino citizen, he contends that she, however, has
failed to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident
of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the
May 2016 elections. Petitioner is not eligible to run for President of
the Republic of the Philippines for lack of the essential requirements
of citizenship and residency under Section 2, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution54. Petitioner's certificate of candidacy (COC), wherein

54 This provision reads:

SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the
election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.
she stated that she is qualified for the position of President, contains
false material representations, and thus, must be cancelled.
Petitioner, not being a natural-born Filipino citizen, is also a nuisance
candidate whose COC can motu proprio be cancelled by the
COMELEC under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

COMELEC Jurisdiction

Justice Carpio highlighted the provisions of Section 2(1), Article IX-C

of the Constitution that vest in the COMELEC the power, among
others, to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, x x x." The initial screening of the
qualifications of all candidates lies within this specific power.
In Tecson v. COMELEC55, involving the issue of Fernando Poe, Jr.'s
citizenship, Justice Carpio dissented and discussed the COMELEC's
jurisdiction, to wit:

x x x. Under Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the

COMELEC has the power and function to "[E]nforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The
initial determination of who are qualified to file certificates of
candidacies with the COMELEC clearly falls within this all-
encompassing constitutional mandate of the COMELEC. The conduct
of an election necessarily includes the initial determination of who are
qualified under existing laws to run for public office in an election.
Otherwise, the COMELEC's certified list of candidates will be
cluttered with unqualified candidates making the conduct of elections
unmanageable. For this reason, the COMELEC weeds out every
presidential election dozens of candidates for president who are
deemed nuisance candidates by the COMELEC.

Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the Constitution also empowers the

COMELEC to "[D]ecide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections x x x. " The power to decide "all
questions affecting elections" necessarily includes the power to
decide whether a candidate possesses the qualifications required by
law for election to public office. This broad constitutional power and
function vested in the COMELEC is designed precisely to avoid any
situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without any legal
remedy. If one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen,
like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the COMELEC is
certainly not powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such
candidate. There is no need to wait until after the elections before
such candidate may be disqualified.

55 468 Phil. 421, 624-642 (2004).

Clearly, pursuant to its constitutional mandate, the COMELEC can
initially determine the qualifications of all candidates and disqualify
those found lacking any of such qualifications before the conduct of
the elections. In fact, the COMELEC is empowered to motu
proprio cancel COCs of nuisance candidates.

On "Natural-Born Citizens"

The term "natural-born citizen" was first discussed by the framers of

the 1935 Constitution in relation to the qualifications of the President
and Vice-President. In particular, Delegate Roxas elaborated on this
term, explaining that a natural-born citizen is a "citizen by birth" - a
person who is a citizen by reason of his or her birth and not by
operation of law. Delegate Roxas explained:

Delegate Roxas. - Mr. President, the phrase, 'natural-born citizen,'

appears in the Constitution of the United States; but the authors say
that this phrase has never been authoritatively interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States in view of the fact that there has
never been raised the question of whether or not an elected
President fulfilled this condition. The authors are uniform in the fact
that the words, 'natural-born citizen,' means a citizen by birth, a
person who is a citizen by reason of his birth, and not by
naturalization or by a further declaration required by law for his
citizenship. In the Philippines, for example, under the provisions of
the article on citizenship which we have approved, all those born of a
father who is a Filipino citizen, be they persons born in the Philippines
or outside, would be citizens by birth or 'natural-born.'

And with respect to one born of a Filipino mother but of a foreign

father, the article which we approved about citizenship requires that,
upon reaching the age of majority, this child needs to indicate the
citizenship which he prefers, and if he elects Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority, then he shall be considered a
Filipino citizen. According to this interpretation, the child of a Filipino
mother with a foreign father would not be a citizen by birth, because
the law or the Constitution requires that he make a further declaration
after his birth. Consequently, the phrase, 'natural-born citizen,' as it is
used in the English text means a Filipino citizen by birth, regardless
of where he was born.

Justice Carpio stressed that it was the intent of the framers of the
1935 Constitution to refer to natural-born citizens as only those who
were Filipino citizens by the mere fact of being born to fathers who
were Filipino citizens -nothing more and nothing less. He reiterated
that, under the 1935 Constitution, only children whose fathers were
Filipino citizens were natural-born Filipino citizens. Those who were
born of alien fathers and Filipino mothers were not considered
 natural-born Filipino citizens, despite the fact that they had a blood
relation to a Filipino parent. Since a natural-born citizen is a citizen
by birth who need not perform any act to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship, then those born of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers and who had to elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, an overt act to perfect citizenship, were not considered
natural-born Filipino citizens. Those whose parents are neither
Filipino citizens or are both unknown, such as in the case of
foundlings, cannot be considered natural born Filipino citizens.

Justice Carpio reiterated that natural-born Filipino citizens who

have renounced Philippine citizenship and pledged allegiance to a
foreign country have become aliens, and can reacquire Philippine
citizenship, just like other aliens, only if "naturalized in accordance
with law." Otherwise, a natural-born Filipino citizen who
has absolutely renounced and abjured allegiance to the
Philippines and pledged sole allegiance to the United States,
undertaking to bear arms against any foreign country, including the
Philippines, when required by U.S. law56, could still become the
Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines by
performing a simple act taking an oath of allegiance before a
Philippine public official to reacquire natural-born Philippine
citizenship. The framers of the Constitution, and the Filipino people
who ratified the Constitution, could not have intended
such an anomalous situation. For this reason, this Court should one
day revisit the doctrine laid down in Bengson III v. HRET57.

Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo

Justice del Castillo contends that the Comelec did not gravely
abuse its discretion or exercise its judgment in a whimsical or
capricious manner as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ordering the cancellation of and denying due course to petitioner's
2015 COC.

56 The oath of allegiance to the United States that naturalized Americans take states:

I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore
been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United
States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the
law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when
required by the law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when
required by the Jaw; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; so help me God.
57 409 Phil. 633 (2001).
According to him, what must not be overlooked is that there are
pieces of evidence showing that from May 24, 2005 to July 18, 2006
petitioner was an alien on temporary sojourn here. It should be
emphasized that after petitioner abandoned the Philippines as her
domicile and became a naturalized U.S. citizen on October 18, 2001,
the U.S. became her domicile of choice.

Petitioner's claim that she had established animus

manendi upon setting foot in this country on May 24, 2005 has no leg
to stand on. The pieces of evidence she presented in support of this
proposition are irrelevant, and are negated by the undisputed fact that
she was then a foreigner temporarily staying here as a balikbayan. In
this context, petitioner's imputation of grave abuse of discretion falls
flat on its face.

Castillo further stressed the fundamental precept that if a

person alleges that he/she has abandoned her domicile, it is
incumbent upon that person to prove that he/she was able to
reestablish a new domicile of choice. Applied to this case, this means
that it is upon the intrinsic merits of petitioner's own evidence that her
claim of reestablishment of domicile in the Philippines on May 24,
2005 must rise or fall; that however, it must be emphasized that
petitioner's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship neither automatically
resulted in the reestablishment of her Philippine domicile nor in the
abandonment of her U.S. domicile. It is settled that RA 9225 treats
citizenship independently of residence. It does not provide for a mode
of reestablishing domicile and has no effect on the legal residence of
those availing of it. "This is only logical and consistent with the
general intent of the law for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born
Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign
citizenships, he[/she] may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he[/she] is also a
citizen."

Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas Bernabe

Justice Perlas Bernabe stated in her dissent that we cannot

tolerate an absurd situation wherein a presidential candidate, who
has already been determined by the COMELEC to have missed a
particular eligibility requirement and, thus, had made a false
representation in his/her CoC by declaring that he/she is eligible, is
still allowed to continue his/her candidacy, and eventually be voted
for. The proposition that the matter of eligibility should be left to the
PET to decide only after the elections is a dangerous one for not only
does it debase the COMELEC's constitutional powers, it also
effectively results in a mockery of the electoral process, not to
mention the disenfranchisement of the voters. Clearly, the votes of
the Filipino people would be put to waste if we imprudently take away
 from the COMELEC its capability to avert the fielding of ineligible
candidates whose votes therefor shall be only considered stray. The
Filipino people deserve to know prior to the elections if the person
they intend to vote for is ineligible. In all reasonable likelihood, they
would not have cast their votes for a particular candidate who would
just be ousted from office later on.

On the issue of residency, Justice Perlas Bernabe disagreed

with the ponencia that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
concluding that petitioner falsely represented in her 2015 CoC that
she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 Elections
as, in fact, it found her representation to be true.

Justice Perlas Bernanbe averred that "to successfully effect a

change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary;
and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual."58

Moreover, Justice Perlas Bernabe stressed that neither did

the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that petitioner
made a false material representation in her 2015 CoC when she
declared that she was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. She
departed from the ponencia's stand that petitioner's blood relationship
with a Filipino citizen is demonstrable on account of statistical
probability, and other circumstantial evidence, namely, her
abandonment as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City,
as well as her typical Filipino features.

Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo de Castro

Pertaining to Technical and Procedural Issues, Justice

Leonardo de Castro opined that:

1. The review power of this Court relative to the present petitions filed
under Rule 64 vis-a-vis Rule 65 both of the Rules of Court, as
amended, is limited to the jurisdictional issue of whether or
not the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

58 Domino v. COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798, 819 (1999).

 jurisdiction;

2. Petitioner Poe failed to satisfactorily show that the COMELEC was so

grossly unreasonable in its appreciation and evaluation of the pieces
of evidence submitted by the parties as to transgress the limits of its
jurisdiction;

3. All the four petitions filed, inclusive of the Tatad Petition, subject of
the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC, adduced ultimate facts
establishing the cause of action for a petition based on Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code (OEC);

4. The COMELEC correctly considered the allegations contained in the

Tatad Petition as one filed under Section 78 of the OEC;

5. The COMELEC did not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal when it took cognizance of the
petitions to deny due course to or cancel the COC of petitioner Poe;
the distinction between jurisdictions of the two tribunals has already
been settled in Tecson v. COMELEC, the jurisdiction of the PET can
only be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or
Vice President and the question of qualifications of candidates for
President or Vice-President properly belongs to the COMELEC;

6. Section 8, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is a valid

exercise of the rule-making powers of the COMELEC, which is not
inconsistent and can be harmonized with its constitutional mandate to
promulgate rules of procedure to expedite the dispositions of election
cases; and

7. The COMELEC has the power to determine petitioner Poe's

citizenship notwithstanding the decision of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal which is still pending appeal and which deals with different
issues;

As to the substantive issues, Justice Leonardo de Castro

concluded that:

1. Sections 1 and 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution clearly and

categorically define who are natural-born citizens: they are citizens
from birth with blood relationship to a Filipino father or mother,
following the "jus sanguinis" principle;

2. Salient Rules of Interpretation and/or Construction of the Constitution

dictate that the clear and unambiguous letter of the Constitution must
be obeyed;
3. Statutes, Treaties and International Covenants or Instruments must
conform to the provisions of the Constitution;

4. Pursuant to the Constitution, natural-born citizenship is an

indispensable requirement for eligibility to constitutionally identified
elective positions like the Presidency;

5. Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the "Citizenship

Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003," makes natural-born
citizenship an indispensable requirement for the retention and/or re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship; in other words, the right to avail
of dual citizenship is only available to natural-born citizens who have
earlier lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of acquisition of
foreign citizenship;

6. Petitioner Poe obtained dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225
by misrepresenting in the Bureau of Immigration that she is the
biological child of a Filipino father and Filipino mother such that the
Bureau was misled into believing that "[petitioner Poe] was a former
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino
parents," which is a false factual averment not an erroneous legal
conclusion; and (it) the said order was not signed by the
Commissioner of the BI as required by Department of Justice (DOJ)
Regulation;

7. As a consequence of petitioner Poe's above-stated

misrepresentations, the July 18, 2006 Order of the Bureau of
Immigration granting petitioner Poe's application for dual citizenship
or the re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship was clearly invalid and
her taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic did not result in her
re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship; and

8. Not having validly reacquired natural-born citizenship, she is not

eligible to run for the Presidency pursuant to Section 2, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution; and even assuming arguendo that she has re-
acquired natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
petitioner Poe has failed to establish her change of domicile from the
United States, her domicile of choice to the Philippines through clear
and unmistakable evidence.
January 21, 2015

G.R. No. 206666

Atty. Alicia Risos- Vidal, Petitioner,

Alfredo S. Lim, Petitioner Intervenor,
vs.
Commission on Elections and Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Respondents59

Ponente: Justice Teresita De-Castro

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former

President Estrada for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case No.
26558, entitled People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
et al. and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria

Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon,
to former President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his
civil and political rights. And on October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m.,
former President Estrada received and accepted the pardon by
affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon.

On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a

Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President but was
opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of
the disqualification cases against him prospered and Motion for
Reconsiderations were denied by Comelec En Banc but he only
placed second in the results on the May 10, 2010 elections.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more

ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,
this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.

On January 24, 2013, Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for

Disqualification against former President Estrada before the

59 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2015/toc/january.php
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/jan2015/gr_206666
_2015.html, last visited: March 8, 2017
Comelec. Risos- Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that
former President Estrada is Disqualified to Run for Public Office
because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 26558 entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. She
relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation
to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that having taken

judicial cognizance of the consolidated resolution for SPA No. 09-028
(DC) and SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En Banc
resolution affirming it, this Commission will not belabor the
controversy further. Moreso, Risos-Vidal failed to present cogent
proof sufficient to reverse the standing pronouncement of this
Commission declaring categorically that former President Estradas
right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon
vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Since this
Commission has already spoken, it will no longer engage in
disquisitions of a settled matter lest indulged in wastage of
government resources. So the Comelec, Second Division, in a
Resolution dated April 01 2013, dismissed the petition for
disqualification.

On April 30, 2103, Risos-Vidal invoked the Courts jurisdiction by

filing this petition.

While the case was pending before the Court, on May 13, 2013,
the elections were conducted as scheduled and former President
Estrada won the mayoralty race and he was proclaimed as the duly
elected Mayor of the City of Manila.

On June 7, 2013, Alfredo Lim, one of former President Estradas

opponents for the position of Mayor, who garnered the second
highest votes, moved to intervene in this case and sought to
disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-
Vidal and praying that he be declared the rightful winning candidate
as Mayor of Manila.

PROCEEDINGS:

The case involve (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65, both of the Revised Rules of Court, by Atty.
Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which essentially prays for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April
1, 2013 and April 23, 2013, Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En banc, respectively, in
SPA No. 13-211 (DC), entitled "Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada" for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) a
Petition-in-Intervention3 filed by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), wherein he
prays to be declared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the City
of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph
Ejercito Estradas (former President Estrada) disqualification to run
for and hold public office.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that
former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public
office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President
Arroyo.

RULINGS:

No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to
adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a whimsical,
arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion
or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or were so
patent and gross as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

The petition for certiorari lacks merit. Former President Estrada

was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the
pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective,
and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that
the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The Court found it unnecessary to separately discuss Lim's

petition-in-intervention, which substantially presented the same
arguments as Risos-Vidal's petition.
 JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

A) The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative

action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and

Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the
Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other
acts of executive clemency, to wit:

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise

provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

xxxx

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of

sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be
granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of
the Commission.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that

the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon
remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet
resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of
election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be
argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to
delimit the pardoning power of the President.

B) The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal

Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former

President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
sentence which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties that
attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if
we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of
civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were
 expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

C) The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of

the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a)

of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC
provides a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon or
amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who
has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final
judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for
and hold any public office, whether local or national position.

D) The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make
the pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular

clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,"
neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the
conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to
seek public elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly

impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the
term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence
educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an
introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas
clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they
are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the
whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the
pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the
fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of
the pardon.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is

merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the
origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict
its operation much less prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be

conditional on Respondents promise never to seek a public office
again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text
of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this
an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is
constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be
interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former President
Estrada.

DISSENTING OPINION:

Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno, Senior Associate Justice

Antonio Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic Leonen dissented in this
case.

Associate Justice Francis Jardeleza inhibited, citing his

previous participation in a case in which he represented the Comelec
as solicitor general.

Contrary to the majority, Justice Marvic Leonen made a

dissenting opinion on Atty. Risos-Vidal Vs. COMELEC and Joseph
Estrada. Justice Leonen, in his 74-page opinion, dissented with the
majority ruling that thumbed down the disqualification cases against
Estrada filed by his political rival former Manila mayor Alfredo Lim
and the latter's legal counsel, Alicia Risos-Vidal.

Leonen, the youngest magistrate in the high tribunal, explained

that Estrada should be perpetually and absolutely disqualified from
public office because the prohibition was an accessory penalty when
he was convicted for plunder by the Sandiganbayan in 2007.

Mr. Estrada continues to suffer the penalty of perpetual,

absolute disqualification and is thereby disqualified from exercising
the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be
elected to public office, Justice Leonen explained in his dissenting
opinion.

According to Justice Leonen, the voices of the people were

moved into a peoples movement through the House of
Representatives and the Senate in a historic impeachment
proceeding which caused the offending President to vacate
Malacaang, to be considered resigned, and to finally be replaced.

The prosecution of former President Estrada was subsequently

ensued. A first in our history, the Sandiganbayan found him guilty of
committing the highest possible crime attended by graft and
corruption. This betrayal of the public trust is called plunder. It is
statutorily punished by a penalty of reclusion perpetua and
permanent disqualification from public office.
 In his dissent60, ( copied in toto ) The person convicted of
plunder now walks free among us. He did not spend a single day in
an ordinary jail. There is no question that he was pardoned. Today,
the majority completes the circle by reading an ambiguous pardon
allowing him yet again to run for public office. The majority uses the
equivocal silence of the succeeding President who devised the
ambiguous pardon as one of the bases to say that the convicted
former President can again seek public office.

This is template for our political elite at the expense of the

masses who toil and suffer from the consequences of corruption. It is
hope for those who occupy high government offices who commit
crimes as they await a next political term when the peoples vigilance
would have waned. It is the denouement in a narrative that will
explain why there is no effective deterrent to corruption in high
places. The pragmatism of politics takes over the highest notion that
public office should be of effective public trust. The rule of law should
unravel to meet this expectation.

The pardon was ambiguous. By our laws and constitutional

fiat, it should have been read as perpetually prohibiting he who was
convicted of plunder from again occupying any public office. This is
my reading of what the values in our laws require.

I do not judge respondent for who he is as a person. That is

not within our constitutional competence. But as a leader, the
respondent will best show that the way forward for the country he
loves should be for him to repent and for him to suffer courageously
the consequences of his past acts. There are things which are clearly
right. There are things which are clearly wrong. For in our hearts we
know that impunity, in any form, should be abhorred especially when
it gives advantage to the privileged and the powerful.

Thus, I dissent."

ACCORDINGLY, contrary to the majority, I vote to GRANT the

petition and the petition-in-intervention. The assailed resolutions
dated April 1, 2013 of the Second Division of public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and April 23, 2013 of public
respondent COMELEC, sitting En Banc, must be ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.

60 http://nlpdl.nlp.gov.ph:81/SC01/2015jan/206666_leonen.pdf, last visited: March 8, 2017

 SEPARATE OPINIONS

Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza61

According to Justice Mendoza, at first glance, this case

presents itself as an ordinary election case involving the issue of who
is the rightful winner in the 2013 mayoralty elections in the City of
Manila. The matter, however, is engrossed in a deeper constitutional
conundrum that affects the exercise of one of the most benevolent
powers of the President-the power to extend executive clemency in
the form of pardon. Undoubtedly, the Court's ruling on this case
would shape the parameters surrounding the future exercise of the
said power, thus, requiring a pragmatic stance that would equal the
theoretical and practical purpose of the pardoning power, that is, the
realization of checks and balances in government and the relief given
to the pardonee.

He discussed three (3) main points which are crafted in a

clear-cut and logical sequence, serve as guideposts for the Court in
order to arrive at conclusions that are consonant with prevailing law
and jurisprudence: 1) Estradas pardon was absolute; 2) Estradas
Civil and Political Rights were restored; 3) Estradas right to run for
public office was restored.

On item 1) Estradas pardon was absolute. He viewed that the

acceptance confers effectivity in both absolute and conditional
pardon. The fact of Estradas acceptance of the pardon, by affixing
his signature therein, is an insufficient indication of its conditional
nature. An acceptance does not classify a pardon as conditional just
by the mere reception and the placing of an inscription thereon. I am
much more amenable to the rule consistent with the benevolent
nature of pardon: that it is an act of forgiveness predicated on an
admission of guilt. To be effective, therefore, this admission of past
wrongdoing must be manifested by the acceptance of a pardon,
absolute or conditional.

Had PGMA intended to impress a condition on Estrada, the

same would have been clearly stated as a requirement of, or
restriction to, the above conferment. I am inclined to posit that the
extension of a conditional pardon to her political rival is a matter that
PGMA would have regarded with solemnity and tact. After all, the
pardoning power is a pervasive means to bluntly overrule the force
and effect, not only of a courts judgment of conviction, but the

61http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/
2015/january2015/206666_mendoza.pdf, last visited: March 8, 2017
punitive aspect of criminal laws. As it turned out, no direct showing
suggests that the pardon was conditional.
For a condition to be operative, the condition must appear on
the face of the document. The conditions must be clear and specific.
The reason is that the conditions attached to a pardon should be
definite and specific as to inform the person pardoned of what would
be required.20 As no condition was patently evinced in the document,
the Court is at no liberty to shape one, only because the plain
meaning of the pardons text is unacceptable for some waylaid and
extraneous reasons. That the executive clemency given to Estrada
was unaccompanied by any condition is clearly visible in the text of
the pardon.

The pardoning power is granted exclusively to the President

amidst the constitutional scheme of checks and balances. While it is
most ideal that the executive strictly adheres to this end, it is
undeniable that the pardoning power is still dependent on the
grantors measure of wisdom and sense of public policy. This reality
invites, if not bolsters, the application of the political question
doctrine. The only weapon, which the Court has freedom to wield, is
the exercise of judicial power against a blatant violation of the
Constitution. When unavailing, the Court is constrained to curb its
own rebuking power and to uphold the acumen of a co-equal branch.
It would do the Court well to remember that neither the Congress nor
the courts can question the motives of the President in the use of the
power.

Hence, in determining the nature of Estradas pardon, the

Court must undertake a tempered disposition and avoid a strained
analysis of the obvious. Where there is no ostensible condition stated
in the body of the pardon, to envisage one by way of statutory
construction is an inexcusable judicial encroachment.

In item 2) Estradas civil and political rights were restored. In

this particular issue, the ponencia deserves my full agreement in
finding that the third preambular clause of Estradas pardon does not
militate against the conclusion that Estradas rights to suffrage and to
seek public office have been restored. Further, the subject pardon
had substantially complied with the statutory requirements laid down
in Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC. The authority of the said provisions
of law was reinforced by the ruling of the Court in Monsanto v.
Factoran.

PGMAs failure to use the term full, apropos to the restoration

of Estradas rights does not denigrate its coverage. PGMAs omission
to use such term in the case of Estrada may have been caused by
reasons unknown to the Court. The Court cannot discount the
possibility that this was borne out of plain inadvertence, considering
the fact that the pardon was unaccompanied by a clear condition.
Had it been PGMAs intention to restrict the rights restored to
Estrada, she could have stated clear exceptions thereto, instead of
employing a phrase, which, in its plain meaning, comprises the right
to vote and to run for public office. Besides, the deprivation of these
rights is a dangerous ground that the Court should not tread on,
especially when the intention to restrict their exercise is impalpable.

Applying this to the case at bench, no ban from holding public

office should be imposed on Estrada, because the absolute pardon
given to him had effectively extinguished both the principal and
accessory penalties brought forth by his conviction. Succinctly,
Estradas civil and political rights had been restored in full.

On item 3) Estradas right to run for public office was restored.

Consistent with the view that Monsanto reflects the obliteration of
Estradas perpetual disqualification, Justice Mendoza conclude that
he now possesses the right to vote and to run for public office.

Without squabble, plunder is a crime involving moral turpitude.

Nevertheless, this fact alone negates a mechanical application of
statutory provisions on disqualification. One thing is clear, in the
exercise of her exclusive power to grant executive clemency, PGMA
pardoned Estrada, thereby wiping away the penalties of his crime and
entitling him the right to run for public office. Corollary to this,
Estradas fitness to hold public office is an issue that should not
concern the Court. All that the Court can rule on is the availability of
Estradas right to seek public office. This ruling on his eligibility is not
tantamount to a declaration that Estrada befits a person wholly
deserving of the peoples trust. The Manileos decision alone can
mould the citys journey to either development or decline. Indeed,
election expresses the sovereign will of the people consistent with the
principle of vox populi est suprema lex. This is the beauty of
democracy which the Court must endeavour to protect at all cost. As
Abraham Lincoln put it with both guile and eloquence, Elections
belong to the people. their decision. If they decide to turn their back
on the fire and burn their behinds, then they will just have to sit on
their blisters.

Separate Opinion of J Brion62

Justice Brion concur with the ponencia 's conclusion that the
pardon granted to respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada (or Erap for
brevity) by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (or PGMAfor brevity)
restored his rights to run for and hold public office and to vote.

62http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence
/2015/january2015/206666_brion.pdf, last visited: March 8, 2017
 He likewise agree with the ponencia that Erap's pardon
complied with the requirements under Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Specifically, Erap's pardon contained an
express restoration of his rights to vote and to hold public office and
an express remission of Erap's perpetual absolute disqualification
brought about by his conviction for plunder. These rights are
subsumed under the phrase "civil and political rights" that PGMA
expressly restored in Erap's pardon.

Aside from the points discussed by the ponencia, other material

legal justifications exist that would support the same conclusion and
address the vagueness that Risos-Vidal attributes to the textual
language of Erap's pardon. These legal justifications include an
unbiased examination of the third preambular clause of Erap' s
pardon, the official definition of "absolute pardon," and the pertinent
rules on statutory construction that, in instances of doubt, give
primacy to the interests of the voters in election cases such as the
present case.

Despite the ponencia 's resolution of the issue of Erap' s pardon

and its effects on his perpetual absolute disqualification, an equally
important issue lingers and remains unresolved -whether or not the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) gravely abused its discretion
in relying on its 2010 rulings that Erap 's pardon restored his rights to
vote and to be voted for a public office.

This issue is particularly important since the Court's certiorari

jurisdiction is being invoked and the assailed COMELEC rulings are
not being questioned specifically on its ruling on the issue of Erap's
pardon but on the COMELEC's reliance on its 2010 ruling on this
particular issue.

This 2010 disqualification ruling pertained to the consolidated

COMELEC Resolution in SP A No. 09-028 (DC) and SP A No. 09-
104 (DC), entitled Atty. Evilio C. Pormento v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada
and In Re: Petition to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito, Joseph M. From
Running As President Due to Constitutional Disqualification and
Creating Confusion to the Prejudice of Estrada, Mary Lou B. These
cases were filed against Erap when he ran as President of the
Philippines in the 2010 elections.

The COMELEC cleared Erap by election day of 2013,

dismissing the disqualification case against him and ruling that the
pardon granted to him restored his right to vote and to be voted upon.
Notably, even this Court did not prevent Eraps candidacy and did not
prevent him from being voted upon after his disqualification case was
brought to this Court. Thus, the people went to the polls and voted
Erap into office with no expectation that their votes could be
rendered stray.

Another crucial issue that must be resolved, in view of its

jurisprudential repercussions, is the legal propriety of Alfredo S. Lims
(Lim) intervention in the present case.

Justice Brion included the intervention of former Mayor Alfredo

S. Lim as a matter for Preliminary Consideration as it is an immaterial
consideration under his position that the COMELEC did not gravely
abuse its discretion in its assailed ruling. Despite its immateriality, he
nevertheless discuss it in light of the Courts prior action approving
his intervention, which court approval was an interlocutory order that
is subject to the Courts final ruling on the merits of the case. He has
to discuss the intervention, too, for jurisprudential reasons: this
intervention, apparently granted without indepth consideration, may
sow confusion into the jurisprudence that those who came before us
in this Court took pains to put in order.

The records show that Lim intervened only after Risos-Vidal

filed the present petition for certiorari with the Court and not during
the disqualification proceedings before the COMELEC. He was
therefore never a party in the disqualification proceeding before the
COMELEC and, consequently, has not presented any evidence to
support his claims; nor was Erap ever given the chance to controvert
Lims claims before the COMELEC, the tribunal vested with the
jurisdiction to settle the issues that he raised in his petition-in-
intervention before the Court.

Justice Brions point on the issue of pardon and the Comelecs

grave abuse of discretion, he pointed out that the COMELEC did not
err at all and thus could not have committed grave abuse of discretion
in its ruling that the terms of Eraps pardon restored to him the right to
vote and to be voted upon. Too, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse
its discretion in dismissing the petition of Risos-Vidal and in citing its
2010 final and executory rulings that Eraps pardon restored his right
to vote and be voted upon.

In considering and interpreting the terms of the pardon

therefore, the starting point for analysis is the position that the
Presidents power is full and plenary, save only for the textual limits
under the Constitution. In the exercise of this power, too, it is not
unreasonable to conclude, in the absence of any plain and expressed
contrary intention, that the President exercised the full scope of his
power.

PGMA clearly intended the granted pardon to be absolute.

Thus, the pardon granted totally extinguished the criminal liability of
Erap, including the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. It cannot be otherwise under the plain and
unequivocal wording of the definition of absolute pardon, and the
statement in the pardon that Erap is restored to his civil and political
rights.

COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in its Resolution

of April 1, 2013 dismissing the Risos-Vidal petition for lack of merit.
In fact, the COMELEC would have gravely abused its discretion had it
granted the petition in light of the 2010 trilogy of disqualification cases
and the finality of its previous final rulings that the third Whereas
Clause of Eraps pardon did not affect at all the restoration of his civil
and political rights, including his right to vote and to be voted upon.

Whatever might be said of the trilogy of cases, the reality is that

the issue of pardon was brought to the forefront of the argued issues
when the parties raised it in all the disqualification cases against Erap
and the COMELEC ruled on the issue. That the pardon issue was
overshadowed by the presidential re-election issue, not only in the
COMELEC, but all the way to this Court, may be an adjudicatory
defect, but certainly is not imperfection on the part of Erap for which
he should suffer.

The COMELEC resolution is not a model resolution that is free

from imperfections; it cannot serve as a model for legal drafting or for
legal reasoning. But whatever these imperfections might be, they
could not -as above explained -have gone beyond errors of law, into
grave abuse of discretion. Having been rulings twice-implemented in
2010 and 2013 elections, these past rulings cannot and should not
now be repudiated without committing fraud against the electorate
who cast their vote and showed their preference for Erap without any
notice that their votes ran the risk of being declared stray.

Justice Arturo D. Brion voted to dismiss the Risos-Vidal Petition

for lack of merit.
February 24, 2015

G.R. No. 211362

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine

Military Academy, represented by his father RENATO P. CUDIA,
who also acts on his own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF
THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD (CRAB), Respondents.

Ponente: Justice Diosdado Peralta

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military

Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013,
Cudias class had a lesson examination in their Operations Research
(OR) subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.

However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a

query to their OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for
her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next class
(English). Later, the English teacher reported Cudia for being late.

In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his

OR class was dismissed a bit late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to
look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said that
their OR class was dismissed late because the OR teacher said she
never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits
and touring hours because of said infraction.

Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the
TO about it. Not content with the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he
will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior tactical officer
(STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his appeal.

In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his
control because his OR class was dismissed at 3pm while his English
class started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on record, and
based on the interview with the teachers concerned, the OR teacher
did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class
started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a
student submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed from said
class and may be excused to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was
in fact dismissed well before 3pm; that it was a lie for Cudia to state
that the class was dismissed late because again, on that day in the
OR class, each student was dismissed as they submit their
examination, and were not dismissed as a class; that if Cudia was
ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction
was initiated by the teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because
of his query to the teacher), although there were at least two students
with Cudia at that time querying the teacher, the three of them cannot
be considered a class; Cudia could just have stated all that instead
of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The
STO sustained the decision of the TO.

Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMAs Honor Committee

(HC) for allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in
his written appeal when he said his class was dismissed late hence,
as a result, he was late for his next class.

The Honor Code is PMAs basis for the minimum standard of

behavior required of their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a
ground to separate a cadet from PMA.

Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC,

which is composed of nine (9) cadets, conducted an investigation.
After two hearings and after the parties involved were heard and with
their witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the members cast
their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1
acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules (Honor System), a dissenting vote
means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a practice of
chambering where the members, particularly the dissenter, are made
to explain their vote. This is to avoid the tyranny of the minority.
After the chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his initial not
guilty vote was improper, hence he changed the same and the final
vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was immediately placed inside PMAs
holding center.

Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied.

Eventually, the Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal of
Cudia from the PMA.

Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to

various military officers requesting for a re-investigation. It was their
claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done by the
HC. As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred to the
Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).

Meanwhile, Cudias family brought the case to the Commission

on Human Rights (CHR) where it was alleged that PMAs sham
investigation violated Cudias rights to due process, education, and
privacy of communication.

Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was

affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff. But on the other hand, the
CHR found in favor of Cudia.63 PMA averred that CHRs findings are
at best recommendatory.

PROCEEDINGS:

Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia (Cadet JCL Cudia), and
Berteni Catalufta Causing filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus with application for extremely urgent temporary
restraining order (TRO).

In a Resolution dated March 1 7, 2014, the Court denied the

prayer for TRO and instead, required respondents to file their
comment on the petition.

Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself and in behalf of her son

Cadet 1 CL Cudia, filed a motion for leave to intervene, attaching
thereto the petition-in-intervention. Per Resolution dated March 31,
2014, the Court granted the motion and resolved to await
respondents' comment on the petition

A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3, 2014,

recommending the admission of the petition-in-intervention and
adopting it as an integral part of their petition.

Respondents filed their Consolidated Comment on June 19,

2014. In a motion, petitioner-intervenor filed a Reply, which was later
adopted by petitioners. Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a
manifestation with motion to submit the case for early
resolution, which the Court noted in a Resolution dated August 11,
2014 and October 3, 2014.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Cudias petitions is proper.

63CHR-CAR issued its Resolution with respect to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission on Human Rights-CAR Office finds
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of
the PMA Honor Committee and .. certain PMA officials, specifically for violations of the rights of
CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due process, education, privacy/privacy of
communication, and good life.
Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its
findings.

Whether or not there has been violation of due process.

RULINGS:

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Mandamus is not proper

Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudias prayer that
PMA should be compelled to reinstate him as well as to give him his
supposed academic awards is not proper. The Courts, even the
Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to do so because the act of
restoring Cudias rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as his
awards is a discretionary act. Mandamus cannot be availed against
an official or government agency, in this case PMA, whose duty
requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. Further, such act
which PMA was sought by Cudia to perform is within PMAs
academic freedom as an educational institution and such
performance is beyond the jurisdiction of courts.

Certiorari is allowed
The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is
whether or not PMA and its responsible officers acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. Under the Constitution,
that is the duty of the courts to decide actual controversies and to
determine whether or not a government branch or instrumentality
acted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, PMA cannot argue that
judicial intervention into military affairs is not proper as a matter of
policy. Suffice it to say that judicial non-interference in military affairs
is not an absolute rule.

On the civil liberties of PMA cadets

One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they
enrolled in the PMA, have surrendered parts of their civil and political
liberties. Hence, when they are disciplined and punished by the PMA,
said cadets cannot question the same, much less, question it in the
courts. In short, they cannot raise due process.

On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that

a PMA cadet, by enrolling at PMA, must be prepared to subordinate
his private interests for the proper functioning of the educational
institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a
student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet facing dismissal
from PMA, whose private interests are at stake (life, liberty, property)
which includes his honor, good name, and integrity, is entitled to due
process. No one can be deprived of such without due process of law
and the PMA, even as a military academy, is not exempt from such
strictures. Thus, when Cudia questioned in court the manner upon
which he was dismissed from the PMA, such controversy may be
inquired upon by the courts.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

It is within PMAs right to academic freedom to decide whether

or not a cadet is still worthy to be part of the institution.

PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it

dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this
case, the investigation of Cudias Honor Code violation followed the
prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was
notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given
the opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed
about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo.
The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied
and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the
investigating team submitted a written report together with its
recommendation to the HC Chairman.

The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations.

When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new
team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal
investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and
given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his
side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his
behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he
was found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty
verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level from the
OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the
Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate
investigation was also conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics
Group). Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General
Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by
the CRAB. Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body
composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was
constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally,
he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all
had issued unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to
disturb the findings of facts by these bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty
finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend
the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor Code violation is
not among those listed as justifications for the attrition of cadets
considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System (manner
which PMA conducts investigation of Honor Code violations) do not
state that a guilty cadet is automatically terminated or dismissed from
service.

Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a

law, the PMA has regulatory authority to administratively dismiss
erring cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act No. 1)
authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power by the
President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may
exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.

Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within

its academic freedom. Academic freedom or, to be precise, the
institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher
learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.

The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of

schools are as follows;
the right to determine who may teach;
the right to determine what may be taught;
the right to determine how it shall be taught;
the right to determine who may be admitted to study.

The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its
academic freedom. If it determines that a cadet violates it, then it has
the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case, based on its findings,
Cudia lied which is a violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudias lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really
warranted?

The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie
and a minor lie. It punishes any form of lying. It does not have a
gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of the PMA as to
what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia enrolled at PMA, he
agreed to abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus,
while the punishment may be severe, it is nevertheless reasonable
and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -also
considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have known all of these.
 JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

Constitutional Law
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are
merely recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court. The
reason is that the CHR's constitutional mandate extends only to the
investigation of all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. As held in Cario v. Commission on Human
Rights and a number of subsequent cases, the CHR is only a fact-
finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not
empowered to adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or
controversies.
September 16, 2014

G.R. No. 206510

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto

Princesa D.D.; MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, JR.,
Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO,
CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA
CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES,
Bayan Muna Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D., Junk VF A
Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V.
PALATINO, Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES,
Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH. D., Agham, ELMER C.
LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR,
Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, THERESA A.
CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON,
PH.D., A. EDSEL F. TUPAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th
Fleet, MARK A. RICE in his capacity as Commanding Officer of
the USS Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, HON. ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO, Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs, HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, Office of the President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T.
GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of National Defense, HON.
RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, VICE ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO,
Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO RENA, Commandant,
Philippine Coast Guard, COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN
EVANGELISTA, Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN.
VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed Forces of the
Philippines Command and LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US
Marine Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-
Director, Respondents.

Ponente: Justice Martin s. Villarama, jr.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines

requested diplomatic clearance for USS Guardian, an Avenger-class
mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy, "to enter and exit the
territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic
Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and
crew liberty."

On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay,
arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa,
Japan. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay
for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. At 2:20 a.m. on
January 17, 2013, while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground
on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs64, about
80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the
incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

US officers65 expressed their regret over the grounding incident.

United States Ambassador to the Philippines, Ambassador Harry K.
Thomas, Jr. Secretary Albert F. del Rosario of the Department of
Foreign Affairs that the United States would provide appropriate
compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship66." By March
30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the
last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef.

Petitioners, on their behalf and in representation of their

respective sector/organization and others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, filed the present petition67 against Scott H.
Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice
in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt.
Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and
Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director ("US respondents"); President
Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert F. Del
Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire
T. Gazmin (Department of National Defense), Secretary Jesus P.
Paje (Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-
Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in
Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast
Guard Commandant), Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista
(Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major General Virgilio 0.

64 Declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150
kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle,
the global center of marine biodiversity.
65 U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift in a Press Statement on January 20, 2013

http://manila.usembassy.gov/pressphotoreleases2013/navy-commander-expresses-regret-
concerning-uss-guardian-grounding.html; and US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K.
Thomas, Jr. in a meeting with DFA officials on February 4, 2013.
66 "Joint Statement Between The Philippines And The United States On The USS Guardian

Grounding On Tubbatata Reef," February 5, 2013. Accessed. at US Embassy website -

<http://manila.usembassy.gov/jointstatementguardiantubbataha.html>
67 Petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary

Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules)
 Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the "Philippine
respondents."

Petitioners claimed that the US respondents committed the

following violations under RA 10067: unauthorized entry; non-
payment of conservation fees; obstruction of law enforcement officer;
damages to the reef; and destroying and disturbing resources. The
grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian caused and will continue to cause environmental damage
of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique,
Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events
violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
They stated that there should be a directive from the Supreme Court
for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in
connection with the grounding incident because the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) provides for a waiver of immunity from suit.

The Respondents, for their part, contended that the Petitioners

have no locus standi and that grounds they relied for the issuance of
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) or writ of
Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage operations on
the ship were already completed. Further, they averred that the
determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government
regarding the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exclusively with
the Executive Branch of the Government.

PROCEEDINGS:

The Petitioners filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental
laws and regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military
ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.

They Pray that the Honorable Court:

1. Immediately issue a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular:

a) Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf,

to cease and desist all operations over the Guardian
grounding incident;
b) Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged
area as well as an additional buffer zone;
 c) Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games
under 'Balikatan' because of the absence of clear
guidelines, duties, and liability schemes for breaches of
those duties, and require Respondents to assume
responsibility for prior and future environmental damage in
general, and environmental damage under the Visiting
Forces Agreement in particular.
d) Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of
ecotourism, diving, recreation, and limited commercial
activities by fisherfolk and indigenous communities near or
around the TRNP but away from the damaged site and an
additional buffer zone;

2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until

further orders of the Court;

3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without

limitation:

a) Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following

the dispositive portion of Nicolas v. Romulo, "to forthwith
negotiate with the United States representatives for the
appropriate agreement on [environmental guidelines and
environmental accountability] under Philippine authorities as
provided in Art. V[] of the VFA ... "
b) Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence
administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings against erring
officers and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to
make such proceedings public;
c) Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over erring U.S. personnel
under the circumstances of this case;
d) Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable
compensation in the settlement of all meritorious claims for
damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef on terms and
conditions no less severe than those applicable to other
States, and damages for personal injury or death, if such
had been the case;
e) Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the
attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production
of evidence, including seizure and delivery of objects
connected with the offenses related to the grounding of the
Guardian;
f) Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United
States to notify each other of the disposition of all cases,
wherever heard, related to the grounding of the Guardian;
g) Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported
restoration, repair, salvage or post salvage plan or plans,
 including cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the
Tubbataha Reef absent a just settlement approved by the
Honorable Court;
h) Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU
consultations in accordance with the Local Government
Code and R.A. 10067;
i) Require Respondent US officials and their representatives
to place a deposit to the TRNP Trust Fund defined under
Section 17 of RA 10067 as a bona fide gesture towards full
reparations;
j) Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate
the areas affected by the grounding of the Guardian in light
of Respondents' experience in the Port Royale grounding in
2009, among other similar grounding incidents;
k) Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly
basis and in the name of transparency and accountability
such environmental damage assessment, valuation, and
valuation methods, in all stages of negotiation;
l) Convene a multi-sectoral technical working group to provide
scientific and technical support to the TPAMB;
m) Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of
National Defense, and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to review the Visiting Forces Agreement
and the Mutual Defense Treaty to consider whether their
provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and for damages which
follow from any violation of those rights;
n) Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces
Agreement for purposes of protecting the damaged areas of
TRNP;
o) Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal
Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the Visiting Forces Agreement
unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for
violating the preemptory norm of nondiscrimination
incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section 2,
Article II, of the Philippine Constitution;
p) Allow for continuing discovery measures;
q) Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha
Reefs in all other respects;

4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and

such other reliefs as are just and equitable under the premises.
 ISSUES:

1. Whether or not, the Petitioners have locus standi

2. Whether the US respondents have immunity from suits

3. Whether the US respondents waived their immunity from suit

found in the VFA.

4. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for

damages caused by USS Guardian.

RULINGS:

The Supreme Court Denied the Petition for the issuance of the
privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also agreed with the Respondents that the Petition
has become moot because the salvage operation sought to be
enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished.

Further, the Supreme Court could order a review of the VFA

and to nullify certain immunity provisions thereof. The VFA was duly
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a
treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly
authorized representative of the United States government. The VFA
being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a
matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. The
present petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail
the constitutionality of its provisions.

On the Issue of locus standi of

Petitioner-minors:

Yes, the Petitioners minors, representing their generation as

well as generations yet unborn, have locus standi. The Court said
that their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
could only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and
harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible
to the present and future generations. Every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.

On the Issue of US respondents

immunity from suits:

Yes, complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign

sovereign from suit without its consent. The US respondents were
sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy
who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.
The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of
the USS Guardian on the Tubbataha Reef was committed while they
were performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials would require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government,
the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of
State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling. The general
rule on states immunity from suit applies in this case. The acts of the
US respondents, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage,
were done in their official capacity. Suing a representative of a state
is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is
not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in
whose service he is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet
imperium -that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if
the judgment against an official would require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed
against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state
itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.

On the issue whether or not US

respondents waived their immunity from
suit found in the VFA

No, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only
to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as for the
issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan. Hence, contrary to petitioners
claim, the US government could not be deemed to have waived its
immunity from suit. Further, the US respondents were sued in their
official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who have
control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. Since
the satisfaction of any judgment against these officials would require
remedial actions and the appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. Thus,
the principle of State Immunity in correlation with the principle of
States as sovereign equals par in parem non habet non imperium
bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the court over their persons.

On the issue of Whether or not US

respondents may be held liable for
damages caused by USS Guardian

Yes. The US government is liable for damages in relation to the

grounding incident under the customary laws of navigation. The
conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted
area in violation of RA 10067 and caused damage to the Tubbataha
Reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the
UNCLOS.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T.

Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when
its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067
and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter
within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically,
warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their
flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in
cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the
coastal State regarding passage through the latters internal waters
and the territorial sea.

Justice Carpio elucidated that in the case of warships, they

continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following
exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and

regulations of the coastal State-

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of
the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea
and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is
made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the
territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused

by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial
purposes -
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss
or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-
compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for
non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or
with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of
international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships

operated for non-commercial purposes.

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in

articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities
of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes. A foreign warships unauthorized entry into our internal
waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in
which the above provisions may apply.

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not

ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US
considers itself bound by customary international rules on the
traditional uses of the oceans as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that the US refusal to

join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS
regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans
and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind, pointing out that
such has nothing to do with its the US acceptance of customary
international rules on navigation.

The Court fully concurred with Justice Carpios view that non-
membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will
disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its
internal waters and territorial sea. The Court said that they expect the
US to bear international responsibility under Article 31 in connection
with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time
ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the
countrys efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk
from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship
while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a
Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to
comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the
global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as
provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS.
 Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as

appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through
competent international organizations, in formulating and
elaborating international rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures consistent with
this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the
marine environment, taking into account characteristic
regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present

controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the
immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while
navigating the latters territorial sea, the flag States shall be required
to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and
regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages
caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated
for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

JUDICIAL DOCTRINE:
Locus standi
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question." It is "a party's personal and substantial interest in a
case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result"
of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a
generalized grievance." The rule on standing is a procedural matter
which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest. The liberalization of standing first
enunciated in Oposa vs Factoran68, insofar as it refers to minors and

68JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD
and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and
NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and
represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor,
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T.
CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T.
NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all
surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE
VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and
generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows
the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on
citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal
and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of
nature."

State Immunity from suit

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine
of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State, is expressly
provided in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution which
states that the State may not be sued without its consent.

The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a

foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law
then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign
sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states,
made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his
representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign
capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a
diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint
could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit
without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to
be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for
the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is,
under the maxim -par in parem, non habet imperium -that all states
are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.
The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an
official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to
pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as
being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.

TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented
by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA,
CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and
represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN
JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE
MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS
BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC. vs. THE HONORABLE
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO,
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993.
 CONCURRING OPINIONS:

Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen

Justice Leonen agreed that the petition should be dismissed

primarily because it is moot and academic, the parties have no legal
standing, and they invoked the wrong remedy.

He averred that the writ of kalikasan is not an all-embracing

legal remedy to be wielded like a political tool. It is both an
extraordinary and equitable remedy, which assists to prevent
environmental catastrophes. It does not replace other legal remedies
similarly motivated by concern for the environment and the
community's ecological welfare. Certainly, when the petition itself
alleges that remedial and preventive remedies have occurred, the
functions of the writ cease to exist. In case of disagreement, parties
need to exhaust the political and administrative arena. Only when a
concrete cause of action arises out of facts that can be proven with
substantial evidence may the proper legal action be entertained.

Citizen's suits are suits brought by parties suffering direct and

substantial injuries; although in the environmental field, these injuries
may be shared with others. It is different from class suits brought as
representative suits under Oposa v. Factoran69. Thus, there is need
to review the doctrine insofar as it allows a non-representative group
to universally represent a whole population as well as an unborn
generation binding them to causes of actions, arguments, and reliefs
which they did not choose. Generations yet unborn suffer from the
legal inability to assert against false or unwanted representation.

Citizen's suits are procedural devices that allow a genuine

cause of action to be judicially considered in spite of the social costs
or negative externalities of such initiatives. This should be clearly
distinguished in our rules and in jurisprudence from class suits that
purport to represent the whole population and unborn generations.
The former is in keeping with the required constitutional protection for
our people. The latter is dangerous and should be used only in very
extraordinary or rare situations. It may be jurisprudentially
inappropriate.

Decisions relating to environmental concens should be more

balanced. It must attend in a more sober way to the required balance
of all interests. Hence, our rule with respect to standing should
require that parties bringing the suit are sufficiently and substantially
possessed of individual interest and capability so that they can
properly shape the issues brought before this court. The capability of

69 Supra.
the parties to bring suit can readily be seen through the allegations
made in their petition.

Our doctrine regarding sovereign immunity also needs to be

refined in the proper case with respect to its nature, source, and its
limitations. The doctrine of sovereign immunity evolves out of the
theory and practice of sovereignty and the principle par in parem non
habet Jurisdictionem. Its particular contours as an international norm
have evolved far beyond the form it took when the theory of absolute
sovereignty was current. Contemporarily, it is understood as a basic
right extended to states by other states on the basis of respect for
sovereignty and independence. There appears to be a consensus
among states that sovereign immunity as a concept is legally binding.
However, there remains to be a lack of international agreement as to
how it is to be invoked and the extent of immunity in some cases.

This vagueness arises from the debate on which among the

sources of international law the doctrine of sovereign immunity draws
its binding authority and the content of the doctrine given its source.
This doctrine of relative jurisdictional immunity (sovereign immunity)
of states and their agents becomes binding in our jurisdiction as
international law only through Section 2 of Article II or Section 21 of
Article VII of the Constitution. Article XVII, Section 3 of the
Constitution is a limitation on suits against our state. It is not the
textual anchor for determining the extent of jurisdictional immunities
that should be accorded to other states or their agents. International
law may have evolved further than the usual distinction between acta
Jure imperii and acta Jure gestionis. Indications of state practice even
of public respondents show that jurisdictional immunity for foreign
states may not apply to certain violations of Jus cogens rules of
international customary law. There can be tort exemptions provided
by statute and, therefore, the state practice of an agent's sovereign
being sued in our courts.

International law does not also prohibit legislation that clarifies

national policy and, therefore, our own considerations of state
practice in relation to the limits of jurisdictional immunities for other
sovereigns. Neither does international law prohibit domestic courts
from shaping exceptions to jurisdictional immunity based upon our
reading of the Constitution as well as international and municipal law.

The case be dismissed principally for its procedural infirmities.

We should reserve doctrinal exposition and declaration of the content
of jurisdictional immunities for other sovereigns and their agents
when the proper cases merit our attention and not yet unduly limit
such jurisprudence in relation to the law of the sea, municipal torts,
and violations of international customary law of a jus cogens
character. The results in this case would have been different if
initiated with the proper remedy, by the proper parties in the proper
court.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Serreno

Chief Justice Serreno concurred with the Decision to dismiss

the Petition. Sovereign immunity serves as a bar for the foreign
sovereign to be subjected to the trial process. Supported both by
local jurisprudence, as well as international law (which forms part of
the Philippine legal structure), the doctrine should not be reversed in
this particular case.

The application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been

restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The
mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private
and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Since the Philippines adheres to
the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the
act involved - whether the entity claiming immunity performs
governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions.

From the Philippine perspective, what determines its ability to

impose its law upon the foreign entity would be the act of the foreign
entity - on whether the act is an aspect of its sovereign function or a
private act.

In this case, the two Naval Officers were acting pursuant to

their function as the commanding officers of a warship, traversing
Philippine waters under the authority of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA). While the events beg the question of what the
warship was doing in that area, when it should have been headed
towards Indonesia, its presence in Philippine waters is not wholly
unexplainable. The VFA is a treaty, and it has been affirmed as valid
by this Court in several cases. It has, in the past, been used to justify
the presence of United States Armed Forces in the Philippines. In this
respect therefore, acts done pursuant to the VFA take the nature of
governmental acts, since both the United States and Philippine
governments recognize the VFA as a treaty with corresponding
obligations, and the presence of these two Naval Officers and the
warship in Philippine waters fell under this legal regime.

From this, the applicability of sovereign immunity cannot be

denied as to the presence of the warship and its officers in Philippine
waters. This does not put an end to the discussion, because even if
immunity is applicable to their presence, the specific act of hitting the
Tubbataha Reef and causing damage thereto is a presumably
tortuous act.
 Under the regime of international law, there is an added
dimension to sovereign immunity exceptions: the tort exception.
Whether this has evolved into a customary norm is still debatable;
what is important to emphasize is that while some states have
enacted legislation to allow the piercing of sovereign immunity in
tortuous actions, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 of the
United States (FSIA) contains such privilege. Specifically, the FSIA
contains exceptions for (1) waiver; (2) commercial activity; (3)
expropriation; (4) property rights acquired through succession or
donation; (5) damages for personal injury or death or damage to or
loss of property; (6) enforcement of an arbitration agreement; (7)
torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the
provision of material support to such an act, if the state sponsors
terrorism; and (8) maritime lien in a suit for admiralty based on
commercial activity.

Any claim under the FSIA goes through a hierarchical process

between the diplomatic channels of the United States and the forum
state. However, by explicitly including the tort exception in its local
legislation under the 4th exception discussed above - with due
consideration to the heavy requirements for any doctrine to attain
customary status - it becomes plausible that the exception can be
applied to the United States, if not through customary international
law, then by reason of acquiescence or estoppel.

Sovereign Immunity is a political decision. Immunity, unlike in

other jurisdictions, is determined not by the courts of law but by the
executive branches.

The basic concept of state immunity is that no state maybe

subjected to the jurisdiction of another state without its consent. The
Court is left to work with is a process by which jurisdiction and
immunity can be determined by answering several questions,
summated:

1. Is the act of the foreign national or entity an act jure imperii, such
that it can be considered an act of state entitled to immunity, or an act
jure gestionis, in which case it is to be considered a private act?

2. In respect of the above question, has the executive branch, in the

exercise of its political power, determined whether absolute
diplomatic immunity is applicable?

3. If it is an act jure imperii and thus entitled to sovereign immunity,

does an exception apply to withdraw the immunity privilege of such
acts?
 In this case, it is apparent that the act of the USS Guardian and
its officers in entering Philippine waters is allowed by the VF A, and
as a treaty privilege should be considered an act Jure imperii.
Its deviation into the waters of Tubbataha, and whether this can be
considered a private act; is a factual issue that should be determined
by the proper body. Indeed, while Philippine authorities may not have
authorized the deviation, if the United States government affirms that
it gave the Guardian sufficient discretion to determine its course, then
the act is not necessarily robbed of its Jure imperii character and is
thus entitled to immunity. The course of action of the Philippine
government would be to engage in diplomatic negotiations for
potential treaty breach liability.

The executive branch has not made a determination of the

applicable immunity. No correspondence has been sent to the Court
as to the issue. Thus, the Court must act in deference to the
executive prerogative to first make this determination under the
presumption of regularity of performance of duties, before it can
exercise its judicial power.

No exception exists in Philippine or international law that would

remove the immunity of the United States in order to place it under
the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. The Writ of Kalikasan is a
compulsory writ, and its issuance initiates a legal process that would
circumvent the internationally established rules of immunity. Should
the Court issue the Writ, it could possibly entail international
responsibility for breaching the jurisdictional immunity of a sovereign
state.
August 12, 2014

G.R. No. 162230

ISABELITA C. VINUYA, et al. In their capacity and as members of

the Malaya Lolas Organization, Petitioners - versus -THE
HONORABLE EXECUTIVESECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
THE HONORABLESECRETARY OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS DELIA
DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE HONORABLESECRETARY OF
JUSTICEMERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE
SOLICITORGENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents.

Ponente: Justice Mariano Del Castillo

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-

stock, non-profit organization registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid
to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines
during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have requested the

Executive Department through the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) for assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment
of the comfort women stations in the Philippines.

The officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the

petitioners, and maintained that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans
compliance with the San Francisco Peace Treaty and bilateral
Reparations Agreement of 1956.

PROCEEDINGS:

The petitioners filed an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule

65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the
DOJ, and the OSG.

The petitioners prayed for the court to:

(1) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their
claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed
against them; and

(2) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official

apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice and other international tribunals.

ISSUE:
The issue is whether or not the Executive Department
committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against
Japan.

RULING:

The Supreme Court denied the petition.

The Court held that the Executive Department did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in not espousing the claims of the
petitioners.

The issue in the case at bar pertains to a political question. The

Court held that although not all cases involving foreign relations
present political questions, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners
claims against Japan, since it is a foreign relations matter where the
authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution to
such department.

The Executive Department is in the best position to decide on

such foreign relations matters since it has the best available
information. As stated in Chief Justice Punos dissenting opinion in
Secretary of Justice vs. Lantio:

x x x The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities

and consequences, sometimes with life and death
significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can only
be entrusted to that department of government which can act
on the basis of the best available information and can decide
with decisiveness. x x x It is also the President who
possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential
information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and
consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all
over the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive
 military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign
affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded
a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs.
The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under
less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to
breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations,
forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a
plethora of other problems with equally undesirable
consequences.70

It has already decided that espousing such claim might disrupt

the smooth flow of relations with Japan and that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
Supreme Court has no power to question the wisdom in such
decision.

The Court also held that the State is not under any international
obligation to espouse the petitioners claim. The individual must be
able to convince the government as for the reason to bring an action
where the latter would assert the right involved on behalf of the
former against another state. In such instance, the right invoked is no
longer that of the individual, but that of the State. The Internal Court
of Justice stated in the Barcelona Traction:

The Court would here observe that, within the limits prescribed by
international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever
means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the
State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is
acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no
remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if
means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining
redress. The municipal legislator may lay upon the State an obligation to
protect its citizens abroad, and may also confer upon the national a right to
demand the performance of that obligation, and clothe the right with
corresponding sanctions. However, all these questions remain within the
province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.71

The exercise of diplomatic protection is the right of the State. In

fine, the State is the sole judge to decide when to exercise such right
and in what manner and extent.

Since there is no state practice nor opinion juris clearly

established, it cannot be said that it is the legal duty of the state to
exercise diplomatic protection of their own nationals abroad.

70 379 Phil. 165, 233-234 (2004).

71 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, case, supra note 56, at p. 44 par. 78
 The invocation of erga omnes and jus cogens cannot be futile. Erga
omnes remains to be a legal concept that is yet to be realized in
practice; while the International Law Commissions concluded in 1963
that no generally accepted criterion to identify a general rule of
international law as having the character of jus cogens has been
adopted.

JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

Political Question Doctrine

In this case, the political question doctrine was used by
the Supreme Court to analyze and resolve the issue. As held by
the US Supreme Court held in Baker vs. Carr:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to

involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it,
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
question.72

In ruling that the Executive Department did not commit grave

abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court recognized that it is well
within the power of the President to decide whether or not to take up
the cause of an individual and espouse it as one that of the State.

72 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)

January 12, 2016

G.R. No. 212426

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, FRANCISCO

"DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN,
PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY
L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR.
CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND
TEDDY CASIO, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE
GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY
ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL
EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 212444

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED

BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN
MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES
AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE
JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE
ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON
NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY
SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO
LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO,
SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G.
BAUTISTA, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY
VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T.
BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO
BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE,
AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND
DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS
RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS,
RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE
PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON,

ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION
AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT
FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR
UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS
NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA
GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND
ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., Petitioners-in-Intervention,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., Petitioner-in-Intervention.

Ponente: Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators,

questioned before the SC the constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the
executive department with the US and ratified on June 6,
2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the
access and use of portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed
Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the Agreed
Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities
within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and
combined training activities; humanitarian and disaster relief
activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the
parties.

Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as

medium of agreement with US violated the constitutional requirement
of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases,
troops and facilities whose entry into the country should be covered
by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through Senate
Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs
congressional ratification.
 ISSUES:

I.THE PETITIONS AS CITIZENS SUIT SATISFY THE

REQUIREMENTS OF LEGAL STANDING IN ASSAILING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EDCA
.
II.THE PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL STANDING AS TAXPAYERS

III.THE PETITIONS QUALIFY AS LEGISLATORS SUIT

IV.THE SC MAY EXERCISE ITS POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

OVER THE CASE

RULINGS:

I. The Court said that, the reason why those who challenge the validity
of a law or an international agreement are required to allege the
existence of a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. 73 But aside from general
statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public right,
and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, they
fail to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that
would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. The Petitioners failed
to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would
be violative by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so,
the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens'
suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned
requirements.

II. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant

to be a tax measure, nor is it directed at the disbursement of public
funds. A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which the official act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public
funds derived from taxation.74 Here, those challenging the act must
specifically show that they have sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that
principle to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the
exercise

73 Bayan Muna v. Romulo, supra note 114, at 265; Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra
note 93, at 893
74 Bayan v. Zamora, supra note 23.
III. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an
institutional prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate. In
a legislators suit, the injured party would be the Senate as an
institution or any of its incumbent members, as it is the Senates
constitutional function that is allegedly being violated. Here, none of
the petitioners, who are former senators, have the legal standing to
maintain the suit.

IV. Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of
transcendental importance 75 which justify setting aside the rule on
procedural technicalities. The challenge raised here is rooted in the
very Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which
provides for a stricter mechanism required before any foreign military
bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is of
paramount public interest that the Court is behooved to determine
whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Executive Department.
.
The Supreme Court said that EDCA is not a treaty by an
Executive Agreement and which does not the concurance of the
Senate. An agreement base on the Mutual Defense Treaty between
the United States of America and the Philippines.

The present acted upon his discreciation as Chief Executive

and who is in charge of foreing policies. He saw the need for the
country to depend its territory with the continuous encroachment of
China and subsequently filling of a diplomatic protest in the
International Trubunal. The Preseident also need the depend he
country thru domestic threat like the Abu Sayyaf and the New
Peoples Army76 and training the arm forces vis--vis with the US
military, they are acquiring knowleges and the transfer of such
knowledge will benefit the mility and the country.

Additionally, our country is fighting a most terrifying enemy: the

backlash of Mother Nature. The Philippines is one of the countries
most directly affected and damaged by climate change. It is no
coincidence that the record-setting tropical cyclone Yolanda
(internationally named Haiyan), one of the most devastating forces of
nature the world has ever seen hit the Philippines on 8 November

75 Petition of Saguisag et al., pp. 21-22, rol/o (G.R. No. 212426, Vol. I), pp. 23-24; Memorandum
of Saguisag et al., pp. 15-17, rollo (G.R. No. 212426, Vol. II), pp. 985-987; Petition ofBayan et al.,
pp. 6, rollo (G.R. No. 212444, Vol. I), pp. 8; Memorandum ofBayan et al., pp. 19, 23, rollo (G.R.
No. 212444, Vol. I), pp. 583, 587
76 Frinston Lim, Authorities believe Abu Sayyaf behind abduction of Filipina, 3 foreigners, 22

September 2015, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, available at <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/l

28739/authorities-believe-npa-behind-abduction-of-filipina-foreigners (last visited 3 December
2015).
2013 and killed at least 6,000 people. 77 This necessitated a massive
rehabilitation project. 78 In the aftermath, the U.S. military was among
the first to extend help and support to the Philippines.
As it is, EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an executive
agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that it
purports to implement.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petitions.

DISSENTING OPINION:

JUSTICE ARTURO BRION

Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners
satisfied the requirement of legal standing in asserting that a public
right has been violated through the commission of an act with grave
abuse of discretion. The court may exercise its power of judicial
review over the act of the Executive Department in not submitting the
EDCA agreement for Senate concurrence not because of the
transcendental importance of the issue, but because the petitioners
satisfy the requirements in invoking the courts expanded jurisdiction.

THE NON-SUBMISSION OF THE EDCA AGREEMENT FOR

CONCURRENCE BY THE SENATE VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTION

The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for

concurrence because it is in the form of a mere executive agreement,
not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the President is empowered to
enter into executive agreements on foreign military bases, troops or
facilities if (1) such agreement is not the instrument that allows the
entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or
treaty.

EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely

involves adjustments in detail in the implementation of the MTD and
the VFA. These are existing treaties between the Philippines and the
U.S. that have already been concurred in by the Philippine Senate
and have thereby met the requirements of the Constitution under Art
XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the status of these prior agreements,
EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate.

77 Joel Locsin, NDRRMC: Yolada death toll hits 6,300 mark nearly 6 months after typhoon, 17
April 2014, GMA NEWS ONLINE
<http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/357322/news/nation/ndrrmc-yolanda-death-toll-hits-6-
300-mark-nearly-6-months-after-typhoon> (last accessed 3 December 2015).
78 Typhoon Yolanda, OFFICIAL GAZETTE, available at <http://www.gov.ph/crisis-
response/updates-typhoon-yolanda/> (last visited 3 December 2015).
July 5, 2011

G.R. No. 171101

HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,

LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION and RIZAL
COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioners-in-
Intervention,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY
NASSER PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM; ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
BUKID NG HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE GALANG, NOEL
MALLARI, and JULIO SUNIGA1 and his SUPERVISORY GROUP
OF THE HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. and WINDSOR
ANDAYA, Respondents

Ponente: Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program

aimed at redistributing public and private agricultural lands to farmers
and farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered by this
law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-
industrial-residential expanse straddling several municipalities of
Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from the Spanish
owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is
owned and/or controlled by Jose Cojuangco Sr., Group. Back in
1980, the Martial Law administration filed an expropriation suit
against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the
farmers at cost.

Regional Trial Court rendered judgment ordering TADECO to

surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Therefrom, TADECO
appealed to the Court of Appeals.

In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the governments case

against TADECO. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case the
Marcos government initially instituted and won against TADECO, et
al. But the dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall
obtain the approval of FWB (Farm Worker Beneficiaries) to the SDP
(Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation.

Section 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock

transfer as two alternative modes in distributing land ownership to the
FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of
TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita
Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.

After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms

of the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by
TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by
then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of
TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.

From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those

benefits to the farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently contested
by two groups representing the interests of the farmers the HLI
Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote
letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms
and/or revocation of the SDOA. They claimed that they havent
actually received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms,
and that their lives havent really improved contrary to the promise
and rationale of the SDOA.

The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues

and to review the terms of the SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2.
Adopting the report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the
DAR Sec recommended to the PARC: (1) the revocation of
Resolution 89-12-2; and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita
through compulsory acquisition scheme. Consequently, the PARC
revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered
by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme under the
CARP law. These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.

On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the

invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the
corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock
transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this
modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being
inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in
Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the PARC possess jurisdiction to recall or revoke

HLIs SDP?

(2) Whether or not, Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock transfer

in lieu of outright land transfer, unconstitutional?
(3) Whether or not PARC gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the
subject SDP and placing the hacienda under CARPs compulsory
acquisition and distribution scheme?

(4) Whether or not those portions of the converted land within

Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO acquired by purchase be
excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution?

RULING:

The Court DENIED the petition of HLI and AFFIRMED the PARC
resolution placing the lands subject of HLIs SDP under compulsory
coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP, with
the MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs were
given the option to remain as stockholders of HLI. It also excluded
from the mandatory CARP coverage that part of Hacienda Luisita that
had been acquired by RCBC and LIPCO.

(1) Whether or not the PARC possess jurisdiction to recall or

revoke HLIs SDP? YES, the PARC has jurisdiction to revoke
HLIs SDP under the doctrine of necessary implication.

Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the

authority to approve the plan for stock distribution of the corporate
landowner belongs to PARC. Contrary to petitioner HLIs posture,
PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously
approved. It may be, as urged, that RA 6657 or other executive
issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC with the
power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority,
however, is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of
necessary implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a
statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.

Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be

stated that the conferment of express power to approve a plan for
stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners
necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the
plan. To deny PARC such revocatory power would reduce it into a
toothless agency of CARP, because the very same agency tasked to
ensure compliance by the corporate landowner with the approved
SDP would be without authority to impose sanctions for non-
compliance with it.

(2) Whether or not, Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock

transfer in lieu of outright land transfer, unconstitutional? NO, Sec. 31
of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional.
 The Court actually refused to pass upon the constitutional
question because it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and
because the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case.
Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since
SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700.

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial

review over, and pass upon the constitutionality of, acts of the
executive or legislative departments, it does so only when the
following essential requirements are first met, to wit: (1) there is an
actual case or controversy; (2) that the constitutional question is
raised at the earliest possible opportunity by a proper party or one
with locus standi; and (3) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case. Not all the foregoing requirements are
satisfied in the case at bar.

While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor

FARM, composed of a small minority of 27 farmers, has yet to explain
its failure to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 as
early as November 21, 1989 when PARC approved the SDP of
Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter, and
why its members received benefits from the SDP without so much of
a protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after approval
of the SDP that said plan and approving resolution were sought to be
revoked, but not, to stress, by FARM or any of its members, but by
petitioner AMBALA. Furthermore, the AMBALA petition did NOT
question the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but concentrated
on the purported flaws and gaps in the subsequent implementation of
the SDP. Even the public respondents, as represented by the
Solicitor General, did not question the constitutionality of the
provision. On the other hand, FARM, whose 27 members formerly
belonged to AMBALA, raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31 only on
May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental Comment with the Court.
Thus, it took FARM some eighteen (18) years from November 21,
1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657
which is quite too late in the day. The FARM members slept on their
rights and even accepted benefits from the SDP with nary a
complaint on the alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the
benefits were derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into
resolving a constitutional issue that FARM failed to assail after the
lapse of a long period of time and the occurrence of numerous events
and activities which resulted from the application of an alleged
unconstitutional legal provision.

The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional
issue must be the very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain.
The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered
not being critical to the resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has
been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If some other
grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching the
constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored.

The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions
originally taken by AMBALA (to which the FARM members previously
belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged non-compliance
by HLI with the conditions of the SDP to support a plea for its
revocation. And before the Court, the lis mota is whether or not PARC
acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the
SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched
and implemented, offends certain constitutional and statutory
provisions. To be sure, any of these key issues may be resolved
without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657.
Moreover, looking deeply into the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et
al., it is not the said section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the
alleged application of the said provision in the SDP that is flawed.

It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700,

amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA
6657 vis--vis the stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In its
pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: [T]hat after June 30,
2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to
sell and compulsory acquisition. Thus, for all intents and purposes,
the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer
an available option under existing law. The question of whether or not
it is unconstitutional should be a moot issue.

(3) Whether or not PARC gravely abuse its discretion in

revoking the subject SDP and placing the hacienda under CARPs
compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme? YES, the
revocation of the HLIs SDP valid.

NO, the PARC did NOT gravely abuse its discretion in revoking
the subject SDP and placing the hacienda under CARPs compulsory
acquisition and distribution scheme.

The revocation of the approval of the SDP is valid: (1) the

mechanics and timelines of HLIs stock distribution violate DAO 10
because the minimum individual allocation of each original FWB of
18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of man days
and the hiring of additional farmworkers; (2) the 30-year timeframe for
HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10
prescribes. In our review and analysis of par. 3 of the SDOA on the
mechanics and timelines of stock distribution, we find that it violates
two (2) provisions of DAO 10. Par. 3 of the SDOA states:
3. At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the
SECOND PARTY [HLI] shall arrange with the FIRST PARTY [TDC]
the acquisition and distribution to the THIRD PARTY [FWBs] on the
basis of number of days worked and at no cost to them of one-
thirtieth (1/30) of 118,391,976.85 shares of the capital stock of the
SECOND PARTY that are presently owned and held by the FIRST
PARTY, until such time as the entire block of 118,391,976.85 shares
shall have been completely acquired and distributed to the THIRD
PARTY.

It is clear as day that the original 6,296 FWBs, who were

qualified beneficiaries at the time of the approval of the SDP, suffered
from watering down of shares. As determined earlier, each original
FWB is entitled to 18,804.32 HLI shares. The original FWBs got less
than the guaranteed 18,804.32 HLI shares per beneficiary, because
the acquisition and distribution of the HLI shares were based on man
days or number of days worked by the FWB in a years time. As
explained by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work for at least 37 days in a
fiscal year before he or she becomes entitled to HLI shares. If it falls
below 37 days, the FWB, unfortunately, does not get any share at
year end. The number of HLI shares distributed varies depending on
the number of days the FWBs were allowed to work in one year.
Worse, HLI hired farmworkers in addition to the original 6,296 FWBs,
such that, as indicated in the Compliance dated August 2, 2010
submitted by HLI to the Court, the total number of farmworkers of HLI
as of said date stood at 10,502. All these farmworkers, which include
the original 6,296 FWBs, were given shares out of the
118,931,976.85 HLI shares representing the 33.296% of the total
outstanding capital stock of HLI. Clearly, the minimum individual
allocation of each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a
result of the use of man days and the hiring of additional
farmworkers.

Going into another but related matter, par. 3 of the SDOA

expressly providing for a 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock
transfer is an arrangement contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10
prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for the implementation of the
approved stock distribution plan within three (3) months from receipt
by the corporate landowner of the approval of the plan by PARC. In
fact, based on the said provision, the transfer of the shares of stock in
the names of the qualified FWBs should be recorded in the stock and
transfer books and must be submitted to the SEC within sixty (60)
days from implementation.

To the Court, there is a purpose, which is at once discernible as

it is practical, for the three-month threshold. Remove this timeline and
the corporate landowner can veritably evade compliance with
agrarian reform by simply deferring to absurd limits the
implementation of the stock distribution scheme.

Evidently, the land transfer beneficiaries are given thirty (30)

years within which to pay the cost of the land thus awarded them to
make it less cumbersome for them to pay the government. To be
sure, the reason underpinning the 30-year accommodation does not
apply to corporate landowners in distributing shares of stock to the
qualified beneficiaries, as the shares may be issued in a much
shorter period of time.

Taking into account the above discussion, the revocation of the

SDP by PARC should be upheld [because of violations of] DAO 10. It
bears stressing that under Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the PARC and the
DAR have the power to issue rules and regulations, substantive or
procedural. Being a product of such rule-making power, DAO 10 has
the force and effect of law and must be duly complied with. The
PARC is, therefore, correct in revoking the SDP. Consequently, the
PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, l989 approving
the HLIs SDP is nullified and voided.

(4) Whether or not those portions of the converted land within

Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO acquired by purchase be
excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution? YES,
those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that
RCBC and LIPCO acquired by purchase should be excluded
from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution.

There are two (2) requirements before one may be considered

a purchaser in good faith, namely: (1) that the purchaser buys the
property of another without notice that some other person has a right
to or interest in such property; and (2) that the purchaser pays a full
and fair price for the property at the time of such purchase or before
he or she has notice of the claim of another.

It can rightfully be said that both LIPCO and RCBC arebased

on the above requirements and with respect to the adverted
transactions of the converted land in questionpurchasers in good
faith for value entitled to the benefits arising from such status.

First, at the time LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred

(300) hectares of industrial land, there was no notice of any supposed
defect in the title of its transferor, Centennary, or that any other
person has a right to or interest in such property. In fact, at the time
LIPCO acquired said parcels of land, only the following annotations
appeared on the TCT in the name of Centennary: the Secretarys
Certificate in favor of Teresita Lopa, the Secretarys Certificate in
favor of Shintaro Murai, and the conversion of the property from
agricultural to industrial and residential use.

The same is true with respect to RCBC. At the time it acquired

portions of Hacienda Luisita, only the following general annotations
appeared on the TCTs of LIPCO: the Deed of Restrictions, limiting its
use solely as an industrial estate; the Secretarys Certificate in favor
of Koji Komai and Kyosuke Hori; and the Real Estate Mortgage in
favor of RCBC to guarantee the payment of PhP 300 million.

To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots

they bought were subjected to CARP coverage by means of a stock
distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order was annotated at the
back of the titles of the lots they acquired. However, they are of the
honest belief that the subject lots were validly converted to
commercial or industrial purposes and for which said lots were taken
out of the CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2
and, hence, can be legally and validly acquired by them. After all,
Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitly allows conversion and disposition of
agricultural lands previously covered by CARP land acquisition after
the lapse of five (5) years from its award when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes or the
locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater
economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes.
Moreover, DAR notified all the affected parties, more particularly the
FWBs, and gave them the opportunity to comment or oppose the
proposed conversion. DAR, after going through the necessary
processes, granted the conversion of 500 hectares of Hacienda
Luisita pursuant to its primary jurisdiction under Sec. 50 of RA 6657
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and its original
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform. The DAR conversion order became final and
executory after none of the FWBs interposed an appeal to the CA. In
this factual setting, RCBC and LIPCO purchased the lots in question
on their honest and well-founded belief that the previous registered
owners could legally sell and convey the lots though these were
previously subject of CARP coverage. Ergo, RCBC and LIPCO acted
in good faith in acquiring the subject lots.

And second, both LIPCO and RCBC purchased portions of

Hacienda Luisita for value. Undeniably, LIPCO acquired 300 hectares
of land from Centennary for the amount of PhP750 million pursuant to
a Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1998. On the other hand, in a Deed of
Absolute Assignment dated November 25, 2004, LIPCO conveyed
portions of Hacienda Luisita in favor of RCBC by way of dacion en
pago to pay for a loan of PhP431,695,732.10.
 In relying upon the above-mentioned approvals, proclamation
and conversion order, both RCBC and LIPCO cannot be considered
at fault for believing that certain portions of Hacienda Luisita are
industrial/commercial lands and are, thus, outside the ambit of CARP.
The PARC, and consequently DAR, gravely abused its discretion
when it placed LIPCOs and RCBCs property which once formed part
of Hacienda Luisita under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme
via the assailed Notice of Coverage.

The Court went on to apply the operative fact doctrine to

determine what should be done in the aftermath of its disposition of
the above-enumerated issues:

While We affirm the revocation of the SDP on Hacienda Luisita

subject of PARC Resolution Nos. 2005-32-01 and 2006-34-01, the
Court cannot close its eyes to certain operative facts that had
occurred in the interim. Pertinently, the operative fact doctrine
realizes that, in declaring a law or executive action null and void, or,
by extension, no longer without force and effect, undue harshness
and resulting unfairness must be avoided. This is as it should
realistically be, since rights might have accrued in favor of natural or
juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in the meantime. The
actual existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a
determination, an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration.

While the assailed PARC resolutions effectively nullifying the

Hacienda Luisita SDP are upheld, the revocation must, by application
of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original
6,296 qualified FWBs to choose whether they want to remain as HLI
stockholders or not. The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that
in 1989, 93% of the FWBs agreed to the SDOA (or the MOA), which
became the basis of the SDP approved by PARC per its Resolution
No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the
FWBs were said to have received from HLI salaries and cash
benefits, hospital and medical benefits, 240-square meter homelots,
3% of the gross produce from agricultural lands, and 3% of the
proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and the
80.51-hectare lot sold to SCTEX. HLI shares totaling 118,391,976.85
were distributed as of April 22, 2005. On August 6, 20l0, HLI and
private respondents submitted a Compromise Agreement, in which
HLI gave the FWBs the option of acquiring a piece of agricultural land
or remain as HLI stockholders, and as a matter of fact, most FWBs
indicated their choice of remaining as stockholders. These facts and
circumstances tend to indicate that some, if not all, of the FWBs may
actually desire to continue as HLI shareholders. A matter best left to
their own discretion.
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. PARC
Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated December 22, 2005 and Resolution
No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006, placing the lands subject of HLIs
SDP under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition
scheme of the CARP, are hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 qualified FWBs shall have the
option to remain as stockholders of HLI. DAR shall immediately
schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the
effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their
choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret
voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing
their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.

DISSENTING OPINIONS:

Chief Justice Corona dissented insofar as the majority refused

to declare Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional. The provision grants
to corporate landowners the option to give qualified FWBs the right to
own capital stock of the corporation in lieu of actual land distribution.
The Chief Justice was of the view that by allowing the distribution of
capital stock, and not land, as compliance with agrarian reform,
Sec. 31 of RA 6657 contravenes Sec. 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which, he argued, requires that the law implementing
the agrarian reform program should employ [actual] land
redistribution mechanism. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, he noted, the
corporate landowner remains to be the owner of the agricultural land.
Qualified beneficiaries are given ownership only of shares of stock,
not [of] the lands they till. He concluded that since an unconstitutional
provision cannot be the basis of a constitutional act, the SDP of
petitioner HLI based on Section 31 of RA 6657 is also
unconstitutional.

Justice Mendoza fully concurred with Chief Justice Coronas

position that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional. He however
agreed with the majority that the FWBs be given the option to remain
as shareholders of HLI. He also joined Justice Brions proposal that
that the reckoning date for purposes of just compensation should be
May 11, 1989, when the SDOA was executed by Tadeco, HLI and the
FWBs. Finally, he averred that considering that more than 10 years
have elapsed from May 11, 1989, the qualified FWBs, who can validly
dispose of their due shares, may do so, in favor of LBP or other
qualified beneficiaries. The 10-year period need not be counted from
the issuance of the Emancipation Title (EP) or Certificate of Land
Ownership Award CLOA) because, under the SDOA, shares, not
land, were to be awarded and distributed.
 Justice Brions dissent centered on the consequences of the
revocation of HLIs SDP/SDOA. He argued that that the operative fact
doctrine only applies in considering the effects of a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a statute or a rule issued by the Executive
Department that is accorded the status of a statute. The SDOA/SDP
is neither a statute nor an executive issuance but a contract between
the FWBs and the landowners; hence, the operative fact doctrine is
not applicable. A contract stands on a different plane than a statute
or an executive issuance. When a contract is contrary to law, it is
deemed void ab initio. It produces no legal effects whatsoever. Thus,
Justice Brion questioned the option given by the majority to the FWBs
to remain as stockholders in an almost-bankrupt corporation like HLI.
He argued that the nullity of HLIs SDP/SDOA goes into its very
existence, and the parties to it must generally revert to their
respective situations prior to its execution. Restitution, he said, is
therefore in order. With the SDP being void, the FWBs should return
everything they are proven to have received pursuant to the terms of
the SDOA/SDP. Justice Brion then proposed that all aspects of the
implementation of the mandatory CARP coverage be determined by
the DAR by starting with a clean slate from [May 11,] 1989, the point
in time when the compulsory CARP coverage should start, and
proceeding to adjust the relations of the parties with due regard to the
events that intervened [thereafter]. He also held that the time of the
taking (when the computation of just compensation shall be
reckoned) shall be May 11, 1989, when the SDOA was executed by
Tadeco, HLI and the FWBs.

Justice Sereno dissented with respect to how the majority

modified the questioned PARC Resolutions (i.e., no immediate land
distribution, give first the original qualified FWBs the option to either
remain as stockholders of HLI or choose actual land distribution) and
the applicability of the operative fact doctrine. She would instead
order the DAR to forthwith determine the area of Hacienda Luisita
that must be covered by the compulsory coverage and monitor the
land distribution to the qualified FWBs.

ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE COURTS DECISION

The High Tribunal actually voted unanimously (11-0) to

DISMISS/DENY the petition of HLI and to AFFIRM the PARC
resolutions. This is contrary to media reports that the Court voted 6-
4 to dismiss the HLI petition. The five (not four) minority justices
(Chief Justice Corona, and Justices Brion, Villarama, Mendoza, and
Sereno) only partially dissented from the decision of the majority of
six (Justice Velasco Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Abad, and Perez). Justice Antonio Carpio took no part in the
deliberations and in the voting, while Justice Diosdado Peralta was
on official leave. The 14th and 15th seats in the Court were earlier
vacated by the retirements of Justices Eduardo Antonio Nachura
(June 13, 2011) and Conchita Carpio-Morales (June 19, 2011).

Another misinterpretation came from no less than the Supreme

Court administrator and spokesperson, Atty. Midas Marquez. In a
press conference called after the promulgation of the Courts
decision, Marquez initially used the term referendum in explaining
the High Courts ruling. This created confusion among the parties and
the interested public since a referendum implies that the FWBs will
have to vote on a common mode by which to pursue their claims over
Hacienda Luisita. The decision was thus met with cries of
condemnation by the misinformed farmers and the various peoples
organizations and militant groups supportive of their cause.

Marquez would later correct himself in a subsequent press

briefing. But since by then the parties had already filed their
respective motions for reconsideration, he called upon everyone to
just wait for the final resolution of the motion[s], which is forthcoming
anyway. The resolution of the consolidated motions for
reconsideration came relatively early on November 22, 2011, or less
than five months from the promulgation of the decision.

Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the

authority to approve the plan for stock distribution of the corporate
landowner belongs to PARC. It may be that RA 6657 or other
executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the
PARC with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP, but such
power or authority is deemed possessed by PARC under the
principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.
Following this doctrine, the conferment of express power to approve a
plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners
necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the
plan.
April 22, 2014

G.R. No. 203335

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P.

MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR.,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203299

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203306

ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), HUKUMAN NG
MAMAMAYAN MOVEMENT, INC., JERRY S. YAP, BERTENI
"TOTO" CAUSING, HERNANI Q. CUARE, PERCY LAPID, TRACY
CABRERA, RONALDO E. RENTA, CIRILO P. SABARRE, JR.,
DERVIN CASTRO, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by President Benigno
Simeon Aquino III, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203359

SENATOR TEOFISTO DL GUINGONA III, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
SECRETARY OFTHE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, and DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203378
ALEXANDER ADONIS, ELLEN TORDESILLAS, MA. GISELA
ORDENES-CASCOLAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., ROMEL R.
BAGARES, and GILBERT T. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, AND THE INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE-DEPARTMENT OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203391

HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. ANTONIO TINIO, VENCER
MARI CRISOSTOMO OF ANAKBAYAN, MA. KATHERINE ELONA
OF THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGIAN, ISABELLE THERESE BAGUISI
OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary
and alter-ego of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, LEILA DE
LIMA in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203407

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL
RENATO M. REYES, JR., National Artist BIENVENIDO L.
LUMBERA, Chairperson of Concerned Artists of the Philippines,
ELMER C. LABOG, Chairperson of Kilusang Mayo Uno,
CRISTINA E. PALABAY, Secretary General of Karapatan,
FERDINAND R. GAITE, Chairperson of COURAGE, JOEL B.
MAGLUNSOD, Vice President of Anakpawis Party-List, LANA R.
LINABAN, Secretary General Gabriela Womens Party, ADOLFO
ARES P. GUTIERREZ, and JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG,
Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, President of the Republic of
the Philippines, PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE
PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, represented by SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR., LEILA DE LIMA, Secretary of the Department of
Justice, LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, Executive Director
of the Information and Communications Technology Office,
NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation, D/GEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, Chief of the
Philippine National Police, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of
the Department of the Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203440

MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA,
AMPARITA STA. MARIA, RAY PAOLO J. SANTIAGO, GILBERT V.
SEMBRANO, and RYAN JEREMIAH D. QUAN (all of the Ateneo
Human Rights Center), Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAQUITO OCHOA in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, HONORABLE LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as
Secretary of Justice, HONORABLE MANUEL ROXAS in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, The CHIEF of the Philippine National Police, The
DIRECTOR of the National Bureau of Investigation (all of the
Executive Department of Government), Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203453

NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(NUJP), PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE (PPI), CENTER FOR
MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, ROWENA CARRANZA
PARAAN, MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS, JOSEPH ALWYN
ALBURO, ARIEL SEBELLINO AND THE PETITIONERS IN THE e-
PETITION http://www.nujp.org/no-to-ra10175/, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE CYBERCRIME
INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING CENTER, AND ALL
AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF GOVERNMENT AND
ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS,
ORDERS, DIRECTION IN RELATION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203454

PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO & RYAN D. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE HON. SECRETARY OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203469

ANTHONY IAN M. CRUZ; MARCELO R. LANDICHO; BENJAMIN
NOEL A. ESPINA; MARCK RONALD C. RIMORIN; JULIUS D.
ROCAS; OLIVER RICHARD V. ROBILLO; AARON ERICK A.
LOZADA; GERARD ADRIAN P. MAGNAYE; JOSE REGINALD A.
RAMOS; MA. ROSARIO T. JUAN; BRENDALYN P. RAMIREZ;
MAUREEN A. HERMITANIO; KRISTINE JOY S. REMENTILLA;
MARICEL O. GRAY; JULIUS IVAN F. CABIGON; BENRALPH S.
YU; CEBU BLOGGERS SOCIETY, INC. PRESIDENT RUBEN B.
LICERA, JR; and PINOY EXPAT/OFW BLOG AWARDS, INC.
COORDINATOR PEDRO E. RAHON; Petitioners,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his capacity as
President of the Republic of the Philippines; SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his
capacity as Senate President; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
represented by FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity
as Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA
M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON. LOUIS
NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his capacity as Executive
Director, Information and Communications Technology Office;
HON. NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his capacity as
Director, National Bureau of Investigation; and P/DGEN.
NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine
National Police, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203501

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his official
capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his official capacity as Executive
Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her official capacity as
Secretary of Justice; LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his
official capacity as Executive Director, Information and
Communications Technology Office; NONNATUS CAESAR R.
ROJAS, in his official capacity as Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation; and DIRECTOR GENERAL NICANOR A.
BARTOLOME, in his official capacity as Chief of the Philippine
National Police, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203509

BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE NERI J. COLMENARES,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, JR.,
Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203515

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
represented by BENNY D. ANTIPORDA in his capacity as
President and in his personal capacity, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRES. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO
III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND ALL OTHER GOVERNMENT
INSTRUMENTALITIES WHO HAVE HANDS IN THE PASSAGE
AND/OR IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 10175,
Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203518

PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE, composed of
DAKILA- PHILIPPINE COLLECTIVE FOR MODERN HEROISM,
represented by Leni Velasco, PARTIDO LAKAS NG MASA,
represented by Cesar S. Melencio, FRANCIS EUSTON R.
ACERO, MARLON ANTHONY ROMASANTA TONSON, TEODORO
A. CASIO, NOEMI LARDIZABAL-DADO, IMELDA MORALES,
JAMES MATTHEW B. MIRAFLOR, JUAN G.M. RAGRAGIO,
MARIA FATIMA A. VILLENA, MEDARDO M. MANRIQUE, JR.,
LAUREN DADO, MARCO VITTORIA TOBIAS SUMAYAO, IRENE
CHIA, ERASTUS NOEL T. DELIZO, CRISTINA SARAH E. OSORIO,
ROMEO FACTOLERIN, NAOMI L. TUPAS, KENNETH KENG, ANA
ALEXANDRA C. CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
THE SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
 OFFICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
THE HEAD OF THE DO OFFICE OF CYBERCRIME, and THE
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND
COORDINATING CENTER, Respondents.

Ponente: Justice Roberto Abad

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The case was a consolidated petition to the Supreme Court of

the Philippines on the constitutionality of the several provisions of the
Cybercrime Preventions Act of 2012, RA 10175

The Petitioners argued that even though the statute or the Act
is the governments platform in battling illegal cybercrime activities,
there were 21 sections of the Act violate the constitutional rights,
particularly the right to freedom of expression and access to
informations.

PROCEEDINGS:

In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of

a temporary restraining order against the government to halt
enforcement of the Act until the adjudication of the issues.

ISSUES:
I. That there were insertions of certain provision that were neither in
the house bill and Senate bill

II. Section 6 of the cybercrime law imposes penalties that are one
degree higher when the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code.

III. The Courts decision upholding the constitutionality of Section

4C(4) which penalizes online libel, effectively tramples the right for
free expression.

RULINGS:

I. The Cybercrime Prevention Act went through both house and they
approved it. Any issue concerning the alleged non-compliance with
the governing rules of both houses regarding the committee
 insertions have to be internallu resolve by each houses. Separation of
Powers

II. The Law merely makes the commission of the existing crimes
through the internet a qualifying circumstance that raises by one
degree of the penalties corresponding so such crime. Compared to
traditional crimes, cybercrimes are more perverse and its crosses
national boundaries, enjoys the advantage of anonymity. That
Congress may provide a variety of periods for the prescription of
offences as it sees fit.

III. As early as 1912, the Court held that libel is a form of expression not
protected by the Constitution.79 Libel, like obscenity, belongs to those
forms of speeches that have never attained Constitutional protection
and are considered outside the realm of protected freedom. As
explained by the US Supreme Court in Champlinsky v. New
Hampsire:80 It is well understood that the right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances. The resort to
personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitutions.

The Court denies with finality all the petitions for reconsideration.

79 Worcester v. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 41 (1912), cited in Bernas, S.J. The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 3rd ed., Rex Book Store, Manila, 2003.
80 9 315 U.S. 568 (1942), cited in Gorospe, R. Constitutional Law: Notes and Readings on the Bill

of Rights, Citizenship and Suffrage, Vol. I, Rex Book Store, Manila, 2006, p. 672.
April 8, 2014

G.R. No. 204819

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for

themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC.

[ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S.
Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B. Luistro, Jose S.
Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C.
Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M.
Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho &
Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne
C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C.
Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C.
Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V.
Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica
Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey
C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor &
Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children
Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho &
Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho
for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael
Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie
Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel
Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children
Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M.
Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN
A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of
Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic
Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE
COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson,
Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH
INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President
Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF
MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Donato Marcos, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and

VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr.

Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal
capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr.
Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in
his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G.
IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC,
EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE

APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE
H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG
SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN
A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein

represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo,
and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B.
Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap,
Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael
Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno
and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-
General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on
Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D.,

CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-
LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and
ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS
ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA
COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as
Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the
Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD

& ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of
Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines,
Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by

Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal
capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A.
CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES,
RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG,
RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON

PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING,
Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY

VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO,
ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN

CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE
 BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A.
RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM,

Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, Respondents.

Ponente: Justice Jose Catral Mendoza

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted Republic Act No.

10354, also known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law). The RH Law is an
enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws
on contraception, women's health and population control.

President Benigno S. Aquino III gave his imprimatur and

support for the said law. Soon thereafter, groups of concerned
citizens, religious organizations, and the Catholic Church instituted
series of petitions in Court against the law to assail RH laws
constitutionality.

Petitioners were assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the

following grounds:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which
 are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law
provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.

3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners

contend that the RH Law violated the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. While it was recognized that the
guarantee of religious freedom was not absolute, they argued that the
RH Law failed to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the
"compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to
free exercise of religion and the right to free speech. For the
petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that were believed to
be contrary to their beliefs was included in the constitutional mandate
ensuring religious freedom.

Moreover, petitioners contended that, "Section 7 of the RH Law

violates the right to due process and privacy of families, by removing
from the people the right to manage their own affairs and to decide
what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services
they shall offer." It ignored the management prerogative inherent in
corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with
their own discretion and judgment.

Petitioners also submitted that the RH Law violated Section

26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one
title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent-
to act as a population control measure.

They also claimed that the provisions of RH Law violated the

rights to equal protection, academic freedom and freedom from
involuntary servitude. It also intruded on the autonomy of local
governments and the ARMM, and violated natural law. Moreover,
they claimed that Congress delegation of authority to the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) in determining which should be included in
the Essential Drugs List (EDL) was invalid.

On the other hand, the Respondents asserted that there was no

actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues were not yet
ripe for judicial determination. Proponents of the RH Law submitted
that the subject petitions did not present any actual case or
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They
claimed that the questions raised by the petitioners were not yet
concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one had been charged
with violating any of its provisions and that there was no showing that
any of the petitioners' rights had been adversely affected by its
operation.

It was contended that judicial review of the RH Law was

premature because it was a prerequisite that something had been
accomplished or performed by either branch before petitioning the
Court, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself because of the challenged action. Thus,
one must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury because of the act.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) assailed the propriety

of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that
the RH Law could not be challenged "on its face" as it was not a
speech regulating measure.

In addition, respondents stated that some petitioners lack legal

standing to question the RH Law. The OSG contended that the "as
applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners could not prosper as the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, and
the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that
are abortive.

The respondents also assailed the petitions because these

were essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction.

They also insisted that the RH Law is not violative of the one-
subject-one-title rule in the Constitution. It is not a birth or population
control measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood"
and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they were separate.

The Court, after deliberating the issues and arguments of the

parties, issued Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) that lead to a 120-day
halt on the implementation of the Law. Due to further arguments and
debates from opposing parties, the SQAO was extended until further
orders of the Court.

PROCEEDINGS:

In toto, 14 petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention were filed

before the Supreme Court:
 1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by spouses Attys. James
M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as
citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children;
and the Magnificat Child Learning Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-
owned educational institution (Imbong);
2. Petition for Prohibition, filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation
Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S.
Noche and several others in their personal capacities as citizens and
on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
3. Petition for Certiorari, filed by the Task Force for Family and Life
Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens
and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
4. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Serve Life Cagayan De
Oro City, Inc., Rosevale Foundation, Inc., a domestic, privately-
owned educational institution, and several others, in their capacities
as citizens (Serve Life);
5. Petition filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen
(Bugarin);
6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Eduardo Olaguer and
the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines, in their
capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by the Philippine Alliance
of Xseminarians Inc., and several others in their capacities as citizens
and taxpayers (PAX);
8. Petition filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others, in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
9. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by spouses Francisco and
Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as
citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F.
Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar
(Tatad);
10. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Pro-Life Philippines
Foundation Inc. and several others, in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the
Bar (Pro-Life);
11. Petition for Prohibition, filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,
Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and
Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers
and members of the Bar (MSF);
12. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by John Walter B. Juat and
several others, in their capacities as citizens (Juat);
13. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Couples for Christ
Foundation, Inc. and several others, in their capacities as citizens
(CFC);
14. Petition for Prohibition filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein
M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah);
15. Petition-In-Intervention filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his
capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
16. Petition-In-Intervention filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B
UHAY), an accredited political party.

ISSUES:

I. Procedural Issues on whether the Court may exercise its power of

judicial review over the controversy:
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

II. Substantive Issues on whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1. Right to Life
2. Right to Health
3. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4. The Family
5. Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6. Due Process
7. Equal Protection
8. Involuntary Servitude
9. Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10. Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM

RULING:

The Court partially granted the Petitions. Accordingly, the Court

declared RA No. 10354, or the RH law as CONSTITUTIONAL, except
with respect to the following provisions that were declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1. Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as

they: (a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which
is conveniently accessible; and (b) allow minor-parents or minors who
have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2. Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,

particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
 healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health
regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3. Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR

insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the
spouse;

4. Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR

insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures.

5. Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,

particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless
of his or her religious beliefs;
6. Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall
do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive
health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7. Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding

the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they
affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation;
and

8. Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the
qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.

The Court also lifted Status Quo Ante Order It issued on March
19, 2013 as extended by Its Order, dated July 16, 2013, insofar as
the provisions of the RH law, which had been declared as
constitutional.
 JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION:

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as

unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-
safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality
reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As
earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of
society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is
a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than
the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and

State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on
the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room
for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and
open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as
we exist alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea

does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the
problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be
said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large
population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population
growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's
wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the

country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which
embarked on such a program generations ago, are now burdened
with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is
dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young
workers represent a significant human capital which could have
helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These
countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still
struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem,

but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal
provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it.
Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom
of a law.

I. Procedural issues

a. Whether or not the Court may exercise

its power of Judicial Review
 Yes. While the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. The following
requisites for judicial review were met: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota
of the case

b. Whether or not there is an actual case

or controversy

Yes, the Court held that there was an actual case or

controversy and that it was ripe for judicial determination. The RH
Law and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR) already took
effect and that public funds were also allocated/appropriated. When
an action of the legislative branch was seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty
of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Moreover, the petitioners have
shown that medical practitioners or medical providers were in danger
of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits. Thus, the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy.

c. Whether the Court may apply facial

challenge

Yes, the scope of application of facial challenges extends to the

regulation of free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights. While this Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech,
but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For
unlike its counterpart in the United States, this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. Verily, the framers of our Constitution envisioned a
proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have

seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech
 and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above had been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law
could indeed pass constitutional scrutiny.

d. Whether or not Petitioners have Locus

Standi

Yes, regardless whether the petitioners are directly injured of

affected by the RH Law or not, the Court leans on the doctrine that
"the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed
for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest." The RH Law falls under
transcendental importance as it drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and
expression and other constitutional rights.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and

substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It
requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies

the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if
he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation
of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also
known as the prohibition against third-party standing.

Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed

through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again
acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded
certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or
with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance be invoked. The
rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the
Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus
allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit
they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act.
 In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents,
not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised
must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law
drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and
health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep
division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no
doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn
which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be
taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at

this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperiled
to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child
is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.

e. Whether or not the petitions are praying

for declaratory relief

Yes. Most of the petitions were praying for injunctive reliefs, not
declaratory reliefs, and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays
for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.

f. Whether the petitions violate the One

Subject-One Title Rule

No. In a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law,

both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. Thus, the Court finds no reason to believe that
Congress had the intention to deceive the public regarding the
contents of the said law.

The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of

the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our
women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing
products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to
provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with
access to information on the full range of modem family planning
products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or
modern, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of
pregnancy.
 For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH
Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-

natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however,
covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to
medically-safe, non-abortificient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the
whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact,
the central idea of the RH Law. Indeed, remove the provisions that
refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its
very foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions
such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and
post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna
Carta for Women."

II. Substantive issues

a. Whether or not the RH Law is

unconstitutional on the grounds that it
violates Right to Life

No. Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State

recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the traditional meaning of

conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente
is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the
view that conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a)

conception to refer to the moment of fertilization and (b) the
protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did
not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only
those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited.
Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and
female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.
 The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the
life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a
measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise.
The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion.
By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but
also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized
ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to
protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office

when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term
primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily
induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for
the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II
of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term
primarily, must be struck down.

a.1. when life begins

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that
the individual members of the Court could express their own views on
this matter. In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life
begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be

made on the particular phrase of Section 12, which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from

conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is
no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the
Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or
when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there
are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact
that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the
view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life
begins.

Concisely, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception

is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male
sperm. On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that
conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the
uterus.

a.2. Plain and legal meaning of words

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the

Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning.
As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First,
because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained;
and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness
it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law
to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of

the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable
and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the

act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the
fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a
being like its parents.

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term

"conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male
spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and
maturation under normal conditions.

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal

personality.
 a.3. determining the intent of the framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the

intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it
clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."

From the deliberations, it is apparent that the Framers of the

Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection
to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity
of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm
and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting
measures that would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the

Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right
to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive
device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to
the courts to decide on based on established evidence. From the
discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized
ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.

Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of

the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take
action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood

under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention
of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception,
that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the
theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.
According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and
successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical
and synonymous." Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that
pregnancy can be medically detected."

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any

legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life
but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an
 inanimate object -it is a living human being complete with DNA and
chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it
would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to
the Constitution.

b. Whether or not the RH Law is

unconstitutional on the grounds that it
violates Right to Health

No, the provisions of RA 4729 are still in place and the status
quo on the sale of contraceptives is maintained and the Court
believes that there are adequate measures that ensure that the public
has access to contraceptives that have been determined safe
following testing, evaluation, and approval by the FDA.

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to

health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of
the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right
to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States'

duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and

comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an

effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health, manpower development, and research,
responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for

disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and
selfreliance, and their integration into the mainstream of
society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

 Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade
malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion; however, these provisions

are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary,
the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-
executing provisions.

It bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not

question contraception and contraceptives per se. In fact, ALFI prays
that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale
and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are
dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be
maintained.

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this

regard is to leave intact the provisions of RA. No. 4729. There is no
intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its
requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees
with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the
RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives
since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs
and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician.
With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to
ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made
available to the public.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and

devices, it must consider the provisions of RA No. 4729, which is still
in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall
be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices
will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all
possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy
responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in
supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held
accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or
incidental to their use.

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive

has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It
behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices
are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to
ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for
public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point,
 the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the
various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the
constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the
case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress

cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine
devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section
9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the
EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative
only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the
FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine
whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is
safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence
concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this
construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the

inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices,
injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary
in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by
the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no
predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are
"safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper
scientific examination.

c. Whether or not the RH Law is

unconstitutional on the grounds that it
violates Freedom of Religion and Right
to Free Speech

The RH law does not violate guarantee of religious freedom via

the state-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which
contravene the religious beliefs of the people including the
petitioners. This is because in doing so, the state would be adhering
to one religion, making a de facto state religion, which is contrary to
religious freedom.

It does not violate the guarantee of religious freedom by

requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition (sec.7, 23, 24). A cursory reading of
the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the
petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be
spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type
of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether
they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who
receive any information during their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them,
are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable,
and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the
intervention of the State.

However, RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom

by compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care
providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions
despite their conscientious objections. The Court is of the view that
the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious
belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on
modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner
Joaquin A. Bernas has written, "at the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it
is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health
providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally
repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly
what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is
equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.

The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. The

principle of separation of Church and State is enshrined in Article II,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be

inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based

on benevolent neutrality or mutual respect. Generally, the State
cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less
question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one
religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the
church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the
rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs,
even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should
ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited
provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers
to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which
metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the
"Church" means the religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to

provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its
secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate
in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987
Constitution.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom

provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from

sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other
religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion
and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a
religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part
of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed

to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal to promote
freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest
terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while
the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In
other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence
individual religious beliefs and practices.

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is

the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of
two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's
belief. The first part is absolute.

The second part however, is limited and subject to the

awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper
regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the
belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.

c.1. religious freedom and the right to free speech

 Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily
intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of
one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be
silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows
the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating
their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what
is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind.223
While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through
informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the
religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or
burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral

convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State,
on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive
health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the
people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of
their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious
freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be
exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he
would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and
conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion"
enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the
applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist
abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.

c.2. legislative acts and the free exercise clause

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to

determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in
the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a
religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according
to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters
dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical
law, custom and rule of a church are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench
should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have
authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom.
 While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted
allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners,
however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema.
Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs
should be respected.

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which

would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors,
however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify
the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show
the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to

believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to
what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is
compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting
according to one's belief.

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the

life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject
provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is
contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she
even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the
burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is
immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on
reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the

infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the
respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a
person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the
respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to
show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective
is the least intrusive means. Other than the assertion that the act of
referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral
by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as
violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to
demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to
achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious
objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by
other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related
procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a
person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves
 the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional
freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the
Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering
other legislations as they stand now, RA No. 4729 or the
Contraceptive Act, RA No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and RA No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna
Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to
health services and programs.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery
of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be
solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on
religious beliefs m exchange for blind conformity.

d. Whether or not the RH Law is

unconstitutional on the grounds that it
infringes the privacy of families

Yes, Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which required only the

consent of the spouse undergoing the provision in order to undergo
reproductive procedures intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy
and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the
basic social institution. Further, the exclusion of parental consent in
cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which declares
that the rearing of children by parents is a natural right.

e. Whether or not the RH Law is

unconstitutional on the grounds that it
violates equal protection and due
process

No, the Law did not violate equal protection clause and due
process.

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal
protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against
the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use. They argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of
the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law
dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles and definition of terms of the law.
 "According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It
"requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions,

not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal
protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is
taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the

laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality,

it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members
of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be
made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the
class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all
those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The
mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other
members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from
all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances

only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included
in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who
 may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not
leave out or "under include" those that should otherwise fall into a
certain classification.

Relatedly, a statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness

when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute

are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their
plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be
exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service
and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications
and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods"
are broad enough to include the providing of information and the
rendering of medical procedures.

f. Whether or not the RH Law is

unconstitutional on the grounds that it
violates academic freedom

The Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity. The

court decided that making a ruling on Section 14 of the RH Law,
which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education, is premature. The
Department of Education has not yet created a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education, thus the constitutionality of
the specifics in such a curriculum still cannot be determined. The
exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH
education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
 especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae

to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the
Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the
youth and their important role in nation building.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory

reproductive health education program shall be developed in
conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will
be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing
such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention
that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is
without merit.

g. Whether or not the RH Law is

unconstitutional on the grounds that it
promotes involuntary servitude

No. The State has the power to regulate the practice of

medicine in order to ensure the welfare of the public. Not only that,
but Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH
service providers to give pro bono service; they do not incur penalties
if they refuse. Conscientious objects are exempt if their religious
beliefs do not allow them to provide the said services.

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services

envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor
analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers
have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono
services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within
the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical
practitioners with Phil Health being a privilege and not a right.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is

undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a
duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of
medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it
directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power
includes the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the
practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the
public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate
or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking
such right altogether.
 Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary
servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or
other similar means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the
assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private
and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers to
render pro bona service. Other than non-accreditation with Phil
Health, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise.
Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service
providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service
they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to
provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is
made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While
the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same
to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive
imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate
state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however,

it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt
from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions
do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or
otherwise.

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural

law, suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a
legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is
the Constitution.

While every law enacted by man emanated from what is

perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute,
executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it
is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural
laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by
theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the
philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction,
rather than in the actual law of the past or present. Unless, a natural
right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a
basis to strike down a law.

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not

sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any
shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control
program of the government by providing information and making non-
abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public,
especially to the poor.
h. Whether or not the RH Law is
unconstitutional on the grounds that it
unduly delegates authority to the FDA

No, the Court found nothing wrong with the delegation. The
FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the
only government entity empowered to render such services and
highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services
and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with
what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

Under RA 3720, the FDA, being the primary and sole premiere
and only agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, has the power and competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services and methods.

i. Whether or not the RH Law is

unconstitutional on the grounds that it
violates autonomy of local governments

No, the RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local
governments. Under paragraph (c) of Section 17, unless a local
government unit (LGU) is particularly designated as the implementing
agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been
provided by the national government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGUs. Not only that, but LGUs
are merely encouraged and not compelled to provide RH services.
Provision of these services are not mandatory.

A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains

to the establishment of health care facilities, the hiring of skilled
health professionals, or the training of barangay health workers, it will
be the national government that will provide for the funding of its
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to national priority
programs which the local government is called upon to implement like
the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are

merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the
wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability
of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot
be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the
national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local
governments.
 The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of
local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law
does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6,
10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded
to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the
RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for
the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied
upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be
exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be
characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the
veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the
supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of
imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the
regional governments. Except for the express and implied limitations
imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to
exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects
which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.

DISSENTING OPINION:

Justice Marvic M.V.F Leonen

Justice Leonen was of the opinion that none of the petitions

properly presented an actual case or controversy which deserves
the exercise of judicial review. The consolidated petitions do not
provide the proper venue to decide on fundamental issues. The law in
question is needed social legislation.

An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict

of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based
on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a
court of justice.

He also opined that the petitioners had no locus standi.

Petitioners, by no stretch of the imagination, cannot be representative
of the interests of the entire Filipino nation. Not all Filipinos are
Roman Catholics. Not all Filipinos are from the Visayas. Certainly not
all Filipinos have a common interest that will lead to a common point
of view on the constitutionality of the various provisions of the RH
law.

The court cannot make a declaration on the beginning of life.

Any declaration on this issue will be fraught with contradictions. Even
the Constitutional Commissioners were not in full agreement; hence,
the use of the word conception rather than fertilized ovum in
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. There were glaring factual
inaccuracies peddled during their discussion.

The Constitutional Commission deliberations show that it is not

true that the issue of when life begins is already a settled matter.
There are several other opinions on this issue. The Constitutional
Commissioners adopted the term conception rather than fertilized
ovum.

Insisting that we can impose, modify or alter rules of the Food

and Drug Administration is usurpation of the executive power of
control over administrative agencies. It is a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, which recognizes that [e]ach department of
the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. The system of
checks and balances only allows us to declare, in the exercise of our
judicial powers, the Food and Drugs Administrations acts as violative
of the law or as committed with grave abuse of discretion. Such
power is further limited by the requirement of actual case or
controversy.

The petitions have failed to present clear cases when the

provisions for conscientious objection would truly amount to a
violation of religion. They have not distinguished the relationship of
conscience and specific religious dogma. They have not established
religious canon that conflict with the general provision of Sections 7,
17 and 23 of the law. The comments in intervention in fact raise
serious questions regarding what could be acceptable Catholic
doctrine on some issues of contraception and sex as only for
procreation.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION:

Justice Antonio Carpio

Justice Carpio stated that the court is not competent to declare

when human life begins. Therefore, the issue must be settled within
the scientific and medical community.

He further opined that RA No. 10354 protects the ovum upon its
fertilization (without actually saying that life begins here). The issue
then, of whether life begins during fertilization or when the ovum
plants itself on the uterus wall, is covered as this protects at both
stages.
 Although the law does not provide a definition of conception, it
has provisions that embody the policy of the state to protect the travel
of the fertilized ovum to the uterus wall. The law states that it will
provide means which do not prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum
as determined by the Food and Drug Administration.

Justice Arturo Brion

Justice Brion conveyed that the petitions are ripe for judicial
review. The petitions allege actions by the legislature and by the
executive that lie outside the contemplation of the Constitution. A
controversy exists appropriate for this Court's initial consideration of
the presence of grave abuse of discretion: and consequent
adjudication if the legislative and executive actions can be so
characterized.

He said that while the RH Law generally protects and promotes

the unborns right to life, its Section 9 and its IRR fail in their fidelity to
the Constitution and to the very terms of the RH Law itself. It fails to
adopt the principle of double effect under Section 12, Article II of the
1987 Constitution.

The Court should formulate guidelines on what the government

can actually procure and distribute under the RH law, consistent with
its authority under this law and Section 12, Article II to achieve the full
protection the Constitution envisions. The attack on Section 14s
constitutionality is premature because that the lack of an
implementing curriculum by the Department of Education makes it
premature to rule on constitutionality. The court cannot determine yet
how parental rights will be affected since the specifics of what would
be taught under the RH education program do not yet exist.

The RH Laws implementation could have political and

economic consequences. It could also produce social consequences
by ushering in behaviors and perceptions about sex, marriage, and
family that are vastly different (in a negative way) from the norm.

Section 23(a) (l) of the RH Law is an unconstitutional

subsequent punishment of speech. It has overreached the
permissible coverage of regulation on the speech of doctors and
other health professionals. The existing information dissemination
program found in the RH law is sufficient in providing information
about available reproductive health services and programs, and the
existing regulatory framework for their practice already sufficiently
protects against such negligence and malpractice. Furthermore, the
said section can create a chilling effect for those in the profession.
June 25, 2013

G.R. No. 179267

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE
JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all
surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.

Ponente: Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of

Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional,
psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation
of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of
marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the Petitioner (Garcia) failed to fulfill
and comply with the requirements and the court issued multiple
modified TPO and extensions and the petitioner failed to answer and
provide comment.

PROCEEDINGS:

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with

prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of
the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted
product of an invalid law.

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but

however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of
constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition
for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted collateral attack on said law.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Thus, this petition is filed.

ISSUES:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN

FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY,
UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN

NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO
PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.

V. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT

DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.

RULINGS:

I. At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special

courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369,
otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
domestic violence against women and children.81 In accordance with

81SEC. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxxx
k) Cases of domestic violence against:
1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse
such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and
freedom movement; and
2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation,
violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development.
 said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of
the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several
key cities identified. To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law,
Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts
designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:

II. The RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the
laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union82, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification
is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that
it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing
conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not
violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.

III. The RA 9262 is not violative of the due process since the essence of
due process is in the reasonable opportunity that was given to the
petitioners to be heard and submit his defense.

IV. The non-referral of a Violence Against Woman Case (VAWC) case to

a mediator is justified. Since time is an essence and referring the
case to mediation will delay the proceedings and further violence can
be prevented and that violence is not subject to compromise.

V. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay Officials.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.83 On the
other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.84

In the instant case, there were no concrete evidence and

convincing argument was presented by the petitioner to warrant a
declaration of the unconstitiuonality of RA 9262.85

82 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, supra note 69, 90.

83 Sec. 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
84 Laurel v. Desierto, 430 Phil. 658 (2002).
85 ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE, Associate Justice
 Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's
movement against domestic violence shows that one of its most
difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we
keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of
women for equality but will be its fulfillment."86

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition for lack of merit.

86 Supra note 85.