DAN RUNILLE ABESAMIS

UNITED HOUSING CORPORATION vs. HON. ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, SPOUSES JOSE M. TAPIA JR. and LYDIA C. TAPIA

FACTS:
Jose M. Tapia, Jr. bought a lot from United Housing Corporation under a Novated Contract to Sell a Parcel of
Land. Tapia has long fully paid the purchase price of said lot but Petitioner Corporation has not executed the Absolute
Deed of Sale nor transferred the title in favor of Tapia despite repeated demands.

Tapia filed a complaint against Petitioner Corporation before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). A compromise agreement was arrived later by the parties wherein Petitioner Corporation promised among
others, to deliver the title of the subject lot within two (2) months from the date of the compromise agreement.

Petitioner Corporation, however, failed to honor its commitment under said compromise agreement to secure
the release of subject title and to deliver the same to the private respondents.

Respondent Tapia moved for the execution of the judgment but was opposed by Petitioner Corporation. Instead
of acting on the motion, the HLURB forwarded the records to the Senior State Prosecutor for violation by herein
petitioner of Section 25 of P.D. 957, consisting in its failure to deliver the subject title to private respondent and to
comply with the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties and approved by the Commission.

Having failed to the effect the execution of the judgment upon compromise, private respondents Spouses Tapia
filed a complaint for specific performance with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Later, Petitioner Corporation moved for the dismissal of the aforesaid complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction by virtue of PD 1344, as amended by EO 648. The motion was then dismissed, hence, this appeal to the S.C.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a case of specific performance decided by the HLURB whose decision has already become final,
may be relitigated in the Regional Trial Court on the same issue and between the same parties.

HELD:
The case of specific performance decided by the HLURB whose decision has already become final, cannot be
relitigated in the Regional Trial Court on the same issue and between the same parties.

As explicitly provided by law, jurisdiction over actions for specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner or developer, is vested exclusively
in the HLURB. There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over
certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise.

Moreover, the S.C. was not oblivious to the stark fact that the parties herein had arrived at a compromise
agreement. No one can dispute that the "essence of compromises, being mutual concessions by the parties, is to avoid
or end litigation. It is therefore a well-settled rule that a compromise, once approved by final orders of the court has the
force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery".

A judgment rendered upon a compromise agreement, not contrary to law or public policy or public order has all
the force and effect of any other judgment, it being a judgment on the merits, hence, conclusive upon the parties and
their privies. As such, it can be enforced by writ of execution.

Thus, under Section 3 of said P.D. 1344, it is specifically provided that: "As soon as the decision has become final
and executory, the HLURB "shall on motion of the interested party, issue a writ of execution, enforceable in accordance
with the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines"

Upon failure then of the HSRC to act on their motion for execution of the judgment, private respondents should
have instituted mandamus proceedings to compel the HSRC to perform its purely ministerial duty of enforcing its final
and executory decision. For the reasons hereinabove discussed a new complaint in court for specific performance was
untenable.

The undeniable fact is that the Compromise Agreement has long become final and executory. Its terms can no
longer be changed and petitioner cannot seek to defer its execution indefinitely. The day of reckoning must come soon if
justice is to acquire real meaning. To require private respondents to plead anew before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board for the execution of the Compromise Agreement would be circuitous and time-consuming. The fairest
and most equitable course to take under the circumstances is to write finis to the controversy between the parties, who
are both within the jurisdiction of the court, by ordering petitioner to perform its obligation under the long final and
executory Compromise Agreement.
TYRONE B. ENOC
Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. Vs. Hon. Albert A. Lerma, et al. , G.R. No. 143581. January 7, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner KOGIES and respondent PGSMC executed a Contract whereby KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder
Manufacturing Plant for respondent. Respondent unilaterally cancelled the contract on the ground that petitioner had
altered the quantity and lowered the quality of the machineries and equipment it delivered. Petitioner opposed
informing the latter that PGSMC could not unilaterally rescind their contract nor dismantle and transfer the machineries
and equipment on mere imagined violations by petitioner. Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Specific Performance
against respondent before the RTC. Respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim asserting that it had the
full right to dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment because it had paid for them in full as stipulated in
the contract. KOGIES filed a motion to dismiss respondents counterclaims arguing that when PGSMC filed the
counterclaims, it should have paid docket fees and filed a certificate of non-forum shopping, and that its failure to do so
was a fatal defect. The RTC dismissed the petitioners motion to dismiss respondents counterclaims as these
counterclaims fell within the requisites of compulsory counterclaims.

ISSUE:
WON payment of docket fees and certificate of non-forum shopping were required in the respondents Answer
with counterclaim?

HELD:
NO. The counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in accordance
with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the Answer with
Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-
claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained therein. As to the failure to submit a
certificate of forum shopping, PGSMCs Answer is not an initiatory pleading which requires a certification against forum
shopping under Sec. 524 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence, the courts a
quo did not commit reversible error in denying KOGIES motion to dismiss PGSMCs compulsory counterclaims. At the
time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said
counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as
amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.
TYRONE B. ENOC
MAGBANUA vs. UY G.R. No. 161003. May 6, 2005

Facts:
As a final consequence of the final and executory decision of the Supreme Court in Rizalino P. Uy v. National Labor
Relations Commission, et. al. (GR No. 117983, September 6, 1996), hearings were conducted to determine the amount of
wage differentials due the complainants therein. As computed, the award amounted to P1, 487,312.69. On February 3, 1997,
petitioner Magbanua filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. On May 19, 1997, respondent] RizalinoUy filed a
Manifestation requesting that the cases be terminated and closed, stating that the judgment award as computed had been
complied with to the satisfaction of the petitioners. Said manifestation was also signed by the petitioners. Together with the
manifestation is a joint affidavit dated May 5, 1997 of the petitioners, attesting to the receipt of payment from the
respondent and waiving all other benefits due them in connection with their complaint. On June 3, 1997, petitioners filed an
urgent motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution wherein they confirmed that each of them received P40,000.00 from the
respondent on May 2, 1997. On June 9, 1997, respondent opposed the motion on the ground that the judgment award had
been fully satisfied. In their Reply, petitioners claimed that they received only partial payments of the judgment award.

Labor Arbiter: issued an order denying the motion for issuance of writ of execution.

NLRC: reversed, holding that a final and executory judgment can no longer be altered and that quitclaims and releases
are normally frowned upon as contrary to public policy.

CA: held that compromise agreements may be entered into even after a final judgment. Thus, petitioners validly
released respondent from any claims, upon the voluntary execution of a waiver pursuant to the compromise agreement.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court could be subject to compromise settlement;
2. Whether or not the petitioners affidavit waiving their awards in the labor case executed without the assistance of
their counsel and labor arbiter is valid;

Held:
1. Yes, a compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order to
resolve their differences and thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit. The issue involving the validity of a compromise
agreement notwithstanding a final judgment is not novel. The Court noted that Article 2040 impliedly allowed such
agreements; there was no limitation as to when these should be entered into. The validity of the agreement is
determined by compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts, not by when it was entered into.
As provided by the law on contracts, a valid compromise must have the following elements: (1) the consent
of the parties to the compromise, (2) an object certain that is the subject matter of the compromise, and (3) the cause
of the obligation that is established.
In the present factual milieu, compliance with the elements of a valid contract is not in issue. Petitioners do
not challenge the factual finding that they entered into a compromise agreement with respondent. There are no
allegations of vitiated consent. Instead, petitioners base their argument on the sole fact that the agreement was
executed despite a final judgment, which the Court had previously ruled to be allowed by law.
The principle of novation supports the validity of a compromise after final judgment. Novation, a mode of
extinguishing an obligation, is done by changing the object or principal condition of an obligation, substituting the
person of the debtor, or surrogating a third person in the exercise of the rights of the creditor. For an obligation to be
extinguished by another, the law requires either of these two conditions: (1) the substitution is unequivocally
declared, or (2) the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. A compromise of a final judgment
operates as a novation of the judgment obligation, upon compliance with either requisite. In the present case, the
incompatibility of the final judgment with the compromise agreement is evident, because the latter was precisely
entered into to supersede the former.

2. YES, the presence or the absence of counsel when a waiver is executed does not determine its validity.
There is no law requiring the presence of a counsel to validate a waiver. The test is whether it was executed
voluntarily, freely and intelligently. Where there is clear proof that a waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or a
gullible person, the law must step in to annul such transaction. In the present case, petitioners failed to present any
evidence to show that their consent had been vitiated. The law is silent with regard to the procedure for approving a
waiver after a case has been terminated. Relevant, however, is this reference to the NLRCs New Rules of Procedure:
Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to the whole or any part of the dispute, the same shall be reduced to
writing and signed by the parties and their respective counsel, or authorized representative, if any, before the Labor
Arbiter. The settlement shall be approved by the Labor Arbiter after being satisfied that it was voluntarily entered
into by the parties and after having explained to them the terms and consequences thereof. A compromise
agreement entered into by the parties not in the presence of the Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending shall
be approved by him, if after confronting the parties, particularly the complainants, he is satisfied that they
understand the terms and conditions of the settlement and that it was entered into freely and voluntarily by them
and the agreement is not contrary to law, morals, and public policy. This provision refers to proceedings in a
mandatory/conciliation conference during the initial stage of the litigation.