Societal Facts

Author(s): Maurice Mandelbaum

Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Dec., 1955), pp. 305-317
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/587130 .
Accessed: 29/08/2014 16:07

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Wiley and The London School of Economics and Political Science are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to The British Journal of Sociology.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 146.83.195.38 on Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:07:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Societal Facts

MAURICE MANDELBAUM

I. INTRODUCTION
T F one adopts BroadXsdistinction between critical and speculative
| philosophyythe followingpaper may be regardedas an attempt to deal
Awith oneof the majorproblemsof a criticalphilosophyof the socialsciences.
Like all such attempts, this paper faces some difficultieswhich are not
encounteredin equally acute form by those who deal with the conceptsand
methodsof the nattlralsciences. In the firstplace,the conceptsand methods
utilized in the natural scienceshasrebeen more sharplydeSnedthan have
been those whichsocial scientistsemploy. In the secondplace, there is less
disagreementamongnaturalscientiststhan amongsocial scientistsas to the
pllrposeswhich actuallydo underlie,or which shouldunderlie,their studies.
In the thirdplaceXthe relationsamongthe variousbranchesof naturalscience
seem to be moreeasily definableand less subjectto disputethan is the case
amongthe social sciences. It is with one aspect of the relationsamongthe
varioussocial sciencesthat this paper utill be concerned.
Therecan scarcelybe any doubt that there is at presenta considerable
measureof disagreementamongsocialscientistsconcerningthe relationswhich
obtainamongtheirvanollsdisciplines. For example,thereis little agreement
as to howthe provinceof " socialpsychology)' is relatedto generalpsychology
on the one hand or to sociologyon the other. There is perhapsesrenless
ag$eementas to how sociologyand history are related,or whether)in fact,
historyis itself a socialscience. Even the provinceof culturalanthropology
which, in its earlierstages, seemedto be capableof clear definition,is now
in a positionin which its relationsto the other fields of social sciencehave
becomeextremelyfluid. Thistype of fluidityin the boundariesof the vanous
social sciences,and the ease ith which conceptsemployedin one discipline
spreadto other disciplines)has been quite generallyregardedas a promising
auguryfor the future of the social sciences. One notes the frequencywith
svhich " integration' is held up as an importantprogrammaticgoal for
socialscientists. But such pleas for integrationare ambiguous. On the one
hand, they may merely signify a recognitionof the fact that attempts to
understandsome concrete problemscall for ctoperation between persons
3o5

This content downloaded from 146.83.195.38 on Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:07:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
306 SOCIETAL FACTS
trainedto use the conceptsand methodsof differentsocial sciences,or that
workersin one disciplineshouldbe awareof the methodsand resultsof those
who work in other fields. On the other hand, what some who plead for
" integration" in socialscienceseemto demandis that the variousdisciplines
shouldmergeinto one largerwhole. On such a view the goal of integration
would be the achievementof a state in which all personswho work in the
field of socialsciencetould operatewith the same set of conceptsand wotlld
utilize the same methodsof inquiry. If I am not mistaken,it is sometimes
assumedthat the socialscienceswill have made their greatestadvancewhen
the individualsocial scienceswhich now exist will have lost their separate
identities. In so far as this paperhas a practicalpurpose,its purposeis to
indicatethat " integration", takenin this sense,is a mistakengoU for sociolo-
psts and psychologiststo pursue.l
In statingthat I wish to argueagainstwhat somesocialscientistsbelieve
to be the most promisingpath whichtheirsciencescan follow,it is clearthat
this paperhaswhatmightbe termedan injunctivecharacter. I am attempting
to rule in advancethat certainmodesof procedureshouldor shouldnot be
adopted by practising social scientists. To those tralned in the critical
philosophyof the naturalsciences,such a procedurewill doubtlessseem both
foolhardyand perverse. Yet, it is unavoidable. So long as thereare funda-
mentaldifferencesamongsocialscientistswith respectto the types of concepts
and types of methodthich they actuallyuse, and so long as the critena by
means of which they measurethe adequacyof these conceptsand methods
differ,every attempt to do morethan compilea corpus of materialsfor com-
parison,t11 involvethat the analystof the socialsciencesshouldtake his ouTn
standwithrespectto the mattersunderdebate. VVhere one can showreasons
for the positionadopted,the injunctiveelementin one's analysescannot be
claimedto be wholly arbitrary. It is in proportionto the strengthof these
reasonsthat any particularinjunctiveproposalis to be judged.
Hontever,any proposalas to the relationsuthichoughtto obtainbetsseen
two or moresocial sciencessvillpresupposea beliefas to xrhatthe goal of the
social sciences may be. Concerningthis topic there is also a considerable
amount of debate. HoweverlI believe it possible to formulatea general
statementwhichmightbe acceptableto all, leavingunprejudiced thosespecific
issueswhichhave dividedsocialscientistsinto opposedcamps. I submitthat
the folloving statementwould be quite generallyacceptable: it is the task
of the socialsciencesto attain a body of knowledgeon the basisof whichthe
actions of humanbeings as membersof a society can be understood. This
definitionof the aim of the social sciencesdoes not rule out the possibility
that an understanding of the actionsof humanbeingsas membersof a society
may be instrumentalto somefurtheraim, such as that of attainingthe means
of controllinghuman behaviour,or of promotinghumansvelfare. (Nor, of
course,does it affirmthat this is the case.) Furthermore,it is to be noted
that in this statementof the aims of the social sciencesI have avoidedpre-
1In this paper I shall not be conceed uith the other social sciences.

This content downloaded from 146.83.195.38 on Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:07:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 bIAURICE MANDELBAUM 3o7
judgingthis issue as to whetherthe body of knowledgewhich is sought can
be formulatedas a system of laws, and whetheran understandingof human
actions is equivalentto explainingthese actions in the sense in which the
term " explanation" is used in the naturalsciences. Throughoutthis paper
I wish to avoidraisingthese questions,and in so far as possibleI shall confine
my discussionto a neutralterminologywhichdoes not prejudgeany of these
issues. Wherevermy langluageseems to suggestthat I am using the model
of explanationused in the naturalsciences,my point could equally well be
phrasedin terms which are compatiblewith the view that the methodsand
conceptsof the social sciencesare utterly differentfrom those employedin
the naturalsciences. And, conversely,whereI use the languageof " under-
standing", my discussioncanequallywellbe rephrasedin termsof the language
of scientific" explanation".
Having now definedwhat I take to be the task of the social sciences,
I can state the aim of this paper. My aim is to shourthat one cannotunder-
stand the actionsof humanbeingsas membersof a societyunlessone assumes
that there is a groupof facts which I shall term " societalfacts " which are
as ultimate as are those facts which are " psychological"in character. In
speakingof " societal facts" I refer to any facts concerningthe forms of
organizationpresent in a society. In speakingof " psychologicalfacts" I
referto any facts concerningthe thoughtsand the actionsof specifichuman
beings.

II. AN EXANIPLE
OFTHEIRREDUCIBILITY
OFSOCIETAL
CONCEPTS
If it be the case, as I wish to claim,that societalfacts are as ultimateas
are psychologicalfacts, then those conceptswhich are used to refer to the
forms of organizationof a society cannot be reducedwithout remainderto
conceptsthich only referto the thollghtsand actionsof specificindividuals.l
Thereare many reasonswhy the type of claimthat I am puttingforwardhas
been doubted,and we shall note some of these reasonsas we proceed. First,
hosntever, it urillbe well to lend some plausibilityto the view by means of
an example.
Supposethat I entera bank, I then take a srithdrawalslip and fill it out,
I walk to a teller'swindow,I hand in my slip) he gives me moneyXI leave
the bank and go on my way. Now supposethat you have been observing
my actionsand that you are accompaniedby, let us say, a TrobriandIslander.
If yoll wishedto explainmy behaviour,how wouldyoll proceed? You could
explain the fillingout of the svithdrasral slip as a means which will lead to
the teller'sbehaviollrtourardsme, that is, as a meansto his handingme some
notes and coins; and you could explainthe wholesequenceof my action as
directedtowardsthis particularend. You couldthen explainthe significance
1 The term " ultimate " may, of course, have other meanings as well. In the present paper,
however, I am taking the irreducibilityof a set of concepts to be equivalent to the ultimacy of
that set of facts to which these concepts refer.

This content downloaded from 146.83.195.38 on Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:07:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
308 SOCIETAL FACTS
which I attachedto the possessionof these notes and coins by followng me
and notinghow the possessionof them led otherpersons,such as assistantsin
shops,to give me goodsbecauseI gave them the notes and coins whichthe
banktellerhad handedto me. Suchwouldbe an explanationof my observed
behaviourin termsof the behaviourof otherspecificindividualstowardsme.
And it might at first glanceappearas if an explanationcouchedin termsof
these interpersonalformsof behaviourwouldbe adequateto cover all of the
aspects of the case.
However,it wouldalso be necessaryfor you to informthe strangerwho
accompaniesyou that it does not sufficefor a personto fill out such a slip
and hand it to just anyonehe may happento meet. It wouldalso be only
fair to informhim that beforeone can expecta banktellerto handone money
in exchangefor a slip, one must have " deposited" money. In short, one
must explain at least the rudimentsof a bankingsystem to him. In doing
so oneis, of course,usingconceptswhichreferto one aspectof the institutional
organizationof our society, and this is preciselythe point which I wish to
make. (Andthe same point can be madewith referenceto how Malinowski
has explainedto us the TrobriandIslanders'system of ceremonialexchanges
of gifts.) In all cases of this sort,the actualbehamourof specificindirriduals
toutardsone anotheris unintelligibleunlessone views theirbehaviollrin terms
of their status and roles,and the conceptsof status and role are devoid of
meaningunlessone interpretsthem in termsof the organlzationof the society
to which the individualsbelong.
To this it may be objectedthat any statementconcerningthe status of
an individualis itself analysablein terms of how speciEcindividualsbehave
tourardsother indixiduals, and how these in turn beharretowards them.
Thusit mightbe claimedthat whilethe explanationof an individual'sbehaviour
often demandsthe introductionof conceptsreferringto " societal status ",
suchconceptsarethemselvesreducibleto furtherstatementsconcerningactual
or probableforms of beharriour.Thus, societal conceptsmight be held to
be heunstic devices, summanzingrepeatedpatternsof behaviour,but they
would be nothing more: their real meaningwould lie in a conjunctionof
statementsconcerningthe behaviourof a numberof individuals.
However,this vieu:is open to seriousobjection. \0rehave seen in the
foregoingillustrationthat my on behaviourtoxrardsthe banktelleris deter-
minedby his status. If the attempt is now made to interprethis status in
termsof the recurrentpattemsof behas-iour ^thichothersexemplifyin dealing
with him, then theirbeharriour is left unexplained: each of them no less
than I will only behaxe in this ray becauseeach recognizesthe teller of
a bank to have a particularstatus. Similarly,it is impossibleto resolvethe
bank teller's role into statements conceminghis behaviourtowards other
individuals. If one wished to equate his societal role with his reactions
towards those who behax-ein a particularway tosards him, it would be
unintelligiblethat he shouldhandus moneyxvhenwe presenthim with a *vith-
drawalslip whenhe standsin his teller'scage,and yet that he urouldcertainly

This content downloaded from 146.83.195.38 on Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:07:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 MAURICE MANDELBAUM 3o9
refuseto do so if we were to presenthim utithsuch a slip whenwe met him
at a party. Banktellersas well as depositorsbehaveas they do becausethey
assumecertain societally definedroles under speciScsets of circumstances.
This being the case, it is impossibleto escapethe use of societalconceptsin
attemptingto understandsome aspects of individualbehaviour: concepts
involving the notions of status and role cannot themselvesbe reducedto
a conjunctionof statementsin whichthese or other societalconceptsdo not
appear.
[Preciselythe same point may be made with respect to attempts to
translatesocietal conceptsinto terms of the thoughtsof individualsrather
than into terms of their overt behaviour. If one shouldwish to say that
I acted as I did towardsthe tellerbecauseI foresawthat throughmy actions
he would be led to give me natney,one would still have to admit that my
anticipationof his responsentasbased upon my recognitionof the fact that
he was a bankteller,and that the roleoI a banktellerdemandsthat he should
act as the bank'sagent, and the functionof a bank (so far as each depositor
is concerned)is that of being a custodianof legal tender,etc. etc. Thus, in
attemptingto analyse societalfacts by means of appealingto the thoughts
which guide an individual'sconduct, some of the thoughtswill themselves
have societal referents,and societal conceptsurillthereforenot have been
expungedfrom our analysis.]
Now I do not wish to claim that an indi^7idual's thoughtsor his overt
actions are wholly explicablein terms of status and roles. Not only does it
seem to be the case that some actionsmay be explainedwithoutintroducing
these concepts,but it is also the case that tsro individuals,say two bank
tellers,may behasredifferentlytouardsme in spiteof the identityin theirroles.
Thus, one may be friendlyand the other hostile or aloof, and the natureof
my omrn behaviourtowardsthemwill then differ. Thusit shouldbe apparent
that I am not seekingto explainall facets of individualbeharriour by means
of statementswhich only referto societalfacts. \\hat I wish to contendis
(a) that in understandingor explainingan individual'sactionswe must often
refer to facts concerningthe organizationof the society in which he lives,
and (b) that our statementsconcerningthese societalfacts are not reducible
to a conjunctionof statementsconcerningthe actionsof individuals. I take
it that almost all social scientistsand philosopherswould grant the first of
these contentions,but that manysocialscientistsand mostphilosophers would
reject the second,insistingthat societalfacts are reducibleto a set of facts
concetningindiszidualbehasriour.

III. THECRITERION OF IRREDUCIBILITY

It is now necessaryto state the cnterion of ixTeduclbility which the
foregoingillustrationhas presupposed.
Let us assumethat thereis a language,S, in whichsociologicalconcepts
such as " institutions", " mores", " ideologies", " status ", " class"} etc.,

This content downloaded from 146.83.195.38 on Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:07:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
3IO SOCIETAL FACTS
appear. These conceptsall refer to aspects of what we term " a society".
That there is a languageof this type is clear from the worksof sociologists,
anthropologists,and histonans. It is also clear from the fact that we use
such terms as " The Presidentof the United States", or " the unmamed
childrenof X". In orderto definethe meaningof the latter termswe must
makereferenceto the Constitutionof the UnitedStates, or to the lamrswhich
govern our marriageand kinship systems, and in these referenceswe are
employingsocietal concepts.
Thereis, of course,also anotherlanplage, P, in which we refer to the
thoughtsand actionsand capabilitiesof individualhumanbeings. In making
statementsin this language(which,for want of a bettername, I have called
our "psychologicallanguage")l we are not using societal concepts. The
differencesbetweenthese two languagesmay be illustratedby the fact that
the connotationof the term " The presentPresidentof the United States"
carriesimplicationswhichdo not followfromthe personalname " DwightD.
Eisenhower",and statementsconcerningthe personalityof DwightD. Eisen-
howercarryno implicationsfor otlr understandingof his societalrole. This
remainstrue even thoughwe admit that in this case, as in most others,the
status of an individualis often causally connectedwith the natllre of his
personality,and even thoughwe also admit that an individual'spersonality
is often connectedwith the fact that he occupes a particularstatus, or that
he functionswithin this status as he does.
Put in theseterms,my thesisthat societalfacts are irreducibleto psycho-
logicalfacts may be reformulated as holdingthat sociologicalconceptscannot
be translatedinto psychologicalconceptswithoutremainder.Whatis signified
by the stipulation" without remainder" must now be made clear.
It would seem to be the case that all statements in the sociological
language,S, are translatableinto statementsconcerningthe behaviourof
specific individuals,and thus would be translatableinto the languageP.
For example,a statementsuch as " The institutionof monogamousmarriage
supplantedthe polygynousmarriagesystem of the Mormons"couldpresum-
ably be translatedinto statementsconcerningthe actionsof certainaggregates
of individuals. However,it is by no means certain that such trarlslations
couldbe effectedwithoutusingotherconceptswhichappearin the sociological
language. Theseconceptstoo might havretheir translationsinto P, but the
translationof the conceptsof S into P mrould not be completeif such transla-
tions still had to employotherconceptswhichappearin S. It is with respect
to incompletetranslationsof this type that I speak of translationswhich
cannot be effected " without remainder".
1 It will be noted that what I have termed our psychological language does not include
terms such as " neural paths ", " brain-traces", etc. NIy argument aims to show that societal
facts are not reducibleto facts concerningthe thoughts and actions of specific individuals; the
problemof whether both societal facts and facts concerningan indisridual'sthoughts and actions
are explicable in terms of (or, are in some sense " reducible" to) a set of physical or physlological
correlatesis not my present concern. It will readily be seen that this is not the point at issue.
Those svhoseek to reducesocietal facts to facts concerningindividualbehaxriour are not attempting
to speak in physical and physiological terlns.

Si las caracteristicas sociolgicas tienen preponderancia,

entonces se estan haciendos generalizaciones absurdas
como las apuntadas por Anscombe en el silogismo
prctico.
This content downloaded from 146.83.195.38 on Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:07:59 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 MAURICE MANDELBAUM 3II

An analogueof this situationwas pointedout by Chisholmin his criticism

of C. I. Lems'stheoryof knowledge.l Accordingto Chisholm,thing-statements
cannot be completelyreducedto statementsconcemingsense-databecause
one must specify the conditionsof the appearanceof these sense-data,and
in doing so one must a6ain use thing-statements. And this is preciselythe
situation which we found to obtain in our illustrationof the behaviourof
a personwithdrawingmoney from a bank.
Nomr,it might be argued(as it has sometimesbeen arguedwith respect
to Chisholm'scontention)that our inability to carry out such translations,
without remainder,representsa practical and not a theoreticalinability.
Accordingto thosewho take this view, the practicaldifficultywhichis present
arises from the indeEnitelylong conjunctionof statementswhich we should
have to make in carryingout our analyses,and to the fact that someof these
statementswouldinvolvea foreknowledge of futureevents. But it is claimed
that no theoreticallyimportantconsequencesfollow from our inability to
completea detailedanalysisof a particularstatement: such partialanalyses
as we can actuallymake may not have omittedany theoreticallysignificant
aspectsof the statementswhichwe wish to analyse. Such a rejoinderwould
be open to two objections,so far as our presentdiscussionis concerned.
First, we are here concernedwith the problemof the relationsbetween
tssroempiricaldisciplines. Therefore,if it be admittedthat it is impossible
in practiceto reducestatementswhichcontainsocietaltermsto a conjunction
of statementswhichonly includeterrnsrefemngto the thoughtsand actions
of specificindividuals,the rejoinderin questionmightconceivablybe significant
from the point of view of a generalontology, but it would not affect my
argumentregardingthe autonomyof the societal sciences.
Second, it is to be noted that thatever may be the case regarding
Chisholrn'sarynent conceming the relation of sense-datastatements to
thing-statements,the problemof reducingstatementswhich includesocietal
terms to statements which only concem specificindividualsis not merely
a questionof how we may analyse actionstatements,but hosvwe may explain
certainfacts. It has been my contentionthat if ureare to explainan indi-
vidual's behaviourwhen, say, he enters a bank, we must have recourseto
societal concepts and cannot merely employ terms which refer to the fact
that this individualmakesmarkson paper,approachesa specificpoint, hands
the markedpaperto anotherindividual,etc. etc. He who knew all of this,
and who also knew all of the other actions performedby the membersof
a society,wouldpossessa seriesof protocolstatements,orbiographical" logs ".
Even thoughthis set of logs includedreferenceto all of the actionsperformed
by all of the membersof the society,no societalconceptstould appearin it.
However,this informationsvouldnot make it possible for our omniscient
collectorof data to explairlurhythe depositorfills out a slip in orderto with-
drawmoney, or why the teller will exchangenotes and coins for such a slip.
l Cf. Chisholm, " The Problem of Empiricism" in Journal ofPslilosophy, v, 45 (I948),
PP- Sx2 . (I am indebted to Roderick Firth for calling my attention to this analogue.)

This content downloaded from 146.83.195.38 on Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:07:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
3I2 SOCIETAL FACTS
Such a transaction only becomes explicable when we employ the concept of
" a bank", and what it means to speak of " a bank" xvillinvollre the use of
concepts such as " legal tender ", and " contract ". Further, what it means
to speak of " a contract " will involve reference to our legal system, and the
legal system itself cannot be defined in terms of individual behaviollr even
the legal realist must distinguish between the behaviour of judges and police-
men and the behaviour of " just anyone ". Thus, if we are to explain certain
forms of individual behaviourwe must use societal concepts, and these concepts
are not (I have argued) translatable urithoutremainderinto terms which only
refer to the behaviour of individuals.
Yet it is important to insist that even though societal concepts cannot be
translated into psychological concepts without leaxringthis societal remainder,
it is not only possible but is indeed necessary to make the partial translation.
It is always necessary for us to translate terms such as " ideologies " or
" banks " or " a monogamousmarriagesystem " into the languageof individual
thought and action, for unless we do so we have no means of verifying any
statements which we may make concerning these societal facts. Ideologies
and banks and marriage systems do not exist unless there are aggregates of
individuals who think and act in specific ways, and it is only by means of
establishingthe forms of their thoughts and their actions that we can apprehend
the nature of the societal organization in which they live, or that ve can
coIToborateor disallo^vstatements concerning this organization. Yet, the
necessity for this translation of specific sociological concepts into terms of
individual behaviour in order that we may verify and reSne our sociological
statements does not alter the fact that the possibility of making such a transla-
tion always involves the necessity for using other societal concepts to define
the conditions under which this behaviour takes place. Thus, the translation
can never obviate the use of societal concepts and reduce the study of society
to a branch of the study of the actions of individuals.

IV. OsJEcTIons
In the foregoing discussion I have been at pains to state my position in
such a way as to avoid the most usual objections to the general type of view
which I hold. Ho^vever,it will be useful to comment on three objections
which have frequently been raised against the viev that societal facts are
irreducible to psychological facts.l
1 NVhenwe consider the type of " irreducibility " which has here been claimed to charactenze
societal facts, we must be prepared to allow that it may not be the only type of irreducibility to
be found among " existelltial emergents ". (On the meaning of this term, ^shich has been
borrowed from Losrejoy, cf. my " Note on Emergence ", in Freedoaez and Reasowz,edited by Baron,
Nagel, and Pinson; Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., I95I.) I am in fact inclined to believe that there
is a stronger form of irreduciL)ility than is here in question. This stronger form may be said
to exist between, say, the colour " red " and brain esrents or light frequencies. In such cases it
might be true that even a partzal translation cannot be effected. All that I have ^sished to sholv
is that while it is undeniable that we can and do make partial translations of societal concepts
by using psychological concepts, these translations cannot be complete: we must alxYays u.<e
further societal concepts to specify the conditions under uhich the observed forms of societally
oriented behaviour take place.

This content downloaded from 146.83.195.38 on Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:07:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 MAURICE MANDELBAUM 3I3

The first of these objectionsmay be termed the ontologicalobjection.

It consistsin holdingthat societalfacts cannotbe said to have any status of
their own since no such facts would exist if there were not individualswho
thoughtand acted in specificways. Now, to hold the view whichI hold)one
need not deny that the existenceof a society presupposesthe existence of
individuals,and that these individualsmust possess certain capacitiesfor
thought and for action if that we term a society is to exist. Yet, this
admissiondoes not entaiTthe conclusionwhichis thoughtto follourfrom it:
one neednot hold that a societyis an entity independentof all humanbeings
in orderto hold that societalfacts are not reducibleto the facts of individual
behaviour. The warrantfor the latter positionis merely this: all human
beingsare borninto a society, and muchof their thoughtand their action is
influencedby the natureof the societiesin whichthey live; therefore)those
facts which concernthe nature of their societiesmust be regardedas being
independentof them. To be sure) these facts are not independentof the
existenceof otherindividuals,and it will be from the forms of behaviourof
these other individualsthat any specificindividualwill have acquiredhis
own societally orientedpatterns of behaviour. But these individuals,too)
were born into an alreadyfunctioningsocietalorganizationwhich was inde-
pendent of them. Thus, their societallyorientedbehaviourwas also condi-
tioned by an alreadyexisting set of societal facts, etc. etc.
To be sure)those who wish to pressthe ontologicalobjectionmay insist
that at some remotetime in the history of the humanrace there were indi-
viduals who were not born into an alreadyexisting society, and that these
individualsmust have formed a societal organizationby virtue of certain
patternsof repeatedinterpersonalactions. Thus, they would seek to insist
that all societalfacts have their originsin individualbehaviour,and that it
is mistakento argue,as I have argued,that societalfacts are irreducibleto
the factsof individualbehaviour. Hostever)this rejoinderis clearlyfallacious.
\5lhatevermay have been the originof the firstformsof societalorganization
(a questionwhichno presentknowledgeputs us in a positionto answer),the
issue vith thich ^seare here concernedis one which involvesthe nature of
societiesas they exist at present. To arguethat the natureof presentsocietal
facts is reducibleto the facts of individualbehaviourbecausethe originsof
a particularsocialsystemgrewup out of certainrepeatedformsof behaviour
is a clear exampleof the genetic fallacy. One might as well argue on the
basis of our knosrledgeof the originsof the Greekdramaand of the modern
dramathat evert currentBroadwayplayis reallyto be understoodas a religious
festival.
However,the aboveanswerto the ontologicaltype of objectionis clearly
not sufficient.l It is, I hope,adequateto showthat one usualformof counter-
ing my position is untenable; yet) the essential paradox remains. One
can still legitimatelyask what sort of ontologicalstatus societal facts can
In what follows I shall only be discussing human societies. The differences between
" animal societies" and human societies are far more striking than are their similarities.

This content downloaded from 146.83.195.38 on Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:07:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 3I4 SOCIETAL FACTS
conceivablypossessif it is afifirmed
that they dependfor theirexistenceon the
activitiesof humanbeingsand yet are claimednot to be identicalwith these
activities. There are, it seems to me, two types of anster which might be
given to this question. In the first type of answerone might contendthat
a wholeis not equal to the sum of its parts,and a societyis not equalto the
sum of those individualactivitieswhichgo to formit. This familiarholistic
answeris not the one thich I should be inclinedto propose. In the first
place, it is by no meanscertainthat the principleof holism (as thus stated)
is philosophicallydefensible. In the secondplace, such an answerassumes
that what may be termedthe " parts" of a society are to be taken to be
individualhumanbeings,andthis is an assumptionwhichI shouldbe unwilling
to make. A11of the precedingargumententails the propositionthat the
" parts" of a society are specificsocietalfacts, not individuals. If this were
not the case, societal concepts could be translatedinto terms referringto
individualbehaviourif we had sufficientknowledgeof all the interrelations
amongthese individuals. Instead,svehave foundthat an analysisof a state-
ment which concernsa societal fact will involve us in using other societal
concepts: for example,that uthatit meansto be a depositorin a bank will
involve statementsconcerningour legal system and our monetaryeconomy.
Similarly,what it means to be a college student cannot be definedwithout
recourseto statementsconceIningoureducationalsystem,andsuchstatements
cannot be analysedwithout utilizingconceptshich referto statutorylaws
as well as to many other aspects of our societal organization. Thus, from
the argumentssvhichhave beengiven,it followsthat the " parts" of a society
are not individualhumanbeings,but are the specificinstitutions,and other
formsof organization,whichcharacterize that society. Oncethis is recognized,
it remainsan open questionas to the extent to whichany specificsociety (or
all societies)are to be conceivedholisticallyor pluralistically.
The secondmethodof dealingwith the ontologicalobjectionis the one
svhichI shouldmyself be inclinedto adopt. It consistsin holdingthat one
set of facts may dependfor its existenceupon anotherset of facts and yet
not be identicalwith the latter. An exampleof such a relationshipwouldbe
that which a traditionalepiphenomenalist wouldregardas existing between
brain events and the contents of consciousness. \hatever objectionsone
may raise againstthe epiphenomenalist view of the mind-bodyrelationship,
onewouldscarcelybe justifiedin holdingthat the positionmustbe falsebecause
the content of consciousnesscould not be differentfromthe natureof brain-
states and yet be dependentupon the latter. If one has reasonsfor holding
that the content of consciousnessis differentfrom bratn states, and if one
also has reasonfor holdingthat it doesdependuponthe latter,one'sontology
must be accommodatedto these facts: the facts cannotbe rejectedbecause
of a priorontologicalcommitment. And,vvithoutwishingto pressmy analogy
fartherthan is warranted,I can point out that my statement concerning
" the parts" of a society has its analoguein hat those who hold to the
epiphenomenalistpositionwould say concerningthe properanalysis of any

This content downloaded from 146.83.195.38 on Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:07:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 MAURICE MANDELBAUM 3I5

statement referringto the content of an individual'sfield of consciousness.

Just as I have claimedthat the componentpartsof a societyare the elements
of its organizationand are not the individualswithout whom it vfouldnot
exist, so the epiphenomenalistwould (t assume)say that the parts of the
individual'sfield of consciousnessare to be foundwithin the specificdata of
consciousnessand not in the brainevents upon whichconsciousnessdepends.
These remarksare, I hope, sufficientto dispel the ontologicalobjection
to the positionwhich I wish to defend. To be sure, I have not attempted
to say whatpositionshouldbe assignedto societalfacts whenone is construct-
ing a generalontology. To do so, I shouldhave to say muchmoreconcerning
the nature of societalfacts, and I shouldof coursealso have to discussthe
natureof othertypes of entity. Hereit has only beenmy concernto suggest
that what I have termedthe ontologicalobjectionto my thesisis by no means
as strongas it may at firstglanceappearto be: the admissionthat all societal
facts dependuponthe existenceof humanbeingswhopossesscertaincapacities
for thought and for action by no meansprecludesthe contentionthat these
facts are irreducibleto facts concerningthose individuals.
The secondof the most usual objectionsto the thesis that societalfacts
cannotbe reducedto psychologicalfacts is an epistemological objection. This
objectionmay take many forms, dependingupon the theory of knowledge
whichis held by the objector. However,the commoncore of all such objec-
tions is the indubitablefact that societalconceptsare not capableof being
" pointedto ", in the sense in whichwe can point to materialobjects,or to
the qualitiesor activities of these objects. Wheneverwe wish to point to
any fact concerningsocietalorganizationwe can only point to a sequenceof
interpersonalactions. Therefore,any theory of knowledgewhich demands
that all errlpiricallymeaningfulconceptsmust ultimatelybe reducibleto data
rhich can be directly inspectedwill lead to the insistencethat all societal
conceptsare reducibleto the pattems of individualbehaviour.
I shall not, of course,seek to disprovethis generaltheory of knowledge.
Yet it is possibleto indicatein very brief compassthat it is inadequateto
deal with societalfacts. Sincethosewhowouldhold this theoryof knourledge
would presumablywish to shoutthat we can be said to know somethingof
the nature of humansocieties,and since they utouldalso wish to hold that
ourmeansof gainmgthis knowledgeis throughthe observationof the repeated
patternsof activities of individuals,a proof that their theory of knourledge
cannot accountfor our apprehensionof the natureof individualaction is, in
the presentcontext,a sufficientdisproofof the epistemological
type of objection.
In orderto offer such a disproof,let us revert to our illustrationof a
depositorwithdrawingmoneyfroma bank. In orderto understandhis overt
actionsin entenng a bank, fillingout a slip, handingit to a teller, receiving
notes and coins, and leavingthe bank,we must view this sequenceof actions
as one intemally connectedseries. Yet what connectsthe elementswithin
the seriesis the person'sintentionto withdrav moneyfromhis account,and
this intention is not itself a directly observableelement within the series.

This content downloaded from 146.83.195.38 on Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:07:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 3I6 SOCIETAL FACTS
Thus, unlessit be admittedthat we can have knourledge of aspectsof human
behaviourwhicharenot directlypresentedto the senses,we cannotunderstand
his behaviourand thereforecannotunderstandthat thich vveseek to under-
stand; i.e., those societal facts which supposedlyare the summationsof
instancesof behaviourof this type. To this, it may of coursebe objected,
that we have learnedto attributecertainintentionsto agents on the basis
of our own experiencedintentions,and then this introspectiveexperienceis
combinedwith our observationof overt behaviourwe learn to interpret
humanactions. Yet if this enlargementof our modesof knowingis allowed,
thereis no reasonto stop with the factsof individualbehaviouras the building-
blocksof a knowledgeof societal facts. NVithinour own experiencevfe are
no less directly aware of our on names, of our belongingto a particular
family, of our status as youngstersor elders,etc., than we are of our own
intentions. To be sure,oursocietalstatusmust,originally,have beenlearned
by us in a sense in which our intentionsneed not presumablyhave been
learned. Yet, once again, we must avoid the geneticfallacy: the originof
ourknowledgeis not identicalwith that knowledgeitself. Just as the concept
of numberhas a meaningwhich need not be identicalwith the experiences
throughurhichit was learned,so the conceptof a family,or of differentiated
status due to age or sex, need not (even for a child) be identicalwith the
experiencesthroughwhich this concept *vasfirst made manifest. And to
theseremarksit shouldbe addedthat oncewe have graspedthe idea of status,
or of family,or of authority,sstecan transferthis conceptto situationswhich
are initiallyaliento our on experience(e.g. to new formsof familyorganiza-
tion) no less readilythan we can apply a knowledgeof our own intentionsto
the understanding of the intentionsof thosewhoact in wayswhichareinitially
strange to us. The problemof extending our knowledgefrom our own
experienceof othersis not, I submit,moreimpossiblein principlein the one
case than in the other. And if this be so, thereis no epistemologicalreason
why we shouldseekto reducesocietalfactsto the factsof individualbehaviour.
OI11Y if it uteretrue that indindual behaviourcould itself be understoodin
termsof tl supposedly" harddata " of directsensoryinspectionwouldthere
be any saving in the reductionof societal facts to facts concerningthis
behaviour. But, as I have indicated,this is not the case.
The third type of objectionto the view which I have been espousingis
the objectionthat such a view interpretsindividualmen as the pawns of
society, devoid of initiative,devoideven of a commonand socially-uncondi-
tioned nature, conceivingof them as mere parts of a self-existingsocial
organism.l Houresrer, such a viev I have in fact alreadyrejected. To hold,
as I have held, that societal facts are Ilot reduciblewithout remainderto
facts concerningthe thoughts and actions of specificindividuals,is not to
1 It is to be noted that some societally onented behaviouris only intelligiblesthen interpreted
xvithrespect to boti;a societal concept and all individual's intention (e.g. in our case of a person
w-ithdrawingmoney from a bank). Hoss-ever,other instances of societally oriented behaviour
(e.g. customary obserxances of age and sex differences)do not involve a consideration of the
agent's intentions.

This content downloaded from 146.83.195.38 on Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:07:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 MAURICE MANDELBAUM 3I7

deny that the latter class of facts also exists, and that the two classes may
interact. Those tho have in the past held to the irreducibilityof societal
facts have, to be sure, often gone to the extremeof denyingthat there are
any facts concerningindividualbehaviourwhich are independentof societal
facts. Such has not been my thesis. And it is perhapsworth suggesting
that if urewish to understandmany of the dilemrnasby thich individuals
are faced,ve can do no betterthan to hold to the view that thereare societal
facts thich exerciseexternalconstraintsover individualsno less than there
are facts concerningindividualvolition which often come into conflictwith
these constraints.

Our Contributors
WIAURICE MANDELBAU1NI is Associate Professorof Sociologyat Princeton University.
\v. BALDAMUSis Lecturerin Industrial Relations at the University of Birmingham.
NOEL TIMMSis Assistant Lecturer-at the University of Birmingham.
DAVID LOCKNVOOD is Assistant Lecturer in Sociology at the London School of
Economics and Political Science, University of London.
L. WILKINS is Senior Research Officerof the Government Social Survey.
GERTRUDE \VILLOUGHBY is Lecturer in Social Science at the London School of
Economics.
T. H. MARSHALL,C.M.G.,M.A., is lWIartin White Professorof Sociologyat the London
School of Economics and Political Science, University of London.

This content downloaded from 146.83.195.38 on Fri, 29 Aug 2014 16:07:59 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions