Topic: JURISDICTION:

PEOPLE V CAWALING 293 SCRA 267

Facts:

Then Mayor Ulysses Cawaling and four other policemen were charged with murder, which case was
filed before the Regional Trial Court in Romblon. The information reads:

That on or about the 4th day of December 1982, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening, in the
Poblacion, [M]unicipality of San Jose, [P]rovince of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation and
taking advantage of their superior strenght [sic] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot RONIE ILISAN, with the use of firearms, inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal injuries in
different parts of his body which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.

The Trial Court finds all 4 accused guilty of the offense charged. It ws qualified to murder because of
the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and treachery.

Thus this case. One of arguments raised by the appellants is that the trial court erred when it
assusmed jurisdiction over the criminal case. They insist that the Sandiganbyan and not the regular
courts had jurisdiction to try and hear the case, as they were public officers at the time of the killing
which was alledgedly committed by reason of or or in relation to their office.

Pertinent issue:

Whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

Yes. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of
the institution of the action. Once the Court acquires jurisdiciton, it may not be ousted from the
case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such proceedings under the
jurisdiction of another tribunal. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no
application in the case at bar, arise when: 1- there is an express provision in the statute, or 2- the
statue is clearly intended to apply to actions pending before its enactment.

Public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide
whether done by private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the
perpetrator, being a public functionary took advantage of his office, as alleged in the case, in which
event the penaly is increased. But the use or abuse ofthe ofice does not adhere to the crime as an
element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, it s materiality arises, not from the allegations but
on the proof, not from the facts that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the
commission of the crime.
Furthermore, the Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that appellants were
public officers who committed the crime in relation to their office. The charge was for murder. As
clarified in Aguinaldo, et. Al. Vs. Domagas, et. Al., in the absence of such allegation, and since the
present case does not involve charges of violation of R.A. 3019, the Sandiganbayan does not have
jurisdiction over the present case. Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the
offense charged, it is thus essential to determine whether that offense was committed or alleged to
have been committed by the public officers and employees in relatin their office.

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In the absence of any
allegation that the offense was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was necessarily
connected with the discharge of their functions, the RTS, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case.

MACASAET V PEOPLE 452 SCRA 255

Facts:

A case for libel was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Alfie Lorenzo, Allen
Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr. And Roger Parejas, columnist, publisher, managing editor, and editor,
respectively ofhte newspaper Abante.

An order dated July 16, 1997 was issued setting the case for arraignemnt on August 27, 1997. The
herein petitioners (the accused) filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer
Proceedings on August 22, 1997 dated August 21, 1997 claiming that they intended to elevate the
adverse Resolution of the Ofice of the City Prosecutorof Quezon City to the DOJ for review. Despite
this motion, the scheduled arraignment of petitioners pushed through on the scheduled date.
Quijano and Castillo refused to enter any plea so the court ordered that a plea of not guilty be
entered into the records on their behalf. As for Macasaet, his arraignment was re-scheduled due to
his absence on the scheduled arraignment.

On September 12, 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the
court has no jurisdiction over the case, according to them, as the information discloses that the
residence of private respondents was in Marikina, which the RTC Quezon City has no jurisdiction over
the case pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.

Subsequently, on September 23, 1997 the court received thru mail a Motion for Reconsideration and
to Withdraw Plea filed by petitioners. They argued that the court committed grave error when it
denied the petitioners Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings and
continued with the scheduled arraignemnt on August 27 1997. According to petitioners that their
co-accused, by the trial judges denial of their Urgent Motion to Defer Arraignment and/or Defer
Proceedings, he had effectively denied them their right to obtain relief fromthe DOJ. The Court
ruled that with the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, the court considers the accused to have
abandoned their Moiton for Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea and sees no further need to act
on the same.
The public prosecutor filed an Opposition, and argued that the RTC Quezon City, had jurisdiction over
the case. He maintained that during the time material to the case, private respondent (the
complainant) was a resident of Quezon City and Marikina Metro Manila, as shown in hte
reply-affidavit during the preliminary investigation. They countered that it was incorrect for the
public prosecutor. On October, 1997, the petitioner filed a Supplemental affidavit attaching
certifications that Joselito Trinidad is not a registered voter of Brgy. Malaya, Quezon City; another
ceritification that Joselito Trinidad was a resident of Brgy. Sto. Nino, Marikina City.

Additional evidence was submitted during the hearing conducted, in the 4th page of the information
stating that the address fo private respondent to be in Marikina and the editorial box appearing in the
newspapr that the tabloid maintains its editorial business address at Intramuros Manila. The private
respondent contended that the certifications were only issued after he had already moved out of the
apartment unit he was renting in Quezon City. As to the other certification, respondent argued that
it is of judicial notice that the barangay and city records are not regularly updated to reflect the
transfer of residence of their constituents. Finally, respondent claimed that his receipt of the copy
of petioner Appeal to the DOJ, which was sent to his alleged address in Quezon City, proved that he
did, and in fact reside at the said place.

The trial court dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction. The Court noted that although the
information alleged the venue of the case falls within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, the evidence
submitted proved otherwise. Private Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, insisting that at
the time the alleged libelous article was published, he was actually residing in Quezon City, and
according to him, he mistakenly stated that he was a resident of Marikina City at the time of
publication of the alleged libelous article because he understood the term address to mean the place
wehre he originally came from. Respondent likewise filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration to which he attached an affidavit of the owner of the house in Quezon City, stated
therein that respondent was residing there from July 1996 to May 1997.

The court denied the motion for reconsideration of respondent. The Public and private prosecutors
filed an appeal, where the Court of Appeals reversed and set asied the trial courts conclusion and
ordered the remand of the case for further proceedings. It was held that it is settled that the
residence of a person must be his perosonal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or
abode and for the purpose of determining the venue, actual residence is a persons place of abode
and not necessarily his legal residence or domicile.

Thus this case.

Pertinent issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has
jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

No, the CA is incorrect in reversing the decision of the trial court.

Jurisdiction has been defined as the power conferred by law upon a judge or court to try a case
cognizance of which belongs to them exclusively and it constitutes the basic foundation of judicial
proceedings. In criminal actions, it is fundamental rule that venue is jurisdicitonal, thus, the place
where the crim was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction.

However, the law on libel is more particular: xxx if hte offended party is a private individual, the
criminal action my also be filed inthe Court of First Instance (RTC) of hte province where he actually
resided at the time of the commission of the offense. Xxx

In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication of the
alleged libelous article, hence, he could only file his libe suit int he City of Manila where Abante was
first published or in the province of city where he actually resided at the time the purported libelous
article was printed.

However, the information of the case revealed that the allegations contained therein are utterly
insufficient to vest jurisiction on the RTC Quezon City. Other than perfunctorily stating Quezon City
at the beginning of the information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the information did
not bother to indicate whether the jursidiction of RTC Quezon City was invoked either because
Abante was printed in that place or private respondent was a resident of said city at the time the
claimed libelous article came out. As these matters deal with the fundamental issue of the courts
jurisdiction, Article 360 of the RPC as amended, mandates that the information filed before the trial
court falls way short of this requirement. The assistant prosecutors failure to properly lay the basis
for invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court of the power to take
cognizance of the case.

It reiterates the earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit: In order to obviate
controversis as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or
information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the
offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was acually resideing at that
time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first published
should likewise be alleged. That allegaion would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where
the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action.

BUAYA V HON. POLO 169 SCRA

Facts:

Solemnidad Buaya (petitioner) was an insurance agent of the Coutnry Bankers Insurance Corporation
(respondent), who was authorized to transact and underwrite insurance business and collect
corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the private respondent.
Petitioner was charged with estafa which was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for
allegedly shortage of he money upon the conduct of an audit. The information reads:

That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation represented by Elmer Banez duly organized and earth under the laws of the
Philippine with principal address at 9th floor, G.R. Antonio Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, in said City, in
the following manner, to wit. the said having been authorized to act as insurance agent of said
corporation, among whose duties were to remit collections due from customers thereat and to
account for and turn over the same to the said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation represented
by Elmer Banez, as soon as possible or immediately upon demand, collected and received the amount
of P368,850.00 representing payments of insurance premiums from customers, but herein accused,
once in possession of said amount, far from complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and
refused to do so and with intent to defraud, absconded with the whole amount thereby
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of P358,850.00 to her own personal
used and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation in the
amount of P358,850.00 Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied by Presiding Judge Hon. Wenceslao Polo.
Subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Petitioner hence filed a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the orders of the
respondent judge denying the two motions filed by petitioner. She contends that the Regional Trial
Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she
allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City. The private respondent countered, called
for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being
interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of apppeal
until final judgment or order rendered.

Pertinent issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is correct in her allegation that the Regional Trial Court of Manila has
no jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:

No, the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the case.

It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be
prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried. Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the RRC provides
that in all criminal-prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried int he court of hte municipality
or province wherein the offense was committed or any ofhte essential element thereof took place.

Clearly then, formthe very allegation of the Information, the RTC of Manila has jurisdiction. Besides,
the cirme of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place where
any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is
damage or prejudice tot he offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of
business and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she
collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.

DE GUZMAN V SANDIGANBAYAN 256 SCRA 171

Facts:

Domingo de Guzman was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for
failure to account the sum of money he received for certain official training programs of the
Department of Agriculture.

Petitioner failed to present a single receipt to support the due disbursement of funds, resulting from
his former lawyers insistence in filing a demurrer to evidence despite prior leave for that purpose
having been denied by the Sandiganbayan (note: In filing a Demurrer to evidence, a Motion for leave
of court must be granted by the Court first; failure to comply is tantamount of waiver on the part of
the accused to present evidence for the defense and automatically submit the case for decision).
Hence, the court saw that no such training programs were held at the designated places based only
on the duly established evidence, 1- lone prosecution witness testified that no such training programs
were held and 2- no single receipt was presented by petitioner.

A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the court en banc in its resolution.

Petitioner takes a novel recourse by filing thru his new counsel the instant Omnibus Motion for Leave
to Vacate Fisrt Motion for Reconsideration in the light of the present developments and to consider
evidence presented herein and to set aside conviction. He seeks to be relieved from the serious
mistake his former lawyer made.

The Solicitor General in one of its comment, argues that the omnibus motion is violative of the Courts
policy on second motions for reconsideration and that petitioner is bound by the mistake of his
former lawyer , assuming that the latter committed one. Petitioner in its reply, contended that the
omnibus motion is not violative of the prohibition and that adherence to the general rule that the
client is bound by his counsels mistake is to deprive petitioner of his liberty through technicality.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners motion be reconsidered and allow the presentation of his evidence.

Ruling:

After carefully considreing anew petitioners plight and keeping in mind that substantial rights must
ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, the Court is swayed to reconsider.

The power of hte Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation
whenerver the purposes of justice requre it, cannot be questioned. In not a few instances, the Court
ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not mentioned in the statute. Clearly, when
transcendental matters like life, liberty or State security are involved, suspension of the rules is likely
to be welcomed more generously.
Petitioners present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to pesos and centavos since it is no
less than his liberty is at stake here. He is just about to lose his liberty simply because his former
lawyers pursued a carelessly contrived procedural strategy of insisting on what has already become
an imprudent remedy, hwich thus forbade petitioner from offering his evidence all the while available
for presentation before the Sandiganbayan. Under the circumstances, higher interests of justice and
equity demand that petitioner be not penalized for hte costly importunings of his previous lawyers
based onthe same principles why this Court had, on many occasions where it granted new trial,
excused parties from the negligence or mistakes of counsel. To cling to the general rule in htis case
is only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice ot petitioners whose only fault was to repose
his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers. Consequently, the receipts and other
documents constituting his evidence which he failed to present in the Sandiganbayan are entitled to
be appreciated, however, by that forum and not this Court, for hte general rule is that we are not
triers of facts. Without prejudging the result of such appreciation, petitioners documentary
evidences prima facie appear strong when reckoned with the lone prosecution witness testimony,
indicating that official training programs were indeed actually conducted and that the sum of mony
received by petitioner were spent entirely for those programs.

Let us not forget that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities taht tend
to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of
Court envisions this liberality. This power to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so
pervasive and encompassing s as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be
final, as we are now compelled to do in this case.

The Rules of Court ws conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice
but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or
robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real
justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when
on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, should give way
to the realities of hte situation. And the grim reality petitioner will surely face, if we do not
compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities in this instance, is the disgrace and misery of
incarceration for a crime which he might not have committed after all. More so, considering that
peitioners record as public servant remained unscathed until his prosecution. Indeed, while guilt
shall not escape, innocence should not suffer.

In resume, this is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow tot he
overriding gol of courts of justice where justice is due-to secure to every individual all possible legal
means to prove his innocense of a crime of which is is charged. As the words of Justice Padilla in the
case of People vs CA, that if only to truly make the courts realy genuine instruments in the
administraion of justice, the Court believes it imperative, in order to assure against any possible
miscarraige of justice resulting from petitioners failure to present his crucial evidence through no
fault of his, that this case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of
petitioners evidence.