Ibn Khaldun Concept Assabiya - Tool For Understanding Long-Term Politics

Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 375407 www.brill.
nl/ajss
Ibn Khalduns Concept of Assabiyya: An Alternative

Tool for Understanding Long-Term Politics?
M. Akif Kayapnar
SUNY Binghamton University, Foundation for Science and Arts
Abstract
This essay considers Ibn Khalduns concept of assabiyya with respect to the generation of the
collective political action, particularly, directed to state formation. Special attention is paid to
the nature and genesis of assabiyya as a technical term developed cumulatively throughout the
Muqaddimah. It asks whether assabiyya, as Ibn Khaldun dened it, can be reformulated and
applied in understanding and explaining current political developments. It concludes with the
assertion that, considering its holistic and interdisciplinary nature, its moral implications, and,
most importantly, its spatio-temporal dimension, assabiyya can emerge as an alternative concep-
tual tool in overcoming the impasse currently facing political theory in general and the liberal
democratic paradigm in particular.
Keywords
Ibn Khaldun, assabiyya, political theory, state formation, socio-political change, organicism
Introduction
Why do states rise and fall? Why are some polities able to develop successful
social and political organisations, while others are not? Are polities sooner or
later destined to collapse? What is it that generates the vitality of a polity?
There has always been attempts to answer these and related questions. Recently,
however, the attempts seem to have intensied. The rise of historical sociology
as a discipline alone can be read as a sign of this tendency. The period of
scholarship, notes Randall Collins (1998), from the mid-1960s onward,
continuing into the present, can appropriately be called the Golden Age of
macro-history.
The decline of the explanatory power of earlier theoretical frameworks
based particularly on the Enlightenment paradigm seems to be the primary
reason lying behind the rising interest in new historical-sociological research.
The weakening of the power of these frameworks, in turn, depends upon a
comprehensive change taking place all around the world. The change is so
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/156853108X327010
376 M. A. Kayapnar / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 375407
wide-ranging that it comprises paradigmatic shifts in philosophical percep-

tions (particularly epistemological), as well as changes in political, cultural and
economic structures. Understanding and explaining such great transforma-
tions necessitate, by nature, holistic and interdisciplinary approaches. Thereby,
the coming to the fore of historical sociology, macro-history or civilisational
history in this transitory period seems to be quite understandable.
Such a profound change that rendered post-Enlightenment (or modern)
bases of scientic explanations obsolete, led many scholars to direct their
attentions to pre-modern and non-western voices. It is this cultural context in
which Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, the 14th century North African Muslim
historian and philosopher, seems to have been re-discovered. Although he
was not unknown for the Western intelligentsia,1 the recent interest in his
ideas goes beyond a simple orientalistic curiosity, which tends to take the
Orient in its totality as an object of study by itself, rather than seeing the ori-
ental perspectives from a disciplinary point of view. For, to use L. N. Gumilevs
(2003:42) provocative words, [T]hey [orientalists] do not read books, but
translate texts. Nowadays, on the other hand, Ibn Khaldun is studied by
social scientists and scholars from almost all branches of human sciences as an
alternative approach to socio-political change, rather than as an interesting
authentic view from the past.2 In this regard, the signicance of Ibn Khalduns
theory lies in the fact that it displays the possibility of developing a historico-
sociological framework outside the positivist worldview. He . . . reinforces
non-positivist emphases on holistic thinking arising from an awareness of his-
torical embeddedness (Pasha, 1997:57). In other words, Ibn Khalduns
approach does not simply dier from others in the kinds of social or political
parameters emphasised in explaining the change. Rather, his explanations are
based upon a radically dierent ontology and epistemology (Gibb, 1968;
Dhaouadi, 1998), which may open new horizons for researchers who are
accustomed to think within the Enlightenment weltanschauung.
Ibn Khaldun lived in a world similar to ours. During his lifetime the Islamic
world in general, and North Africa where Ibn Khaldun spent most of his
life in particular, was in political and social turmoil. The general situation
in the Maghreb (the West) and in the Mashreq (the East), says Dhaouadi
1
In the rst quarter of the 19th century (in 1810 for the rst time), the orientalist Silvestre
de Sacy published extracts from the Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldun (see Rabi, 1967).
2
Ibn Khalduns conception of state, for example, constitutes a fruitful alternative perspective
for the debates on state and sovereignty in international relations theories. As opposed to Real-
ism, which imposes a state-centric approach and became the dominant paradigm in interna-
tional relations in the second half of the 20th century, Ibn Khaldun claims that the state
corresponds only to a certain phase in the life-cycles of societies (Cox, 1996:157).
M. A. Kayapnar / Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 375407 377
(1998:40), was that these areas were in a state of deterioration. Robert Cox
(1996:157) formulates this state of deterioration as follows:
He [Ibn Khaldun] confronted the problem of decline. The reconquista had reduced the
Islamic hold on Spain to Granada. The North African states were hard pressed by
nomadic tribes on one side and by the Christian states to the north controlling the
Mediterranean seaways on the other. Christians and Jews were the middlemen in
international trade. To the east, Mongol invasion shattered the existing structures,
even though the invaders ultimately became absorbed into Islamic culture. Major cit-
ies were ruined; irrigation systems were disrupted or destroyed; oppressive taxation
and the practice of tax farming fragmented power and undermined administrative
organization. Although the cultural preeminence of Islam remained, the material
foundations of Islamic hegemony were much weakened.
Ibn Khaldun himself was extremely conscious of this global and radical change.
He [Ibn Khaldun] was aware of living and acting, continues Cox (1996:147),
in a period of historical change, a period of decline and disintegration of the
social and political structures that had been the underpinnings of past glory
and stability. Thus, the structural and, probably, the existential challenge for
an intellectual like Ibn Khaldun was to understand and explain the change, in
particular, the dissolution of a magnicent political and social structure taking
place in front of his eyes:
When there is a general change of conditions, notes Ibn Khaldun, it is as if the

entire creation had changed and the whole world been altered, as if it were a new and
repeated creation, a world brought into existence anew. Therefore, there is need at this
time that someone should systematically set down the situation of the world among
all regions and races, as well as the customs and sectarian beliefs that have changed for
their adherents. (MQ, I, 65)
Ibn Khaldun himself undertook this job. He developed a social and political
philosophy revolving around the notion of change. According to him, the
fundamental law to keep in mind about socio-political systems is that they are
not static. As Mustapha Kamal Pasha (1997:61) noted, to Ibn Khaldun, no
social order is eternal and natural, but historical. For . . . in terms of quality,
quantity and space, mutation is the natural state of culture. With the change
of periods conditions within the nations and races change too. It is interesting
to recognise that the change also penetrates into the very nature of individuals,
as well as to the social structures of cities and political dynamics of states.
Furthermore, the transformation is deeply hidden and as such becomes notice-
able only after a long time, with the exception of a few distinguished people,
whose awareness, however, would not stop this profound change (MQ, I,
5657). This is because social systems do not follow a linear path. Thinking
linearly, on the other hand, in or about a nonlinear period is necessarily mis-
leading and accelerates the process.
Ibn Khaldun not only points up the signicance of change, but also gives a
detailed analysis and trajectory of it. He claims to have discovered the general
rules making the identication of change possible, by underlying the variables
through which it can be followed up. Since every epoch has its own peculiar
rules and logic, understanding any socio-political and economic event taking
place in that certain epoch requires knowing the specic rules and logic gov-
erning that epoch.
Ibn Khaldun reduces the general dynamic of change into one single notion:
assabiyya. As Lenn Evan Goodman (1972:258) states, Like the matter of
physical science, assabiyya is a lowest common denominator, the irreducible
substrate of all forms of political change. There have been thinkers who
oered similar variables determining the trajectory of the whole change.
Hegels volksgeist and Gumilevs passionarity can be counted among them. In
their cases, however, these notions are treated as an exogenous variable
(Turchin, 2003:42). Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, oers assabiyya as an
endogenous variable, the transformation of which is directly related to other
variables in the system.
Despite the fact that the concept of assabiyya constitutes the backbone of
Ibn Khalduns political philosophy, the term has not been clearly dened yet.
It has been translated into Western languages as group feeling, esprit de
corps, esprit de clan, gemeinsinn, nationalitatsidee, corporate spirit,
feeling of solidarity, group solidarity, group will, communal spirit,
social cohesion, martial spirit, solidarity, striking power and social
solidarity.3 Yves Lacoste (1984:100) is right in this sense, when he claimed
that everyone who has written on Ibn Khaldun developed his own under-
standing of assabiyya. As Arnason and Stauth (2004:33) note, assabiyya is one
of Ibn Khalduns most untranslatable terms. Part of the diculty lies in the
fact that, although Ibn Khaldun attributes a larger and dierent meaning to
the term than its conventional usage (Rosenthal, 1980:ixxviii), he himself did
not give a clear and all encompassing denition for assabiyya (Yldrm,
1998:82). He talks about the sources and functions of assabiyya here and there
3
Franz Rosenthal (group feeling), De Slane (esprit de corps), Vincent Monteil (esprit de clan),
Von Kremer ( gemeinsinn and nationalitatsidee), H. Ritter (feeling of solidarity), M. Halpern
(group solidarity), S.H. Bahsh and H. Shirvani (communal spirit), Hourani (corporate spirit),
Aziz el-Azmeh (group will), Ernest Gellner (social cohesion and martial spirit), Erwin Rosenthal
(solidarity and striking power), D.S. Margoliouth (clannishness) and M. Mahdi (social solidar-
ity) (see Uluda, 1988:120121; Yldrm, 1998:8384).
throughout the Muqaddimah, but the centrality of the term in Ibn Khalduns
social system and the historical role it plays in socio-political organisations
make these partial descriptions inadequate.
Thus, throughout this essay we will mainly deal with the thorough meaning
of assabiyya as it is used and meant by Ibn Khaldun. In this regard we shall
examine the role assabiyya plays in the transformation of a polity. Before doing
that, however, we shall rst turn to what assabiyya conventionally meant for
the general public before and after Ibn Khaldun.
Conventional Use of Assabiyya

Although Ibn Khaldun was the rst person who conceptualised assabiyya as a
socio-political parameter, the term, in its conventional usage, is closely associ-
ated with the Bedouin lifestyle and qabila (tribe) organisation, which are as
old as Arab history. The classical Arab society is characterised mainly by badu-
hadar divisions, which have not entirely disappeared yet (Barakat, 1993:48).
Hadar (or hadaris) designates city dwellers. Cities in the Arab world, not
unlike the rest of the world, have been the centres of economic, political, cul-
tural and religious activities. For the purpose of this essay, however, we shall
focus here on badawa. Halim Barakat (1993:4950) denes badawa as: [A]
pastoral and tribally organised pattern of living in the badia (the beginning of
life in the desert). In terms of the ways of securing their livelihood Bedouins
can be divided into further sub-categories. The most nomadic Bedouins are
those raising camels and therefore roaming deeply into the desert. Those who
raise sheep and cattle, on the other hand, are less mobile and closer to cities
and villages. A third category may be added to include those who combined
raising animals and cultivating land. These people are less inclined to be
nomadic and, therefore, they lead mostly a settled life (Barakat, 1993:50). The
basic unit of Bedouin social organisation is the qabile (tribe), which is accom-
panied by some other complementary sub-units such as ashira (clan), hamula,
fakhdh, batn, or far (sub-tribes); beit, ahl, aila (extended family); and the usra
(nuclear family) (Barakat, 1993:51). Qabila is a social organisation that unites
its members under a common ancestry (Apak, 2004:1). In other words, the
underlying characteristic of a qabila is that its members are united almost
exclusively by blood ties.
In daily conversation assabiyya is generally accompanied by qabila, i.e., the
assabiyya of qabila. For assabiyya is connected with the word asaba, which are
male relations in the male line (Gabrieli, 1958:681), namely agnates (Rosenthal,
1980:ixxviii). Assabiyya is derived from the root asab, which means to bind. It
implies binding the individuals into a group (Baali, 1988:43). Assabiyya, in
turn, means spirit of kinship in the family or tribe (Gabrieli, 1958:681).

Rosenthal (1980:ixxviii) borrows his denition of assabiyya from the great
Arabic dictionary, Lisn al-Arab: Making common cause with ones agnates.
To be more explicit, during the pre-Islamic Arab world, which is called Jahili-
yya (time of ignorance) in the Islamic terminology, assabiyya had been under-
stood as a spirit of unity and solidarity that unites all the members of a qabila
around a notion of descending from a common ancestor. It is a social and
psychological spirit that drives the (male) members of that qabila to act
together against an external threat or to attack another qabila even if it does
not pose a threat, which was not uncommon in the lawless deserts of pre-
Islamic Arabia. Kutam, a poet lived in the Umayyad period, expresses this
tradition of assault in the following way: If we attack on a tribe, our plunder
reach it wherever it is . . . If we cannot nd others, we attack on our brothers,
Bekrs (Apak, 2004:8).
Although having strong feelings of unity and solidarity for family members
and for close relatives is a natural psychological trait of human beings, consid-
ering the conditions of Bedouin lifestyle assabiyya used to have also a social
and environmental character. In other words, in a world where a person could
not survive without the protection of a qabila membership, acting together
with other members of the qabila was a social obligation, as well as a psycho-
logical motive.
The main source of assabiyya is the unity of nasab (lineage). However, since
assabiyya in the nal analysis is a feeling, the existence of lineage is not absolute
but relative. In other words, it is the belief in belonging to a lineage that cre-
ates assabiyya, rather than its real existence. In this regard what generates ass-
abiyya is the psychological perception rather than biological reality (Apak,
2004:21). In classical Arab society, the signicance of the notion of belonging
to a lineage was reected and reproduced by the tradition of keeping records
of lineages. It is a well-known tradition that Semitic societies in general, and
among them Arabs in particular, were extremely concerned with genealogies
(Apak, 2004:34). It can even be argued that genealogy reached to the level of
an independent discipline in Arab intellectual history. The books of genealo-
gies, such as Jamharat ansab al-Arab of Ibn Hazm or Ansab al-Ashraf of Bala-
zuri, reveal how far Arabs were concerned with this issue.
Compared to other feelings and motives governing the behaviours of human
beings within a qabila organisation, assabiyya is the most powerful one. Its
power is so strong that it may even separate a husband from his wife if she
happens to belong to an enemy tribe (Apak, 2004:29). It is assabiyya that leads
a member to die without hesitation for the sake of his tribe. As Muhammad
Abid al-Jabiri notes, . . . in these organisations individual identities disappear
into tribal identities and the notion of I is replaced by the notion of we

(Apak, 2004:22). Crime and punishment, for instance, are not personal but
collective. In other words, the tribe as a whole is responsible for the behaviours
(mostly crimes committed against other tribes) of its members (arc,
1991:453). According to assabbiya rule when a member asks for the help of his
tribe (istigsa), the tribe must be with him, which constituted one of the main
reasons for the unending vendettas and wars between tribes in the pre-Islamic
Arabia (arc, 1991:453).
It should also be noted that, although the unity and integrity within a tribe
were guaranteed by assabiyya, as far as supra-tribal identities were concerned
assabiyya played an opposite role. In other words, the tribal identity was so
strong and exclusive that no alternative source of identity beyond the tribal
level could emerge during the Jahiliyya period. Thus, it became the greatest
impediment in front of the materialisation of a greater socio-political structure
in the Arab world, like a state or empire where all tribal identities were dis-
solved into a greater political identity. The semantic transformation of the
term Arab is a good indicator of this aspect of assabiyya. By the birth of Islam
it had been used to separate those settled in cities and those living in rural
areas. In an Arabic inscription dated 328 AD, the term Arab was used to
mean those living in badia. It is interesting and important to recognise that
the rst authentic text where Arab was used to designate an ethnic nation,
including both Bedouins and hadaris, was the Quran (Yldrm, 1998:43).
The most signicant aspect of assabiyya in the pre-Islamic period was that it
required unconditional subordination and blind support. That is to say, with-
out taking into consideration whether a person is right or wrong, oppressor or
oppressed, his tribe must protect him against the tribe of other side(s). In a
poem attributed to Jundab b. Anbar b. Tamm, it is asserted that, Help your
brother be he is oppressor or oppressed. (arc, 1991:453). Likewise
another poet, Asleb b. Abdallah, defends this notion by saying that, If I do
not help my brother when he acts unfairly, how can I help him if he is treated
unfairly? (arc, 1991:453). As these examples clearly show assabiyya, in its
conventional meaning, transcends all moral values. Or, more truly, it creates
its own morality. It is this aspect of assabiyya that makes it condemned by
Islam. The Prophet Muhammad denes assabiyya as someones blind support
to his tribe, even if it is wrong (arc, 1991:453). In another well-known
tradition He says that, He is not one of us who calls for assabiyya, he is not
one of us who ghts for assabiyya and he is not one of us who dies for assabi-
yya (arc, 1991:453).
Assabiyya in the Muqaddimah: Assabiyya is Essentially a Quality

of Badawa
Despite the fact that Ibn Khaldun takes this conventional and relatively local con-
ception of assabiyya as the point of departure, he reloads the term with a larger
connotation. Thus by turning assabiyya into a technical and de-contextualised
term, he presents it as the basic political parameter, which is thought to be
applicable to all cases of collective political action in various forms and scales.
Ibn Khaldun asserts that living in the desert or other rural areas outside cit-
ies (badia) is possible only for those who have assabiyya (MQ, I, 261). For God
put evil, as well as good, into human nature. In other words, mutual aggres-
sion is a natural condition of social life. Those people living in cities and towns
are protected against the aggressions of their fellow beings by laws and against
the attacks of others by city walls, armies or professional guardians, which
are created and supervised by a strong and centralised political authority.
Those who live in rural areas outside cities and towns, however, do not have
such facilities to protect themselves against the attacks and aggressions of
others. The only means they have, beyond their own fortitude, is the support
of their fellow beings who share the same destiny. Thus without the support
of his fellow beings (basically his close relatives) no man is able to survive
in badia.
Then how does assabiyya originate in badwa? This might be the crucial
question to be answered, because having an insight into the circumstances
under which assabiyya comes into existence, we may understand the true nature
of socio-political collective action, i.e., the action directed to state formation.
Assabiyya, says Ibn Khaldun, results only from blood relationship (al-
iltihm bin-nasab) or something corresponding to it (MQ, I, 264). It is one
of the basic natural dispositions of human beings to have aection towards
their relatives. The clearest sign of this quality of human nature, according to
Ibn Khaldun, is that man feels shame in his soul when his relatives are treated
unjustly or attacked, and he wishes to help them in their struggle.
Accordingly, assabiyya is something that exists in dierent degrees depending
on how close the relationship is. The closer the blood relationship is the more
aection is generated in someones soul. In other words, as far as an individual
is concerned, his feeling of aection for his fellows spreads out like circles
which lie one inside other, starting from his own house to the group of the
greatest number, with whom he shares a common descent, real or imaginary.
Indeed, Ibn Khaldun notes that as the size of population of a group increases
the lineage must turn into something imaginary and devoid of reality (MQ, I,
265). Since they live a relatively isolated life, only the Bedouins dealing with
camel-raising and, thereby, penetrated deep into the desert may preserve the
purity of their lineage. Otherwise lineages are confused across generations and
no-one is able to know how pedigree developed (MQ, I, 265266). As far as
assabiyya is concerned, however, what is signicant is not the real existence of
blood relationship, but the existence of the imagination or belief that creates
close contact and mutual help (MQ, I, 265).
Here, the question of where this blood relationship comes to an end can be
raised. Is it the assabiyya of the Sons of Talib (Ben Talib) that is central for
collective action to take place or the assabiyya of the Sons of Hashim (Ben
Hashim) or the Sons of Abdumenaf (Ben Abdumenaf ), the assabiyya of
Quraysh or Mudar, Adnan or the assabiyya of the Sons of Ishmael? In fact,
if it is a mental construction in the nal analysis, why can not we further
the chain of blood relationship all the way back to Adam and think of an
assabiyya of the whole of humanity? All students of Ibn Khaldun would
acknowledge that it is dicult to nd clear answers to these and related ques-
tions in the Muqaddimah. The debate that took place among the European
orientalists in the early 20th century on the question of whether Ibn Khaldun
oered a theory of nationalism was instigated mainly by this ambiguity con-
cerning the limits and eects of blood relationship. For Ibn Khaldun some-
times talks about the assabiyya of Quraysh (MQ, I, 400) and sometimes about
the assabiyya of Arabs (MQ, I, 458459). We may, however, fairly speculate
about the possible responses that Ibn Khaldun would give to these questions.
When we take into consideration the general spirit of the Muqaddimah as a
whole, we may say that blood relationship would come to an end at a point
beyond which there appears no feeling of assabiyya. This would be a functional
understanding of blood relationship and is by no means constant, because it
changes from case to case. Sometimes it comes to the end in the Sons of
Hashim (Ben Hashim) and sometimes it reaches a higher level to include all
Arabs, depending on the nature and intensity of the relationships between the
related groups.
Real and, although less powerful in degree, imaginary blood tie is the sim-
plest and the most natural source of assabiyya, but Ibn Khaldun does not
restrict assabiyya to these factors only. He adds clients, allies and neighbours to
the same category (MQ, I, 264). The proof of the existence of the assabiyya
among these people is the fact that they feel the approximate or the same
degree of shame when one of these is humiliated or treated unjustly. The
reason for it, says Ibn Khaldun, is that a client (master) relationship leads to
close contact (al-iltihm) exactly, or approximately in the same way, as does
common descent (MQ, I, 264). The key term to be underlined here is close
contact. The following passage shows what Ibn Khaldun means by assabiyya
and close contact:
. . . the purpose of assabiyya, which is defence and aggression, can materialise only
with the help of a common descent. For, as we have stated before, blood relations and
other close relatives help each other, while strangers and outsiders do not. Client rela-
tionships and contacts with slaves or allies have the same eect as (common descent).
The consequences of (common) descent, though natural, still are something imagi-
nary. The real thing to bring about the feeling of close contact (al-iltihm) is social
intercourse, friendly association, long familiarity, and the companionship that results
from growing up together, having the same wet nurse, and sharing the other circum-
stances of death and life. If close contact is established in such a manner, the result will
be aection and co-operation. (MQ, I, 374)
It must be clear from this passage that the assabiyya that results from blood ties
is only one type, namely, to use Mahdis words (1957:196), the most elemen-
tary form of it. Common ancestry, common interests, and common experi-
ences of life and death, continues Mahdi, reinforce each other in developing
assabiyya. In time, the latter factors overshadow common ancestry (Mahdi,
1957:196197). What has to be underlined here is the feeling of close contact
(al-iltiham), which may come into existence as a result of several dierent
associations other than and besides common descent. Ibn Khalduns func-
tional understanding of assabiyya can be exemplied by another passage, where
he emphasises the consequences of an aliation rather than its origin: When
the things which result from (common) descent are there, it is as if (common
descent) itself were there, because the only meaning of belonging to one or
another group is that one is subject to its laws and conditions, as if one had
come into close contact with it (MQ, I, 267).
As clearly seen, Ibn Khalduns denition of assabiyya is not genetic, but
functional. In this regard, his conception of assabiyya is notably distinct from
its conventional use, as Franz Rosenthal (1980) notes. For in its conventional
sense assabiyya is a characteristic of tribal organisation, and has an exclusive
nature, which eventually impedes the emergence of a greater political organi-
sation, such as a centralised state structure. Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand,
attempts to develop a theory of political change that has universal application.
Consequently he extends the meaning of assabiyya and perceives the feeling of
close contact as essential, with blood ties and other kinds of associations gen-
erating this feeling as accidental.
The Source of Assabiyya is Being Outside

That must be why assabiyya weakens as the ease, luxury and comfort of the
hadari lifestyle intensify. Were the blood ties the essential source of assabiyya,
this would not be the case. For luxury and comfort do not change the biology
of relationship, but rather aects the socio-psychological consequences of

blood ties, i.e., the feeling of close contact (al-iltiham) derived from it. Now
we are able to understand why assabiyya is stronger in badia. This is so, because
the degree of close contact is higher in the harsh conditions of badia. The
individual in badawa is almost identied with society, because no individual is
able to survive outside his group. Individuals need each other in almost every
minute of their lives. They have to work and defend themselves together. Even
their living spaces are not too isolated from each other, as they are in hadra.
Thus, mutual help and aection, namely assabiyya, resulted from close contact
is naturally stronger in badawa.
Although Ibn Khaldun does not specically discuss it, if we further his
logical reasoning to its end, we can see that close contact is a relative term.
Some conditions may generate psychologically more intensive contact, while
the psychological intensity of contact in other conditions may be weaker. It is
naturally expected that the more dicult the conditions are, the more psycho-
logically intensive and, therefore, close the contact is. Accordingly the most
intensive and closest contact emerges among people when they share life and
death experiences. Wars and other catastrophic conditions, in this sense, can
be said to generate the highest degree of assabiyya.
Now we are able to see why and how assabiyya, the crucial dynamic lying at
the centre of change, come into existence. Assabiyya originates in badwa. In
one word, it is the state of being outside of hadra and mulk (political power)
that creates assabiyya. Nobility [the secret of assabiyya], says Ibn Khaldun,
originates in the state of being outside . . . That is, being outside of leadership
and nobility and being in a vile, humble station, devoid of prestige. In badia
(outside), the conditions of life are dicult to tackle with without the help of
others. Therefore, living in the conditions of badawa brings it into close con-
tact, i.e., social intercourse, friendly association, long familiarity, and the
companionship that results from growing up together, having the same wet
nurse, and sharing the other circumstances of death and life, which, in turn,
generates assabiyya. In other words, keeping Ibn Khalduns method of causal
explanation in mind, it seems that it is not assabiyya that causes people to enter
into close contact with each other. Rather assabiyya is unintentionally gener-
ated in the course of time as a natural result of close contact, which in return
is led by the dicult conditions of badia. Logically, there has to be a time gap
between exposition to dicult conditions and to the emergence of assabiyya.
Once generated, however, it is assabiyya that causes people to act collectively,
almost exclusively in political matters. It can be claimed that until assabiyya
comes into existence people are passive and determined by external stimulus,
while after assabiyya they become active and determinant in their environment.
More explicitly, to be exposed together to dicult conditions does not auto-

matically and immediately create response, i.e., collective political action.
Rather, it creates a ground on which assabiyya is generated and it is assabiyya,
in turn, that leads them to act collectively. As Ibn Khaldun repeatedly under-
lies, no serious collective (particularly political) action can take place without
assabiyya: . . . assabiyya gives protection and makes possible mutual defence,
the pressing of claims, and every other kind of social activity (MQ, I, 284).
Setting the causality in this way gives us an opportunity to separate severe
conditions and assabiyya from each other. That is to say, although assabiyya is
a function of badia, which is being-outside, all types of being-outside may not
always create assabiyya. The story of the Israelites, as narrated in the Quran
(5:2026) and cited by Ibn Khaldun in the Muqaddimah, exemplies this fact
very well:
Remember Moses said to his people: O my people! Call in remembrance the favour
of Allah unto you, when He produced prophets among you, made you kings, and gave
you what He had not given to any other among the peoples.
O my people! Enter the holy land which Allah hath assigned unto you, and turn
not back ignominiously, for then will ye be overthrown, to your own ruin.
They said: O Moses! In this land are a people of exceeding strength: Never shall
we enter it until they leave it: if (once) they leave, then shall we enter.
(But) among (their) Allah fearing men were two on whom Allah had bestowed His
grace. They said: Assault them at the (proper) Gate; when once ye are in, victory will
be yours; But on Allah put your trust if ye have faith.
They said: O Moses! While they remain there, never shall we be able to enter, to
the end of time. Go thou, and thy Lord, and ght ye two, while we sit here (and
watch).
He said: O my Lord! I have power only over myself and my brother; so separate
us from this rebellious people!
Allah said: Therefore will the land be out of their reach for forty years. In distrac-
tion will they wander through the land. But sorrow thou not over these rebellious
people.
To Ibn Khaldun the reason for the Israelites attitude was that they had lost
their assabiyya under the harshness that the Copts in Egypt practiced against
them (MQ, I, 288). Hence God commanded them to stay in the desert
between Egypt and Syria for forty years. They had no contact with civilisa-
tion nor did they settle in any city, and they did not mix with any human
beings (MQ, I, 288). During this forty years . . . the generation whose char-
acter had been formed and whose assabiyya had been destroyed by the humil-
iation, oppression, and force . . . (MQ, I, 289) disappeared. A new generation
having no experience of humiliation and oppression emerged in the desert.
With this new generation a new assabiyya could grow up in the desert and lead
them to superiority. Forty years, for Ibn Khaldun, is the minimum amount of
time in which one generation is replaced by another one.
The Israelites in Egypt were neither in power, nor in a position to benet
from the advantages of power. That is to say, they were in the state of being
outside leadership and nobility. They were in a vile, humble situation, devoid
of prestige. Yet these conditions completely destroyed their assabiyya, much
less created a stronger one. This point needs to be explained.
Ibn Khaldun argues that the ultimate goal to which assabiyya leads is mulk
(MQ, I, 284). However, there are two conditions that diminish or weaken
assabiyya before it achieves its goal. One of them is . . . luxury and the submer-
gence of the tribe in a life of prosperity (MQ, I, 286). Some groups with
some assabiyya obtain a share from the mulk in proportion of the degree of
their assabiyya, even if they are not powerful enough to get the mulk totally for
themselves. They also have a degree of luxury and welfare, again in proportion
of their share in the mulk. Such a group is content with what it has, thereby it
submits to the power of the dominant assabiyya and does not struggle to obtain
the mulk completely. They . . . are merely concerned with prosperity, gain,
and a life of abundance. (They are satised) to lead an easy, restful life in the
shadow of the ruling dynasty, and to adopt royal habits in building and dress,
a matter they stress and in which they take more and more pride, the more
luxuries and plenty they obtain, as well as all the other things that go with
luxury and plenty (MQ, I, 286287). In the course of time a hadari lifestyle
becomes the nature of their children and grand children. Accordingly this
group looses the character once acquired in their Bedouin lifestyles, including
assabiyya.
A second factor destroying assabiyya is . . . meekness and docility to outsid-
ers (MQ, I, 287). This is so, because, just as like obeying laws contrary to
individual will does (MQ, I, 259), being subservient to an authority by force
for a long time breaks vigour and strength, and destroys assabiyya as well. In
other words, the availability of harsh and dicult conditions is not enough for
assabiyya to come into being. The degree and type of harshness also play a role
in the generation of assabiyya.
As is seen, although being outside (or being deprived of ) is a necessary
condition for assabiyya to come into being, if this deprivation results from
the cruelty and oppression performed by a dominant authority, it diminishes
assabiyya, not creates it. The deprivation that the Israelites were exposed to in
Egypt was this kind of deprivation. While being outside the system because of
the oppression and cruelty exercised against them by the Copts in Egypt
diminished their assabiyya; being outside (being in the desert) of Egypt led
them to recover their assabiyya, because this time deprivation did not come
from an oppressive political authority, but from the natural physical conditions.
At this point, to be able to complete the picture drawn in the Muqaddimah,
we may apply to the conceptualisations of Arnold Toynbee, who saw Ibn
Khaldun as the greatest of historians and seems to have been inuenced by
him profoundly. According to Toynbee civilisations come into existence as a
response to some set of challenges or diculty. Here we can clearly see the
traces of Ibn Khalduns impact on Toynbee. To Ibn Khaldun, as we have men-
tioned above, it is the severity of badia that creates assabiyya, which in turn
determines the trajectory of umran (civilisation). However, Toynbee (1947:i,140)
seems to be more aware of the dierent consequences of dierent degrees
of severity:
If we increase the severity of the challenge ad innitum, do we thereby ensure an

innite intensication of the stimulus and an innite increase in the response when
the challenge is successfully met? Or do we reach a point beyond which increasing
severity produces diminishing returns? And, if we go beyond this point, do we reach a
further point at which the challenge becomes so severe that the possibility of respond-
ing to it successfully disappears? In that case the law would be that the most stimulat-
ing challenge is to be found in a mean between a deciency of severity and an excess
of it.
Toynbee describes this as the optimum level of challenge, neither decient

nor excessive. Ibn Khaldun makes similar distinction in the issue of physical
geography and its inuence upon human settlement. In other cases, however,
he is less clear. How the excessiveness of physical challenge prevents human
beings from developing a socio-political organisation was reected perfectly
where Ibn Khaldun describes the geographical zones and climates. At the
beginning of the Muqaddimah, depending upon the information given by
Ptolemy and the Sharf al-Idrs in the Book of Roger, he argues that the earth
is divided into seven geographical zones and . . . civilisation (umran) has its
seat between the third and the sixth zones (MQ, I, 104). In terms of physical
conditions other parts of the earth are not suitable for the settlement of human
beings in large quantity. That is to say, the severity of the conditions in those
areas is beyond a human capacity to handle with, no matter how close their
mutual contact is.
Ibn Khalduns distinction between challenges seems to depend on quality,
as well as quantity, of the challenge. He argues that obedience to an external
authority, even to laws by force for a long time destroys fortitude and assabi-
yya. This challenge is qualitatively dierent from the diculty of badawa.
Hence, it can be argued that for Ibn Khaldun harshness and diculty are
necessary for assabiyya to be generated. Yet, to use Toynbees words, the chal-
lenge should not be excessive in degree, as in the sparsely settled areas of the
earth, and it should not be excessive in quality, as in the obedience to an exter-
nal authority by force. If the degree of force is high, then this challenge
becomes also excessive in degree. So, the challenge the Israelites had to face in
Egypt was excessive both in degree and in quality.
Before closing this section I shall underline some points. In the rst place
assabiyya is a political factor. When it exists it leads the group to political col-
lective action. It leads them to ask for a better political position than they
have. Secondly, assabiyya comes into existence as a result of the close contact
necessitated by the severe conditions of being-outside. Finally, being-outside
should not be accompanied by excessive and destructive challenge both in
degree and in quality.
The Components of Assabiyya

So far it must be clear that assabiyya is a distinguishing mark of Bedouins. Yet
it is associated with and/or composed of some other qualities, to which now
we turn.
Bedouins, says Ibn Khaldun, are closer to being good than hadaris
(MQ, I, 253). He addresses that human nature is neutral in its natural state of
creation ( ftrat al-ula). Although it has a potential to incline towards and
choose the good, it is equally open to the eects of the good and evil. What-
ever good or evil arrive in the soul rst, it leaves an imprint upon it. Thus the
soul moves away from the other and it becomes dicult for the person to
acquire it later on. Therefore, given the diculty of the actualisation of the
un-embedded rationality of human nature, goodness or evilness of the soul
depends primarily on the external conditions (i.e., customs) into which a per-
son happens to be born.
Ibn Khaldun presumes that the customs in hadra are evil by nature.
Hadaris are much concerned with all kinds of pleasures. They are accustomed
to luxury and success in worldly occupations and to indulgence in worldly
desires. Therefore their souls are coloured with all kinds of blameworthy and
evil qualities. The more of them they possess, the more remote do the ways
and means of goodness become to them (MQ, I, 254). Living in a highly
mobile and crowded society, they have lost the feeling of shame, which may
free them to act shamefully.
Bedouins, on the other hand, devote their whole time and energy to make
a living at the level of bare necessity. They are far away from luxury and indul-
gence in worldly desires. Therefore, . . . as compared with those of hadaris,
their evil ways and blameworthy qualities are much less numerous (MQ, I, 254).
Here Ibn Khaldun talks about the rst natural state ( ftrat al-ula) (MQ, I, 254),
to which Bedouins are closer. The notion of the value of the rst natural state
is borrowed from a famous hadith (tradition) of the Prophet Muhammad say-
ing, Every infant is born in the natural state ( ftra). It is his parents who make
him a Jew or a Christian or a Magian. For Ibn Khaldun badia is the begin-
ning of umran and closer to the initial state of creation, where nature (umran)
is in its full potential. The life of a civilisation starts in badia and ends in
hadra. Hence the last stage of hadra represents at the same time the last stage
of evil (MQ, I, 255). In this regard, the goodness of badwa can be compared
to the purity and goodness of an infant, who has not started to reect of his
social world yet.
Second, Ibn Khaldun argues that . . . Bedouins are more disposed to cour-
age than hadaris (MQ, I, 257). Since the hadaris have a luxurious and com-
fortable life, they become used to laziness and ease. In a society where the
division of labour is highly increased, hadaris meet their needs without much
eort. The most important of all is that the security of life and property is
entrusted to the government in hadra, which provides hadaris with full assur-
ance of safety. As successive generations have grown up in this way of life, in
the course of time, vulnerability, carelessness, and laziness become a quality of
character of hadaris.
In badia, on the other hand, there are no governmental authorities or mili-
tias to whom the issue of security is assigned. Bedouins are responsible by
themselves for the safety of their lives and properties against both the assaults
of intruders and of wild animals in the desert. This makes Bedouins more
alert, careful, and courageous. Thus across successive generations fortitude
becomes a quality character of Bedouins. For Ibn Khaldun believes that
. . . man is a child of the customs and the things he has become used to. He is
not the product of his natural disposition and temperament (MQ, I, 258).
To Ibn Khaldun, another reason why hadaris lose fortitude and power of
resistance is their reliance upon laws (MQ, I, 258). Enforcement of laws by
force and punishment is a character of hadari lifestyle. Submission to these
laws against the individual will, in turn, leads in the long run to the erosion of
fortitude in the soul. For obedience to an external authority contrary to per-
sonal will leads to humiliation and the weakening of self-condence. So the
more oppressive a regime is, the more it destroys individual fortitude. In badia,
on the other hand, laws are not enforced by force. Indeed for Bedouins there
are no laws other than habits and customs. To a certain extent, Bedouins
behave as they wish, without any restraint. In this regard, their wild nature
remains intact and resistant against impositions from above.
What has to be underlined here is that for a restriction to annihilate forti-

tude in this way it must be against the individual will and come from outside.
In other words, there has to be a psychological tension inside a person when
he acts in a certain way. Otherwise laws and regulations would not destroy
personal self-condence. In this context Ibn Khaldun discusses the case of
early Muslim society (MQ, I, 260). Their behaviours were restricted and
directed by new laws and regulations brought by the Prophet Muhammad. Yet
these laws had not destroyed their fortitude. Indeed they were more coura-
geous compared to their pre-Islamic lives. Ibn Khaldun argues that once they
received the laws from the Prophet, because of the inuence of the faith they
already had, they internalised them right away. Thus the restraining inuence
of these laws began to come from inside, rather than from outside, which
never created a tension in their psychology. They never felt restricted by an
external authority. Their souls never experienced the feeling of humiliation
and restriction for obeying these regulations. Thus laws had not aected their
fortitude negatively. As time passed, however, the faith of the Muslim society
lost its strength and the enforcement of laws turned out to be something exter-
nal to the soul. Therefore the laws began to be conceived of as restraining
personal wills which, in return, destroyed fortitude.
Thirdly, Ibn Khaldun holds that . . . only those who share in assabiyya can
have a house and nobility in the basic sense and in reality, while others have
it only in a metaphorical and gurative sense (MQ, I, 273). Given that ass-
abiyya originates in a quality of badwa, a house, in its actual meaning,
belongs to Bedouins only. According to Ibn Khaldun, having a house means
belonging to a lineage among the members of which there are men who
became famous by their courage, bravery, generosity, humility and by all other
valued personal qualities. If a man belongs to such a lineage he counts as
noble. His fellows respect him and are ready to obey him when he claims
leadership. The nobility and prestige of a house is in proportion to its degree
of assabiyya, . . . because nobility is the secret of assabiyya (MQ, I, 274).
Since assabiyya declines and nally disappears in hadra, hadaris can have
nobility only in a metaphorical sense. That implies that nobility is not some-
thing permanent, rather it is constructed through socially valued deeds and it
gradually disappears. Building the glory of a family is not an easy matter. Pre-
serving it requires extreme care, which cannot be guaranteed forever. Ibn
Khaldun addresses that its duration is four generations (MQ, I, 278).
Finally, Ibn Khaldun claims that: A sign of (the qualication of an indi-
vidual for) mulk is his eager desire to acquire praiseworthy qualities, and vice
versa (MQ, I, 291). Since we will deal with this issue in detail in the next
section, where we analyse the relationship between assabiyya and religion, for
the time being, we will be content with emphasising the fact that, for Ibn
Khaldun, those who obtain mulk are always those who acquire praiseworthy
qualities at the same time. In other words, assabiyya leading to mulk is always
associated with goodness.
Assabiyya and Religion

The question to be raised here is whether religion is a constituent of assabiyya
or not. We need the answer of this question to be able to dene properly what
assabiyya is. Ibn Khaldun is not very clear in this issue. Considering the
approach is embedded in the Muqaddimah as a whole, there is no debate
among the students of Ibn Khaldun on the fact that assabiyya is the motor
power of the transformation of umran, from its emergence to its end. Ibn
Khaldun is unequivocal on this issue when he says that: Mulk and large
dynastic (power) are attained only through . . . assabiyya (MQ, I, 313). Never-
theless, he insists somewhere else in the Muqaddimah that, to be able to attain
mulk, there needs to exist, besides assabiyya, some religious characteristics:
He who thus obtained assabiyya guaranteeing power, and who is known to have good
qualities appropriate for the execution of Gods laws concerning His creatures, is ready
to act as (Gods) substitute and guarantor among mankind . . . It has thus become clear
that good qualities attest the (potential) existence of mulk in a person who (in addition
to his good qualities) possesses assabiyya. Whenever we observe people who possess
assabiyya and who have gained control over many lands and nations, we nd in them
an eager desire for goodness and good qualities. . . .4 (MQ, I, 292)
From this passage it can be deduced that Ibn Khaldun sees religious qualities
and assabiyya as two separate things. Likewise when he claims that religious
propaganda cannot be successful without assabiyya (MQ, I, 322), he seems to
do the same. Every mass political enterprise by necessity requires assabiyya
4
Ibn Khaldun explains these good qualities as follows: . . . good qualities such as generosity,
the forgiveness of error, tolerance toward the weak, hospitality toward guests, the support of
dependents, maintenance of the indigent, patience in adverse circumstances, faithful fullment
of obligations, liberality with money for the preservation of honour, respect for the religious law
and for the scholars who are learned in it, observation of the things to be done or not to be done
that (those scholars) prescribe for them, thinking highly of (religious scholars), belief in and
veneration for men of religion and a desire to receive their prayers, great respect for old men and
teachers, acceptance of the truth in response to those who call to it, fairness to and care for those
who are too weak to take care of themselves, humility toward the poor, attentiveness to the
complaints of supplicants, fullment of the duties of the religious law and divine worship in all
details, avoidance of fraud, cunning, deceit, and of not fullling obligations, and similar things.
(MQ, I, 322). Since religious propaganda requires impelling people to act col-
lectively for a certain end and, therefore, needs a strong power behind those
who perform this propaganda, it cannot be complete without assabiyya. Indeed,
to Ibn Khaldun, the person, even if he is right, would drive himself to disaster,
when he attempts to perform such propaganda without having assabiyya
behind him (MQ, I, 322323).
Ibn Khaldun claims that:
For all these (reasons), the Arabs are by nature remote from royal leadership. They
attain it (only) once their nature has undergone a complete transformation under the
inuence of some religious colouring that wipes out all such (qualities) and causes the
Arabs to have a restraining inuence on themselves and to keep people apart from
each other, as we have mentioned. (MQ, I, 307)
In this passage also he seems to treat religion and assabiyya as two separate
parameters working together in the way of attaining mulk. Despite all these
passages, however, we should not immediately conclude that Ibn Khaldun has
in his mind sharp dividing lines between assabiyya and religion. For in various
places in the Muqaddima he considers assabiyya and religion so intertwined
that one may quite legitimately think of religion as a complementary factor of
assabiyya, rather than being something outside of it. In the rst place, as we
have discussed above, those who have assabiyya are closer to the good. For
human beings are born upon the rst tra. There is a consensus among the
Muslim religious authorities (ulama) that the state of the rst tra means
the state of Islam. Furthermore, according to Ibn Khaldun, as we have seen in
the section of human nature, human beings are ready to lean towards either
good or evil, depending on whichever reaches to their souls rst. In badwa,
as opposed to hadra, it is highly likely that the good reaches to the soul rst
because, from a religious perspective, the degenerating eects of Bedouin
lifestyle are less numerous compared to hadra. Besides that, badwa is closer
to the state of the rst tra, which is considered good by nature. Ibn Khaldun
argues that: . . . no people are as quick (as the Arabs)5 to accept (religious)
truth and right guidance, because their natures have been preserved free from
distorted habits and uncontaminated by base character qualities (MQ, I, 306).
Consequently, Bedouins, who have assabiyya by denition, tend to have a
good character, which is religious by nature.
Secondly, as we have seen above, having nobility and a house in real terms
is exclusively a characteristic of Bedouins. Hadaris can have it only in a meta-
phorical sense. Nobility, on the other hand, is identied mostly with good
5
In many places Ibn Khaldun uses the term Arab to refer to Bedouins (Rosenthal, 1968).
qualities (MQ, I, 273, 282), which are religious by nature. Ibn Khaldun also
argues that only those who have assabiyya can have true nobility (MQ, I, 272),
because the secret of assabiyya is nobility (MQ, I, 274). The following passage
leaves no room for doubt about the complementary nature of assabiyya and
religious qualities:
. . . glory has a basis upon which it is built and through which it achieves its reality.
(That basis) is assabiyya and the tribal group (to which an individual belongs). Glory
also depends upon a detail that completes and perfects its existence. (That detail) is (an
individuals personal) qualities. Mulk is a goal of assabiyya. Thus, it is likewise a goal of
the perfecting details, namely, the (personal) qualities. The existence of (mulk) without
the (simultaneous existence of ) the perfecting details would be like the existence of a
person with his limbs cut o, or it would be like appearing naked before people.
(MQ, I, 291)
Thirdly, Ibn Khaldun applies to the theory of caliphate to demonstrate that

those who obtain mulk and preserve it for long time have (or ought to have)
good personal qualities. For mulk and caliphate are necessary human institu-
tions for the application of the law of God on the earth. The law of God is
exclusively good. In such a situation, it is a must for those who would apply
the law of God to acquire good personal qualities. Accordingly, assabiyya
which is the source of obtaining mulk intermingles with religious qualities
(MQ, I, 291292).
Fourthly, Ibn Khaldun argues that mulk can be attained only by superiority,
which results from assabiyya. In many cases, however, assabiyya plays a mutu-
ally destructive role between dierent small scale assabiyyas. Only through
religion, on the other hand, individual desires come together and hearts
become united. It prevents mutual jealousy and envy among people who share
in assabiyya and leads concentration upon truth. Therefore, those states
depending on religion have wide power and large mulk (MQ, I, 319320).
Fifthly, the following passage also clearly demonstrates how religion and
assabiyya are interconnected to each other in obtaining and maintaining the
mulk:
Thus, we know that these are the qualities of leadership, which (persons qualied for
mulk) have obtained and which have made them deserving of being the leaders of the
people under their control, or to be leaders in general. It is something good that God
has given them, corresponding to their assabiyya and superiority. It is not something
superuous to them, or something that exists as a joke in connection with them. . . .
Vice versa, when God wants a nation to be deprived of mulk, He causes (its members)
to commit blameworthy deeds and to practice all sorts of vices. This will lead to com-
plete loss of the political virtues among them. (These virtues) continue to be destroyed,
until they will no longer exercise royal authority. (MQ, I, 293)
Finally, Ibn Khaldun notes that when Bedouin Arabs accepted Islam their
assabiyya was not diminished, but became stronger. Under normal conditions,
however, considering Ibn Khalduns theory of umran, submission to laws
would have weakened vigour and courage of these people. Obeying religious
laws, however, did not break the dynamism of these Bedouin Arabs because,
in their case, restraining and the feeling of submission came from inside
(MQ, I, 260), rather than resulting from the oppressive policies of an external
political authority.
Many more similar arguments can be found in the Muqaddimah that would
lead us to conclude that as far as a vigorous state structure is concerned assabi-
yya and religion are not mutually exclusive factors. They are either comple-
mentary parts of the same phenomenon or, taking into account the narrower
denition of assabiyya, two separate factors always working together. Further-
more, as Ira M. Lapidus (1990:30) notes, it is also a historical phenomenon
that the basis of conquest movements in North Africa, which Ibn Khaldun
was very familiar with, was religious assabiyya, rather than kinship and lineage
assabiyya.
Goodman (1972:259), in this context, sees religion as a manifestation of
assabiyya at a certain stage of its metamorphosis. For him, religion is the ado-
lescence of assabiyya, while tribalism constitutes its childhood:
Religion involves the self with the transcendent as such. Thus only religion can transform
the otherwise diuse energies of particularistic asabiyyt into a coherent unity for,
to put the matter in military terms (since assabiyya is at bottom a military force) only
religion can align and unify the otherwise mutually destructive forces of rival asabi-
yyt, transforming bands of savages into an eective striking force. Only religion, by
an appeal at once concrete and universal, can broaden the purview of identication
beyond the immediately interdependent group. Thus only religion (through the new
values it introduces and its appeal to the unseen, its supplanting of exclusive standards
of identity with inclusive ones) can oer fullment to the groping aspirations of ass-
abiyya in search of horizonless worlds to conquer.
Having seen the impact of secular ideologies in the modern history of Europe,
at this point we have to be able to claim that secular ideologies also play the
same role in the transformation of umran from its particularistic tribal phase
into broader political units, such as states. Writing in the late 1940s, Hellmut
Ritter (1948:31) underlines this fact when he notes that:
Just as solidarity (assabiyya) gains in power and determination when backed up by a

strong leadership, it gains in clearness of purpose and strength when the gathered
forces are shown by an ideology the direction in which they ought to be active. Ibn
Khaldun knows ideology in the form of religion. A common religious faith would
be capable of strengthening the assabiyya. Religion was surely the most important
ideology in past times, but not the only one. The aim pursued must in any case be an
ideal one; purely economic interests and practical aims, belong in associations and
societies having these corresponding aims.
In concluding this section, it must be clear that religion, ideology or any

abstract notion of desires that unites the future expectations of people, who
would otherwise struggle against each other in a mutually destructive way, are
necessary dynamics in order that a particularistic social structure turns into a
broader political unit, i.e., the state. Assabiyya, in its childhood phase, to use
Goodmans terminology, only disunites, as it had been the case for the Arab
tribes until the rise of Islam. Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, tries to explain
greater political structures like empires. A conception of assabiyya, separate
from an ideological form, however, cannot be a useful tool in understanding
and explaining these kinds of political structures. Consequently as a rule we
can say that the potential of collective political action can be materialised only
within an ideological framework.6 The strength and popularity of this ideo-
logical vision, in turn, determines the strength of assabiyya.
What, then, is Assabiyya?

After all these discussions how can we dene assabiyya? To do that, rst we
have to look at Ibn Khalduns own direct denitions of it, which are numerous
and apparently not very coherent:
Assabiyya is a factor that enables a person . . . in power to force the others to

follow him wherever he wants to go (MQ, I, 93). In other words, assabiyya
causes the others to obey the political authority (MQ, I, 284).
Assabiyya is a factor that . . . results only from blood relationship or some-
thing corresponding to it (MQ, I, 263).
Assabiyya is a factor that may also result from clientship and alliance, which
leads to close contact similar to the one caused by common descent (MQ, I, 263).
For . . . when things which result from (common) descent are there, it is as if
(common descent) itself were there, because the only meaning of belonging to
one or another group is that one is subject to its laws and conditions, as if one
had come into close contact with it (MQ, I, 267).
6
In some cases we may see collective actions taking place without a popular common ideo-
logical framework, such as some revolutions or protest movements. When analysed, however,
these kinds of movements are directed to destroy rather than to construct. High level collective
political actions, like state formation, on the other hand, are necessarily to be embodied in an
ideological structure.
In some cases assabiyya may emerge even among the lowest class of people,
especially in the period of senility of the state (MQ, II, 305).
Assabiyya is a factor that can be large enough to include each tribe and sub-
tribe because of their common descent, but at the same time . . . there exist
among them special kinds of assabiyya because of special relationships that
constitute a closer kind of contact than common descent (MQ, I, 269).
Assabiyya is the source of nobility and prestige. Nobility, in turn, is the
secret of assabiyya (MQ, I, 273274).
Assabiyya is a factor the ultimate goal of which is mulk (MQ, I, 284).
Assabiyya is a dynamic that is necessary for every collective action (particu-
larly political) to take place (MQ, I, 284).
Assabiyya is a factor that leads a person (or a group) sharing in that assabiyya,
to desire the next superior political position, when he (or they) already reached
a certain level of political authority (MQ, I, 284).
The strongest assabiyya desires to subordinate other assabiyyas of other
tribes, after it established its hegemony over its own tribe (MQ, I, 285).
If there exist in a region more than one assabiyya, the strongest assabiyya
gains the upper hand over all the other assabiyyas combined and make them
subservient to its authority. In this way, all the assabiyyas conjoin the strongest
assabiyya and thus a new and greater assabiyya comes out. Otherwise, splits
would occur. In such a case, in turn, what we see is endless dissention and
strife, rather than a political unity (MQ, I, 284285).
If the power of an assabiyya is equal to another one and therefore they can-
not gain upper hand over each other, each assabiyya maintains its hegemony in
their own regions. Indeed this is . . . the case with tribes and nations all over
the earth (MQ, I, 285).
Assabiyya is a dynamic that tends to weaken when those people sharing in
this assabiyya enjoys the fruits of mulk (welfare and luxury) in proportion of
the power of their assabiyya, even if they could not obtain the mulk completely
because of the unchallengeable strength of the dominant assabiyya in authority
(MQ, I, 287).
Assabiyya is a feature that leads to mulk when it is accompanied by good and
praiseworthy qualities (MQ, I, 292). God has given good and praiseworthy
qualities to those who obtain the mulk, corresponding to their assabiyya. It is
not something superuous to them, or something that exists as a joke in con-
nection with them (MQ, I, 293).
As long as a nation (umma) retains its assabiyya, mulk that disappears in
one branch will, of necessity, pass to some other branch of the same nation
(MQ, I, 296).
The d, the Thamd, the Amalekites, the Himyar, the Tubba, the Adhwa
and the Mudar were dierent branches of the same assabiyya. The same was
also the case of the Kayyanids and the Persians, and the Greeks and the
Romans. When the rule of the Greeks was wiped out, their brethren Romans
replaced them (MQ, I, 298).
Assabiyya is a quality that diers (rise and fall) from one generation to
another, in parallel with the decline and rise of the luxury and welfare (MQ,
I, 298).
. . . aggressive and defensive strength is obtained only through assabiyya
which means (mutual) aection and willingness to ght and die for each
other (MQ, I, 313). Therefore the attainment of mulk and the foundation of
state, which requires mostly struggle and ght, are possible only with assabi-
yya. When a state is rmly established, however, assabiyya can be dispensed
(MQ, I, 314).
There was an Arab assabiyya which had been destroyed by the time of al-
Mutasim and al-Wthiq (MQ, I, 314).
Thus, the expansion and power of a state correspond to the numerical
strength of those who obtain superiority at the beginning of the rule. The
length of its duration also depends upon it. The life of anything that comes
into being depends upon the strength of its temper. The temper of states is
based upon assabiyya. If the assabiyya is strong, the (states) temper likewise is
strong, and its life of long duration. Assabiyya, in turn, depends on numerical
strength, as we have stated (MQ, I, 331).
That assabiyya leads to mulk does not mean that every assabiyya has mulk.
Mulk belongs to those who dominate subjects, collect taxes, send out (mili-
tary) expeditions, protect the frontier regions, and have no one over them who
is stronger than they (MQ, I, 381). In other words, assabiyya that is able to
monopolise mulk exclusively is nothing but sovereignty.
In the early periods of Islam the type of assabiyya ruling the Muslim society
and politics was the assabiyya of caliphate. Later on, however, it turned into
the assabiyya of mulk, following an interval during which these two assabiyya
co-existed together (MQ, I, 428).
Assabiyya has often disappeared (at the time the state grows senile), and
pomp has taken the place it occupied in the souls of men. Now, when in addi-
tion to the weakening of assabiyya, pomp, too, is discontinued, the subjects
grow audacious vis--vis the state, because the presumption of pomp remains.
Therefore, the state shields itself by holding on to pomp as much as possible,
until everything is nished (MQ, II, 118).
Assabiyya nds its expression in soldiers (MQ, II, 119).
Assabiyya is the secret divine (factor that) restrains people from splitting up
and abandoning each other. It is the source of unity and agreement, and the
guarantor of the intentions and laws of Islam (MQ, I, 438).
As is clearly seen from these denitions and descriptions, even though they
give a rough and general idea about what assabiyya is, we nd various and
sometimes unrelated (even contradictory) characterisations of assabiyya in the
Muqaddimah. Some scholars attributes this equivocalness about the boundar-
ies of the concept of assabiyya to Ibn Khalduns use of the term in a loose way,
while for Muhsin Mahdi (1957:196) this ambiguity stems from the fact that
Ibn Khaldun does not always use it as a technical term. Even if we accept the
argument that Ibn Khaldun uses the term loosely, considering the usage of
the term within the entire context of the Muqaddimah, it should be clear that
the whole story is driven by a certain, yet complicated, (i.e., technical) mean-
ing of assabiyya. Therefore Mahdis argument seems to be closer to the truth.
When we accept Mahdis point, on the other hand, our problem will not be
solved immediately, because it is not an easy task to determine in a certain
context whether Ibn Khaldun uses the term in a technical way or in its ordi-
nary sense.7 Thus, it would be relevant to assume that assabiyya, as a technical
term, is dened throughout the Muqaddimah, in a progressive/cumulative
way. Therefore, to be able to see its limits and to draw its boundaries properly,
all the connotations of assabiyya need to be considered together and inter-
preted in parallel to Ibn Khalduns intentions and method as well as to the
spirit of the Muqaddimah. More specically, Ibn Khaldun was by no means a
literalist. He tended to think in an eclectic and interpretative manner. He tries
to reach the unchanging essence of things hidden behind their mere appear-
ance. If we also adopt such an approach in understanding the Muqaddimah,
the results we achieve would be more fruitful and universally applicable.
In its non-technical meaning, assabiyya, as a bond resulted from blood relation-
ship or something corresponding to it, means the unconditional support of some-
one to his/her tribe, including self-sacrice. In this regard, it is a trait almost
exclusively of Arab Bedouin societies. As is exemplied in pre-Islamic Arab history,
while it provides the internal unity and coherency for a tribe, the existence of such
an assabiyya renders the emergence of a supra-tribal political structure impossible.
Thereby it is absolutely unworkable to think that Ibn Khaldun means this non-
technical implication of assabiyya when he talks about Roman or Persian empires.
7
While De Slane corresponded assabiyya in its technical sense with esprit de corps, in other
contexts he used family, kinsmen, group of friends, devoted group, community, a people ani-
mated by a sense of its own dignity, sympathy, fellow feeling, zeal and ardour, feeling and inter-
est, patriotism, tribal spirit, national spirit, national feeling, party, strength, power, support,
army. On the other hand, Lacoste (1984:103) is right when he argues that: Ibn Khaldun could
have used much more specic words or expressions for most of these notions. The fact that he
did not do so indicates that he is describing a combination of elements and not a relatively
simple phenomenon.
Based on this non-technical and literary meaning of assabiyya and disre-

garding Ibn Khalduns analysis of the states and empires established in several
places other than North Africa, much less the general and universal spirit of
the Muqaddimah, some authors, though limited in number, try to restrict
assabiyya to a local and restrictive context applicable only to the Bedouin soci-
eties of North Africa. Ibn Khaldun, however, tries to establish a methodology
and historiography that requires thorough understanding of the nature of
umran, which is unequivocally universal. And he develops his concept of ass-
abiyya within this universal context. In this regard Yves Lacoste (1984:103) is
certainly wrong when he argues that:
They [almost all interpretations of assabiyya] tend to turn into a phenomenon that
exists in all places and all times, and virtually ignore the extremely specic historical
context within which Ibn Khaldun inscribes it: he places considerable limitations on
its spatial extension. According to Ibn Khaldun, assabiyya is specic to North Africa
and explains both the survival of tribal phenomena and the political instability of the
region.
Likewise, trying to restrict assabiyya to patrimonial (patriarchal) societies alone

also contradicts both what Ibn Khaldun intends to do and the actual meaning
and connotations of assabiyya as it is used in the Muqaddimah. It is an undis-
putable fact that, the horizon and the area of interest of Ibn Khaldun in the
Muqaddimah was far beyond the Arab tribal socio-political organisation, even
though his Ibar intends to analyse the history of North Africa. Since he was in
search of understanding and explaining the complex relationship between,
besides local tribal organisations, large-scale political structures like the
Umayyads and Abbasids, Kayyanids and Sasanids, Greeks and Romans, ass-
abiyya as re-constructed by Ibn Khaldun comes to the forth as a more compre-
hensive and dynamic universal concept. Assabiyya is an energy that includes
several dierent signicant psycho-political and social qualities, such as soli-
darity, cohesion, trust, self-esteem, belonging, power, legitimacy, nobility,
courage and fortitude, freedom and praiseworthy qualities. Accordingly, it
would be by no means sucient to translate assabiyya as solidarity or social
solidarity alone. For solidarity, as a parameter of sociological research, does
not necessarily lead to political struggle, which is the core of assabiyya.
Hellmut Ritter (1948:23) sees some fundamental similarities between Ibn
Khalduns assabiyya and Machiavellis idea of virt. He borrows his denition
of virt from his brother Gerhard Ritter, who describes virt as follows:
With regard to the individual it means generally: political ability, a mere natural asso-
ciation of will power and cleverness . . . This kind of virt is a purely combative ability,
the virtue of mere active, organised force, not yet ethical reason, its symbol being a
combination of lion and fox . . . therefore still another kind of virt, which forges
stronger ties than the terror of open violence, is required. He, Machiavelli, traces it (as
Cicero had done before) to the public spirit of the old Roman Republic, particularly
in its older, better period.
In the last quarter of the 19th and early decades of the 20th centuries, when
the theoretical discussions and practical implications of nationalism were at
their peaks, some of those who studied Ibn Khaldun inclined to interpret
assabiyya as nationalism. A. von Kremer, for instance, translated it as Nation-
alittsidee, Nationalittsgefhl , Nationalitt and nationaler Geist (Simon,
1999:149). Similarly, T. Khemiri (1936) understood assabiyya as a kind of
Nationalismus, while tribal assabiyya for him corresponded to Chauvinismus.
Francesco Gabrieli (1958:681), on the other hand, rejected the approach
identifying assabiyya with nationalism and accused those who do that of the
fallacy of modernisierung. In our opinion, assabiyya may manifest itself, at
least partially, in the form of nationalism, as Ritter (1948:4) also acknowl-
edged, because after all in many cases it unites the hearts and minds of people
and leads them to act collectively for the sake of the group they belong to. It
would be a great mistake, however, to identify assabiyya with nationalism. For
nationalism is mostly a modern phenomenon, while assabiyya has been the
motor of political change throughout human history. Secondly, assabiyya is a
greater concept, the rise and fall of which follows an idiosyncratic path.
Among others, Kamil Ayads (1930:203204) interpretations of assabiyya
seem to be more apt. Like De Sacy, he argued that Ibn Khaldun used assabiyya
at least in four dierent senses: (1) blood relationship; (2) supporter (partisan)
of those who have blood relationship among themselves; (3) partisanship of
those who came together for a reason other than blood relationship; and
(4) power of vitality. It seems that, among these four usages, only the last one,
i.e., Lebenskraft of a politically united people, meets the meaning of assabiyya
as a technical term. In this regard, assabiyya can be understood simply as the
source of vitality of a polity.
Assabiyya is the inner go and motor of the dynamic transformation of
umran. As Toynbee (1934:iii,474) underlines, it is . . . the psychic protoplasm
out of which all bodies politic and bodies social are built up.
Assabiyya has a dialectical character; it includes its anti-thesis within itself.
For its ultimate goal is political authority. Political authority, however, is some-
thing that gradually diminishes and nally destroys assabiyya. In this regard,
assabiyya is essentially a non-rational (sometimes irrational) political energy,
subject to the law of entropy. The metamorphoses of assabiyya are the meta-
morphoses of politics, continues Goodman (1972:257), the potentialities
and limitations of assabiyya will mark the possibilities and impossibilities of

political change: The laws of assabiyya will be the laws of history.
Though it is a political dynamic, it operates over a psycho-ontological pro-
cess. It determines the nature of the relationship of an individual with the
state. In other words, when it is eective, it turns an individual into a political
being and the masses into cohesive socio-political units. In this regard, it is not
only political, but also ontological and ethical. No need to add that the state
is also an ethical entity, as well as a political structure. Assabiyya leads to the
identication of individual wills and interests with the common will and
interest. It does not, however, destroy the autonomy and liberty of the indi-
vidual, because it transforms the nature of individual from inside (psycho-
ontologically), not from outside (economy-politically). That is to say, in a
political organisation with a strong assabiyya, as far as political rights and obli-
gations are concerned, an individual never feels restricted by an external power.
When he/she starts to feel so, however, assabiyya begins to diminish.
Assabiyya leads people to act politically and collectively. As Goodman
(1972:260) notes, Action is the least expression of eective identication and
dying is the greatest, that these dene the upper and lower levels of the modal-
ities of politics. Assabiyya embraces both ends of politics. When it exists at its
minimum level it causes people simply to act, whatever it is. At its maximum,
however, it leads people to sacrice their lives.
Assabiyya as an Alternative Tool in Political Theory

Writing at the beginning of the new millennium Noel OSullivan (2000:1)
underlines a brute fact that has been increasingly felt for couple of decades
among political thinkers around the world:
There are times when a wider gap appears between established concepts and the social
reality they are intended to illuminate than exists at other, and that the contemporary
period may plausibly be described as one such time. At any rate, the claim . . . that the
entire modern political vocabulary has now become inapplicable is worth pondering.
For Sullivan (2000:1), among the four new issues dominating recent theoreti-
cal debates in politics, it is the nature of individual and his or her relation to
society that comes rst, while others being the concept of citizenship in a
highly diversied political society, globalisation and the impasse facing politi-
cal theory today.
The crisis of political theory means more or less the crisis of liberal democracy,
which has been the predominant ideology in the Western political thought
(Freeden, 1996:141; Heywood, 1999:11) throughout the post-Enlightenment

era and relies primarily, more than other ideologies, upon the presumptions of
the Enlightenment paradigm, which . . . has dominated intellectual con-
sciousness in the West for the better part of four centuries (Shapiro, 2003:3).
Accordingly, the crisis of political theory, in a sense, is symptomatic of the
crisis of the Enlightenment paradigm in general (Kelly, 2000:225).
Throughout this era, the central concerns of political theory, including the
happiness of individual as its ultimate goal, have been condensed to a few core
values: (1) the centrality of the individual human being who is born free and
equal, capable of possessing and pursuing his/her own goals, interests and ide-
als; (2) the idea of liberty; (3) the limitation of the scope of the state; (4) free
market economy; and (5) the idea of progress (Festenstein, 1998:14). Among
the issues left out or disregarded by liberal democracy the socio-economic
injustices brought about by the free market economy have been, from the very
beginning, the backbone of Socialist and Communist ideologies, which were
simply the by-products of the same Enlightenment paradigm (Shapiro, 2003:71).
Other issues pertaining to daily life, however, were simply ignored or over-
looked. This was more or less the case until a few years ago, when political,
economic, cultural and scientic developments that took place both in domes-
tic and international arenas made it increasingly impossible anymore to absorb
the problems and questions left out by the liberal democratic approach. Con-
sequently a new era of critique of the fundamentals of liberal democracy, and,
as such, of the Enlightenment outlook began to dominate the intellectual
milieus, including political thought. The concerns of new political thought,
continues Adam Lent (1998:10),
Have also brought whole realms of human [behaviour] into theoretical debate, which
older thinkers would have found it preposterous to discuss. The importance of issues
of sexuality and domestic life for feminist thought, the spiritual well-being of the
individual for much green thought, the concern with personal morality for fundamen-
talism and the role of the family for communitarianism have brought these new issues
to the fore. This is after a long period in which the dominance of liberal ideas about
the sanctity of the division between public and private consigned such concerns to the
margins; and only totalitarian strands, in their own highly authoritarian and intrusive
way, took an abiding interest in so called private matters.
Throughout the classical ages politics, as an intellectual eld of search, was a

sub-discipline of ethics. Its ultimate goal was the improvement of human soul,
and, as such, the principles of the good society (Strauss, 1975). In modern
times, however, for the epistemological concerns brought about by the Enlight-
enment outlook, more precisely by 19th and 20th century positivism, politics
was divorced from its ethical roots and narrowed down to visible, measurable
and material institutional mechanisms, which alone were expected to improve
what is called individual freedom and human rights. Throughout this process
of scientication of politics, along with the conguration of other social sci-
ence disciplines, two intrinsically destructive methodological approaches were
adopted: First, the multi-disciplinary outlook was abandoned and, like every
other social science discipline, political science was thought to be self-con-
tained in terms of its methodology, problems and solutions. Second, along
with the idea of progress and universalism of the Enlightenment worldview,
the spatio-temporal dimension of politics was overlooked. The problems and
solutions of a certain space and time were absolutised, universalised and
imposed upon other various spaces and times. In a sense, to use R.B.J. Walk-
ers terms (1993), temporality was xed and universalised across dierent
times and spaces. The most lucid example in which these two methodological
approaches were embodied is the Modernisation Theory that rose in the after-
math of the Second World War and accompanied the formations of new
nation states all around the world.
Politics is, in the nal analysis, . . . the most general response to the simul-
taneous asking of the two questions, who am I? and who are we?. In other
words, it is a double-edged activity. It deals primarily with the creation of
inter-subjectivity, for the purpose of preserving the subject. As Goodman
(1972:256) puts it, [T]he art of governing proper is precisely the art of attain-
ing the rational, semi-rational, or irrational identication of the interests, etc.
of the individual with those of someone other than himself. Despite this
inter-subjective aspect of politics, however, liberal democracy emphasised sub-
jectivity almost exclusively, which ended up naturally with a crisis of the indi-
vidual in general. To speak historically, the death of God is followed by the
death of community and the death of man respectively.
This is, basically, the reason behind the emergence of anti-liberal, anti-positivist
and anti-Enlightenment perspectives in political thought in recent years. Lib-
eral democracy survived the challenge of the socialist and communist ideolo-
gies, because they did not question the paradigmatic roots of liberal democracy.
With minor revisions and eclectic applications, it could absorb this chal-
lenge. New critiques, however, are directed at the very fundamentals of the
Enlightenment outlook in general and of liberal democracy in particular. Thus
it is hardly possible for liberal democracy anymore to survive this challenge by
minor changes. On the other hand, it should be noted that, although these
perspectives rose up on legitimate grounds, they dont seem to be successful in
re-construction of a new political theory as much as in de-constructing the lib-
eral democratic paradigm. As Andrew Heywood (1999:11) underlined, None
of these traditions is a hermetically sealed system of thought, enjoying a xed

logic and strict internal consistency. It is important to recognise that, theo-
retically speaking, liberal democratic theory relies on a deep and comprehensive
philosophical tradition. Although new critiques of liberal democracy are backed
strongly by todays practice, they should develop a theoretical/philosophical
alternative to the Enlightenment paradigm to be able to replace democratic
liberalism. And this is not an easy task, which may take hundreds of years.
In this regard, Ibn Khalduns concept of assabiyya seems to be a very prom-
ising tool for the future of political theory. On the one hand it relies upon a
comprehensive philosophical/theoretical paradigm, and it provides, on the
other hand, an alternative way of thinking, which embraces most of the con-
cerns of new political critiques of liberal democracy. His theory of assabiyya
brings spatio-temporal dimensions to political theory and necessitates an
inter-disciplinary and holistic approach. Moreover, unlike the modern politi-
cal consciousness, it does not attribute to politics and state an autonomous
realm outside morality.
Although Ibn Khaldun did a great job in drawing the borders of assabiyya,
we should not be content with his framework, however. Ibn Khaldun should
be taken as a point of departure, but assabiyya can be developed further and
turned into a practical tool in understanding and explaining contemporary
politics. It can be used, for example, to understand the transformation of
American politics from its Puritan origins to its Neo-conservative outlook:
the decline of Americas social capital can be replaced by the decline of
Americas assabiyya. No need to say that it can also be used in the rise and fall
of the great powers in international relations.
In short, assabiyya is a political concept applicable at the sub-state, inter-
state and supra-state (civilisational) levels. As long as it is studied further, it
may provide a fertile ground for the alternative of the liberal democratic para-
digm, which seems by no means to survive the complexities of the post-
Enlightenment era.
References
Apak, Adem (2004) Asabiyet ve Erken Dnem slam Siyasi Tarihindeki Etkileri. Istanbul: Dnce
Kitabevi.
Arnason, J.P. and Stauth, G. (2004) Civilization and State Formation in the Islamic Context:
Re-reading Ibn Khaldun. Thesis Eleven 76(2): 2947.
Ayad, M. Kamil (1930) Die Geschichts und Gesellschaftslehre Ibn Halduns. Stuttgart: J.G.
Cottasche Buchhandlung Nachfolger.
Baali, Fuad (1988) Society, State, and Urbanism: Ibn Khalduns Sociological Thought. New York:
State University of New York Press.
Barakat, Halim (1993) The Arab World: Society, Culture and State. Los Angeles: University of
California Press.
arc, Mustafa (1991) Asabiyet. TDV slam Ansiklopedisi.
Collins, R. (1998) Introduction: The Golden Age of Macro-Historical Sociology. Philadel-
phia: University of Pennsylvania. Available at: http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/10/043.
html [accessed 30 January 2008].
Cox, R. (1996) Approaches to World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dhaouadi, M. (1998) The Part Ibn Khalduns Personality Traits and his Social Milieu Played in
Shaping his Pioneering Social Thought. slam Aratrmalar Dergisi 2:2347.
Festenstein, Matthew (1998) Contemporary Liberalism in Lent, A. (ed.) New Political Thought.
London: Lawrence and Wishar.
Freeden, Michael (1996) Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Gabrieli, Francesco (1958) Asabiyya, in Lewis, B., Pellat, Ch. and Schacht, J. (eds.) The Ency-
clopaedia of Islam. Volume I, Fascicules 11. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
Gibb, H.A.R. (1968) The Islamic Background of Ibn Khalduns Political Theory, repr. in Shaw,
S.J. and Polk, W.R. (ed.) Studies on the Civilization of Islam. Boston: Beacon.
Goodman, L.E. (1972) Ibn Khaldun and Thucydides. Journal of the American Oriental Society
92(2): 250270.
Gumilev, L.N. (2003) Etnogenez: Halklarn ekillenii, Ykseli ve Dleri. Istanbul: Selenge
Yaynlar.
Heywood, Andrew (1999) Political Theory: An Introduction. New York: St. Martins Press.
Ibn Khaldun (1980) The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, III Volumes, translated from
the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Kelly, Paul (2000) Political Theory in Retreat? Contemporary Political Theory and the Histori-
cal Order in OSullivan, N. (ed.) Political Theory in Transition. New York: Routledge.
Khemiri, T. (1936) Der Asabija-Begri in der Muqaddima des Ibn Haldun. Der Islam 23:
163188.
Lacoste, Yves (1984) Ibn Khaldun: The Birth of History and The Past of the Third World. London:
Verso.
Lapidus, I.M. (1990) Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History, in Khoury, P.S. and
Kostiner, J. (ed.) Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East. Los Angeles: University of
California Press.
Lent, Adam (1998) Introduction in Lent, A. (ed.) New Political Thought. London: Lawrence
and Wishar.
Mahdi, Muhsin (1957) Ibn Khalduns Philosophy of History: A Study in the Philosophical Founda-
tion of the Science of Culture. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
OSullivan, Noel (2000) Introduction in OSullivan, N. (ed.) Political Theory in Transition.
New York: Routledge.
Pasha, M.K. (1997) Ibn Khaldun and World Order, in Gill, S. and Mittelman, J (eds.) Innova-
tion and Transformation in International Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rabi, M. Mahmoud (1967) The Political Theory of Ibn Khaldun. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
Ritter, Hellmut (1948) Irrational Solidarity Groups: A Socio-Psychological Study in Connec-
tion with Ibn Khaldun. Oriens 1(1): 144.
Rosenthal, Franz (1980) Introduction to the English Translation of the Muqaddimah. New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
Shapiro, Ian (2003) The Moral Foundations of Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Simon, Robert (1999) Ibn Khaldun: History as Science and the Patrimonial Empire. Budapest:
Akademiai Kiado.
Strauss, Leo (1975) Political Philosophy: Six Essays. New York: Pegasus.
Toynbee, A.J. (1934) A Study of History. Volume III. London: Oxford University Press.
(1947) A Study of History. Abridgement by D.C. Somervell. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Tracy, B. (1990) The Idea of Political Theory: Reections on the Self in Political Time and Space.
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Turchin, P. (2003) Historical Dynamics: Why States Rise and Fall. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Uluda, Sleyman (1988) Introduction to the Turkish Translation of the Muqaddimah. Istanbul:
Dergah Yaynlar.
Walker, R.B.J. (1993) Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Yldrm, Yavuz (1998) bn Haldunun Bedavet Teorisi. Unpublished Ph.D. Marmara niver-
sitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstits, slam Tarihi ve Sanatlar Anabilim Dal, slam Tarihi Bilim
Dal.

Ibn Khaldun Concept Assabiya - Tool For Understanding Long-Term Politics

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Ibn Khaldun Concept Assabiya - Tool For Understanding Long-Term Politics

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Asian Journal of Social Science 36 (2008) 375407 www.brill.

Ibn Khalduns Concept of Assabiyya: An Alternative

wide-ranging that it comprises paradigmatic shifts in philosophical percep-

When there is a general change of conditions, notes Ibn Khaldun, it is as if the

Conventional Use of Assabiyya

turn, means spirit of kinship in the family or tribe (Gabrieli, 1958:681).

into tribal identities and the notion of I is replaced by the notion of we

Assabiyya in the Muqaddimah: Assabiyya is Essentially a Quality

The Source of Assabiyya is Being Outside

of relationship, but rather aects the socio-psychological consequences of

More explicitly, to be exposed together to dicult conditions does not auto-

If we increase the severity of the challenge ad innitum, do we thereby ensure an

Toynbee describes this as the optimum level of challenge, neither decient

The Components of Assabiyya

What has to be underlined here is that for a restriction to annihilate forti-

Assabiyya and Religion

Thirdly, Ibn Khaldun applies to the theory of caliphate to demonstrate that

Just as solidarity (assabiyya) gains in power and determination when backed up by a

In concluding this section, it must be clear that religion, ideology or any

What, then, is Assabiyya?

Assabiyya is a factor that enables a person . . . in power to force the others to

Based on this non-technical and literary meaning of assabiyya and disre-

Likewise, trying to restrict assabiyya to patrimonial (patriarchal) societies alone

and limitations of assabiyya will mark the possibilities and impossibilities of

Assabiyya as an Alternative Tool in Political Theory

(Freeden, 1996:141; Heywood, 1999:11) throughout the post-Enlightenment

Throughout the classical ages politics, as an intellectual eld of search, was a

of these traditions is a hermetically sealed system of thought, enjoying a xed

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi