Patricio vs DarioG.R. No.

170829Topic: Family Home

____________
The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that
last during one's lifetime
Facts:

Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by

hiswife,petitionerP e r l a G . P a t r i c i o a n d t h e i r t w o s o n s , M a r c e l i n o M a r
c D a r i o a n d p r i v a t e respondent Marcelino G. Dario III.
H e l e f t a r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e a n d a p r e -
s c h o o l b u i l d i n g s i t u a t e d a t C u b a o , Quezon City.

Petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extra judicially settled theestate of Marcelino
V. Dario.
Petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of theirintention to
partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership.
o
Private responded refused to partition the property.
o
Petitioner and Marcelino Marc filed an action for partition before RTCQuezon City

Trial court ordered the partition of the property.

o
Private respondents motion for reconsideration denied.

Appeal to the Court of Appeals denied:

o
Upon motion for reconsideration, CA dismissed the petitioners motionfor partition.

It held that family home should continue despite the death of one or both
spouses as long as there is a minor
b e n e f i c i a r y t h e r e o f . T h e h e i r s c o u l d n o t p a r t i t i o n t h e p r o p e r t y u n l e s s t h e cou
rt found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. [Son of theprivate respondent was a minor
beneficiary of the family
home]Issue:
Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-ownersr e f u s e
t o a c c e d e t o s u c h p a r t i t i o n o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t a m i n o r b e n e f i c i a r y s t i l l resides
in the said home.
Held:
Petition granted as the minor son does not satisfy all the requisites to beconsidered as a
beneficiary of the family home.

G.R. No. 70736 Case Digest

G.R. No. 70736, March 16, 1987
Bonifacio Hilario and Eduarda Buencamino Hilario
vs Hon. IAC and Salvador Baltazar
Ponente: Gutierrez

Facts:
January 1981, Salvador Baltazar filed a verified complaint with Courts
of Agrarian Relation-Bulacan alleging that since January 1955 he had
been continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of land in
Bulacan which was previously owned by Socorro Vda. de Balagtas.
Thereafter, the spouses Hilario began to threaten him to desist from
entering and cultivating the land.

Baltazar claims that he became sa tenant of Socorro by virtue of a

kasunduan executed in 1979. After the death of Socorro, he allegedly
gave the share pertaining to the daughter of Socorro Corazon Pengzon.
It was only in December 1980 that Baltazar knew that portion of the
land was already owned by the Hilarios.

The Hilarios, aver that they acquired the land from the PNB after it
had been foreclosed. CAR ruled that the land in question is not an
agricultural land but a plain "bakuran". Hence, Baltazar is not a
tenant.

CA however remanded the case to the lower court for further

proceesings on the ground that the findings of CAR were not supported
by substantial evidence. In compliance, CAR admitted additional
evidence.

Again, CAR declared Baltazar as non-tenant. Baltazar appealed with

IAC, IAC set aside the decision of the CAR and entitling Baltazar
security of tenure on the land. Spouse Hilario then petition for
review.

Issue: Whether Baltazar is a tenant.

Ruling:

The evidence presented is more than sufficient to justify the

conclusion that Baltazar is not a tenant of the landholding. (a) The
kasunduan refers to 2-hectare land, while the landholding is only
4000 sqm. (b) When Socorro died, no new contract was executed. (c)
Corazon did not receive any rental or share from the produce of the
land.
Posted by Jeannette Guian at 5:00 AM

G.R. No. 108941 Case Digest

G.R. No. 108941, July 6, 2000
Reynaldo Bejasa and Erlinda Bejasa
vs CA, Isabel Candelaria and Jamie Dinglasan
Ponente: Pardo

Facts:
This case involves two parcels of land located in Oriental Mindoro
owned by Isabel Candelaria. October 1974, Candelaria entered into a
3-year lease agreement with Pio Malabanan wherein Malabanan agreed
to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to purchase calamansi, and
other seedlings, to attend and care for whatever plants thereon exist,
to make the necessary harvest of fruits.

Malabanan, later hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear
it. On May 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a 6-year usufruct over the
land. 1983, Malabanan died. Candelaria constituted Jaime Dinglasan
as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the
land.

October 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract with

Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife with a 1-year term. On December
1984, Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent in consideration of an
"pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term of 1 year.

After the 1 year period, Victoria demanded for Bejasas to vacate, but
Bejasas continued to stay and did not give any consideration for its
use, be in rent or share. Candelarian again entered with a 3-year
lease agreement with Dinglasans, and made Jaime her attorney-in-fact
again. Jaime then filed a complaint before Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking for ejectment of Bejasas.
COSLAP dismissed the complaint.

Jaime then filed it with RTC for recovery of possession; the case was
referred to DAR. DAR certified that ht e case was not proper for
trial before the civil courts. Trial court dismissed the complaint
of Jaime including the leasehold claim of Bejasas. Bejasas then filed
a complaint for confirmation of leasehold and recovery of damages
against Candelaria and Jaime.

RTC favored the Bejasas. On appeal, CA reversed the decision saying

that (1) there was no tenant relationship, (2) Bejasas are mere
overseers and not as permanent tenants, (3) the pakyaw contract have
expired, (4) sharing of profits was not proven, (5) the element of
personal cultivation was not proven.

Issue: Whether there is tenancy in favor of Bejasas.

Ruling:

There is no tenancy relationship. There was no proof of shared

harvests. Between Candelaria (as owner) and the Bejasas, there is no
relationship. Candelaria never gave her consent. As to the authority
of Dinglasans, they had authority to bind the owner in a tenancy
agreement, but there is no proof of such presented.

G.R. No. L-62626 Case Digest

G.R. No. L-62626, July 18, 1984
Spouses Cayetano and Patricia Tiongson, etc.
vs CA and Teodoro Macaya
Ponente: Gutierrez

Facts:
1946, Severino Manotok donated and transferred to his 8 children and
2 grandchildren a 34 hectare land in Quezon City. Severino Manotok
was appointed judicial guardian of his minor children. There was no
tenant occupying the property at the time of the donation.

Later, Teodoro Macaya accompanied Vicente Herrera, the overseer of

the property, went to the Manotok and pleaded that he be allowed to
live in the property to prevent theft and to guard the property.
Manotok allowed Macaya but imposed the condition that any time the
owners needed to take the property, Macaya and his family must vacate,
and that he could raise animals and plant according to his needs, and
that the owners have no responsibility to Macaya and he will use only
3 hectares. These conditions were not put in writing.

In 1950, the property owners organized themselves as a corporation

and transferred the 34 hectare land a capital contribution to the
capital stock of the corporation. Later, when the owners demanded for
payment of taxes, Macaya agreed to help pay the taxes by remitting
10 cavans of palay every year as his contribution. Later, owners
requested Macaya to increase his contribution to 20 cavans, Macaya
agreed. Later, Macaya pleaded that he will contribute 10 cavans only,
the owners said the "he might as well not deliver anymore". Macaya
did not deliver palays from then on.

1974, the owners executed a Unilateral Deed of Conveyance of the

property to Patricia Tiongson, etc. Macaya was informed that the land
is needed for house construction of the owners and was asked to
vacate, Macaya pleaded that he may be allowed to harvest first before
vacating. However, after harvest, Macaya did not vacate and even
expand his cultivation to 6 hectares without the consent of the
owners.

Issue: Whether there is tenancy relationship between the parties.

Ruling:
Real estate taxes of the property declare the land as residential.
The physical view of the property also shows that the land was a
rolling forestal land without any flat portion except the one tilled
by Macaya.

As to the sharing, the decision of the petitioners not to ask for

anymore contributions from Macaya reveals that there was no tenancy
relationship ever agreed upon by the parties. Neither can such
relationship be implied from the facts as there was no agreed system
of sharing the produce of the property. Moreover, from 1946 to 1956
at which time, Macaya was also planting rice, there was no payment
whatsoever. At the most and during the limited period when it was in
force, the arrangement was a civil lease where the lessee for a fixed
price leases the property while the lessor has no responsibility
whatsoever for the problems of production and enters into no agreement
as to the sharing of the costs of fertilizers, irrigation, seedlings,
and other items.

As to consent, the lot was taxed as residential land in a metropolitan

area. There was clearly no intention on the part of the owners to
devote the property for agricultural production but only for
residential purposes. Thus, together with the third requisite, the
fourth requisite which is the purpose was also not present.

There was no agreement as to any system of sharing the produce of the

land. The petitioners did not get anything from the harvest and
private respondent Macaya was using and cultivating the land free
from any charge or expense.

G.R. No. 36213 Case Digest

G.R. No. 36213, June 29, 1989
Felix Gonzales and Carmen Gonzales
vs CA, deceased spouses Andres Agcaoile and Leonora Agcaoile,
substituted by Lucia Sison
Ponente: Grino-Aquino

Facts:
October 1988, Lucia Sison filed a motion to be substituted in lieu
of Andres and Leonora as she inherited the unsold lots of the deceased
spouses. The court granted her motion.

Spouses are owners of parcels of land in Bulacan At the time of the

purchased of the spouses, Maximo Cruz was th tenant who was planting
palay thereon. Maximo continued as tenant until he died and was
succeeded by his son Fidel Cruz. After 4 years as tennat, Fidel was
succeeded by Pascual Gonzales, father of Felix Gonzales. In 1954,
Pascual ceased to be a tenant because the land was proposed to be
converted into residential subdivision.
Since 1956, spouses offered to pay rental and acted as agents for the
sale of the subdivision lots. While they are renting, the spouses
requsted that they may be allowed to plant palay on the lots that
have not yet been sold. No specific agreement was concluded with
regards of harvest, but spouses delivered part of the yield to
Federico Mateo, defendants overseer.

When spouses defaulted in paying the rentals, the owner demanded for
payment of rental or to vacate. Spouses then filed to elect the
leasehold system and pray for a reliquidation of past harvest
embracing the agricultural years. Before summons were served, owners
initiated an action against the spouses for recovery of possession.
CFI-Bulacan, favored Gonzales, the owner.

CA upheld the decision of the court saying that the property ceased
to be an agricultural or farmland, having been converted as
residential subdivision.

Issue: Whether an agricultural tenancy relationship can be created

over land embraced in an approved residential subdivision.

Ruling:
There is no merit. An agricultural leasehold cannot be established
on land which has ceased to be devoted to cultivation or farming
because of its conversion into a residential subdivision.

Petitioners may not invoke Section 36(l) of Republic Act No. 3844
which provides that "when the lessor-owner fails to substantially
carry out the conversion of his agricultural land into a subdivision
within one year after the dispossession of the lessee, the lessee
shall be entitled to reinstatement and damages," for the petitioners
were not agricultural lessees or tenants of the land before its
conversion into a residential subdivision in 1955. Not having been
dispossessed by the conversion of the land into a residential
subdivision, they may not claim a right to reinstatement.

Furthermore, their admission that: (1) they leased from the

respondents a lot (No. 1285-M) in the subdivision on which they built
their house; (2) that as commission agents for the respondents, they
were able to sell a subdivision lot to Clemente Bernabe, and received
a P 300-commission on the sale; and (3) that "a number of other lots
were sold by respondents to different buyers," (p. 51, Rollo) refutes
the petitioners' contention that the development of the subdivision
was a mere "scheme" to dispossess the previous tenant.

On the other hand, the petitioners' tactic of entering the subdivision

as lessee of a homelot and thereafter cultivating some unsold lots
ostensibly for temporary use as a home garden, but covertly for the
purpose of later claiming the land as "tenanted" farm lots, recalls
the fable of the camel that sought shelter inside its master's tent
during a storm, and once inside, kicked its master out of the tent.
Here, the private respondents' tolerance of the petitioners'
supposedly temporary use of some vacant lots in the subdivision was
seized by the latter as a weapon to deprive the respondents of their
land.

G.R. No. 78214 Case Digest

G.R. No. 78214, December 5, 1988
Yolanda Caballes
vs Dept. Agrarian Reform, Hon. Heherson Alvarez and Bienvenido Abajon
Ponente: Sarmiento

Facts:
The landholding subject of the controversy is consists of 60 sqm was
acquired by spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes by virute of a Deed
of Sale executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes, this land is situated
in Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. Before the sale of the property to Caballes,
Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a protion of the land,
paying monthly rental to Andrea Millenes. Abjon was likewise allowed
to plant thereon, and they have agreed that the produce thereon would
be shred by them 50-50.

When the property was sold, Caballes told Abajon that they will put
up a poultry on the land and they intended to build it close to
Abajon's house and they pursuaded Abajon to transfer his dwelling to
the opposite portion of the land. Abajon offered to pay renta; to the
new owners, but they refuse and later demanded for Abajon to vacate.
Abajon refused to leave.

DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of the former owner, Andrea.

Issue: Whether Abajon is a tenant under the new owners.

Ruling:
Abajon is not a tenant for it only occupied a miniscule portion of
the land which cannot be interpreted as economic-family size farm
under the definition of RA 3844.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make
an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to
security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the Government under existing tenancy laws.

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish

a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner
to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants
certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano
trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for
favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-
sharer a tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only 60,
or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in. the
heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status
arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its
possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The
circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's
status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of
benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden
of some sort at its south western side rather than a tenant of the
said portion.

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that

since Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the criminal case for
malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for
trial so that proceedings in the lower court can resume.